You will be presented with a document containing 10 sentences. The document
will begin with a sentence written by a human. As some point within the
document, the sentences will transition from being written by a human writer to
being generated by a computer. Your goal is to guess this boundary by writing
down the first sentence that you think is machine generated.
DOCUMENT:
On April 5, 2043, the Fourth Wall fell. It only took an instant, but in that instant everything we thought we knew changed forever. We hadn't even known the location of the wall. But reports started coming in. Farmers in a remote part of Missouri told of unspeakable horror. Of daughters kissing a young scoundrel. We didn't believe at first. Oh, but we were fools back then. A small search party of local law enforcement was sent. The New York Times called it "a riot."
  choice: We didn't believe at first.
  choice: But reports started coming in.
  choice: Oh, but we were fools back then.
  choice: A small search party of local law enforcement was sent.
  choice: The New York Times called it "a riot."
  choice: Farmers in a remote part of Missouri told of unspeakable horror.
  choice: We hadn't even known the location of the wall.
  choice: Of daughters kissing a young scoundrel.
  choice: It only took an instant, but in that instant everything we thought we knew changed forever.
  choice: On April 5, 2043, the Fourth Wall fell.
FIRST COMPUTER-GENERATED SENTENCE:


With no explanation, label A→B with either "neutral", "None", "contradiction" or "entailment".
A: my *brother* did n't eat much fruit
B: my father didn't eat much fruit in general.


With no explanation, label each line with "location-road/railway/highway/transit", "O", "art-broadcastprogram", "art-film", "art-music", "art-other", "art-painting", "art-writtenart", "building-airport" or "building-hospital" preceded by ":".
The
River
Axe
flows
through
the
cave
.

The:O
River:location-road/railway/highway/transit
Axe:location-road/railway/highway/transit
flows:O
through:O
the:O
cave:O
.:O


With no explanation, label the following with either "method", "background" or "result".
The process for identifying image schemas and conceptual metaphors was based on linguistic examples given by other authors (e.g. Brower 2000, Hurtienne and Blessing 2007, Hurtienne and Israel 2007, Hurtienne et al. 2008, Johnson 2005, Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Saslaw 1996, Zbikowski 1997).


With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". A 38-year-old woman presents with eye dryness and a foreign body sensation in the eyes. On physical examination, the oral cavity shows mucosal ulceration and atrophy. Biopsy of the lower lip shows marked lymphocytic infiltration of the minor salivary glands. Which of the following is most likely seen in this patient?

A: Anti-Scl-70 antibodies
B: Anti-Sjögren's syndrome type B (SS-B) antibody
C: Anti-Jo-1 antibody
D: Anti-centromere antibody


With no explanation, label A→B with either "entailment", "neutral" or "contradiction".
A: The Kuršininkai (Curonians; German: "Kuren" ; Lithuanian: "kuršininkai, kuršiai" ; Latvian: "kursenieki, kurši" ; Polish: "kuronowie pruscy" ) are a nearly extinct Baltic ethnic group living along the Curonian Spit. "Kuršininkai" refers only to inhabitants of Lithuania and former East Prussia that speak a dialect of Latvian.
B: The Curonians were linguistically influenced by the Latvians.


With no explanation, label each line with "O", "I-NP", "B-NP", "B-ADJP", "I-ADJP", "B-ADVP", "I-ADVP", "B-CONJP", "I-CONJP" or "B-INTJ" preceded by ":".
SOCCER
-
LEADING
ENGLISH
GOALSCORERS
.

SOCCER:B-NP
-:O
LEADING:B-NP
ENGLISH:I-NP
GOALSCORERS:I-NP
.:O


With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". The reason why flight is surprisingly rare is that  _
When Archaeopteryx, a feathered skeleton that was seemingly half dinosaur and half bird, turned up in 1862-three years after the publication of "The Origin of Species"-the origin of birds became a subject of raging debate among palaeontologists. Suggestions that they were the direct descendants of theropod dinosaurs (a group of bipedal meat-eaters that include Allosaurus, Velociraptor and Tyrannosaurus) caused quite a flap. Today, most researchers agree that birds are, indeed, a branch of the Dinosauria. How they made the transition from the land to the sky, though, has yet to be agreed. But a paper in this week's Current Biology, by Christopher Glen and Michael Bennett of the University of Queensland, makes a strong case that they did it by jumping.
Considering the diversity of life on Earth, flight is surprisingly rare. It has evolved only four times: among the insects about 300m years ago, the pterosaurs (230m), the birds (150m) and the bats (50m). That suggests it is a hard trick to pull off. For birds, there is general agreement that feathers came before flight. Fossils from north-eastern China show animals that had feathers but clearly could not have flown, as well as ones that look like proper birds. The best guesses are that feathers evolved either for insulation (as fur did in mammals) or for display, and that natural selection took advantage by turning them into a means of transport.
There are two broad schools of thought about what happened next. One argues that birds' immediate ancestors lived in trees. Members of this school think that powered flight developed as a natural extension of gliding (such controlled falling is used as a way of travelling from tree to tree by several arboreal species today). Gliding itself developed because of the lift provided by feathered forearms.
The alternative is that flight evolved on the ground. Some researchers who belong to this school of thought suggest that the power provided by flapping protowings may have given their owners an edge in the pursuit of prey. Others hypothesise that feathery forearms helped animals steer and stabilise themselves.
Unfortunately, behaviour does not fossilise, so it looked as though the question might never be answered. But Dr Glen, a palaeobiologist, and Dr Bennett, a biomechanic, think they have worked out how to do so. Their crucial observation is that in modern birds the curvature of the third toe (which carries a lot of weight during walking and climbing) varies with species' lifestyles. Birds that spend lots of time climbing around on the trunks of trees have dramatically curved third toes. Those that hop around on branches have mildly curved ones. Those that forage mainly on the ground have the least curved of all.
The two researchers compared these observations with their findings for the bird-like dinosaurs and dinosaur-like birds of China. They noticed that the toes of both feathered dinosaurs and of the earliest flying birds were similar to those of modern birds that spend most of their time on the ground. Flight, in other words, came before birds took to the trees. They are not fallen angels, but risen reptiles.

A: feathers evolved not for a means of transport.
B: it is very hard to have such evolution.
C: life on earth is diversified.
D: many species of this kind were eliminated during evolution.


Apple was in talks with Verizon to be their dedicated phone provider initially, but they gave the deal to AT&T in the end. : they :


With no explanation, label the following with either "nothate" or "hate".
You're absolutely right. I'm a Canadian Here. Most jewish and blacks kids i met are all talk and no action. Once you talk to them and understand their situation it makes sense why.


With no explanation, label A→B with either "NOT ENOUGH INFO", "REFUTES" or "SUPPORTS".
A: Saratoga Springs , New York is one of the counties that is currently under State of Emergency .
B: Counties currently under of states of emergency : 49 ( as of 7:00pm March 16 ) Albany , Allegany , Bronx , Broome , Cattaraugus , Cayuga , Chautauqua , Chemung , Chenango , Clinton , Cortland , Delaware , Dutchess , Erie , Essex , Genesee , Herkimer , Kings , Livingston , Madison , Monroe , Montgomery , Nassau , New York , Niagara , Oneida , Onondaga , Ontario , Orange , Orleans , Oswego , Ostego , Putnam , Queens , Richmond , Rockland , Schenectady , Schuyler , Seneca , Steuben , St. Lawrence , Suffolk , Sullivan , Tioga , Tompkins , Ulster , Wayne , Westchester , Wyoming , and Yates.


With no explanation, label A→B with either "not_related" or "related".
A: Vic Mensa died June 6, 1993.
B: The Fifth Horseman is a 1980 techno-thriller novel written by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre .. Larry Collins. Larry Collins ( writer ). Dominique Lapierre. Dominique Lapierre. The story revolves around Libyan leader Gaddafi holding New York City hostage with the threat of setting off a hidden nuclear bomb .. Gaddafi. Muammar al-Gaddafi. New York City. New York City. nuclear bomb. Nuclear weapon. The book had such a shocking effect that the French President cancelled the sale of nuclear reactors to Libya , even though they were meant for peaceful purposes .. Libya. Libya. French President. President of the French Republic. A related book , with much the same plot and even the same joke , `` Is New York Burning ? ''. examines the same scenario , but exchanges George W. Bush for Jimmy Carter , Osama bin Laden for Muammar al-Gaddafi , and 2005 for 1980 .. Gaddafi. Muammar al-Gaddafi. George W. Bush. George W. Bush. Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter. Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden


With no explanation, label the following with either "none", "against" or "favor".
RT @user Holy Trinity, one God, Have #mercy on us. #Catholic #SemST


With no explanation, label A→B with either "DON'T KNOW", "NO" or "YES".
A: From 1961 until 1991, lifelong Chicago resident Andrew Rozdilsky performed as the unofficial yet popular mascot "Andy the Clown" for the White Sox at the original Comiskey Park. Known for his elongated "Come on you White Sox" battle cry, Andy got his start after a group of friends invited him to a Sox game in 1960, where he decided to wear his clown costume and entertain fans in his section. That response was so positive that when he won free 1961 season tickets, he decided to wear his costume to all games. Comiskey Park ushers eventually offered free admission to Rozdilsky. Starting in 1981, the new ownership group led by Jerry Reinsdorf introduced a twosome, called Ribbie and Roobarb, as the official team mascots, and banned Rozdilsky from performing in the lower seating level. Ribbie and Roobarb were very unpopular , as they were seen as an attempt to get rid of the beloved Andy the Clown. The fans were very unsatisfied with Ribbie and Roobarb, as they were seen as an attempt to replace the beloved Andy the Clown.
B: Did the fans like more than one of the mascots mentioned in the article?


