Iransko-irački rat bio je rat koji se vodio između Iraka i Irana tijekom većeg dijela osamdesetih godina dvadesetog stoljeća, od 1980. do 1988. godine. Nakon osam godina borbi, rat je ekonomski iscrpio obje države i uzrokovao gubitak više od milijuna ljudskih života.

 Nazivi rata
lijevo|mini|200px|U ime svoje "pobjede" u ratu, Saddam je 1985. godine u Bagdadu dao podignuti monumentalni spomenik "Mačevi Kadisije". Do 1990. godine i Iračke invazije na Kuvajt, ovaj se sukob ponekad nazivao i "Zaljevskim ratom", ili "Perzijskim zaljevskim ratom". U Iranu se rat naziva "Nametnuta obrana" ili "Sveti rat". U Saddamovom, pak, Iraku, rat se nazivao "Sadamova Kadisija" ili "Sadamova slavna Kadisija". Ovime se prema službenom narativu Saddamove basističke stranke, aludiralo na Bitku kod Kadisije iz razdoblja arapske ekspanzije u 7. stoljeću, u kojoj su arapske vojske porazile vojske Sasanidske Perzije. Iran se do 1935. godine zvao Perzija.

 Uvod
 Odnos snaga prije rata
Zahvaljujući šahu Mohammedu Reza Pahlaviju, Iran je tijekom 1970-ih postao superioran Iraku u gotovo svim granama oružanih snaga.Karsh (2002) Osim što je raspolagalo s većim brojem letjelica, iransko je ratno zrakoplovstvo zahvaljujući šahovim dobrim odnosima s SAD-om nabavilo tada najmodernije američke lovce/presretače F-14 Tomcat.

Najveća razlika bila je u mornarici gdje Irak s obalom od svega 58 kilometara (naspram Iranske od 2400 km) nije mogao ustrojiti ozbiljniju pomorsku silu. Tako se Iračka mornarica sastojala od 12 brzih napadnih brodova kojima su bili suprostavljeni iranski razarači, fregate, korvete, raketne topovnjače itd.

Odnos kopnenih snaga bio je nešto izjednačeniji. Iako je Iran brojčano bio jači (280.000 prema 190.000), broj vojnih formacija bio je podjednak. Broj tenkova bio je gotovo isti (1800 prema 1750), s naglskom da je Irak bio stručan u gotovo svim oblicima oklopne borbe.

Ovakve odnose snaga poljuljala je Iranska revolucija koja se dogodila 1979. godine. Nakon preuzimanja vlasti, nova islamistička vlast u Iranu započela je sustavne čistke iranskih oružanih snaga smatrajući ih najvjerojatnijim izvorom potencijalne proturevolucije i neistomišljenika. Na posebnom udaru nove islamističke politike našli su se djelatnici zrakoplovstva zbog čega su mnogi piloti i tehničari završili u zatvorima.

 Alžirski dogovor iz 1975.
Irak i Iran imali su teritorijalni spor na rijeci Šat al-Arab, koji je 1975. godine prividno bio riješen Alžirskim dogovorom. Do dogovora je došlo nakon što je tadašnji šahov režim potpomagao kurdsku pobunu u Iraku, pa je Saddam Hussein u zamjenu za prestanak šahove potpore Kurdima, pristao na koncesije u iransku korist. Iako se tada činilo da je dogovor postignut, irački lideri tim dogovorom zapravo su bili uvrijeđeni, pa su s padom šahova režima i zapadanja Irana u revolucionarni kaos ponovo počeli isticati stare pretenzije na ovo područje a Saddam je dogovor jednostrano proglasio ništavnim.

 Tijek rata

lijevo|mini|200px|Dva iranska vojnika tijekom uličnih borbi za Horamšar.
 Iračka invazija
U rujnu 1980. godine Irak započinje invaziju na naftom bogatu iransku pokrajinu Huzestan, koja se nalazila s iranske strane rijeke, kako bi povećavajući rezerve nafte svoju državu prometnuo u regionalnu velesilu. U Huzestanu se također nalazio i značajan postotak arapskog stanovništva, pa se Saddam pred njima htio prikazati kao osloboditelj, nadajući se njihovoj pobuni, koja se kako je vrijeme pokazalo, nikada nije dogodila. U rujnu 1980. godine Saddam je pokrenuo kopneni napad na ovu iransku provinciju zamišljen u stilu blitzkriega. U prvoj fazi napada iračko zrakoplovstvo napalo je iranske zračne baze želeći uništiti iransko zrakoplovstvo na zemlji, no učinci njihovog djelovanja su bili gotovo nikakvi. Zatim je krenuo napad iračkih tenkovskih divizija u dubinu iranskog teritorija prema Huzestanu, koje je usporio žilav otpor Iranaca oko grada Horamšara.

Iako su nakon dva mjeseca teških uličnih borbi za Horamšar Iračani uspjeli okupirati grad, njihova ofanziva nepovratno je izgubila je na zamahu i elementu iznenađenja, pa su se Iranci uspjeli konsolidirati a rat je postao statičan.Kao odgovor na iračku invaziju, iransko je zrakoplovstvo idućeg dana napalo ciljeve u dubini iračkog teritorija, gađajući naftnu industriju, brane i petrokemijska postrojenja. Iranski jurišni helikopteri, izveli su nekoliko prepada na iračke snage unutar teritorija Irana, uništivši nešto oklopnih vozila, no iračku ofanzivu nisu u potpunosti zaustavili.Modern Warfare: Iran–Iraq War (dokumentarni film). Do godine 1981., rat je ušao u pat poziciju, postavši statičan poput velikih rovovskih bitaka tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata, no istovremeno vođen suvremenim oružjima primjerenim kasnom 20. stoljeću.Farrokh, Kaveh, Iran at War: 1500–1988. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-221-4.Pollack, Kenneth M. (2004). "Iraq". Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-8783-9.

 Taktike ljudskih valova
desno|270px|mini|Poginuli iranski vojnik nosi fotografiju ajatolaha Homeinija na svojoj uniforni
Budući da je Iran imao manjak teškog naoružanja, ali mnogo veći broj stanovnika, njihovi su se ratni napori počeli oslanjati na brojnost u ljudstvu, odnosno fanatične, ali slabo obučene i opremljene mladiće (ponekad i maloljetne) koje su zvali basidži. Oni bi inače kao topovsko meso prvi jurišali prema iračkim prednjim crtama, katkad čisteći minska polja svojim tijelima. Nakon njihovog juriša, nastupala je iranska Revolucionarna garda čiji je zadatak bio probijanje načetih iračkih linija obrane, dok bi potom nastupala regularna vojska s mehaniziranim pješaštvom, koje bi manevarskim ratovanjem nastojalo okružiti neprijatelja. Ovakve taktike, dovele su do nekoliko teških iračkih poraza, iako su bile izrazito krvave za iransku stranu koja ih je provodila.

 Istjerivanje Iračana iz Irana 1982.
Iran je u prvoj polovici 1982. godine, pokrenuo operacije: Neosporna pobjeda i Beit ol Moqaddas, ostvarivši nekoliko pobjeda nad Saddamovim vojskom, da bi zatim u ožujku iste godine iranska vojska oslobodila i Horamšar od iračkih okupatora. Ovi porazi uzdrmali su i brojčano oslabili Iračku vojsku, pa se Saddam Hussein odlučio na povlačenje svojih snaga iz većeg dijela Irana. Također je za kaznu dao pogubiti sav onaj časnički kadar kojeg je smatrao odgovornim za nedavne poraze. Dana 20. lipnja 1982., Irak je zatražio prekid neprijateljstava i ponudio potpuno povlačenje iz Irana kroz idućih dva tjedna. Međutim, vrhovni vođa Irana - Ruholah Homeini, ne samo da ponudu nije prihvatio, nego je i najavio da rat neće završiti dok Iran ne sruši Sadamom basistički režim, naplati ratna odštetu a Irak transformira u islamsku republiku. Sljedećih pet godina, Irak je uglavnom proveo u defenzivi, dok je iranska strana u nastavku rata pokrenula više od sedamdeset ofenziva prema teritoriju Iraka.lijevo|mini|270px|Karta prikazuje kako su se pomicale bojišnice tijekom rata. Ljubičasta područja su teritorij Irana kojeg je Saddamova vojska okupirala u ratnim operacijama a žutom bojom označen je teritorij Iraka, kojeg je u protunapadima zauzele Oružane snage Irana.
 Okršaji na granici
Iračka vojska ojačana tehnikom koja im je stigla iz Sovjetskog Saveza, ustrojila je na svojim granicama nekoliko profesionalno složenih linija obrane kojima su se branili po dubini. Kada bi Iranci pokrenuli svoje napade ljudskim valovima, iračka vojska bi se povukla a Iranci bi zbog konfiguracije obrane bili kanalizirani u zone uništenja gdje bi ih prvo prikovala snažna topnička vatra kombinirana s napadima zrakoplovstva a zatim bi ih iračko oklopništvo i mehanizirano pješaštvo u potpunosti istjeralo. Na taj način Iračani su željeli Irancima u kontinuitetu nanositi velike gubitke i tako "iskrvariti" mobilizacijski potencijal Irana za daljnji nastavak rata.

 Bitka za močvare
Pokretanjem Operacije Hajbar, u veljači 1984. godine iranska se je vojska pokušala probiti kroz močvarna područja na iračko-iranskoj granici koristeći čamce i transportne helikoptere. Na taj su način željeli presjeći komunikacije između iračke prijestolnice Bagdada i grada Basre na jugu Iraka. Iako je Iran pretrpio teške gubitke kad je iračka lovačka avijacija presrela pedesetak otpravljenih iranskih transportnih helikoptera CH-47 Chinook, od kojih se tek jedan uspio vratiti, Iranci su uspjeli uspostaviti kontrolu nad strateški važnim otokom Qurna. Iransko pješaštvo koje se probijalo kroz močvarne vode na granici, Iračani su ubili strujom postavljanjem električnih kablova u močvarnu vodu a zatim, prema pisanju LA Timesa, od tijela gomile ubijenih Iranaca izgradili cestu kroz močvarni teren. Unatoč teškim gubicima, koristeći silinu brojeva, Iranci su se probili kroz močvare, samo da bi ispred njih naletjeli na nove linije iračke obrane, s kojih su se Iračani branili upotrebom: topništva, zrakoplovstva, tenkova ali i bojnog otrova Iperita.

 Rat gradova
Početkom 1984. godine, Saddam se upustio u teroristička bombardiranja iranskih gradova, želeći demoralizirati stanovništvo Irana koja su prozvana "ratom gradova". Iračke oružane snage provodile su zračna bombardiranja iranskih gradova i napade korištenjem mobilnih raketnih lansera "R-300 Elbrus" - NATO naziva Scud. U ovim napadima pogibali su na tisuće iranskih građana. Iran je u međuvremenu nabavio vlastite Scud projektile iz Rusije i Libije i počeo uzvraćati raketnu paljbu po iračkim gradovima poput Bagdada.

 Tankerski rat
Godine 1984. počeo je "Tankerski rat", nakon što je Irak proglasio svo brodovlje koje ulazi/izlazi iz iranskih luka podložno napadima. Na taj način, Irak je želio isprovocirati disproporcionalni odgovor Irana, poput blokade Hormuškog tjesnaca, što bi onda u rat zapetljalo Sjedinjene Američke Države budući da je Bijela kuća nekoliko puta prijetila intervencijom bude li tjesnac zatvoren.

 Izraelski zračni napad
Glavni članak:Operacija Opera

Usprkos anticionizmu Imama Homeinija, Izrael je surađivao s Iranom.  Tijekom 1970-ih Irak je pokušao nagovoriti Francusku da mu proda nuklearni reaktor sličan onima koji su korišteni u francuskom programu za razvoj oružja. Francuska je to odbila, ali je pristala prodati dijelove i pomoći u izgradnji eksperimentalnog reaktora Osirak u nuklearnom centru Tuwaitha nedaleko Bagdada.

Izrael je ustvrdio da Irak razvija nuklearno oružje. Strahujući da bi Irak mogao u budućnosti napasti Izrael, premijer Menachem Begin je poslao nekoliko ratnih zrakoplova tipa F16 koji su u samo nekoliko sekundi reaktor pretvorili u ruševine. Izraelska vojska je tada priopćila da je napadom "nuklearni duh Bagdada vraćen nazad u bocu".  Izraelski napad je dočekan s osudom, čak i od Sjedinjenih Država, tradicionalnog izraelskog saveznika.

 Kemijsko oružje
Zna se da je Irak od 1983. koristio bojni otrov iperit, a od 1985. i nervni bojni otrov tabun protiv iranskog pješaštva i slabo obučenih dobrovoljaca. Tabun ih je ubijao u vrlo kratkom vremenu.

Godine 1988. Irak je kemijsko oružje upotrijebio protiv Kurda na sjeveru zemlje.  Neke kurdske gerilske jedinice pridružile su se iranskoj ofenzivi. Dana 16. ožujka 1988. Irak je na kurdski grad Halabju bacio bombe punjene bojnim otrovima iperit, sarin i tabun. Procjenuje je se da je poginulo od 3 200 do 5 000 civila, dok su mnogi preživjeli bili suočeni s dugotrajnim zdravstvenim problemima.  Kemijsko oružje je korišteno i tijekom iračke ofenzive pod nazivom Anfal, sedmomjesečne kampanje u kojoj je korištena taktika spaljene zemlje i u kojoj je ubijeno ili nestalo između 50 000 i 100 000 Kurda. Tada je uništeno i stotine sela.

Vijeće sigurnosti Ujedinjenih naroda donijelo je rezoluciju kojom je osuđena upotreba kemijskog oružja. No, Sjedinjene Države i druge vlade zapadnog svijeta počele su u završnim fazama rata pružati vojnu i političku podršku Bagdadu.

 Podrška Zapada
Zapad je pod izlikom sprječavanja širenja iranskog utjecaja u regiji otvoreno stao na iračku stranu. Godine 1982. Sjedinjene Države su uklonile Irak s popisa država koje podržavaju terorizam. Dvije godine nakon toga uspostavljeni su diplomatski odnosi, koji su bili prekinuti još od arapsko-izraelskog rata 1967.
Glavni irački dostavljač oružja bio je njegov dugogodišnji saveznik - SSSR.

No, nekoliko zapadnih država, uključujući Britaniju, Francusku i Sjedinjene Države, potajno je prodavalo oružje i vojnu opremu Iraku, a Amerikanci su sa Sadamovim režimom surađivali i na obavještajnom planu.
Skandal «Irangate», kojim je otkriveno da su Sjedinjene Države potajno prodavale oružje Iranu pokušavajući isposlovati oslobađanje američkih talaca iz zatočeništva u Libanonu, izazvao je nesuglasice između Washingtona i Bagdada.

U završnim fazama rata Iran i Irak su svoje vojne snage usmjerili na napade na naftne tankere u Perzijskom zaljevu pokušavajući tako onemogućiti jedan drugog da ostvare prihod od izvoza nafte. Američki, britanski i francuski ratni brodovi bili su upućeni u Zaljev, gdje je nekoliko kuvajtskih tankera plovilo pod američkom zastavom i vojnom pratnjom kako bi se spriječilo Iran da ih napadne.

Još 1982. godine američki predsjednik Ronald Reagan je izjavio da će SAD napraviti što god je potrebno da Irak ne bi izgubio rat.Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-Up Tijekom "tankerskog rata" američki ratni brodovi su 1988. godine uništili više iranskih naftnih platformi i greškom, kako su tvrdile vlasti u Washingtonu, oborili iranski putnički zrakoplov s 290 civila.

 Mir i dug
mini|270px|Spomen ploča poginulima Irancima tijekom rata
Prekid vatre stupio je na snagu mjesec dana kasnije, 20. kolovoza, a u to su područje upućene mirovne snage Ujedinjenih naroda. Rat nije bitnije promijenio granicu između dvije države, no cijena osmogodišnjeg ratovanja u ljudskim žrtvama i posljedicama po gospodarstvo je bila ogromna i za Irak i za Iran. Procjenjuje se da je poginulo 400 tisuća ljudi, a da ih je ranjeno čak 750 tisuća. Tijela poginulih su otkrivana sve do nedavno, neka su pronađena prošle godine. Ekonomska cijena rata je, prema nekima, za svaku zemlju iznosila više od 400 milijardi dolara. U taj iznos su uključeni troškovi razaranja te procjena o izgubljenom prihodu zbog otežane proizvodnje i izvoza nafte.

 Izvori

 Literatura
Efraim Karsh - "The Iran-Iraq War 1980 - 1988.", Osprey Publishing, 2002,
Stephen C. Pelletiere - "The Iran - Iraq war: Chaos in a vacuum", Praeger, 1992,

 Vanjske poveznice

 Dokumentarac o ratu
 Lista kompanija i zemalja koje su prodale kemijska oružja Iraku
 Opširnije o ratu, s linkovima
 Video snimke rata
Irački nervni agensi
Paul Reynolds. 'Kako je Sadam osramotio Zapad', BBC, 16. prosinca 2003.
Globalna karta zemalja koje su stale na stranu u Iračko-iranskom ratu

Kategorija:Ratovi
Kategorija:Iračka vojna povijest
Kategorija:Iranska vojna povijest

In the name of his "defeat" in the war, Saddam in 1985 in Baghdad gave up a monumental monument "Kadisi's Fighters".

Until the 1990s and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this conflict was sometimes called the "Zalev War" or the "Persian Gulf War".

Question: when did saddam give up kadisi's fighters

In the name of his "defeat" in the war, Saddam in 1985 in Baghdad gave up a monumental monument "Kadisi's Fighters".

Until the 1990s and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this conflict was sometimes called the "Zalev War" or the "Persian Gulf War".

when did saddam give up kadisi's fighters

Question: in which city did the iransko-irački rat give up a monument

in which city did the iransko-irački rat give up a monument

Question: what monument did saddam give up in baghdad

what monument did saddam give up in baghdad

Question: who gave up the monument kadisi's fighters

who gave up the monument kadisi's fighters

Question: when did the persian gulf war end

Question: what is another name for the zalev war

Question: what was the persian gulf war called until the 1990s

what was the persian gulf war called until the 1990s

In the name of his " defeat " in the war , Saddam in 1985 in Baghdad gave up a monumental monument " Kadisi 's Fighters " .

Until the 1990s and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait , this conflict was sometimes called the " Zalev War " or the " Persian Gulf War " .

Nazivi rata U ime svoje "pobjede" u ratu, Saddam je 1985. godine u Bagdadu dao podignuti monumentalni spomenik "Mačevi Kadisije". Do 1990. godine i Iračke invazije na Kuvajt, ovaj se sukob ponekad nazivao i "Zaljevskim ratom", ili "Perzijskim zaljevskim ratom".

Nazivi rata U ime svoje "pobjede" u ratu, Saddam je 1985. godine u Bagdadu dao podignuti monumentalni spomenik "Mačevi Kadisije".

Do 1990. godine i Iračke invazije na Kuvajt, ovaj se sukob ponekad nazivao i "Zaljevskim ratom", ili "Perzijskim zaljevskim ratom".

In the name of his "defeat" in the war, Saddam in 1985 in Baghdad gave up a monumental monument "Kadisi's Fighters". Until the 1990s and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this conflict was sometimes called the "Zalev War" or the "Persian Gulf War".

In the name of his "defeat" in the war, Saddam in 1985 in Baghdad gave up a monumental monument "Kadisi's Fighters".

Until the 1990s and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, this conflict was sometimes called the "Zalev War" or the "Persian Gulf War".

In Saddam, then, Iraq, the war was called "Saddam's Kadis" or "Saddam's famous Kadis".

This, according to the official narrative of the Saddam Basic Party, aludited to the Battle of Kadesia from the period of Arab expansion in the 7th century, in which the Arab troops defeated the troops of Sasanid Persia.

