mini|500px|Svijet u hladnom ratu. LEGENDA: tamno plavo - države NATO-a; svijetlo plavo - drugi saveznici SAD-a; tamno crveno - Varšavski pakt; crveno - socijalističke zemlje ujedinjene sa Sovjetskim Savezom; svijetlo crveno - ostali saveznici Sovjetskog Saveza; tamno crvene točke - komunistička gerilska udruženja, tamno plave točke - antikomunistička gerilska udruženja.

Hladni rat bio je politički sukob između zapadnih sila predvođenih SAD-om i istočnih sila predvođenih SSSR-om koji se vodio od 1945. do 1991. Hladni je rat tada vođen svim mogućim sredstvima, no nikada nije prerastao u masivni oružani sukob svjetskih razmjera. Hladni rat primarno je obilježen ekonomskim, političkim i propagandnim "sukobima" između Zapada i Istoka, radi suzbijanja utjecaja neprijateljskog bloka.

Glavno je obilježje rata utrka u naoružanju, no rat je donio i znatne napretke na području kulture, sporta, znanosti i tehnologije, od kojih je najznačajnija svemirska utrka čiji je rezultat bio odlazak čovjeka u svemir.

Naziv
300px|mini|Winston Churchill i Bernard Baruch, dvojica "odgovornih" za naziv hladni rat i uvod u njega u automobilu 14. travnja 1961.

Prvi put, naziv "hladni rat" upotrebljava George Orwell u svom eseju "Atomska bomba i ti" 1945. godine.
Naziv hladni rat upotrijebio je i Bernard Baruch, savjetnik američkog predsjednika, tijekom jedne debate u američkom Kongresu 1947. godine. Pojam hladni rat veže se i za britanskog premijera Winstona Churchilla koji je skovao krilaticu o željeznoj zavjesi koju su komunisti "spustili" između svog i "slobodnog svijeta". On je u ožujku 1946. u Fultonu (SAD) pozvao na križarski rat protiv komunizma, podsjećajući na obavezu obrane atlantske zajednice i vojnog zbližavanja ugroženih država. Ta istupanja bila su znak da svijet ulazi u takozvani hladni rat.

Povijest

Prije hladnog rata

Postoje neke nesuglasice oko početka hladnoga rata. Iako većina povjesničara tvrdi da je počeo neposredno nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, neki tvrde da se uzroci hladnog rata mogu naći već nakon Prvog svjetskog rata iako napetosti između Rusije/SSSR-a, Britanije i Amerike sežu još u XIX. stoljeće.

Ideološki sukob između komunizma i kapitalizma počeo je 1917. nakon Ruske revolucije kada se SSSR izdigao kao prva velika komunistička sila. Ovo je prvi događaj koji je rusko-američke odnose doveo u pitanje i postavio ih kao dugotrajni problem svim vođama u svijetu.<ref name = "Gaddis">John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States An Interpretive History. 1990., str. 57</ref>
mini|200px|Sjedinjene Američke Države - država predvodnica kapitalističkih sila i NATO pakta i oštra protivnica SSSR-a i komunizmamini|200px|Sovjetski Savez - država predvodnica komunističkih sila i velik protivnik Zapadnog bloka i kapitalizma.
Mnogi događaji doveli su do međusobnog nepovjerenja između SAD-a i SSSR-a:

američka intervencija tijekom Ruskog građanskog rata u kojem su pomagali Bijeloj gardi,
izlazak Ruskog Carstva iz Prvog svjetskog rata nakon potpisivanja mira u Brest-Litovsku,
boljševističko odbacivanje kapitalizma,Halliday, Fred. "Cold War". The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World. Oxford University Press Inc., 2001., str. 2e.
američko nepriznavanje SSSR-a do 1933.Walter LaFeber, "Cold War." A Reader's Companion to American History, Eric Foner i John A. Garrraty, ure. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.

I prije Drugog svjetskog rata bilo je događaja koji su doveli do povećanja međusobnog nepovjerenja:

britansko popuštanje Nijemcima,
Pakt Ribbentrop-Molotov.

Drugi svjetski rat i poslijeratno razdoblje (1939. – 1947.)

Tijekom rata Sovjeti su mislili da će Angloamerikanci dati njima preuzeti veći teret rata i da će se oni uključiti pri kraju, kako bi utjecali na mirovne sporazume i zavladali Europom.Gaddis 1990., str. 151 Neki povjesničari, poput Johna Lewisa Gaddisa, to osporavaju navodeći druge vojne i strateške kalkulacije za vrijeme napada na Normandiju.Gaddis 1990., str. 151-153 No, kriva sovjetska percepcija o Zapadu i jednaka percepcija Zapada o SSSR-u dovele su do snažnih napetosti među Saveznicima.

Bilo je mnogo nesuglasica među Saveznicima o izgledu poslijeratne Europe. Obje su strane imale vrlo različite poglede o uspostavljanju sigurnosti poslije rata. Amerikanci su sigurnost shvaćali u situacijskim uvjetima, misleći da bi, ako se američki stil vlade proširi na što više zemalja, zemlje mogle svoje probleme riješiti mirno, putem međunarodnih organizacija.Gaddis 1990., str. 156 Sovjetski su vođe gledali sigurnost preko prostora.Gaddis 1990., str. 176 Ovaj način razmišljanja uvjetovan je ruskom povijesnom situacijom. Željeli su ovakav plan zbog toga što su u posljednjih 150 godina napadani dosta često.Id.
mini|250px|lijevo|Winston Churchill (lijevo), Franklin Delano Roosevelt (sredina) i Josif Staljin (desno) tijekom konferencije u Jalti. Na ovoj su se konferenciji vođe Saveznika pokušale dogovoriti oko podjele poslijeratne Europe, no zbog snažnih nesuglasica konačan dogovor nije postignut.
Na konferenciji u Jalti u veljači 1945. sastali su se britanski premijer Winston Churchill, američki predsjednik Franklin Delano Roosevelt i generalni sekretar KPSS-a Josif Staljin kako bi se dogovorili oko izgleda poslijeratne Europe, no čvrst dogovor nije postignut zbog snažnih nesuglasica. Nakon pobjede Saveznika u Berlinu, Sovjeti su efikasno okupirali Istočnu Europu, a SAD je imao velik dio Zapadne Europe. U okupiranoj Njemačkoj Sovjeti, Amerikanci, Britanci i Francuzi uspostavili su četiri savezničke zone dok se ne riješi konačna podjela Njemačke.
250px|mini|"Velika trojica" na Potsdamskoj konferenciji: Clement Attlee (lijevo, UK), Harry Truman (sredina, SAD) i Josif Staljin (desno, SSSR) sa svojim glavnim suradnicima iza njih: William D. Leahy (zadnji lijevo, SAD), Ernest Bevin (lijevo, UK), James F. Byrnes (sredina, SAD) i Vjačeslav Molotov (desno, SSSR). Na ovoj konferenciji saveznički vođe rješavali su problem budućnosti Njemačke i Istočne Europe.
Potsdamskoj konferenciji, koja je počela u srpnju, prisustvovali su britanski premijer Clement Attlee, američki predsjednik Harry S. Truman i generalni sekretar KPSS-a Josif Staljin. Na ovoj su konferenciji saveznički vođe rješavali ozbiljan problem budućnosti Njemačke i Istočne Europe.Peter Byrd, "Cold War" The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Ure. Iain McLean i Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 2003. Osim rješavanja tog problema, predsjednik Truman obavijestio je Staljina da SAD posjeduje novo moćno oružje. Staljin je na to odgovorio: "Drago mi je čuti za bombu i nadam se da će biti upotrijebljena."Zašto je Truman bacio bombu? « Misli o vojnoj povijesti Samo tjedan dana nakon konferencije SAD je bacio atomske bombe na japanske gradove Hirošimu i Nagasaki. Atomsko bombardiranje Hirošime i Nagasakija dovelo je do jedne od najvećih katastrofa u ljudskoj povijesti i do povećanja tenzija između SAD-a i SSSR-a. Nedugo nakon napada Staljin je protestirao američkim službenicima kada je Truman Sovjetima ponudio malo utjecaja u okupiranom Japanu.LaFeber 2002., str. 28

U veljači 1946. Dugi telegram Georgea F. Kennana iz Moskve doveo je do veće odbojnosti Amerikanaca prema Sovjetima. U tom telegramu Kennan je Sovjetski Savez i komunizam proglasio neprijateljima i objavio da SSSR želi uništiti kapitalizam, te da sovjetska vlada skriva neke važne podatke o državi. Takva slika o SSSR-u kao osovini zla koja želi uništiti SAD nije dobro prihvaćena u Zapadnom bloku, što je dovelo do još većih napetosti između SAD-a i SSSR-a. Dana 6. rujna 1946. James F. Byrnes održao je govor u Njemačkoj u kojem je odbacio Morgenthauov plan i upozorio SSSR da će SAD ostati vojno nazočne u Europi na neodređen vremenski period. Sam Byrnes poslije je priznao: "Odbijanje našeg vlastitog programa bilo je radi pridobivanja Nijemaca [...] bila je to bitka između nas i Rusa oko mozgova [...]" Curtis F. Morgan, Southern Partnership: James F. Byrnes, Lucius D. Clay i Njemačka, 1945. - 1947.  Nekoliko tjedana nakon objavljivanja Dugog brzojava, Winston Churchill održao je svoj poznati govor u Fultonu, u Missouriju, naslovljen "Željezna zavjesa". U tom govoru Churchill poziva Angloamerikance na savez protiv Sovjeta, za koje je rekao da su spustili željeznu zavjesu "od Szczecina na Baltiku do Trsta na Jadranu."David F. Schmitz, "Cold War (1945–91): Causes" The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ure., Oxford University Press 1999.

Blokovi

Blokovska je podjela učvršćena stvaranjem vojno-političkih saveza. Na jednoj je strani bio blok kojeg su predvodile SAD (kapitalistički sustav), a drugi je blok predvodio SSSR (socijalistički sustav). Mnogo država nije se željelo pridružiti nijednome bloku. Stoga su one, predvođene Egiptom, Indijom i Jugoslavijom, 1961. godine utemeljile Pokret nesvrstanih.

NATO

Sjevernoatlantski savez (NATO) osnovali su 1949. godine ministri vanjskih poslova SAD-a, Velike Britanije, Francuske, Nizozemske, Belgije, Luksemburga, Norveške, Islanda, Kanade, Italije, Portugala i Danske. Njegovo sjedište bilo je u Bruxellesu a osnovna zadaća bila je spriječiti Sovjetski Savez prodrijeti u zapadnu Europu. Države na zapadu i članice NATO pakta bile su kapitalističke i vjerovale u privatnu svojinu nad posjedima i poslovima.
300px|mini|Odnos članica NATO pakta (plava boja) i Varšavskog pakta (crveno)

Varšavski pakt

Iste je godine Sovjetski Savez objavio da posjeduje atomsku bombu, a u Kini su na vlast došli komunisti. Nakon Staljinove smrti 1953. malo je popustila napetost u međunarodnim odnosima, ali su ipak 1955. godine SSSR i zemlje istočne Europe stvorili Varšavski pakt. SSSR i njegovi saveznici htjeli su stvoriti besklasno društvo u kojem se sve dijelilo podjednako. Njegove članice bile su SSSR, Bugarska, Čehoslovačka, Istočna Njemačka, Mađarska, Poljska i Rumunjska, a do 1968. i Albanija. Imao je svoje organe i jedinstven glavni stožer te svoje sjedište u Moskvi.

Od Marshallova plana do Korejskoga rata (1947. – 1953.)

Trumanovi su savjetnici do 1947. vjerovali da je krajnje vrijeme oduprijeti se utjecaju Sovjetskog Saveza. U Europi je financijska pomoć opadala, a spremnici hrane i neophodnih potrepština bili su česti. Trumanovi su se savjetnici bojali da bi SSSR mogao umanjiti moć SAD-a u poslijeratnom periodu zbunjenosti i kolapsa.

Događaj koji je natjerao Trumana i formalno usvojiti politiku blokiranja jest objava britanske vlade u veljači 1947. da više ne može financirati grčke monarhiste u njihovu sukobu protiv komunističke vojske u građanskom ratu. Cilj politike blokiranja bilo je zaustavljanje domino-efekta približavanja zemalja komunističkom SSSR-u, a udaljavanja od američko-europskog kapitalizma. Politika je formalno usvojena jer Amerikanci Grčki građanski rat nisu shvatili kao građanski sukob nego kao pokušaj SSSR-a proširiti svoj utjecaj. No to gledište najvjerojatnije je pogrešno jer komunističkim pobunjenicima nije pomagala službena Moskva nego SFRJ. Sam rat bio je prvi primjer protukomunističke pobune.

mini|lijevo|250px|Predsjednik Truman iznosi svoju doktrinu o ograničavanju utjecaja komunizma

Pobjeda antikomunističkih snaga dovela je do grčkog članstva u NATO i do definiranja ideološke ravnoteže snaga oko Egejskog mora tijekom čitavoga hladnog rata. Državni tajnik Dean Acheson optužio je SSSR za urotu protiv grčkih rojalista radi proširivanja svog utjecaja na Srednji istok, Aziju i Afriku. Trumanova je administracija u ožujku 1947. izdala tzv. "Trumanovu doktrinu" o zaustavljanju širenja komunizma davajući Turskoj i Grčkoj ekonomsku pomoć. Truman u doktrini kaže:

Truman je svojom doktrinom potaknuo Amerikance dati 400 000 000 dolara pomoći Grčkoj. Radi "mobiliziranja" republikanskog kongresa, demokratski je predsjednik rat prikazao kao sukob između "slobodnih" ljudi i "totalitarnih" režima time dramatično podižući retoričke uloge rata. Pomažući Grcima, Truman je postavio pravilo prema kojem bi SAD pomagao režimima koji bi tražili pomoć u borbi protiv komunizma, neovisno o tome koliko su korumpirani i represivni. Ovo je očit primjer koliko su daleko Amerikanci bili spremni ići radi zaustavljanja širenja komunizma.Gaddis 1990, str. 186

Bez financijske pomoći koja je stizala iz SAD-a zapadnoeuropske države nisu se same mogle oporaviti od velikih gubitaka nakon rata. No komunističke partije sve su više pobjeđivale na slobodnim izborima u zemljama kao što su Italija i Francuska. Američka se vlast bojala da bi ekonomska kriza u Zapadnoj Europi mogla doći do te razine da komunističke partije i tu preuzmu vlast, preko izbora ili narodnih revolucija. Neki su se političari bojali da bi i njihova država mogla doživjeti krizu ako se ne poveća potražnja za izvozom u Zapadnu Europu.
mini|200px|Poster za Marshallov plan (hrv. "Kakvo god bilo vrijeme, moramo krenuti zajedno."(u engleskoj inačici postoji rima)).
Godine 1948. Komunistička partija Čehoslovačke, uz potporu SSSR-a, preuzela je vlast izvršivši državni udar i tako uspostavivši komunističku vladavinu koja je trajala više od četrdeset godina. Zapadne sile bile su šokirane ovim događajem, što je uzrokovalo užurbano usvajanje Marshallova plana.

Za američku vlast prijetnje balansu moći u Europi nisu uvijek bile vojne, nego i ekonomske i političke. George Kennan sažeo je problem na sastanku State Departmenta u svibnju 1947.: "Komunističke aktivnosti" nisu bile "korijeni problema u Zapadnoj Europi" nego "razorni efekti rata na ekonomsku, političku i socijalnu strukturu Europe."George F. Kennan, Memorirs: 1925-1950 An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1967. str. 335-336. Prema njemu, "komunisti su iskorištavali krizu" kako bi osvojili moć. Na savjet State Departmenta Trumanova je doktrina dopunjena Marshallovim planom, službenim planom SAD-a o obnovi poslijeratne Europe i suzbijanju utjecaja komunizma nakon Drugog svjetskog rata. Zadatak o izradi plana dobio je George Marshall.

Iako je plan već donesen, generali Clay i Marshall su zajedno s Trumanovom administracijom shvatili da provedba plana neće biti uspješna bez obnavljanja njemačke industrijske baze o kojoj su prije ovisili.Ray Salvatore Jennings "The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq"  svibanj 2003.,  Peaceworks No. 49 str.15

Jedan od prvih neprijateljskih koraka između velikih sila na samom početku hladnog rata bila je Iranska kriza iz 1946. godine.  Neposredno nakon svršetka Drugog svjetskog rata, uspokos odredbama iransko-britansko-sovjetskog ugovora o savezu prema kojima su strane trupe bile primorane napustiti Iran, Staljin je odlučio da sovjetska vojska ostane na sjeverozapadu iranskog teritorija pod izlikom kako je to područje vitalno za sovjetsku sigurnost. Razlogom Staljinove teritorijalne penetracije prema tom području smatraju se bogata nalazišta nafte u Iranskom Azarbajdžanu koja su ranije iste godine istraživali upravo Sovjeti. Kako bi osnažio sovjetski utjecaj, pokušana je uspostava dvaju marionetskih režima, kurdske Republike Mahabad i azerske Narodne Republike Azerbajdžan. Nakon oružanog sukoba u kojem je iranska vojska suzbila separatiste i političke intervencije Sjedinjenih Država u Ujedinjenim narodima (rezolucije br. 3. i 5.), Josif Staljin odustao je od daljnjih teritorijalnih pretenzija i povukao ostatke sovjetske vojske iz Irana.

U srpnju je Truman opozvao Morgenthauov plan JCS 1067 koji je naređivao američkim snagama u okupiranoj Njemačkoj "da ne poduzimaju nijedan korak prema ekonomskoj rehabilitaciji Njemačke." Zamijenio ga je JCS 1779 koji je govorio da "uredna, uspješna Europa treba ekonomske doprinose stabilne i produktivne Njemačke."Pas de Pagaille!   28. srpnja 1947.

Truman je u srpnju i reorganizirao vladu kako bi se borio u hladnom ratu. Akt o državnoj sigurnosti iz 1947., koji je Truman potpisao 26. srpnja, stvorio je ujedinjeno Ministarstvo obrane, CIA-u (Central Intelligence Agency) i Nacionalno sigurnosno vijeće. Ove će organizacije postati glavne birokracije SAD-a tijekom hladnog rata.Zachary Karabell, "Cold War (1945–91): External Course" The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., Oxford University Press 1999.

Dvojne politike Trumanove doktrine i Marshallova plana dovele su do toga da Zapadna Europa, Grčka i Turska od SAD-a prime milijarde dolara pomoći. Uz pomoć SAD-a Grčka je 1949. pobijedila komunističke sile u ratu, a u Italiji su na izborima 1948. demokršćani porazili snažnu komunističko-socijalističku koaliciju.