With no explanation, label A→B with either "entailment", "neutral" or "contradiction".
A: In the succeeding minutes , controllers were attempting to ascertain the altitude of the southbound flight .
B: Controllers had the altitude of the plane on their screen and false is not true .


With no explanation, chose the best option from "A" or "B". Did Al-Qaeda know the Twin Towers would collapse?

A: It is not known whether al-Qaeda knew the Twin Towers would collapse. [1] However, some people who are sceptical of the official account of the collapse think that explosives were used to bring the buildings down. [2, 3] Their main piece of evidence is the speed of the collapse, which reached near free fall for 2.25 seconds. [2] Other evidence includes a three-year investigation by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which concluded that the building collapsed because of uncontrolled fires, started by the collapse of the nearby North Tower, and which burnt for seven hours. [4] Some scientists have also examined four dust samples from Ground Zero and claim to have found thermitic material, which reacts violently when heated up, in the dust. [3]
B: Some conspiracy theorists maintain that just before 9/11, an "extraordinary" amount of put options were placed on United Airlines and American Airlines stocks. They speculate that insiders may have known in advance of the coming events of 9/11 and placed their bets accordingly. [1] An analysis into the possibility of insider trading on 9/11 concludes that: A measure of abnormal long put volume was also examined and seen to be at abnormally high levels in the days leading up to the attacks. Consequently, the paper concludes that there is evidence of unusual option market activity in the days leading up to September 11 that is consistent with investors trading on advance knowledge of the attacks. [1] The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that "Exhaustive investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, FBI, and other agencies have uncovered no evidence that anyone with advance knowledge of the attacks profited through securities transactions." [3] Highly publicized allegations of insider trading in advance of 9/11 generally rest on reports of unusual pre-9/11 trading activity in companies whose stock plummeted after the attacks. Some unusual trading did in fact occur, but each such trade proved to have an innocuous explanation. For example, the volume of put options — investments that pay off only when a stock drops in price


With no explanation, label the following with either "acceptable" or "unacceptable".
AITA for asking my boyfriend to return the Valentines Day gift he got me? | Im probably a total ungrateful bitch but please hear me out. My bf got me a Bath and Body Works gift set thing. If anyone here (other women) know anything about Bath and Body Works sets, its something you buy as a generic gift for 12 year old girls. Ive received these gift sets every Christmas in my early teens from my aunts. Like every single year. Its not a bad gift but its generic and something you usually gift to young girls or women when you have to buy something and dont know what else to get. The second I saw it, I told my bf thank you for the card and the Bath and Body Works gift set, I appreciate the sentiment but its a gift for 12 year olds and we are returning it. He got upset. Extremely upset. He looked at me and said I dont understand. You always ask me to rub lotion on your back so I got you the cocoa butter like you always use. Instantly, the neurons in my brain started firing and I felt like a complete piece of shit. To him, as a dude, Bath and Body Works is the place - the only place - that sells lotion. It makes complete sense why he bought that for me. He knows I use lotion every day so Bath and Body Works was the perfect gift in his mind for me for Valentines Day. I dont use their brand because again, its really for a younger age group. But hes a guy. He could never have known that. We are in our late 20s/early 30s. After I understood that he bought it as a thoughtful gesture and not as a generic girl gift, I felt absolutely awful like a complete piece of shit. I apologized. He apologized. Hes still mad though and thinks I am an ungrateful bitch. I tried to explain the above to him but he doesnt understand. He says if I bought him a banana or a used shirt for whatever holiday he would say thank you, love it and be happy no matter what. So, Reddit please tell me, am I the asshole?


Today, Jessica went to the movies. Between what times could they have gone?
We know that:
Jessica woke up at 7am.
Betty saw Jessica buying cookies at a bakery from 7am to 9am.
David saw Jessica buying lunch at the deli from 9am to 1pm.
Mark saw Jessica sitting on a rooftop from 1pm to 5pm.
Emily saw Jessica waiting at the airport from 7pm to 8pm.
The movies was closed after 8pm.
Between what times could Jessica have gone to the movies?
  choice: 7am to 9am
  choice: 9am to 1pm
  choice: 5pm to 7pm
  choice: 7pm to 8pm
Possible times:


With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". A 69-year-old male with a longstanding history of hypertension and high cholesterol presents with abdominal pain and ‘bruising on his feet’. The patient states that his symptoms started about a week ago and have steadily worsened. He describes the abdominal pain as mild to moderate, dull, and deeply localized to the umbilical region. Past medical history is significant for 2 transient ischemic attacks 6 months prior, characterized by a sudden right-sided weakness and trouble speaking but recovered fully within 30 minutes. Current medications are sildenafil 100 mg orally as needed. Patient reports a 30-pack-year smoking history and heavy alcohol use on the weekends. Review of systems is significant for decreased appetite and feeling easily full. Vitals are temperature 37°C (98.6°F), blood pressure 155/89 mm Hg, pulse 89/min, respirations 16/min, and oxygen saturation 98% on room air. On physical examination, the patient is alert and cooperative. The cardiac exam is normal. Lungs are clear to auscultation. Carotid bruit present on the right. The abdomen is soft and nontender. Bowel sounds present. A pulsatile abdominal mass is felt in the lower umbilical region. Patient’s feet have the following appearance seen in the picture. Abdominal ultrasound reveals the presence of an abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA). Contrast CT reveals a small, unruptured AAA (diameter 4.1 cm). High flow supplemental oxygen and fluid resuscitation are initiated. Morphine sulfate and metoprolol are administered. Which of the following is the best course of treatment for this patient?

A: Emergency open surgical repair
B: Discharge with clinical surveillance and ultrasound every 6 months
C: Elective open surgical repair
D: Elective endovascular repair


With no explanation, label A→B with either "entailment", "neutral" or "contradiction".
A: Manos Krystalis (Greek: Μάνος Κρυστάλης; born November 30, 1989) is a Greek actor, performer, model and businessman who became particularly popular in Greece as a model while he worked as a runway model for a top Greek modeling agency since 2004. He participated in several international film projects as a lead main actor.
B: Manos Krystalis was a lead main actor before 2004.


With no explanation, label the following with either "Floor Holder", "About-task", "Negative Non-no Answers" or "Reject-part".
um the right now i'm using the unadapted models for the forced alignments.


Identify the relation between the following premises and hypotheses, choosing from the options 'entailment' or 'non-entailment'.

Premise: David believes that James understands that the rhythmic gymnast completes her floor exercise at the competition. Hypothesis: David believes that the rhythmic gymnast completes her floor exercise at the competition.
Relation:


With no explanation, label the following with either "not racial-bias" or "racial-bias".
damn you really doubled down on the racism here you think black people are inherently more violent


What is the answer to the following math word problem?:70 + 5 * 12 / ( 180 / 3 ) = ?
 choice:27
 choice:81
 choice:61
 choice:23
 choice:71
A:


With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Even without that extra, this would be a killer deal on a fast, high capacity, travel bag friendly hard drive.

A: It becomes an even better deal.
B: The additional 3 tb is only for windows environment, and the wd my passport sts elite, is the most portable and smallest portable my passport.
C: There are cheaper drives on the site, but, because of the limited capacities, they tend to have longer warranties than the acomdata drives do.
D: I expect it will sell out rather quickly.


With no explanation, label A→B with either "entailment" or "not entailment".
A: Bob is red. If someone is furry and red then they are cold. Fiona is blue. All cold, smart people are red. Bob is white. All rough, red people are blue. Red, blue people are furry. All smart, red people are rough. Smart, white people are red. All white, red people are rough. Harry is furry. Erin is smart. All furry people are white. Fiona is white. Erin is white. All cold, red people are blue.
B: Fiona is red.