Rhetoric espoused by the Baʿthi regime of Iraq reflected a deliberate mix of nationalistic and religious elements, most clearly expressed in the discourse surrounding the war with Iran, termed ‘Saddam's Qadisiyyah’, after a battle during the Arab-Islamic conquests, which Saddam Husayn turned into a metaphor for Arab-Iranian relations. As the memory of the seventh century engagement was popularized in Iraq, Qadisiyyah nomenclature spread throughout the Arab world (and beyond) and Saddam's political paradigm found acceptance among Arab governments and western observers alike. Saddam used this propaganda campaign to three ends: (1) to portray the political conflict with Iran as an ancient ethnic clash; (2) to promote his cult of personality; and (3) to present a successful precedent for Arab victory over Iran. In doing so, Saddam forged a new ‘Arab-Islamist’ discourse, combining religious faith with nationalist sentiment, which he embraced with increasing reliance to the end of his rule. Today, radical Sunni Islamist groups have assumed the mantle of this rhetoric.
Notes
A version of this article was presented at the 5th annual conference of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa, 11–13 Oct. 2012. It is based on part of my doctoral dissertation ‘Qādisiyyah, Then and Now: A Case Study of History and Memory, Religion, and Nationalism in Middle Eastern Discourse’ (Brandeis University, 2011). I thank Avigdor Levy (Brandeis), David Powers (Cornell), and Kanan Makiya (Brandeis) for their helpful comments and suggestions. It goes without saying, but bears affirmation, that any errors, whether clerical, factual, or analytical, are entirely my own.
1. L. Thurgood, ‘Iron Will, Iron Fist: Facing Multi-billion Dollar Debts, a Shattered Economy and Foreign Outrage at his Tactics and Treatment of the Kurds, Saddam Hussain's Vision of a Glorious Iraqi Future is Yellowing at the Edges’, The Guardian, 4 Sept. 1989.
2. ‘The “Liberation” of Muhammarah/Khuninshahr’, Iraq News Agency (hereafter INA) (24 Oct. 1980, 1400 GMT), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC/SWB) ME/6559 (25 Oct. 1980), p.A9; A. ash-Shahid, ‘The “Liberation” of Muhammarah/Khuninshahr’, Voice of the Masses (hereafter VOM) (24 Oct. 1980, 1209 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6559 (27 Oct. 1980), p.A9; ‘Iranian Military Communiques’ (10 Feb. 1983, 1036 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7252 (11 Feb. 1983), p.A10; ‘Iranian Military Communiques’ (10 Feb. 1983, 1638 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7256 (12 Feb. 1983), p.A4; Maj.-Gen. M. ʿAbd ar-Rashid, ‘Corps Commander's Message to Iraqi President’, VOM (28 Feb. 1984, 1305 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7580 (1 March 1984), p.A1; ‘Defence Minister Visits Qadisiyah Forces Command’, Republic of Iraq Radio (RIR) (28 Sept. 1993, 1800 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1807/MED (30 Sept. 1993).
3. War Information Headquarters of the Supreme Defence Council (WIHSDC), Animosity to Peace (Tehran: Kayhan Press, 1987), p.34; R. Cruz Johnson, ‘La Tormenta que destruyo la armada de Iraq’, Revista de Marina, Vol.115, No.837 (1997), p.6. Animosity to Peace, an official Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) publication, alleged that the selection of ‘QS’ ‘was no doubt inspired from Saddam's speech at a military base by this name’. Following Saddam's fall, al-Qadisiyyah Airbase, the second-largest in Iraq, became al-Asad Airbase.
4. O. Bengio, Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.79, 184; Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., Vol.9 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), s.v. ‘Ṣiḥāfa (vii. ʿIrāḳ)’, p.561b; O. Raw-Rees, ‘The Iraqi Order of Qadassiya Saddam’, Journal of the Orders and Medals Society of America, Vol.55 (2004), pp.32–6; Saddam Husayn, ‘Iraqi Amnesty for Deserters and those Failing to Enlist’, VOM (12 Feb. 1983, 1205 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7257 (14 Feb. 1983), p.A9; idem, ‘Iraqi President says Faw Victory Marks a Better Future for Arabs’, INA (21 April 1988, 1725 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0133 (23 April 1988), p.A1; idem, ‘Iraq Saddam Husayn Addresses Awards Ceremony’, VOM (27 Sept. 1988, 1700 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0269 (29 Sept. 1988), p.A1; ‘Iraq Adviser to President Appointed’, INA (13 July 1989, 1355 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0509 (15 July 1989), p.A1; ‘Saddam Reportedly Executes Senior Army Officer Opposition Radio Claims’, Voice of the Iraqi Opposition (19 July 1991, 1637 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1130 (22 July 1991), p.A1; ‘TV Calls on Saddam's Fedayeen to Join Units’, Iraqi TV (8 Nov. 1997, 2055 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/D3072/MED (10 Nov. 1997); ‘London-based Paper Reports “Liquidation” of Iraqi Officers’, London ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 28 May 2000 (BBC/SWB ME/D3853/MED, 30 May 2000). Raw-Rees provides a detailed account of the insignia, including images of the various medals, swords, stars, and brooches.
5. A one-dinar coin from 1980 also depicts the profile of Saddam with an Arab warrior charging forward in the background.
6. For a detailed study of Baʿthi postage stamps, including 20 examples, see D.M. Reid, ‘The Postage Stamp: A Window on Saddam Hussein's Iraq’, Middle East Journal, Vol.47 (1993), pp.77–89. See also Encyclopædia of Islam, 2nd ed., Vol.8 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), s.v. ‘Posta’, pp.331a–333a.
7. A. Baram, Between Impediment and Advantage: Saddam's Iraq (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), pp.5–6; ‘Qadisiyah Hydro Project Opened’, INA (28 July 1986, 1530 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/W1401 (5 Aug. 1986), p.A4; ‘Saddam Husayn Orders Construction of “Fifth River” Project’, RIR (31 Jan. 1993, 1500 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1601 (2 Feb. 1993), p.A7; ‘Saddam Husayn Informed of Completion of Qadisiyah River’, INA (20 March 1993, 1350 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1644 (23 March 1993); ‘President's Adviser Inaugurates Fifth River’, INA (30 March 1993, 1530 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1644, 1652 (1 April 1993), p.A2; ‘Saddam Husayn Orders Funds for Irrigation Project in Salah al-Din’, INA (27 Nov. 1994, 1130 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/W0362/MEW (6 Dec. 1994); ‘Central Bank to Issue 250-dinar Banknote’, INA (22 Jan. 1995, 1450 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/W0369/MEW (31 Jan. 1995); H. Partow, The Mesopotamian Marshlands: Demise of an Ecosystem (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 2001), pp.23–5, 45; ‘Iraqi Engineers Manufacture Steel-production Equipment’, INA (9 Feb. 1995, 1100 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/W0371/MEW (14 Feb. 1995); S.R. Scott, Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 15th February 1996 for the Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1996), pp.592–3. Several munitions factories were named after al-Qadisiyyah, as well as other symbols of the Arab-Islamic conquest.
8. S. Boseley, ‘Iraq Displays Happy Kurds’, Guardian, 17 Sept. 1988. Other al-Qadisiyyahs existed, as well; see R. Mckay, ‘Life or Death?’, Scotland on Sunday, 19 April 1998, p.10; A. Badkhen, ‘“Graduation” for Iraqi Troops’, San Francisco Chronicle, 9 Dec. 2005, p.A1.
9. E.M. Davis, ‘The Museum and the Politics of Social Control in Modern Iraq’, in J.R. Gillis (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.99.
10. P. Balta, Iran–Irak: Une guerre de 5000 ans (Paris: Anthropos, 1987), p.134.
11. M. Curtius, ‘Iraqis Insulated from Economic, but not Human, costs in Gulf War’, Christian Science Monitor, 21 Nov. 1985, p.22.
12. J.-M. Cadiot, Quand l’Irak entra en guerre: La Qadissiyah de Saddam (Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1989), p.139; Bengio, Saddam's Word, p.174; Balta, Iran–Irak, p.134; WIHSDC, Animosity, p.34; Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's 19th August Speech: Israel and Syria’, INA (19 Aug. 1980, 1845 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6503 (21 Aug. 1980), p.A8. According to Cadiot, thousands of students participated in the ‘Camp of al-Qadisiyyah for Popular Work’, which consisted of 240 houses and invited youths from Moroccan, Tunisia, Guinea, Yugoslavia, and even Spain to take part.
13. W. Walther, ‘Studies in Human Psyche and Human Behavior under Political and Social Pressure: The Recent Literary Works of Fu’ad al-Takarli’, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol.19 (1997), p.21; M. Cooke, Women and the War Story (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1996), pp.226–7; A. Rohde, ‘Opportunities for Masculinity and Love: Cultural Production in Ba’thist Iraq during the 1980s’, in L. Ouzgane (ed.), Islamic Masculinities (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p.191; Bengio, Saddam's Word, p.174.
14. WIHSDC, Animosity, p.38; ‘Iranian Military Communiques and Reports’ (15 Aug. 1985, 1636 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/8032 (17 Aug. 1985), p.A1. Pointedly, the Iranian media began referring to Khorramshahr (‘the pleasant city’) as ‘Khuninshahr’ (‘city of blood’); ‘Can Iraq Stop Short of Trying to Knock Iran to Bits?’, The Economist, 25 Oct. 1980, p.63.
15. L.C. Soley, ‘The Political Context of Clandestine Radio Broadcasting in 1981’, Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, Vol.27 (1983), p.246; ‘The “Voice of Qadisiyah from Ahvaz”’, Sawt Qadisiyyah min al-Ahwaz (3 March 1981, 0500 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6664 (4 March 1981), p.A7; ‘“Voice of Ahvaz Revolution” on Khomeyni's Policies’, Sawt ath-Thawrah al-Ahwaziyyah (31 Jan. 1983, 0705 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7247 (2 Feb. 1983), p.A1. In 1983, the station changed its name to the ‘Voice of the Ahvazi Revolution’ (Sawt ath-Thawrah al-Ahwaziyyah). Ahvaz, or al-Ahwaz in Arabic, is the capital of Khuzestan Province and an ancient city captured during the Arab-Islamic conquests. Its name derives probably from the Arabic broken plural of Khuzi, the ancient Elamite people who lived in this region, and whose name is also the origin of the province itself.
16. The description of this term as a propaganda campaign was confirmed by detailed intelligence documents that fell into western hands following the 1991 war; A. Adib-Moghaddam, ‘Inventions of the Iran–Iraq War’, Critique, Vol.16 (2007), p.68. See also I. al-Marashi, ‘An Insight into the Mindset of Iraq's Security Apparatus’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.18 (2003), pp.1–23. The Baʿth had already acknowledged its techniques in a 1977 article titled ‘Hawl ad-diʿayah wa-ʾt-tahrik al-jamahiri’ (On Propaganda and Mass Mobilization), which noted that mass mobilization was a matter of ‘science and art’; cited in Bengio, Saddam's Word, p.9. Some observers have claimed that the regime emphasized the Qadisiyyah parallel less as the war with Iran dragged on; Cadiot, Quand l’Irak entra en guerre: La Qadissiyah de Saddam, p.19. (Perhaps this stood behind the name change of Iraq's clandestine radio station in Khuzestan?; v.s., n.15.) The incongruence of the analogy between the two confrontations, given the duration of the modern engagement, is not lost on contemporaries; Cadiot, Qadisiyyah de Saddam, p.152; P.E. Salem, ‘Saddam Hussein's Qadisiyah: The Iran–Iraq War Marks its Fifth Anniversary', in D.H. Partington (ed.), The Middle East Annual: Issues and Events (Boston: G K Hall, 1986), p.125. However, the Baʿth's resolute insistence on referring to the latter as QS, as inferred from these documents, coupled with Saddam's continued references to al-Qadisiyyah during his remaining 15 years in power, prove that, at least for him, the symbolism retained its value.
17. Saddam Husayn, ‘President Visits Scene of Grenade Incident 2 Apr’, VOM (2 April 1980, 1200 GMT), FBIS-MEA 80-066 (3 April 1980), pp.E2–3; Saddam Husayn, ‘Iraqi President's 2nd April Speech on Grenade Incident’, VOM (2 April 1980, 1900 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6388 (4 April 1980), p.A3.
18. For example, in what may be his earliest reference to al-Qadisiyyah vis-à-vis relations between Iran and Iraq, Saddam told an interviewer that Iranians bear an abiding grudge against Arabs as a result of al-Qadisiyyah and that they seek to reverse the battle; cited in E. Karsh and I.R. Karsh, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography (New York City: Free Press, 1991), p.152.
19. Innumerable cases of the mention of these champions – Saʿd b. Abi Waqqas, al-Qaʿqaʿ b. ʿAmr, and Abu Mihjan ath-Thaqafi – as well as other early Islamic figures and even the later hero Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi, exist; see, for example, Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's Denial of Presence of Cuban Troops’, INA and VOM (17 Oct. 1979, 1600 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6249 (19 Oct. 1979), p.A1; Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's Id al-Adha Address’, (18 Oct. 1980, 2115 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6553 (20 Oct. 1980), p.A9; Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Says “Aggressors” to be “Buried in their own Coffin”’, INA (8 Aug. 2002, 0709 GMT), FBIS-NES 2002-0808 (8 Aug. 2002); ‘“Liberation” of Muhammarah’, p.A9; Iraqi Revolution Command Council, ‘Iraqi RCC Statement on Military Action against Iran’, RIR (22 Sept. 1980, 1143 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6531 (24 Sept. 1980), pp.A3–4; Iraqi Armed Forces General Command, ‘Iraqi Military Communiques’, VOM (10 Feb. 1983, 0830 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7255 (11 Feb. 1983), p.A1; ‘Baghdad Radio Encourages Troops to Crush “Evil Gathering”’, RIR (25 Feb. 1991, 0647 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1006 (26 Feb. 1991), p.A1.
20. Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's Speech on Conditions for Peace with Iran’, VOM (28 Sept. 1980, 2055 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6536 (30 Sept. 1980), p.A7. I have modified slightly the quotation from the original text, which has numerous typographical errors.
21. The imagery of Salah ad-Din and Hittin appears frequently in Saddam's discourse, but stands out as an exception amidst an array of early Islamic leaders and battles. One may attribute Saddam's choice of the Kurdish commander to ethnic reasons (to appeal to the Kurdish minority in Iraq) or patriotic ones (Salah ad-Din, like Saddam, was born in Takrit). Furthermore, the imagery of a Muslim leader defeating a western military force provided ample ammunition for Saddam's propaganda machine during his later confrontations with American-led coalitions.
22. Cited in O. Bengio, ‘Nation Building in Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Iraq’, in O. Bengio and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), Minorities and the State in the Arab world (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp.174–5. According to the journal, these ‘similarities’ were that both confrontations took place in Iraq, both followed ‘revolutionary ferment’, and both faced a larger and better-equipped Iranian opponent, yet ‘just as the Persians had been broken by Saʿd the first time, they would soon be broken by Saddam’.
23. Note (as above, n. 16) that for this reason, the regime required that all official documents refer to the war solely as QS; al-Marashi, ‘Insight’, p.3.
24. Cited in T. Atrissi, ‘The Image of Iranians in Arab Schoolbooks’, in K.D. Haseeb (ed.), Arab–Iranian Relations (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1998), pp.156–7. This also involved a careful re-imagining of early Islamic history. Thus, according to one text, Abu Luʾluʾah, the assassin of ʿUmar, acted out of ‘intense hatred for the Arab nation after the Arab victory in the battle of Qadisieh’; cited in ibid., p.157.
25. See, for example, Iraqi Armed Forces General Command, ‘Armed Forces General Command Communiques 3–4 Nov’, VOM (3 and 4 Nov. 1980, 1758 GMT & 0841 GMT), FBIS-MEA 80–215 (4 Nov. 1980), pp.E1–2; ‘“Voice of Ahvaz Revolution”’, p.A1; T.M.D. Maʿruf, ‘Iraqi Vice-President Notes Israel's Arms Supplies to Iran’, VOM (13 Nov. 1986, 1428 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/8417 (15 Nov. 1986), p.A1.
26. For example, note the case – typical for many pious believers – of the architect Mohamed Makiya, who, according to his son, ‘continued to maintain a certain reverent regard for Khomeini the entire time he was working for Saddam’; L. Weschler, ‘Architects amid the Ruins’, New Yorker, 6 Jan. 1992, p.55.
27. Reid, ‘Postage Stamp’, p.87. Makiya noted that the original plans for the Arch of Victory (v.i.) called for one of the ‘swords of al-Qadisiyyah’ to be Dhu al-Fiqar, although this was eliminated, probably for aesthetic reasons; K. Makiya, The Monument: Art, Vulgarity, and responsibility in Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p.11. In his speeches, Saddam also referred to Dhu al-Fiqar as ‘drawn against the infidels during the g[l]orious battles of Islam’; Saddam Husayn, ‘Conditions for Peace’, p.A7; W. Richey, ‘Iraqi Leader Fans Nationalist Pride to Offset Iran's Appeal to Shiites’, Christian Science Monitor, 29 Sept. 1987, p.7.
28. ‘“Voice of Ahvaz Revolution”’, p.A1.
29. A. Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baʿthist Iraq, 1968–89 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), p.110. See also pp.48–9.
30. Cited in Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.141.
31. S.K. Aburish, Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge (New York: Bloomsbury, 2000), p.201. For example, on the arrival of a symbolic force of Jordanian volunteers, known as the ‘Yarmuk Forces’, the Baʿth organ ath-Thawrah exclaimed: ‘Welcome to Yarmuk as it is embracing [the spirit of] Qadisiyah in the most honourable and proud stands of the Arabs in their con[t]emporary history’; ‘Reaction to Jordan's “Yarmuk Forces” for Iraq’, Baghdad ath-Thawrah, 29 Jan. 1982 (B.S.o.W.B. (BBC/SWB) ME/6942, 1 Feb. 1982), p.A1. Saddam made similar statements during a speech that he gave to the volunteers on 3 March 1982; see Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's Speech to the Jordanian Yarmuk Forces’ (3 March 1982, 1900 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6970 (5 March 1982), p.A2.
32. Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's Remarks on Arab War against Iran’, INA and VOM (27 Aug. 1983, 1550 GMT and 1600 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7425 (30 Aug. 1983), p.A1. Although Saddam was clearly showing his hand, he could not allow that statement to stand, lest it impugn Iraqi pride. He continued to state that ‘now’ Iraqis can fight the Persians ‘on their behalf’ alone, although he wondered aloud why no Arab states were coming to Iraq's assistance.
33. See WIHSDC, Animosity, p.34. Furthermore, numerous statements that mentioned ‘the traditional enemies of the nation’ referred not to the Iraqi nation, but to the Arab one; see, for example, Iraqi Armed Forces General Command, ‘Communiques’, pp.E1–2.
34. Saddam Husayn, ‘Conditions for Peace’, p.A7. Numerous other examples exist: in a telephone conversation with Saʿudi King Khalid (r. 1975–82); in a meeting between Tariq ʿAziz and the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (b. 1926); in missives borne by envoys from Saddam to ‘the kings and presidents of 27 countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia'; see BBC/SWB ME 6571 (10 Nov. 1980), p.I; BBC/SWB ME/6569 (7 Nov. 1980), p.A4; BBC/SWB ME/6545 (10 Oct. 1980), p.A10. On the identification of this phrase with the war, see T.A.J. Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq: From 636 to the Present (London: Pearson Longman, 2003), p.189; Karsh and Karsh, Saddam Hussein, pp.157–8.
35. Husayn I b. Talal, ‘King Husayn's Address to the Yarmuk Forces Volunteers’ (9 Feb. 1982, 1218 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6951 (11 Feb. 1982), p.A8.
36. C.M. Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1984). According to Davis, Helms sought to ‘foster the Baʿthist image of a beleaguered nation-state defending the Arab nation's borders from those, such as the Iranians, intent on undermining its unity’; E.M. Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p.165. See also P. Sluglett, review, H-Levant (2009), http://tinyurl.com/Sluglett2009.
37. See at-Tabari, Annales quos scripsit Abu Djafar Mohammed ibn Djarir at-Tabari, Vol.1 (Leiden: E J Brill, 1879 –1901), p.2228. For more on this term, see D.G. Lewental, ‘Qadisiyyah, Then and Now: A Case Study of History and Memory, Religion, and Nationalism in Middle Eastern discourse’ (PhD thesis, Brandeis University, 2011), p.366 n.1421. Whether or not this was a conscious parallel by Saddam is unclear. One might also note that Iranian leaders also viewed Iraq as ‘the “gate” through which Iran's “Islamic conquests” would commence’ – hence the popular slogan, ‘The road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala’ (rah-e Qods az Karbala migzarad); H. Ram, Myth and Mobilization in Revolutionary Iran: The Use of the Friday Congregational Sermon (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1994), pp.212–13; S.M. Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran (London and New York: I B Tauris, 1999), p.115. Consciously or unconsciously, both sides connected their struggle to the Arab-Islamic conquests through their use of the term ‘gate’.
38. M. Rida, ‘Qadisiyya: A New Stage in Arab Cinema’, Ur, Vol.3 (1981), p.40; Balta, Iran–Irak, p.134. According to Bengio, every movie theatre in Iraq screened the film; Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.174.
39. Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.172. The Iranian government would later claim the film's earlier date as proof of Iraqi ‘premeditation’; Balta, Iran–Irak, p.134.
40. ‘Warning to Egyptians in Iraq not to Fight Iran’, Tehran in Arabic for abroad (13 Oct. 1980, 1450 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6549 (15 Oct. 1980), p.A3.
41. E. O'sullivan, ‘With US Help, Iran Prepares to Reverse the Verdict of Qadisiyah’, MEED Middle East Economic Digest, Vol.49 (2005), p.56. Of course, not everybody accepted Saddam's reinterpretation of al-Qadisiyyah. In particular, the pro-IRI Syrian regime presented a more traditional account of the engagement in its schoolbooks, which attribute greater importance to the pre-Islamic encounter at Dhu Qar; al-Qadisiyyah is but ‘one of many battles the Arabs fought’; Atrissi, ‘Image’, p.170. Egyptian textbooks also failed to treat it as a national victory, describing it quickly and with little detail as ‘merely a historical event, and one of the stages of the Islamic conquest’; ibid., pp.175, 91. While Saʿudi schoolbooks referred to it as an ‘important battle’ and provided a detailed account of the battles on the Persian front, they neglected to attribute to Iranians any ‘special hatred towards Arabs’; ibid., p.183. Davis has argued that even Iraqi textbooks only superficially reflected the official Baʿthi narrative and, at times, ignored al-Qadisiyyah altogether; Davis, Memories, p.224; E.M. Davis, ‘Baghdad's Buried Treasure’, New York Times, 16 April 2003, p.A19. (However, this does not accord with Atrissi's detailed study; cf. Atrissi, ‘Image’, pp.155–68.)
42. G. Godsell, ‘Behind Iran–Iraq Clash: Battle to Control Gulf’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 April 1980, p.1; G. Godsell, ‘“Round 2” Could Put Iraq on Top in Centuries-old Arab-Persian War’, Christian Science Monitor, 30 Sept. 1980, p.1.
43. ‘How to Lose Arab Friends and Madden Almost Everybody’, The Economist, 12 April 1980, p.23.
44. ‘It all Goes Back to AD 637’, The Economist, 27 Sept. 1980, p.41; R.D. Kaplan, ‘History of Violence between Arabs and Persians Goes Back to 2700 BC’, Christian Science Monitor, 4 April 1984, p.18.
45. Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, pp.81–3; Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baʿthist Iraq, p.48.
46. Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, pp.79–80, 3–5, 193–4; Makiya, Monument, p.13; Cadiot, Quand l’Irak entra en guerre: La Qadissiyah de Saddam, p.139; E. McBride, ‘Monuments to Self’, Metropolis, Vol.18 (1999), p.68. As Bengio noted, Saddam could not explicitly compare himself to Muhammad without seeming blasphemous; however, he solved this problem creatively, by adopting the name ʿAbd-Allah and various titles starting with the word ‘messenger’ (rasul) – a term synonymous with Muhammad; by calling his biography a ‘sirah’, the name of the orthodox biography of Muhammad; by naming his personal aircraft al-Buraq, the name of Muhammad's legendary steed; by adopting a blessing following his own name in imitation of the pious expression added to Muhammad's name. Regarding al-Husayn, the most famous example of Saddam conjuring up his memory was when he inaugurated the Qaws an-Nasr (v.i.) riding atop a white stallion – as the Shiʿi martyr did at the Battle of Karbalaʾ; see Makiya, Monument, p.11; A.I. Ahram, ‘Iraq and Syria: The Dilemma of a Dynasty’, Middle East Quarterly, Vol.9 (2002), p.37; M. Roy, 'saddam's Arms: Nationalist and Orientalist Tendencies in Iraqi Monuments', Public, Vol.28 (2004), p.62.
47. Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baʿthist Iraq, p.78; Roy, ‘Saddam's Arms’, pp.61–2; McBride, ‘Monuments’, p.68.
48. Makiya, Monument, pp.3–4.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., pp.1–6; A. Gumbel, ‘Monumental Absurdities’, The Independent, 14 May 2007.
51. Cited in P.-J. Luizard, ‘Iraniens d’Irak, direction religieuse chiite et état arabe sunnite’, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, Vol.22 (1996), p.184.
52. Cited in Atrissi, ‘Image’, p.161. Atrissi cited another passage: ‘Our ancestors’ Qadisieh has been revived by the hero of Arabism and Islam, leader Saddam Hussein, and against the same Persian enemy'.
53. Makiya, Monument, p.13, plate 7.
54. Baram, Culture, History, and Ideology in the Formation of Baʿthist Iraq, plate 15.
55. Cited in Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.69; J.M. Long, Saddam's War of Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), p.79.
56. As al-Marashi noted, the name QS ‘revealed his vision of how the war should end: a decisive Arab victory over the Persian masses, leading to the complete surrender of the Iranian nation’; I. al-Marashi, ‘The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.7 (2003), pp.1–2. Perhaps Saddam himself believed (or hoped) that history would repeat itself. Makiya remarked that Saddam may have harboured hope that the Arabs of Khuzestan would defect to Iraq's side, much as many Arab tribes living in Iraq had joined the Muslim army at al-Qadisiyyah; K. Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p.286.
57. See, for example, Saddam Husayn, ‘Conditions for Peace’, p.A7; Saddam Husayn, ‘Id al-Adha Address’, p.A9; ‘Iraqi Military Communiques and Reports’ (18 and 19 Oct. 1984, 1200, 1705, 1130 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/7779 (20 Oct. 1984), p.A1; Maʿruf, ‘Iraqi Vice-President Notes Israel's Arms Supplies’, p.A1.
58. Saddam Husayn, ‘Id al-Adha Address’, p.A9.
59. Saddam recalled the legitimating precedent of earlier encounters in his later confrontations with the West. In 2001, an Iranian journalist quoted Saddam as having told a group of military figures, ‘Just as the second Caliph [ʿUmar] rose from Iraq and Medina to fight the Persians and the Romans, Arabs must rise today from within’; S.M. Ḥakim, ‘Iran: Article says Present Baghdad Regime Will Always be Hostile to Iran’, Sada-ye ʿEdalat, 15 Nov. 2001 (FBIS-NES 2001-1122, 22 Nov. 2001), p.2.
60. According to Makiya, if work commenced on the Martyrs Monument in April 1981, its planning must have begun many months earlier; likewise, the invitations to the inauguration of the Qaws an-Nasr state that Saddam conceived it in 1985 – ‘[i]ts conception therefore precedes the reality it is meant to commemorate’; Makiya, Monument, pp.23, 10. Similarly, production of the film al-Qadisiyyah began long before the outbreak of hostilities with Iran; v.s., n.39.
61. Iraqi Armed Forces General Command, ‘Iraqi Military Communiques and Reports’ (15 and 16 March 1985, 1705 GMT, 2013 GMT, 1958 GMT, 1014 GMT, 1025 GMT, 1246 GMT, 1402 GMT, 1540 GMT, 1803 GMT, 2151 GMT, 1940 GMT, 0715 GMT), BBC/SWB ME-7902 (18 March 1985), p.A1. Cooke highlighted the dangers of this ‘anticipatory representation’: ‘the fighters were the most burdened because they could only come into their own after winning the victory already said to be won’; Cooke, Women, p.231.
62. Saddam Husayn, ‘President Saddam Husayn's Message to Fourth Army Corps’, VOM and INA (30 March 1982, 1600 GMT & 1135 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/6993 (1 April 1982), p.A1 (emphasis added).
63. According to Denoeux, the blurring of the lines separating past, present, and future served to ‘convey an impression of powerful historical forces and cycles’ and to ‘ascribe meaning and a sense of predetermination to the disastrous situations’; G. Denoeux, ‘Saddam's Word: Political Discourse in Iraq’, Middle East Policy, Vol.6 (1998), p.212.
64. Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.163.
65. Ibid., p.169; R.S. Simon, ‘The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-nation State: The Case of Iraq during the Interwar Period, 1921–1941’, in J.P. Jankowski and I. Gershoni (eds.), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p.95; K. Abdi, ‘From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein's Cult of Personality: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iraqi National Ideology’, Journal of Social Archaeology, Vol.8 (2008), p.23.
66. Saddam Husayn, Hawla kitabat at-taʾrikh (Baghdad: Dar al-Ḥurriyyah li-ʾt-Ṭibaʿah, 1978); Davis, Memories, pp.xi, 171, 291 n. 172; Cooke, Women, p.231; K. Lenner, ‘Beyond the Republic of Fear: Symbolic domination in Baʿthist Iraq’, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS, Vol.32 (2007), p.5.
67. Cited in Davis, Memories, p.172; Abdi, ‘From Pan-Arabism’, p.23. According to Cooke, Saddam's intention was simple: ‘possess history lest it possess you. The past could, in fact should, be rewritten, the future should be created to precede and thus to transform an always already malleable present, the perfect simulacrum’; Cooke, Women, p.231.
68. ‘Saddam Meets Military Commanders’, I. TV (14 Nov. 1999, 1800 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/D3693/MED (16 Nov. 1999).
69. Cooke, Women, p.231. Saddam, Davis discerned, believed that ‘[h]istory writing must affirm the facts of the past and the linear trajectory of the future’; Davis, Memories, p.172.
70. Ironically, these very achievements on the battlefield were what put an end to the ethnic uniformity that had heretofore defined the early Muslim community. Nonetheless, this inconvenient truth was often overlooked.
71. Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, pp.2–32, 74–5; Makiya, Monument, p.11.
72. Abdullah, A Short History of Iraq, p.189; O. Bengio, ‘Baʿthi Iraq in Search of an Identity: Between Ideology and Praxis’, Orient, Vol.28 (1987), p.515.
73. D.F. Eickelman and J.P. Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.64. Furthermore, outside of the shrine of al-ʿAbbas stood a portrait of Saddam Husayn.
74. ‘Iraqi President in Saudi Arabia’, radio (28 Dec. 1986), ME/8452 (30 Dec. 1986), p.i. Eickelman and Piscatori noted that other Muslim leaders have attempted to gain religious legitimacy from the pilgrimage or public prayer, including Indonesian president Suharto (1921–2008) and Syrian dictator Hafiz al-Asad; Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, p.65.
75. Cited in B. Maddy-Weitzman, ‘Islam and Arabism: The Iran–Iraq War’, Washington Quarterly, Vol.5 (1982), p.186.
76. Long, Saddam's War, pp.70, 210 n.98; Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.188.
77. See Bengio, ‘Nation building’, pp.188–91, 72; Long, Saddam's War, pp.70–71. Other examples included the infamous Operation al-Anfal (1986–89), a genocidal campaign against the Kurds, led by the ‘Badr’ forces (named after the key early battle between Muhammad and his Makkan opponents that inspired the revelation of the Qurʾanic surah ‘al-Anfal’); al-Husayn and al-ʿAbbas missiles; the Muhammad, Salah ad-Din, Khalid b. al-Walid, al-Muthanna, and Tariq b. Ziyad army units.
78. In fact, al-Harrasi argued that Saddam did not simply use such Islamic terminology to describe the Persian Gulf crisis, but he also ‘adopted a conceptual metaphor in which the whole domain of early Islamic expansion struggles is mapped onto the contemporary political struggle of the Gulf war’; A.N.K. al-Harrasi, ‘Metaphor (in Arabic-into-English) Translation, with Specific Reference to Metaphorical Concepts and Expressions in Political Discourse’ (DPhil thesis, Aston University, 2001), p.227ff.
79. Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn's Victory Day Message Moves Against “Despicable Croesuses” Upheld’, RIR (7 Aug. 1990, 1700 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0838 (9 Aug. 1990), p.A1; Iraqi Revolution Command Council, ‘Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council Statement on Merger with Kuwait’, RIR (8 Aug. 1990, 1436 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0839 (10 Aug. 1990), pp.A1–3; Provisional Free Kuwait Government [Iraqi Occupying Regime], ‘“Provisional Free Kuwait Government” Issues Three Communiques’, VOM (2 Aug. 1990, 1126 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0833 (3 Aug. 1990), p.A1; ‘Iraq Says Volunteers in South Hastening to Defend the Kuwaiti “Revolution”’, INA (4 Aug. 1990, 0822 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0835 (6 Aug. 1990), p.A1. In his Victory Day speech, Saddam elaborated: ‘with God's help, it will also be a loyal son … and its consequences shall be the beginning of a new, lofty and rising stage, in which virtue will spread throughout the Arab homeland … New suns and moons will shine; stars will glitter; light will expel darkness; and lunar and solar eclipses will withdraw from the skies of Iraq and the Arab world’. See also Karsh and Karsh, Saddam Hussein, pp.224–6; Long, Saddam's War, pp.9, 94, 115. Regarding ‘the Mother of Battles’: this term (which means something like ‘the decisive battle’) is closely associated with the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah – even in the Western press (see, for example, W. Safire, ‘Degrading Attrition’, New York Times, 24 Feb. 1991, p.20). However, I have found no evidence of this term in texts written on the battle by pre-modern Muslim historians.
80. Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn Message Urges Arabs to “Defend Mecca, Resist the Invaders”’, RIR (10 Aug. 1990, 1500 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0841 (13 Aug. 1990), p.A1. Although the Battle of Hittin initially appears out of place, its significance as a major defeat of western ‘imperialist’ Crusaders served as an attractive precedent in all of Saddam's clashes with western powers. As the international coalition commenced its air operation, Iraq launched 42 missile strikes against Israel in the hopes of fracturing the Western–Arab alliance. In a communiqué regarding the operation, the Iraqi military highlighted the Crusader theme, attempting to connect its ‘war’ with Israel to the earlier Muslim campaigns against the Crusader states in Palestine. At the same time, in Arab-Islamist fashion, the statement recalled the seventh-century conquest of Palestine and the role of ʿUmar b. al-Khattab as a liberator, drawing a direct link between the second caliph and Saddam Husayn; see Iraqi Armed Forces General Command, ‘Iraqi Military Communiques and Reports’, INA (18, 19, and 20 Jan. 1991, 1758 GMT, 0910 GMT, 1304 GMT, 1304 GMT, 1500 GMT, 2037 GMT, 1810 GMT, 0740 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0976 (22 Jan. 1991), p.E1.
81. Iraqi Revolution Command Council and Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Baʿth Party, ‘Iraq Joint RCC Baʿth Party Statement on Future “Battle to Liberate Jerusalem”’, RIR (20 Sept. 1990, 2010 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/0876 (22 Sept. 1990), p.A1.
82. ‘World Islamic Conference Begins in Baghdad’, RIR (17 Jan. 1992, 1500 GMT), BBC/SWB ME/1282 (20 Jan. 1992), p.A1. On the possible connection between the phrase ‘Mother of battles’, the official Baʿthi name for the 1991 war, and the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, v.s., n.79.
83. A.I. Dawisha, ‘“Identity” and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq’, Middle East Journal, Vol.53 (1999), p.562.
84. Davis, Memories, p.189.
85. Roy, ‘Saddam's Arms’, p.71; J.F. Burns, ‘Threats and Responses: The Iraqi Leader; Hussein's Obsession: An Empire of Mosques’, New York Times, 15 Dec. 2002, p.1; M. Basu, ‘Huge Mosques Reflect Rising Role of Islam in Iraq’, Cox News Service, 2 Jan. 2003; D. Blair, ‘Saddam has Koran Written in his Blood’, London Daily Telegraph, 14 Dec. 2002, p.22. Roy noted that the ‘consubstantiation of the blood of the cult leader with the words of the Quran spells out the sacredness of his own blood’ and ‘connotes sacrifice … the very thing that he encouraged in his armies’. Since the fall of the Baʿth, this mosque has been renamed ‘Jamiʿ Umm al-Qura’ (Mother of Cities Mosque) and Saddam's blood-inscribed Qurʾan has been removed pending a decision regarding its fate. Nevertheless, in 2004, locals continued to refer to it by the former name and a sign still hung at the entrance praising its builder, Saddam; N. Rosen, ‘The Battle for Sunni Hearts and Minds’, Asia Times Online, 16 April 2004, http://tinyurl.com/Rosen2004. Several photographs of the mosque, including aerial views, can be viewed online at http://tinyurl.com/UmmQura1 and at http://tinyurl.com/UmmQura2.
86. Roy, ‘Saddam's Arms’, p.1; Blair, ‘Saddam has Koran’, p.22. The Jamiʿ ar-Rahman was intended to be completed by 2004, Jamiʿ Saddam al-Kabir in 2015. Photographs of these mosques are available online at http://tinyurl.com/JamiRahman and at http://tinyurl.com/SaddamKabir; The website GlobalSecurity.org has published satellite images online at http://tinyurl.com/BaghdadMosques. Yet another Jamiʿ Saddam al-Kabir was built in Mawṣil, since renamed ‘The Great Mawṣil Mosque’ (Jamiʿ Mawsil al-Kabir).
87. Roy, ‘Saddam's Arms’, p.71.
88. Basu, ‘Huge Mosques’; Blair, ‘Saddam has Koran’, p.22.
89. Basu, ‘Huge Mosques’; Blair, ‘Saddam has Koran’, p.22.
90. Basu, ‘Huge Mosques’. This reporter noted that Abu Nuwas Street, named after the poet and hedonistic boon companion of al-Amin (r. 809–813), at one time home to Baghdad's secular and western nightlife was ‘silenced by Saddam's ban on alcohol in public places’, reduced to ‘a handful of coffee shops and riverside restaurants famous for masgouf, or grilled fish’.
91. Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Husayn Highlights Resistance in Gulf War Anniversary Speech’, Iraqi Satellite Channel (17 Jan. 2003, 0804 GMT), BBC/SWB (17 Jan. 2003); Saddam Husayn, ‘“Buried” [FBIS]’; Saddam Husayn, ‘Saddam Says “Aggressors” to be “Buried in their Own Coffin”; Text of Speech’, (Online: INA, 2002), BBC/SWB/8 Aug. 2002 (8 Aug. 2002).
92. Saddam Husayn, ‘Open Letter from Saddam Hussein to the People of Iraq – 26/12/2006’ (26 Dec. 2006), http://tinyurl.com/Saddam2006; Saddam Husayn, ‘Letter by Saddam Hussein 29/12/2006’ (29 Dec. 2006), http://tinyurl.com/Saddam2006.
93. However, Saddam could not abstain from resurrecting his original devils – the Persians – ‘who are hateful as a result of their rulers’ actions who had inherited Kisra's inheritance in place of Satan‘; Saddam Husayn, ‘Open Letter’ Undoubtedly, Saddam's hostility towards Iranians this time stemmed from IRI influence in post-Baʿthi Iraqi politics; the Persians thus represent an allusion to Iraq's Shiʿi community. In a coded message to Sunni Iraqis, he suggested that Persians/Shiʿis stand in the way of Iraqi unity (‘The enemies of your country, the invaders and the Persians, found that your unity stands as a barrier between them and your enslavement’.) Likewise, his references to ‘strangers who are carrying the Iraqi citizenship’ resemble his one-time comments about ‘holders of Arab identity cards’ – i.e. Iraqis or Arabs in name only – seem to refer to Shiʿi Iraqis; Saddam Husayn, ‘Letter’; Bengio, ‘Nation Building’, p.175.
94. ‘Video Shows Taunts at Execution’, BBC News Online, 31 Dec. 2006, http://tinyurl.com/BBC2006.
95. A judge who witnessed the event told a reporter: ‘A cleric who was present asked Saddam to recite some spiritual words. Saddam did so, but with sarcasm. These were his last words’; ‘Video Shows Taunts at Execution’.
96. See Saʿd's Qadisiyyah Brigade, ‘Sniper Shoot a Tracer on US Soldier’, 27 Dec. 2007, http://tinyurl.com/SQB2007.
97. See Iraqi National Council, ‘Iraqi National Council: Coalition to Recognize Iraqi Resistance Effort’ (Online, 2009), WNC: Jihadist Websites – OSC Summary/2009-0916, 16 Sept. 2009; al-Mansur Network, ‘al-Mansur Network Marks 3rd Anniversary, Pledges Allegiance to Izzat al-Duri’ (Online, 2010), WNC: Jihadist Websites – OSC Summary/2010-0224, 12 Feb. 2010.
98. M. Karouny, ‘Syrian Rebels Prepare for Push on Eastern Oil City’, Reuters, 12 Feb. 2013, http://tinyurl.com/Karouny2013. The Islamic Qadisiyyah Brigade launched a website on 15 May 2013; see http://tinyurl.com/IslamicQBrigade. In June 2013, Syrian fighters launched an operation to maintain their hold on Aleppo against a Syrian government assault; they called the operation alternately the ‘Battle of al-Qadisiyyah’ or the ‘third Qadisiyyah’; see B. Dayoub, ‘“Iʿsar Halab” yatahawal ila “Qadisiyyah” … bi-la natijah’, al-Akhbar, 25 June 2013, http://tinyurl.com/Dayoub2013; ‘al-Kataʾib as-Suriyyah tunaqish itlaq al-Qadisiyyah ath-thalithah ʿala maʿarik at-tasadi li-Hizb-Allah wa-ʾl-Haras ath-Thawri’, az-Zaman, 26 June 2013, http://tinyurl.com/Zaman2013; R. Spencer, ‘Syria: Rebels Heed Lesson of Qusayr to Drive Back Assad Forces in Aleppo’, Daily Telegraph, 23 June 2013, http://tinyurl.com/Telegraph2013. An earlier offensive operation in the autumn of 2012 was termed the ‘second battle of Qadisiyyah’. I am currently working on a more extensive study of the use of al-Qadisiyyah by radical Islamists and hope to elaborate upon this matter further in a future communication.
99. I maintain an ongoing catalogue of Qadisiyyah nomenclature, with hundreds of examples of toponymy, state symbols, cultural and artistic productions, educational, religious, and recreational organizations, radical Islamist groups, and much more on my website, DGLnotes.com

Question: who did the arabs defeat in the battle of kadesia

In Saddam, then, Iraq, the war was called "Saddam's Kadis" or "Saddam's famous Kadis".