SAD je konsolidirao svoju novu ulogu kao gospodar Zapada. Kao osveta zapadnjačkim težnjama za ujedinjenjem Zapadne Njemačke, SSSR je u Zapadnom Berlinu postavio blokade kako bi spriječio ulazak zapadnih sila u grad. Berlinska blokada predstavlja prvu veliku krizu hladnoga rata. No Truman je uspio zrakom (Berlinski let) osigurati opskrbu savezničkih vojnika koji su ostali zarobljeni u Berlinu tako što je redovito slao letove preko grada koji su bacali zalihe hrane vojnicima.
Godine 1948. Josip Broz Tito, vođa SFRJ-a i Josif Staljin, vođa SSSR-a, došli su u sukob jer Tito Jugoslaviju nije želio podložiti Sovjetskom Savezu i sovjetskom načinu života. Zbog odbijanja Staljina SFRJ je 1948. isključen iz Kominforma, što je uzrokovalo njegovo nepovjerenje prema SSSR-u (koje je obnovljeno za Hruščovljeva mandata). Josip Broz Tito tako je postao prvi čovjek koji se javno usprotivio Staljinu i preživio. Prema nekim izvorima Staljin je pripremao atentat na Tita, no to je zaustavljeno zbog Staljinove smrti. Većina povjesničara tvrdi da je glavni razlog raskida odnosa Titovo odbijanje potpune podložnosti SSSR-u i želja za zadržavanjem suvereniteta Jugoslavije i boljeg života za sve u njoj.
200px|mini|Njemačka 1949.: Zapadna Njemačka - plavo, DDR - crveno, Berlin - zeleno.
SAD se sa Zapadnom Europom formalno spojio 1949. potpisivanjem Sjevernoatlantskog sporazuma i osnivanjem Sjevernoatlantskog saveza, NATO-a. Staljin je kontrirao tomu tako što je ujedinio ekonomije istočnoeuropskih zemalja sovjetskom verzijom Marshallova plana znanom kao COMECON te tako što je testirao prvu sovjetsku atomsku bombu 1949. godine.

SAD je preuzeo vodstvo u stvaranju Zapadne Njemačke iz tri savezničke okupacijske zone 1949. godine. Kako bi kontrirao Sjedinjenim Državama (koje su savezničke zone ujedinile u državu), SSSR je na području svoje okupacijske zone 1949. stvorio državu znanu kao Istočna Njemačka. SAD se tijekom 1950-ih zalagao za ponovno naoružavanje Zapadne Njemačke, a 1955. Zapadna Njemačka postala je punopravna članica NATO pakta.
mini|200px|lijevo|Kineski komunistički vođa Mao Ce-tung drži govor 1939. tijekom građanskoga rata.
Godine 1949. komunisti Maoa Ce-tunga porazili su Čang Kaj-šekov Kuomintang koji je imao potporu SAD-a u građanskom ratu. Građanski rat završio je kada su nacionalisti 1949. godine pobjegli na Tajvan, a komunisti su pod vodstvom Mao Ce-tunga proglasili narodnu republiku. Ubrzo nakon toga SSSR je sklopio savez s novonastalom Narodnom Republikom Kinom. Suočena s kineskom revolucijom i krajem američkoga nuklearnog monopola, Trumanova je administracija 1949. započela širenje politike blokiranja. U tajnom dokumentu iz 1950-ih, znanom kao NSC-68, Trumanova administracija predložila je jačanje prozapadnog saveza i četverostruko povećanje trošenja za obranu.

Američki su službenici politiku blokiranja proširili na Afriku, Aziju i Latinsku Ameriku. U isto vrijeme, revolucionarno-nacionalistički pokreti, koje su često vodili komunisti, borili su se protiv obnavljanja europskih kolonijalnih carstava u Jugozapadnoj Aziji. SAD je savez s Japanom formalizirao tijekom 1950-ih što im je osiguralo velik broj dugoročnih vojnih baza. Truman je sklopio saveze i s drugim državama, kao što su Australija, Novi Zeland, Filipini i Tajland.

U lipnju 1950. godine Sjeverna Koreja pokreće iznenadni rat protiv Južne Koreje. Nakon jednoga graničnog sukoba, sjevernokorejske snage potpomognute kineskim dobrovoljcima i uz podršku SSSR-a prelaze 38. paralelu. Na Staljinovo iznenađenje, Truman je naredio američkim trupama da natjeraju Sjevernu Koreju povući se i pomognu Južnoj Koreji. Sjedinjene Države traže povlačenje agresora s područja Južne Koreje. No taj zahtjev Sjeverna Koreja ignorira pa oružane snage SAD-a uime UN-a dolaze pomoći Južnoj Koreji. Naizmjenične ofenzive jednih i drugih snaga do 1952. godine nisu dale prevagu ni jednoj zaraćenoj strani. Sukob je završio 1953. godine potpisivanjem primirja u Panmunjonu. Granica između dvije države ostala je na 38. paraleli (usporednici).

Javno mišljenje u državama kao što je Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo i druge saveznice SAD-a bilo je podijeljeno: neki su željeli rat, a neki nisu. Britanski državni odvjetnik Sir Hartley Shawcross 1951. godine odbacio je mišljenje onih protiv rata, rekavši:

Korejski rat završio je 1953. bezizlaznim položajem, no Sjedinjene Države polako su se uplele u novi građanski rat. SAD je podupirao južnovijetnamsku vladu u borbi protiv Sjevernog Vijetnama, koji je imao potporu SSSR-a i Kine. Ta se potpora poslije razvila u Vijetnamski rat.

Kriza i izbijanje (1953. – 1962.)

Godine 1953. promjena u političkom vodstvu na obje strane promijenila je dinamiku hladnoga rata.Zachary Karabell, "Cold War (1945–91): External Course" The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., Oxford University Press 1999. U SAD-u, u siječnju 1953., za predsjednika je prisegnuo Dwight D. Eisenhower. Tijekom posljednjih osamnaest mjeseci Trumanove administracije američki budžet za obranu povećao se četiri puta. Eisenhower se odlučio na smanjivanje troškova za vojsku tako što je prijetio američkom nuklearnom superiornošću nastavljajući efektivno voditi SAD kroz hladni rat. Dana 5. ožujka 1953. Josif Staljin umro je od posljedica srčanog udara, a naslijedio ga je Georgij Malenkov. Staljinistički nastrojen Malenkov na vlasti je izdržao samo šest mjeseci, kada ga je naslijedio Nikita Sergejevič Hruščov. Dolaskom Hruščova na vlast u SSSR-u je počeo proces destaljinizacije i javnog osuđivanja Staljinove vladavine.
mini|200px|Operacije tijekom Sueske krize.
Eisenhowerov državni tajnik John Foster Dulles predložio je "Novi pogled" na politiku blokiranja prema kojem je tražio da se Amerika puno više oslanja na svoje nuklearno oružje. Dulles je objavio i doktrinu "masovne osvete" prijeteći Sovjetima da će SAD snažno reagirati na bilo kakav oblik agresije koji bi mogao doći s njihove strane. Zbog nuklearne superiornosti Eisenhower je zaustavljao sve sovjetske prijetnje o intervenciji tijekom Sueske krize 1956. godine. Predmet krize bila je kontrola nad strateški važnim  Sueskim kanalom koji je Egipat nacionalizirao. Unatoč vojnim uspjesima, rezultat je bio blamaža i slabljenje europskih sila (Britanija, Francuska u savezu s Izraelom), jačanje egipatskog položaja na Bliskom istoku i porast utjecaja SSSR-a u tom području.
okvir|lijevo|Prizori iz Mađarske revolucije.
Iako je nakon Staljinove smrti došlo do blagog smirivanja tenzija, hladni rat u Europi i dalje je bio obilježen uznemirenim oružanim primirjem.Jan Palmowski, "Cold War" A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. Oxford University Press, 2003. Američke su trupe stalno bile stacionirane po Zapadnoj Europi, a sovjetske po Istočnoj. Kako bi kontrirali ponovnom naoružanju Zapadne Njemačke, SSSR je 1955. sklopio formalni savez s komunističkim zemljama Istočne Europe, znan kao Varšavski pakt. Jedina prijetnja cjelovitosti Varšavskog pakta bila je 1956. u Mađarskoj. Mađarska revolucija 1956. godine bio je spontani revolt protiv komunističke vlade Mađarske i njenih nametnutih sovjetskih patrona, koji je poveo premijer i reformist Imre Nagy uz potporu mnogih stanovnika. Trajala je od 23. listopada do 10. studenog. Ovo je bio prvi primjer protusovjetske revolucije u nekoj komunističkoj zemlji, a završio je sovjetskom invazijom jer SSSR nije dopuštao Mađarima svrgnuti komunizam.

U SAD-u se senator Joseph McCarthy iz Wisconsina izdigao kao vrlo utjecaj političar tijekom hladnog rata. Iako ni Truman ni Eisenhower (koji je za razliku od Trumana, koji je bio u sukobu s McCarthyjem, podupirao McCarthyjeve ciljeve) nisu podupirali njegove metode, McCarthy je nastavio širiti antikomunističke parole i teoriju o velikoj zavjeri komunista za preuzimanje američke vlade. Period u vrijeme McCarthyjeva mandata doveo je do masivnog "lova na vještice", a znan je kao makartizam.
Godine 1957. objavljeno je da je SSSR lansirao u orbitu prvi svemirski satelit "Sputnik" i počela je svemirska utrka između SAD-a i SSSR-a, kao i trka u naoružanju koja je zaprijetila uništenjem čovječanstva. Došlo je do velikog i neočekivanog tehnološkog napretka te do američke gradnje raketa koje su mogle nositi nuklearne bojne glave. Nakon Sputnika SSSR je 1957. poslao prvo živo biće, psa Lajku, u svemir, a 1961. godine poslao je i prvog čovjeka u orbitu - Jurija Aleksejeviča Gagarina. Ovakav napredak Sovjetskog Saveza potaknuo je Amerikance 1969. godine poslati ljude na Mjesec.

Tijekom 1950-ih takozvani Treći svijet bio je značajno borilište za dvije glavne hladnoratovske sile. Nakon Drugog svjetskog rata SAD je izašao kao dominantnija sila u Trećem svijetu od SSSR-a i tako je popunio prostor stare carske hegemonije svojih formalnih saveznika - Velike Britanije, Francuske i Nizozemske.Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. Vintage Books, 1991. No, vođe nacionalističkih pokreta u postkolonijalnim zemljama često su bile nesklone Zapadnom bloku.Hobsbawm 1991., str. 227 Za europske je sile prilagođavanje procesu dekolonizacije bilo jako teško, ekonomski i psihološki, a patio je i sam NATO jer je prije dekolonizacije imao sve veće sile na svijetu na svojoj strani.William A. Link i Arthur S. Link, American Epoch: A History of the United States since 1990 Volume II Affluence and Anxiety, 1940-1992. Sedmo izdanje. McGraw Hill, 1993.

Nacionalistički pokreti u nekim zemljama i regijama, kao što su Gvatemala, Iran, Filipini i Indokina, bili su često skloni komunizmu ili ih je Zapad povezivao s komunizmom.Zachary Karabell, "Cold War (1945–91): External Course" The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., Oxford University Press 1999. U tom kontekstu, SSSR i SAD preko svojih zastupnika borili su se za prevlast u zemljama Trećeg svijeta tijekom naglog širenja dekolonizacije 1950-ih i 1960-ih. Sjedinjene Države iskoristile su CIA-u kako bi uklonili antiameričke vlade i dale podršku onim proameričkim. Pomoću CIA-e Sjedinjene Države svrgavale su vlade za koje je službeni Washington mislio da postaju prosovjetske. Najpoznatiji su primjeri Iran i Gvatemala.

Iran je 1951. dobio svoju prvu demokratski izabranu vladu na čelu s Mohammedom Mossadeghom. Kada se Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo pobunilo protiv Mossadegha i njegove politike o nafti i ulju, te njegove politike nacionalizacije, i planiralo ga svrgnuti, Mossadegh je Britaniju proglasio neprijateljem pa su počeli planovi za njegovo svrgavanje. CIA je odobrila milijun dolara za njegovo svrgavanje. Događaj znan kao operacija Ajax uzrokovao je svrgavanje Mossadegha s vlasti 1953. i postavljanje novog, prozapadnog, premijera Fazlollaha Zahedija.

Godine 1951. na predsjedničkim izborima u Gvatemali je pobijedio socijalist Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán. On je u svom predsjedničkom mandatu započeo brojne reforme, među kojima i agrarnu, koja je imala izniman značaj za njegovu zemlju. Kako je Guzmán bio prvi socijalistički vođa u zemlji koja je bila u blizini SAD-a, CIA je organizirala događaj znan kao operacija PBSUCCESS. CIA je uz pomoć multinacionalnih kompanija i domaće oligarhije nasilno svrgnula Guzmána s vlasti. Nakon njegove vladavine državu je vodila vojna junta Carlosom Castillom koja je državu uvela u veliku krizu.

No, mnoge zemlje Afrike, Azije i Latinske Amerike nisu željele pritisak biranja između Istoka i Zapada. Godine 1955., na konferenciji u Bandungu, vođe mnogih zemalja Trećeg svijeta odlučile su da će ostati neutralne tijekom hladnog rata. Konsenzus postignut u Bandungu doveo je do potpisivanja Brijunske izjave 19. srpnja 1956. o stvaranju Pokreta nesvrstanih. Pet glavnih zagovornika i osnivača Pokreta bili su indonezijski predsjednik Sukarno, predsjednik Gane Kwame Nkrumah, predsjednik Egipta Gamal Abdel Naser, indijski premijer Džavaharlal Nehru i vođa Jugoslavije Josip Broz Tito. U rujnu 1961., uz veliku zaslugu Josipa Broza Tita, održala se je prva službena konferencija Pokreta nesvrstanih u Beogradu.

U međuvremenu, Nikita Hruščov je proširio vidike službene Moskve i počeo je uspostavljati veze s mnogim državama Trećeg svijeta.
mini|250px|Izgradnja Berlinskog zida.
Dana 15. lipnja 1961., istočnonjemački vođa Walter Ulbricht održao je govor u kojem je pobio neke teorije o mogućoj izgradnji zida između zapadnog i istočnog dijela Berlina. Nakon što su 12. kolovoza istočnonjemački vođe nazočile jednoj vrtnoj zabavi, sljedećeg dana, 13. kolovoza 1961. započela je izgradnja 156km dugog zida koji će biti znan kao Berlinski zid. Svrha zida je bila onemogućiti prijelaz između Istočne i Zapadne Njemačke.
mini|lijevo|250px|Nikita Sergejevič Hruščov i John Fitzgerald Kennedy na sastanku 1961.
Tijekom 1950-ih SSSR i SAD su započeli nuklearno naoružavanje i izradu dalekometnih nuklearnih projektila kojima bi mogli raketirati teritorije jedni drugih. Fizičar Andrej Saharov je 1953. izradio prvu sovjetsku hidrogensku bombu znanu kao Tzar bomba. No, nakon 1956. stvari nisu išle najboljim putem za Sovjetski Savez, a najbolji primjer toga je Sovjetsko-kineski sukob. Sukob je izbio 1950-ih, a vrhunac je dostigao na kraju 1960-ih tijekom graničnog sukoba 1969. Najznačajniji uzrok sukoba bili su različiti nacionalni interesi dvaju zemalja i razlika u komunističkim ideologijama u zemljama. Sve do 1964., kada je Hruščov bio prisiljen dati ostavku, SSSR i Kina su bili u oštrom sukobu oko toga tko će voditi komunističke zemlje.

Utrka u nuklearnom naoružanju dovela je dvije sile do ruba nuklearnog rata. Hruščov je sklopio savez s Fidelom Casrtom nakon kubanske revolucije 1959. u kojoj je Casrto došao na vlast. Kada je Kuba počela instalirati nuklearne projektile američki predsjednik John Fitzgerald Kennedy je 1962. uzvratio pomorskom blokadom. Taj događaj označio je početak najveće hladnoratovske krize - kubanske raketne krize.

Kada je Fidel Castro došao na vlast na Kubi i uveo komunizam, SAD nisu mogle prihvatiti komunističku zemlju i samu ideologiju u svojoj blizini, te su, u skladu s tim, tiho odobrile svrgavanje Castra i njegovog režima.Department of State Izvještaj sa susreta s Castrom - 4. rujna 1959. Bay of Pigs Global Security.org Castro marks Bay of Pigs victory BBC News Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders Originalni dokument Profile in Courage New York Times. 8. lipnja 2003.  Sovjetski vođa Nikita Hruščov poslao je veliku vojnu pomoć Kubi i prema njoj je poslao nuklearne rakete koje su tajno instalirane. U listopadu 1962. američki špijunski avion otkrio je jedan balistički projektil na lansirnom mjestu na Kubi. Kennedy je odmah zahtijevao da se rakete uklone i naredio pomorsku blokadu Kube. U vrijeme Kubanske raketne krize američka prednost u strateškom oružju bila je 17:1 i vojske SSSR-a i SAD-a bile su u stanju pripravnosti, pa je tako svijet tijekom dva dana 1962. godine živio na rubu nuklearnog rata. Potom je Hruščov povukao projektile s Kube, a zauzvrat dobio obećanje od SAD-a da će povući svoje projektile iz Turske i da nikada neće napasti Kubu.

Ovakvo rješenje kubanske krize uzrokovalo je mijenjanje obojice vođa. John F. Kennedy ubijen je 22. studenog 1963. u Dallasu kao dio zavjere jer su neki dužnosnici mislili da je preblag prema komunizmu i smetalo im je što nije želio rat. Hruščov je smijenjen kao dio urote. Među urotnicima su bili Aleksandr Šeljepin, Vladimir Semiščasni i njegov nasljednik Leonid Brežnjev koji su, dok je Hruščov bio na odmoru, održali sastanak u Centralnom komitetu i, kada se Hruščov vratio, izglasali da su za to da on da ostavku. Razlozi za urotu bili su, prema njima, loše vođenje kubanske krize i odnosa s Kinom, te loša organizacija sovjetske ekonomije. Odlaskom Hruščova i Kennedyja hladni rat je polako ušao u novi etapu koja je znana kao detant.

Od konfrontacije do detanta (1962. – 1979.)

Tijekom 1960-ih i 1970-ih i SAD i SSSR su se trudili prilagoditi novoj politici prema kojoj svijet više ne bi bio podijeljen na dva bloka."Cold War." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2006. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Odmah nakon Drugog svjetskog rata, Japan i Zapadna Europa počeli su se brzo oporavljati od destrukcije Drugog svjetskog rata i počeli dostizati SAD. Zemlje Trećeg svijeta mogle su se također razvijati zbog dominacija organizacija kao što su OPEC i Pokret nesvrstanih koje su umanjivale utjecaj SAD-a i SSSR-a. Tijekom tog perioda, službena Moskva se morala brinuti o domaćim problemima, a sovjetski vođe kao Aleksej Kosigin i Leonid Brežnjev su počeli prihvaćati politiku detanta.

No, unatoč svemu ovom i SAD i SSSR su se borili protiv izazova njihovim vođama i željeli su ojačati svoje globalno vodstvo. Godine 1965., američki predsjednik Lyndon Johnson je odobrio slanje 22,000 američkih vojnika na Dominikansku Republiku. Uzrok za taj događaj, znan kao Operacija Power Pack, je prema Johnsonu bio strah od komunističke revolucije slične onoj na Kubi. Operacija je završila u rujnu 1966. pobjedom SAD-a.

Situacija na Istoku bila je drugačija. Amerika se borila protiv jačanja komunizma, a Sovjeti su se morali suočiti s pokušajima svrgavanja komunizma. Prvi takav pokušaj bio je 1968. godine u Čehoslovačkoj. Događaj znan kao Praško proljeće bilo je razdoblje političke liberalizacije u Čehoslovačkoj koje je počelo 5. siječnja 1968., a trajao do 20. kolovoza iste godine kada je Sovjetski Savez sa svojim saveznicima iz Varšavskog pakta (izuzev Rumunjske) okupirao zemlju. Od sredine šezdesetih Česi i Slovaci su počeli pokazivati sve veću odbojnost prema postojećem režimu. Ove promjene su se odražavale u raspoloženju reformističkih elemenata unutar same Komunističke partije koji su uspjeli izabrati Aleksandra Dubčeka za lidera stranke. Dubčekove reforme političkih procesa, koje je on nazivao "socijalizmom s ljudskim licem" nisu predstavljale potpuno odbacivanje starog režima, kao što je bio slučaj u Mađarskoj 1956. Dubčekove promjene imale su široku podršku društva, uključujući i radničku klasu. Međutim, sovjetske vođe predvođene Brežnjevom su ove reforme promatrali kao prijetnju njihovoj hegemoniji nad zemljama Istočnog bloka kao i na ugrožavanje sigurnosti samog Sovjetskog Saveza što je i bio glavni uzrok okupacije i zadržavanja starog komunističkog režima u Čehoslovačkoj koji je trajao do 1990-ih.