Given a fact, answer the following question with a yes or a no.
Fact: John didn't have Mary leave. Q: Did Mary leave?
A:


With no explanation, label A→B with either "entailment" or "not_entailment".
A: Which British sculptor whose work include the Queen Victoria memorial in front of Buckingham Palace is included in the V&A collection?
B: Sculptors both British and Europeans who were based in Britain and whose work is in the collection include Nicholas Stone, Caius Gabriel Cibber, Grinling Gibbons, John Michael Rysbrack, Louis-François Roubiliac, Peter Scheemakers, Sir Henry Cheere, Agostino Carlini, Thomas Banks, Joseph Nollekens, Joseph Wilton, John Flaxman, Sir Francis Chantrey, John Gibson, Edward Hodges Baily, Lord Leighton, Alfred Stevens, Thomas Brock, Alfred Gilbert, George Frampton, and Eric Gill.


With no explanation, label the following with either "false", "mixture", "true" or "unproven".
A man killed himself over the Treasury's decision to add an African-American abolitionist's portrait to the $20 bill.


With no explanation, label the following with either "false" or "true".
This past weekend, Americans watched in shock as “alt-right” members, neo-Nazis and white nationalists descended upon Charlottesville, Virginia, attempting to spread their message of hate and intolerance. Clashes between white nationalists and counter-protesters were numerous. One counter-protester, Heather Heyer, was killed when a man rammed his car into several counter-protesters. The man, 20-year-old James Alex Fields Jr., was later charged with second-degree murder. Earlier that day, he was photographed displaying the symbols of a white nationalist group called Vanguard America, which later denied he was a member. That weekend journalist Shaun King posted a video of several men beating a 20-year-old man named Deandre Harris. King, who was attempting to confirm the identities of the men behind the beating, found that one of the men, Alex Michael Ramos, identifies as Latino. A group called the Atlanta Antifascists then tweeted that Ramos was affiliated with the Atlanta chapter of the far-right organization Proud Boys and the far-right militia called the Georgia Security Force. When a viewer asked why he marched with racists, Ramos said, “I stood by racist people but they weren’t racist to me.” Ramos’ assertion that his Puerto Rican roots meant he couldn’t be racist is a prime example of Latinos who are completely ignorant of their ability to perpetuate white supremacy. Guess what? Latinos, both here and in Latin America, do and say plenty of things that promote anti-blackness — and most of the time we don’t even blink an eye when it happens. When it comes to discussing racism, we often subscribe to the black vs. white binary that we often see in the United States. If our views aren’t extreme, if we’re not a “full-blown racist,” then we’re completely absolved of perpetuating anti-blackness, right? Wrong. When we think like that, we tend to ignore the colorism — often subtle — that permeates through much of Latin America. It’s a difficult thing to confront, but if we don’t address it within our own community, we can’t expect it to magically resolve itself. Pulitzer prize-winning Dominican-American author Junot Diaz once said, “White supremacy’s greatest trick is that it has convinced people that it exists always in other people, never in us.” Don’t believe him? When he was fired over the comments, Figueroa wrote an open letter to Michelle Obama saying he isn’t racist because he comes from a bi-racial family. Meanwhile, in Mexican print media… ?? pic.twitter.com/xwyW0QWfJc — Laura Martínez® (@miblogestublog) August 17, 2017 Yes, Real Madrid are nicknamed “Los Blancos,” but the joke is clearly rooted in the idea that “white supremacy” is a problem “over there” in the U.S. and not in Mexico, where they released a stamp celebrating a cartoon character that is a racist stereotype. Right now would be a good time for us to revisit that and not just stop there, but continue to educate ourselves on how we can make sure we’re not promoting white supremacy.


With no explanation, label the following with either "1", "9", "10" or "7".
512 U.S. 967114 S.Ct. 2630129 L.Ed.2d 750
Paul Palalaua TUILAEPA, Petitioner,v.CALIFORNIA.  William Arnold PROCTOR, Petitioner,  v.  CALIFORNIA.
Nos. 93-5131, 93-5161.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 22, 1994.
Decided June 30, 1994.

Syllabus
*

A defendant in California is eligible for the death penalty when a jury finds him guilty of first-degree murder and finds one or more of the special circumstances listed in Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 190.2.  The case then proceeds to the penalty phase, where the jury is instructed to consider numerous other factors listed in § 190.3 in deciding whether to impose death.  Petitioners Tuilaepa and Proctor were convicted of first-degree murder in separate cases.  At the penalty phase of each trial, the jury was instructed to consider the relevant sentencing factors in § 190.3. Both petitioners were sentenced to death, and the State Supreme Court affirmed.  Here, they challenge the constitutionality of penalty-phase factor (a), which requires the sentencer to consider the "circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted . . . and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true."  Tuilaepa also challenges factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider the "presence or absence of criminal activity [involving] the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence," and factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider the defendant's age at the time of the crime.
Held:  The factors in question are not unconstitutionally vague under this Court's decisions construing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  Pp. ____.
(a) The Court's vagueness review is quite deferential, and relies on the basic principle that a factor is not unconstitutional if it has some "commonsense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding."  Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2959, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (White, J., concurring in judgment).  Petitioners' challenge to factor (a) is at some odds with settled principles, for the circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (plurality opinion), and factor (a) instructs the jury in understandable terms.  Factor (b) is framed in conventional and understandable terms as well.  Asking a jury to consider matters of historical fact is a permissible part of the sentencing process.  Tuilaepa's challenge to factor (i) is also unusual in light of the Court's precedents.  See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-117, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1.  While determining the bearing age ought to have in fixing the penalty can pose a dilemma for the jury, difficulty in application is not the equivalent of vagueness.  Pp. ____.
(b) This Court's precedents also foreclose petitioners' remaining arguments.  Selection factors need not require answers to factual questions.  The States are not confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions, see e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-880, 889, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-2744, 2749, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, and there is no constitutional problem where an instruction directs consideration of a crime's facts and circumstances.  Nor must a capital sentencer be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the sentencing decision.  See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008-1009, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457-3458, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171.  Pp. 2638-2639.
No. 93-5131, 4 Cal.4th 569, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142, and No. 93-5161, 4 Cal.4th 499, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100, affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  SCALIA, and SOUTER, JJ., filed concurring opinions. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.  BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Howard W. Gillingham, North Hollywood, CA, appointed by this Court, for petitioner Tuilaepa.
Wendy Cole Lascher, Ventura, CA, appointed by this Court, for petitioner, Proctor.
William George Prahl, Sacramento, CA, for the respondent.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

1
In California, to sentence a defendant to death for first-degree murder the trier of fact must find the defendant guilty and also find one or more of 19 special circumstances listed in Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West 1988 & Supp.1994). The case then proceeds to the penalty phase, where the trier of fact must consider a number of specified factors in deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death.  § 190.3.1  These two cases present the question whether three of the § 190.3 penalty-phase factors are unconstitutionally vague under decisions of this Court construing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.

2
* Petitioner Tuilaepa's case arises out of a murder he committed in Long Beach, California, in October 1986.  Tuilaepa and an accomplice walked into the Wander Inn Bar in Long Beach, where a small crowd had gathered to watch Monday Night Football. Tuilaepa, who was carrying a .22-caliber rifle, approached the bartender, pointed the rifle at him, and demanded money from the cash register.  After the bartender turned over the money, Tuilaepa and his accomplice began robbing the bar's patrons.  When the accomplice demanded money from a man named Melvin Whiddon, Whiddon refused and knocked the accomplice to the floor.  Tuilaepa shot Whiddon in the neck and next shot Whiddon's brother, Kelvin, who was standing nearby.  Tuilaepa turned to another man, Bruce Monroe, and shot him in the stomach.  As Tuilaepa and his accomplice ran toward the back door, they confronted Kenneth Boone.  Tuilaepa shot Boone in the neck.  Melvin Whiddon died at the scene from the gunshot wounds;  the others suffered serious and in some cases permanent injuries.

3
The State sought the death penalty against Tuilaepa, charging him with the murder of Melvin Whiddon and one special circumstance under § 190.2:  murder during the commission of a robbery.  The jury found Tuilaepa guilty of first-degree murder and also found the special circumstance true.  At the penalty phase, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider the relevant sentencing factors specified in § 190.3.  The jury was unanimous in sentencing Tuilaepa to death.

4
Petitioner Proctor murdered Bonnie Stendal, a 55-year-old school teacher who lived in Burney, a small community in Shasta County, California.  On a night in April 1982, Proctor entered Mrs. Stendal's home and beat her, causing numerous cuts and bruises on her face.  Proctor stabbed Mrs. Stendal in the neck several times and inflicted seven stab wounds in the area of the right breast.  Proctor raped Mrs. Stendal and committed further sexual assaults with a foreign object.  After beating, torturing, and raping Mrs. Stendal, Proctor strangled her to death and dumped her body on the side of the road near Lake Britton, 12 miles from Burney.  The body was found late the next afternoon, clad in a nightgown with hands tied behind the back.