This, according to the official narrative of the Saddam Basic Party, aludited to the Battle of Kadesia from the period of Arab expansion in the 7th century, in which the Arab troops defeated the troops of Sasanid Persia.

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In Saddam , then , Iraq , the war was called " Saddam 's Kadis " or " Saddam 's famous Kadis " .

This , according to the official narrative of the Saddam Basic Party , aludited to the Battle of Kadesia from the period of Arab expansion in the 7th century , in which the Arab troops defeated the troops of Sasanid Persia .

U Saddamovom, pak, Iraku, rat se nazivao "Sadamova Kadisija" ili "Sadamova slavna Kadisija".

Ovime se prema službenom narativu Saddamove basističke stranke, aludiralo na Bitku kod Kadisije iz razdoblja arapske ekspanzije u 7. stoljeću, u kojoj su arapske vojske porazile vojske Sasanidske Perzije.

In Saddam, then, Iraq, the war was called "Saddam's Kadis" or "Saddam's famous Kadis". This, according to the official narrative of the Saddam Basic Party, aludited to the Battle of Kadesia from the period of Arab expansion in the 7th century, in which the Arab troops defeated the troops of Sasanid Persia.

In Saddam, then, Iraq, the war was called "Saddam's Kadis" or "Saddam's famous Kadis".

This, according to the official narrative of the Saddam Basic Party, aludited to the Battle of Kadesia from the period of Arab expansion in the 7th century, in which the Arab troops defeated the troops of Sasanid Persia.

Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

Question: when did iran change from persia to iran

Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

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Question: in which battle of the 7th century did the arabs defeat the sasan

Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

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Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

Question: in which century was the battle of kadesia

Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

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Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

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Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

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Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

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Ovime se prema službenom narativu Saddamove basističke stranke, aludiralo na Bitku kod Kadisije iz razdoblja arapske ekspanzije u 7. stoljeću, u kojoj su arapske vojske porazile vojske Sasanidske Perzije. Iran se do 1935. godine zvao Perzija.

This, according to the official narrative of the Saddam Basic Party, aludited to the Battle of Kadesia from the period of Arab expansion in the 7th century, in which the Arab troops defeated the troops of Sasanid Persia. Iran was known as Persia until 1935.

After taking over the power, the new Islamist power in Iran began systematic cleansing of Iranian armed forces considering them the most likely source of potential anti-revolution and unthinking.

At the special blow of the new Islamist policy, aircraft operators were found, which led to the fact that many pilots and technicians ended in prisons.

Question: who ended up in prison in iran

After taking over the power, the new Islamist power in Iran began systematic cleansing of Iranian armed forces considering them the most likely source of potential anti-revolution and unthinking.

At the special blow of the new Islamist policy, aircraft operators were found, which led to the fact that many pilots and technicians ended in prisons.

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systematic cleansing of Iranian armed forces

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After taking over the power , the new Islamist power in Iran began systematic cleansing of Iranian armed forces considering them the most likely source of potential anti - revolution and unthinking .

At the special blow of the new Islamist policy , aircraft operators were found , which led to the fact that many pilots and technicians ended in prisons .

Nakon preuzimanja vlasti, nova islamistička vlast u Iranu započela je sustavne čistke iranskih oružanih snaga smatrajući ih najvjerojatnijim izvorom potencijalne proturevolucije i neistomišljenika.

Na posebnom udaru nove islamističke politike našli su se djelatnici zrakoplovstva zbog čega su mnogi piloti i tehničari završili u zatvorima.

After taking over the power, the new Islamist power in Iran began systematic cleansing of Iranian armed forces considering them the most likely source of potential anti-revolution and unthinking. At the special blow of the new Islamist policy, aircraft operators were found, which led to the fact that many pilots and technicians ended in prisons.

After taking over the power, the new Islamist power in Iran began systematic cleansing of Iranian armed forces considering them the most likely source of potential anti-revolution and unthinking.

At the special blow of the new Islamist policy, aircraft operators were found, which led to the fact that many pilots and technicians ended in prisons.

The agreement came after the then chess regime supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, so Saddam Hussein, in return for the cessation of the chess support to the Kurds, agreed to concessions in favour of Iran.