Same SAD su nastavile podupirati proameričke trećesvjetovne režime u Aziji. No, sukobi su se u prokomunističkim zemljama, najviše u Vijetnamu, nastavili. Iako je Vijetnamski rat izbio 1959., SAD su nastavile podupirati Južni Vijetnam u sukobu protiv Ho Ši Minovog Sjevernog Vijetnama sve do 1975. kada su komunisti osvojili Sajgon i službeno pobijedili i uspostavili Socijalističku Republiku Vijetnam. Ovaj sukob je jako oslabio američku ekonomiju i mnogi su ga gledali kako je jednu veliku svjetsku silu sramotno porazila mala države. U međuvremenu, Brežnjev se morao suočiti s obnavljanjem sovjetske ekonomije, koja je pala zbog velikih vojnih troškova.

Još jedan sukob komunizma i kapitalizma u Aziji bio je Kambodžanski građanski rat. Rat je započeo 1967. zbog krize tijekom vladavine Norodoma Sihanouka. Tada je započelo okupljanje komunističke vojske znane kao Crveni kmeri, a koju je vodio Pol Pot. Oružani sukobi kulminirali su 1970. kada je počeo snažan udar Crvenih kmera na republikansku vladavinu Lon Nola i njegove Kmerske Republike (koja je uspostavljena nakon puča 1970.). Nakon 5 godina oružanih sukoba, Pol Potovi Crveni kmeri su u travnju 1975. zauzeli Phnom Penh i time uspostavili Demokratsku Kampućeju. Zbog loše vladavine i diktature Pol Pota i Demokratska Kampućeja je ukinuta 1979. tijekom Kambodžansko-vijetnamskog rata kada je uspostavljenja Narodna Republika Kampućeja (koja je bila pod Vijetnamskom okupacijom) i tek je 1993. država dobila svoj današnji naziv - Kambodža.
mini|250px|Američki državni tajnik Henry Kissinger i kineski vođa Mao Ce Tung 1972. U pozadini je kineski premijer Žu Enlai.
Kineski ministar obrane maršal Lin Piao pokrenuo je veliku akciju pod parolom «čitava zemlja mora učiti od vojske», što je posebno ojačalo one snage KP Kine i u vojsci koje su se protivile daljnjoj suradnji sa SSSR-om. Godine 1964. NR Kina je, pod utjecajem ove akcije, uspješno izvršila svoj prvi nuklearni pokus. Iste te godine, kineski vođa Mao Ce Tung započinje događaj znan kao Kineska kulturna revolucija. Tijekom revolucije je smijenjeno više od 30 milijuna ljudi na vodećim položajima, a jedan je milijun poginuo u velikoj hajci tzv. revolucionara. Inspirirani i podupirani od visokih vojnih krugova i supruge Mao Ce Tunga, protagonisti kulturne revolucije su sasvim izolirali zemlju i udaljili ju od sovjetskih zbivanja, a sve to da bi održali autohtonost kineske revolucije i kineskih stajališta o borbi za socijalizam. Iako je ovaj pokret možda i zamišljen kao nešto dobro, većina povjesničara (u i izvan Kine) smatra kulturno revoluciju katastrofom koja se u budućnosti treba izbjegavati. Iako je Mao objavio da je revolucija završila 1969., većina povjesničara smatra da je završila tek 1976., nakon Maove smrti.

Nakon sukoba i raskida odnosa između Kine i SSSR-a, 1969. godine izbio je sukob između te dvije zemlje znan kao Kinesko-sovjetski granični sukob. Ovaj događaj se smatra vrhuncem Sovjetsko-kineskog raskola koji je započeo tijekom 1950-ih. Vrhunac samog sukoba bio je oružani sukob kod otoka Ženbao koji je pripadao SSSR-u pod nazivom Damsnskij, no nakon raspada SSSR-a pripojen je Kini. Ovim događajem službeno je završen Sovjetsko-kineski sukob.

Iako su se indirektni sukobi između supersila hladnog rata i dalje trajali, tijekom 1960-ih i 1970-ih došlo je do zahlađenja odnosa i započela je sve veća i češća primjena detanta. Sam detant označavao je smirivanje tenzija i zahlađivanje neprijateljskih odnosa između dvaju supersila, te pregovore koji su trebali dovesti do kraja hladnog rata. Osim SSSR-a, i Kinezi su započeli s primjenjivanjem detanta u njihovim odnosima sa SAD-om. Godine 1972., američki predsjednik Richard Nixon posjetio je Narodnu Republiku Kinu i sastao se s vođom Maom Ce Tungom i premijerom Žu Enlaiom. Nakon sastanka Nixon i Henry Kissinger su objavili da je došlo do značajnih poboljšanja odnosa između SAD-a i Kine. Po završetku posjeta, SAD i NR Kina su izdali Šangajski Communiqué, dokument koji je iznio poglede dvaju zemalja o vanjskoj politici i postao baza za kinesko-američke odnose. U priopćenju obje nacije su obećale da će težiti ka potpunoj normalizaciji odnosa dvaju zemalja. Nixon i američka vlada potvrdili su želju da se tajvansko pitanje riješi na miran način, što je poduprijela i sama Kina. Ta izjava je SAD-u i Kini omogućila da privremeno stave sa strane "ključno pitanje koje ometa normalizaciju odnosa"http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18006.htm oko političkog statusa Tajvana. No, SAD je nastavio diplomatske odnose s Tajvanom sve do 1979. kada je raskinuo te odnose i uspostavio potpune diplomatske odnose s NR Kinom.
mini|250px|lijevo|Američki predsjednik Gerald Ford i sovjetski vođa Leonid Brežnjev potpisuju SALT I u Vladivostoku, 23. studenog 1974.mini|lijevo|250px|Američki predsjednik Jimmy Carter i sovjetski vođa Leonid Brežnjev potpisuju SALT II u Beču, 18. lipnja 1979.
Kasnije, u lipnju iste godine, Nixon i Kissinger su otišli u Moskvu i objavili početak pregovora o ograničenju strateškog naoružanja koji su trebali ograničiti proizvodnju skupih antibalističkih projektila i nuklearnih raketa. Ovi pregovori znani su pod kraticom SALT. Kao potvrdu o dobrom tijeku pregovora, SAD i SSSR su potpisali dva dokumenta znana kao SALT I i SALT II. SALT I su 23. studenog 1974. u Vladivostoku potpisali novi američki predsjednik Gerald Ford i sovjetski čelnik Leonid Brežnjev. SALT I je zamrznuo broj strateških ispaljivača nuklearnih projektila na tadašnji broj, a zahtijevao je povećanje broja ispaljivača podmorskih nuklearnih projektila, ali samo nakon što se rastavi isti broj interkontinentalnih balističkih projektila.

SALT II su 18. lipnja 1979. u Beču potpisali američki predsjednik Jimmy Carter i sovjetski čelnik Leonid Brežnjev. Odredbe SALT II sporazuma bile su da se ograniči proizvodnja strateških nuklearnih projektila.
mini|200px|Njemački kancelar Willy Brandt. Čovjek koji je uveo Ostpolitik i poboljšao odnose između Zapadne i Istočne Njemačke.
U međuvremenu su se svi ovi događaji vremenski podudarali s događanjima u Zapadnoj Njemačkoj. Tadašnji kancelar Willy Brandt uveo je novu politiku Zapadne Njemačke znanu kao Ostpolitik. Ostpolitk je predstavljao uspješan pokušaj kancelara Brandta da normalizira odnose s komunističkim zemljama Istočne Europe, a posebice s Istočnom Njemačkom.

Svi ostali ugovori težili su ka stabilizaciji situacije u Europi, a kulminirali su Helsinškom deklaracijom koji je potpisala KESS 1975. godine.

No, detant 1970-ih je bio kratkovječan. Američki Kongres je toliko ograničio ekonomski pakt između Nixona i Brežnjeva da ga je SSSR 1975. i odbacio. Sukob dvaju supersila nastavio se indirektno i tijekom detanta, ponajviše u zemljama Trećeg svijeta. Najznačajnija krizna žarišta bila su u Aziji (Jomkipurski rat, Iranska revolucija), Africi (Angolski građanski rat, Građanski rat u Mozambiku) i u Latinskoj Americi (Čileanski državni udar 1973., Revolucija u Nikaragvi). Upravo zbog svih ovih događanja umanjena je i vrijednost SALT II pakta koji je potpisan 1979.

Jomkipurski rat je bio sukob između Izraela i arapskih zemalja predvođenih Egiptom i Sirijom vođen 1973. na području Sinaja. Nakon Lipanjskog rata, 1. rujna 1967. u sudanskom gradu Khartoumu održan je arapski samit na kojem je odlučeno da nema ”mira,pregovora, ni priznanja Izraela“. Rat je započeo na najveći židovski blagdan Yom Kippur, a trajao je samo 20 dana, no posljedice se osjećaju i danas. Rat je završio dogovorom o prekidu vatre koji je doveo do Ženevske konferencije. Jedna od glavnih posljedica rata bila je ostavka premijerke Golde Meir i cijelog njezinog kabineta. Nakon intenzivnog napora predsjednika Cartera, on, egipatski predsjednik Anwar el-Sadat i izraelski premijer Menahem Begin tajno su se sastali u američkoj bazi Camp David i vodili su pregovore koji su trajali 12 dana. Dana 17. rujna 1978. potpisan je tzv. sporazum iz Camp Davida s kojim je Egipat priznao Izrael kao državu i time postao prva arapska država koja je to učinila. Ovaj sporazum direktno je doveo do potpisivanja Egipatsko-izraelskog mirovnog sporazuma 1979. Osim Cartera, među ključnim ličnostima koji su inicirali mir i normalizaciju odnosa između dvije zemlje bio je i sam egipatski predsjednik Sadat, no on sam nije smio ništa inicirati jer su mnoge zemlje Varšavskog pakta zaprijetile Egiptu ratom ako bi to učinio.
lijevo|mini|250px|Izraelski premijer Menahem Begin (lijevo), američki predsjednik Jimmy Carter (sredina) i egipatski predsjednik Anwar el-Sadat (desno) u Camp Davidu, 7. rujna 1978. godine. Begin i Sadat su 1978. godine dobili Nobelovu nagradu za mir zbog njihovog zalaganja oko sklapanja mira između Egipta i Izraela, a predsjednik Carter ju je dobio 2002. zbog velikog truda oko mirnog rješavanja mnogih međunarodnih kriza tijekom svog predsjedništva.
No, potpisivanje mira i priznavanje Izraela dovelo je do promjene gledanja arapskih zemalja na Egipat. Egipat se prije smatrao najmoćnijom arapskom zemljom, no nakon što je Sadat potpisao mir to se promijenilo, a isto to dovelo je i do suspendiranja Egipta iz Arapske lige u periodu od 1979. do 1989. Potpisivanje mira i priznavanje Izraela dovelo je i do atentata na predsjednika Sadata 6. listopada 1981. godine u kojem je i poginuo. Sadata je naslijedio tadašnji potpredsjednik Hosni Mubarak koji na vlasti ostaje sve do 11. veljače 2011.

Iran je sve do 1979. godine bio monarhija kojom je u tom periodu vladao Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Iranska ili islamska revolucija je događaj u kojem je Iran postao islamska republika. Glavni vođa revolucije, Ruholah Homeini je sve do tada bio u egzilu, no kao vođa revolucije, nakon pobjede revolucionara, Homeini je postao vrhovni vođa Irana. Revolucija je započela u siječnju 1978. s prvim velikim protestima, a završila se usvajanjem novog teokratskog ustava - čime je Homeini postao vrhovni vođa zemlje - prosinac 1979. U međuvremenu, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi je pobegao iz zemlje u siječnju 1979. nakon što su štrajkovi i protesti paralizirali zemlju, i 1. veljače 1979., ajatolah Homeini se vratio u Teheran da pozdravi nekoliko milijuna Iranaca. Konačni kraj dinastije Pahlavi se dogodio ubrzo zatim (11. veljače) kada je iranska vojska proglasila „neutralnost“ nakon što su gerilske i pobunjeničke snage nadjačale snage vjerne šahu. Iran je službeno postao islamska republika 1. travnja 1979. kada su Iranci u velikoj većini poduprli tu odluku na referendumu.

U Africi je bila drugačija situacija. Kako su neke zemlje tek u ovom periodu uspjele izboriti neovisnost i kako su mnoge od njih počele prihvaćati komunizam kao ideologiju koja ih može izvesti iz postkolonijalne krize, SAD je, kao oštar protivnik komunizma koji je želio što manje komunističkih zemalja, potpomagao mnogim zemljama i organizacijama u borbi protiv komunizma u njihovim zemljama. U Angoli, koja je tek 1975. dobila neovisnost, sukob se vodio između komunističkog MPLA, koji je imao potporu Kube, Mozambika i SSSR-a, i antikomunističke UNITA-e, koja je imala potporu SAD-a, Južnoafričke Republikei i Republike Zair koju je vodio diktator Mobutu Sese Seko. Rat je službeno završio tek 2002. i pretpostavlja se da je umrlo preko 500,000 ljudi. Ovaj građanski rat bio je jedan od najdužih, ali i najvažnijih sukoba hladnog rata jer su i SSSR i SAD ovaj sukob smatrali kritičnom za balans snaga u hladnom ratu. Rat je završio pobjedom komunista koji i danas pobjeđuju na izborima u Angoli.

Drugi značajan sukob bio je u još jednoj novonastaloj državi Mozambiku. Mozambik je, kao i Angola, neovisnost stekao 1975. i već je 1977. uvučen u rat. Uzrok je bio isti - dolazak komunista na vlast i pobuna antikomunista protiv komunista. U Mozambiku je komunističke snage predstavljala stranka FRELIMO, a antikomunističke, točnije konzervativce, RENAMO. FRELIMO je vodio tadašnji predsjednik Joaquim Chissano i Samora Machel, a RENAMO André Matsangaissa i Afonso Dhlakama. U rat su još bili umiješani na strani FRELIMA Zimbabve Roberta Mugabea i Tanzanija Juliusa Nyererea. Rat je trajao sve do 1992. godine, a sa sobom je odnio preko 900,000 žrtava. Rat je završio primirjem i izborima u Mozambiku. Jedna od najzaslužnijih strana za sklapanje mira između dvaju sukobljenih vođa je ONUMOZ ili Operacija Ujedinjenih Naroda u Mozambiku koja je svojim djelovanjem uspjela pomiriti dvojicu sukobljenih vođa i donijeti mir u Mozambik.
mini|lijevo|Čileanski predsjednik Salvador Allende, prvi marksist koji je demokratski izabran na mjesto vođe neke države.
Latinska Amerika je u ovom periodu bila žarište revolucija i državnih udara. Čileanski državni udar 1973. donio je još jednu smjenu komunističkog predsjednika, Salvadora Allendea, koji je i prvi marksist koji je demokratski izabran na mjesto vođe neke države. Allende je svojom politikom agrarne reforme, nacionalizacije rudnih bogatstava i pravedne raspodjele bogatstva, opasno ugrozio interese krupne buržoazije i stranih, posebno američkih kompanija. Zbog tog ugrožavanja, SAD su poduprijele i uvježbale generala Augusra Pinocheta koji je 1973. izveo državni udar na ondašnju komunističku vladu predsjednika Allendea. Kad je prvi put pokušao, nije uspio, no samo dva mjeseca poslije drugi put pokušava i uspijeva. General Pinochet je, uz potporu SAD-a, uspio svrgnuti predsjednika Allendea. Sam Allende umro je tijekom državnog udara. Prema službenoj objavi, Allende se ubio, ali danas postoje mnoge teorije koje govore kako su Allendea zapravo ubile Pinochetove postrojbe tijekom puča. Nakon puča, general Pinochet preuzeo je vlast i uveo antikomunističku vojnu huntu koja je trajala sve do 1990. godine kada je izgubio na predsjedničkim izborima.mini|200px|General Augusto Pinochet 1974. godine. Vođa državnog udara 1973. u kojem je smijenio predsjednika Allendea i uspostavio antikomunističku vojnu huntu.
Nikaragvanska revolucija je jedan također vrlo važan politički događaj, ne samo za Nikaragvu i američki kontinent, nego i za cjelokupni ishod hladnog rata. Ova rezolucija predstavlja osnivanje, razvoj i vrhunac nikaragvanskog revolucionarnog procesa koji je oružjem uspio svrgnuti diktatorsku dinastiju Somoza s vlasti, koju je država još od 1930-ih. Tri člana obitelji Somoza bili su predsjednici Nikaragve i to u nekoliko mandata: Anastasio Somoza García (prvi mandat: 1937. – 1947., drugi mandat: 1950. – 1956.), Luis Somoza Debayle (1956. – 1963.) i Anastasio Somoza Debayle (prvi mandat: 1967. – 1972., drugi mandat: 1974. – 1979.). Vodeća organizacija koje je vodila revoluciju bila je komunistička stranka FSLN. Ova revolucija i smjena vlasti predstavljala je jako važan događaj u povijesti Nikaragve, ponajviše u socijalnom smisli. Revoluciju je predvodio Daniel Ortega koji je od 1979. do 1985. vodio huntu, a od 1985. do 1990. je obnašao dužnost predsjednika. Godine 1990. FSLN prvi put gubi na izborima i to od stranke UNO, no FSLN ponovo dolazi na vlast 2007. godine kada Ortega ponovo postaje predsjednik.

"Drugi hladni rat" (1979. – 1985.)

Pojam "Drugi hladni rat" koristili su neki povjesničari da bi opisali ponovno povećanje tenzija između dvaju hladnoratovskih supersila tijekom ranih 1980-ih. Godine 1980. Ronald Reagan je porazio Cartera na izborima i zalagao se za vojne troškove kako bi se mogao suočiti sa SSSR-om. I Reagan i novoizabrana britanska premijerka (jedina u povijesti) Margaret Thatcher su se odrekli sovjetske ideologije i probuduli rivalstvo koje je između tih zemalja postojalo samo tijekom ranih 1940-ih.
mini|lijevo|250px|Karta koja prikazuje gdje je srušen KAL 007.
Kako su tenzije ponovo porasle, NATO je, pod utjecajem Reaganovog kabineta, počeo izgradnju Pershing II raketa u Zapadnoj Europi, posebno u Zapadnoj Njemačkoj. Ova izgradnja bi rakete udaljila samo 6 minuta od središta "zlog carstva", kako je Reagan opisao Moskvu i SSSR. No, podrške za izgradnju je nedostajalo i mnogi nisi bili sigurni u to je li potrebno dalje podizati tenzije. No, 1. rujna 1983. Sovjetski Savez je srušio KAL 007 dok je letio preko Sahalina. Ovaj događaj najvjerojatnije je napravljen kao upozorenje SAD-u da obustavi postavljanje balističkih projektila u Zapadnu Europu. Predsjednik Reagan je ovaj događaj, u kojem je poginulo 269 ljudi, opisao kao masakr. Barbarnost ovog čina, koju su vidjeli SAD i njezini saveznici, uzrokovala je veću potporu za postavljanje projektila koja je stajala čvrsto sve do kasnijih razgovora između Reagana i Gorbačova.

