text: Voluntary Contributions to Property Rights
  Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/apl/wpaper/13-14.html
  David M. Bruner
  This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Speci cally, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero contributions to property rights are observed without pre- commitment. Positive voluntary contributions are observed with pre- commitment, but are less than predicted. Nonetheless, as predicted, stronger property rights with pre-commitment results in less con ict and more production. The experiment also tests predictions for group- size e ects. While average contributions to property rights are un- a ected by group-size, mean con ict increases and mean production decreases with larger groups. Key Words: Property Rights; Con ict; Public Goods; Experiments
  Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:13-14
  File URL: http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp1314.pdf
  David M. Bruner & Robert J. Oxoby, 2012. "Investment under Anarchy," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 731-753, December.
  NEP-CBE-2013-08-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
  NEP-CDM-2013-08-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
  NEP-NPS-2013-08-16 (Nonprofit & Public Sector)
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