Two aspects of the Iraq-Iran conflict are easy to explain: which side began the fighting and why hostilities erupted in September 1980. Except for official Iraqi spokesmen, there is nearly universal agreement that Iraq initiated hostilities on Sep. 2, when it sent troops into Iran near Qasr-e-Shirin, that it escalated the conflict on Sep. 17 (by renouncing a border treaty with Iran), and that it began a full-scale war on the 22nd by sending warplanes to attack ten Iranian airfields. In each case, Iran merely responded to Iraqi initiatives.
Iraq's leaders chose an excellent moment to attack Iran. September is the right season for an infantry assault, and in late 1980 both superpowers had focused their attention elsewhere (Afghanistan and Poland in the case of the Soviet Union, the Iranian hostage crisis and presidential elections in the U.S. case).
It was also a time when the Iranians seemed least capable of defending themselves. One and a half years after Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran, the revolution had frayed: oil revenues remained low while inflation and unemployment ran high; many Iranians, especially Kurds and leftists, had openly rebelled against their government; and, most important, the large and well-armed military forces built up for years by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi had apparently collapsed. Morale plummeted, discipline eroded, and troops deserted as the armed forces fell into deep disfavor under Khomeini. The mullahs purged officers, canceled weapons purchases, terminated military privileges, and established a rival force that was loyal to them (the Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards). U.S.-supplied materiel had been cut off on Nov. 9, 1979, five days after the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, though Tehran did manage to acquire some spare parts through third parties. Reports perhaps exaggerated the decline in Iran's military forces, but the general consensus was that Iran could no longer stand up to Iraq. Thus, Iraqi leaders had many reasons to attack when they did.
But why did the Iraqis attack? What goals prompted President Saddam Husayn's regime to confront Iran and provoke a large-scale war? What made it worth risking oil facilities, wide international disapproval, loss of revenues, and domestic unrest? Assuming Saddam Husayn is not one to act rashly or foolishly - even critics acknowledge his pragmatism - one must conclude that he had serious reasons for making war in September 1980.
Most analysts stress two factors: "general hostility" between the two sides and Ba'th party fears that the Khomeini government might stir up a Shi'i rebellion in southern Iraq. I shall argue, however, that while these factors had some role in worsening relations, they hardly entered into the decision to attack Iran; rather, the war resulted primarily from territorial disputes, especially the centuries-old conflict over the boundary at the Shatt al-'Arab River.
1. General Hostility
As tensions between Iraq and Iran rose in April and September 1980, many observers emphasized the two countries' political and religious differences, citing animosities that began in the seventh century. For instance, the Levant correspondent for The Economist wrote:
This is one of the world's oldest conflicts across a primarily racial divide. ... The origins of the present hostilities between Iraq and Iran can be traced all the way back to the battle of Qadisiya in southern Iraq in 637 A.D., when an army of Muslim Arabs put paid to a bigger army of Zoroastrian Persians and to the decadent Sassanian empire.
Geoffrey Godsell went even further in The Christian Science Monitor, calling the Arab-Persian frontier "one of the great ethnic and cultural divides on the earth's surface." When Iraq invaded Iran, The New York Times explained this as an "ancient struggle" and a continuation of the Arab effort begun in 637 to subdue the Persians. Three years later, when Iranian forces invaded Iraq, The Economist suggested this was the Shi'a of Iran's "chance at revenge" for the massacre at Karbala in A.D. 680.
But this is nonsense, and for two reasons. First, it takes too seriously the combatants' war propaganda. The regimes in Baghdad and Tehran need to motivate their troops, so they hark back to historic conflicts. There is no reason, however, to make these inspirational messages as factors in the outbreak of war.
Second, as Narayanan Balakrishnan of the New Nation (Singapore), has shown, "nothing delights journalists more than looking for historical parallels to current events. ... Nothing like a dash of history to add profundity to a mundane current event; it seems to be the current journalistic dictum. A closer look, though, shows that many of these 'historical' parallels are on very shaky ground." Balakrishnan goes on to observe, very astutely:
It is no accident that historical generalizations are made more often about the developing countries than about Europe. It is not that the French and Germans have a special gift for forgetting the past 80 years, whereas the Sunnis and Shias cannot forget grudges from 12 centuries ago. Few foreign correspondents - and even fewer Western readers - are aware that the history of Asia is also a many-headed hydra, like the history of Europe, and that it can be used to justify almost anything. That is why the Iraq-Iran conflict is more likely to be explained in terms of Shia-Sunni conflict than as the ideological, economic and territorial dispute that it is, whereas the French-German conflicts are explained in terms of common agricultural policy of the EEC without recourse to the events of the two world wars.
Indeed, many differences do separate Iraq and Iran, but their many common elements should also be kept in mind. Both countries are heirs to a shared legacy going back five millennia; both had vital roles in the ancient culture of the Middle East; both fell to Alexander the Great while escaping Roman rule; and both succumbed to Arabian conquerors around A.D. 630. Iraq and Iran had disproportionately large roles in shaping Muslim civilization, contributing some of its greatest figures, its most splendid cities, and its key institutions. Populations in both countries converted massively to Islam and today less than 10 percent of their citizens remain non-Muslim. The two are virtually alone in the world in having a majority population of Twelver Shi'is. Kurdish and Turkic minorities are numerous and powerful.
Today's regimes also share much. Both are republics that obtained power through the spectacular repudiation of monarchs: a bloody coup d'êtat on July 14, 1958, ended the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, and Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 toppled the Pahlavi shahs. Reacting against the pro-Western bent of these monarchs, the republican regimes are nonaligned with a distinct anti-U.S. character. Iraq entered the 1980s without having reinstated the diplomatic relations with the United States it had broken on June 7, 1967, in the midst of the Six Day War. Iran under the mullahs compensated for the shah's close times with Washington by blaming the United States for every ill it experienced "from assassination and ethnic unrest to traffic jams [and] drug addiction." The seizure of U.S. diplomats as hostages led to an extraordinary burst of rancor against the United States and a nearly complete rupture in relations.
Both Iraq and Iran enjoy better, though not harmonious, relations with the Soviet Union. Iraq bought military equipment and supported Soviet actions on most international issues for years before it signed a friendship treaty in 1972. But Baghdad remained a free agent, shooting local communists and making overtures to the West from time to time. Khomeinists feared Soviet encroachment and abominated communism, yet they carefully avoided challenging the Soviet Union. Both governments are obsessed with Israel, though the Iraqi concern goes back much further and runs deeper.
Their differences fall into several categories: the Iraqi leaders are Arabs, Pan-Arabists, "Semites," and Sunnis, while the Khomeinists are non-Arabs, Pan-Islamists, "Aryans," and Shi'is. Each of these dissimilarities is claimed to have provoked animosity in Baghdad against Iran.
Arabs versus Iranians. In the ninth century, cultural antagonism between the Arab and Iranian peoples blossomed into a war of words, dubbed the Shu'ubiya. It featured an exchange of colorful insults ("fire worshipers," "lizard eaters," and the like), which has provided literary ammunition that Arabic and Persian speakers drew on through the centuries. Even today, echoes of this clash reverberate in the propaganda surrounding the war, especially from the Iraqi side.
The Shu'ubiya had a serious purpose: Iranians impugned Arabic culture in an attempt to assert the value of their own heritage. If Arabic speakers thought all Muslims must become Arabized, Iranians eloquently demurred. Being a Muslim, they replied, does not mean losing one's identity and becoming an Arab. The point was made, and today Iranians still speak and write Persian. The Shu'ubiya battle - in contrast to the exchange of missiles that began in September 1980 - was fought by the pen alone, and the Shu'ubiya legacy could have had only the vaguest influence on Iraq's decision to go to war.
Further, the distinction between Arab and Iranian had almost no political import before modern times. Until European ideas of nationalism permeated the Middle East, language identified a person's cultural background, while political allegiance depended on religious, geographic, and ethnic factors. To the extent that the notion of an Arab or an Iranian people existed in premodern times, they were defined by cultural, not political, orientations. A dramatic illustration of this comes from the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire in Turkey and the Safavid Empire in Iran were often at war with each other. While the Ottoman sultan reigning in Istanbul made a name for himself writing Persian poetry, the Safavid shah in Isfahan wrote in Turkic; neither worried about the implications of using his opponent's language. Only in the age of nationalism, then, did language take on a political significance that could prompt people to take up arms.
Pan-Arabists versus Pan-Islamists. While campaigning for the presidential elections in January 1980, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr observed that Arab nationalism is hardly better than Zionism. In Baghdad, where the Ba'th party considers Pan-Arabism virtually sacrosanct and Zionism the mortal enemy, this remark caused apoplexy. But Bani-Sadr did not say this just to provoke the Iraqis; his view is in accord with the pan-Islamic ideology that reigned in Iran after the Khomeinists took over in early 1979. The Iranian Revolution brought men to power who have no use for any sort of nationalism - Arab, Iranian, or otherwise - and who despise it as a Western innovation inimical to Islam. Khomeini considers nationalism (like racism) a form of 'asabiya and, as such, a moral abomination.
Pan-Islam calls for political harmony among Muslims. At minimum, existing Muslim states should cooperate; ideally, they should eliminate their borders and unify as one state. This ideology derives from Islam, which stresses the unity of all those who accept Muhammad as God's prophet. Islamic doctrines strongly urge Muslims to follow a single political leader and forbids them from using force against each other. While these goals are obviously impractical (Muslims number over 800 million and stretch from Senegal to the Philippines), Islamic ideals remain vitally important for many Muslims. While they generally recognize that national states cannot be replaced with a single Islamic government, pan-Islamists rarely feel much attachment to existing national units. (In this, they resemble communists, who also accept the present international order of nations without giving it their ultimate loyalty.)
In contrast, pan-Arabism is concerned only with the Arabic-speaking peoples (or, about one-sixth of all Muslims). Pan-Arabism mixes the pan-Islamic urge to unify all Muslims with the nationalist urge to form a single nations. It can be understood as a modern, secular version of pan-Islam. Pan-Arabists resemble pan-Islamists in their hope to create something larger and more meaningful than the existing state system, but they differ in defining their people by language rather than by religion. Some pious Muslims, including many in Khomeini's government, consider this emphasis anti-Islamic. But it is one thing to disagree over ideals and quite another to go to war over them; nothing indicates that the Iranian government's emphasis on pan-Islamic ideals provoked the Iraqis to initiate hostilities.
Once the fighting started though, the theme of pan-Arabism versus pan-Islamism emerged repeatedly. The Iraqi government stressed the nationalistic purpose of the war: patriotic songs on television, a stress on ethnic rivalry with the Iranians, and repeated references to the seventh-century Battle of Qadisiya (when Arabians beat Iranians). In contrast, the Iranian government ignored nationalism; calling its army "the soldiers of Islam" and the Iraqi army the "forces of blasphemy."
Semites versus Aryans. The notion that a racial difference distinguishes Iraqis from Iranians often enters discussions of the factors leading up to the 1980 war. Not only is there no such racial divide between the two peoples, but neither state considers such distinctions important.
Basic truths about racial concepts cannot be repeated too often. The adjectives "Semitic" and "Aryan" refer to families of languages, not to the peoples that speak them. Arabic is related linguistically to several other languages of the Middle East, including Hebrew; modern scholars have called these the Semitic languages in reference to Shem, the eldest son of Noah. Because Semitic tongues share many traits, it is reasonable to expect that the peoples that speak them also share racial, ethnic, and cultural qualities. In the case of small, confined languages, this assumption often holds true, but this is not so with larger, dispersed ones. Peoples are constantly changing languages, so that ties between race and language are loosened with time to the point that they become meaningless.
An example will serve to illustrate this. In medieval times, English was spoken by a small insular nation whose people were usually related to one another. With the expansion of British power around the world, however, English spread to ethnic groups and races on all continents. In the United States alone, English is the mother tongue of people from every race - how can they all be Anglo-Saxons? There is no longer any ethnic or racial implication to speaking English, and the same holds for other major languages, including Arabic.
Arabic spread like English, though a thousand years earlier. It began as a local language and expanded internationally through force of arms. People from Mauritania to Iraq speak Arabic, not just because the Arabians spread out from the peninsula to cover this whole area, but because the Arabians established a new order that encouraged the vanquished peoples to change languages. Most did - hence Arabic's wide distribution today - but some peoples, notably the Iranians, kept their ancestral speech. There is no deep racial meaning here; these events might well have been reversed, with the Iraqis still speaking Assyrian and Iranians speaking Arabic. Thus, except in a purely linguistic sense, those who speak Semitic languages (commonly known as "Semites," a misleading term) share very little in common; the same applies to those who speak Indo-European languages ("Aryans"), including the Iranians.
Of course, the fact that the Semitic-Aryan distinction is misconceived does not preclude it from taking on political significance, as the Nazi experience has shown. But this has not occurred in Iraq and Iran, neither of which considers differences in language family to have much significance (although Ba'thists, as we have seen, do stress the importance of Arabic). In the 1930s, Nazi propaganda reached Iran, inspiring both a change in the official name of the country in many languages from "Persia" to "Iran" and the addition of the sobriquet "Hero of the Aryans" (Aryamehr) to the shah's titles. These pseudoscientific notions, however, did not penetrate deeply; furthermore, by enshrining racism, they directly contradict Islamic principles.
Sunnis versus Shi'is. When Christian churches split, they begin with differences over theology which later take on political significance. In contrast, Islamic schisms start as political quarrels and only later acquire theological overtones. In particular, the greatest divide between Muslims, that separating Sunnis and Shi'is, has powerful political implications. Already in the first decades of Islam, the Shi'a broke off in a dispute over rightful leadership of the Muslim community. While Sunnis accepted the best qualified man from Muhammad's tribe as caliph, Shi'is insisted on restricting the caliphate to one of Muhammad's direct descendants.
Antagonisms remained vivid throughout the centuries. Shi'is had little mundane success, while the Sunnis became numerically dominant and controlled nearly every Muslim government. Twelver Shi'a forces did capture Iran in 1501, however, and have ruled there ever since. Although surrounded by hostile Sunni states, the Iranian Shi'is did hold their own. The government of today's Iraq inherited the traditional Sunni animosity toward Shi'i rule, and that animosity remains strong today. While this factor undoubtedly exacerbated relations once the war began in 1980, there is no indication it had anything to do with the Iraqi decision to make war. Baghdad has far more pressing concerns than ancient grudges.
One of those concerns is the fact that more than one-half of Iraq's population adheres to the same Twelver Shi'i version of Islam that prevails in Iran. This engenders deep fears of a Shi'i rebellion in Iraq.
2. Fears of a Shi'i Rebellion
Politics in Iraq begins with the ethno-religious divisions that define the country's three largest communities: the Twelver Shi'i Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Sunni Kurds. Precise figures do not exist, but most observers estimate that Shi'is of the Twelver sect constitute a majority of Iraq's population, probably 55 to 60 percent. They live predominantly in the southern half of the country and, as a community, enjoy considerably less wealth and power than the Sunnis, who make up about 35 to 40 percent of the population. (Non-Muslims number about 5 percent.) Sunnis, in turn, divide rather evenly between Arabic and Kurdish speakers, with the Arabs living mostly in the northwest, the Kurds in the northeast. Each of these three communities has an important constituency outside Iraq: the Twelver Shi'is of Iran; the Sunni Arabs in all the Arab states; and the Kurds in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and the Soviet Union.
Today, as at all times since the sixteenth century, Sunni Arabs dominate Iraqi politics. Although they constitute only one-fifth of the population, they have maintained a hold on power through all the changes in government. Sunnis ruled when Iraq was an Ottoman province, a British mandate, an independent monarchy, and a socialist republic. The Ba'th party's secular ideology did not affect the communal distribution of power; although the Sunni grip relaxed slightly when the Ba'thists first came to power in 1963, it was reasserted by 1968. Subsequently, the Sunni domination became more complete than ever before; by the mid-1970s, much of the top political and military leadership came from a single Sunni town, Takrit.
As minority rulers, the Sunni Arabs are obsessed with the prospect of losing power to the Shi'is. (Kurdish rebels merely seek autonomy and thus pose less of a threat.) Most Iraqi government actions should be viewed in light of this concern, from its aggressive foreign policy to its extreme emphasis on pan-Arabism. Pan-Arabism helps Sunni Arabs retain power by allying them with other Sunni Arab states, and by imbuing their role with ideological legitimacy. Also, since neither Kurds nor Shi'a care much for the principal goal of pan-Arabism - that of unifying all the Arabs (why would either group want to submerge itself in a sea of Sunni Arabs?) - the incessant repetition of pan-Arabist goals serves as an effective means to exclude them from political power.
Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 rise to power in Iran made the Iraqi Sunni leadership's long-standing concern with the Shi'a population newly urgent. Khomeini demonstrated the fundamentalist Muslim's characteristic concern for fellow Muslims in other countries. For some months at least, he seemed to command a moral influence far beyond the boundaries of Iran, as Muslim rulers everywhere worried that he might inspire other Iranian-style revolts against themselves. Memories of the Middle East's last charismatic ruler, Gamal Abdel Nasser, rushed back. Kings and presidents feared that Khomeini's brand of Islam would touch the masses as had Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabism.
To understand Khomeini's appeal, see him as a pious Muslim might. Khomeini gained eminence as a scholar and a legal authority long before his political involvement late in life. In 1963 he joined the anti-government demonstrations in Qom and had to leave Iran the next year as a result, moving to Najaf, a Shi'i holy city in southern Iraq. From Najaf, Khomeini established himself as Pahlavi regime's most outspoken and extreme critic. Living piously in modest surroundings, preaching Islamic virtues, uninterested in the modern world, he presented a picture exactly opposite to the martial glitter of the Westernized shah. As the shah's power crumbled, Muslims witnessed an old man living a simple and familiar way defeat an oil billionaire whose vast military forces enjoyed the backing of both superpowers.
Masjid al-Imam Ali in Najaf, a leading Shi'i shrine.
Khomeini wasted little time in extending his influence outside Iran. Even before coming to power, his influence impelled Shahpur Bakhtiar to terminate Iranian oil sales to Israel. A weak financial and political base prevented him from taking direct action in most cases, but Khomeini cut trade with the Philippines, where the state was at war with Muslims. He then allowed some volunteers to depart for Lebanon to take up arms against Israel.
But Khomeini's influence was primarily rhetorical, as was illustrated one day after the attack on Mecca's Great Mosque on Nov. 20. 1979. Iranian radio quoted Khomeini to the effect that it was "not farfetched" to assume that the attack had been "perpetrated by the criminal American imperialism." On Nov. 24, he accused the United States "and its corrupt colony, Israel," of "attempting to occupy" the Great Mosque, and called on Muslims to "rise up and defend Islam." These statements inspired demonstrations and rioting against U.S. diplomatic buildings all across the Eastern Hemisphere: in the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Libya. In the most serious case, that of Pakistan, several lives were lost and a hundred more seriously endangered; in Libya, the government of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi apparently approved the attack that heavily damaged the U.S. embassy in Tripoli.
While Khomeini affected Muslims in many countries, his greatest efforts were directed toward Iraq, an area of special concern to him, owing to its proximity, its downtrodden majority of Twelver Shi'is (many of Iranian origin), and his own long residence there. Shi'is had occasionally contested Sunni supremacy in Iraq, but with little success. Lacking an organization and a spokesman, they failed to make the weight of their numbers felt. Unlike previous Shi'i leaders of Iran, Khomeini took an active interest in his co-sectarians across the border. Further, he had an ideology to offer them, a populist doctrine of Islam aimed at stirring up the oppressed and quiescent masses. Khomeini's message exactly fit the needs of Iraqi Shi'is, and having lived among them for fourteen years, he knew them first hand. No doubt, too, the humiliating expulsion from Iraq at a critical moment in late 1978 caused Khomeini, a vindictive man, to hunger for revenge against the Ba'th regime.
Relations with Iraq were bad from the very beginning of Khomeini's rule. His agents helped finance Ad-Daniel'wa, the principal Shi'i organization of Iraq. Tehran radio urged Iraqi Shi'is to resist the government. By mid-1980, officials in Baghdad were convinced that Iranian operators in Iraq's main Shi'i cities (Basra, Najaf, Karbala', and Kufa) stood behind the thousands of Shi'is who took the streets carrying huge pictures of Khomeini and their own religious leaders. Violent attacks on Ba'th officers in Iraq were also ascribed to Iranian efforts.
Several incidents caused Iraqi-Iranian relations to plummet during April 1980. On the first of that month, an Iranian threw a hand grenade, wounding Tariq Aziz, a deputy premier of Iraq, and two students; a second bomb followed a few days later. On April 6, Iraq cabled U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim to demand that Iran pull back from the Persian Gulf islands it had occupied in 1971; Iran responded by placing its border troops on full alert. Verbal fireworks followed. Khomeini called on the people of Iraq to bring down their government: "Wake up and topple this corrupt regime in your Islamic country before it is too late." He advised the army "not to obey the orders of the foes of the Qur'an and Islam, but join the people." President Husayn responded: "Anyone who tries to put his hand on Iraq will have his hand cut off without hesitation." Khomeini retorted that he hoped the Iraqi regime would be "dispatched to the refuse bin of history."
A few days later, according to Khomeini, the leader of Iraq's Shi'is, Ayatollah Muhammad al-Baqr as-Sadr, was executed by the Iraqi government. In retaliation, Khomeini called on "the noble people of Iraq" to rid themselves of Ba'th party rule. On April 23, he called on government employees to "throw in their lot with the Iraqi people in an effort to do away with the usurping Ba'th government." Many Iranian leaders joined Khomeini in making a host of incendiary statements about the rulers in Baghdad. An Iraqi role was widely suspected when Arabs from the Iranian province of Khuzistan seized Iran's embassy in London on April 30.
Iranian officials continued the verbal threats to Iraq. In August 1980, for example, President Abolhasan Bani Sadr told a Lebanese newspaper: "Orders have been issued to the Iranian armed forces not to give way to the enemy at any place. ... The rulers of Iraq should realize that henceforth we shall not be spectators nor shall we wait. We shall take the initiative to hit them and to destroy their positions and installations."
The weakness of Ba'th rule, the volatility of Iraqi Shi'is, and Khomeini's intentions convinced some observers that fear of Khomeini prompted Iraq's leaders to make war. According to this reasoning, Saddam Husayn hoped that by seizing Iranian territory and aiding rebels there, Iraqi attacks would lead to the overthrow of the mullahs. In the view of one dissident Ba'thist in exile, "the only reason Iraq went to war against Iran was to topple Khomeini. Never in the 12-year history of the Baath regime in Iraq has the rule of Saddam Husayn come under such a threat as it did since Khomeini came to power." Hanna Batatu agrees: "the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war ... was intimately related to Shi'a unrest." Eric Davis draws an even more ominous picture: "While there were many reasons for Iraq's invasion of Iran, the key motivation was the fear than an international Shia consciousness would develop, extending from Iran through Iraq and into Syria and Lebanon."
Saddam Hussein (L) and Ayatollah Khomeini.
Second, if concern about Shi'is had paramount importance, the Iraqi government would not have launched the war from the most heavily Shi'a portion of Iraq, the south. The two countries share a border extending some 920 miles, and it was not necessary to attack across the Shatt al-'Arab. Third, a more northerly route would have struck closer to Tehran, improving Baghdad's chances of toppling the regime. As it was, Iraqi troops made no move in the direction of the capital.
Fourth, had Shi'is been the first concern, the Iraqi government would not have attacked Iranian civilians with such brutality. The Iraqi army did not fight a clean war; for months it lobbed shells across the battle lines, indiscriminately killing civilians. Worse yet, its jets attacked cities right from the beginning of the war.
The frequently repeated assumption that the Ba'thists, fearing Tehran's influence over Iraqi Shi'is, hoped to bring down the Khomeini regime does not accord with their actual conduct of the war. Rather, Iraqi military action suggests Baghdad expected to withstand Iranian influence over half its population. It surely hoped to finish the fighting so quickly that the Shi'is would have no chance to respond; and if the fighting did drag on, the government must have decided it could withstand Shi'a discontent. If so, it was proved right, for no major problems with Shi'is arose during the hostilities. If Baghdad did worry about Iranian influence over its Shi'is, this played a minor, perhaps negligible, role in causing the war.
Neither accumulated antagonisms nor fear of a Shi'a rebellion led Baghdad to make war in 1980. The primary causes of the war must be looked for elsewhere, in the boundary issues between the two countries.
3. The Shatt al-'Arab and other Territorial Disputes
The foremost geographic disagreement between Iraq and Iran involved the Shatt al-'Arab River (Persian: Arvand Rud); other disputed territory included the three islands near the Hormuz Strait, the headwaters of rivers arising in Iran and flowing into Iraq, and the province of Khuzistan. These areas had profound economic and military importance for both countries; the stakes included maritime access, oil rights, water sources, and strategic positioning.
Indeed, the origins of today's problems go back to the early sixteenth century; a review of this controversy clarifies why the issue remains so contentious today. In brief, Iraq wants the whole river and Iran demands half of it. Each side has a wealth of legal, geographic, and historical arguments with which to back up its claims. The Shatt's history as a border falls into two broad periods: the imperial (1514-1920) and the independent (1920 to the present).
The Imperial Period. The modern state of Iraq did not come into existence until 1920; before then, it had been ruled as three provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Based in Istanbul, the Ottoman rulers viewed Iraq primarily as a buffer protecting their Anatolian heartland from Iranian incursions. The Ottoman conquest of Iraq began in 1514 and ended in 1535 with the capture of Baghdad. At the conclusion of this war, the Ottomans signed a peace treaty with the Safavid government of Iran in which the Safavids recognized the Ottoman victories. War between these two empires resumed often during the next century, usually followed by treaties. They signed treaties in 1555, 1568, 1590, 1613, and 1618.
In 1639 a treaty for the first time laid down a frontier. The Ottomans unilaterally declared what was theirs and what was Iran's, and the Safavids accepted these terms. The treaty specified the names of towns belonging to one ruler or the other. For example, it read in part: "The fortress of Zindir, which lies on top of the mountain, shall be demolished; the [Ottoman] sultan will take possession of the villages lying westward of it, and the [Safavid] shah will take possession of those lying eastward." It did not mention the Shatt al-'Arab (see Map 1.1). According to Alexander Melamid, this treaty created "a vague border resembling a broad zone... generally over a hundred miles wide [where] neither empire exercised much jurisdiction." But, however vague, the treaty lasted without major changes for 200 years and served as the foundation for all future boundary discussions.
A long peace followed, disrupted by hostilities from 1722 to 1746. Again, numerous rounds of fighting concluded with treaties (in 1724, 1727, 1732, and 1736); the final treaty of 1746 did little more than confirm the 1639 boundaries. A second long era of peace followed, broken by war in 1821-23. The First Treaty of Erzurum, in 1823, confirmed the 1746 treaty. Twenty years later, hostile incidents between the two countries brought them to the verge of war; but this time, alarmed by the prospect of still more fighting, two European powers, Russia and Great Britain, offered to mediate, thus changing the complexion of the negotiations.
Russian conquest in the Caucasus and British control of India had given these two powers a direct interest in Ottoman and Iranian affairs. Despite their rivalry, both powers found it advantageous to settle the Ottoman-Iranian boundary. Russia hoped to build a road from its territories to Baghdad and needed a clearly defined boundary; Britain wanted to regularize the legal status of the Shatt al-'Arab before setting up a steamship company there.
Ottoman and Iranian leaders had little choice but to accept the powers' offer of mediation, and in 1843 delegates from all four countries met in the Anatolian town of Erzurum. Four years of stormy meetings and no end of haggling finally produced in 1847 the Second Treaty of Erzurum, which confirmed the first treaty and made some adjustments: Iran ceded its claims to the Kurdish region of al-Sulaymaniya and in return acquired new territory and rights in the Shatt al-'Arab area. The 1847 agreement was particularly important because it dealt with the Shatt al-'Arab in detail and because it authorized a commission to delimit the border on the ground.
In light of subsequent arguments, it is striking that the 1847 accords never dealt with control over the Shatt itself, only with the lands on its eastern bank. The river was then under Ottoman control, and the treaty assumed this would remain unchanged; the accords dealt with Ottoman possessions on the eastern bank and Iranian rights of navigation and anchorage. The key passage reads:
The Ottoman Government formally recognizes the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the port and city of Muhammara [now called Khorramshahr], the island of Khizr [now called Abadan Island], the anchorage [at Khorramshahr], and the land on the eastern bank, that is to say, the left bank of the Shatt al-'Arab.
In an explanatory note addressed to the Ottomans in April 1847 and not seen by the Iranians until January 1848, the Russian and British governments note that by anchorage at Khorramshahr they meant anchorage in the Karun River just above its confluence with the Shatt, and not in the Shatt itself.
"As a result of this detailed definition," Melamid writes, Ottoman "territorial waters in fact extended only to the western banks of Iranian islands except where there are no islands, as for example near Khorramshahr." Prior to the 1847 treaty, the Ottomans had controlled some areas on the eastern shore, but these were now ceded to Iran. In addition, Iranian vessels gained "the right to navigate freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt al-'Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontier of the two Parties." Both sides had free use of the entire river. As hoped for, the establishment of the Shatt al-'Arab boundary did lead to steamship service on the Shatt beginning in 1861 and on the Karun River ten years later.
The delimitation commission called for by the treaty met initially in 1850 to survey the terrain and to place markers. But, in the words of a participant, a "spirit of chicane, dispute and encroachment" prevented work; then the Crimean War intervened, and the problem was put aside in favor of more urgent business. It then took 20 years just to produce a map acceptable to all four parties!
Oil later emerged as a complicating issue. British prospectors found commercial quantities in Khuzistan in 1908, placing new strains on Iran's single port at Khorramshahr, the conduit for nearly all heavy equipment entering the country and oil shipments leaving. Because Iran's anchorage was in Ottoman waters (in accordance with the April 1847 explanatory note), Ottoman inspectors and customs agents had a free hand to meddle in the Khorramshahr port; in response, the British resolved to transfer the anchorage to Iranian jurisdiction.
The Ottomans and Iranians met in 1911 to solve these boundary problems on their own, but eighteen meetings produced no results, principally because of differences over the explanatory note. At the same time, the Russian and British authorities again felt an urgent need to regularize this border: conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Iran might drag them into war at a time when they needed to cooperate against the growing German menace in Europe. In 1913 the four countries signed the Constantinople Protocol and agreed to a new delimitation commission. Concerning the Shatt al-'Arab, the protocol states: "The frontier follows the course of the Shatt al-Arab down to the sea, leaving under Ottoman sovereignty the river and all the islands in it" except for three islands (including Abadan Island) and "the modern port and anchorage of Muhammara [Khorramshahr] above and below the confluence of the river Karun." The London Declaration, signed by British and Ottoman representatives in July 1913, put it more concisely: "The frontier follows the Shatt al-Arab to the sea, leaving the river and its islands under Ottoman sovereignty" with certain noted exceptions. For the first time, Iran had won rights in the Shatt al-'Arab itself, in a small area around Khorramshahr.
To expedite the demarcation of borders, the Russian and British commissioners (both distinguished Orientalists) had the authority to arbitrate all disputes, and at long last the boundary was demarcated between January and October of 1914. After "seventy years of diplomatic pourparlers, international conferences and special commissions," the Ottoman boundary with Iran was thus finally settled. One participant called the process "a phenomenon of procrastination unparalleled in the chronicles of oriental diplomacy."
Far from settling the conflict, however, the demarcation merely specified it. One indication of the trouble to come was the fact that the Ottoman Empire, which joined the German war effort in 1914 against Russia and Britain, never ratified the protocols of 1913.
The Independent Period. Except for Great Britain, all the actors change in the second period. Russia turns into the U.S.S.R. and recedes from the scene in 1917, Iraq comes into existence in 1920, the Ottoman Empire disappears in 1924, and Reza Shah's strong new monarchy replaces generations of weak Iranian rulers in 1925. The political and economic stakes grew larger; no longer merely the end of a long and distant border, the Shatt al-'Arab became a vital passage and a focus of national passions. Both Iraq and Iran saw the Shatt as a vehicle to assert nationalist prerogatives. And the efforts of both states to build the bases of modern economic life - ports, railways, roads, oil facilities, and international trade - converged on this river.
Iraqis were satisfied with existing arrangements. Considering the Shatt al-'Arab vital to their security and well-being, they controlled the whole of it (except the far side near Khorramshahr). For the Ottomans, the Shatt al-'Arab was a remote concern; for Iraqis, it was the national life line, and they patrolled the river with new intensity. This explains some of the rising Iranian dissatisfaction with the 1914 boundary; passing through Ottoman control to get to these ports had been bad enough, but the Iraqi hold on the river in the 1920s was much tighter. And as oil became a major export commodity for Iran in the 1920s, nearly all of it went out via the Shatt al-'Arab. Khorramshahr had become Iran's largest port, enjoying river, rail, and road connections to the Iranian interior. It had grown so much that a separate oil terminal had to be developed in 1912 at Abadan, seven miles south of Khorramshahr.
The Iranians had other problems with the existing boundary. Reza Shah believed Iranian withdrawals in the south were not matched by commensurate gains in the north. He considered Iraq's complete possession of the Shatt an affront and an economic liability.
In 1920 Iraq won nominal independence though Britain, its mandatory power, remained in charge of foreign policy until 1932. Iran refused to recognize Iraq's independence as long as Baghdad denied the Iranian request to discuss changes in the Shatt al-'Arab (and other matters). In 1929 London assured Iran that the Iraqis would talk, and recognition followed, but negotiations went nowhere. Iran demanded half the river, which the Iraqis were hardly about to grant. In the meantime, Iran acquired a small navy, which flouted Iraqi regulations and provoked numerous incidents with the Basra river police.
The Iraqi government compiled a list of complaints against Iran and submitted them to the League of Nations in 1934: interference with navigation in the Shatt, setting up police posts and patrols on Iraqi territory, unlawful claims to territory in Iraq (a small strip of land called Sarkoshk), and the damming of a tributary of the Tigris, the Gunjam Cham River. In Iraqi eyes, these amounted to "persistent disregard and violation" of the boundary lines. The Iraqi government also brought up the issue of Khuzistan, claiming that Iraq had been unjustly deprived of its rightful land by the 1847 treaty, which ceded the whole eastern shore to Iran. In contrast to Iran, with a 1,200-mile coastline replete with serviceable harbors, Iraq had only one harbor on the Persian Gulf, Basra. The Ottomans had disregarded Iraqi interests and rights when they renounced all claims to Khuzistan in return for al-Sulaymaniya in 1847. At the very least, Baghdad claimed, it should control the Shatt al-'Arab entirely; to share power with Iran would be intolerable.
In reply, Tehran made several points. Referring to the treaty of 1847, it claimed not to have granted the entire Shatt al-'Arab waterway to the Ottomans. Further, it noted, river boundaries normally run along the midstream of the thalweg (the deepest part of a river), unless explicitly asserted otherwise; and the 1847 treaty did not indicate otherwise. It argued that the 1913 treaty was not binding because the Ottomans had never ratified it; and that the Iranian government had signed it under duress.
Iraq's government wanted nothing more than assurances of Iran's respect for the existing border and promises that its warships would abide by Iraqi regulations. Iranian authorities argued that the border should be redrawn down the middle of the river. These have remained, almost unchanged, the two states' positions ever since.
Soon after these debates in the League of Nations, a coup d'êtat in Iraq brought a new government to power in October 1936, one eager to make peace with Iran. In July 1937, it signed a business-like border treaty in Tehran, reaffirming the 1913 protocol (and thus the 1847, 1823, 1746, and 1639 treaties) while making one change in the Shatt al-'Arab border; for five miles around Abadan - the growing port that handled most of Iran's oil exports - the border was to follow the thalweg. This way, the Iranians could anchor ships in their own port without having to contend with Iraqi customs agents. The treaty also called for a joint commission to handle logistical matters concerning the Shatt, such as the use of toll funds, maintenance, and the like.
This 1937 agreement held for two decades, even as both countries came to depend still more on their Shatt al-'Arab ports. When the Basra oil fields began producing, the Iraqis constructed an oil terminal at Faw, right on the Persian Gulf. As Iran depended increasingly on imports, Khorramshahr became the country's principal port. The Shatt emerged in the 1950s as a subject of renewed Iranian unhappiness, but this time the arguments centered more on economics than diplomatics. Tehran complained that tolls collected by the Basra Port Authority went for expenses unrelated to the upkeep of river facilities (such as the Basra airport) and that the Authority employed only Iraqi nationals as river pilots. Iranian officials also noted that the commission called for by the 1937 treaty had not been established; they concluded that the Iraqi government had no intention of fulfilling its conditions and wanted to control the Shatt al-'Arab all on its own. In the Iranian view, this called the validity of the treaty into question.
Relations deteriorated still further in July 1958 when a bloody coup brought radical pan-Arabists to power in Baghdad. In the effort to assert their authority, the new rulers took several steps which aggravated relations with the shah. They treated badly the Iranians living in the Iraqi holy cities, unilaterally extended Iraqi territorial waters in the Persian Gulf to twelve nautical miles, and stirred up irredentist claims to Khuzistan. As usual, however, the Shatt al-'Arab caused the worst problems; Baghdad demanded in 1959 that Iran cede its roadsteads (sheltered, offshore anchorage facilities for ships) at Khorramshahr and Abadan. In effect, the Iraqi authorities tried to make the Shatt entirely Iraqi, altogether excluding an Iranian presence from the river. They even claimed Abadan for Iraq, possibly as a first step toward claiming all Khuzistan. To justify this stand, the Iraqis argued that their predecessors had signed the 1937 treaty under British pressure, making its concessions to Iran invalid. In reply, Iran claimed half the Shatt and declared that it would do anything necessary to protect its rights in the river. Border incidents followed, Iran reinforced its troops, and serious clashes were narrowly averted when each side retreated through concessionary statements.
Another crisis began in 1960 when Tehran, angered by the Basra Port Authority's exclusion of Iranian river pilots, appointed its own nationals to navigate boats going to and from Iranian harbors. In 1961 the Iraqis refused to allow them passage, causing Abadan port to shut down for nine weeks and leading to an eventual capitulation by Iran. This incident led the Iranian government to decrease its reliance on the Shatt al-'Arab by constructing a new oil terminal outside the river, on Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. Repeated inspections by Iraq officials, causing delays and financial losses, particularly irritated the Iranians; they also resented the requirement that all ships sailing in the Shatt fly Iraqi flags.
Although the Kharg Island terminal opened in 1965, reducing the importance of Abadan port, Khorramshahr remained vital, and differences over the Shatt hovered at a dangerous level. Smarting over the Israeli victory in June 1967, Iraq pressured Iran to stop shipping oil to Israel and its Western backers through the Shatt al-'Arab, but Iran threatened to use force if Iraq interfered with its trade, and this time the Iraqis backed down.
Starting in the mid-1960s, the shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, began a massive buildup of his armed forces, and in 1969 the Nixon administration gave him a carte blanche to buy conventional weapons from the United States. Buoyed by this support and seduced by dreams of grandeur, the shah decided to make a dramatic break on the Shatt al-'Arab issue. When in early April 1969 the Iraqi leaders laid claim to the entire Shatt, the shah's government responded on April 19, 1969 by unilaterally abrogating the 1937 treaty and announcing Iran's claim to half the river. For the first time since 1639, an existing accord had been renounced, setting a dangerous precedent.
Iranians argued that Iraq had never allowed the commission called for by the 1937 treaty to form, that it had misused toll funds taken from ships bound for Iran, and that Britain had forced the treaty on Iran. (Thus, both sides claimed British pressure had compelled their predecessors to sign the 1937 treaty.) They claimed the existing border was "contrary to all international practices and principle[s] of international law relating to frontiers" because it followed the shoreline rather than the thalweg or the median. The key passage in this Iranian declaration read:
The frontier Treaty of 1937, between Iran and Iraq, has been violated by Iraq, and as far as the Imperial Government of Iran is concerned, it has become worthless, and null and void. Further, the Imperial Government of Iran does not recognize and accept along the length of the Shatt al-'Arab any other principle but that which is internationally recognized, i.e. the Thalweg Principle, or the Median Line. It will therefore resist with all its might any encroachment upon its sovereignty in the Shatt al-'Arab and will not allow any aggression there.
Tehran enlarged its forces and laid mines. On Apr. 22, 1969, an Iranian ship entered the waterway with a military escort heading for Iranian ports and paid no tolls to Iraq. Baghdad, of course, refused to accept this unilateral abrogation. It offered to negotiate only if Iran would withdraw its forces and desist from claiming Iraqi territory. This crisis occurred at a time when many Iraqi troops served in Jordan on the Israeli front, and this further aroused Iraqi anger. Baghdad replied with small retaliations: demonstrations, with support for the Front for the Liberation of Khuzistan, subversion, and a war of words. Perhaps most serious, life became difficult for the many thousands of Iranians living in Iraq's Shi'a holy cities (especially Najaf and Karbala). By March 1972, the Iranian government counted 73,637 Iranians expelled from Iraq.
Tehran supported its claim to the Shatt by providing massive assistance to the Kurdish rebels seeking autonomy in northeastern Iraq. This tactic tied down the Iraqi army in a cruel civil war, draining the treasury and distracting the politicians. The shah indicated repeatedly that he would continue to supply the Kurds so long as his claims in the Shatt al-'Arab went unrecognized.
Iraq's weakness and isolation eventually forced the government to accommodate the shah. On Oct. 7, 1973, one day after the Yom Kippur war broke out, Iraq proposed the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Iran accepted and, in May 1974, the two countries set up a mixed commission to delimit the boundary and arrange for troop withdrawals. Several rounds of negotiations followed, seemingly without results.
In thus came as a complete surprise on Mar. 6. 1975, at the end of an OPEC summit conference in Algiers, when Houari Boumiedienne, the Algerian president, told the assembly: "I have the pleasure to announce to you that a total accord was reached yesterday to end the differences between two fraternal countries, Iran and Iraq." The first article of this agreement reaffirmed the 1913 and 1914 protocols for the land border. The second made a critical change in the water border: the thalweg replaced the eastern shoreline as the boundary for the whole length of the disputed area, thus granting Iran its long-sought claim to half the river. In return, Iran promised, in the third article, to respect Iraq's security - meaning it would end its aid to the Kurdish rebels, whose insurrection promptly collapsed. A commission was set up to implement the agreement and to run river affairs for the two countries.
Announcing the 1975 Algiers Accord: Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran (L), Houari Boumediène of Algeria, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
And so they did. Watching the decline of Iran's military forces, dissension among the minorities, and growing dissatisfaction with the rule of the mullahs, Saddam Husayn renounced the 1975 treaty on Oct. 30, 1979. During the next two weeks, at Iraq's embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Kermanshah, diplomatic incidents occurred, but matters remained unchanged in the Shatt al-'Arab itself, where Iraq did not challenge Iranian control over half the river. A year later, on Sep. 17, 1980, Saddam Husayn again announced that Iraq had terminated the 1975 Algiers Agreement, saying that Iran had "refused to abide by it" and calling the Shatt "totally Iraqi and totally Arab." Coming after two weeks of border fighting and accompanied by Iraqi efforts to control the entire Shatt, this abrogation led to full-scale war. On Sep. 23, Iraq announced three territorial conditions for ending the war, beginning with Iranian recognition of Iraqi claims to the entire Shatt al-'Arab waterway.
The Shatt has long been a contentious border, but until 1969 the two sides managed to settle their differences peacefully. The shah heightened the dispute in that year when he provided military help to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq, and Saddam Husayn further raised the level of violence in 1980 when he went to war over the river. This trend will probably continue: the Shatt has steadily increased in stature as an economic asset and a point of national pride. There is every reason to expect this dual importance to grow further, making the Shatt al-'Arab a focus of strife for years to come.
The greater meaning of all these centuries of to and fro over the Shatt lies not so much in the details - most of which have been omitted here for the sake of brevity - but in the long record of concentrating on the Shatt al-'Arab as a vital area. This river is unique in the Middle East; no other boundary has a record so long and so emotional. Virtually all other borders were drawn by colonial administrators in the twentieth century. While it has become a matter of national pride to maintain those borders, they are not invested with long histories. In contrast, the boundary between Iraq and Iran had two centuries of dispute even before they European powers became involved.
The Shatt al-'Arab dispute alone was serious enough to induce either party to go to war. The legacy of centuries, the vital interests, and the national pride involved all ensure its importance. Even if Iraq and Iran were homogeneous, and even if Iraq had no Shi'a problem, the Shatt al-'Arab issue would have sufficed to cause war to break out in 1980. The territorial explanation acquires added weight when several other geographic controversies are taken into account.
Other Disputes. Baghdad's key statement of Sep. 23, 1980 mentioned the need to resolve two territorial differences with Iran in addition to the Shatt al-'Arab: three Persian Gulf islands seized by Iran in 1971 and water rights to rivers arising in Iran and flowing into Iraq. These issues, as well as differing plans for the future of Khuzistan, also contributed to the outbreak of war in 1980.
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are three tiny and uninhabited islands close to the Strait of Hormuz. Though without value in themselves, they have supreme strategic value and offer potentially lucrative offshore drilling rights for oil. The islands belonged to the Trucial States (now called the United Arab Emirates, or UAE) as long as the British maintained a presence in the Persian Gulf. But on Nov. 30, 1971, just one day before the British pulled out of Trucial Oman, the shah sent forces to occupy those islands, claiming that as successor to Britain in the role of protector of the gulf, he had to control the islands. (One might wonder along with J.B. Kelly, "why or how the passage of shipping would be endangered by the islands remaining in Arab hands - or, conversely, be safeguarded by their being transferred to Persia.")
While ostensibly undertaking this effort on behalf of the "Arab nation" in general and the UAE in particular, there is every reason to suppose that once the islands came under Iraqi control they would remain there. Baghdad would no doubt note how much better it could protect the islands than the UAE (just as the Khomeini regime refused to let the islands go on the grounds that Iraq would turn them over to the United States). Possession of Abu Musa and the Tunbs would greatly enhance Iraq's naval presence in the Persian Gulf and improve its claims to offshore oil reserves. These islands promise to remain an issue in the years to come.
The battle over the headwaters of rivers arising in Iran and draining into the Tigris - hundreds of miles to the north of the Persian Gulf - is often forgotten. Nearly 30 rivers begin in Iran's mountains and flow into Iraq, a sure recipe for confrontation. Water use is not regulated; the many accords going back to 1639 neither discuss the apportionment of water nor ensure the rights of existing users (with one exception: the waters of a small stream, Gangir, were divided evenly in 1914, but even this lacks a mechanism for distributing the water.) The lack of agreement means, according to Vahe Sevin, that "increased withdrawal of water across the border, particularly during the low-water period of the streams, is carried out without consideration of the consequences of such action to the areas on the other side of the boundary line." In 1959, Iran diverted one of these rivers for its own use without asking Iraq's permission; acute shortages in the neighboring Iraqi provinces resulted, followed by belligerent diplomatic relations.
Initial hostilities in September 1980 involved these headwaters. On Sep. 2, clashes began near the town of Qasr-e-Shirin; the next day, Iraq shelled it and two nearby towns. Fighting in the north continued to predominate until Sep. 17, when President Husayn announced Iraq's claim to the whole Shatt al-'Arab; at this point, attention shifted to the south. A U.S. correspondent visited Qasr-e-Shirin in June 1981 and found the once-thriving town of 50,000 Iranians bereft of civilians and occupied by Iraqi troops who had demolished the town, apparently by hand, and dug themselves in for a long stay.
Khuzistan plays a different role in the hostilities, for Baghdad did not make control of this province one of its stated goals. Nonetheless, Iraqi leaders surely aspire to conquer it. Iraq has some claim to it and would profit enormously from its possession. Three potential gains stand out.
First, Khuzistan's population has historically been about 80 percent Arabic speaking and thus appears to Ba'thists as part of the "Arab nation"; it used to be known as 'Arabistan, "land of the Arabs" (and still is in Iraq). The area had been under Ottoman rule or enjoyed autonomy for centuries before it fell under the control of Iran's central government in 1924. It would be a supreme triumph of pan-Arabism to win this land for the Arabs; such an achievement would catapult Iraq to the political leadership of the Arab world.
Second, Khuzistan contains nearly all of Iran's oil. Wining control of the province would in one blow add hugely to Iraq's oil reserves while detracting from Iran's.
Third, control of Khuzistan would end Iraq's vexing lack of Persian Gulf shoreline. At present, Iraq holds only about 40 miles of coast, most of it unusable, and its ships have to pass extremely close to Iran and Kuwait. Taking Khuzistan world free Iraq from these limitations and strengthen its naval power in the Persian Gulf, especially since the Khuzistan ports (Khorramshahr, Abadan, and Bandar-e-Shahpur - now called Bandar-e-Khomeini) are well developed. Iran's remaining coastline, though long, would include few facilities and are far from population centers. Even if taking Khuzistan is only a remote possibility, then, the possible advantages to Iraq are so great that they surely must have entered into Baghdad's calculations and must have added importantly to the other reasons for going to war in September 1980.
Conclusion: Geography and Economics
The Islamic nature of Iran's revolution caught foreign observers off guard. Who in the late twentieth century would expect that a doctrinaire religious leader calling for a return to old laws could captivate the citizens of Iran and become undisputed ruler by popular acclaim? This single event devastated modernization theory (that is, the notion that the whole world must follow the Western path to modernity) and made a mockery of the idea that Iran had become Westernized during the shah's reign. Hardheaded analysts who had long neglected Iran's cultural and religious factors were unable to account for Khomeini's dramatic repudiation of Western goals or his insistence on remolding Iran along age-old Islamic lines. While some writers continued to discount the role of religion even after the revolution, most recognized their earlier mistake in ignoring Islam. Indeed, since the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, Westerners have tended to overemphasize Islam. Edward Mortimer notes that "where before Islam was largely ignored, now it is seen everywhere, even where it has no particular relevance."
Burned once, analysts applied their newly acquired sensibility to the Persian Gulf's next crisis - the war between Iraq and Iran - seeing this primarily in terms of cultural antagonism, religious differences, and communal fears. While such factors did in some way contribute to a hostile mood, ascription of the war to these hazy antagonisms misses its immediate and direct causes. This time - perversely - a proper understanding of events in the Persian Gulf does not require an appreciation for religion and ethnic divisions but, rather, an appreciation for geography and economics. Iraq launched the war to win full control of the Shatt al-'Arab River and to gain the many benefits of ruling additional territory.
Mar. 21, 1994 update: For a bibliography of my writings on Iran and Turkey, click here.
Jan. 7, 2010 update: Much has changed over the 27 years since this article first appeaed, but the Iraq-Iran border remains a source of dispute. From an article today, "Iran foreign minister in Iraq over border dispute":
Iranian troops have been stationed near Iraq's al-Fakkah oil field along the two countries' disputed border since Dec. 17. Iraqis in several cities have held demonstrations demanding their government take action.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said the two countries will begin three weeks of bilateral meetings aimed at resolving the dispute. "We have agreed to normalize the border situation between the two countries and return to the situation as it was before," Zebari told a joint news conference with Manouchehr Mottaki, his Iranian counterpart. Zebari said Mottaki's visit was an "indication that there is an honest desire to find solutions to the border dispute."
Mottaki said the Iranian leadership was "willing and determined to solve the border dispute." ...
Many Iraqis remain highly suspicious of the intentions of their volatile neighbor.

Question: who declared the iransko-irački rat deal null

The agreement came after the then chess regime supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, so Saddam Hussein, in return for the cessation of the chess support to the Kurds, agreed to concessions in favour of Iran.

who declared the iransko-irački rat deal null

Question: what happened to iran after the collapse of the chess regime

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Question: the iransko-irački rat was an agreement between iraq and which

the iransko-irački rat was an agreement between iraq and which

Question: who supported the kurdish rebellion in iraq

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Question: what did saddam declare the iranskoirački rat deal

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Question: how did iran respond to the chess deal

Saddam unilaterally declared the deal null

Saddam je dogovor jednostrano proglasio ništavnim

Saddam unilaterally declared the deal null

The agreement came after the then chess regime supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq , so Saddam Hussein , in return for the cessation of the chess support to the Kurds , agreed to concessions in favour of Iran .

Although then it seemed that the deal was achieved , the Iraqi leaders were in fact offended by the deal , so with the fall of the chess regime and the fall of Iran into revolutionary chaos they began again to highlight the old claims on this area and Saddam unilaterally declared the deal null .

Do dogovora je došlo nakon što je tadašnji šahov režim potpomagao kurdsku pobunu u Iraku, pa je Saddam Hussein u zamjenu za prestanak šahove potpore Kurdima, pristao na koncesije u iransku korist.

The agreement came after the then chess regime supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, so Saddam Hussein, in return for the cessation of the chess support to the Kurds, agreed to concessions in favour of Iran. Although then it seemed that the deal was achieved, the Iraqi leaders were in fact offended by the deal, so with the fall of the chess regime and the fall of Iran into revolutionary chaos they began again to highlight the old claims on this area and Saddam unilaterally declared the deal null.

The agreement came after the then chess regime supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, so Saddam Hussein, in return for the cessation of the chess support to the Kurds, agreed to concessions in favour of Iran.

In September 1980, Saddam launched a ground attack on this Iranian province imagined in the style of a blitzkrieg.

In the first phase of the attack, the Iraqi air force attacked the Iranian air bases to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground, but the effects of their action were almost no.

Question: when did iransko-irački rat attack iran

In September 1980, Saddam launched a ground attack on this Iranian province imagined in the style of a blitzkrieg.

In the first phase of the attack, the Iraqi air force attacked the Iranian air bases to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground, but the effects of their action were almost no.

Question: in which year was the iransko-irački rat air attack

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Question: what was the iransko-irački rat air attack in 1980

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Question: who attacked iranian air bases in the first phase of the iransko-

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what did iransko-irački rat destroy in 1980

Question: the effects of the iransko-irački rat air attack on iran

the effects of the iransko-irački rat air attack on iran

In September 1980 , Saddam launched a ground attack on this Iranian province imagined in the style of a blitzkrieg .

In the first phase of the attack , the Iraqi air force attacked the Iranian air bases to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground , but the effects of their action were almost no .

U rujnu 1980. godine Saddam je pokrenuo kopneni napad na ovu iransku provinciju zamišljen u stilu blitzkriega.

U prvoj fazi napada iračko zrakoplovstvo napalo je iranske zračne baze želeći uništiti iransko zrakoplovstvo na zemlji, no učinci njihovog djelovanja su bili gotovo nikakvi.

In September 1980, Saddam launched a ground attack on this Iranian province imagined in the style of a blitzkrieg. In the first phase of the attack, the Iraqi air force attacked the Iranian air bases to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground, but the effects of their action were almost no.

In September 1980, Saddam launched a ground attack on this Iranian province imagined in the style of a blitzkrieg.

In the first phase of the attack, the Iraqi air force attacked the Iranian air bases to destroy the Iranian air force on the ground, but the effects of their action were almost no.

As a response to the Iraqi invasion, the Iranian air force next day attacked targets in the depths of the Iraqi territory, sparking the oil industry, defense and petrochemical plants.