Reagan je potrošio $2,2 bilijuna na obrambene troškove u osam godina. U kombinaciji s ekonomskim problemima iz 1970-ih, SAD su od najbogatije svjetske države došle na rang države s najvećim dugom. Tenzije su još jednom porasle tijekom 1980-ih kada je Reagan u Europu postavio američke projektile koji bi mogli uništiti druge projektile u letu.Ovaj događaj označio je početak Strateške obrambene inicijative koju su mediji nazvali i Zvjezdani ratovi.
mini|120px|Lech Wałęsa - vođa pokreta Solidarnost. Wałęsa je po struci bio električar koji je vodio Solidarnost i antikomunističku revoluciju i 1989. postao prvi poljski demokratski izabrani predsjednik.
Godine 1980. u Poljskoj počinje inicijativa za svrgavanje komunizma. Događaj u kojem je došlo propadanja komunističkog sistema znan je kao Poljska revolucija. Sami prosvjedi započeli su u brodogradilištu u  Gdańsku. Iz svakodnevnih protesta rodio se sindikalni pokret Solidarnost (polj. Solidarnošć), koji je predvodio Lech Wałęsa. Zbog štrajkova i nemira širom zemlje, vojni vrh je izvršio državni udar 1981. godine. Potom je izvršena promjena državnog i društvenog sistema, i to mirnim putem. Prvi slobodni izbori u Poljskoj, ujedno i prvi demokratski u istočnoj Europi, održani su u lipnju 1989. godine. Uvjerljivu pobjedu odnijela je opozicija, a Lech Wałęsa je sljedeće godine izabran za predsjednika Poljske. Ovo je bio prvi uspješan pokušaj svrgavanja komunizma u nekoj, do tada, komunističkoj zemlji. Posljednji vođa komunističke Poljske bio je general Wojciech Jaruzelski koji je najpoznatiji po svom Bračnom zakoni iz 1981. godine.
Što se tiče samog vodstva u Americi i SAD-u tijekom ovog predzadnjeg perioda hladnog rata s jedne strane nije bilo promjena, a s druge ih je bilo dosta. Nakon pobjede nad Carterom, Reagan je osvojio dva mandata i ostao predsjednik sve do 1989. godine tj. do zadnje faze rata, ali u SSSR-u je bilo drugačije. Brežnjev je umro 1982. godine, a naslijedio ga je Jurij Andropov. Andropov se općenito smatra jednim od boljih vođa jer je unatoč visokim tenzijama uspio zadržati mir, a i zbog njegovog komuniciranja s desetogodišnjim Amerikankom Samanthom Smith kojoj je odgovorio na upit o tome hoće li biti nuklearni rat. Andropov je odgovorio da će Sovjetski Savez dati sve što je u njegovoj moći da ga ne bude i pozvao je Samanthu u Moskvu. Upravo se zato Andropov smatra jednim od najpozitivnijih sovjetskih vođa jer je u svojoj kratkoj vladavini (1982. – 1984.) uspio zadržati dosta dobre odnose sa SAD-om u periodu u kojem su tenzije bile jako visoke. Nakon Andropova, došao je Konstantin Černjenko koji je bio bliži Brežnjevu, no Černjenko je vladao samo godinu dana kada je umro i naslijedio ga je Mihail Gorbačov, kojeg je sam Andropov jako podrupirao. Gorbačov je uvelike poboljšao odnose između dviju zemalja, a na vlasti je ostao sve do kraja hladnog rata.

U SAD-u je zabrinutost oko američke intervencije u stranim sukobima postojala još od kraja Vijetnamskog rata.LaFeber 2002, str. 323 No, Reagan se tijekom predsjedništva nije suočio s velikim problemima oko njegovih intervencija u stranim sukobima. No, Reagan se, osim nekoliko afera (Iran-Contra afera), samo jednom, tijekom svog prvog mandata, suočio s ozbiljnim problemom - pokušajem atentata. Dana 30. ožujka 1981. John Hinckley, Jr. pucao je na Reagana, Jamesa Bradyja i još dvojicu ljudi i zamalo pogodio Reaganovo srce, no pogodio je lijevo plućno krilo koje je kasnije utajilo. Reagan je odveden u bolnicu gdje se tijekom operacije šalio s liječnicima. No, na Reaganovu sreću, pokušaj nije bio opasan po Reaganov život i on se oporavio relativno brzo.

Tijekom 1983., Reaganova administracija intervenirala je u nekoliko međunarodnih sukoba. Među te sukobe spadaju Libanonski građanski rat, invazija Grenade, bombardiranje Libije, a podupirala je i srednjoameričke Kontraše - desničarske stranke koje su željele svrgnuti prosovjetsku FSLN s vlasti u Nikaragvi. Iako su Reaganove intervencije u Libiji i Grenadi Amerikanci smatrali dobrima, njegovo podupiranje Kontraša nije dobro prihvaćeno. Jedna od afera koja je izbila u vezi s tim kontrašima je Iran-Contra afera. Afera je izbila 1986. godine kada se otkrilo da SAD tajno prodaje oružje Iranu (koji je tada ratovao s Irakom) i dobiveni novac troši kao potporu kontrašima u Nikaragvi. Otkriće tih tajnih poslova u studenom iste godine je ozbiljno uzdrmalo Reaganovu administraciju. Tome je doprinijela činjenica da je pukovnik Oliver North, zajedno sa svojom sekretaricom Fawn Hall, uništavao dokumente vezane uz slučaj. Reagan je u svrhu istrage imenovao posebnu predsjedničku, tzv. Towerovu komisiju. Njeni nalazi su teretili Poindextera, Northa i tajnika za obranu Caspara Weinbergera, ali ne i Reagana. Međutim, Kongres, kojim je tada dominirala Demokratska stranka govorio je da je Reagan glavni krivac za aferu. North i Poindexter su 16. ožujka 1988. optuženi, a kasnije i osuđeni za ometanje pravde i slična krivična djela. Međutim, njihove presude su oborene na višim sudovima, a novi postupci su ostali nepokrenuti. Nakon svega ovoga Reagan je uspio uvjeriti Amerikance da nije znao što rade njegovi podčinjeni i povratio je popularnost.

Još jedna prihvaćena Reaganova intevrencija bila je Operacija El Dorado Canyon, znana i kao američko bombardiranje Libije 1986. godine. Napad je došao kao odgovor na tadašnje podupiranje terorizma libijskog režima Muammara al-Gaddafija. Bombardiranje je provedeno zrakom, a glavni avion bio je F-111F. Amerikanci su pretežito bombardirali Tripoli, a tijekom bombardiranja je poginulo 37 ljudi (među kojima je i bila Gadaffijeva kći), no Gadaffi je ostao neozlijeđen.
Kako je glavni motiv bila borba protiv terorizma, SAD su se nadale da će ovime bar malo suzbiti terorizam, no čak i tijekom napada, ali i nakon njih, dogodilo se nekoliko terorističkih napada. Gadaffi je prekinuo sve odnose sa SAD-om, no kasnije je došlo do poboljšanja odnosa i priključivanja Libije u mnoge međunarodne organizcaije bez promjene vođe. Američka javnost dobro je prihvatila bombardiranje, no većina ostalih država, čak i američki saveznici su osudili napad, a SSSR je otkazao sastanak svog ministra vanjskih poslova s američkim državnim tajnikom.
mini|250px|Američki saveznici s karipskih otoka tijekom invazije.
Operacija Urgent Fury ili američka invazija Grenade je američka invazija koja se dogodila 1983. godine. Invazija je izvedena kao odgovor na ilegalno smjenjivanje i ubijanje premijera Mauricea Bishopa. Invazija je započela 25. listopada, a trajala je do 15. prosinca. Amerikanci su na otoku pobijedili revolucionare s Grenade koji su imali potporu Kube i svrgnuli su vojnu diktaturu Hudsona Austina. Invazija je dobila različite reakcije, no uglavnom je dobro prihvaćena među američkom i među dijelom populacije s Grenade.

Kao i SAD, i Sovjeti su intervenirali u sukobima u drugim zemljama. Tijekom ovog perioda zbila se posljednja veća sovjetska intervencija. Sovjetsko-afganistanski rat je sukob koji je započeo 1979., a trajao je punih deset godina. Iako je Brežnjev bio uvjeren da će rat biti kratak, muslimanski gerilci su pružili izrazito dug i jak otpor.LaFeber 2002, str. 314 Kremlj je poslao oko 100,000 trupa u Afganistan kako bi pomogli komunističkom režimu, što je dovelo do toga da mnogi ovaj sukob nazivaju Sovjetskom Vijetnamom. No, ovaj sukob je više štetio Sovjetima, nego što je Vijetnam Amerikancima jer je SSSR tada prolazio kroz domaću krizu. Rat je započeo nakon što je novo uspostavljena Demokratska Republika Afganistan provela marksističke promjene koje islamsko stanovništvo nije dobro primilo. Nakon 7 godina ratovanja protiv mudžahedina, komunistička vlada je smijenila predsjednika Karmala i na vlast je došao Mohamed Nadžibulah koji je uveo i novi ustav. Nakon godinu dana vlasti, Nadžibulah je započeo s podupiranjem sovjetske inicijative za povlačenje iz Afganistana. Ono je započelo 20. srpnja 1987., a završilo je 15. veljače 1989. čime je službeno i završen sovjetsko-afganistanski rat. Rat je imao snažne posljedice na politiku SSSR-a koje su naposljetku dovele i do njegovog raspada.

Još jedna značajnija posljedica ovog rata očitovala se i na Olimpijskim igrama. Iako su već na OI 1976. u Montrealu neke afričke zemlje bojkotirale igre zbog toga što je Novi Zeland nastavio igrati ragbi s Južnoafričkom Republikom unatoč njezinoj politici apartheida i zabrani nastupanja na OI, OI 1980. u Moskvi i OI 1984. u Los Angelesu dovele su prvi veliki politički bojkot. Sjedinjene Države bojkotirale su OI 1980. u Moskvi, zajedno s još 61 zemljom, kao znak protesta sovjetskoj intervenciji u Afganistanu. Sljedeće OI održale su se 1984. u Los Angelesu i ovaj put je SSSR, s još 14 zemalja Istočnog bloka, bojkotirao OI kao znak protesta američkoj antikomunističkoj propagandi, te antisovjetskoj paranoji koju je širila zemljama saveznicima. Ovo su jedini primjeri kada su dvije zemlje svoje sukobe rješavale i na polju sporta.

Kraj hladnog rata

Tijekom 1980-ih, vojska SSSR-a bila je najveća na svijetu po mnogim mjerilima. Bila je najveća po kvantiteti, po broju i vrsti oružja koje su posjedovali, te po veličini i broju vojnoindustrijskih baza.William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, Yale University Press, 1998., str. 1. No, ta kvantitativna nadmoć često je prikrivala polja u kojima je Istočni blok daleko zaostajao za Zapadom. To je dovelo do toga da Zapad uvelike precijeni SSSR.LaFeber 2002, 340
200px|mini|Reagan i Gorbačov u SAD-u 1985. Ovaj posjet Gorbačova Sjedinjenim Državama označio je novi pogled na odnose dvaju hladnoratovskih velesila.
Iako tijekom ovog perioda nije bilo velikih vojnih intervencija, vojska je i dalje imala važnu ulogu. Na početku kraja hladnog rata (1985.), američki predsjednik Reagan je osvojio svoj drugi mandat, a preminulog Černjenka je naslijedio Mihail Sergejevič Gorbačov. Ovaj period označio je novi put u vanjskoj politici dvaju zemalja jer je sam Reagan pozvao Gorbačova u SAD, i to neslužbeno, te je time Gorbačov postao prvi sovjetski dužnosnik koji je neslužbeno posjetio SAD.
mini|250px|lijevo|Sovjetska poštanska marka koja promovira glasnost i perestrojku.
No, unatoč poboljšavanju odnosa sa SAD-om, Gorbačov se morao suočiti s ekonomskom krizom u svojoj zemlji. Ta kriza ponajviše je uvjetovana padom cijena nafte. Gorbačov je tada započeo s reformama znanim kao perestrojka i glasnost. Perestrojka je predstavljala reformu koja je trebala podići sovjetsku privredu, koja je već od početka osamdesetih godina počela stagnirati. Plan je bio da se promjeni neefikasno vođena ekonomija i da se uvede decentralizirana, tržišno orijentirana ekonomija. Već 1990. godine, perestrojka je počela slabiti i privredna situacija je ponovo bila kritična. Godina 1988. postaje vrijeme glasnosti kojom se dopušta kritiziranje partije i njenih čelnika putem javnih glasila. Također se, u nastavku ekonomskih reformi, donosi novi zakon kojim se omogućuje osnivanje privatnih kompanija. Kako bi ova drastična promjena prošla među komunističkim čelnicima, u ovaj zakon je umetnuta uredba da privatnici moraju plaćati neuobičajeno visoke poreze. Nedugo nakon prolaska zakona ovi nenormalni porezi bit će smanjeni na normalni nivo tako da se stvori "poduzetnička klima". U lipnju ove godine na partijskom kongresu Gorbačov objavljuje svoje daljnje želje za stvaranjem jakog predsjedničkog sistema i drastičnog smanjivanja utjecaja partije na politički život države. Ove reforme i kriza bili su jedni od glavnih razloga za kasniji raspad Sovjetskog Saveza.
mini|250px|lijevo|Ronald Reagan drži govor u Berlinu 12. srpnja 1987. u kojem je izazvao Mihaila Gorbačova da sruši Berlinski zid. Ovaj događaj bio je jedan od ključnih za sam završetak hladnog rata.
Dana 12. srpnja 1987., Ronald Reagan bio je u Berlinu na proslavi 750. obljetnice grada. Tijekom svog govora na Brandenburškim vratima Reagan je "izazvao" Gorbačova da sruši Berlinski zid:

I uistinu, istočnonjemačke vlasti su dvije godine nakon dopustile ljudima iz DDR-a da prelaze u Zapadni Berlin, a sam Berlinski zid službeno je srušen 1989. godine. Ovaj događaj bio je ključan za reunifikaciju Njemačke, te jedan od najvažnijih događaja u odnosima SAD-a i SSSR-a, a doveo je i do eventualnog kraja hladnog rata.

Godine 1987. u baltičkim zemljama koje su pripadale SSSR-u započinje Raspjevana revolucija. Taj događaj odvijao se od 1987. pa sve do 1991. godine kada tri zemlje, Estonija, Litva i Latvija dobivaju neovisnost. U Estoniji je glavni pokretač bila glazba i festivali na kojima su se masovno počele izvoditi patriotske pjesme. Nakon borbe s mnogim pokušajima državnog udara, Estonski Vrhovni Sovjet (u suradnji s kongresom) 20. kolovoza 1991. proglašava nastanak neovisne Estonije. U Latviji se borba za samostalnošću nije vodila preko glazbe, nego preko mnogih nevladinih organizacija koji su svojim govorima na javnim mjestima tijekom javnih događaja poticali i budili nacionalnu svijest latvijskog naroda. Na novim izborima za Latvijski Vrhovni Sovjet pobijedila je stranka za nezavisnost. Isti taj Sovjet donio je 4. ožujka 1990. deklaraciju nezavisnosti, a Latvija je službeno priznata nakon neuspješnog državnog udara 6. rujna 1991. U Litvi je bitka za neovisnost započela 1988. s osnivanjem stranke Sąjūdis. Nakon snažnog zalaganja stranke. u studenom 1988. parlament usvaja novu zastavu i himnu. Nakon trogodišnje borbe i nekoliko nasilnih sukoba (Krvava nedjelja), Litva je konačno priznata u kolovozu 1991. nakon neuspjelog državnog udara.

Godine 1988., Gorbačovljev kabinet donosi tzv. Sinatrinu doktrinu (nazvanu prema Franku Sinatri) prema kojoj se Sovjetski Savez prestaje uplitati u pitanja unutarnjih poslova svojih saveznika. Ova doktrina otvorila je put ka svrgavanju komunizma u mnogim zemljama Varšavskog pakta i revolucijama 1989., a dovela i do eventualnog pada samog SSSR-a i kraja hladnog rata.

Samo godinu dana nakon donošenja te doktrine, započinje tzv. jesen naroda. Taj događaj obuhvaća revolucije u zemljama Istočnog bloka čiji je rezultat bio svrgavanje komunizma i uspostava demokratske vlade. Revolucije su se zbile u Čehoslovačkoj, Bugarskoj, Poljskoj, DDR-u, Mađarskoj i Rumunjskoj. Revolucionarni pokret Solidarnost javio se u Poljskoj već na početku desetljeća, a u DDR-u je revolucija završila rušenjem Berlinskog zida. U Mađarskoj je revolucija provedena mirnim putem. Iako su u Mađarskoj provedene mnoge uspješne reforme, velike promjene dogodile su se nakon smjene Jánosa Kádra na mjestu Generalnog sekretara KPM-a. Nova vlast uvela je demokratski paket, a na svojoj povijesnoj sjednici održanoj od 16. listopada do 20. listopada 1988. prihvatila je nove zakone i time omogućila prve demokratske izbore za vladu i predsjednika. Usvajanjem ovih zakona, Mađarska je iz narodne republike prešla u političko uređenje demokratske republike.

U Bugarskoj je situacija bila drugačija. Tadašnji vođa Todor Živkov pokušao je provesti glasnost i perestrojku, no neuspješno što je izazvalo veliko nezadovoljstvo u narodu, a pogotovo među prodemokratskim organizacijama. Živkov je 10. studenog 1989. sišao s vlasti i time završio najdužu vladavinu pojedinca u sovjetskom bloku, vladavinu koju je obilježio nepotizam, mnoge krize i veliko nezadovoljstvo naroda. No, ni odlazak Živkova nije zadovoljio prodemokrate. Prosvjedi su se nastavili i tijekom kratkotrajne vladavine Živkovljevog nasljednika Petra Mladenova sve do 1990. godine kada su u Bugarskoj održani prvi demokratski izbori nakon 1931. godine. Ovim događajem i Bugarska je napravila tranziciju iz komunizma u demokraciju. Sam Živkov je 1991. osuđen, no izbjegao je smrt (za razliku od Ceauşescua).

Čehoslovačka Republika je prijelaz u demokraciju napravila događajem koji je znan kao Baršunasta revolucija. Tijekom tog događaja Čehoslovačka se mirnim putem raspala na Češku i Slovačku. Kako je Čehoslovačka bila prva zemlja koja je skinula Željeznu zavjesu, a nije dobila opasku SSSR-a, nastavila je s reformama među kojima je najvažnija bila odluka KPČSSR-a da više neće držati politički monopol. Tada su započeli mirni prosvjedi u svrhu održavanja novih izbora. Na jesen 1989. izbori su održani i sastavljena je prva vlada u kojoj komunisti nisu imali većinu još nakon 1948. Bodljikava žica je uklonjena s granica sa Zapadnom Njemačkom i Austrijom u prosincu i 10. prosinca komunistički predsjednik Gustáv Husák daje ostavku. Pisac Václav Havel postaje posljednji predsjednik Čehoslovačke 29. prosinca 1989. godine i time završava komunizam u Čehoslovačkoj. Dana 1. siječnja 1993. dolazi i do mirnog raspadanja Čehoslovačke i nastajanja Češke i Slovačke. Ovaj raspad znan je kao Baršunasti razvod.