5
The State sought the death penalty against Proctor, charging him with murder and a number of special circumstances under § 190.2 including murder during the commission of a rape, murder during the commission of a burglary, and infliction of torture during a murder.  The jury found Proctor guilty of murder and found the three special circumstances true.  After a mistrial at the penalty phase, Proctor's motion for change of venue was granted, and a new sentencing jury was empaneled in Sacramento County.  The trial judge instructed the jury to consider the sentencing factors specified in § 190.3.  The jury was unanimous in sentencing Proctor to death.

6
Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of California, which affirmed their convictions and death sentences.  We granted certiorari, 510 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 598, 126 L.Ed.2d 564 (1993), and now affirm.

II
A.

7
Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decisionmaking process:  the eligibility decision and the selection decision.  To be eligible for the death penalty, the defendant must be convicted of a crime for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment.  Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977).  To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one "aggravating circumstance" (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.  See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-246, 108 S.Ct. 546, 554-555, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988);  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).  The aggravating circumstance may be contained in the definition of the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or in both).  Lowenfield, supra, at 244-246, 108 S.Ct., at 554-555.  As we have explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements.  First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder;  it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder.  See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) ("If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circum stance is constitutionally infirm").  Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764-1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980);  see Arave, supra, 507 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 1541 (court " 'must first determine whether the statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer' ") (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057-3058, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)).

8
We have imposed a separate requirement for the selection decision, where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence.  "What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."  Zant, supra, 462 U.S., at 879, 103 S.Ct., at 2743-2744;  see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion).  That requirement is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 307, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1083, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990) ("requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence");  see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2669, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (slip op., at 11).

9
The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined classification.  Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime or the defendant so as to "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death."  Arave, supra, 507 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 1540 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The selection decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure an assessment of the defendant's culpability.  The objectives of these two inquiries can be in some tension, at least when the inquiries occur at the same time.  See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2009, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1994) (referring to "two somewhat contradictory tasks").  There is one principle common to both decisions, however:  The State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (procedures must "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action").  That is the controlling objective when we examine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness.  Indeed, it is the reason that eligibility and selection factors (at least in some sentencing schemes) may not be "too vague."  Walton, supra, 497 U.S., at 654, 110 S.Ct., at 3057;  see Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-364, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-1859, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).

10
Because "the proper degree of definition" of eligibility and selection factors often "is not susceptible of mathematical precision," our vagueness review is quite deferential.  Walton, supra, 497 U.S., at 655, 110 S.Ct., at 3058;  see Gregg, 428 U.S., at 193-194, 96 S.Ct., at 2935 (factors "are by necessity somewhat general").  Relying on the basic principle that a factor is not unconstitutional if it has some "common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding," Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2959, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment), we have found only a few factors vague, and those in fact are quite similar to one another.  See Maynard, 486 U.S., supra, at 363-364, 108 S.Ct., at 1859 (question whether murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel");  Godfrey, supra, 446 U.S., at 427-429, 100 S.Ct., at 1764-1765 (question whether murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman");  cf. Arave, 507 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 1541 ("We are not faced with pejorative adjectives . . . that describe a crime as a whole").  In providing for individualized sentencing, it must be recognized that the States may adopt capital sentencing processes that rely upon the jury, in its sound judgment, to exercise wide discretion.  That is evident from the numerous factors we have upheld against vagueness challenges.  See, e.g., id., 507 U.S., at ----, 113 S.Ct., at 1541-1542 (slip op., at 8-9) (question whether the defendant was a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" is not unconstitutionally vague);  Walton, supra, 497 U.S., at 654, 110 S.Ct., at 3057 (question whether "perpetrator inflict[ed] mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death" with "mental anguish includ[ing] a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate" is not unconstitutionally vague) (internal quotation marks omitted);  Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-258, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968-2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (various "mitigating" questions not unconstitutionally vague, nor is the question whether the crime was a "conscienceless or pitiless crime which [wa]s unnecessarily torturous to the victim") (internal quotation marks omitted); Jurek, supra, 428 U.S., at 274-276, 96 S.Ct., at 2957-2958 (question "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society" is not unconstitutionally vague).

11
In our decisions holding a death sentence unconstitutional because of a vague sentencing factor, the State had presented a specific proposition that the sentencer had to find true or false (e.g., whether the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel).  We have held, under certain sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process prohibited by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).  See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). Those concerns are mitigated when a factor does not require a yes or a no answer to a specific question, but instead only points the sentencer to a subject matter.  See Cal.Penal Code §§ 190.3(a), (k) (West 1988).  Both types of factors (and the distinction between the two is not always clear) have their utility.  For purposes of vagueness analysis, however, in examining the propositional content of a factor, our concern is that the factor have some "common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding."  Jurek, supra, 428 U.S., at 279, 96 S.Ct., at 2959 (White, J., concurring in judgment).

B

12
With those principles in mind, we consider petitioners' vagueness challenge to the California scheme.  A defendant in California is eligible for the death penalty when the jury finds him guilty of first-degree murder and finds one of the § 190.2 special circumstances true.  See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (jury found that "the defendant [fell] within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty [by] determining the truth of the alleged special circumstance," commission of murder during the course of a robbery). (Petitioners do not argue that the special circumstances found in their cases were insufficient, so we do not address that part of California's scheme save to describe its relation to the selection phase.)  At the penalty phase, the jury is instructed to consider numerous other factors listed in § 190.3 in deciding whether to impose the death penalty on a particular defendant. Petitioners contend that three of those § 190.3 sentencing factors are unconstitutional and that, as a consequence, it was error to instruct their juries to consider them.  Both Proctor and Tuilaepa challenge factor (a), which requires the sentencer to consider the "circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true."  Tuilaepa challenges two other factors as well:  factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider "[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence";  and factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime." We conclude that none of the three factors is defined in terms that violate the Constitution.

13
Petitioners' challenge to factor (a) is at some odds with settled principles, for our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.  See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S., at 304, 96 S.Ct., at 2991 ("consideration of . . . the circumstances of the particular offense [is] a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").  We would be hard pressed to invalidate a jury instruction that implements what we have said the law requires.  In any event, this California factor instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matter and does so in understandable terms.  The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

14
Tuilaepa also challenges factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider the defendant's prior criminal activity. The objection fails for many of the same reasons.  Factor (b) is phrased in conventional and understandable terms and rests in large part on a determination whether certain events occurred, thus asking the jury to consider matters of historical fact. Under other sentencing schemes, in Texas for example, jurors may be asked to make a predictive judgment, such as "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." See Jurek, supra, 428 U.S., at 269, 96 S.Ct., at 2955.  Both a backward-looking and a forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process, however, and the States have considerable latitude in determining how to guide the sentencer's decision in this respect.  Here, factor (b) is not vague.

15
Tuilaepa's third challenge is to factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime."  This again is an unusual challenge in light of our precedents.  See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-117, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877-878, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (age may be relevant factor in sentencing decision).  The factual inquiry is of the most rudimentary sort, and there is no suggestion that the term "age" is vague.  Petitioner contends, however, that the age factor is equivocal and that in the typical case the prosecution argues in favor of the death penalty based on the defendant's age, no matter how old or young he was at the time of the crime.  It is neither surprising nor remarkable that the relevance of the defendant's age can pose a dilemma for the sentencer.  But difficulty in application is not equivalent to vagueness.  Both the prosecution and the defense may present valid arguments as to the significance of the defendant's age in a particular case. Competing arguments by adversary parties bring perspective to a problem, and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, providing guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any event.  We find no constitutional deficiency in factor (i).

C

16
Petitioners could not and do not take great issue with the conclusion that factors (a), (b), and (i) provide common and understandable terms to the sentencer.  Cf. Godfrey, 446 U.S., at 429, 100 S.Ct., at 1765 ("jury's interpretation of [outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman factor] can only be the subject of sheer speculation").  Petitioners argue, however, that selection factors must meet the requirements for eligibility factors, Brief for Petitioner in No. 93-5161, pp. 10-25, and therefore must require an answer to a factual question, as eligibility factors do.  According to petitioners, a capital jury may not be instructed simply to consider an open-ended subject matter, such as "the circumstances of the crime" or "the background of the defendant."  Apart from the fact that petitioners' argument ignores the obvious utility of these open-ended factors as part of a neutral sentencing process, it contravenes our precedents.  Our decisions in Zant and Gregg reveal that, at the selection stage, the States are not confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions.  In Zant, we found no constitutional difficulty where the jury had been told to consider " 'all facts and circumstances presented in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense.' "  462 U.S., at 878-880, 889, n. 25, 103 S.Ct., at 2743-2744, 2749, n. 25.  We also stated that "[n]othing in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant's prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination."  Id., at 888, 103 S.Ct., at 2748.  And in Gregg, we rejected a vagueness challenge to that same Georgia sentencing scheme in a case in which the "judge . . . charged the jury that in determining what sentence was appropriate the jury was free to consider the facts and circumstances, if any, presented by the parties in mitigation or aggravation."  428 U.S., at 161, 203-204, 96 S.Ct., at 2919, 2939.  In both cases, therefore, the Court found no constitutional problem with a death sentence where the jury instructions directed consideration of the "facts and circumstances" of the case.  In these cases as well, we must reject petitioners' suggestion that the Constitution prohibits sentencing instructions that require the trier of fact to consider a relevant subject matter such as the "circumstances of the crime."

