code: def check_xsrf_cookie(self) -> None:
          
          # Prior to release 1.1.1, this check was ignored if the HTTP header
          # ``X-Requested-With: XMLHTTPRequest`` was present.  This exception
          # has been shown to be insecure and has been removed.  For more
          # information please see
          # http://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2011/feb/08/security/
          # http://weblog.rubyonrails.org/2011/2/8/csrf-protection-bypass-in-ruby-on-rails
          token = (
              self.get_argument("_xsrf", None)
              or self.request.headers.get("X-Xsrftoken")
              or self.request.headers.get("X-Csrftoken")
          )
          if not token:
              raise HTTPError(403, "'_xsrf' argument missing from POST")
          _, token, _ = self._decode_xsrf_token(token)
          _, expected_token, _ = self._get_raw_xsrf_token()
          if not token:
              raise HTTPError(403, "'_xsrf' argument has invalid format")
          if not hmac.compare_digest(utf8(token), utf8(expected_token)):
              raise HTTPError(403, "XSRF cookie does not match POST argument")
docs: Verifies that the ``_xsrf`` cookie matches the ``_xsrf`` argument.
  
          To prevent cross-site request forgery, we set an ``_xsrf``
          cookie and include the same value as a non-cookie
          field with all ``POST`` requests. If the two do not match, we
          reject the form submission as a potential forgery.
  
          The ``_xsrf`` value may be set as either a form field named ``_xsrf``
          or in a custom HTTP header named ``X-XSRFToken`` or ``X-CSRFToken``
          (the latter is accepted for compatibility with Django).
  
          See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery
  
          .. versionchanged:: 3.2.2
             Added support for cookie version 2.  Both versions 1 and 2 are
             supported.