U SR Rumunjskoj se zbila jedina nasilna revolucija i jedina revolucija koja je završila smaknućem komunističkog vođe. Rumunjska revolucija 1989. je oružani sukob koji je trajao od 16. do 22. prosinca 1989. godine, a sukobili su se pristaše komunizma i Securitate (Državna siguronosna služba) protiv antikomunista i rumunjske vojske. Revolucija je započela prosvjedima u Temišvaru koje je vodio Ion Iliescu, prvi demokratski predsjednik Rumunjske, Ceauşescuov nasljednik. Prosvjedi sz započeti kao rezultat loše i diktatorske vladavine koju je vodio Ceauşescu, te represivnog komunističkog režima. Zauzeta je državna televizija iz koje su koordinirani svi ostali potezi ustanika. Nakon 6 dana ustanka, Nicolae Ceauşescu je 22. prosinca izišao da održi govor s balkona predsjedničke palače u Bukureštu, no odmah su počeli stalni zvižduci. Narod se nije moglo utišati. Diktator je pobjegao helikopterom, ali je uhićen, te mu je suđeno na prijekom sudu. Na Božić 1989. pogubljen je sa suprugom ispred streljačkog voda što je kasnije prikazano i na televiziji. Rumunjska je jedina istočnoeuropska država koja je nasilno srušila komunizam i uspostavila demokraciju (koju je vodio prvi predsjednik demokratske Rumunjske Ion Iliescu).

Ovi događaji doveli su do toga da SSSR ostane posljednja zemlja (uz SFRJ, no i tu je započela kampanja nastankom zasebnih republika) u Europi koja još uvijek ima koliko-toliko čvrst komunistički sustav vlasti. No, u prosincu 1989. godine, na sastanku u Malti, Mihail Gorbačov i novi američki predsjednik George Herbert Walker Bush potpisali su ugovor kojim su završili hladni rat, "Cold War," A Dictionary of World History. Oxford University Press, 2000. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. no ni taj događaj nije označio službeni kraj rata. Službenim krajem rata smatra se 1991. godina kada je došlo do kolapsa SSSR-a.

Tijekom dugog niza desetljeća razvoj SSSR-a je bio usporavan. Forsiranje teške industrije dovelo je do loše kvalitete robe i niskog životnog standarda. Unutrašnje i ekonomsko loše stanje, kao i utjecaj velikog broja revolucija u istočnoj Europi, opće slabljenje Sovjetskog Saveza, i Gorbačovljeve reforme glasnost i perestrojka'', doveli su i do njegovog konačnog raspada. Komunistička partija Sovjetskog Saveza odriče se monopola moći i svoje vlasti 1990. godine. Referendum, održan 17. ožujka 1991. na kojem je 78% glasača odabralo cjelovitost SSSR-a, baltičke zemlje, Armenija, Moldova i Gruzija su bojkotirale.

Gorbačov se trudio da održi zemlje SSSR-a na jednom mjestu pa je 20. kolovoza 1991. trebao biti potpisan novi sporazum zemalja u kome bi zemlje prihvatile federaciju i savez koji bi imao zajedničkog predsjednika, vojsku i stranu politiku. Međutim, dan prije potpisivanja, visoki funkcionari SSSR-a su stavili Gorbačova u kućni pritvor u njegovoj rezidenciji na Krimu kako bi spriječili potpisivanje sporazuma i domogli se vlasti. Taj događaj, odnosno pokušaj puča, znan je kao Kolovoški puč. Oni su očekivali masovnu podršku naroda, ali se dogodilo upravo suprotno; narod je bio protiv njih. Poslije tri dana, 21. kolovoza, puč je doživio kolaps i Gorbačov se vratio na poziciju predsjednika SSSR-a.

Ali, njegova vlast je propadala jer ga ni ruska ni sovjetska vlada nisu slušale, pa je ruska vlada, s Borisom Jeljcinom na čelu, počela preuzimati sovjetsku, ministarstvo po ministarstvo. Gorbačov nije uspio održati SSSR u cjelini jer nije uspio napraviti kompromis između želje za demokracijom i želje za starim Sovjetskim Savezom. Poslije puča, sovjetske republike ubrzavaju procese ka neovisnosti. Tako je 6. rujna 1991. sovjetska vlada priznala neovisnost tri baltičke države, a 1. prosinca Ukrajina proglašava neovisnost poslije referenduma na kojem se 90% građana odlučilo za neovisnu i slobodnu Ukrajinu. Zatim, 17. prosinca dvanaest od petnaest sovjetskih republika potpisuje u Haagu sporazum s 28 europskih zemalja, Europskom zajednicom i četiri neeuropske zemlje, kao da su neovisne republike. I 25. prosinca 1991. Gorbačov daje ostavku i sve sovjetske zemlje preuzimaju uloge kao individualne republike.

To je predstavljalo raspad SSSR-a i kraj komunizma u Europi, kao i sam kraj hladnog rata. Sve sovjetske države osigurale su samostalnost i osnovale su Zajednicu Neovisnih Država, koja postoji i danas, no za razliku od SSSR-a, sve države članice imaju svoj suverenitet.

 Izvori

 Literatura

 Kolb, Richard K. Cold War Clashes: Confronting Communism, 1945-1991 (Hardcover - sij. 2004.)
 Ball, S. J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947–1991 (1998.)
 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (1989.)
 Clarke, Bob. Four Minute Warning:Britain's Cold War (2005.)
 Clarke, Bob. Ten Tons for Tempelhof: The Berlin Airlift (2007.)
 Cowley, Robert. The Cold War: A Military History (2005.)
 Friedman, Norman. The Fifty Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. (2000.)
 Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History (2005.)
 Gaddis, John Lewis. Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States. An Interpretative History (1990.)
 Gaddis, John Lewis. Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (1987.)
 Kort, Michael.  "The Columbia Guide to the Cold War" (1998.)
 LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1992 (1993.)
 Lundestad, Geir. East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945 (1999.)
 Mcmahon, Robert. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. 2003.
 Powaski, Ronald E. The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991 (1998.)
 Walker, Martin. The Cold War: A History (1995.)
 Westad, Odd Arne The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times (2006.)

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Question: what is the hladni rat in stalin's arsenal

Oxford University Press, 2003

what is the hladni rat in stalin's arsenal

In addition to solving this problem , President Truman informed Stalin that the United States possesses a new powerful weapon .

Osim rješavanja tog problema, predsjednik Truman obavijestio je Staljina da SAD posjeduje novo moćno oružje.

Oxford University Press, 2003 In addition to solving this problem, President Truman informed Stalin that the United States possesses a new powerful weapon.

The long telegram of George F. Kennan from Moscow led to a greater resistance of the Americans to the Soviets.