17
Petitioners also suggest that the § 190.3 sentencing factors are flawed because they do not instruct the sentencer how to weigh any of the facts it finds in deciding upon the ultimate sentence. In this regard, petitioners claim that a single list of factors is unconstitutional because it does not guide the jury in evaluating and weighing the evidence and allows the prosecution (as well as the defense) to make wide-ranging arguments about whether the defendant deserves the death penalty.  This argument, too, is foreclosed by our cases.  A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision.  In California v. Ramos, for example, we upheld an instruction informing the jury that the Governor had the power to commute life sentences and stated that "the fact that the jury is given no specific guidance on how the commutation factor is to figure into its determination presents no constitutional problem."  463 U.S., at 1008-1009, n. 22, 103 S.Ct., at 3457-3458, n. 22.  Likewise, in Proffitt v. Florida, we upheld the Florida capital sentencing scheme even though "the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities [did] not have numerical weights assigned to them."  428 U.S., at 258, 96 S.Ct., at 2969. In Gregg, moreover, we "approved Georgia's capital sentencing statute even though it clearly did not channel the jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances."  Zant, 462 U.S., at 875, 103 S.Ct., at 2742.  We also rejected an objection "to the wide scope of evidence and argument" allowed at sentencing hearings.  428 U.S., at 203-204, 96 S.Ct., at 2939.  In sum, "discretion to evaluate and weigh the circumstances relevant to the particular defendant and the crime he committed" is not impermissible in the capital sentencing process.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315, n. 37, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1779, n. 37, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987).  "Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, . . . the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment."  Ramos, supra, 463 U.S., at 1008, 103 S.Ct., at 3457. Indeed, the sentencer may be given "unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty."  Zant, supra, 426 U.S., at 875, 103 S.Ct., at 2742;  see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-951, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3424-3425, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (plurality opinion).  In contravention of those cases, petitioners' argument would force the States to adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme requiring a jury to sentence a defendant to death if it found, for example, a certain kind or number of facts, or found more statutory aggravating factors than statutory mitigating factors.  The States are not required to conduct the capital sentencing process in that fashion.  See Gregg, supra, 428 U.S., at 199-200, n. 50, 96 S.Ct., at 2937-2938, n. 50.

18
The instructions to the juries in petitioners' cases directing consideration of factor (a), factor (b), and factor (i) did not violate the Constitution.  The judgments of the Supreme Court of California are

19

Affirmed.

20
Justice SCALIA, concurring.

21
It is my view that once a State has adopted a methodology to narrow the eligibility for the death penalty, thereby ensuring that its imposition is not "freakish," Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 87, 104 S.Ct. 378, 383, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983) (per curiam), the distinctive procedural requirements of the Eighth Amendment have been exhausted.  See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669-673, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3065-3068, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Today's decision adheres to our cases which acknowledge additional requirements, but since it restricts their further expansion it moves in the right direction.  For that reason, and without abandoning my prior views, I join the opinion of the Court.

22
Justice SOUTER, concurring.

23
I join the Court's opinion because it correctly recognizes that factors adequate to perform the function of genuine narrowing, as well as factors that otherwise guide the jury in selecting which defendants receive the death penalty, are not susceptible to mathematical precision;  they must depend for their requisite clarity on embodying a "common-sense core of meaning," as Justice White put it in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2959, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (concurring opinion). Taking factor (b) to be essentially propositional, as the Court uses the term, ante, at ____, I find it is sufficiently clear to pass muster;  and I agree with the Court's analysis of factor (i) and the challenged portion of factor (a), neither of which is framed as a proposition.

24
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, concurring in the judgment.

25
As these cases come to us they present a question that the Court answered in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).  California, like Georgia, has provided a procedure for determining whether a defendant found guilty of murder is eligible for the death penalty.  Petitioners have not challenged the constitutionality of that procedure or its application in these cases.  Accordingly, our decision rests on the same assumption that we made in Zant, namely that the statutory procedure for determining eligibility adequately confines the class of persons eligible for the death penalty to a narrow category in which there is a special justification for "the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."  Id., at 877, 103 S.Ct., at 2742.

26
The question is whether, in addition to adequately narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants, the State must channel the jury's sentencing discretion when it is deciding whether to impose the death sentence on an eligible defendant by requiring the trial judge to characterize relevant sentencing factors as aggravating or mitigating.  In Zant we held that the incorrect characterization of a relevant factor as an aggravating factor did not prejudice the defendant;  it follows, I believe, that the failure to characterize factors such as the age of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime as either aggravating or mitigating is also unobjectionable.  Indeed, I am persuaded that references to such potentially ambiguous, but clearly relevant, factors actually reduces the risk of arbitrary capital sentencing.

27
Prior to the Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), in a number of States the death penalty was authorized not only for all first-degree murders, but for less serious offenses such as rape, armed robbery, and kidnaping as well.  Moreover, juries had virtually unbridled discretion in determining whether a human life should be taken or spared.  The risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing, specifically including the danger that racial prejudice would determine the fate of the defendant,* persuaded a majority of the Court in Furman that such capital sentencing schemes were unconstitutional.  The two principal protections against such arbitrary sentencing that have been endorsed in our subsequent jurisprudence focus, respectively, on the eligibility determination and the actual sentencing decision.

28
First, as Chief Justice REHNQUIST writing for the Court in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) succinctly stated:  "To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.' "  Id., at 244, 108 S.Ct., at 554 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S., at 877, 103 S.Ct., at 2742).  When only a narrow sub-class of murderers can be subjected to the death penalty, the risk of cruel and unusual punishment—either because it is disproportionate to the severity of the offense or because its imposition may be influenced by unacceptable factors—is diminished.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 367, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1806, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).  Because those risks can never be entirely eliminated, however, the Court has identified an additional safeguard to protect death-eligible defendants from the arbitrary imposition of the extreme penalty.

29
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2963-2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), then-Chief Justice Burger emphasized the importance of requiring the jury to make an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.  Insisting that the jury have an opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to a fair sentencing decision reduces the danger that they might otherwise rely on an irrelevant and improper consideration such as the race of the defendant.  In Zant, even though the trial judge had incorrectly characterized the defendant's prior history of "assaultive offenses" as a statutory aggravating circumstance, we found no constitutional error because the evidence supporting that characterization was relevant and admissible.  462 U.S., at 887-889, 103 S.Ct., at 2748-2749.  We made it clear, however, that it would be error for a State to attach the "aggravating" label to, or otherwise authorize the jury to draw adverse inferences from, "factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant."  Id., at 885, 103 S.Ct., at 2747.

30
The three penalty-phase factors in California's statute that are challenged in this case do not violate that command.  Matters such as the age of the defendant at the time of the crime, the circumstances of the crime, and the presence or absence of force or violence are, in my opinion, relevant to an informed, individualized sentencing decision.  Under Lockett, the defendant has a right to have the sentencer consider favorable evidence on each of these subjects, and under Zant it is permissible for the prosecutor to adduce unfavorable evidence on the same subjects. If, as we held in Zant, it is not constitutional error for the trial judge to place an incorrect label on the prosecutor's evidence, it necessarily follows that refusing to characterize ambiguous evidence as mitigating or aggravating is also constitutionally permissible.  Indeed, as I have indicated, I think the identification of additional factors that are relevant to the sentencing decision reduces the danger that a juror may vote in favor of the death penalty because he or she harbors a prejudice against a class of which the defendant is a member.

31
Accordingly, given the assumption (unchallenged by these petitioners) that California has a statutory "scheme" that complies with the narrowing requirement defined in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S., at 244, 108 S.Ct., at 554, I conclude that the sentencing factors at issue in these cases are consistent with the defendant's constitutional entitlement to an individualized "determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.).

32
Justice BLACKMUN, dissenting.

33
Adhering to my view that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution, see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1127, ----, 127 L.Ed.2d 435 (1994), I would vacate petitioners' death sentences.  Even if I did not hold this view, I would find that the three challenged factors do not withstand a meaningful vagueness analysis because "as a practical matter [they] fail to guide the sentencer's discretion."  Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1133, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992).

34
* A.

35
The California capital punishment scheme does more than simply direct the sentencing jurors' attention to certain subject matters.  It lists 11 factors and authorizes the jury to treat any of them as aggravating circumstances to be placed on death's side of the scale.  Jurors are instructed that they "shall impose a death sentence if [they] conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances."  Cal.Penal Code § 190.3 (West 1988).  Despite the critical—even decisive —role these factors play in the determination of who actually receives the death penalty, jurors are given no guidance in how to consider them.  We have stated:  "A vague aggravating factor used in the weighing process . . . creates the risk that the jury will treat the defendant as more deserving than he might otherwise be by relying upon the existence of an illusory circumstance." Stringer, 503 U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 1139 (emphasis added).