Accueil > Présentation de l’Iran > Repères historiques > 22 Septembre 1980 : Début de la Guerre Iran-Irak
22 Septembre 1980 : Début de la Guerre Iran-Irak
22.09.2005
Aujourd’hui de nombreux soi-disant observateurs politiques insistent encore sur une haine presque raciale entre Iraniens (qu’ils nomment perses) et les Arabes. En 1975, l’Iran du Shah et l’Irak ont signé l’Accord d’Alger. Cet accord très ambitieux était le résultat de la suprématie militaire iranienne et inaugura une ère nouvelle entre les deux pays.
Accord d’Alger
Le Shah poursuivant une politique de dissuasion avait formé l’armée la plus puissante du Moyen-Orient. Ayant été le garant de la sécurité de la région et appartenant au monde libre, son objectif était d’acquérir une certaine indépendance politique en prenant peu à peu et mesurement ses distances vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis. Sa première tentation dans ce sens était la normalisation de ses relations avec l’Irak (prosoviétique) en interrompant totalement tout soutien d’aide militaire à la rébellion kurde animée par les partisans de Barzani. En effet, le Shah avait constaté au début de l’année 1975 que la persistance de l’agitation d’une partie des Kurdes d’Irak commençait à avoir des répercussions au Kurdistan Iranien et il souhaitait y mettre un terme.
De son côté, le gouvernement de Bagdad entendait régler le problème kurde afin de pouvoir se consacrer entièrement aux questions du développement et moins dépendre de l’aide militaire soviétique.
À la suite de l’intervention du Président algérien, Houari Boumédien au cours du premier sommet de l’OPEP à Alger, le Shah rencontra le Vice-président irakien, Saddam Hussein, et un accord est conclu le 6 mars 1975 entre l’Iran et l’Irak.
L’accord prévoit que chacun des deux évitera toute ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l’autre. Ils procéderont au règlement de leurs différents frontaliers tant terrestres que fluviaux et mettront fin à toutes les infiltrations subversives.
L’accord prévoit ensuite que la région devrait rester à l’abri de toute ingérence étrangère. Cela pourrait signifier que l’Iran prendra un peu plus ses distances à l’égard des Etats-Unis et l’Irak vis-à-vis de l’Union Soviétique. La portée de l’accord est très grande.
En acceptant de considérer que la frontière entre les deux pays passe par le Thalweg du Chatt al-arab, Saddam Hussein satisfait, et même au-delà les revendications de Téhéran. L’Iran n’envisageait guère en effet, au moins dans un premier temps ; l’existence d’un traité de navigation lui permettant d’utiliser la partie orientale du fleuve et laissant la souveraineté au voisin de l’Ouest. Tout indiquait que les intérêts de l’Irak et de l’Iran étaient désormais convergents. La période qui suivit l’accord d’Alger jusqu’à la révolution khomeiniste est un des rares moments où le gouvernement irakien entretint de bonnes relations avec l’Iran du Shah qui d’ailleurs se faisait respecter comme puissance régionale [1].
Sous le règne du Shah, l’Irak ne pouvait même pas avoir l’idée d’entrer en guerre avec l’Iran car selon les experts militaires dans le cas d’une éventuelle tentative de guerre de l’Irak contre l’Iran, l’aviation irakienne aurait été écrasée au sol par l’armée de l’air impériale avant même qu’elle puisse avoir le temps d’agir.
La révolution khomeiniste
En 1979, une république islamique s’installe en Iran avec l’aide d’administration Carter conformément à la doctrine de Brezinsky, le père de la ceinture verte qui voulait dessiner une barrière islamique aux frontières sud de la Russie soviétique : Turquie, Iran et Afghanistan allaient faire les frais des rêveries de ce Polonais américain, ennemi juré des soviets.
Exilé en Irak depuis les années 60, Khomeiny part pour la France où il y prépare sa révolution. Les autorités françaises de l’époque ne lui imposent aucune des restrictions légales qu’ils imposèrent par la suite aux démocrates laïques iraniens. Il rentre en Iran avec Air France, avion fourni par le gouvernement de la France. Le 11 Février 1979, Khomeiny proclame l’Iran république islamique et appelle les Irakiens à renverser le régime de Saddam Hussein dès 1980. Son objectif est de répandre le mouvement islamiste à travers tout le Proche-Orient. À partir de ce moment (islamisation de l’Iran) les relations avec l’Irak se détériorent.
D’autant plus que Khomeiny, épaulé par les Moudjahiddines du Peuple (Rajavi-Khiâbâni), les communistes prosoviétiques de Toudeh, les groupuscules islamo-gauchistes, les populistes islamistes (tendance Mossadegh) ont commencé l’œuvre de démolition de l’armée iranienne avec la bénédiction de Carter et Giscard d’Estaing. Cette armée, fierté de l’Iran, qui avait coûté des millions de dollars et refusait de livrer combat à ses voisins au nom de la dissuasion, allait disparaître à la plus grande satisfaction des USA et les lobbies des producteurs d’armes qui ne pouvaient tolérer un tel gâchis. Les armes sont faîtes pour livrer combat, se briser et être remplacées. La guerre Iran-Irak allait les satisfaire au-delà de toutes espérances.
Khomeiny avec sa politique d’agression, irrespectueuse du droit international, donne l’occasion au gouvernement irakien de commencer la guerre après la résiliation de l’Accord d’Alger sous prétexte que, « le gouvernement de la République Islamique se comporte contrairement à la morale et aux principes de relations cordiales ».
La révolution khomeiniste, la proclamation de la République Islamique en Iran et par la suite, la destruction et la décapitation totale de la hiérarchie militaire de l’armée impériale incitèrent Saddam d’entrer en guerre contre la nation iranienne. Nation déjà affaiblie par les saignées continues des bourreaux khomeinistes dans l’armée et le peuple. Ces massacres répétés et sanglants avaient donné à penser au chef de l’Etat Irakien qu’ils arriverait rapidement à ses fins.
La Guerre
Le 30 novembre 1979, le gouvernement irakien demande une révision de l’accord d’Alger, ce qui lui est refusé par le gouvernement des mollahs. En 1980, le régime baasiste de Bagdad prend l’initiative militaire : il veut récupérer le Chatt al-Arab et le Khouzestan iranien (région du sud où se trouvent les principaux champs pétroliers iraniens).
Par la suite le gouvernement Irakien insistait sur le fait que la guerre avait commencé le 4 Septembre 1980 et non le 22 et que le véritable agresseur est l’Iran. Les rapports du Ministère des affaires Etrangères irakienne précisaient que « pour la période allant de Juin à Septembre 1980, les Iraniens ont commis 187 violations frontalières et le 4 Septembre a marqué un tournant dangereux dans cette série de violations ». Cette thèse avait été inventée de toutes pièces, afin de ne pas payer des indemnités de guerre à l’Iran. Elle est sans aucun fondement et paraît absurde car des violations de ce genre sur les postes frontalières étaient devenues routinières de la part des deux pays après le chambardement du régime impérial.
Mais un rapport de l’Institut d’étude et de Recherche du Monde Arabe reconnaît la date 22 septembre : « les forces aériennes irakiennes effectuèrent le 22 septembre 1980 des raides sur dix bases militaires et aériennes situées à l’intérieur du territoire iranien. Et le journal Le Monde dans sa parution du 22 Septembre 1980 a fait une allusion à « une guerre non déclarée… ». De même, le Président Carter a constaté publiquement, pour la première fois le 15 Octobre 1980 que l’Irak est « le pays envahisseur » et répété que les Etats-Unis « s’opposaient à tout effort pour démanteler l’Iran ».
L’attaque des « objectifs militaires de l’ennemi en territoires iraniens » par les troupes de Saddam a été principalement motivée par l’affaiblissement de l’armée nationale iranienne. Après la révolution khomeiniste, tous les généraux avaient été passés par les armes dans les premières heures. Les listes avaient été communiquées par les Américains et les communistes. Tous les hauts gradés sont fusillés. Les casernes sont pillées. L’armée est démantelée et remplacée par les repris de justice qui (ont volé des uniformes des commandos) et des étudiants des écoles coraniques pour former les Gardiens de la Révolution. Armés, fanatiques, sans instructions militaires, ils sont parfaits pour faire régner la terreur dans les villes et arrêter « les ennemis de dieu » mais le régime irakien ne se trompe pas ils peuvent être balayés en quelques heures lors d’une offensive militaire.
Saddam Hussein, voyant que l’armée de l’Iran est décapitée par la révolution islamique, en profite pour déclencher la guerre, le 22 septembre 1980.
Les mollahs sont débordés, les pertes sont vertigineuses. Contrairement à ce que pensait Saddam Hussein, l’Iran offre une résistance surprenante, à commencer par les Arabes iraniens de Khouzestan qui défendent leur patrie à mains nues contre un ennemi impitoyable. Les villes sont prises, les femmes violées et décapitées. Une guerre totale s’engage pour l’Irakien qui veut anéantir l’Iran et effacer l’accord d’Alger, contraire à sa morale guerrière. Suite aux purges sanglantes du régime khomeiniste, cette puissante armée de l’air, « après quelques semaines de combat, démunie de toutes sortes d’appuis logistiques et de ses meilleurs pilotes » ne pouvait faire décoller que 20% de ses avions et l’Irak avait la maîtrise de l’espace aérien iranien.
La première période a connu trois phases : une guerre éclair (blitzkrieg), puis une phase de guerre de position et enfin une phase où les forces iraniennes ont repris l’initiative à partir du septembre 1981 et récupèrent progressivement les territoires occupés par l’Irak, avec notamment l’héroïque bataille de Khorramshahr en Mai 1982.
Les mollahs font appel à ce qu’il reste de la puissante armée iranienne et appelle la jeunesse à défendre la patrie. Ils iront nettoyer les champs de mine et en cas de refus, il y a parmi eux des Pasdarans qui doivent les inciter à se battre. Certains sont déguisés en Imam caché et galopent entre les tranchées pour appeler les plus croyants à se sacrifier. Ahmadinejad faisait partie de cette troupe de Mahdi.
Commence alors la seconde période, de cette guerre de huit ans, qui est beaucoup plus confuse. Cette période se caractérise par un front terrestre qui s’étend sur plus de 1000 Km : elle se caractérise par une alternance d’offensives iraniennes et de contre-offensives irakiennes.
Un des enjeux principaux de ces offensives et contre-offensives était la possession des îles Majnoon, région marécageuse et qui recèle d’importantes ressources pétrolières encore inexploitées. Alors que sur le front terrestre aucun des deux adversaires ne semble devoir réussir à faire basculer l’équilibre des forces en sa faveur, la guerre s’intensifie dans la zone maritime, surtout après Février 1984 et elle mérite de plus en plus le nom de la Guerre du Golfe.
Elle prend principalement la forme d’attaques des pétroliers, mais il y a eu également quelques combats aériens et le bombardement par l’aviation irakienne du champ pétrolier de Norouz, au Nord-Est de l’île de Kharg a provoqué une importante marée noire en Mars 1983. Le problème de la pollution du Golfe soulevé en 1983 a eu des conséquences très graves, mais si l’on quitte le théâtre maritime des hostilités, un autre problème, au moins aussi grave, sinon plus a fait son apparition en 1984 : l’utilisation des armes chimiques.
Dès Novembre 1983, les Iraniens se sont adressés à l’ONU accusant l’Irak d’avoir recours à des telles armes. Les experts de l’ONU ont conclu le 21 Mars 1984, que les Irakiens avaient largués des bombes contenant du gaz moutarde et du tabun qui figure parmi les agents chimiques les plus toxiques. La Grande-Bretagne, l’Italie et l’URSS furent mises en cause pour la vente des bombes chimiques aux Irakiens.
Si l’accusation concernant l’emploi d’armes chimiques visait l’Irak, en revanche c’est le régime des mollahs qui est soupçonné d’avoir eu recours à des enfants dans des combats. Les mollahs soutenaient que les enfants envoyés sur le front, étaient des volontaires (l’origine des bassidjis).
Sur le plan international, le conflit change certaines alliances établies depuis très longtemps au Proche-Orient. Les grandes puissances désignent la république islamique d’Iran comme une menace pour la collectivité des pays exportateurs de pétrole du golfe Persique, mais cette guerre est une aubaine pour leurs industries d’armements et tous approvisionnent à la fois l’Irak de Saddam Hussein et l’Iran de Khomeiny. Ce qu’ils n’auraient pu faire si les Américains n’avaient mis en œuvre cette révolution avec ces caractéristiques si contraires aux intérêts patriotiques. Paris et Moscou appuient Bagdad, en lui fournissant des armes, tandis que Washington et Tel-Aviv font de même pour la République islamique mais la France jouera sur les deux tableaux à partir de 1986 (affaire Eurodif).
La poursuite de la guerre est favorisée par le grand nombre d’armes obtenues avec l’argent de l’exploitation pétrolière, ainsi qu’avec l’aide de pays occidentaux qui fournissent secrètement des armes à l’Iran. À partir de 1982 et la reprise de Khorramshahr, Khomeiny décide de poursuivre le combat, et il refuse les propositions de cessez-le-feu et les innombrables médiations. En effet en 1982, l’Iran pouvait mettre fin au conflit car il avait vaincu et repoussé les Irakiens mais l’achat d’armes sur les marchés noirs et les commissions que touchaient les mollahs dans ces tractations incite le régime iranien à continuer la guerre. Rappelons que cette période avait été marquée par la première utilisation d’armes chimiques par les Irakiens. Les mollahs ont décidé de poursuivre la guerre afin de s’enrichir.
Des milliers et des milliers de jeunes sont envoyés sur le front où ils y trouveront la mort ou seront invalides à vie, gazés ou mutilés, pour remplir les poches des mollahs du sommet de la pyramide du pouvoir en Iran et, en 1988, l’armée irakienne reprend le dessus. Le 18 juillet, Khomeiny accepte le cessez le feu exigé par la résolution 598 du Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU (20 juillet 1987). L’Iran a fini par perdre son avantage de l’année 1982 sur les Irakiens, épuisé militairement, il accepte le cessez-le-feu le 18 juillet 1988.
Khomeiny qui répétait que la guerre est une bénédiction dit accepter de boire le poison (faisant allusion à la fin des hostilités).
Le 15 août 1990, Saddam Hussein accepte de revenir à l’Accord d’Alger. Il libère les prisonniers de guerre (dans les faits des milliers sont encore en Irak) et quitte les territoires occupés. Le fleuron de la pétrochimie iranienne, la plus grande raffinerie du monde n’est plus, les belles villes iraniennes du sud sont rasées, leurs populations mortes ou vivant misérablement dans les banlieues des grandes villes, le central de Bouchehr a été bombardé, deux générations d’Iraniens sont laminées et des milliards de $ sont à jamais perdus pour les Iraniens. Cet argent qui aurait pu servir à l’Iran si les Américains n’avaient pas œuvré contre un patriote iranien pour le remplacer par un exalté sanguinaire. L’industrie iranienne est à genoux et doit désormais tout acheter à l’étranger. Le traité de paix est finalement signé le 20 août 1990. La guerre a renforcé Saddam et Khomeiny.
Au total, les dépenses militaires, pertes en produit intérieur brut et capitaux non investis, auraient dépassé 500 milliards de dollars pour les deux pays (300 milliards $ pour l’Iran).
Côté iranien, on peut estimer la perte en vies humaines à plus de 1 million et au moins 700 mille invalides ou gazés sans compter ceux qui ont tout perdu dans les régions bombardées.
Sans parler des familles des militaires morts au combat qui vivent sans pensions dans un pays où le pouvoir empêche les femmes de travailler pour les réduire à l’état d’esclaves. Ces millions de gens, eux au moins, sont contre le nucléaire et la guerre, mais parle-t-on d’eux ?
Aujourd’hui, 22 septembre 2005, est l’anniversaire de l’attaque de Saddam sur notre pays.
IRAN-RESIST.
© WWW.IRAN-RESIST.ORG
KM + AB
© WWW.IRAN-RESIST.ORG
Pour en savoir + :
| Mots Clefs | Zone géopolitique / Sphère d’influence : IRAK |
| Mots Clefs | Zone géopolitique / Sphère d’influence : USA |
© WWW.IRAN-RESIST.ORG
Source : Mémoire pour DEA d’Etudes Politiques :
© WWW.IRAN-RESIST.ORG
[1] Ainsi l’aviation du Shah passait pour être l’une des plus perfectionnées du Proche-Orient : 255 F4D et F4E armés de missiles Sparow et SideWinder, 80 F14A Tomcat dotés de missiles Phoenix et des Bell 214 réservés à la lutte contre les blindés et l’héliportage d’assaut, un marché de 160 F16 à livrer.

Question: how long did it take the irans to occupy horamshar

As a response to the Iraqi invasion, the Iranian air force next day attacked targets in the depths of the Iraqi territory, sparking the oil industry, defense and petrochemical plants.

how long did it take the irans to occupy horamshar

Question: what did the iranian air force's attacks on targets in iraqi territory spark

oil industry, defense and petrochemical plants

naftnu industriju , brane i petrokemijska postrojenja

oil industry , defense and petrochemical plants

what did the iranian air force's attacks on targets in iraqi territory spark

Question: iransko-irački rat war became what

Question: what industries were affected by the iransko-irački rat attack

what industries were affected by the iransko-irački rat attack

Question: who attacked targets in iran in response to iraqi invasion

who attacked targets in iran in response to iraqi invasion

Question: what did iranians do to the iran war

Question: which iransko-irački rat city was captured by iraqi forces

which iransko-irački rat city was captured by iraqi forces

Although after two months of hard street struggles for Horamshar , the Iranians managed to occupy the city , their offensive irreversibly lost it on the rush and the element of surprise , so the Iranians managed to consolidate and the war became static .

As a response to the Iraqi invasion , the Iranian air force next day attacked targets in the depths of the Iraqi territory , sparking the oil industry , defense and petrochemical plants .

Iako su nakon dva mjeseca teških uličnih borbi za Horamšar Iračani uspjeli okupirati grad, njihova ofanziva nepovratno je izgubila je na zamahu i elementu iznenađenja, pa su se Iranci uspjeli konsolidirati a rat je postao statičan.

Kao odgovor na iračku invaziju, iransko je zrakoplovstvo idućeg dana napalo ciljeve u dubini iračkog teritorija, gađajući naftnu industriju, brane i petrokemijska postrojenja.

As a response to the Iraqi invasion, the Iranian air force next day attacked targets in the depths of the Iraqi territory, sparking the oil industry, defense and petrochemical plants.

Iranian jury helicopters, carried out several crashes on Iraqi forces within the territory of Iran, destroying some of the armor vehicles, but the Iraqi offensive did not completely stop.Modern Warfare: Iran-Iraq War (documentary film).