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James Francis Byrnes
James Francis Byrnes was born on May 2, 1882 in
Charleston, South Carolina. He left school early to work, but studied
law in his spare time. This "self-taught lawyer" was admitted to the
bar in 1903 and entered public life as a prosecuter in South Carolina
in 1908.
In 1911 Byrnes, a Democrat, was elected to the U.S.
House of Representatives and served there until 1925.
In 1924 he lost the Democratic primary to run for the
U.S. Senate, but was elected to that body on his second try in 1930 and
was subsequently re-elected in 1936. As a Senator, Byrnes helped push
many of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" measures through Congress.
Although he later criticized some of FDR's programs as too radical, he
remained on good terms with the President and later played a large role
in supporting FDR's foreign policy by helping repeal the Neutrality Act
and win approval of Lend Lease.
In 1941 Byrnes was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
but resigned a year later to become the director of economic
stabilization and later head of the Office for War Mobilization. In
that capacity Byrnes was known as the "assistant President" because of
the powers his office held over the economy.
Byrnes accompanied Roosevelt to the Yalta (Big Three)
Conference in February 1945. In July of that year, three months after
FDR's death, President Harry S. Truman named Byrnes secretary of state
and, he accompanied the President to the Potsdam Conference the same
month.
On September 6, 1946 Byrnes held his famous "Speech of Hope" in the Staatstheater in
Stuttgart, Germany. This speech repudiated the Carthaginian peace
forseen for Germany in the Morgenthau Plan, and held out for the
Germans the prospect of eventual prosperity and an honorable return to
the community of nations. Moreover, in the speech Byrnes committed
American forces to Europe for as long as any of the other occupying
powers remained in Germany. This speech set the tone of American
post-war German policy.
After leaving Truman's cabinet in 1947, Byrnes served as
governor of South Carolina from 1951 to 1955.
James F. Byrnes died in Columbia, South Carolina on
April 9, 1972.
SOUTHERN PARTNERSHIP:
JAMES F. BYRNES, LUCIUS D. CLAY AND GERMANY, 1945-1947
by Curtis F. Morgan, PhD
(Curtis F. Morgan, Jr. received his PhD in Modern
European History from the University of South Carolina. He is currently
Associate Professor of History at Lord Fairfax Community College,
Middletown, VA.)
The career of James Francis Byrnes of Spartanburg,
South Carolina was a remarkable one. He was one of a very fewmen who
served in all three branches of the United States Government. Byrnes
had served as Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and
earlier as a Supreme Court Justice and as a distinguished Senator and
Congressman from South Carolina. But Byrnes had his greatest impact
while working in the Executive Branch as Secretary of State under Harry
Truman. James F. Byrnes was America's senior diplomat during a crucial
period in history: the months immediately following the end of the
Second World War. For the United States, the years 1945-47 were a time
of rapid transition In the five months separating the Yalta and Potsdam
conferences alone, President Roosevelt died, Harry Truman succeeded
him, American and Russian troops met at Torgau, Nazi Germany
surrendered, and an atomic explosion in the New Mexico desert ushered
in a new age.
There was too little time to absorb and comprehend
these changes; the victorious Allies had to decide what to do with a
crushed Germany, as well as a more fundamental question: what to do
about each other? It was increasingly apparent that
Great Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union had
divergent aims and visions for postwar Europe, and the focal point for
these conflicting conceptions was Germany. Although the Allies
disagreed over other issues, such as the political shape of liberated
Poland, the problem of the future of Germany, the cultural and
industrial heart of Europe, proved so insoluble that the country lost
the unity it had enjoyed since 1871, a historical development of major
importance.
James F. Byrnes played a crucial role in this
development; indeed, he is sometimes blamed for the "partition" or
"division" of Germany. This paper will explore Byrnes's relationship
with a fellow Southerner, General Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Military
Governor of the U.S. Occupation Zone in Germany. Whereas Byrnes helped
formulate U.S. policy toward Germany, it was Clay's task to carry it
out. Clay had known Byrnes for many years and served under him in the
Office of War Mobilization, and was often outspoken in his attempts to
clarify (even change) U.S. policy. Clay weighed in during policy
debates and was crucial in the drafting of Byrnes's Stuttgart speech,
much of which derived from a Clay cable to Washington. Byrnes trusted
Clay both as a longtime friend and as "the man on the spot" in occupied
Germany; Clay's opinions carried great weight with Byrnes, and
influenced much of his thinking on Germany.
Lucius DuBignon Clay was born and raised in Marietta,
Georgia, at a place and time in which memories of the Civil War and
Reconstruction were fresh. (Clay once told reporters, "I was going to
be damned sure that there weren't any carpetbaggers in the military
government. . . .") His father was a U.S. Senator, and he was
introduced to Washington very early in life. He chose the Army as a
career, graduating from West Point in 1918; despite a desire for active
combatduty in World War I, the war ended before he was available for
call-up; he became an engineering instructor. He suffered through the
doldrums of the between-wars Army, spending 17 years at the rank of
first lieutenant. Several times tempted to enter civilian life, he
nevertheless remained in the Army. His time with the Army Corps of
Engineers during the Depression years gave him valuable experience
planning construction projects, administering large budgets,
negotiating with lawmakers and other government officials, etc.
When war came in 1941, Clay was disappointed again:
denied a field command, he remained in Washington to help organize the
mobilization and conversion effort. It is in this context that Clay met
James F. Byrnes. As victory in Europe neared in the fall of 1944,
Byrnes's Office of War Mobilization began to address the coming need to
reconvert the U.S. economy to peacetime production. Asked by his
biographer when he met Byrnes, Clay replied:
" Well, I don't know that I can answer that. Certainly
I met him when I was working on rivers and harbors and he was Senate
majority leader -- but not in any real sense. Then, during the war,
when he left the Supreme Court and went into this particular job [OWM],
I was sent over representing the War Department on a number of issues
that came before him for settlement. Out of it, he asked me to come
over and be his deputy. He didn't ask me -- he told me I was coming. In
that particular period I became very close to him. Then he became
Secretary of State while I was in Germany, and we kept up really a very
close relationship."
Byrnes hired Clay as Deputy Director of War
Mobilization in December 1944, just after Congress had granted Byrnes's
department the authority to plan for reconversion. Byrnes himself
recalled:
"At this time the need to obtain the maximum manpower
and to expedite our production to the front lines was so great that for
the first time I permitted an increase in my staff. At many of our
office conferences involving War Department affairs, Major General
Lucius D. Clay had been present as one of the [War] department
representatives, and during the discussions would often come up with
solutions to our most pressing problems. I came to have the highest
regard for his judgment, and drafted him as my deputy director for war
programs and general administration, though he remained in the Army and
continued to wear his uniform."
Geography played a large role in the two men's mutual
respect and regard, of course. Clay's biographer Jean Smith writes
that, while close personally, Clay was in no sense Byrnes's
protegé. Yet, it is clear from the above remarks that, many
years after these events, Byrnes and Clay shared a deep respect and
esteem. Both men were from the southern Piedmont region: Byrnes's home
in Spartanburg, S.C. was barely one hundred miles from Clay's home town
of Marietta, Ga. Smith writes: "They spoke the same soft cadences of
the Appalachian plateau and understood each other instinctively. Both
were manipulators of broad governmental coalitions, and devotees of
pragmatic compromise." Their collaboration can be said to have laid the
foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany.
In March, 1945 much discussion in the Oval Office
concerned who would act as American proconsul in Germany. President
Roosevelt had definite ideas about the post and who should fill it. FDR
envisaged a civilian "High Commissioner for Germany" and initially
wanted Byrnes to perform this task. Byrnes had other plans; he had just
submitted his resignation as Director of OWM. Asked to suggest a
replacement, Byrnes named Clay. Roosevelt remarked, "I have never known
you to be so enthusiastic about anyone in government." But then,
according to Byrnes confidant Walter Brown's recollection, Byrnes
hesitated, "since the various special interest groups would object to
having a military man as war mobilizer." Assistant Secretary of War
John J. McCloy was also considered. In March, 1945 Roosevelt summoned
McCloy into his office and saluted him: "Heil hoch Kommissar für
Deutschland!" McCloy countered with the suggestion that a military
governor would be preferable, and recommended Clay. FDR replied, "Oh,
McCloy, I'm too tired to argue with you." After further maneuvers, it
was decided to replace Byrnes at OWM with Fred Vinson, send Clay to
Germany as General Eisenhower's Deputy Military Governor "with a view
to his later becoming our High Commissioner there," and appoint Robert
Murphy Clay's political advisor. Clay's various connections with the
White House and the executive departments made him a natural choice.
Robert Murphy later claimed that "The substitution of the Army officer
in place of a civilian High Commissioner in Germany was arranged almost
singlehandedly by Byrnes." Although Eisenhower was to be Military
Governor, his duties as Supreme Allied Commander would leave little
time for occupation affairs; Clay would administer the U.S. zone on a
daily basis.
Clay himself was not enthusiastic, perhaps because he
was not even informed of the decision immediately. Robert Murphy
brought the "unwelcome" news to Clay, who fervently wished a combat
division command. Clay brusquely told Murphy he must be mistaken, but
then received a call from Byrnes, who told him the President had
appointed him to oversee the occupation. Clay recalls: "I wasn't
interested in the job, and it was the last thing I wanted."
The Partnership Begins: Potsdam
Within a month, Clay contacted Byrnes, a private
citizen but widely known to be Harry Truman's Secretary of
State-designate, describing what he saw in Germany.
"Conditions in Germany are getting progressively worse
and large sections of all important cities have been obliterated. Of
course, we have a long range problem of preventing the restoration of
Germany's war potential. However, this is not the short range problem
as several years will be required to develop even a sustaining economy
to provide a bare minimum standard of living. The coming winter months
will be most difficult. I think too much of our planning at home has
envisaged a Germany in which an existing government has surrendered
with a large part of the country intact."
Clay's remarks, Byrnes's enthusiastic endorsement of
them, and Murphy's detailed reports persuaded President Truman that any
punitive peace settlement with Germany was out of the question.
Reparations estimates had to be lowered, if not eliminated entirely, to
save the German people from mass starvation. Clay later recalled his
impressions in even stronger terms, stating the conviction he shared
with Byrnes by July, 1945: "It seemed obvious to us even then that
Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that
immediate steps would have to be taken to revise industrial production."
That month the Potsdam Conference opened outside
Berlin. Here Byrnes and Clay collaborated on Germany for the first
time. Although not a member of the American delegation, Clay was
invited by Byrnes to attend "special discussions" along with his
political adviser Robert Murphy. In the evenings, Clay attended
Byrnes's meetings with his staff, finding them "always inspirational."
Byrnes wanted to be near Clay because the general knew the conditions
"on the ground" in the American zone of Germany and spoke freely and
candidly with the Secretary. Byrnes's personal conviction that
Germany's economic potential must be preserved for the recovery of all
Europe was strongly supported by Clay, who later recalled: It was clear
to us that for many months to come German production would not suffice
to keep the German people alive, and that the use of any part of it for
reparations would mean that once again the United States would be not
only supporting Germany but also paying the bill for reparations.
The entire economic policy question eventually
revolved around the reparations issue. Except for the dispute over the
shape of the Polish government, more time was spent at Potsdam
discussing reparations than anything else. This issue was not new.
Byrnes later explained:
"Ever since Yalta the great variance between the
Soviet Union and ourselves on the subject of reparations had been
apparent. We agreed that reparations should be obtained through
reparations "in kind" rather than in currency. But the meetings of the
Committee on Reparations had demonstrated that our agreement extended
no further."
The American-Soviet difference of view was based on
the fact that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, had suffered
horrendous damage during the war. Russia's industry was gutted, its
labor force severely depleted. Stalin was determined to replenish and
rebuild as quickly as possible, using captured German industrial
materials. He considered it well within the Soviet Union's national
interest to strengthen his country by consuming Germany. Stalin wished
to ensure that Germany would not recover until after the Americans had
left Europe and the Soviets could reorder the region to their
advantage. The United States was pursuing precisely the opposite policy
direction, wishing to rebuild Germany to prevent it from becoming an
economic burden on Europe and to enable Germany to contribute to the
European recovery. This polarity of ambitions made disagreement and
misunderstanding inevitable.
Widespread Soviet looting and indiscriminate
dismantling of industrial plant in the name of "war booty" further
muddled the issue. Byrnes had hoped to negotiate a plan whereby
reparations would be determined and distributed in an orderly manner,
with each ally given equal access to Germany's resources, agricultural
and industrial. This was not to be. Byrnes later recounted:
"We knew that, if reparations were to be drawn from
all Germany we would have to demand an accounting of the Soviets. We
were sure they could not even approximate an accurate valuation of what
had been taken, and we realized that the effort to establish and
maintain such an accounting would be a source of constant friction,
accusations and ill- will. [We] concluded that the only way out of the
situation was to persuade each country to satisfy its reparations
claims out of its own zone."
It was this decision that can be said to have split
Germany into east and west. Yet, according to Byrnes, the blame lay
squarely with the Soviets, not the Americans. The Secretary, having
defended the policy of treating Germany as an economic unit in
conference, was forced to compromise in the face of a Soviet policy
that stripped eastern Germany of all that total warfare had not. On
July 31, Byrnes presented a "package deal," seeking simultaneous
agreement on reparations, the Polish frontier, and Italian membership
in the United Nations. After some grumbling, the Soviets accepted. In
the final agreement, the Soviets were entitled to reparations from
their own zone, plus 15% of reparations from the western zones to be
exchanged for food and fuel from the Soviet zone, plus 10% more with no
obligation to repay. Byrnes hoped that this compromise would ease the
path to a German peace treaty that would preserve German economic unity
for Europe's benefit. These hopes were soon disappointed.
The Road to Stuttgart
Through the fall of 1945 and into the summer of 1946,
Byrnes worked in the Potsdam-mandated Council of Foreign Ministers to
lay the groundwork for what he hoped would be the pinnacle of his
career: a set of peace treaties ending World War II in Europe that
would preserve German political and economic unity. Clay was fully in
sympathy with Byrnes's aim. "At the various Foreign Ministers
Conferences, we would have conversations out of which our Germany
policy would develop," he wrote. State Department officials were
irritated by the Byrnes-Clay collaboration. One complained: "Every time
we go into a Foreign Ministers Conference, we first have to make a
treaty with our General Clay." Byrnes protected Clay from critics in
both the State and War Departments. Meanwhile, Byrnes relied more on
Clay's views on Germany than on those of his State Department "experts"
in Washington.
The prime example of the Byrnes-Clay collaboration is
the role Clay played in helping draft Byrnes's "Restatement of U.S.
Policy Toward Germany," better known as the Stuttgart speech. This
statement was primarily a reaction to a perceived change in Soviet
policy toward Germany made public at the Paris Council of Foreign
Ministers meeting in the summer of 1946.
As with previous conferences, Byrnes invited Clay and
Murphy to attend sessions devoted to the German problem when the Paris
meetings opened May 15-16, 1946. Clay took advantage of his opportunity
once again to steer policy in a direction he favored. "My attendance at
the conference had given me the opportunity to explain to Byrnes the
economic consequences which were already resulting from the severance
of Germany into four independently operated areas," he later wrote.
Germany, far from operating as an economic whole, was dying as the four
occupation zones cut off its circulation. In a cable to Gen.
Eisenhower, Clay described conditions in Germany:
After one year of occupation, zones represent airtight
territories with almost no free exchange of commodities, persons, and
ideas. Germany now consists of four small economic units which can deal
with each other only through treaties in spite of the fact that no one
unit can be regarded as self-supporting, although British and Russian
zones could become self-supporting.
Clay urged that "immediate decisions" be made to
establish a common economic infrastructure as called for by Potsdam.
Pending such four-power agreement, Clay ordered the cessation of all
reparations deliveries from the American zone. In tandem with Clay,
Byrnes proposed a 25-year, four-power agreement to unite Germany and
guarantee its neutrality and complete disarmament. This effort was
directed at the French, who had balked at German unity since Potsdam.
The Soviets replied coolly to this proposal, then surprised the
Americans with a major announcement of their own. At the Paris session
of July 10, with Clay in attendance, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov
declared Russia's support for German political and economic unity,
criticizing those who "talk about dismembering Germany into several
'autonomous' states, federalizing her and separating the Ruhr from
her." Thus the Soviets hoped to win points with the German populace by
accusing the Western powers of supporting the French desire to destroy
Germany.
Byrnes later recalled, "I had to admit the
effectiveness of the effort because there had been confusion in our own
country on the policy of the United States toward Germany." That
evening Byrnes met with Clay, Murphy, and U.S. Senators Connally and
Vandenburg. Byrnes was convinced that consolidation of the zones "to
the fullest extent possible" was now necessary. The U.S. had been
thrown on the defensive, and Clay told Byrnes that a clarification of
American aims in Germany was now imperative. He returned to Berlin to
begin putting together a restatement of American policy aims.
Titled "A Summary of United States Policy and
Objectives in Germany," Clay's effort to turn U.S. occupation policy in
a positive direction was as influential as George F. Kennan's "Long
Telegram" from Moscow a few months earlier. While the Germans were
discussing Molotov's statement, Clay pointed out, military government
officials lacked a summarized statement of current policy or objectives
to which they could refer in discussions with the German people. Clay
presented such a summary on July 19. It stated as U.S. objectives the
destruction of war potential, reeducation of the Germans for a
liberal-democratic form of government, the preservation of German unity
of economic and financial policy as well as political structure, and
the retention of the industry-rich Ruhr region as part of a united
Germany. Clay called for all-German elections "at the earliest possible
date" and the setting up of a provisional government. Zonal
restrictions should be removed "to permit the free exchange of
commodities, persons and ideas throughout Germany. . . . The United
States insists that the air-tight territories now created through the
establishment of the four zones be eliminated. . . ."
Clay's superiors in the War Department were unhappy
about his cable, feeling that it was a "policy-making" document, when
this was the exclusive preserve of the State Department. Clay wanted
the statement made public, but was overruled. Upset, Clay called Byrnes
in Paris, who invited him to visit. There, Clay found a sympathetic
ear. He urged the Secretary to visit Germany to make a statement of
American policy. Byrnes recalled:
"I did not think it proper to make such a declaration
in Paris while the peace conference was in session; therefore, I
decided to go to Germany to talk to the occupation forces, military and
civilian, in the American zone. General Clay encouraged me to do this."
The Stuttgart Speech
On September 6, 1946 Secretary of State James F.
Byrnes travelled by train to Stuttgart via Berlin. The site for
Byrnes's speech was carefully chosen by Clay. Stuttgart, located in
Baden-Württemburg in the U.S. occupation zone (and just a few
miles from the French zone) was home to a U.S.-sponsored German
government-in-embryo. For nearly a year, "minister-presidents"
representing the three states (Länder) established in the U.S.
zone had been meeting regularly as the Länderrat, or "State
Council," to coordinate the rebuilding of German administrative organs
under strict American military government supervision. Byrnes would
address a picked audience in the Staatstheater comprising the top
leadership of American military government as well as prominent German
political figures headed by the three minister-presidents. Arrangements
had also been made to broadcast the speech live, with a German
translator heard over Byrnes's voice.
The speech was based largely on Clay's July 19 cable
to Washington, which his superiors had found distasteful. Clay had
appealed to his friend Byrnes over the heads of his War Department
superiors, and had won his point. Clay even maintains that, in Berlin,
"we went over his speech." This paper will only permit a brief synopsis
of Byrnes's speech, which lasted about a half hour. The Secretary
reiterated Clay's preamble that the U.S. sought demilitarization and
denazification of Germany in the interests of world peace, in
fulfillment of the Potsdam Agreement. He recalled the agreement over
reparations, but denied that it had ever been intended that they be
taken from current production, as the Soviets and French were doing in
their zones, hampering industrial recovery. This was the economic
equivalent of "killing the goose that lays the golden eggs." Closely
following Clay's cable, Byrnes announced that the United States
supported German political unity, and "is firmly of the belief that
Germany should be administered as an economic unit and that zonal
barriers should be completely obliterated . . . . We cannot continue to
restrict the free exchange of commodities, persons and ideas throughout
Germany." In July, the British had agreed to merge their zone with the
American. Byrnes now repeated the invitation he had issued at that time
for the other occupying powers to follow suit.
Byrnes called for the establishment of central
administrative agencies to rebuild the shattered German infrastructure.
"Twelve months have passed and nothing has been done," he complained.
He then declared American support for political unification and
democratic self-government: "It is the view of the American Government
that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards,
should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their
own affairs." Byrnes called for the establishment of an all-German
preliminary government in the form of a "National Council," composed of
minister-presidents of all the German Länder, which would be
empowered to draft a German Constitution. He concluded:
"The American people want to return the government of
Germany to the German people. The American people want to help the
German people to win their way back to an honorable place among the
free and peace-loving nations of the world."
Reaction to Byrnes's speech was mixed. The British
heartily approved; the French were outraged; the Soviet response was
muted. In the U.S. the speech was applauded by many as a declaration
that we were finally "standing up to the Russians." But perhaps most
instructive is the German reaction. In addition to radio coverage
(which included much comment on news and feature programs), the speech
received front-page treatment in German newspapers, "the biggest play
in the history of the new democratic German press." The Stuttgarter
Zeitung headline on September 7 proclaimed "A Day of Global Importance
in Stuttgart" and was accompanied by an editorial by Karl Ackerman
titled "Plain Speaking." The Wiesbadener Kurier saw "A Ray of Light at
Last." It must be kept in mind that the German press in the American
zone was the least censored of all occupied Germany, on Clay's
insistence. The press was as "free" as could be expected under a
military occupation regime.
A newly-elected member of the Hesse parliament
declared "The Byrnes speech was a ray of hope for the possibility of a
state, a community for Germany." Bavarian Finance Minister Ludwig
Erhard (soon to be the financial architect of West Germany's "Economic
Miracle") said: "Since the collapse no act has felt so liberating as
the proclaimed intent in the speech of the American foreign minister to
open to the German people the possibility of shaping its own destiny."
The Meaning of Stuttgart
Much ink has been spilled over Byrnes's statement;
both traditional and revisionist Cold War historians see it as directed
at the Soviet Union, citing passages in the speech such as:
It is not in the interest of the German people or in
the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a
partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West.
. . . Security forces will probably have to remain in Germany for a
long period. I want no misunderstanding. We will not shirk our duty. We
are not withdrawing. We are staying here. As long as there is an
occupation army in Germany, American armed forces will be part of that
occupation army.
Interestingly, the stated promise that U.S. troops
would remain in Germany was Clay's idea. Byrnes included it, despite
the fact that he was unable to reach President Truman for approval of
so sweeping a commitment.
Historian John Gimbel argues that the Stuttgart speech
was directed primarily at the French, who fought most stubbornly
against German unity in any form, especially the Potsdam directive to
set up "central administrative agencies." France had not been
represented at Potsdam, and had used their veto on the Allied Control
Council to frustrate any move toward German unity. Byrnes insisted that
such central agencies were "essential . . . Germany must be enabled to
use her skills and her energies to increase her industrial production
and to organize the most effective use of her raw materials."
However, the most convincing interpretation of the
meaning of Stuttgart is that Byrnes's speech, which one could say was
"ghost-written" by Lucius Clay, was directed first at the Germans. The
press coverage in the western zones speaks overwhelmingly of Byrnes's
message to Germans and the hope it brought of rehabilitation and a
positive place for Germany in the family of nations. Twenty years
later, the dean of German historians of the postwar era wrote that the
Stuttgart speech "marked the transition of the western occupation
policy from the Morgenthau Plan to the Marshall Plan, from the
annihilation of Germany to the reconstruction of Germany."
The two men most responsible for the speech agree.
Lucius Clay told his biographer, "Mr. Byrnes's speech was aimed at the
Germans. It was an attempt to give them some hope." In October 1946
Byrnes candidly told a delegation of U.S. Senators in Paris: "The nub
of our program was to win the German people . . . it was a battle
between us and Russia over minds. . . ."
To the Southerner in the United States, this
government's decision to treat a conquered enemy with a measure of
compassion, to the point of protecting the enemy population from the
depredations (committed and intended) of allied powers, must provoke
mixed feelings: pride, resentment, perhaps envy. Ironically, it is two
German scholars who point out the contrast between the positive legacy
of the U.S. occupation of their country, which resulted in the
establishment of the Federal Republic as one of America's staunchest
allies, and the Federal occupation of the former Confederate States in
1865-1877, a source of much bitterness even today.
James F. Byrnes and Lucius D. Clay are little
remembered today, even in their native South Carolina and Georgia; but
their legacy in Germany has never been forgotten. Their Southern
partnership was a bright spot in the dark years of the Cold War.
Bibliography/Source List
Books About Byrnes
Brown, Walter J. James F. Byrnes of South Carolina: A
Remembrance. n.p.: by the author, 1992.
Burns, Richard D. “James F. Byrnes 1945-1947.” In An
Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth
Century, ed. Norman Graebner. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.
Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1947.
________. All in One Lifetime. New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1958.
Clements, Kendrick, ed. James F. Byrnes and the Origins
of the Cold War. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1982.
Conover, Denise O’Neal. “James F. Byrnes, Germany and
the Cold War, 1946.” Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University,
1978.
________. “James F. Byrnes and the Four-Power
Disarmament Treaty.” Mid-America 70 (1988): 19-34.
Curry, George. “James F. Byrnes.” In The American
Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. 14. eds. Robert Ferrell
and Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1965.
“James F. Byrnes on Foreign Policy.” Intro. Miles S.
Richards. South Carolina Historical Magazine 92:1 (January 1991): 34-44.
Kreikamp, Hans-Dieter. “Die amerikanische
Deutschlandpolitik im Herbst 1946 und die Byrnes-Rede in
Stuttgart.”Vierteljarhshefte für Zeitgeschichte 29 (1981): 269-285.
Messer, Robert L. The End of an Alliance: James F.
Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War. Chapel
Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1982.
Curtis F. Morgan, Jr. PhD. James F. Byrnes, Lucius Clay
and American Policy in Germany, 1945-1947. Lewiston, New York: The
Edwin Mellen Press, 2002.
Morgan, Curtis F. “‘The Success That Failed’: James F.
Byrnes, Germany, and the Potsdam
_______. "Southern Partnership: James F. Byrnes, Lucius
D. Clay, and American Policy in Germany, 1945-1947." Ph.D.
dissertation, University of South Carolina 1998.
Robertson, David. Sly and Able: A Political Biography of
James F. Byrnes. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994.
Ward, Pat Dawson. The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes
and the Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1946. Kent, Ohio: Kent State
Univ. Press, 1979.
Related Works
Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. Garden City, NY:
Doubleday & Co., 1950.
Smith, Jean Edward, Lucius D. Clay, An American Life.
New York: Henry Holt, 1990.
A James F. Byrnes Chronology
May 2, 1882 -- James Francis Byrnes born in Charleston,
South Carolina
1896 -- Byrnes is hired as "office boy" in law firm of
Mordecai, Gadsden, Rutledge and Hagood, Charleston, SC
1900 -- Byrnes is appointed (after a competition) as
court reporter (stenographer) for the Second Judicial District, Aiken,
South Carolina
May 2, 1906 -- Byrnes, a Catholic, marries Maude Busch,
an Episcopalian
1908 -- Having passed the SC Bar, and set up a law
practice, "Jimmy" Byrnes is elected Court Solicitor for the Second
Judicial District of South Carolina.
1910 -- Byrnes is elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives from the Second District as a Democrat
1911-1925 Byrnes serves as Congressman from South
Carolina
1924 -- Byrnes is defeated in a bid to become U.S.
Senator by Cole L. Blease
1925-1931 -- Byrnes practices law in Spartanburg, SC
1930 -- Byrnes defeats Blease to become U.S. Senator
1931-1941 Byrnes serves as U.S. Senator from South
Carolina
1940 -- Byrnes runs for nomination as Vice-President; is
defeated by Henry Wallace
1941 -- President Franklin D. Roosevelt appoints Byrnes
a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
December 7, 1941 -- Japan attacks Pearl Harbor; U.S.
enters World War II
October 3, 1942 -- Byrnes "retires" from Supreme Court;
Roosevelt appoints Byrnes Director of the Office of Economic
Stabilization, later the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
1942-1945 -- Byrnes serves as Director of War
Mobilization and Reconversion; his wide powers cause the press to refer
to him as "Assistant President for the Home Front"; is involved, among
other things, in budgeting for Project Manhattan, the development of
the atomic bomb
July, 1944 -- Byrnes, with Roosevelt's encouragement,
runs for Vice-Pesidential nomination again; Roosevelt chooses Senator
Harry Truman
February, 1945 -- Byrnes accompanies Roosevelt to Yalta
Conference
March, 1945 -- Byrnes resigns as War Mobilization
Director
April 12, 1945 -- President Roosevelt dies at Warm
Springs, Ga.; Harry Truman sworn in as President
May 8, 1945 -- Nazi Germany surrenders
July 3, 1945 -- President Truman appoints Byrnes
Secretary of State
July, 1945 - January, 1947 -- Byrnes serves as U.S.
Secretary of State, U.S. representative to Council of Foreign
Ministers; negotiates peace treaties with Axis satellites
July 17 - August 2, 1945 -- Byrnes accompanies Truman to
Potsdam Conference
August-September, 1945 -- Byrnes urges use of atomic
bomb on Japan; Truman orders atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki; Japan surrenders; World War II ends
September 6, 1946 -- Byrnes delivers "Stuttgart speech"
announcing U.S. commitment to a united, democratic Germany, and
presence of U.S troops indefinitely
January 20, 1947 -- Byrnes resigns as Secretary of
State; returns to South Carolina to practice law
1950 -- Byrnes elected Governor of South Carolina
1951-1955 Byrnes serves as Governor of South Carolina
1952, 1956 -- Byrnes serves as South Carolina Chairman
of Democrats for Eisenhower
1960, 1968 -- Byrnes supports Presidential campaigns of
Richard Nixon
April 9, 1972 -- James F. Byrnes dies peacefully in his
home in Columbia, South Carolina

Question: who sent the telegram to the soviet union declaring communism as an enemy

The long telegram of George F. Kennan from Moscow led to a greater resistance of the Americans to the Soviets.

who sent the telegram to the soviet union declaring communism as an enemy

Question: where did george f. kennan send the hladni rat

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Question: what did the soviet union want to destroy

what did the soviet union want to destroy

Question: what two countries did george f kennan declare as enemies

Sovjetski Savez i komunizam proglasio neprijateljima i objavio da SSSR želi uništiti kapitalizam

what two countries did george f kennan declare as enemies

Question: the telegram of george f. kennan from moscow led to a

the telegram of george f. kennan from moscow led to a

Question: what ideology did george f kennan declare as an enemy of the sov

what ideology did george f kennan declare as an enemy of the sov

Question: the telegram of george f. kennan from moscow led to the

the telegram of george f. kennan from moscow led to the

The long telegram of George F. Kennan from Moscow led to a greater resistance of the Americans to the Soviets .

In that telegram , Kennan declared the Soviet Union and Communism as enemies and announced that the USSR wants to destroy capitalism , and that the Soviet government hides some important information about the country .

Dugi telegram Georgea F. Kennana iz Moskve doveo je do veće odbojnosti Amerikanaca prema Sovjetima.

The long telegram of George F. Kennan from Moscow led to a greater resistance of the Americans to the Soviets. In that telegram, Kennan declared the Soviet Union and Communism as enemies and announced that the USSR wants to destroy capitalism, and that the Soviet government hides some important information about the country.

The long telegram of George F. Kennan from Moscow led to a greater resistance of the Americans to the Soviets.

One of the first hostile steps between the great powers at the very beginning of the Cold War was the Iranian crisis of 1946.