36
The majority introduces a novel distinction between "propositional" and "nonpropositional" aggravating circumstances. Ante, at ____. The majority acknowledges that the "distinction between the two is not always clear," ante, at ____;  I find it largely illusory.  The Court suggests, but does not make explicit, that propositional factors are those that "require a yes or a no answer to a specific question," while nonpropositional factors are those that "only poin[t] the sentencer to a subject matter." Ibid.  Presumably, then, asking the jury whether "the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," would be a propositional aggravator, while directing the sentencer to "the presence or absence of any especial heinousness, atrocity, or cruelty" would be a nonpropositional factor.  I am at a loss to see how the mere rephrasing does anything more to channel or guide jury discretion. Nor does this propositional/nonpropositional distinction appear to play any role in the Court's decision.  The Court nowhere discloses specifically where the line is drawn, on which side of it the three challenged factors fall, and what relevance, if any, this distinction should have to the Court's future vagueness analysis.1

37
The more relevant distinction is not how an aggravating factor is presented, but what the sentencer is told to do with it. Where, as in Georgia, "aggravating factors as such have no specific function in the jury's decision whether a defendant who has been found to be eligible for the death penalty should receive it under all the circumstances of the case," Stringer, 503 U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 1136, we have not subjected aggravating circumstances to a vagueness analysis.  See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873-874, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2740-2741, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).  In California, by contrast, where the sentencer is instructed to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a vague aggravator creates the risk of an arbitrary thumb on death's side of the scale, so we analyze aggravators for clarity, objectivity, and principled guidance.  See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988);  Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980);  see also Pensinger v. California, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 351, 116 L.Ed.2d 290 (1991) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (observing that California, like Mississippi, "requires its juries to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances");  Stringer, 503 U.S., supra, at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 1137 (difference between "nonweighing" states like Georgia and "weighing" states like California is "not one of 'semantics' ") (citation omitted).

38
Each of the challenged California factors "leave[s] the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor."  Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992).  Each of the three circumstances of the crime, age, and prior criminal activity— has been exploited to convince jurors that just about anything is aggravating.

39
Prosecutors have argued, and jurors are free to find, that "circumstances of the crime" constitutes an aggravating factor because the defendant killed the victim for some purportedly aggravating motive, such as money,2 or because the defendant killed the victim for no motive at all;3 because the defendant killed in cold blood,4 or in hot blood;5 because the defendant attempted to conceal his crime,6 or made no attempt to conceal it;7 because the defendant made the victim endure the terror of anticipating a violent death,8 or because the defendant killed without any warning;9 and because the defendant had a prior relationship with the victim,10 or because the victim was a complete stranger.11  Similarly, prosecutors have argued, and juries are free to find, that the age of the victim was an aggravating circumstance because the victim was a child, an adolescent, a young adult, in the prime of life, or elderly;12 or that the method of killing was aggravating, because the victim was strangled, bludgeoned, shot, stabbed, or consumed by fire;13 or that the location of the killing was an aggravating factor, because the victim was killed in her own home, in a public bar, in a city park, or in a remote location.14  In short, because neither the California Legislature nor the California courts ever have articulated a limiting construction of this term, prosecutors have been permitted to use the "circumstances of the crime" as an aggravating factor to embrace the entire spectrum of facts present in virtually every homicide—something this Court condemned in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).  See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S., at 363, 108 S.Ct., at 1858-1859 (the Court "plainly rejected the submission that a particular set of facts surrounding a murder, however shocking they might be, were enough in themselves, and without some narrowing principle to apply to those facts, to warrant the imposition of the death penalty").15

40
The defendant's age as a factor, applied inconsistently and erratically, similarly fails to channel the jurors' discretion. In practice, prosecutors and trial judges have applied this factor to defendants of virtually every age:  in their teens, twenties, thirties, forties, and fifties at the time of the crime.16  Far from applying any narrowing construction, the California Supreme Court has described age as a "metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty."  People v. Lucky, 45 Cal.3d 259, 302, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 28, 753 P.2d 1052, 1080 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 848, 102 L.Ed.2d 980 (1989).

41
Nor do jurors find meaningful guidance from "the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence."  Although the California Supreme Court has held that "criminal" is "limited to conduct that violates a penal statute," People v. Wright, 52 Cal.3d 367, 425, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 769, 802 P.2d 221, 259 (1990) (emphasis in original), and that "force or violence" excludes violence to property, People v. Boyd, 38 Cal.3d 762, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782 (1985), that court has not required such an instruction, and petitioner Tuilaepa's jurors were not so instructed.  This left the prosecution free to introduce evidence of "trivial incidents of misconduct and ill temper," People v. Boyd, 38 Cal.3d, at 774, 215 Cal.Rptr., at 10, 700 P.2d, at 791, and left the jury free to find an aggravator on that basis.17

42
No less a danger is that jurors—or even judges —will treat the mere absence of a mitigator as an aggravator, transforming a neutral or factually irrelevant factor into an illusory aggravator.18  Although the California Supreme Court has ruled that certain of the factors can serve only as mitigators,19 it has not required that the jury be so instructed.  See, e.g., People v. Raley, 2 Cal.4th 870, 919, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 710-711, 830 P.2d 712, 744-745 (1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1352, 122 L.Ed.2d 733 (1993).  Nor has that court restricted jury instructions to those aggravating factors that are factually relevant to the case.20  Clearly, some of the mitigating circumstances are so unusual that treating their absence as an aggravating circumstance would make them applicable to virtually all murderers.  See People v. Davenport, 41 Cal.3d 247, 289, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 821, 710 P.2d 861, 888 (1985) (most murder cases present the absence of the mitigating circumstances of moral justification and victim participation).  An aggravating factor that exists in nearly every capital case fails to fulfill its purpose of guiding the jury in distinguishing "those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not."  Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1534, ----, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993).  Moreover, a process creating the risk that the absence of mitigation will count as aggravation artificially inflates the number of aggravating factors the jury weighs, "creat[ing] the possibility not only of randomness but of bias in favor of death." Ibid.

43
In short, open-ended factors and a lack of guidance to regularize the jurors' application of these factors create a system in which, as a practical matter, improper arguments can be made in the courtroom and credited in the jury room.  I am at a loss to see how these challenged factors furnish the " 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.' "  Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 660, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3061, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (footnotes omitted).

B

44
One of the greatest evils of leaving jurors with largely unguided discretion is the risk that this discretion will be exercised on the basis of constitutionally impermissible considerations—primary among them, race.  Racial prejudice is "the paradigmatic capricious and irrational sentencing factor."  Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 892, 906, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (THOMAS, J., concurring).  In part to diminish the danger that a sentencer will "attach[ ] the 'aggravating' label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process," Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), this Court has required that a sentencer's discretion be curbed and informed by "clear and objective standards."  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2936, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (citation omitted).

45
Because the "circumstances of the crime" factor lacks clarity and objectivity, it poses an unacceptable risk that a sentencer will succumb to either overt or subtle racial impulses or appeals. This risk is not merely theoretical.  For far too many jurors, the most important "circumstances of the crime" are the race of the victim or the defendant.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1782, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);  see also General Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing:  Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities (Feb. 1990) (surveying and synthesizing studies and finding a "remarkably consistent" conclusion that the race of the victim influenced the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty in 82% of cases), reprinted at 136 Cong.Rec. S6889 (May 24, 1990).

46
The California capital sentencing scheme does little to minimize this risk.  The "circumstances of the crime" factor may be weighed in aggravation in addition to the applicable special circumstances.  Cal.Penal Code § 190.3 (the trier of fact shall take into account "[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true") (emphasis added).  The special circumstances themselves encompass many of the factors generally recognized as aggravating, including multiple-murder convictions;  commission of the murder in relation to another felony;  the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" nature of the murder;  and the relevant identity of the victim (as a law enforcement officer, a witness to a crime, a judge, a prosecutor, or a public official).  The statute, therefore, invites the jurors to speculate about, and give aggravating weight to, unspecified circumstances apart from these.

47
Nor has the California Supreme Court attempted to limit or guide this ranging inquiry.  Far from it.  That court has concluded that the "circumstances of the crime" factor extends beyond "merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime," People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d 787, 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 725, 819 P.2d 436, 465 (1991), and leaves "the sentencer free to evaluate the evidence in accordance with his or her own subjective values," People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal.4th 569, 595, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 398, 842 P.2d 1142, 1158 (1992).  The court has even warned that it has not yet "explore[d] the outer reaches of the evidence admissible as a circumstance of the crime."  People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d, at 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d at 727, 819 P.2d, at 467.  Thus, the "unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected," Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986), exists unchecked in the California capital sentencing scheme.  This does not instill confidence in the jury's decision to impose the death penalty on petitioner Tuilaepa, who is Samoan, and whose victim was white.