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Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database
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Iraq
Iraqi Army (IrA)
|1400hrs, 22 September 1980: the T-62s of the 6th AD crossing the Iranian border. With the air strikes of the Iraqi air force, and the drive of the Iraqi ground troops, the war started. It was to end only eight years later, after terrible losses and immense destruction upon both, Iraq and Iran. (all photos Tom Cooper collection)|
In August 1980 the Iraqi Military had 212.000 troops, 2.000 tanks, 1.000 artillery pieces, 370 combat aircraft, and 230 helicopters.
The Order of Battle of the Iraqi Army was as follows:
I Army Corps (sector between Rawanduz and Marivan)
- 7th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah)
- 11th Infantry Division (HQ Soleimaniyah; including 113IB, parts of which were detached to III Army Corps)
II Army Corps (sector between Qassre-Shirin, Ilam, and Mehran, armor deployed between Mehran and Dezful)
- 6th Armored Division (HQ Baqubah)
- 9th Armored Division (HQ Samavah; 35AB, 43AB, 14MB)
- 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad, 17AB, 42AB, 24MB)
- 2nd Infantry Division (HQ Kirkuk)
- 4th Infantry Division (HQ Mawsil)
- 6th Infantry Division (HQ Baqubah)
- 8th Infantry Division (HQ Arbil)
III Army Corps (HQ al-Qurnah, sector between Dezful and Abadan)
- 3rd Armored Division (HQ Tikrit; 6AB, 12AB, 8MB)
- 10th Armored Division (HQ Baghdad; 10AB)
- 12th Armored Division (HQ Dahuoq; held in reserve)
- 1st Mechanized Division (HQ Divaniyeh; 1MB, 27MB, 34AB)
- 5th Mechanized Division (HQ Basrah; 26AB, 15MB, 20MB)
- 10th Independent AB
- 31st Independent Special Forces Brigade (minus two battalions: one was attached to 5th Mechanized Division, another to 3rd Armored Division),
- 33rd Independent Special Forces Brigade
- 113 Infantry Brigade (detachments)
There were also two independent armored brigades, the 10th and the 12th, dislocations of which are as of yet unclear.
Standard Iraqi armored division (AD) of the time had two armored (equipped with 300 T-62 MBTs) and one mechanized brigade (with BMP-1 ICVs), a single artillery brigade (with self-propelled artillery), and support elements. A standard Iraqi mechanized division (MD) had one armored brigade (equipped with 200 T-54/55s), one mechanized brigade (equipped with Czech OT-64s APCs or BTR-50s), and one artillery brigade, as well as support elements.
According to Western sources, in September 1980 the IrA operated some 100 T-72 tanks, probably attached to the 10th Independent Armored Brigade, based at al-Rashid Barracks, in Baghdad. Some Iraqi sources state that the first shot of the war was in fact fired by their T-72s. However, there is no firm confirmation yet that the Iraqi Army indeed operated T-72s at this stage of the war. Their first confirmed appearance occurred only in 1982.
All Iraqi ADs and MDs had also an organic air defense regiment, consisting of at least one SA-6 SAM-site (contrary to many wrong reports, the Iraqi SA-6s always remained under the Army control), SA-9s, and ZSU-23-4s. At later stages of the war the SA-13s replaced SA-9s in most of the mechanized formations.
|Within only few days after the start of the war, the Iraqi troops already learned to fear the attacks of the Iranian air force - especially the AGM-65 Maverick-armed F-4Es: the crew of this BMP-1 is evacuating their vehile in hurry because of two Phantoms that appeared over the horizont.|
Iraqi Army Air Corps (IrAAC)
The IrAAC at the time operated two “Composite Combat Transport Wings” (the 1st and the 2nd) with a total of eight squadrons of helicopters. Each of the squadrons had several flights, each of which was equipped with a different types of helicopters, so that every squadron had a number of Mi-8s, SA.342L Gazelles, and SE.316 Alouette IIIs on order. The exception from this rule was the “4th Assault, Transport, Training, and Special Operations Squadron” (4th ATTSOC), which, beside the Mi-8s and SA.342Ls, also operated all the 17 Mi-25s available to the Iraqis at the time, as equipment of the “4th Squadron’s Special Operations Unit” (4th SSOC). Also, the “3rd Assault, Transport, and Training Squadron” operated the handful of remaining Wessex HU.Mk.52 helicopters. The main base of the IrAAC was al-Taji, but different flights from different squadrons were deployed at many different sites throughout the country. The 4th ATTSOC/4th SSOC, for example, had usually pairs of Mi-25s based at Basrah International, near the Presidential palace in Baghdad, al-Kut, Kirkuk, Nassiriyah, Jalibah, Ruthbah, and Tallil. Very early after its establishment in 1980, the Mi-25s of the 4th SSOC were armed with chemical weapons, and the unit would usually have at least a pair of Mi-25s armed with chemical bombs based at Samara, Baiji, Mawsil, and/or Falluja. Later, the same unit was to get Bo.105 helicopters, some of which were also armed with tanks for spraying chemicals. Also later during the war, at the times of the larger Iranian offensives and after more Mi-25s were delivered to Iraq, the 4th SSOC established permanent detachments at each of these bases, at which the Hinds equipped with chemical weapons stood constant alerts.
Theoretically, the IrAAC was under IrA control, but effectivelly it was put directly under the control of regime already at these times.
The IrAAC did not control all the Iraqi helicopter assets: a VIP-Transport unit, flying SA.342s and Mi-8s, was responsible for transportation of important political and military figures, while a squadron of some 14 (out of 16 originally delivered) SA.321G/H Super Frelons, some of which were compatible with AM.39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, was assigned to the Iraqi Navy.
|With some 40 examples in service, the SA.342 Gazelle was the main type of attack helicopter with the Iraqi Army Aviation early during the war. While well armed, the type proved too vulnerable to any kind of anti-aircraft fire, and losses were heavy. |
|As the Soviets were slow to deliver more Mi-25s, the Iraqis were slow to introduce these to service. Besides, by the end of 1980, out of six examples delivered to Iraq, four were lost in combat (including one to IRIAF F-14As and two by IRIAA AH-1J Cobras).|
Iraqi Air Force (IrAF)
(Note: The following Order of Battle for the Iraqi Air Force and the Iraqi Army Air Corps were upgraded with additional informations, which were not available at the time the book “Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988” was published by Schiffer Military Publishing, Atglen, PA, in December 2002):
IrAF/Support Command
(Deployment as from north towards south, and from west towards east)
Kirkuk Fighter-Bomber Wing
- No. 1 FBS, Su-20, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk)
- No. 5 FBS, Su-22M, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk)
- No. 17 FS, MiG-21MF, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk)
- No. 44 FBS, Su-22M & Su-22M-3R, at al-Hurriyah AB (Kirkuk)
Mosul Fighter-Bomber Wing
- No. 11 FS (Det.), MiG-21MF, at Firnas AB (Mosul)
Qayyarah West Wing (in formation; not operational)
- No. 63 FS, MiG-23MLA, at Qayyarah West (moved to Tahmmouz AB after the start of the the war)
- No. 79 FS, Mirage F.1EQ (not yet delivered)
- No. 92 FS, Mirage F.1EQ (not yet delivered)
Bomber Wing
- 7th Sqn, Tu-22B/U, at Tahmmouz AB ("al-Taqaddum", near Habbaniyah)
- 8th Sqn, Tu-16/Tu-16K-11-16, at Tahmmouz AB (the 7th and 8th Squadrons were later combined into the 10th Squadron). A handful of Il-28s were at Tahmmouz AB as well; their condition at the moment of Iraqi invasion remains unclear: according to one source they were not operational any more but used as decoys; according to others they were deployed in combat.
- No. 39 FS "Defenders of Baghdad", MiG-23MS, Tahmmouz AB
- No. 84 FRS, MiG-25RB, Tahmmouz AB (in formation; not operational)
- No. 96 FS, MiG-25PDS, Tahmouz AB (in formation; not operational)
Flying Leaders School
- Detachment ?, Hunter F.Mk.59A/B at Rashid AB (Baghdad)
- Detachment ?, Jet Provost T.Mk.52 at Rashid AB (Baghdad)
al-Rashid Fighter Wing
- No. 9 FS, MiG-21PFM, at Rashid AB (Baghdad)
- No. 11 FS, MiG-21bis, at Rashid AB (Baghdad)
- No. 70 FRS, MiG-21RF, at Rashid AB (Baghdad)
H-3/al-Wallid Wing
- No. 84 Sqn (actually detachment), MiG-23MS, at al-Wallid AB
- No. ?? Sqn (actually detachment), MiG-21bis/MF, at al-Wallid AB
al-Kut Fighter-Bomber Wing
- No. ?? FBS, Su-7BMK, at Abu Ubaida al-Jarrah AB ("al-Kut" or "al-Jarrah" AB)
- No. 23 FBS, MiG-23BN, at Abu Ubaida al-Jarrah AB ("al-Kut" or "al-Jarrah" AB)
Nasseriyah Fighter-Bomber Wing
- No. 73 FS, MiG-23MF, at Ali Ibn Abu-Talib AB ("Tallil") (in formation; not operational)
- No. 77 FBS, MiG-23BN, at Ali Ibn Abu-Talib AB
Shoibiyah Fighter-Bomber Wing
- No. ?? FS, MiG-21MF, at al-Wihda/Shoibiyah AB
- No. 109 FBS, Su-22M, at al-Wihda/Shoibiyah AB
The IrAF/ADC also operated almost 120 SA-2 and SA-3 sites (soon to be reinforced by at least four batteries of Roland-2 SAMs, delivered from France), as well as all the AAA over caliber 57mm. While SA-2s and SA-3s were operated as complex sites, Rolands were to be deployed as single firing units.
It must be added that a sizeable contingent of Soviet air force was operational with the IrAF at the time of invasion. This consisted of 24 MiG-25R/RB/RBShs, at least 12 MiG-21MFs and at least eight MiG-23MLAs, all based at as-Shoibiyah AB, near Basrah, which was effectivelly put under Soviet control. Original intention was to test these aircraft against Iranians, before gradually putting them under Iraqi command. For example, between August 1980 and April 1981 four MiG-25s were put under Iraqi control, and the MiG-23MLA-unit consisted of Soviet but also Iraqi pilots, while the MiG-21MFs were eventually all given to the IrAF after the war started. The Iranians, however, did not care very much about Soviet or Iraqi plans, but four F-4Es from TFB.3 raided as-Shoibiyah heavily already in their first strike in response to the Iraqi invasion, on the late afternoon of 22 September. Additional strikes were flown on the following two days, and eventually the Soviets were forced to evacuate all MiG-25s to H-3/al-Wallid AB, in western Iraq, while all the MiG-23MLAs were moved to Qayyarah West AB, in north-western Iraq.
Although Moscow was time and again stressing its neutral stance regarding this war, its contingent remained in Iraq until April 1981: it was actually evacuated only after the MiG-23MLA-unit suffered heavy losses in air combats with Iranians (including four MiG-23MLAs to a single IRIAF F-14A, on 29 October 1980; two additional examples were lost while fighting Iranian counteroffensives in 1981), and several MiG-25s were destroyed and/or damaged on the ground by Iranian Phantoms in the "H-3 Blitz", on 4 April 1981.
IrAF/Training Command
Air Force Academy, Tikrit
Basic Training
- 1st Flying School, A.202A Bravo
- 2nd Flying School, A.202A Bravo
- 3rd Flying School, Mi-2, Mi-4, SA.342 Gazelle
Primary Training (partially conducted from al-Rashid AB)
- 4th Flying School, L-29
- 5th Flying School, L-29
Weapons Training
- 6th Flying School, PC-7
- 7th Flying School, Jet Provost T.52, at al-Rashid AB
IrAF/Transport Command
Transport Brigade
- 31st Sqn/A Flight, Il-76MD, at Baghdad/Saddam International
- 31st Sqn/B Flight, An-12B, al-Rashid AB
- 32nd Sqn/A Flight, An-2, miscellaneous airfields
Most of the transport aircraft – except all the An-12Bs, but including all Il-76MDs – were operated in the colors of the Iraqi national airline, “Iraq Airways”. The same company also operated numerous An-24TVs, most of which, however, were used for military purposes, and quite a few of which were cached and destroyed on the ground during early Iranian air strikes.
Iraqi Navy (IrN)
Naval Aviation
- No. ?? NS, SA.321GV Super Frelon, at NAS Umm-ol-Qassr
- No. ?? NS, AB.212ASW, (in formation; not operational; helicopters never delivered)
Iran
Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA)
In general, the units of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army were in very poor condition. Most were down to only 50% of their strenght (some even less) and under command of lower-ranking officers, as all the generals of the former Imperial Iranian Army were removed from their posts after the revolution in 1979. During the early days of the war there was a considerable chaos within the chain of command, which led to a situation in which most of larger units were scattered into small battle-groups, that fought in cooperation with local militias and without a coherent overall command.
In September 1980 the IRIA had following units garrisoned along the Iraqi border:
- 16th Armored Division, based in Ghazvin, with three ABs equipped with M-60A-1 MBTs and M-113 APCs, including 1st in Ghazvin, 2nd in Zanjan, and 3rd in Hamedan.
- 81st Armored "Kermanshah" Division, with three ABs equipped with Chieftain MBTs and M-113 APCs, including 1st in Kermanshah, 2nd in Islam-Abad-Gharb, and 3rd in Sar-e-Pol-e-Zahab.
- 92nd Armored "Khuzestan" Division, with three ABs equipped with Chieftain MBTs and M-113 APCs (including 283rd Arm Cav. Bn), including 1st west of Khorramshahr and south of Ahwaz, 2nd west of Dezful, and 3rd west of Ahwaz.
- 21st Infantry Division, based in Tehran, established as combination of the 2nd Guards Brigade and the 1st Infantry division in Tehran, with total of four mechanized formations (including brigades of the former 1st Guards Division and Independent Guards Brigade, and 141 Infantry Battalion)
- 28th Infantry Division, with one AB (equipped with M-60A-1s MBTs), two MBs (equipped with M-113s), and a reconnaissance regiment (equipped with Scorpion LTs and M-113s), deployed in the areas of Sanandaj, Saquez and Marivan.
- 64th Infantry Division, garrisoned in Orumiyeh, and covering the Oromiyeh, Mahabad, Piransahr and Salmas areas.
- 77th Infantry Division, consisting of one AB (equipped with M-47s) and two MBs (equipped with BTR-50s), garrisoned in Khorasan, and covering the Soviet and Afghan borders, as well as remaining eastern Iran.
- 37th Armored Brigade, based in Shiraz
- 88th Armored Brigade, based in Zahedan (equipped with Chieftain MBTs), covering the borders to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- 30th Infantry Brigade, with HQ in Gorgan.
- 84th Infantry Brigade, with HQ in Khoramabad, but deployed in field and covering the Ilam area, connecting the positions of the 81st and 92nd ADs.
- 23rd Special Forces Brigade, with HQ in Tehran, deployed along the Iraqi border in 13 separate detachments.
- 55th Airborne Brigade, based in Shiraz, with a battalion deployed in Sardasht, and a company each in Sanandaj and Dezful.
- 11th Independent Artillery Group, deployment area unknown.
- 22nd Independent Artillery Group, deployed in Khuzestan.
- 33rd Independent Artillery Group, deployment area unknown.
- 44th Independent Artillery Group, deployment area unknown.
- 55th Independent Artillery Group, deployed in Khuzestan.
Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation (IRIAA)
Kermanshah/Bakhtaran Army Aviation Group, main base Shahid Ashrafi Esfahani, in Kermanshah
- ? Company, AB.205 and AB.206
- ? Company, Bell 214C
- ? Company, Bell 209/AH-1J
Esfahan Army Aviation Group, main base Shahid Vatanpour (named so in 1981), near Esfahan, and Shahid Ashtari/4th Army Aviation Support Base
- ? Company, AB.206
- ? Company, Bell 214C
- ? Company, Bell 209/AH-1J
- ? Company, CH-47C
Kerman Army Aviation Group, main base Masjed-Suleyman
- ? Company, Bell 214C
- ? Company, Bell 209/AH-1J
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)
* TFB.1, Mehrabad IAP (Tehran)
11th TFW
- 11th OCU "Instructors", F-4E & RF-4E (detachment at TFB.4 in 1981)
- 12th TFS, F-4E & RF-4E
1st ERW
- ?? TRS, (E)C-130E
- ?? TRS, RF-4E and RF-5A (only nominally: all aircraft were deployed with different units of 21st, 31st and 61st TFWs)
?? TTW
- 11th TTS, C-130E/H
- 12th TTS, C-130E/H
- Tanker Squadron, Boeing 707-3J9C and Boeing 747-2J9F
- Base Flight, Bell 214A & HH-43
- ?? TTS, Fokker F.27M
?? Training Wing
- ?? TS, T-33A
- ?? TS, Beech F33
* TFB.2, Tabriz IAP (Tabriz)
21st TFW
- 21st TFS, F-5E/F
- 22nd TFS, F-5E/F
- 23rd TFS, F-5E/F
- Detachment, RF-5A (assigned to any of the three TFS')
- Detachment, C-130H
- ?? COIN Sqn, O-2A
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
* TFB.3, Shahid Nojeh AB (former Shahorkhi AB, near Hamedan)
31st TFW
- 31st TFS, F-4E & RF-4E
- 32nd TFS, F-4E & RF-4E
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
32nd TFW
- 306th TFS, F-4D (sent to 71st TFS in December 1980)
- 308th TFS, F-4D (sent to 72nd TFS in December 1980)
- 33rd TFS, F-4E & RF-4E (from December 1980, with F-4Es from 71st TFS; detachment at TFB.4 from early 1981)
- 34th TFS, F-4E (from December 1980, with F-4Es from 91st
and 101st TFWs; detachment at TFB.9 in 1988)
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
* TFB.4, Vahdati AB (Dezful)
41st TFW
- 41st TFS "Lions", F-5E/F
- 42nd TFS "Devils", F-5E/F
- 43rd TFS "Tigers", F-5E/F
- 306th Detachment (71st TFS), F-4D (periodically from October 1980)
- 308th Detachment (72nd TFS), F-4D (periodically from October 1980)
- Detachment from 21st TFW, F-5E (temporarily deployed in October/November 1980)
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
* TFB.5, Kermanshah (by 1980 used by IRIAF only as emergency airfield; instead, TFB.5 became one of main IRIAA bases)
- no units permanently deployed
* TFB.6, Bushehr IAP (Bushehr)
61st TFW
- 61st TFS, F-4E & RF-4E
- 62nd TFS, F-4E & RF-4E
- 61st TTW, C-130H
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
* TFB.7, Hor AB (Shiraz)
71st TFW
- 71st TFS, F-4E (replaced for F-4Ds from 32nd TFW)
- 72nd TFS "Flying Lions", F-14A (replaced by F-4Ds from 32nd TFW; all F-14s to 73rd TFS' detachment at Mehrabad in 1981)
- 73rd TFS, F-14A
71st TTW
- 71st TTS, C-130E/H
- 72nd TTS, C-130E/H
- 73rd TTS, Fokker F.27M
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
- VP-??, P-3C
* TFB.8, Khatami AB (later Shahid Baba'ie AB; Esfahan)
81st TFW
- 81st TFS, F-14A
- 82nd TFS, F-14A
- Base Flight, Bell 214A
* TFB.9, Bandar Abbas AB (Bandar Abbas)
91st TFW
- 91st TFS "Sharks", F-4E
- 92nd TFS, F-4E
* TFB.10, Chah Bahar AB (Chah Bahar)
101st TFW
- 101st TFS, F-4E (disbanded in 1980, crews sent to TFB.3; reformed in the 1990s with remaining F-4Ds)
- 101st TTS, C-130E/H
* TFB.11 Omidiyeh AB (Aghajari) (construction incomplete and not operational at the start of the war; was to see larger deployment of IRIAF units only from 1981)
51st TFW (in formation)
- 51st TFS, F-5E/F (in formation)
- 52nd TFS, F-5E/F (in formation)
* TFB.12 Masjed Soleyman (used by IRIAF as dispersal airfield or for basing of an F-5E-detachment from 41st TFW, as well as for larger detachment of IRIAA helicopters)
- no units permanently deployed
Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN)
- 3 Marine Battalions
Islamic Republic of Iran Naval Aviation (IRINA)
* NAS Chahbahar
- HC-?, Bell 206
- HM-?, MH-53
- HS-?, AB.212ASW
Iranian Deployment in Khuzestan
For the defence of Khuzestan, which was the main target of the Iraqi invasion, the IRIA had following units at hand:
92nd Armored Division was covering 400km of front (which was attacked by five Iraqi divisions and something like five brigades). This unit was at 50% of its nominal menpower, but reinforced by following elements:
- 37th Armored Group, composed of parts of the 37th Armored Brigade deployed to support the 2nd AB/92nd AD west of Dezful.
- 151 Fortification Battalion, manning the main fortifications north of Khoramshahr and 27 other fortifications developed along the border to Iraq (usually built some three kilometres from the border); this unit was equipped with 80 M-4 Sherman and M-24 Chaffee tanks, emplaced in a number of static fortifications (each "fort" had two tank-emplacements), 106mm recoilles guns, anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tang guided missiles; it should have counted some 1.300 troops in total, but was badly understrenght.
- 1 infantry battalion from 21st ID
- 1 infantry battalion and 1 armored company from 77th ID
- 1 armored battalion from 88th AD
- 1 battalion of IRIN Marines (deployed at Khoramshahr Naval Base).
|Iranian Army Chieftain seen moving towards the front near Abadan: a single company of these tanks remained inside the city after it was put under a siege by the Iraqis. |
Iraqi Invasion
The Iraqi operations between 22 and 30 September 1980 developed as follows:
I Army Corps
- 1st and the 11th IDs mainly operated against the Kurds
- 4th ID started actually the first attack into Iran, capturing Panjwin after two days of fierce fighting against Iranian border troops, gendarmerie, and the local Pasdaran, Basij, and Mostafazin units (which were joined under the unitary “Revolutionary Guards Command” as per 1 January 1981) even before the invasion was officially started, on 22 September. Once the Iraq invaded Iran, the 4th ID started a drive into Iranian Kurdestan, with the task of capturing Orumiyeh and Sandandaj.
II Army Corps
- 7th MD advanced towards Qassre-Shirin, capturing the city after much fighting in which the place was completely destroyed; then advanced towards the provincial capital Kermanshah (renamed Bakhtaran after the revolution in Iran, but renamed back to Kermanshah after the war with Iraq).
- 2nd ID captured Mehran, threatened Ilam, and reached the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, thus cutting off the road network connecting northern Iran with Dezful and the rest of Khuzestan.
- the task of two armored divisions belonging to this corps was to capture Dezful and sever the road connections between northern and southwestern Iran.
- 10th AD was to drive deep into Iran together with the 9th AD. However, it was swiftly stopped by counterattacks mounted by the Iranian Army Aviation (IRIAA) and the Air Force (IRIAF). The IRIAA deployed a large number of Bell AH-1J Cobra attack helicopters - which made excessive use of AGM-71A TOW ATGMs – and the IRIAF the Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II fighters, armed with Mk.82s, napalm, and cluster bombs, as well as 68mm rocket launchers. In a series of air strikes during the first five days of the war, almost 50% of the vehicles belonging to the 10th AD were destroyed.
- 9th AD managed a much deeper penetration, driving over 40kms into Iran within the first week. In the process of the advance, it captured the strategically important early warning radar station some 15km southwest of Dezful, and directly threatened the Vahdati AB (“TFB.4” in Iranian military parlance), which was put under heavy artillery attacks. The drive of this unit, however, was also stopped by the stubborn resistance of the IRIAA and the IRIAF, which while trying to buy time for the heavier Iranian Army units to be mobilized, effectively neutralized the 9th AD as a combat-capable unit, destroying over 200 of its MBTs and APCs.
III Army Corps
Task of the units belonging to this corps was the actual target of the whole invasion: the capture of the Iranian oil-rich province of Khuzestan, in order to secure the waterway of Shatt-al-Arab for Iraq, enlarge the Iraqi reach into the Persian Gulf, and secure additional oil resources. Topography of the area favored invaders and the use of tanks and other armored vehicles.
- 1st MD was tasked with an offensive from al-Amarah towards Ein-e-Khoosh and Fakeh, with aim of reaching and capturing Andimeshk and Dezful, in turn isolating Ahwaz from the north; this unit became stuck only few kilometres from the border and was not able to advance until the 10th AD penetrated deep into Iran, in turn causing IRIA units to pull back in good order behind Pol-Naderi bridge on Karakeh River.
|Parts of the 1st MD advancing towards Dezful, in late September 1980.|
- 10th AD was to push along a route parallel to the 1st MD, on its northern flank, towards via Dehloran and Musian to Malavi, Andimeshk and Dezful, isolating Dezful from the north in the process. The division successfully accomplished the deepest Iraqi penetration of the war: it's elements were the first to reach the Karakeh River, some 75km behind the border, on the seventh day of the war.
- 6th AD was to do the same, but along a southern route: it was to penetrate Iran near Bostan, then pass north of Susangerd and capture Ahwaz. In a drive similar to that of the 10th AD, the unit reached northern suburbs of Ahwaz by the end of the first week of the war.
|T-62s of the 6th Iraqi AD seen on the Karakeh Plain, in March 1982: weeks later, this unit was almost annihiliated by Iranian attacks which turned the course of the war against Iraq.|
- 5th MD attacked directly towards and to the north of Abadan: it's original objective was advance on and the capture of Ahwaz. The unit achieved only a minimal penetration and was not able to do more than support the 3rd AD in its advance. Nevertheless, these two units achieved an encirclement of Khoramshahr.
- 3rd AD was to build the third prong of this attack, with the target of driving some 40km deep into Iran, then turning south and isolating Khoramshahr. It was stopped by exceptionally heavy Iranian air attacks while advancing north of Khoramshahr, and managed a penetration of only some 15-20 kilometers. As a result, it was barely able to cut the road connecting Khoramshahr with Ahwaz in the northeast. It's 12th "Abu-al-Wallid" Armored Brigade was held back as Corps reserve, and did not participate in combat.
Battle of Karoun River
The battle of Karoun River erupted on 11 October 1980, when elements of the 5st MD and 6th AD established a small bridgehead on the eastern side, near Darkhowein, some 15km northeast of Khoramshahr, causing a surprise on the Iranian side and threatening to block local Iranian supply routes. From that point the Iraqis could advance towards east and south, and eventually encircle Dezful.
Battle of Karakeh River
The battle of Karakeh River erupted when elements of the 1st MD, on their advance towards Andimeshk and Dezful, established a bridgehead near Shoush.
On the Iranian side, the frontlines defending Dezful with the Vahdati (TFB.4) and the strategically important Dehloran radar site were held by following units (as seen from the north towards the south, stretching from Beyat, via Nahr-Anbar and Shoush to Fakkeh):
- 283rd Arm Cav Bn/92nd AD
- 2nd AB/92nd AD
- 37th AB (Combat Group)
- 138th Inf Bn/21st ID
- 141st Inf Bn/21st ID (held as reserve at Pol-Naderi bridge)
Failed Experience: Battle of Naderi Bridge, the First Iranian Counter-offensive
Already in early October 1980 the High Command IRIA prepared its first counter-offensive. This was to be based on reinforcements deployed from Tehran into the Dezful and Andimeshk area, foremost on elements from the 21st Division, supported by the 291st Armored Battalion/77th Division. The 2nd Brigade of the 92nd Armored Division was also deployed in the Shoush area, but apparently did not participate in this operation.
The task of this operation was to breach the Iraqi frontlines near Sorkheh Naderi, due south-east of Andimeshk, and launch a two-pronged advance: the northern via Dashe-e-Abas towards Ein-e-Khoosh, and southern via Chenaneh towards Fakkeh, on the Iraqi border. In the case of success, the southern prong would then turn towards south and attack Iraqi rear installations in the Bostan area.
This plan was very bold, calling for a swift advance of few small Iranian Army units (equivalent of one division) against no less but two reinforced Iraqi divisions. Without surprise, this offensive, launched on 15 October 1980, achived only minimal gains, resulting in a small dent in Iraqi lines: while the infantry of the 21st Division advanced for few kilometres, the Hunters of the IrAF Flying Leaders School - flown by some of the most experienced Iraqi pilots - hit the M-60 MBTs and M-113 APCs of the 291st Battalion as these were marshalling for their advance in a valley north-east of Andimeshk, destroying a number of tanks and APCs.
Even more severe was the blow the Iraqi fighters caused by a strike against the supply column of the Iranian battalion, which also caused heavy damage and resulted in the Iranian unit being left without fuel and ammunition. Eventually, the Iranian offensive had to be cancelled before it was properly started.
This was the only significant operation of this war in which the IrAF Hunters are known to have participated. According to Iraqi sources interviewed recently, it was also the last opportunity at which this type saw combat.
It is interesting to note that this was another occassion during this war when the air power delivered at least one of decisive blows: even if the Iranian planning was overenthusiastic, the operation at the Naderi Bridge had a potential to cause severe losses to the 10th Iraqi AD - if the initial attack could breach its left flank. However, the pre-emptive Iraqi air strikes made it impossible for the Iranains to launch their armoured strike.
Battle of Khorramshahr
Iraqi Army Units Involved (Sept/Oct.1980)
- 3AD (35 + 43 AB, 14th MB)
- 31 Special Forces Bde (in particular the 2nd and 3rd Bn)
- 33 Special Forces Bde (in particular the 8th and 9th Bn)
- al-Hassan Tank Bn (detached from 26AB/5MD and attached to 33rd SF Bde)
- 3 Mech Bn (detached from 15AB/5MD - the main body of which was attacking towards Ahwaz on flank of 3AD)
- 1st Bn (detached from 49IB)
- 4th Commando Bn (detached from 2ID)
- 2nd and 3rd Bns (detached from 2IB/2ID)
- 1st Bn/429IB
- Jeish-Al-Shabi Forces (two battalions of paramilitary)
- 1st Bn (detached from 23IB)
- 3rd Republican Guards Special Forces Bn (detached from Republican Guard Brigade)
The first Iraqi operation to enter Khorramshahr was launched by the main body of the 3rd AD. This was stopped and blocked at Pol-No and Nahr Arayez,a nd could not proceed with attack. The next attempt had been launched by the 8th Battalion of the 33rd Special Forces Brigade. This was stopped with heavy losses for Iraqis, causing a shock on the Iraqi side. The IrA commanders reacted by deploying additional commandos, followed by armour support.
The battle of Khorramshahr lasted for 34 days, and saw an immense investment of Iraqi forces, far beyond what Iraqi war plans envisaged. In turn, this battle enabled the Iranians to stablize front-lines at Dezful, Ahwaz and Susangerd, and move reinforcements to Khuzestan: by the time Khorramshahr fell, the Iraqi Army units deployed to capture this province were not longer facing just the Iranian 92nd AD, but also the 16th AD, 21th ID, and 77th ID.
|T-62 of the 3rd AD passing down the streets of Khoramshahr: only a handfull of buildings in the city were not destroyed during the fighting in October and November 1980, resulting in Khramshahr frequently being nicknamed "Iranian Stalingrad".|
Conclusions
Overall Iraqi plan for invasion of Iran was originally indeed based on similar British plans for an intervention from the 1950s, as reported in several different sources. After almost 30 years, in every of which the planning was updated by Iraqis in accordance to changes on the Iranian side, a completely new plan was developed. According to former high-ranking Iraqi officers, the eventual idea for invasion in 1980 was to drive the Iranian artillery units away from the Iraqi border, so these could not shell Iraqi cities - foremost Basrah. This task was to be completed within a time-frame of between three and seven days, and then Baghdad intended to negotiate with Tehran. This would be completely in accordance with standard Arab war strategy of delivering a heavy "first blow", and then negotiating on the basis of "new situation". Accordingly, the penetration the Iraqi High Command was looking for was not to be deeper but 40km, and there was no intention for holding any Iranian territory for any longer periods of time.
This idea led nowhere, then the Iranians were not ready to negotiate - especially not with Iraqi troops so deep within their territory. Also, the Iranian clergy was interested in extending the war and exploiting it for own purposes - for firming itself in power.
The Iraqi military was well-equipped but actually not completely ready for the war when it was ordered for an invasion of Iran: nevertheless, the Iranians were even less ready. The most important Iraqi units fared surprisingly well: "tank-raids" deep over the open terrain between the Iranian cities several times surprised the Iranian High Command, causing shock and chaos between scattered Iranian units that were badly outnumbered and overstretched in an attempt to defend too large parts of the frontlines.
Although many observers tend to describe the Iraqi operations as "Soviet-style", the Iraqis were far more influenced by the British, and fought accordingly - even if their Army was almost exclusively equipped with Soviet MBTs, APCs, and artillery.
|Iranian Chieftain MBT seen early during the war. The Iranians had only one Armored Division stationed in Khuzestan on the start of the war, and this was actually still in organization in 1979, when the Islamic Revolution developed. Consequently, the unit was not ready for fighting when the Iraqi invasion came. Nevertheless, the two of its armored brigades did their best to help stop the Iraqi advance.|
The missing link which in the end turned the whole Iraqi operation into a failure was the airpower aspect: the IrAF could never match the Iranian flying services, foremost the IRIAF and the IRIAA. It lacked the firepower, aircraft capability, and training. The Iraqi regime knew this; but, they hoped that the condition of the Iranian Air Force and the Army Aviation would be at least as poor as that of the rest of the Iranian military. There was also a hope that the IrAF could suppress the IRIAF by the first strike against most important Iranian airfields. This hope - fuelled foremost by reports from Iranian officers who defected to Iraq during 1979 and - especially - summer of 1980, was in vain.
Within only 24 hours, the IRIAF turned into a war-fighting machinery, striking not only all over Iraq, but also causing tremendous losses to the Iraqi Army on the ground. Within only three weeks - and it would take less time if there was not a period of bad weather through the early October 1980 - the IRIAF effectivelly stopped the Iraqi invasion by completely destroying its supply, and most of the depots near the front.
|Right from the start of the war, transport helicopters of the Iranian Army Aviation and Air Force were very active in moving reinforcements and supplies - as well as evacuating injured - along the front. It was mainly due to the immense efforts of their pilots that the Iranians managed to stop the Iraqi onslaught. Quite a few helicopters (as well as IRIAF aircraft) went into combat still wearing the title of Imperial Armed forces.|
The Iraqi Air Force gave its best to put the IRIAF under pressure, but only few of its support operations were effective. The IrAF also suffered considerable losses. Consequently, it turned its attention against targets of propagandistic character. The sole success the Iraqi fliers achieved that far in the war was the disruption of the fuel supply in Iran, which caused shortfalls felt even by the IRIAF - in one moment depleting its strategic reserves of kerosene to a level sufficient for only a few days. In response, the IRIAF mounted a strategic POL-campain, damaging the whole Iraqi oil industry to such a degree that Iraq had to cancell all oil exports. The Iraqi oil industry was not to recover from this blow for several years.
The IRIAF campaign against Iraqi POL depots and oil industry was three-fold: the Iranians effectivelly interdicted those oil depots that were supplying fuels and lubricants to the Iraqi military; they blocked the Iraqi ports of al-Faw and Basrah, and then also neutralized the two oil terminals south of al-Faw (al-Omayeh and al-Bakr). Subsequently, the IRIAF hit all the major pumping stations along the oil-pipelines to Turkey, Syria, and Jordan, effectivelly stopping the oil flow.
|The KRB3MR-bridge, seen here after being hit and destroyed by GBU-10 LGBs, dropped by IRIAF F-4Ds: although four aircraft each armed with two LGBs were sent into this attack, already the first bomb hit home and the Iraqi advance north of Ahwaz was stopped. |
Eventually, the Iraqi offensive had to fail: the Iranian regime could not be crushed from within by a foreign intervention, then the highly patriotic Iranians rallied around regardless which leadership in Tehran to defend their country. Contrary to Iraqi expectations, even Arabs living in Khuzestan - but so also Iranian Kurds, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis - joined the battle for the defence of Iran. Actually, the Iraqi invastion enabled the shaky regime in Tehran to establish itself in power, and thus resulted in exactly the opposite situation then expected.
Although in the state of chaos the Iranian Army and other ground forces (including different formations of the "Revolutionary Guards", Gendarmerie and Police) proved able to improvise stubborn and bitter resistance, which came as a complete surprise for the Iraqis. Consequently, the Iranians caused immense casualties to the inexperienced Iraqi Army. Only a considerable chaos within the regime in Tehran and the leadership in field, foremost caused by the Islamic Revolution of 1979, prevented Iranians from deploying the full power of their military against Iraq already at an early stage in the war. In fact, even in 1980 most Iranians expected this war not to last for longer than few weeks: that this did not happen was one of the most severe blows for many of them. But, at the time of the revolution they were not yet aware of this fact.
Patriotism alone, however, would not have been enough to stop the Iraqis - without the Iranian air power. The IRIAF and the IRIAA, namely, were highly effective in destroying so many Iraqi vehiles, artillery pieces and supplies, that the Iraqi Army's offensive capability was effectivelly neutralized. The Iraqis could not continue their advance despite a decision for their armored and mechanized units to drive deep between the Iranian cities, and so cut these off the rear instead of becoming entangled in urban warfare.
The air power was thus - contrary to what is usually reported about this war - instrumental for the eventual outcome. The Iranian flying services effectivelly won this "Battle of Persia" - even at a price of ultimate sacrifice of many precious crews and aircraft.
The reasons for the success of Iranian air operations are manifold. Although Iraqi sources deny this stubbornly until today, a single squadron of IRIAF F-14s established air superiority over the battlefield in Khuzestan, in mid-October 1980, by downing over a dozen Iraqi fighters within only two days, and in turn enabling the units from Vahdati AB (TFB.4) and Hamedan (TFB.3) - reinforced by elements from Tabriz (TFB.2) - to first neutralize newly-established Iraqi air defence system in the area (consisting of several SA-6-sites), and then destroy the Iraqi supply-net. The IrAF was out of condition to counter F-14s, and even less so to prevent IRIAF F-4s and F-5s, as well as IRIAA AH-1Js from hitting Iraqi ground forces heavily.
To besiege encircled Iranian cities in Khuzestan the Iraqis needed additional resources. These, however, had to be moved along exposed supply communications. The IRIAF hit these heavily and repeatedly. For this reason the Iraqis were eventually able of capturing only one large Iranian city: Khoramshahr - situated only few kilometres from the Iraqi border.
Elsewhere, the advancing Iraqi mechanised columns were put under vicious air strikes that destroyed men and equipment. The bold Iraqi offensive over the Karoun river, in late October, for example, was spoiled despite the moment of surprise and chaos it caused in local Iranian forces - because the IRIAF and the IRIAA, despite all the problems with targeting intelligence, managed to find the Iraqi break-through and destroy any vehicle their pilots could find. The Iranian air operations were frequently so effective, that there are several examples in which a division of four AH-1J Cobras was sufficient to stop advance of a whole Iraqi armoured brigade for hours. Such cases proved decisive.
The City of Khoramshahr was eventually captured by the Iraqis after exceptionally bitter fighting for every house, flour and room - where Iranian air power could not play a dominant role or be effective - but during which the Iraqis suffered such heavy losses that they never attempted anything similar with any other Iranian city again.
By the time Khoramshahr fell, namely, their strategic reserves were drained down to a point where they were not able of re-starting any offensive operations for years to come. Their invasion of Iran therefore died in the face of stubborn Iranian resistance - and then the rainy season of November 1980.
© Copyright 2002-3 by ACIG.org
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Question: what type of helicopter crashed in iran

Iranian jury helicopters, carried out several crashes on Iraqi forces within the territory of Iran, destroying some of the armor vehicles, but the Iraqi offensive did not completely stop.Modern Warfare: Iran-Iraq War (documentary film).

Question: what type of aircraft carried out several crashes on iranese forces

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Question: what did the iranian air force destroy in response to the iraqi invasion

oil industry, defense and petrochemical plants

naftnu industriju , brane i petrokemijska postrojenja

oil industry , defense and petrochemical plants

what did the iranian air force destroy in response to the iraqi invasion

Question: who attacked targets in iran in response to the iran iraqi invasion

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Question: who attacked targets in iran during the iran-iraq war

who attacked targets in iran during the iran-iraq war

Iranian jury helicopters , carried out several crashes on Iraqi forces within the territory of Iran , destroying some of the armor vehicles , but the Iraqi offensive did not completely stop . Modern Warfare : Iran - Iraq War ( documentary film ) .

Iranski jurišni helikopteri, izveli su nekoliko prepada na iračke snage unutar teritorija Irana, uništivši nešto oklopnih vozila, no iračku ofanzivu nisu u potpunosti zaustavili.Modern Warfare: Iran–Iraq War (dokumentarni film).

Although after two months of hard street struggles for Horamshar, the Iranians managed to occupy the city, their offensive irreversibly lost it on the rush and the element of surprise, so the Iranians managed to consolidate and the war became static. As a response to the Iraqi invasion, the Iranian air force next day attacked targets in the depths of the Iraqi territory, sparking the oil industry, defense and petrochemical plants. Iranian jury helicopters, carried out several crashes on Iraqi forces within the territory of Iran, destroying some of the armor vehicles, but the Iraqi offensive did not completely stop.Modern Warfare: Iran-Iraq War (documentary film).

Iranian jury helicopters, carried out several crashes on Iraqi forces within the territory of Iran, destroying some of the armor vehicles, but the Iraqi offensive did not completely stop.Modern Warfare: Iran-Iraq War (documentary film).

Iran in the first half of 1982, launched operations: The Innocent Victory and Beit ol Moqaddas, achieving several victories over the Saddam Army, to then in March of the same year the Iranian army liberated Horamshar from the Iraqi occupants.

Question: what was the name of the iransko-irački rat that was liberated

Iran in the first half of 1982, launched operations: The Innocent Victory and Beit ol Moqaddas, achieving several victories over the Saddam Army, to then in March of the same year the Iranian army liberated Horamshar from the Iraqi occupants.

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iransko-irački rat achieved several victories over which army in 1982

Question: when did iranskoirački rat liberate horamshar

polovici 1982 . godine , pokrenuo operacije : Neosporna pobjeda i Beit ol Moqaddas , ostvarivši nekoliko pobjeda nad Saddamovim vojskom , da bi zatim u ožujku iste godine iranska

when did iranskoirački rat liberate horamshar

Question: where did the iransko-irački rat liberate horamshar

where did the iransko-irački rat liberate horamshar

Question: what was the name of iransko-irački rat's 1982 campaign against

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Question: who did iran defeat in 1982

Iran in the first half of 1982 , launched operations : The Innocent Victory and Beit ol Moqaddas , achieving several victories over the Saddam Army , to then in March of the same year the Iranian army liberated Horamshar from the Iraqi occupants .

Iran je u prvoj polovici 1982. godine, pokrenuo operacije: Neosporna pobjeda i Beit ol Moqaddas, ostvarivši nekoliko pobjeda nad Saddamovim vojskom, da bi zatim u ožujku iste godine iranska vojska oslobodila i Horamšar od iračkih okupatora.

Iran je u prvoj polovici 1982. godine, pokrenuo operacije: Neosporna pobjeda i Beit ol Moqaddas, ostvarivši nekoliko pobjeda nad Saddamovim vojskom, da bi zatim u ožujku iste godine iranska vojska oslobodila i Horamšar od iračkih okupatora.

Iran in the first half of 1982, launched operations: The Innocent Victory and Beit ol Moqaddas, achieving several victories over the Saddam Army, to then in March of the same year the Iranian army liberated Horamshar from the Iraqi occupants.