RUSSIA
ii. IRANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS (1917-1991)
From the outset, the very first international resolutions of the young Soviet state had an immediate impact on relations with Iran. On October 26 1917, the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets passed the Decree on Peace declaring the abrogation of all unequal treaties. On December 3 1917, the Appeal of the Soviet government “To All Working Muslims of Russia and the East” was published. Among other items, it declared that “the Treaty on the division of Persia (this is how the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was known in Russia) has been torn up and annulled. As soon as military activities cease, the troops will be called off from Persia, and the Persians will be provided with the right to decide freely about their destiny on their own” (Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR, vol. 1, p. 12). Due to persistent requests from the Russian side, the text of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between Russia and Germany and its allies included clauses about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Persia. In February 1918 Asad Khan, the Persian chargé d’affairs in Petrograd, received an official diplomatic note in which the Soviet government expressed its agreement to begin negotiations regarding the withdrawal of the Russian troops. At the same time, an order was given to the General Headquarters of the Caucasian Front to evacuate the Russian troops from Persia, and by the end of March the evacuation was over. However, a part of the Russian troops headed by General Baratov, as well as officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade, refused to obey the Soviet Command, remained on Iranian soil and joined the military service of the British.
In early December 1917, all tsarist diplomats who did not agree with the politics announced by the new authorities were dismissed from the diplomatic service of the Soviet Russia. The Soviet government abolished all diplomatic ranks, and the heads of all diplomatic representatives were now addressed as plenipotentiaries of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). Persia recognized the new Soviet government in December 1917, and thus the diplomatic relations between Russia and Iran were not in fact interrupted. The Iranian diplomatic mission also continued its work in Petrograd after the October Revolution and was granted financial and other help. In a memorandum to the RSFSR government dated 30 January 1918, the Persian government expressed “complete readiness to start negotiations for concluding new treaties, consular conventions and other acts, on the principles of free agreement and mutual respect of peoples” (Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR, vol. 1, p. 92). However, the establishment of diplomatic relations was delayed. This was mainly due to the strong pressure exerted on Persia by Great Britain which, upon occupying a part of Trans-Caucasia, Central Asia, and Persia in 1918-19, had managed to sign a strategically important treaty with Persia in 1919. N. Z. Bravin, who had been appointed the diplomatic representative of the RSFSR in Persia, arrived in Tehran in January 1918. Without refusing to deal with the representative of the new power in Russia, the officials in Tehran, nonetheless, continued to recognize the tsarist envoy von Etter as the official diplomatic representative of Russia, because Russia was in a state of civil war and faced with foreign intervention, and the status of the Soviet government did not look very stable. By the middle of 1918, the British had gained an extremely powerful position in Persia and were thus opposed to substituting the tsarist embassy by the Soviet representatives. In the summer of 1918, N.Z. Bravin was appointed the head of the diplomatic mission in Afghanistan, while I.O. Kolomiytsev was assigned as the permanent representative of the RSFSR in Persia. However, the Persian government did not recognize the mission of Kolomiytsev. In November, the mission was extirpated in Tehran, and its members were sent to Mesopotamia under escort. Kolomiytsev was the only one who managed to escape. In July 1919, the government of the RSFSR deputed him to Persia again, but he was captured on his way there by the Persian Cossacks acting on the orders of the British and killed on the island of Āšurādā.
In spite of the fact that the Soviet Republics created on the territory of the former Russian Empire (the first integration into a unified state was in 1922) delegated issues of foreign policy to the RSFSR, they could still undertake quite autonomous foreign activities. An example of such activities was the deputing of the diplomatic mission to Persia from the Soviet Turkistan whose capital was at Tashkent. The mission had the objective of establishing regular commercial relations with the Northern provinces of Iran, as the supply of food to Central Asia from Russia had been interrupted. The head of the mission was E. A. Babushkin who was entrusted with consular rights to organize a representative office of the Republic of Turkistan in Mashad. However, this mission too was aborted by the British troops and its members arrested. In 1919 Babushkin and some members of the mission were transferred to India and then to Europe, and liberated only after long negotiations between the RSFSR and Great Britain (Popov, 1974).
In response to the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 which was signed in Tehran in August 1919 and which could have potentially made Iran a de facto British protectorate, in late August 1919 the Soviet government announced in its appeal “To the Workers and Peasants of Persia” that it did not recognize the Agreement. Aiming to weaken the British position in Persia and acting from ideological considerations (mainly having the idea of spreading the proletarian revolution to the East), the leadership of the Soviet Republics in Russia, Trans-Caucasus and Turkistan started to provide considerable help to the Jangali movement of Mirza Kuček Khan. The order of the Political Office of the Revvoensovet (Revolutionary Military Council) of the RSFSR No. 107, dated October 8 1920, stated that “political work in the East is the most vital objective for the RSFSR. This work must be taken up with as much determination as was done for the preparation of October [i.e. the October Revolution].” (RTsKhIDNI, Fond 122, Inventory 1, Case 261, unnumbered folio). The immediate reason given for the military help to Kuček Khan was the return of the ships driven away to Anzali by the troops of A. Denikin and the British. In May 1920, the ships of the Volga-Caspian fleet, under the command of F. Raskol’nikov, approached Anzali and landed troops there. An infantry regiment entered Persia from the recently created Soviet Azerbaijan. The offer by the Iranian side to set up diplomatic relations with both the RSFSR and Soviet Azerbaijan was welcomed by Moscow at a time when it felt endangered by the real possibility of British intervention in Russia being strengthened from the South and mainly from Persian territory. The establishment of relations with Persia provided a clear opportunity to prevent the possibility of such an intervention. In a diplomatic note dated May 23, Moscow explained that the Anzali operation had been carried out through the initiative of the military command, and without any prior agreement with the central government. This was undoubtedly a diplomatic ploy, since the government had known about the operation. It should, however, be borne in mind that the central authorities in Russia and in other Soviet Republics did not share a unanimous opinion with regard to whether the movement of Kuček Khan should be supported to the detriment of relations with the central government in Persia. Thus, in the radio ultimatum sent to the British with the request to surrender Anzali, Raskol’nikov declared that “he was acting on his own initiative, without orders from Moscow, and considered this action necessary for the safety of the Caspian Fleet” (Genis, 2000, p. 68). On May 25, the situation in Persia was discussed at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) [Russian Communist Party (of the Bolsheviks)]. It passed a resolution instructing Raskol’nikov to provide “necessary support to Kuček Khan by supplying stores, instructors, etc. Anzali and other localities of Persia, which are in our hands, should be given over to the latter’s control. The fleet should be withdrawn from these localities after a declaration is made upon the order of the Soviet government confirming its refusal to interfere in Persia’s domestic affairs. A section of the fleet sufficient in size to offer continuing assistance to Kuček Khan, is to be left at Anzali under the pretext of police service but under the Azerbaijani flag” (Idem, p. 21). The Soviet Republic of Gilān was thus established in May 1920 in the city of Rašt (the provincial capital of the Gilān province) with the backing of the Russian Bolsheviks (Chaqueri).
Since the state interests of Russia made the normalization of relations with Persia of paramount importance, the Moscow government started to insist on evacuating its troops from Persia. F. Rotshtein, who was appointed the plenipotentiary of the RSFSR in Tehran in November 1920, wrote a personal letter to Lenin in which he asked him to exert his influence upon those people in Baku who had initiated military raids on territories in Iranian Azerbaijan and Gilān. On 26 February 1921 the Soviet-Iranian Treaty was officially signed in Moscow. This had been prepared and agreed upon prior to the military coup of Reza Khan on 21 February 1921 (see COUP D’ETAT OF 1299/1921). According to its terms, the Soviet government annulled all its previous treaties with Persia, as well as other treaties of the Tsarist government concluded to the detriment of Iranian interests, and surrendered the rights to the loans of the Tsarist government and its concessions. All the facilities belonging to Russia were handed over to Persia including: railways, roads, and telegraph lines, port facilities at Anzali and on lake Urmiya, the Russian Discount-Loan Bank and other properties, but on the condition that these were not handed over to other countries. The Āšurādā and other islands on the Caspian Sea were transferred to Persia. Clause 11 confirmed for Persia the rights to keep its fleet under the Persian flag on the Caspian Sea. The treaty stipulated the rights of the transit trade for both countries. In essence, it was the first equitable treaty for Persia, and it was even more profitable to Tehran than to Moscow. For the Soviet government, the safety of the frontiers was of more importance, and in exchange for the refusal from all claims to the property of the Tsarist Russia, clauses 5 and 6 were included in the treaty. These two clauses excluded the possibility for organizations or individuals engaged in armed struggle against the government of either country to reside or operate on the territory of the other country (clause 5), and envisaged the possibility of the Soviet troops entering Iranian territory if the Persian government proved unable to avert this threat (clause 6). These two clauses, which undoubtedly violated the sovereign rights of Persia, were implemented during the Second World War. The treaty of 1921 is fundamental to relations between the two countries. It has remained valid to the present, except for clauses 5 and 6 that were unilaterally annulled by the Iranian side after the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
In the course of the negotiations in Moscow, the Russian side (G. Chicherin and L. Karakhan) tried to retain the oil and fishing concessions for Russia. The issue of the oil concession was not settled definitively from a legal point of view, while the fishing concession (the former concession of Lianozov) was retained for Russia (Aliev, 2004, p. 131).
The question of how to set up relations with Persia, even after the conclusion of the treaty, remained a controversial issue within the Soviet government. One alternative suggested by Karakhan envisaged the “Sovietization” of Persia through direct intervention and the removal of the shah. For this purpose Karakhan proposed to strengthen the Soviet forces in Anzali by using the expeditionary corps. This would enable the expulsion of the British from Persia and the formation of a Socialist-nationalist government (Persits, 1996, p. 36). These radical aims were not, however, pursued and instead attempts were made to develop relations with Persia through peaceful economic measures. These policies began to be implemented at a time when Reza Shah was consolidating his power and influence over Persia. He had always been personally afraid of Moscow’s political intrigues, and not only in the context of the expansion of the communist influence, but also in view of the possibility of his assassination by agents of the NKVD [People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs] (Mokhtari, 1998, p. 53). However, the interests of the country and, more immediately, the development of its northern provinces, required the normalization of relations.
By 1923-25, both countries had consolidated their state and administrative structure and had managed to crush internal separatist movements. In terms of conditions for achieving complete political independence, the main problems shifted to the sphere of the economy. Both in Persia and in the USSR (established in 1922), efforts were made to unfetter and expand private enterprise. In the USSR, this was made through the policy of NEP [New Economic Policy], and in Persia through the policy of encouraging the formation of companies. This also reflected in the way foreign trade was channeled through the creation of joint companies. Already in 1923, the Commercial Representative Office of the USSR was opened in Tehran, and later its branches were established in Tabriz, Anzali, Mashad and Bābol. They supervised the activities of the newly formed Soviet-Iranian societies. Some of the latter were specialized commercial companies, while others were engaged in export-import operations. In 1923, the Soviet-Iranian company Perskhlopok [Persian Cotton] was organized. It had a fixed capital of one million of Rials which increased tenfold by 1930. Not only did this company engage in exporting Iranian cotton to the USSR, which consumed 99% of Iranian exported cotton in the late 1920s, but it also provided agro-technical assistance and participated in the formation of enterprises for the primary treatment of raw cotton (Entner; see also COTTON ii. PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN IRAN). Improved American and Egyptian cotton seeds were introduced, model farms opened, and several dozen cotton-cleaning plants built. In Isfahan and Sabzavār alone, Perskhlopok built eight cotton-cleaning plants. Butter-making and soap-making workshops were opened in 1927 at plants built by Perskhlopok in Khorasan (in Terek). The company also reconstructed and launched plants located in Bandargaz, Ašraf, Bārforuš, Qom, Torbat and other cities, which had been closed in the period 1915-23 (Rabizade, 1970, p. 27).
Similar work was done by Persshelk [Persian Silk] company, which had also been created by the Commercial Representative Office of the USSR in 1923 (see ABRIŠAM). Silkworm breeding in northern Persia was in fact re-established with its help. Soviet-Iranian companies Sharq (Šarq), Rusperssakhar [Russian-Persian Sugar], Perssovneft [Persian-Soviet Oil] and Mansujāt-e Persorus were engaged in export-import operations. Avtoiran [Auto-Iran] and Byuropers [Bureau-Persia] companies provided transportation service for the Soviet-Iranian trade, Ruspersbank [Russian-Persian Bank] dealt with clearing transactions. Series of representative offices of the Soviet organizations, such as Glavkhlopok and Zakgostorg, were at work (Palyukaĭtis, 1965, pp. 200-01). In 1923, the Soviet-Iranian Bank (Ruspersbank) began its work to provide credit for the joint companies.
Trying to retain the right to the concession for oil extraction in the northern regions of Persia, which had been received in 1916 by the Russian industrialist A. M. Khoshtariya, the Soviet government in 1925 bought out his allotted shares (65%) in the Kavir-e Ḵuriān Company that owned several low-powered wells in the Semnān region. However, the government did not recognize the legitimacy of the deal, which was part of the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Second World War.
On the basis of the fishing concession reserved for the Soviet side for five years according to the treaty of 1921, the joint company Persryba [Persian Fish] (later Iranryba [Iranian Fish]) was created in 1927 after the concession expired. The juridical basis was the agreement of 1927 for joint exploitation (for 25 years) of fish resources of the southern coast of the Caspian Sea and at the mouth of the rivers Safid-rud, Bābol, and Gorgān. This agreement was signed simultaneously with the Treaty of Warranties and Neutrality concluded in 1927 in Moscow, for three years with automatic annual extensions, so long as both sides agreed to it. Another agreement was also signed which legally laid out the organizational perimeters of the foreign trade and the economic relations already formed by then. The quota system and the trade balance ratios were fixed so that every import transaction had to be accompanied by an export transaction of approximately equal amount. During that period, upon initiating the monopoly for the foreign trade and starting the industrialization, the USSR toughened the currency control. The negotiations were long and difficult, and, for the purpose of gaining concessions from the Soviet side, Persia even resorted to boycotting Soviet goods in early 1927. In April 1927, replying to the proposal of the delegation of merchants to close the Iranian border to the import of Soviet goods, Reza Shah suggested to wait for the results of the negotiations (Agaev, 1971, p. 63). As the Soviet government agreed to establish the license-free mode in the trade with Persia, with the right for the Iranian merchants to perform commercial transactions immediately on the Soviet territory, the question of the boycott was never raised any more.
Additional benefits were granted to the participants in the annual trade fairs held until 1928 in the cities of Nizhniy Novgorod and Baku, and in which Persia took an active part. The trade with Persia was important both for the USSR and for Persia. It is not without reason that a study commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the National Bank stated that “at the moment of creation of the National Bank in 1928, the economic situation in Iran was very difficult. However, upon establishing commercial relations with Russia, the situation changed towards the revival of the economy that enabled the Iranian government to carry out a series of economical measures” (Tārik-e sisāla, p. 155).
The further development of the Soviet-Iranian relations was influenced by changes in the power structure in the two states as they both increasingly gravitated towards dictatorship, as well as by the world economic crisis. In the period 1929-33, the foreign trade turnover of Iran was reduced 3.3 fold and the Soviet Union accounted for 35 percent of Iranian foreign trade. However, it was most important for Iran to retain its share of the Soviet market. In those years, the USSR was buying 100 percent of all Iranian exports of fish and ambary, 97.5 percent of rice and cattle, 90 percent of cotton, 86 percent of wool, 68 percent of silkworm cocoons, 47 percent of leather and hides (Vneshnyaya torgovlya k VII S”ezdu Sovetov SSSR. Otchyot Narodnogo komissariata vneshneĭ torgovli, p. 52). Already in 1931 Persia passed a law establishing a monopoly in foreign trade and, before that, a law for the currency monopoly, and the state began to interfere vigorously into the economy of the country, including foreign trade. The USSR was the first country to recognize the monopoly in foreign trade that Persia and Russia had declared, in the treaty of 1931, on trade and sea navigation. This treaty confirmed the principle of establishing a trade balance, though this time not for each transaction but for annual results. The Treaty of 1931 covered trade rules for a period of three years.
In these years, the NEP (New Economic Policy) was being curtailed in the USSR, and private capital was completely forced out not only from industry, but from commerce too. All joint Soviet-Iranian companies ceased their activities, except for Soviranryba (Soviet-Iranian Fish) that stopped its dealings after the expiration of the 25-year period of agreement, in 1952.
The new Treaty of 1935 (also concluded for a period of three years) was put into practice by the state organizations exclusively. Not only did they carry out the trade, but they also participated in the building and equipping of various state-owned plants and in supplying transportation means for the northern section of the Trans-Iranian railway, which then was under construction. In this period, Persia and the USSR signed a convention for combating horticultural pests and diseases, a sanitary-veterinary agreement, and a convention for fighting locusts in the border regions. Relations on the national level were fairly buoyant. In 1935, a commercial-industrial delegation from Persia headed by the Minister of Commerce and the Minister of Agriculture visited Moscow, and so did the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran. In 1935, the USSR agreed to hand over to Iran the lighthouses located on the Iranian shore of the Caspian Sea. When the USSR joined the League of Nations in 1934, Iran tried to use this move to persuade the USSR to delete clause 6 from the Treaty of 1921 (see above), on the grounds that the Charter of the League of Nations itself guaranteed the members’ security. However, the USSR refused to do so and this had an adverse effect on any further development of relations between the two countries.
After the expiration of the period of validity of the Treaty of 1935, economic relations between the USSR and Iran practically ceased, as the Iranian side refused to prolong the treaty. The share of the USSR in the Iranian foreign trade turnover in 1939-40 dropped to 0.5 percent. The political relations of the USSR with Iran were at a level well below those with Turkey and Afghanistan. The concept of Germany as a “third power” to counter-balance the excessive Russian and British influence on Iranian affairs started to play an ever-increasing role in the foreign policy of Iran.
Worsening of relations in this period was, to a certain extent, connected to the increasingly repressive measures adopted by the Iranian government against Iranian communists and the trade unions. This was the period of the expulsion of Iranian migrants from the USSR to Iran. Many of them had been seasonal workers as early as in the period of the Tsarist Russia and mainly lived in Trans-Caucasus, in Azerbaijan. The number of those who were expelled just from the Caucasus exceeded 3,000 people.
The government of the USSR had to cut down the network of its consulates and reduce the number of the consular and diplomatic representatives. By 1938, only the consulate in Bandar-e Pahlavi (Anzali) was functioning. At the same time, the Soviet leadership also demanded a reduction in the number of the Iranian consulates within the USSR.
The problem of the frontier (in the region of Moḡān and Atrek) was left unresolved, until boundary controversies were settled by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1957, which finally resolved the frontier issues. In the 1930s, the juridical status of the Caspian Sea was fixed legally for the first time. In 1931, the convention of settlement, trade and sea navigation was passed, in which the legal status of the Caspian was fixed as that of a common sea. Yet, the question of the demarcation of the waters was not raised. However, in subsequent years, the Soviet Union actually unilaterally established the boundary sea line as a conventional line connecting the opposite points of the land frontier–from Āstārā to Ḥasan-Qoli. Iranian ships were not allowed beyond this line (423 km). This may have been a pragmatic decision, but it was not in anyway legally related to the navigation treaties between the two countries, the Treaty of Navigation of 1935, or the Treaty of Trade and Navigation of 1940. The Treaty of 1940 became the final and the crucial document regarding the status of the Caspian Sea. The Caspian was regarded as a Soviet and Iranian sea; equal rights were envisaged for navigation under the national flag, and the order of using the ports, carriage of freights and fishing was stipulated. According to the clause 13, only the ships of the USSR and Iran were allowed in the Caspian Sea. For the first time, the treaty discussed the question of the territorial rights of the coastal zone, defined to exist within the limit of ten nautical miles.
The welcoming attitude of the Iranian government towards the expansion of the German presence (economic and military) in the late 1930s made relations between the USSR and Iran even more tense. Even though, after the outbreak of World War II, Iran declared its neutrality, the danger of using its territory by the German troops remained considerably high. Iran was of strategic interest for Germany, both as a bridgehead to advance into the USSR and British India, and as a source of oil. After the invasion of the USSR by German troops, the Soviet government sent diplomatic notes to the Iranian government on June 26, July 19 and August 16, 1941 requesting the expulsion of German agents from the country; similar notes were dispatched by the British government. The growing Soviet-British pressure over Iran was accompanied by the concentration of troops at the borders. The legal basis for bringing the troops in was the clause 6 of the Treaty of 1921. On August 25, 1941, the Soviet troops entered the territory of Northern Iran through the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the British troops entered Southern Iran. The agreement between Iran, the USSR and Great Britain, concluded on 8th September 1941, defined the troop disposition according to which the Iranian troops remained in the central part of Iran. However, since the main condition of the Agreement, namely the expulsion of the representatives of Germany, was not fulfilled, the Allied troops occupied Tehran on September 15. The next day Reza Shah abdicated from the throne in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza. The official reasons given for bringing in the troops were the threat of an offensive against the USSR directed from Iran, preventing the potential use of Iranian troops against the USSR and the necessity to transport military supplies and food to the USSR through Iranian territory. The Iranian operation turned out to be practically the only military success in the initial period of the war, since by September 1941 the Germans had occupied the Baltic Republics, the Byelorussia and a considerable part of the Ukraine, and the Red Army was suffering heavy losses. In January 1942, the USSR, Great Britain, and Iran concluded a Union Treaty according to which Iran made its territory available for transit supplies to the USSR. Great Britain and the USSR declared their respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Iran, pledged to protect it against aggression from Germany and to withdraw their troops not later than six months after victory over Germany. In November 1943 Tehran was the venue for the Allies’ Conference, which charted out the further development of the war and its aftermath. It was the only trip ever made by Joseph Stalin outside the USSR.
In the autumn of 1945, Great Britain and the U.S. began to withdraw their troops, since their period of stay would expire in December 1945. Since on November 12 the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was declared in Tabriz, claiming a wide measure of autonomy within Iran, and in January 1946 the Kurdish Autonomous Republic was proclaimed, the Soviet troops prevaricated and did not follow suit. The Iranian side, through their prime minister, Aḥmad Qawām (Qawām-al-Salṭana), who visited Moscow in February 1946, was trying to speed up the withdrawal of the troops and agreed to the proposal of the Soviet side to grant the USSR a concession for exploiting oil in the Northern regions of Iran. At the time when the Soviet troops were sent into Iran, a geological survey group from Baku was deputed to the Northern Iranian provinces. The group attested to the existence of substantial oil deposits in Iranian Azerbaijan, Gilān and other northern provinces. However, all subsequent data from the region has failed to substantiate this claim. Large-scale geological surveys carried out in the last decade of the 20th century has not found any indications of commercially significant oil deposits in this region either. It appears that the earlier positive conclusion was made under pressure from Bagirov who, as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, was eager to occupy and control the Azerbaijani territories of Iran with the perspective of their unification with the Soviet Azerbaijan. Also, the fact that there were substantial oil fields in Soviet Azerbaijan, made the possibility that similar fields were also to be found on the Iranian side more credible to the Soviet Union. On 4 April 1946, the Agreement on Oil was signed in Tehran. Upon signing the provisional communiqué, the USSR announced the withdrawal of the troops. In a letter by Qawām addressed to Stalin, which the Persian prime minister sent before leaving Moscow, he assured Stalin that his aim was “to consolidate the political, economic, and cultural relations between our two countries” (Aliev, 2004, p. 222). This, to the Russian side, implied the retaining of the democratic autonomous governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. However, already by December 1946, government troops entered into Azerbaijan and Kurdistan after the earlier withdrawal of the Soviet troops in May 1946. The regional movements for local autonomy were suppressed, and their activists arrested, and many killed. Thousands of Iranian families emigrated to the Soviet Union, mainly from Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The 1946 Agreement on Oil was rejected by the parliament (majles), which declared it null and void.
After that, the relations between the USSR and Iran were restricted to formal diplomatic contacts. The strengthening of the influence of the USA in Iran had a negative impact on the bilateral relations, especially after the US-initiated coup of 1953, which deposed the government of Moṣaddeq (see COUP D’ETAT OF 1332/1953), and after Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Nevertheless, both sides took steps towards improving relations. In 1954, an agreement was signed for settling controversial frontier and financial questions, and in 1956 the Soviet side officially abandoned its claims to oil explorations by the Kavir-e Ḵuriān company. In June-July 1956, the Shah of Iran and Queen Soraya visited the USSR. However, after the downfall of the monarchy in Iraq, a military treaty signed between Iran and the Unites States clearly had an adverse impact on Iranian and Soviet relations. In 1959, Iran was engaged in negotiations with the USSR for the conclusion of the treaty of non-aggression but was delaying the negotiations by putting forward new conditions each time. As a result, the Soviet delegation left Tehran, and the relations between the two countries suffered a new crisis.
The White Revolution (enqelāb-e sefid) of 1963, heralding a series of reforms from above, was preceded by a new stage in the normalization and expansion of the relations with the USSR. In a redirection of its foreign policy, Iran turned from an exclusive orientation to the USA and engaged in the tactics of flexible maneuvering between the West and the East. On 15 September 1962, the Iranian government declared to the Soviet government in a diplomatic note that Iran “shall not grant any foreign state the right to have missile bases of whatever type on the territory of Iran” and “shall never allow Iran to become an instrument of aggression against the territory of the Soviet Union” (Pravda, 16 September 1962). In the autumn of 1962, Leonid Brezhnev visited Iran, and in 1965 the Shah reciprocated by visiting the Soviet Union. In 1963, for the first time after the war, a major agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed in Tehran. It envisaged cooperation in the construction of the sites which were important for the development of economies of both countries, such as hydro-technical facilities on the frontier river Aras (a dam, a water reservoir and two electric power stations), sturgeon-breeding plant, grain elevator, melioration works in the region of the Bay of Mordāb on the Caspian, and others. Financing of the works was arranged on an equal footing. For the purpose of paying for the supply of equipment and technical services from the USSR, Iran was given a twelve-year credit to the amount of 35 million rubles with annual interest rate of 3.6 per cent. Given the rapid pace of industrialization that Iran had embarked upon, it was envisaged that the loan could be repaid through the export of Iranian goods to the USSR.
In August 1964, an agreement on airways was signed between Moscow and Tehran that made it possible for Soviet planes to fly to countries in Asia via Tehran and through Iranian air space and for Iranian planes to fly to Europe via Moscow.
In January 1966, the Soviet-Iranian Agreement of Cooperation in building industrial and other facilities was signed. This agreement envisaged the participation of the Soviet Union in the construction of the Isfahan metallurgic complex with an annual production capacity of 500-600 tons of steel. Besides that, the USSR was to cooperate in the creation of a plant to manufacture machine tools, and in the construction of the Trans-Iranian gas pipeline for exporting gas to the USSR. According to the agreement, Soviet organizations would design and survey the plants, supply equipment and provide experts for providing technical assistance. The Agreement envisaged supplies of gas to the Soviet Union and supplies of machinery and equipment to Iran for the period from 1970 to 1985. For these purposes, the USSR granted a credit to the amount of 200 million rubles for 12 years at an annual interest rate of 2.5%.
The steel-works in Isfahan was launched in March 1973. Mines for coal and iron ore extraction were launched with the help of the USSR to provide the complex with raw materials. For those employed at the complex, the USSR built the city of Āriyāšahr with its necessary economic and social infrastructure.
The plant for the production of machine tools in the city of Arāk, which was built with the help of USSR in 1969-72, had the capacity of 30 thousand tons of products per year and was the first multi-purpose enterprise for manufacturing lifting cranes, steam-boilers, equipment for sugar and cement plants, and agricultural machinery.
The 1,106 km Trans-Iranian gas pipeline was launched in 1970. Its northern section of 500 km was built by the Soviet side. From the locality of Bid-e Boland, where the head facilities are situated, the pipeline passed along a route to Isfahan, Kāšān, Qom, Tehran, Qazvin, Rašt, Anzali, and Āstārā. From Āstārā, the gas entered the USSR, and in late 1970, supplies of gas to the Trans-Caucasus began. It was Iran’s first export gas pipeline; prior to that the gas had been burnt off as waste. Already in 1972, the export of gas amounted to 8 milliard cubic meters and was on the increase in subsequent years.
As early as 1968, the Permanent Soviet-Iranian Commission for Economic Cooperation was set up with the aim of strengthening Soviet-Iranian economic relations. The Commission had had regular meetings up until the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
In connection with the construction of the hydro-technical facilities on the Aras river, an Additional Protocol to the Agreement of 1954 was signed in May 1970. The protocol defined the new line of the border across the water reservoirs of the Aras hydro-technical unit and the Mil-Moḡan intake water dam on the Aras River. Upon completing the demarcation works in August 1973, Iran and the USSR signed an Additional Protocol for the Treaty about the regulations of the Soviet-Iranian boundary of 1957 that was connected to the changes in boundary lines (Kulagina and Dunaeva, 1998, p. 75).
In 1972, a new treaty on developing economic and technical cooperation was signed which envisaged the participation of the USSR in the development of Iranian ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, oil-and-gas and petrochemical industries, irrigation, agriculture, power energy facilities, and grain elevators. Considerable attention was paid to cooperation in the field of personnel training. The treaty was concluded for a period of 15 years with automatic annual renewals for the subsequent five years so long as neither side formally requested its suspension.
Further expansion of economic relations and strengthening of political relations were interrupted by the Revolution of 1979 in Iran. After the overthrow of the shah, the leadership of the USSR declared its intention to develop friendly and neighborly relations with Iran. Besides that, it counted on the consolidation of the positions of the pro-communist parties within the new power structure and viewed the revolution as democratic and petty bourgeois in its inception. Many activists of the Tudeh (tuda) party, who had lived for years in exile, returned to Iran. The plenary session of the Tudeh Party’s (or PPI, People’s Party of Iran) Central Committee, which took place in East Berlin in late February 1979, declared its full support for the idea of creating an Islamic Republic in Iran. The Soviet leadership was likewise attracted by the anti-American mood of the new authorities. Even though the Islamic leadership announced the main trend of its foreign policy to be “neither East nor West,” it was the USSR ambassador who was the first foreign envoy to be received by Ayatollah Khomeini (Ḵomeyni) after the Islamic Revolution.
However, subsequent events indicated that the new regime was curtailing its ties with the USSR. Immediately after the revolution, Iran made an appeal to the UN to denounce clauses 5 and 6 of the Treaty of 1921 and then announced a price rise for the gas supplied to the USSR. The Iranian-Soviet relations also suffered an important setback when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Like the United States, the Soviet Union was also branded and denounced as a “Satan.” There were attacks on its embassy in Tehran and on the Consulate in Isfahan. Relations were also adversely affected by the supply of Soviet weapons to Iraq at the peak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1982, and by the suppression of the Tudeh party and subsequent show trials of some of its prominent members on television. Because of the disagreement on gas prices, Iran cut off supplies to the gas pipeline in February 1980, even though there was no market for the Iranian gas other than in the Soviet Union. In 1983, a group of people employed at the Soviet Embassy was expelled from Iran, and in 1984-85 the number of the Soviet Diplomatic Corps at the Embassy was reduced. The Soviet-Iranian Cultural Center in Tehran was closed down, and it became exceedingly difficult for Soviet nationals to obtain entry visas to Iran. However, the viewpoint of those in authority in the USSR who did not support the economic embargo of Iran gradually prevailed and given the immediate needs of Iran for essential consumer commodities and for replacing equipment, especially after the end of the war with Iraq, a slow amelioration in the relationship between the two states began to emerge. Already during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moḥammad Javād Lārijāni, visited Moscow and handed over a message from the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ʿAli Khamenei (Ḵāmeneʾi), regarding the intention of the Iranian leadership to develop good neighborly relations with the USSR. In February 1988, the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.F. Petrovskiĭ, attended the celebrations of the 9th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. Together with the Iranian Prime Minister Mir Ḥosayn Musavi, they discussed questions of renewing large-scale cooperation. The Treaty on transit was signed, and the USSR became a regular participant in the international trade fairs in Tehran. In 1988, the two countries signed an Agreement of cooperation for the construction and exploitation of hydro-technical units in Ḵodā-Āfarin and Qiz-Qalasi on the Aras River.
A new stage in the improvement of relations is connected with the beginning of the perestroika period in the USSR and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. On January 1 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini addressed Mikhail Gorbachev with a message in which he spoke of the necessity of learning about Islam and said that Communism should be looked for in museums of political history and that Iran follows the principles of being a good neighbor. In February 1989, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, visited the Islamic Republic of Iran for the first time and was received by Ayatollah Khomeini. Soon after the death of Khomeini, the Speaker of the Iranian majles, ʿAli-Akbar Hāšemi-Rafsanjāni, who became the president of the country shortly afterwards, visited the USSR. On June 22 1989, a long-term program for commercial-economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation until the year 2000 was signed in Moscow. Simultaneously, treaties were signed regarding commodity circulation supplies of Iranian gas, which were renewed in April 1990 (after the breakdown of the USSR it ceased to be the property of Russia), the construction of the railway Tejen-Saraḵs- Mashad, and the participation of the USSR in the modernization of the Iranian energy power supply sources including the development of nuclear energy. The program also envisaged military-technical cooperation, which mainly included supplies of military equipment. After the breakdown of the USSR, Russia, as the legal successor of the international obligations of the former, continued the cooperation with Iran on the basis of this program, with the exception of those sites which had immediate bearing to the interests of the newly formed post-Soviet states. The new stage of cooperation with Iran is connected with the formation of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) as an independent state.
Bibliography:
S. L. Agaev, Iran: vneshnyaya politika i problemy nezavisimosti. 1921-1945 gg. (Iran: Foreign Policy and Problems of Independence. 1921-1945.), Moscow, 1971.
Moḥammad Ṭāher Aḥmadi, ed., Asnād-e rawābeṭ-e Irān va Šowrāvi dar dawra-ye Reżā Šāh, 1304-1318 Ḥ.Š, Sāzmān-e asnād-e melli-ye Irān, Tehran, 1995.
S. M. Aliev, Istoriya Irana. XX vek (History of Iran. 20th century), Moscow, 2004.
Cosroe Chaqueri, The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920-1921: Birth of the Trauma, Pittsburgh, 1995.
Dokumenty vneshneĭ politiki SSSR (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR), vol. 1, Moscow, 1957.
M. L. Entner, Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828-1914, The University of Florida Monographs 28, Gainesville, 1965.
V. Genis, Krasnaya Persiya (Red Persia), Moscow, 2000.
L. M. Kulagina and E. V. Dunaeva, Granitsa Rossii s Iranom (istoriya formirovaniya) (The Frontier of Russia with Iran (the History of its establishment), Moscow, 1998.
M. T. Mokhtari, “K voprosu ob otnosheniyakh Irana i Rossii” (About the question of relations between Iran and Russia), Islamskaya Respublika Iran v 90-e gody (Islamic Republic of Iran in the 90s), Moscow, 1998.
Moḥammad Mokri, Na šarqi, na ḡarbi, jomhuri-ye eslāmi: majmuʿa-ye soḵanrāni-hā va aḵbār-e montašer šoda dar jarāʾed, Tehran, 1983.
I. I. Palyukaĭtis, Īkonomicheskoe razvitie Irana (Economic development of Iran), Moscow, 1965.
M. A. Persits, Zastenchivaya iterventsiya (A hesitant intervention), Moscow, 1996.
M. V. Popov, Missiya E. A. Babushkina v Irane (Mission of E. A. Babushkin in Iran), Moscow, 1974.
Pravda (The Newspaper “Pravda”), 16 September 1962.
M. M. Rabizade, Razvitie kapitalisticheskogo predprinimatel’stva v promyshlennosti Irana v 30-kh godakh XX veka (Development of the Capitalist Undertaking in the Industry of Iran in the 30s of the 20th Century), Baku, 1970.
Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Modern Historical Documents, Fond 122, Inventory 1, Case 261, unnumbered folio.
Vneshnyaya torgovlya k VII S”ezdu Sovetov SSSR. Otchyot Narodnogo komissariata vneshneĭ torgovli (Foreign Trade up to the 7th Congress of Soviets of the USSR. Report by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade), Moscow, 1935.
Tāriḵ-e sisāla-ye bānk-e melli-e Irān. 1307-1337, trans. into Russian as 30-letie istorii natsional’nogo banka, Tehran, 1959.
March 6, 2009
(N. M. Mamedova)
Originally Published: July 20, 2009
Last Updated: July 20, 2009Cite this entry:
N. M. Mamedova, “RUSSIA ii. IRANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS (1917-1991),” Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 2009, available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/russia-ii-iranian-soviet-relations-1917-1991 (accessed on 07 July 2009).