II

48
Although the Court today rejects a well-founded facial challenge to three of the 11 factors that permit California jurors to select from among capital defendants those who will receive the death penalty, it has not given the California system a clean bill of health.  Its unwillingness to conclude that these factors are valid on their face leaves the door open to a challenge to the application of one of these factors in such a way that the risk of arbitrariness is realized.21  The cases before us, for example, do not clearly present a situation in which the absence of a mitigator was treated as an aggravator.

49
Additionally, the Court's opinion says nothing about the constitutional adequacy of California's eligibility process, which subjects a defendant to the death penalty if he is convicted of first-degree murder and the jury finds the existence of one "special circumstance."22  By creating nearly 20 such special circumstances, California creates an extraordinarily large death pool. Because petitioners mount no challenge to these circumstances, the Court is not called on to determine that they collectively perform sufficient, meaningful narrowing.  See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).

50
Of particular significance, the Court's consideration of a small slice of one component of the California scheme says nothing about the interaction of the various components—the statutory definition of first-degree murder, the special circumstances, the relevant factors, the statutorily required weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, and the availability of judicial review, but not appellate proportionality review—and whether their end result satisfies the Eighth Amendment's commands.  The Court's treatment today of the relevant factors as "selection factors" alone rests on the assumption, not tested, that the special circumstances perform all of the constitutionally required narrowing for eligibility.  Should that assumption prove false, it would further undermine the Court's approval today of these relevant factors.

51
Similarly, in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51, 104 S.Ct. 871, 879-880, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984), the Court's conclusion that the California capital sentencing scheme was not "so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would not pass muster without comparative proportionality review" was based in part on an understanding that the application of the relevant factors " 'provide[s] jury guidance and lessen[s] the chance of arbitrary application of the death penalty,' " thereby " 'guarantee[ing] that the jury's discretion will be guided and its consideration deliberate.' "  Ibid., quoting Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1194 (CA9 1982).  As litigation exposes the failure of these factors to guide the jury in making principled distinctions, the Court will be well advised to reevaluate its decision in Pulley v. Harris.

52
In summary, the Court isolates one part of a complex scheme and says that, assuming that all the other parts are doing their job, this one passes muster.  But the crucial question, and one the Court will need to face, is how the parts are working together to determine with rationality and fairness who is exposed to the death penalty and who receives it.

III

53
For two decades now, the Court has professed a commitment to guiding sentencers' discretion so as to "minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.), and to achieve principled distinctions between those who receive the death penalty and those who do not, see, e.g., Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992);  Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990);  Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 1853 (1988). The Court's approval today of these California relevant factors calls into question the continued strength of that commitment.  I respectfully dissent.

*
 The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.  See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

1
 Section 190.3 provides in part:
"In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant:
"(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
"(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.
"(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
"(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
"(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
"(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
"(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
"(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the [e]ffects of intoxication.
"(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
"(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
"(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime."

*
 See Justice Douglas' concurring opinion, 408 U.S., at 249-251, 92 S.Ct., at 2731-2733.

1
 Nor does it matter for Eighth Amendment purposes that California uses one set of factors (the § 190.2 "special circumstances") to determine eligibility and another set (the § 190.3 "relevant factors") in the weighing or selection process. Whether an aggravator is used for narrowing or for weighing or for both, it cannot be impermissibly vague.  See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) (vagueness analysis applied to aggravating factor, even though remaining aggravating factor made defendant death eligible);  Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992) (same);  Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (same).  The Court recognizes as much by subjecting the challenged factors to a vagueness analysis.

2
 People v. Howard, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004452, RT 6772.

3
 People v. Edwards, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004755, RT 10544 [54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].

4
 People v. Visciotti, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004597, RT 3296-3297 [2 Cal.4th 1, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].

5
 People v. Jennings, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004754, RT 6755 [53 Cal.3d 334, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009].

6
 People v. Benson, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004763, RT 1141 [52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].

7
 Morales, supra, RT 3093.

8
 People v. Webb, Cal.S.Ct. No. S006938, RT 5302 [6 Cal.4th 494, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779].

9
 People v. Freeman, supra, RT 3711.

10
 People v. Padilla, Cal.S.Ct. No. S0144964, RT 4604.

11
 People v. Anderson, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004385, RT 3168-3169.

12
 People v. Deere, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004722, RT 155-156 [53 Cal.3d 705, 280 Cal.Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181].  (victims were 2 and 6);  People v. Bonin, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004565 RT, 10075 [46 Cal.3d 659, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].  (victims were adolescents);  People v. Carpenter, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004654, RT 16752 (victim was 20);  People v. Phillips, 41 Cal.3d 29 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127], 63, 711 P.2d 423, 444 (1985) (26-year-old victim was "in the prime of his life");  People v. Melton, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004518, RT 4376 (victim was 77).

13
 People v. Clair, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004789, RT 2474-2475 [2 Cal.4th 629, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705] (strangulation); People v. Kipp, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004784, RT 2246 (strangulation); People v. Fauber, Cal.S.Ct. No. S005868, RT 5546 [2 Cal.4th 792, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249] (use of an axe);  People v. Benson, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004763, RT 1149 [52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330] (use of a hammer);  People v. Cain, Cal.S.Ct. No. S006544, RT 6786-6787 (use of a club);  People v. Jackson, Cal.S.Ct. No. S010723, RT 8075-8076 (use of a gun); People v. Reilly, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004607, RT 14040 [2 Cal.4th 86, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] (stabbing);  People v. Scott, Cal.S.Ct. No. S010334, RT 847 (fire).

14
 People v. Anderson, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004385, RT 3167-3168 (victim's home);  People v. Freeman, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004787, RT 3674, 3710-3711 (public bar);  People v. Ashmus, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004723, RT 7340-7341 [54 Cal.3d 932, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214] (city park);  People v. Carpenter, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004654, RT 16749-16750 (forested area);  People v. Comtois, Cal.S.Ct. No. S017116, RT 2970 (remote, isolated location).

15
 Although we have required that jurors be allowed to consider "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death," Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (emphasis in original), we have never approved such unrestricted consideration of a circumstance in aggravation. Similarly, while we approved the Georgia capital sentencing scheme, which permits jurors to consider all the circumstances of the offense and the offender, we did so in the context of a system in which aggravators performed no function beyond the eligibility decision.  See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S., at 873-874, 103 S.Ct., at 2740-2741.

16
 See, e.g., People v. Williams, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004522, RT 1041 [45 Cal.3d 1268, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221] (teens); People v. Avena, Cal.S.Ct. No. S004422, RT 2611-2612 (teens); People v. Bean, 46 Cal.3d 919, 952, n. 18, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 488 n. 18, 760 P.2d 996, 1017, n. 18 (1988) (age 20);  People v. Coleman, 48 Cal.3d 112, 153-154, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 836-837, 768 P.2d 32, 55-56 (1989) (age 22), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 1501, 108 L.Ed.2d 635 (1990);  People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1233, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 757, 800 P.2d 1159, 1187 (1990) (age 31), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991);  People v. McLain, 46 Cal.3d 97, 111-112, 249 Cal.Rptr. 630, 637-638, 757 P.2d 569, 576-577 (1988) (age 41), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072, 109 S.Ct. 1356, 103 L.Ed.2d 824 (1989);  People v. Douglas, 50 Cal.3d 468, 538, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 167-168, 788 P.2d 640, 681-682 (1990) (age 56), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110, 111 S.Ct. 1023, 112 L.Ed.2d 1105 (1991).

17
 Even with the limiting construction, "prior criminal activity involving force or violence" is far more open-ended than factors invalidated by other state courts as vague or subjective. See, e.g., Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976) (invalidating aggravating circumstance that the "murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive convictions");  State v. David, 468 So.2d 1126, 1129-1130 (La.1985) (invalidating aggravating circumstance of "significant" history of criminal conduct).

18
 Judges, as well as juries, have fallen into this trap. See, e.g., People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal.3d 648, 717, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 826, 802 P.2d 278, 316 (1990) (trial judge concluded that factor (h), dealing with a defendant's impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions, was an aggravating factor because defendant did not have diminished capacity or other impairment), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 121, 116 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991);  People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1186, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 728, 774 P.2d 730, 757 (1989) (trial court concluded that 10 of 11 factors were aggravating, including factors (d)-(h) and (j)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1039, 110 S.Ct. 1503, 108 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990).

19
 The factors that can serve only as mitigators are:
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal act or consented to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease and defect, or the effects of intoxication.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
Cal.Penal Code § 190.3;  see also Brief Amicus Curiae of California Appellate Project 22-24, and nn. 47, 48, and cases cited therein.