Iran in the first half of 1982, launched operations: The Innocent Victory and Beit ol Moqaddas, achieving several victories over the Saddam Army, to then in March of the same year the Iranian army liberated Horamshar from the Iraqi occupants.

On June 20, 1982, Iraq demanded a cessation of hostilities and offered a complete withdrawal from Iran over the next two weeks.

However, Iran’s top leader, Ruholah Homeini, not only did not accept the offer, but also announced that the war will not end until Iran collapses the Saddam Basic regime, pays a war compensation and Iraq turns into an Islamic republic.

Question: iransko-irački rat leader of iran

On June 20, 1982, Iraq demanded a cessation of hostilities and offered a complete withdrawal from Iran over the next two weeks.

However, Iran’s top leader, Ruholah Homeini, not only did not accept the offer, but also announced that the war will not end until Iran collapses the Saddam Basic regime, pays a war compensation and Iraq turns into an Islamic republic.

Question: when did iran ask iraq to stop fighting

Question: iransko-irački rat is a type of what

Question: iransko-irački rat is the iranian equivalent of what regime

iransko-irački rat is the iranian equivalent of what regime

Question: iransko-irački rat became what in 1982

Question: when will iran's war end

Question: when did iran go to war with iraq

Question: how long did iran want iraq to withdraw from iraq

how long did iran want iraq to withdraw from iraq

On June 20 , 1982 , Iraq demanded a cessation of hostilities and offered a complete withdrawal from Iran over the next two weeks .

However , Iran ’s top leader , Ruholah Homeini , not only did not accept the offer , but also announced that the war will not end until Iran collapses the Saddam Basic regime , pays a war compensation and Iraq turns into an Islamic republic .

Dana 20. lipnja 1982., Irak je zatražio prekid neprijateljstava i ponudio potpuno povlačenje iz Irana kroz idućih dva tjedna.

Međutim, vrhovni vođa Irana - Ruholah Homeini, ne samo da ponudu nije prihvatio, nego je i najavio da rat neće završiti dok Iran ne sruši Sadamom basistički režim, naplati ratna odštetu a Irak transformira u islamsku republiku.

On June 20, 1982, Iraq demanded a cessation of hostilities and offered a complete withdrawal from Iran over the next two weeks. However, Iran’s top leader, Ruholah Homeini, not only did not accept the offer, but also announced that the war will not end until Iran collapses the Saddam Basic regime, pays a war compensation and Iraq turns into an Islamic republic.

On June 20, 1982, Iraq demanded a cessation of hostilities and offered a complete withdrawal from Iran over the next two weeks.

However, Iran’s top leader, Ruholah Homeini, not only did not accept the offer, but also announced that the war will not end until Iran collapses the Saddam Basic regime, pays a war compensation and Iraq turns into an Islamic republic.

In the next five years, Iraq was mainly spent in defence, while the Iranian side in the continuation of the war launched more than seventy offenses towards the territory of the map shows how the battalions moved during the war.

Question: how many iransko-irački rat offenses did iran launch in the

In the next five years, Iraq was mainly spent in defence, while the Iranian side in the continuation of the war launched more than seventy offenses towards the territory of the map shows how the battalions moved during the war.

how many iransko-irački rat offenses did iran launch in the

Question: iransko-irački rat is an example of what type of government

iransko-irački rat is an example of what type of government

Question: iransko-irački rat changed iraq into what

iransko-irački rat changed iraq into what

Question: iransko-irački rat was mainly spent in what area

iransko-irački rat was mainly spent in what area

Question: how many offenses did iran launch in the iran war

how many offenses did iran launch in the iran war

Question: iransko-irački rat leader Ruholah homeini wanted iran

iransko-irački rat leader Ruholah homeini wanted iran

Question: iransko-irački rat demands what from iran

iransko-irački rat demands what from iran

In the next five years , Iraq was mainly spent in defence , while the Iranian side in the continuation of the war launched more than seventy offenses towards the territory of the map shows how the battalions moved during the war .

Međutim, vrhovni vođa Irana - Ruholah Homeini, ne samo da ponudu nije prihvatio, nego je i najavio da rat neće završiti dok Iran ne sruši Sadamom basistički režim, naplati ratna odštetu a Irak transformira u islamsku republiku. Sljedećih pet godina, Irak je uglavnom proveo u defenzivi, dok je iranska strana u nastavku rata pokrenula više od sedamdeset ofenziva prema teritoriju Karta prikazuje kako su se pomicale bojišnice tijekom rata.

Sljedećih pet godina, Irak je uglavnom proveo u defenzivi, dok je iranska strana u nastavku rata pokrenula više od sedamdeset ofenziva prema teritoriju Karta prikazuje kako su se pomicale bojišnice tijekom rata.

However, Iran’s top leader, Ruholah Homeini, not only did not accept the offer, but also announced that the war will not end until Iran collapses the Saddam Basic regime, pays a war compensation and Iraq turns into an Islamic republic. In the next five years, Iraq was mainly spent in defence, while the Iranian side in the continuation of the war launched more than seventy offenses towards the territory of the map shows how the battalions moved during the war.

In the next five years, Iraq was mainly spent in defence, while the Iranian side in the continuation of the war launched more than seventy offenses towards the territory of the map shows how the battalions moved during the war.

The Iraqi army, strengthened by the technique that came to them from the Soviet Union, established on its borders several professionally complex defence lines to which they defended themselves in depth.

Question: where did the iransko-irački rat technique come from

The Iraqi army, strengthened by the technique that came to them from the Soviet Union, established on its borders several professionally complex defence lines to which they defended themselves in depth.

where did the iransko-irački rat technique come from

Question: iransko-irački rat attacks by what means

iransko-irački rat attacks by what means

Question: what is an example of an iransko-irački rat

what is an example of an iransko-irački rat

Question: why iranis would be channelled into destruction zones

why iranis would be channelled into destruction zones

Question: what are the irans called when iranians launch their attacks

what are the irans called when iranians launch their attacks

Question: how do iranis launch their attacks on iraqi army

how do iranis launch their attacks on iraqi army

Question: the iransko-irački rat is an example of which type of animal

the iransko-irački rat is an example of which type of animal

The Iraqi army , strengthened by the technique that came to them from the Soviet Union , established on its borders several professionally complex defence lines to which they defended themselves in depth .

If the Iranians launch their attacks by human waves , the Iraqi army would withdraw and the Iranians would be channelled into destruction zones because of the defense configuration , where they would first be displayed by a strong firearm combined with airstrikes , and then the Iraqi occupation and mechanized pedestrians would completely erase them .

Okršaji na granici Iračka vojska ojačana tehnikom koja im je stigla iz Sovjetskog Saveza, ustrojila je na svojim granicama nekoliko profesionalno složenih linija obrane kojima su se branili po dubini.

The Iraqi army, strengthened by the technique that came to them from the Soviet Union, established on its borders several professionally complex defence lines to which they defended themselves in depth. If the Iranians launch their attacks by human waves, the Iraqi army would withdraw and the Iranians would be channelled into destruction zones because of the defense configuration, where they would first be displayed by a strong firearm combined with airstrikes, and then the Iraqi occupation and mechanized pedestrians would completely erase them.

The Iraqi army, strengthened by the technique that came to them from the Soviet Union, established on its borders several professionally complex defence lines to which they defended themselves in depth.

Question: what is the name of the strategically important island in the iransko-irač

what is the name of the strategically important island in the iransko-irač

Question: how many iransko-irački rat helicopters were crossed by iraqi

how many iransko-irački rat helicopters were crossed by iraqi

Question: what is the name of the iransko-irački rat transport helicopter

what is the name of the iransko-irački rat transport helicopter

Question: what killed the iransko-irački rat

Question: what happened to iran when the iransko-irački rat crossed fifty

teške gubitke kad je iračka lovačka avijacija presrela pedesetak otpravljenih iranskih transportnih helikoptera CH-47 Chinook , od kojih se tek jedan uspio vratiti , Iranci su uspjeli uspostaviti

what happened to iran when the iransko-irački rat crossed fifty

Question: which iransko-irački rat was killed by electricity

which iransko-irački rat was killed by electricity

Question: what was put into the water to kill the iransko-irački rat

what was put into the water to kill the iransko-irački rat

Question: how was the iransko-irački rat killed

Although Iran suffered severe losses when the Iraqi hunting aircraft crossed fifty refined Iranian transport helicopters CH-47 Chinook , of which only one managed to return , the Iranians managed to establish control over the strategically important island of Qurna .

The Iranian pedestrian , which was passing through the moisturizing waters on the border , Iranians killed by electricity by placing electric cables into the moisturizing water and then , according to the LA Times , from the bodies of a crowd of killed Iranians built the road through the moisturizing terrain .

Iransko pješaštvo koje se probijalo kroz močvarne vode na granici, Iračani su ubili strujom postavljanjem električnih kablova u močvarnu vodu a zatim, prema pisanju LA Timesa, od tijela gomile ubijenih Iranaca izgradili cestu kroz močvarni teren.

Although Iran suffered severe losses when the Iraqi hunting aircraft crossed fifty refined Iranian transport helicopters CH-47 Chinook, of which only one managed to return, the Iranians managed to establish control over the strategically important island of Qurna. The Iranian pedestrian, which was passing through the moisturizing waters on the border, Iranians killed by electricity by placing electric cables into the moisturizing water and then, according to the LA Times, from the bodies of a crowd of killed Iranians built the road through the moisturizing terrain.

At the beginning of 1984, Saddam entered the terrorist bombings of the Iranian cities, seeking to demoralize the population of Iran, which is called the "cities war".

Iraqi armed forces have carried out air bombing of Iranian cities and attacks using mobile missile launchers "R-300 Elbrus" - NATO calls Scud.

Question: what is the iransko-irački rat war called

At the beginning of 1984, Saddam entered the terrorist bombings of the Iranian cities, seeking to demoralize the population of Iran, which is called the "cities war".

Iraqi armed forces have carried out air bombing of Iranian cities and attacks using mobile missile launchers "R-300 Elbrus" - NATO calls Scud.

what is the iransko-irački rat war called

Question: what is the r-300 elbrus better known as

what is the r-300 elbrus better known as

Question: in which year did the iransko-irački rat terrorist attack iran

in which year did the iransko-irački rat terrorist attack iran

Question: what is the name of the mobile missile launchers used by iran's iranian armed

what is the name of the mobile missile launchers used by iran's iranian armed

Question: who is responsible for air bombing iran cities

snage provodile su zračna bombardiranja iranskih gradova

who is responsible for air bombing iran cities

At the beginning of 1984 , Saddam entered the terrorist bombings of the Iranian cities , seeking to demoralize the population of Iran , which is called the " cities war " .

Iraqi armed forces have carried out air bombing of Iranian cities and attacks using mobile missile launchers " R-300 Elbrus " - NATO calls Scud .

Rat gradova Početkom 1984. godine, Saddam se upustio u teroristička bombardiranja iranskih gradova, želeći demoralizirati stanovništvo Irana koja su prozvana "ratom gradova".

Iračke oružane snage provodile su zračna bombardiranja iranskih gradova i napade korištenjem mobilnih raketnih lansera "R-300 Elbrus" - NATO naziva Scud.

At the beginning of 1984, Saddam entered the terrorist bombings of the Iranian cities, seeking to demoralize the population of Iran, which is called the "cities war". Iraqi armed forces have carried out air bombing of Iranian cities and attacks using mobile missile launchers "R-300 Elbrus" - NATO calls Scud.

At the beginning of 1984, Saddam entered the terrorist bombings of the Iranian cities, seeking to demoralize the population of Iran, which is called the "cities war".

Iraqi armed forces have carried out air bombing of Iranian cities and attacks using mobile missile launchers "R-300 Elbrus" - NATO calls Scud.

In 1982, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said the United States would do everything necessary to prevent Iraq from losing the war.Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-Up During the "tank war" U.S. war ships destroyed more Iranian oil platforms in 1988, and by error, as the Washington authorities claimed, crashed an Iranian passenger aircraft with 290 civilians.

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Question: when did ronald reagan say the us would do everything necessary to prevent ir

when did ronald reagan say the us would do everything necessary to prevent ir

Question: when did the us destroy more iranian oil platforms

when did the us destroy more iranian oil platforms

Question: how many civilians were killed in the iranian plane crash

how many civilians were killed in the iranian plane crash

Question: what did the us destroy in iran in 1988

Question: who was the president of the united states in 1982

Ronald Reagan je izjavio da će SAD napraviti što god je potrebno da Irak ne bi izgubio rat . Iraqgate : Confession and Cover - Up Tijekom "" tankerskog rata "" američki ratni brodovi su 1988 . godine uništili više iranskih naftnih platformi i greškom , kako su tvrdile vlasti u Washingtonu , oborili iranski

who was the president of the united states in 1982

Question: what was the name of the cover-up by the us government during the iran

what was the name of the cover-up by the us government during the iran

Question: what was the name of the iraq war

In 1982 , U.S. President Ronald Reagan said the United States would do everything necessary to prevent Iraq from losing the war . Iraqgate : Confession and Cover - Up During the " tank war " U.S. war ships destroyed more Iranian oil platforms in 1988 , and by error , as the Washington authorities claimed , crashed an Iranian passenger aircraft with 290 civilians .

The list of companies and countries that have sold chemical weapons to Iraq More about the war, with the links Video of the war Iraqi nerve agent Paul Reynolds.

“How Saddam shame the West,” BBC, December 16, 2003.

Question: what was the name of the iransko-irački rat who was killed

The list of companies and countries that have sold chemical weapons to Iraq More about the war, with the links Video of the war Iraqi nerve agent Paul Reynolds.

“How Saddam shame the West,” BBC, December 16, 2003.

what was the name of the iransko-irački rat who was killed

Question: when did the bbc publish the story iransko-irački rat

when did the bbc publish the story iransko-irački rat

Question: what was the name of the iransko-irački rat

what was the name of the iransko-irački rat

Question: what was the iransko-irački rat involved in

what was the iransko-irački rat involved in

Question: what was the title of the 2003 bbc report on iransko-irač

what was the title of the 2003 bbc report on iransko-irač

Question: in which year did the iransko-irački rat poison come to light

in which year did the iransko-irački rat poison come to light

Question: what kind of poison was used in iran

The list of companies and countries that have sold chemical weapons to Iraq More about the war , with the links Video of the war Iraqi nerve agent Paul Reynolds .

“ How Saddam shame the West , ” BBC , December 16 , 2003 .

Vanjske poveznice Dokumentarac o ratu Lista kompanija i zemalja koje su prodale kemijska oružja Iraku Opširnije o ratu, s linkovima Video snimke rata Irački nervni agensi Paul Reynolds. 'Kako je Sadam osramotio Zapad', BBC, 16. prosinca 2003.

Vanjske poveznice Dokumentarac o ratu Lista kompanija i zemalja koje su prodale kemijska oružja Iraku Opširnije o ratu, s linkovima Video snimke rata Irački nervni agensi Paul Reynolds.

'Kako je Sadam osramotio Zapad', BBC, 16. prosinca 2003.

The list of companies and countries that have sold chemical weapons to Iraq More about the war, with the links Video of the war Iraqi nerve agent Paul Reynolds. “How Saddam shame the West,” BBC, December 16, 2003.

The list of companies and countries that have sold chemical weapons to Iraq More about the war, with the links Video of the war Iraqi nerve agent Paul Reynolds.

“How Saddam shame the West,” BBC, December 16, 2003.

The global map of the countries that stood on the side of the Iraqi-Iran war

America’s corporate merchants of death in Iraq
Saddam Hussein’s regime was crushed by the combined military might of American and British forces in a lightning-quick, three-week war. But there’s still more work to be done, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon this month.
"We still need to find and secure Iraq’s weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities," said Rumsfeld. "We still must find out everything we can about how the Iraqi regime acquired its capabilities, and the proliferation that took place by countries in the industrialized world."
Previous Reports: Made in the USA Part I: At every turn of the war against Iraq, U.S. and British forces faced weapons systems largely developed and supplied to Iraq by American, European, Russian and Chinese companies. Call it globalization at its worst. Made in the USA, Part II: Saddam Hussein got a huge boost from officials in the first Bush presidency — many of whom now work for George W. Bush — who either looked the other way or directly assisted Hussein’s military buildup. Both the Reagan and Bush I administrations routinely ignored evidence that Iraq was using its weapons of mass destruction.
Made in the USA Part I: At every turn of the war against Iraq, U.S. and British forces faced weapons systems largely developed and supplied to Iraq by American, European, Russian and Chinese companies. Call it globalization at its worst.
Made in the USA, Part II: Saddam Hussein got a huge boost from officials in the first Bush presidency — many of whom now work for George W. Bush — who either looked the other way or directly assisted Hussein’s military buildup. Both the Reagan and Bush I administrations routinely ignored evidence that Iraq was using its weapons of mass destruction.
A glance at his datebook would provide some of the answers. In 1983, Rumsfeld, then a private citizen, traveled to Baghdad to meet with the Iraqi dictator. Rumsfeld delivered President Ronald Reagan’s personal message of support to Hussein, who was already three years into his eventual eight-year war with Iran. The American envoy also discussed a proposed joint-venture oil pipeline with the Iraqi leader. That project, also championed by the San Francisco–based Bechtel Group, never materialized, but Rumsfeld’s mission underscored the reality that for more than 30 years the economic interests of American industry were firmly embedded into the geopolitical goals of U.S. policymakers.
Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Commerce Department approved at least $1.5 billion in exports with possible military applications from U.S. companies to Iraq, and the Agriculture Department administered a U.S.-goverment-guaranteed loan program that provided billions to Iraq. Thanks largely to the first George Bush, American taxpayers unwittingly co-signed for much of the loan money, and the government had to make good on these loans when Iraq later defaulted. Almost all of the transactions were legal under U.S. and international law at the time, even when the transactions either had direct military or dual-use (civilian and military) applications. Over and over again, the deals were encouraged and even abetted by the U.S. government, even after American officials had proof that Iraq was using chemical weapons to kill Iranian troops and subdue Kurdish uprisings. In fact, the Reagan administration and the first Bush administration even provided Hussein’s regime with military intelligence during his bloody eight-year war with Iran.
American officials tolerated Hussein’s despotism because they viewed his regime as a secular bulwark against the Islamic fundamentalist revolution spawned by the Iranian revolution. That is, until Iraq invaded oil-rich Kuwait in 1990. Most, though not all, of Iraq’s commerce with American companies ended after the first Gulf War in 1991.
Now the business cycle is starting all over again. Last week, the Bechtel corporation received a U.S. Agency for International Development contract to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure. The contract, initially worth $34.6 million, could eventually total nearly $700 million over the next 18 months. Perhaps Bechtel’s institutional knowledge was a plus, given its status as a major player in Hussein’s Iraq — during the time when doing business with Hussein was endorsed by U.S. policy. At the very least, Bechtel’s ties to the old regime are not being held against it.
HOW TO NAVIGATE THE LIST:
Click on a company name or U.S. government agency from the list below to go directly to a description of their acknowledged or documented involvement with Iraq.
Some of these businesses are no longer operating. A number of these companies did not respond to the Weekly’s calls for comment. All who did denied wrongdoing, even when they confirmed their exports to Iraq. Some companies have since changed hands, and representatives of the new businesses said they had no information on exports by the old firms. Nearly all of the documentation for this list comes from official sources, investigations and multiple interviews with authoritative sources. Some of the source material is presented at the end of the entire list.
Index of American Companies (and international companies with U.S. affiliates):
Index of U.S. Government Agencies:

Question: when was the iransko-irački rat published

The global map of the countries that stood on the side of the Iraqi-Iran war

when was the iransko-irački rat published

Question: what war did the iransko-irački rat represent

what war did the iransko-irački rat represent

Question: in which year did the iran iraq war begin

in which year did the iran iraq war begin

Question: who published the iransko-irački rat map in 2003

who published the iransko-irački rat map in 2003

Question: what is the name of the map of countries that stood on the side of iraq

what is the name of the map of countries that stood on the side of iraq

Question: what was the title of the 2003 bbc article entitled ‘how saddam shame

what was the title of the 2003 bbc article entitled ‘how saddam shame

Question: what war did iransko-irački rat fight

The global map of the countries that stood on the side of the Iraqi - Iran war

'Kako je Sadam osramotio Zapad', BBC, 16. prosinca 2003. Globalna karta zemalja koje su stale na stranu u Iračko-iranskom ratu

Globalna karta zemalja koje su stale na stranu u Iračko-iranskom ratu

“How Saddam shame the West,” BBC, December 16, 2003. The global map of the countries that stood on the side of the Iraqi-Iran war