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One of the first hostile steps between the great powers at the very beginning of the Cold War was the Iranian crisis of 1946.

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One of the first hostile steps between the great powers at the very beginning of the Cold War was the Iranian crisis of 1946 .

One of the first hostile steps between the great powers at the very beginning of the Cold War was the Iranian crisis of 1946.

One of the first hostile steps between the great powers at the very beginning of the Cold War was the Iranian crisis of 1946.

In July, Truman revoked Morgenthau's JCS 1067 plan that ordered the U.S. forces in the occupied Germany "to not take any step towards the economic rehabilitation of Germany."

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okupiranoj Njemačkoj "" da ne poduzimaju nijedan korak prema ekonomskoj rehabilitaciji Njemačke

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In July , Truman revoked Morgenthau 's JCS 1067 plan that ordered the U.S. forces in the occupied Germany " to not take any step towards the economic rehabilitation of Germany . "

When Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba and introduced communism, the United States could not accept the communist country and the ideology itself in its proximity, and, accordingly, silently approved the revenge of Castro and his regime.Department of State Report with a meeting with Castro - 4 September 1959.

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This statement allowed the U.S. and China to temporarily take a side of the “ key issue that disrupts the normalization of relations ” about Taiwan ’s political status .

But the U.S. continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 1979 , when it broke these relations and established complete diplomatic relations with China .

US President Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brežnev sign the SALT I in Vladivostok , on 23 November US President Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brežnev sign the SALT II in Vienna , on 18 June 1979 .

Later , in June of the same year , Nixon and Kissinger went to Moscow and announced the beginning of negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons that had to limit the production of expensive anti - ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles .

Ta izjava je SAD-u i Kini omogućila da privremeno stave sa strane "ključno pitanje koje ometa normalizaciju odnosa" oko političkog statusa Tajvana. No, SAD je nastavio diplomatske odnose s Tajvanom sve do 1979. kada je raskinuo te odnose i uspostavio potpune diplomatske odnose s NR Kinom. Američki predsjednik Gerald Ford i sovjetski vođa Leonid Brežnjev potpisuju SALT I u Vladivostoku, 23. studenog Američki predsjednik Jimmy Carter i sovjetski vođa Leonid Brežnjev potpisuju SALT II u Beču, 18. lipnja 1979. Kasnije, u lipnju iste godine, Nixon i Kissinger su otišli u Moskvu i objavili početak pregovora o ograničenju strateškog naoružanja koji su trebali ograničiti proizvodnju skupih antibalističkih projektila i nuklearnih raketa.

This statement allowed the U.S. and China to temporarily take a side of the “ key issue that disrupts the normalization of relations” about Taiwan’s political status. But the U.S. continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan until 1979, when it broke these relations and established complete diplomatic relations with China. US President Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brežnev sign the SALT I in Vladivostok, on 23 November US President Jimmy Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brežnev sign the SALT II in Vienna, on 18 June 1979. Later, in June of the same year, Nixon and Kissinger went to Moscow and announced the beginning of negotiations on the limitation of strategic weapons that had to limit the production of expensive anti-ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles.

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