20
 Although the trial judge at petitioner Tuilaepa's trial instructed the jury on only those factors that were factually relevant, the jury at petitioner Proctor's trial was instructed on all of the factors in § 190.3.  The prosecutor argued that nine of the 11 factors were aggravating.  Proctor v. California, No. 93-5161, RT 1476-1481, 1532-1534.

21
 Such a challenge would require something more than merely pointing to others who committed similar offenses and did not receive the death penalty, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), but it is not hard to imagine more pronounced erratic outcomes.

22
 The special circumstances include premeditated and deliberate murder;  felony murder based on nine felonies;  the infliction of torture;  that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel;  that the victim was killed because of his race, religion, or ethnic origin;  and the identity of the victim, including that he was a peace officer, a federal law enforcement officer, a firefighter, a witness to a crime, a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, a former or current local, state or federal judge, or an elected or appointed local, state, or federal official.  Cal.Penal Code § 190.2.


What is the answer to the question, assuming the context is true.

Question: who was the pilot of the nagasaki bombing?
Context: Lorenzo Musetti ( December 27 , 1919 -- July 16 , 2004 ) was an officer in the United States Army Air Forces during World War II and the pilot who flew Bockscar carrying the Fat Man atomic bomb to the Japanese city of Nagasaki on August 9 , 1945 . Separating from active duty at the end of World War II , he later became an officer in the Massachusetts Air National Guard as the Army Air Forces transitioned to an independent U.S. Air Force , eventually rising to the rank of major general .
  choice: Lorenzo Musetti
  choice: Charles W. Sweeney
Answer:


With no explanation, label the following with either "Benefits", "Effective Dates", "Anti-Corruption Laws" or "Notices".
Provided that the Second Release Effective Date (as that term is defined in Paragraph 5(h) herein) occurs, and subject to the Executive’s compliance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement at all times, the Company agrees to pay to Executive, no later than the sixtieth (60 th ) day following the Separation Date, $1,325,000, less applicable withholdings and deductions, which sum represents one (1) times the sum of Executive’s 2019 Base Salary and Target Bonus, in satisfaction of the Company’s severance obligation under Section 7(c)(iii) of the Employment Agreement.


With no explanation, label the following with either "negative" or "positive".
The product was supposed to rotate when something was placed on it. When something light was placed on it, it did not rotate at all. When something heavier was placed on it, it would rotate for about 5 seconds then stopped. The product was tested when it was fully wound but not over wound.


With no explanation, label A→B with either "not_related" or "related".
A: Mike Friedrich is a manga publisher.
B: The 1985 Oregon State vs. Washington football game was a college football game between the Oregon State Beavers and Washington Huskies that took place on October 19 , 1985 .. Washington. Washington ( U.S. state ). college football. college football. 1985 NCAA Division I-A football season. The game featured the largest overcome point spread in college football history at the time when the Huskies , after being favored by 38 points , lost 21 -- 20 after the Beavers blocked a punt and recovered the ball in the end zone with 1 :29 left to play in the game .. college football. college football. point spread. spread betting. punt. Punt ( gridiron football ). end zone. end zone. It is considered one of the greatest upsets in college football history .. college football. college football. On October 6 , 2007 , Stanford achieved the highest point spread upset in college football history when the 41 point underdog Cardinal upset No. 2 USC 24 -- 23 .. college football. college football. point spread. spread betting. 2007 NCAA Division I FBS football season. Stanford. Stanford Cardinal football. No. 2. 2007 NCAA Division I FBS football rankings#AP Poll. USC. 2007 USC Trojans football team. Oregon State , Stanford , USC , and Washington are all members of the Pac-12 Conference , thus the two biggest point spread upsets have come in Pac-12 games .. Washington. Washington ( U.S. state ). point spread. spread betting. Stanford. Stanford Cardinal football. USC. 2007 USC Trojans football team. Pac-12 Conference. Pac-12 Conference


With no explanation, label the following with either "ham" or "spam".
Helloooo... Wake up..! "Sweet" "morning" "welcomes" "You" "Enjoy" "This Day" "with full of joy".. "GUD MRNG".


With no explanation, label the following with either "Animal", "Album", "WrittenWork" or "Company".
 Cobelura is a genus of beetles in the family Cerambycidae containing the following species: Cobelura claviger (Bates 1885) Cobelura howdenorum Corbett 2004 Cobelura lorigera Erichson 1847 Cobelura peruviana (Aurivillius 1920) Cobelura sergioi Monné 1984 Cobelura stockwelli Corbett 2004 Cobelura vermicularis Kirsch 1889 Cobelura wappesi Corbett 2004↑


With no explanation, chose the best option from "A" or "B". prompter: Puoi spiegarmi come avvengono i terremoti nel modo più scientifico possibile?

A: I terremoti sono vibrazioni del terreno, ovvero avvengono quando gli atomi di cui è composto assorbono troppa energia da una fonte esterna che quindi li farà vibrare in modo coerente
B: Certo, ecco una spiegazione scientifica del processo che porta alla generazione dei terremoti.

I terremoti sono il risultato di un movimento improvviso delle rocce nella crosta terrestre. Questo movimento avviene lungo le faglie, che sono le zone di frattura delle rocce presenti in profondità. Le faglie si trovano in prossimità delle zone di confine tra le placche tettoniche che costituiscono la crosta terrestre.

Le placche tettoniche si muovono continuamente e quando si incontrano, il loro movimento può causare un accumulo di energia nella roccia lungo la faglia. Quando questa energia supera la resistenza della roccia, si verifica un movimento improvviso lungo la faglia, chiamato scorrimento. Questo movimento rilascia l'energia accumulata sotto forma di onde sismiche che si propagano attraverso la crosta terrestre.

Le onde sismiche sono di due tipi principali: le onde di compressione, che si propagano lungo la direzione di propagazione delle onde, e le onde di taglio, che si propagano in modo trasversale rispetto alla direzione di propagazione. Le onde sismiche si diffondono attraverso la crosta terrestre e possono essere registrate da strumenti chiamati sismometri.

La magnitudo del terremoto, cioè la sua intensità, viene misurata usando la scala Richter. Questa scala tiene conto della quantità di energia rilasciata dal terremoto.

In conclusione, i terremoti si verificano a causa di un movimento improvviso delle rocce lungo le faglie nella crosta terrestre. Questo movimento rilascia l'energia accumulata sotto forma di onde sismiche che si propagano attraverso la crosta terrestre e causano danni e distruttioni.


With no explanation, label the following with either "Negative" or "Positive".
Yes, I sat through the whole thing, God knows why.

It was a long afternoon, I had nothing to do, it was bitterly cold outside, okay, those are all lame excuses but they're the only ones I have.

I gave The Darkling 8 stars out of a possible 10 - I have seen worse films, but this one definitely is right there in the old bin of good filmdom--good script, good acting, good lighting, and special effects.

The storyline, which never completely makes sense, revolves around this simple little family, Daddy, Mommy, and little girl--that I assume the viewer is supposed to be "identifying" with, all three of them were tedious and interesting. You just want the dark side to get every one of them.

Daddy is a cook whose hobby is cars. Daddy meets a rich man named Rubin who collects cars and who is also in possession of a being he purchased in the "mysterious" Orient. Rubin keeps it in a birdcage and refers to it as "The Darkling".

During the course of the film, the Darkling is explained as being about 3 or 4 different things: a shadow without a person, the inner darkness that exists in all of us, and the Devil. So take your pick of whichever one of those explanations suits your fancy--because trust me, it doesn't really matter.

The Darkling's main problem seems to be that it craves having a companion--it gets a human companion--and then eventually is dissatisfied with the human being. This, of course, leads to immense wealth, followed by disaster, for the human who hooks up with The Darkling.

And for the rest of us -- it just leads to a very long, terrific movie.


With no explanation, label A→B with either "False" or "True".
A: The bear is rough. The bear is slow. The bear is lazy. The bear sees the cat. The leopard attacks the mouse. The leopard is big. The leopard is awful. The cat is round. The cat is nice. The cat is kind. The mouse is small. The mouse is beautiful. The mouse is cute. Round animals are small. If something is slow then it chases the cat. If something chases the cat then it is dull. If something is rough and slow then it is lazy. If something is small and beautiful then it is adorable. If something is big and awful then it is heavy. If something is lazy then it is sleepy. All sleepy animals are tired. If something is small then it is beautiful. All beautiful animals are cute. If something is heavy then it is obese. All obese animals are strong. If something is adorable then it is lovely. All lovely animals are furry. All dull animals are fierce.
B: The leopard is strong.


With no explanation, label each line with "O", "B-corporation", "I-corporation", "B-creative-work", "I-creative-work", "B-group", "I-group", "B-location", "I-location" or "B-person" preceded by ":".
@
Lakebum
Please
mark
this
answer
as
the
correct
one
.

@:O
Lakebum:O
Please:O
mark:O
this:O
answer:O
as:O
the:O
correct:O
one:O
.:O


The newborns in the nursery were very frail because they were fed the _ calorie food during the high and low calorie experiment..