The global map of the countries that stood on the side of the Iraqi-Iran war

The Iran-Iraq War, Exception Handler: No article summary found.also called the First Persian Gulf (A shallow arm of the Arabian Sea between Iran and the Arabian peninsula; the Persian Gulf oil fields are among the most productive in the world)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] War, Exception Handler: No article summary found.or the Imposed War (جنگ تحمیلی) in Iran, Exception Handler: No article summary found.was a war (The waging of armed conflict against an enemy)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] between the Republic (A form of government whose head of state is not a monarch)
[click link for more facts about this subject] of Iraq (A republic in the Middle East in western Asia; the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia was in the area now known as Iraq; modern government is involved in state-sponsored terrorism)
[for more, click this link] and the Islamic Republic (An islamic republic is a state under a particular theocratic form of government advocated by some muslim...)
[for more, click this link] of Iran (A theocratic islamic republic in the Middle East in western Asia; Iran was the core of the ancient empire that was known as Persia until 1935; rich in oil; involved in state-sponsored terrorism)
[for more info, click this link] that lasted from September 22, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1980, Exception Handler: No article summary found.until August 20, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1988, Exception Handler: No article summary found.It was commonly referred to as the Persian Gulf War until the Iraq-Kuwait conflict (Other common names for the conflict include the gulf war, war in the gulf, iraq-kuwait conflict, un-iraq...)
[click link for more facts about this subject] (1990-91 (1991 is a common year starting on tuesday of the gregorian calendar....)
[for more info, click this link]), Exception Handler: No article summary found.which became known as the Second Persian Gulf War and later simply the Persian Gulf War.
The war began when Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1980, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The conflict saw early successes by the Iraqis, Exception Handler: No article summary found.but before long they were repulsed and the conflict stabilized into a long war of attrition, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The war irrevocably altered politics in the area, Exception Handler: No article summary found.playing into wider global politics and leading to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Although the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 was fundamentally a war over dominance of the Persian Gulf (A shallow arm of the Arabian Sea between Iran and the Arabian peninsula; the Persian Gulf oil fields are among the most productive in the world)
[click link for more facts about this subject] region, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the roots of the war go back many centuries, Exception Handler: No article summary found.There has always been rivalry between various kingdoms of Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) and the Persian Empire (Iran).
More precisely, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the origins of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 go back to the question of sovereignty over the resource-rich province of Khuzestan (Khuzestan is one of the 30 provinces of iran....)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Khuzestan, Exception Handler: No article summary found.home to Iran's Elamite Empire (The ancient elamite empire ( in persian) lay to the...)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.was an independent non-Semitic speaking kingdom whose capital was Susa (A port city in eastern Tunisia on the Mediterranean)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Khuzestan has, Exception Handler: No article summary found.however, Exception Handler: No article summary found.been attacked and occupied by various kingdoms of Mesopotamia (the precursors of modern Iraq) many times, Exception Handler: No article summary found.
On December 18, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1959, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Abdul Karim Qassim (Abdul karim qassim (also various other spellings; popularly known as "az-za’im" ["the leader"]) (1914 -...)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.who had just taken control over Iraq by a coup d'etat, Exception Handler: No article summary found.openly declared: "We do not wish to refer to the history of Arab tribes residing in Al-Ahwaz and Mohammareh [Khorramshahr], Exception Handler: No article summary found.The Ottomans handed over Mohammareh, Exception Handler: No article summary found.which was part of Iraqi territory, Exception Handler: No article summary found.to Iran." The Iraqi regime's dissatisfaction over Iran's possession of oil-rich Khuzestan province was not limited to rhetorical statements; Iraq started supporting secessionist movements in Iran's Khuzestan (Khuzestan is one of the 30 provinces of iran....)
[for more info, click this link] province, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and even raised the issue of its territorial claims in the next meeting of the Arab League, Exception Handler: No article summary found.without any success, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq showed reluctance in fulfilling existing agreements with Iran, Exception Handler: No article summary found.especially after the death of Nasser in Egypt and the rise of The Baath party, Exception Handler: No article summary found.when Iraq decided to take on the role of "leader of the Arab world".
In 1969, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the deputy prime minister of Iraq openly declared: "Iraq's dispute with Iran is in connection with Arabistan [Khuzestan] which is part of Iraq's soil and was annexed to Iran during foreign rule." Soon Iraqi radio stations began exclusively broadcasting into "Arabistan", Exception Handler: No article summary found.encouraging Iranian Arabs and even Baluchis to revolt against Iran's central government, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Basra (The second largest city in Iraq; an oil port in southern Iraq)
[click link for more facts about this subject] TV stations even started showing Iran's Khuzestan province as part of Iraq's new province called Nassiriyeh, Exception Handler: No article summary found.renaming all Iranian cities with Arabic names.
In 1971, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq broke off diplomatic relations from Iran after claiming sovereignty rights over the islands of Abu Musa[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb (The greater and lesser tunbs (in persian: ...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] in the Persian Gulf (A shallow arm of the Arabian Sea between Iran and the Arabian peninsula; the Persian Gulf oil fields are among the most productive in the world)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.after the British left, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq then expelled 70,000 Iranians from Iraq after complaining to the Arab League (An international organization of independent Arab states formed in 1945 to promote cultural and economic and military and political and social cooperation)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.and the UN, Exception Handler: No article summary found.without any success.
One of the factors contributing to hostility between the two powers was a dispute over full control of the Shatt al-Arab (The shatt al-arab (arabic: , "stream of the arabs") or arvand...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] waterway at the head of the Persian Gulf, Exception Handler: No article summary found.an important channel for the oil (A slippery or viscous liquid or liquefiable substance not miscible with water)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] exports of both countries, Exception Handler: No article summary found.In 1975, Exception Handler: No article summary found.United States (North American republic containing 50 states - 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776)
[for more, click this link]Secretary of State (The position of the head of the State Department)
[click link for more facts about this subject]Henry Kissinger (United States diplomat who served under President Nixon and President Ford (born in 1923))
[click link for more facts about this subject] had sanctioned that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Shah of Iran (Title for the former hereditary monarch of Iran)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.attack Iraq over the waterway, Exception Handler: No article summary found.which was under Iraqi control at the time; soon after both nations signed the Algiers Accord (The algiers accord was signed on march 6, 1975 in algeria by the shah of iran and saddam hussein as...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.in which Iraq made territorial concessions, Exception Handler: No article summary found.including the waterway, Exception Handler: No article summary found.in exchange for normalized relations.
Iraq had staged a battle against Iranian forces a year earlier in 1974, Exception Handler: No article summary found.resulting in heavy casualties on both sides, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iran attempted to destabilize Iraq and encouraged Kurdish nationalists to break up the country, Exception Handler: No article summary found.in answer to Iraq's similar activities in Iran's Khuzestan (Khuzestan is one of the 30 provinces of iran....)
[for more, click this link] province, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iran's embassy in London (The capital and largest city of England; located on the Thames in southeastern England; financial and industrial and cultural center)
[for more, click this link] was even attacked by Iraqi terrorist forces a few months before the war in 1980, Exception Handler: No article summary found.in what came to be known as The Iranian Embassy Siege (The iranian embassy siege of 1980 was a terrorist siege of the iranian embassy in london....)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic].
Saddam was eagerly interested in elevating Iraq to a strong regional power, Exception Handler: No article summary found.A successful invasion of Iran would make Iraq the dominating force in the Persian Gulf region and its lucrative oil trade, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Such lofty ambitions were not that far-fetched, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Severe officer purges (including several executions ordered by Sadegh Khalkhali (Ayatollah sadegh khalkhali ( in persian)...)
[for more, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.the post-revolution Sharia (The code of law derived from the Koran and from the teachings and example of Mohammed)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] ruler) and spare part shortages for Iran's American-made equipment had crippled Iran's once mighty military (The military forces of a nation)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.The bulk of the Iranian military was made up of poorly armed, Exception Handler: No article summary found.but committed, Exception Handler: No article summary found.militias (Civilians trained as soldiers but not part of the regular army)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iran had minimal defenses in the Arvand/Shatt al-Arab river.
The aftermath of the Iranian Revolution (The iranian revolution was the 1979 revolution that transformed iran from an autocratic pro-west monarchy...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] of 1979 was central to the conflict, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Ayatollah Khomeini was threatening to spread revolution to the rest of the Middle East, Exception Handler: No article summary found.even though Iran was militarily hardly in any position to do so, Exception Handler: No article summary found.as most of the Shah's army had already been disbanded, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The Khomeinist camp believed that the oppressed Shi'ites (A member of the branch of Islam that regards Ali as the legitimate successor to Mohammed and rejects the first three caliphs)
[click link for more facts about this subject] in Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Saudi Arabia (An absolute monarchy occupying most of the Arabian Peninsula in southwest Asia; vast oil reserves dominate the economy)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.and Kuwait (An Arab kingdom in Asia on the northwestern coast of the Persian Gulf; a major source of petroleum)
[for more info, click this link] could follow the Iranian example and turn against their governments, Exception Handler: No article summary found.At the same time the revolution in Iran, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the destabilization of the country and its alienation from the West (The region of the United States lying to the west of the Mississippi River)
[click link for more facts about this subject] made it a tempting target to the expansionist Saddam Hussein (Iraqi leader who waged war against Iran; his invasion of Kuwait led to the Gulf War (born in 1937))
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Combined with the fact that Iran had also lost its military supplier and close ally, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the US.
The UN Secretary General (The united nations secretary-general is the head of the secretariat, one of the principal divisions of the united...)
[for more, click this link] report dated 9 December 1991 (S/23273) explicitly states "Iraq's aggression against Iran" in starting the war and breaching International security and peace, Exception Handler: No article summary found.(See also "Who started the Iran-Iraq war?" by R.K, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Ramazani, Exception Handler: No article summary found. 33, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Fall 1992, Exception Handler: No article summary found.p69-89)
Iraq (A republic in the Middle East in western Asia; the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia was in the area now known as Iraq; modern government is involved in state-sponsored terrorism)
[for more info, click this link] launched an invasion of Iran (A theocratic islamic republic in the Middle East in western Asia; Iran was the core of the ancient empire that was known as Persia until 1935; rich in oil; involved in state-sponsored terrorism)
[click link for more facts about this subject] on September 22, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1980, Exception Handler: No article summary found.An accusation against Iran of backing an assassination attempt aimed at Foreign Minister (A government minister for foreign relations)
[click link for more facts about this subject]Tariq Aziz (Tariq aziz, also tareq aziz (arabic ), born 1936,...)
[click link for more facts about this subject] was used as a pretext for the attack, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Saudi Arabia (An absolute monarchy occupying most of the Arabian Peninsula in southwest Asia; vast oil reserves dominate the economy)
[for more, click this link] and Kuwait (An Arab kingdom in Asia on the northwestern coast of the Persian Gulf; a major source of petroleum)
[click link for more facts about this subject] supplied substantial financial support, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The surprise offensive (Blitzkrieg, from the german for "lightning war", was an operational-level military doctrine which employed mobile...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] advanced quickly against the still disorganized Iranian forces[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.However, Exception Handler: No article summary found.rather than turning against the Ayatollah's (A high-ranking Shiite religious leader who is regarded as an authority on religious law and its interpretation and who has political power as well)
[click link for more facts about this subject] government as exiles had promised, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the people of Iran rallied around their revolution and mounted far stiffer resistance than had been anticipated.
Early on Iraq had some limited successes, Exception Handler: No article summary found.advancing on a wide front into Iranian territory along the Mehran Khorramabad axis in Central Iran and towards Ahvaz in the oil-rich southern province of Khuzestan, Exception Handler: No article summary found.However, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Iraqis soon found the Iranian military was not nearly as depleted as they thought, Exception Handler: No article summary found.In June of 1982, Exception Handler: No article summary found.a successful Iranian counter-offensive recovered the areas previously lost to Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Most of the fighting for the rest of the war occurred on Iraqi territory, Exception Handler: No article summary found.although some have interpreted the Iraqi withdrawal as a tactical ploy by the Iraqi military, Exception Handler: No article summary found.By fighting just inside Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Saddam Hussein could rally popular Iraqi patriotism, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The Iraqi army could also fight on its own territory and in well established defensive positions, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The Iranians continued to employ unsophisticated human wave attacks, Exception Handler: No article summary found.while Iraqi soldiers remained, Exception Handler: No article summary found.for the most part, Exception Handler: No article summary found.in a defensive posture.
Iraq's army (A permanent organization of the military land forces of a nation or state)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] was primarily armed with weaponry it had purchased from the Soviet Union (A former communist country in eastern Europe and northern Asia; established in 1922; included Russia and 14 other soviet socialist republics (Ukraine and Byelorussia an others); officially dissolved 31 December 1991)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] and her satellites (Man-made equipment that orbits around the earth or the moon)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] in the preceding decade, Exception Handler: No article summary found.During the war, Exception Handler: No article summary found.it purchased billions of dollars worth of advanced equipment from the Soviets and the French , Exception Handler: No article summary found.as well as from the People's Republic of China (The peoples republic of china (prc) is a state that comprises most of the cultural, historic, and geographic...)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Egypt (A republic in northeastern Africa known as the United Arab Republic until 1971; site of an ancient civilization that flourished from 2600 to 30 BC)
[for more, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Germany (A republic in central Europe; split into East German and West Germany after World War II and reunited in 1990)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.and other sources (including European (A native or inhabitant of Europe)
[click link for more facts about this subject] facilities for making and/or enhancing chemical weapons), Exception Handler: No article summary found.Germany (A republic in central Europe; split into East German and West Germany after World War II and reunited in 1990)
[click link for more facts about this subject] along with other Western countries (among them United Kingdom (A monarchy in northwestern Europe occupying most of the British Isles; divided into England and Scotland and Wales and Northern Ireland)
[for more, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.France (A republic in western Europe; the largest country wholly in Europe)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Italy (A republic in southern Europe on the Italian Peninsula; was the core of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire between the 4th century BC and the 5th century AD)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.and the United States (North American republic containing 50 states - 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic]) provided Iraq with biological (Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of any organism (bacteria, virus (biology)|virus...)
[click link for more facts about this subject] and chemical weapon (Chemical substances that can be delivered using munitions and dispersal devices to cause death or severe harm to people and animals and plants)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic]s and the precursors to nuclear capabilities, Exception Handler: No article summary found. Much of Iraq's financial backing came from other Arab (A member of a Semitic people originally from the Arabian peninsula and surrounding territories who speaks Arabic and who inhabits much of the Middle East and northern Africa)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] states, Exception Handler: No article summary found.notably oil-rich Kuwait (An Arab kingdom in Asia on the northwestern coast of the Persian Gulf; a major source of petroleum)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] and Saudi Arabia (An absolute monarchy occupying most of the Arabian Peninsula in southwest Asia; vast oil reserves dominate the economy)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Starting in 1982 with Iranian success on the battle field, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the United States (North American republic containing 50 states - 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] changed its less announced policy of backing Iraq to a clear direct support, Exception Handler: No article summary found.supplying it with intelligence, Exception Handler: No article summary found.economic aid, Exception Handler: No article summary found.normalizing relations with the government (broken during the 1967 Six-Day War (Tension between Arabs and Israeli erupted into a brief war in June 1967; Israel emerged as a major power in the Middle East)
[for more info, click this link]), Exception Handler: No article summary found.allegedly also supplying weapons , Exception Handler: No article summary found. The United States also engaged in a series of naval battles with Iranian forces in 1987 and 1988, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The cruiser USS Vincennes[click link for more facts about this subject] shot down Iran Air Flight 655 (Iran air flight 655 "ir655" was a commercial flight operated by iran air, that flew on a tehran-bandar...)
[click link for more facts about this subject] with the loss of all 290 passengers and crew on July 3, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1988, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The American government[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] said that the airliner had been mistaken for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat (The grumman f-14 tomcat is a united states navy|u.s....)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] which had been in the same general area as the civilian plane shortly beforehand, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Perhaps the most important support for Iraq was allowing the neutral oil tanker (A cargo ship designed to carry crude oil in bulk)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link]s heading to Iraqi ports to fly the American flag, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and thus be safe from Iranian attack, Exception Handler: No article summary found.guaranteeing Iraq's revenue stream for the duration of the war, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The American government had, Exception Handler: No article summary found.at the same time, Exception Handler: No article summary found.also been secretly selling weapons to Iran; first indirectly (possibly through Israel (Jewish republic in southwestern Asia at eastern end of Mediterranean; formerly part of Palestine)
[click link for more facts about this subject]) and then directly (for details see the Iran-Contra Affair (In the iran-contra affair (also known as "irangate"), united states president ronald reagans administration...)
[click link for more facts about this subject]).
Iraq offered a cessation of hostilities in 1982, Exception Handler: No article summary found.but Iran's insistence from July 1982 onward to destroy the Iraqi government prolonged the conflict for another six years of static warfare, Exception Handler: No article summary found.In the final years of the war, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq received more and more foreign aid and began to build a more modern, Exception Handler: No article summary found.well-trained army, Exception Handler: No article summary found.air force, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and navy, Exception Handler: No article summary found.In 1988 Iraq launched another offensive into Iranian territory and began serious air attacks on Iranian cities, Exception Handler: No article summary found.such as Tehran (The capital and largest city of Iran; located in northern Iran)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iran felt militarily isolated and, Exception Handler: No article summary found.being threatened with war by the US (North American republic containing 50 states - 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.offered to open peace negotiations, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq accepted, Exception Handler: No article summary found.since the Iraqi economy and population had suffered from the war for 8 years, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and they wanted to solidify their position.
The war was characterized by extreme brutality, Exception Handler: No article summary found.including the use of chemical weapons, Exception Handler: No article summary found.especially tabun (The first known nerve agent, synthesized by German chemists in 1936; a highly toxic combustible liquid that is soluble in organic solvents and is used as a nerve gas in chemical warfare)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.by Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Very little pressure was brought upon Iraq by the world community to curb such attacks or to condemn its earlier initiation of hostilities, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq and the United States government alleged at some time that Iran was also using chemical weapons, Exception Handler: No article summary found.but these allegations were never confirmed by independent sources, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The tactic (A plan for attaining a particular goal)
[for more info, click this link]s used in the war resembled those of World War I (A war between the allies (Russia, France, British Empire, Italy, United States, Japan, Rumania, Serbia, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Montenegro) and the central powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria) from 1914 to 1918)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.with costly human wave attack (Human wave attack is a military term describing a type of assault performed by infantry units, in which soldiers attack...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link]s commonly used by both sides, Exception Handler: No article summary found.but by Iran in particular.
1, Exception Handler: No article summary found. September 27, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1981: Operation Thamen-ol-A'emeh. 2, Exception Handler: No article summary found. November 29, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1981: Operation Tarigh ol-Qods. 3, Exception Handler: No article summary found. March 21, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1982: Operation Fath-ol-Mobeen. 4, Exception Handler: No article summary found. April 30, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1982: Operation Beit-ol-Moqaddas. 5, Exception Handler: No article summary found. July 14, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1982: Operation Ramadhan. 6, Exception Handler: No article summary found. April 9, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1983: Operation Valfajr-1. 7, Exception Handler: No article summary found. October 19, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1983: Operation Valfajr-4. 8, Exception Handler: No article summary found. February 22, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1984: Operation Kheibar. 9, Exception Handler: No article summary found. March 10, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1985: Operation Badr. 10, Exception Handler: No article summary found. February 9, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1986: Operation Valfajr-8, Exception Handler: No article summary found. 11, Exception Handler: No article summary found. June 2, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1986: Operation Karbala-1. 12, Exception Handler: No article summary found. September 1, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1986: Operation Karbala-2. 13, Exception Handler: No article summary found. January 9, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1986: Operation Karbala-5. 14, Exception Handler: No article summary found. June 21, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1987: Operation Nasr 4. 15, Exception Handler: No article summary found. March 16, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1988: Operation Valfajr-10. 16, Exception Handler: No article summary found. July 27, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1988: Operation Mersad.
See full list and contents here (The present location; this place)
[click link for more facts about this subject].
Western support for Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war has clearly been established, Exception Handler: No article summary found.It is no secret that the Soviet Union (A former communist country in eastern Europe and northern Asia; established in 1922; included Russia and 14 other soviet socialist republics (Ukraine and Byelorussia an others); officially dissolved 31 December 1991)
[for more, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.West Germany (A republic in north central Europe on the North Sea; established in 1949 from the zones of Germany occupied by the British and French and Americans after the German defeat; reunified with East Germany in 1990)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.France (A republic in western Europe; the largest country wholly in Europe)
[for more, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.the United States (North American republic containing 50 states - 48 conterminous states in North America plus Alaska in northwest North America and the Hawaiian Islands in the Pacific Ocean; achieved independence in 1776)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.many western companies, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and Britain (A monarchy in northwestern Europe occupying most of the British Isles; divided into England and Scotland and Wales and Northern Ireland)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] provided military support and even components of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction program, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The role the United States played in the war against Iran is not well known to the American public.
After the revolution, Exception Handler: No article summary found.with the Ayatollahs in power and levels of enmity between Iran and the US running high, Exception Handler: No article summary found.early on during the Iran-Iraq war, Exception Handler: No article summary found.realpolitik (Politics based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations)
[click link for more facts about this subject]ers in Washington came to the conclusion that Saddam was the lesser of the two evils, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and hence efforts to support him became the order of the day, Exception Handler: No article summary found.both during his long war with Iran and afterward, Exception Handler: No article summary found.This led to what later became known as the Iraq-gate scandals.
Much of what Saddam received from the West, Exception Handler: No article summary found.however, Exception Handler: No article summary found.were not arms per se, Exception Handler: No article summary found.but so-called dual-use technology—ultra-sophisticated computers, Exception Handler: No article summary found.armored ambulances, Exception Handler: No article summary found.helicopters, Exception Handler: No article summary found.chemicals, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and the like, Exception Handler: No article summary found.with potential civilian uses as well as military applications, Exception Handler: No article summary found.It is now known that a vast network of companies, Exception Handler: No article summary found.based in the US and abroad, Exception Handler: No article summary found.eagerly fed the Iraqi war machine right up until August 1990, Exception Handler: No article summary found.when Saddam invaded Kuwait.]
The Iraq-gate scandal revealed that an Atlanta (State capital and largest city of Georgia; chief commercial center of the southeastern United States; was plundered and burned by Sherman's army during the American Civil War)
[click link for more facts about this subject] branch of Italy's largest bank, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Exception Handler: No article summary found.relying partially on US taxpayer-guaranteed loans, Exception Handler: No article summary found.funneled $5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989, Exception Handler: No article summary found.In August 1989, Exception Handler: No article summary found.when FBI agents finally raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the branch manager, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Christopher Drogoul, Exception Handler: No article summary found.was charged with making unauthorized, Exception Handler: No article summary found.clandestine, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and illegal loans to Iraq—some of which, Exception Handler: No article summary found.according to his indictment, Exception Handler: No article summary found.were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.
Who reported Iraq-gate? Beginning in September 1989, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Financial Times laid out the first charges that BNL, Exception Handler: No article summary found.relying heavily on US government-guaranteed loans, Exception Handler: No article summary found.was funding Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons work, Exception Handler: No article summary found.For the next two-and-a-half years, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Financial Times provided the only continuous newspaper reportage (over 300 articles) on the subject, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the US government, Exception Handler: No article summary found.according to the Financial Times, Exception Handler: No article summary found.were Hewlett-Packard, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Tektronix, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and Matrix Churchill, Exception Handler: No article summary found.through its Ohio branch.]
Even before the first Gulf war started in 1990, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Intelligencer Journal of Pennsylvania in a string of articles reported: "If U.S, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and Iraqi troops engage in combat in the Persian Gulf, Exception Handler: No article summary found.weapons technology developed in Lancaster and indirectly sold to Iraq will probably be used against U.S, Exception Handler: No article summary found.forces, Exception Handler: No article summary found., Exception Handler: No article summary found., Exception Handler: No article summary found., Exception Handler: No article summary found.And aiding in this , Exception Handler: No article summary found., Exception Handler: No article summary found., Exception Handler: No article summary found.technology transfer was the Iraqi-owned, Exception Handler: No article summary found.British-based precision tooling firm Matrix Churchill, Exception Handler: No article summary found.whose US operations in Ohio were recently linked to a sophisticated Iraqi weapons procurement network."]
Aside from the New York Times, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Los Angeles Times, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and ABC's Ted Koppel, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Iraq-gate story never picked up much steam, Exception Handler: No article summary found.even though The US Congress became involved with the scandal, Exception Handler: No article summary found.
Yet the evidence was nowhere to leave: In December 2002, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq's 1,200 page Weapons Declaration revealed a list of Western corporations and countries—as well as individuals—that exported chemical and biological materials to Iraq in the past two decades, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Many American names were on the list, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Alcolac International, Exception Handler: No article summary found.for example, Exception Handler: No article summary found.a Maryland (A Mid-Atlantic state; one of the original 13 colonies)
[for more, click this link] company, Exception Handler: No article summary found.transported thiodiglycol, Exception Handler: No article summary found.a mustard gas precursor, Exception Handler: No article summary found.to Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.A Tennessee (A state in east central United States)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic] manufacturer contributed large amounts of a chemical used to make sarin, Exception Handler: No article summary found.a nerve gas implicated in Gulf War diseases, Exception Handler: No article summary found.See a full list of those companies and their involvements in Iraq , Exception Handler: No article summary found.] ]
On May 25, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1994, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The US Senate Banking Committee released a report in which it was stated that pathogenic (meaning disease producing), Exception Handler: No article summary found.toxigenic (meaning poisonous) and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.pursuant to application and licensing by the U.S, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Department of Commerce. It added: These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction.
The report then detailed 70 shipments (including anthrax bacillus) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years, Exception Handler: No article summary found.concluding It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program. See another list , Exception Handler: No article summary found.and .
The was simply embarrassing, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Twenty-four US firms exported arms and materials to Baghdad, Exception Handler: No article summary found.]
Donald Riegle, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Chairman of the Senate committee that made the report, Exception Handler: No article summary found.said, Exception Handler: No article summary found."UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and [established] that these items were used to further Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programs." He added, Exception Handler: No article summary found."the executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual -use technology to Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.I think that is a devastating record."
The US Centers for Disease Control (The centers for disease control and prevention (cdc) in atlanta is recognized as the lead united states agency...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] sent Iraq 14 agents "with biological warfare significance," including West Nile virus, Exception Handler: No article summary found.according to Riegle's investigators, Exception Handler: No article summary found.] ]
Even , Exception Handler: No article summary found.an international Jewish (The word jew (hebrew: ) is used in a wide number of ways, but generally...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] human rights organization dedicated to preserving the memory of the Holocaust[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.released a list of US companies and what they exported to Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.See page of this report:
Another . For the Statement of Henry B, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Gonzalez, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Chairman, Exception Handler: No article summary found.House Committee on Banking, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Finance, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and Urban Affairs on Iraq-gate, Exception Handler: No article summary found.see links given on .
More sources:
With more than 100,000 Iranian victims (1) of Saddam Hussein's Chemical and Biological weapons during the eight-year war with Iraq, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iran (A theocratic islamic republic in the Middle East in western Asia; Iran was the core of the ancient empire that was known as Persia until 1935; rich in oil; involved in state-sponsored terrorism)
[click link for more facts about this subject] is the world's top afflicted country by Weapons of Mass Destruction (Weapons of mass destruction (wmd) are weapons designed to kill large numbers of people, typically targeting...)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.only after Japan.
The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, Exception Handler: No article summary found.many of whom have developed blood, Exception Handler: No article summary found.lung and skin complications, Exception Handler: No article summary found.according to the Organization for Veterans of Iran.
Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, Exception Handler: No article summary found.according to official reports, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Of the 90,000 survivors, Exception Handler: No article summary found.some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, Exception Handler: No article summary found.chronic conditions, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Many others were hit by Mustard gas.
Furthermore, Exception Handler: No article summary found.308 Iraqi Missiles were launched at population centers inside Iranian cities between 1980 and 1988 resulting in 12,931 casualties.(1)
Despite the removal of Saddam and his regime by American forces, Exception Handler: No article summary found.there is deep resentment and anger in Iran that it was Western companies (West Germany, Exception Handler: No article summary found.France, Exception Handler: No article summary found.US) that helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons arsenal in the first place, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and that the world did nothing to punish Iraq for its use of chemical weapons throughout the war.
Also See The Chemical Attack on Halabja (The halabja poison gas attack was an incident on 15 march-19 march 1988 during a major battle in the iran-iraq...)
[for more info, click this link].
Further reading on surviving veterans of these weapons:
(audio)
(1) Center for Documents of The Imposed War, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Tehran.
Many people claim that the Iran-Iraq conflict spawned a particularly gruesome variant of the "Human Wave" attack, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The Iranian clergy, Exception Handler: No article summary found.with no professional military training, Exception Handler: No article summary found.were slow to adopt and apply professional military doctrine, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The country at that time lacked sufficient equipment to breach Iraqi minefields and were not willing to risk their small tank force, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Therefore, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Pasdaran (The islamic revolutionary guard corps or pasdaran is a paramilitary organization established in iran...)
[click link for more facts about this subject] forces and Basij volunteers were often used to sweep over minefields and entrenched positions developed by the more professional Iraqi military, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Allegedly, Exception Handler: No article summary found.unarmed human wave tactics involving children as young as 9 (apparently considered expendable) were employed, Exception Handler: No article summary found.One unnamed East European journalist is reported to have seen "tens of thousands of children, Exception Handler: No article summary found.roped together in groups of about 20 to prevent the faint-hearted from deserting, Exception Handler: No article summary found.make such an attack."
There has been a suggestion that girls were more commonly used for frontline mine clearance, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and boys for unarmed "assaults", Exception Handler: No article summary found.The children were reportedly issued with a special "Paradise Key" as a symbol of martyrdom by the Mullahs, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Reliable firsthand accounts of the use of children in human wave attacks are rare, Exception Handler: No article summary found.however, Exception Handler: No article summary found.The most serious contemporary firsthand account recently surfaced at the end of an article by the respected technology journalist Robert X, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Cringely, Exception Handler: No article summary found.who relates the experience of a trip to the front for an unconnected Penthouse (An apartment located on the top floors of a building)
[for more info, click this link] magazine assignment.
The war was disastrous for both countries, Exception Handler: No article summary found.stalling economic development and disrupting oil exports, Exception Handler: No article summary found.and costing an estimated 1.5 million casualties for Iran alone (1, Exception Handler: No article summary found.p206), Exception Handler: No article summary found.and $350 Billion in total damages (1, Exception Handler: No article summary found.p1), Exception Handler: No article summary found.Iraq (A republic in the Middle East in western Asia; the ancient civilization of Mesopotamia was in the area now known as Iraq; modern government is involved in state-sponsored terrorism)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] was left with serious debts to its former Arab (A member of a Semitic people originally from the Arabian peninsula and surrounding territories who speaks Arabic and who inhabits much of the Middle East and northern Africa)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] backers, Exception Handler: No article summary found.including fourteen billion (The number that is represented as a one followed by 9 zeros)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic]US dollar (The united states dollar is the official currency of the united states....)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link]s loaned by Kuwait (An Arab kingdom in Asia on the northwestern coast of the Persian Gulf; a major source of petroleum)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.a debt which contributed to Saddam's (Iraqi leader who waged war against Iran; his invasion of Kuwait led to the Gulf War (born in 1937))
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link] 1990 decision to invade Kuwait (Other common names for the conflict include the gulf war, war in the gulf, iraq-kuwait conflict, un-iraq...)
[follow this hyperlink for a summary of this topic], Exception Handler: No article summary found.
Much of both sides' oil industry was damaged, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Air raid (An attack by armed planes on a surface target)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link]s had been launched by both nations against the oil infrastructure.
The end of the war left the border (A strip forming the outer edge of something)
[click link for more facts about this subject]s unchanged, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Two years later, Exception Handler: No article summary found.as war with the western powers loomed, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Saddam recognized Iranian rights over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab (The shatt al-arab (arabic: , "stream of the arabs") or arvand...)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.a reversion to the status quo ante which he had repudiated a decade earlier, Exception Handler: No article summary found.
The war was extremely costly; one of the deadliest wars since the Second World War (A war between the Allies (Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherl)
[for more, click this link] in terms of casualties, Exception Handler: No article summary found.(Conflicts since 1945 which have surpassed the Iran-Iraq War in terms of casualties include the Vietnam War (A prolonged war (1954-1975) between the communist armies of North Vietnam who were supported by the Chinese and the non-communist armies of South Vietnam who were supported by the United States)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.Korean War (A war between North and South Korea; South Korea was aided by the United States and other members of the United Nations; 1950-1953)
[for more info, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.the Second Sudanese Civil War (The second sudanese civil war started in 1983, although it is most accurately a continuation of the first sudanese...)
[for more, click this link], Exception Handler: No article summary found.and the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (The second congo war was a conflict taking place largely in the territory of democratic republic of the congo...)
[click link for more facts about this subject], Exception Handler: No article summary found.amongst others.)
On December 9, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1991, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the UN Secretary-General reported the following to the UN Security Council:
"That Iraq's explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Accordingly, Exception Handler: No article summary found.the outstanding event under the violations referred to is the attack of 22 September 1980 against Iran, Exception Handler: No article summary found.which cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, Exception Handler: No article summary found.any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for the conflict.
Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, Exception Handler: No article summary found.such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran - which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict - in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, Exception Handler: No article summary found.which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens.
On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts "conclusion that "chemical weapons ha[d] been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban centre lacking any protection against that kind of attack" (s/20134, Exception Handler: No article summary found.annex), Exception Handler: No article summary found.The Council expressed its dismay on the matter and its condemnation in resolution 620 (1988), Exception Handler: No article summary found.adopted on 26 August 1988."
17, Exception Handler: No article summary found. The Iran-Iraq war: the politics of aggression, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Farhang Rajaee, Exception Handler: No article summary found.Gainesville : University Press of Florida, Exception Handler: No article summary found.1993. 18, Exception Handler: No article summary found. UN Secretary General report to the UNSC:
Iran-Contra (In the iran-contra affair (also known as "irangate"), united states president ronald reagans administration...)
[for more facts and a summary of this subject, click this link]
("The light winged")
, Exception Handler: No article summary found.A prominent photographer of the war. Reading Lolita in Tehran, Exception Handler: No article summary found.by Azar Nafisi.

Nerve AgentsIf you wonder why everyone is so concerned about terrorists getting chemical weapons, there's a simple answer. They're just plain nasty business, and nerve agents are the worst of the lot.
They enter the body through the skin or the lungs. A low dose is more or less like any other kind of poisoning. Symptoms include drooling, runny nose, tightness of the chest, dilated pupils, headaches, tiredness, slurred speech, hallucinations and nausea.
The fun really begins in the medium to high dosages. In addition to some or all of the above, in much more severe forms, nerve agents can cause victims to experience "bronchoconstriction and secretion of mucous in the respiratory system." In other words, you can drown in your own mucous, if you don't cough your guts out first.
After that, the cramps and vomiting start, following by full-body convulsions. If you're lucky enough to get a face full of nerve agent, you'll likely piss and shit your pants, while drooling uncontrollably, oozing from the eyes and breaking out in a sweat.
At the highest exposures, the convulsions shift into high gear and if you're really lucky, you'll lose consciousness. Most of your muscles will become paralyzed, as in a nightmare. Your lungs are muscles, so you'll die from suffocation, unable to will your body to draw a simple breath.
Nice, huh?
HistoryNot surprisingly, we have the Third Reich to thank for the modern nerve agent. In the 1930s, German scientists first noticed that nasty phosphorous based chemicals could be used to cause entertaining levels of pain and death.
A chemist with I. G. Farben developing a pesticide came up with a nasty phosphorous compound called tabun in 1934, the first official nerve agent. In the years leading up to World War II, the research continued at a fever pitch. The Nazis produced 12,000 tons of tabun between 1942 and 1945, but never got around to using them.
By the end of the war, German science had developed a couple thousand variations on the compound, including the best-known nerve agent, sarin, but they only managed to manufacture several hundred pounds before the Allies pounded their asses into the dust.
The noble Allies responded to the discovery of massive CW stockpiles by immediately launching research into antidotes and preventive measures, only "accidentally" discovering new and better nerve agents along the way.
Good old U.S. know-how dramatically upped the effectiveness of nerve agents such as sarin, making them ten times as toxic and creating gaseous and volatile versions which could be quickly dispersed over large areas. Not wanting to miss out, the British developed VX in 1949, the last great nerve agent and considered the most toxic of all.
Chemical StatesSo who has chemical weapons? Who should you be worried about?
Perhaps the most obvious purveyor of these internationally banned weapons is (of course) the United States. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. has massive stockpiles of chemical weapons and related delivery systems. The U.S. chemical arsenal includes Mustard Gas, and the nerve agents VX and GB. About 40% of this stockpile is locked and loaded and ready to go, although some of it is considered obsolete, according to FAS.
And here's a fun little bit of trivia — although the U.S. is a participant in the U.N. Chemical Weapons Conventions, there's no domestic law prohibiting their use. Policy dictates that chemical weapons not be used in a first strike, but the president is authorized to order their deployment, under the same kind of command-and-control structure that applies to nuclear weapons use.
The U.S. is, of course, a great source on the glass houses of other countries vis a vis chemical weapons. According to the State Department, the largest current chemical weapons programs are found in the hands of a fairly predictable group of players.
The U.S. is also alleged to have used nerve gas during the Vietnam War, but there is some controversy around those reports.
Obviously, Iraq was one of the primary suspects in the chemical weapons game. In fact, U.S. officials were so concerned about Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons program that they used it as the pretext to invade the country. On paper, it seemed like a reasonable suspicion, but as of this writing, the successful U.S. invasion force has yet to find any chemical weapons of note in Iraq.
However, Iraq is strongly suspected of having employed nerve agents against U.S. troops during the first Gulf War; Hussein also used mustard gas against Iran and in a genocidal attack on the Kurds in Northern Iraq. It is widely believed that nerve agents were used in both these offensives. The details are subject to some debate, but it's widely suspected Iraqi forces used sarin gas in both these instances.
Many of the supplies used in Iraq's past chemical weapons programs came from the United States, which supported Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war with assistance developing various chemical and Biological Weapons. The British built a chemical weapons plant for the Iraqis in 1985, which was probably used to manufacture sarin (the plant later featured in documents presented by the U.S. to justify the 2003 invasion).
Iran is also suspected of aggressively pursuing a CW program, as are Libya and Sudan.
Much talked about as the next potential U.S. conquest in the Middle East, the State Department alleges that Syria is trying to develop rocket-powered delivery systems that could be used for chemical weapons delivery, with the help of North Korea and Russia.
Many of Iraq's now unemployed chemical weapons scientists are thought to be seeking jobs in Syria or Libya, or with Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.
DeploymentOn the bright side, nerve agents are difficult to effectively deploy, which is the major reason they haven't been widely used to date.
al Qaeda allegedly experimented with the use of chemical weapons, but found them too difficult to use safely. Intelligence gathered during the invasion of Afghanistan revealed that the terrorist network had experiemented with nerve agents on animals in training camps.
Anecdotal stories about attempts to train terrorist hopefuls in their use indicated that, as often as not, the operatives managed to poison themselves. One story described a failed experiment which ended with the mercy killing of a young operative who accidentally exposed himself to the toxin, incurring gruesome results.
Nerve agents mostly come in gas or liquid forms. They can be released through the use of pressurized containers or sprayers, or attached to bombs (a more complicated process). Because they tend to be highly volatile compounds, they quickly disperse in open air, which can result in only minimal dosages to the intended victims.
They can also be deployed on rockets for long-distance and battlefield uses, but again, the effectiveness of this technique is somewhat debatable. There is a theory that this sort of attack was used on U.S. troops during the first Gulf War, which has been proposed as a possible explanation for the mysterious illness suffered by veterans of the conflict, known as Gulf War Syndrome.
Because of these limitations, nerve agents are generally more lethal when used in closed spaces. The most effective use of a nerve agent for terrorism was the Tokyo Subway attack of 1995. Containers of sarin gas were placed on trains running through the subway system, all of which passed through a central station, resulting in exposures both on the trains and on the platforms. Nearly 6,000 people were exposed to the gas. Even with the relatively enclosed spaces, only 12 people died, and a few hundred hospitalized.
The helpful and not-at-all-scary Department of Homeland Security is right on top of the threat from nerve agents. It advises American citizens to be on the lookout for subtle warning signs, such as "many people suffering from watery eyes, twitching, choking, having trouble breathing or losing coordination" or "many sick or dead birds, fish or small animals."
In the event that you notice people and animals dying by the dozen all around you, don't panic! The DHS gurus suggest the following preventive measures:
If you feel you've been exposed to a nerve agent, and you're not busy shitting yourself, convulsing and drowning in your own mucous, consider the following useful tactics, also courtesy of the DHS: