Falklandski rat ili Malvinski rat je oružani sukob Argentine i Velike Britanije koji je trajao od 19. ožujka do 14. lipnja 1982. godine, a kojemu je povod bio teritorijalni spor oko Falklandskog otočja.

 Uzroci rata

 Rana povijest
Prema tvrdnjama Britanaca, otočje je otkrio istraživač John Davies 1592., dok Argentinci tvrde da je otočje otkrio španjolski istraživač Esteban Gomez 1520. Nakon toga, otočje je promijenilo nekoliko suverena koji su se kretali od Engleza, Francuza, Španjolaca itd. Do 1811. godine Malvinama su vladali Španjolci, od kojih se 1816. osamostalila Argentina i četiri godine kasnije preuzela suverenitet nad otočjem. Godine 1833., Britanci su ponovo preuzeli vlast i istjerali stanovnike. Godine 1837., otočje je dobilo status britanske kolonije i ime Falklandi.

 20. stoljeće
Argentina, u kojoj se otočje naziva Malvinskim otočjem (Islas Malvinas) ih je sve vrijeme smatrala svojim, ali sve do druge polovice 20. stoljeća nije bila u stanju mnogo učiniti po tom pitanju s obzirom na snagu Britanskog Imperija. U međuvremenu je na otočju sagrađena pomorska baza kao i doveden određen broj uglavnom škotskih doseljenika čiji se potomci danas uglavnom bave uzgojem ovaca.
lijevo|mini|250px|Leopoldo Galtieri u tzv. Ružičastoj kući, službenom središtu izvršne vlasti Argentinske Republike.
Nakon drugog svjetskog rata Velika Britanija je zapala u veliku ekonomsku krizu i bila prisiljena započeti proces dekolonizacije, koji je uključio i njene udaljene posjede. Falklandsko otočje je davno bilo izgubilo svoju stratešku važnost i održavanje britanskog suvereniteta na tako udaljenom, ekonomskim neisplativom i gotovo nenastanjenom području se smatralo neopravdanim. Od kraja 1960-ih britanski Foreign Office je započeo pregovore s Argentinom u cilju podjele, odnosno prijenosa suvereniteta.

Ti pregovori su tekli prilično sporo, pa je početkom 1980-ih tadašnja argentinska vojna hunta pod vodstvom generala Leopolda Galtierija odlučila teritorijalni spor prekinuti oružanim putem kako bi pažnju javnosti skrenula s katastrofalne ekonomske krize i desetina tisuća mrtvih i nestalih u Prljavom ratu protiv ljevice. S obzirom na to da je Velika Britanija iz ekonomskih razloga već desetljećima smanjivala vlastite oružane snage, uključujući nekoć snažnu Kraljevsku mornaricu, kao i na udaljenost Falklanda od najbližih britanskih baza, držalo se da je bilo kakva vojna reakcija na argentinsko osvajanje otočja iznad britanskih mogućnosti te da će britanska vlada biti prisiljena prihvatiti svršeni čin.

 Tijek rata

Smatra se da su ratne operacije počele 19. ožujka iskrcavanjem 50 Argentinaca na otok Južnu Georgiju, podizanjem argentinske zastave i simboličkim preuzimanjem suvereniteta. Pokušaj britanskog broda HMS Enterprise da intervenira je spriječila argentinska ratna mornarica. Dana 2. travnja 1982. argentinski marinci su se u tzv. "Operaciji Rosario" iskrcali na Falklande i nakon kraćeg otpora savladali malobrojni britanski garnizon. Istoga dana su argentinske snage zaposjele Južnu Georgiju i otočje Južni Sandwich.

U Argentini je uspješna invazija izazvala svenarodno slavlje. Argentinske vlasti su promijenile ime falklandskog glavnog grada Port Stanley u "Puerto Argentino", uvele španjolski kao službeni jezik i tjerale stanovnike da voze desnom stranom ulice.

lijevo|mini|250px|Nosač aviona HMS Invincible negdje u južnom Atlantiku 1982.

Nakon početne nevjerice i šoka, britanska vlada Margaret Thatcher je odlučila otočje vratiti oružanim putem:"Ovo je pozadina nasuprot koje moramo donositi odluke i razmotriti najbolje mjere koje možemo poduzeti. Ne mogu reći Domu precizno koje aktivnosti su poduzete - dio brodovlja je već na moru, drugi su stavljeni u najviši stupanj pripravnosti u četvrtak navečer. Vlada je donijela odluku da će velika operativna grupa isploviti čim sve pripreme budu gotove. "HMS Invincible" će joj biti na čelu i u ponedjeljak će napustiti luku. Naglašavam da ne mogu prognozirati kakve će naredbe operativna grupa dobivati u nastavku. To će ovisiti o onome kako će se situacija s vremenom razvijati. U međuvremenu se nadamo da će kontinuirani diplomatski napori, u kojima nam pomažu mnogi prijatelji, uroditi plodom..."  - obraćanje Margaret Thatcher Donjem domu britanskog parlamenta, 3. travnja 1982. Mornarička eskadra s dva nosača aviona (HMS Invincible i HMS Hermes) poslana je u Južni Atlantik, a kasnije su im se pridružile kopnene snage od nekih 5000 ljudi. Velika Britanija je također pokrenula diplomatsku ofenzivu - iako su se latinoameričke i nesvrstane zemlje (uključujući SFRJ) uglavnom svrstale uz Argentinu, Britanci su uspjeli isposlovati rezoluciju UN koja je zahtijevala argentinsko povlačenje te podršku od strane svojih partnera u EEZ. S druge strane, SAD su ostale neutralne u sukobu, a administracija Ronalda Reagana oštro podijeljena po tome kojem od svoja dva saveznika pružiti podršku. Francuska, pak, iako formalno na britanskoj strani, nastavila je pružati tehničku podršku Argentini s protubrodskim projektilima Exocet.

Britanska protuofenziva je prve rezultate dala 21. travnja kada je odred marinaca i specijalaca 25. travnja osvojio Južnu Georgiju i zarobio argentinsku podmornicu.

Dana 1. svibnja su Britanci počeli sa zračnim napadima na Port Stanley, a nakon toga su uslijedili prvi okršaji između britanskih i argentinskih zrakoplova. Dan kasnije zbio se ključni događaj cijelog rata - britanska nuklearna podmornica Conqueror potopila je argentinsku krstaricu General Belgrano. Nakon toga se argentinska mornarica povukla u matične luke, prepustivši zrakoplovstvu da snabdijeva garnizon na Falklandima i pokuša spriječiti britansko iskrcavanje.
desno|mini|250px|Sea Harrier britanske Kraljevske mornarice uoči Falklandskog rata

Iako se argentinsko zrakoplovstvo, koje je operiralo iz baza u Argentini, istaklo u ratu i iako je uspjelo potopiti britanske brodove, uključujući razarač Sheffield, nije bilo u stanju spriječiti britansko iskrcavanje u zaljevu San Carlos 21. svibnja.

Iako su britanske snage na Falklandima bile brojčano inferiorne Argentincima te opterećene nedostatkom teškog oružja i cijelim nizom logističkih problema, 28. svibnja su nakon teške borbe uspjele likvidirati argentinski garnizon u Goose Greeneu. Nakon toga su slijedili manji okršaji kao priprema za ofenzivu na Port Stanley koja je počela 11. lipnja. Tom prilikom su Britanci izveli jedan od posljednjih juriša u povijesti u kojima je korišten bajunet. Argentinske snage, sastavljene od neiskusnih, demoraliziranih i loše vođenih ročnika, brzo su podlegle malobrojnijim napadačima sastavljenim od iskusnih, vrhunski izvježbanih i profesionalnih postrojbi. 14. lipnja, u trenutku kada su se britanske snage nalazile na prilazima Port Stanleyu, je argentinski zapovjednik Falklanda potpisao kapitulaciju. Dana 20. lipnja je kapitulirao i argentinski garnizon na Južnom Sandwich otočju čime su završile ratne operacije.

 Posljedice
lijevo|mini|250px|Položena oružja predatih Argentinaca
Iako zasjenjen hladnim ratom, a poslije ignoriran zbog "političke korektnosti", Falklandski rat je jedan od najvažnijih sukoba iz druge polovice 20. stoljeća.

S obzirom na to da je predstavljao jedan od rijetkih modernih oružanih sukoba u kojemu su sukobljene strane bile relativno izjednačene po svojim snagama i opremi, te koji se vodio isključivo konvencionalnim snagama, falklandski rat već desetljećima privlači pažnju vojnih analitičara zbog cijelog niza pouka koje se mogu primijeniti na slične sukobe koji bi se mogli zbiti u budućnosti.

Političke posljedice samog rata bile su daleko važnije od odgovora na pitanje čiji je suverenitet nad Falklandskom otočju.

U Argentini je poražena i osramoćena vojska izgubila svaki autoritet, te je nakon niza prosvjeda, u kojemu su prednjačili veterani falklandskog rata, bila godine 1983. prisiljena odstupiti u korist demokratski izabranih predstavnika naroda. Time je Argentina postala primjer cijelom nizu drugih latinoameričkih državama u kojima će 1980-ih i 1990-ih vojne diktature biti zamijenjene demokratskim uređenjem.

U Velikoj Britaniji je pobjeda u falklandskom ratu vratila nacionalno samopouzdanje i označila povratak te države kao velike sile. Margaret Thatcher i njena Konzervativna stranka, kojoj su prije rata svi bili predviđali poraz, godinu dana kasnije je na izborima do nogu potukla oporbene laburiste te dobila mandat za svoj radikalni program neoliberalnih gospodarskih reformi, koje danas predstavljaju standard u većini razvijenih industrijskih država.

 Hrvati u Malvinskom ratu
desno|mini|200px|Par Super Etendarda Argentinske ratne mornarice 1982.
Nekoliko argentinskih Hrvata istaknulo se u ratu, uglavnom kao piloti Argentinskog ratnog zrakoplovstva. Kapetan korvete Roberto Ćurilović bio je pilot aviona Dassault Super Étendard koji je 25. svibnja 1982. lansiranjem projektila Exocet potopio SS Atlantic Conveyor, što je tada bio bio je najveći u ratu potopljeni britanski brod od kraja Drugog svjetskog rata. Sergio Sepetić bio je dio posade izvidničkog zrakoplova Lockheed P-2 Neptune koja je 4. svibnja 1982. navela argentinske lovce prema razaraču HMS Sheffield nakon čega je taj brod potopljen. Daniel Antonio Jukić poginuo je 1. svibnja 1982. kao pilot FMA IA 58 Pucare u napadu britanskih Harriera na Goose Green.

 U popularnoj kulturi

 Film

 Nedžentlmenski potez (engl:An Ungentlemanly Act), igrani je film u redatelja Suarta Urbana iz 1992., u produkciji BBC-a, koji prati tzv. Operaciju Rosario iz perspektive britanskog garnizona na otočju.
 Prosvijetljeni vatrom (španj: Iluminados por el fuego), argentinski je film iz 2005. godine koji prati sukob kroz sjećanja mladog ročnika poslanog na Falklande.

 Glazba

 Pjesma Dire Straitsa - Brothers in Arms inspirirana je Falklandskim ratom

 Videoigre

 Project Reality, mod za Battlefield 2 sadrži mape koje se odvijaju u Falklandskom ratu.

 Arma 3, sadrži Steam Workshop mod naziva:  "Goose Green, Falklands", što su mape koje se odvijaju u Falklandskom ratu.

 Izvori

Kategorija:Ratovi
Kategorija:Povijest Argentine
Kategorija:Povijest Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva (1945. – 1989.)
Kategorija:Povijest Falklandskog otočja
Falklandski
Kategorija:Europska kolonizacija Južne Amerike

After that, the islands changed several sovereigns that moved from the English, French, Spanish, etc.

Îles Malouines
(Falkland Islands)
Territoire britannique d'outre-mer
|
Capitale: Port Stanley
|
Population: 2800 habitants (+ 2000 soldats britanniques)
Langue officielle: anglais (de facto)
Groupe majoritaire: anglais (96 %)
Groupes minoritaires: espagnol (3,5 %), japonais (0,8 %)
Système politique: territoire britannique d'outre-mer
Articles constitutionnels (langue): art. 1, 5, 6, 16 et 18 de la Constitution du 1er janvier 2009
Lois linguistiques: Loi sur la nationalité britannique (1981); Loi sur la marine marchande (1995); Loi sur le Tribunal pénal international (Territoires d'outre-mer) (2001); Loi sur la nationalité, l'immigration et le droit d'asile (2002); Loi sur l'éducation (2002).
|Les îles Malouines
(en anglais:
Falkland Islands; en espagnol: Islas Malvinas) forment un
archipel du sud de l'océan Atlantique, à l'est du détroit de Magellan et
au nord-est de l'extrémité australe de l'Amérique du Sud (voir
la carte générale). Les quelque 200 îles de l'archipel sont réparties en deux
groupes principaux à l'est et à l'ouest du détroit des Falkland: l'East Falkland ou
Falkland orientale et
la West Falkland ou Falkland occidentale (voir
la carte détaillée).
|
L'archipel a une superficie totale d'environ 12 173 km², correspondant à peu près à celle de l'Irlande du Nord (14 139 km²) ou une fois et demi celle de la Corse (8691km²). la Falkland occidentale occupant 6760 km² et la Falkland orientale, 5413 km², toutes les deux comprenant de nombreux îlots attenants. La capitale est Port Stanley (ou Stanley) sur la côte est de la Falkland orientale. Les îles Malouines constituent un territoire britannique d'outre-mer (Overseas Territory of the Falkland Islands), distant de 15 000 km de la Grande-Bretagne.
Du point de vue géologique, les îles Malouines font partie de la Patagonie, située en Argentine, et sont reliées au continent par un plateau sous-marin élevé. Les Malouines sont situées à 485 km des côtes argentines, soit trente fois moins que pour Londres.
De son côté, l'Argentine a toujours revendiqué les îles Malouines (les Malvinas) comme faisant partie de son territoire national. Voici les «dispositions transitoires» de la Constitution argentine de 1994:
DISPOSICIONES TRANSITORIAS
Primera.
1) La Nación Argentina ratifica su legítima e imprescriptible soberanía sobre las islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos e insulares correspondientes, por ser parte integrante del territorio nacional.
2) La recuperación de dichos territorios y el ejercicio pleno de la soberanía, respetando el modo de vida de sus habitantes, y conforme a los principios del Derecho Internacional, constituyen un objetivo permanente e irrenunciable del pueblo argentino.
DISPOSITIONS TRANSITOIRES
Première disposition
1) La nation argentine ratifie sa souveraineté légitime et imprescriptible sur les îles Malouines, les îles Géorgie du Sud et Sandwich du Sud ainsi que les espaces maritimes et insulaires correspondants comme faisant partie intégrante du territoire national.
2) La récupération de ces territoires et l'exercice entier de la souveraineté, respectant le mode de vie de ses habitants, et conformément aux principes du droit international, constituent un objectif permanent et irrévocable du peuple argentin.
|Les Argentins réclament aussi comme dénomination internationale le nom de Malvinas (Malouines, en français). Aujourd'hui, la Géorgie du Sud-et-les Îles Sandwich du Sud sont sous la même juridiction que les îles Malouines. Aujourd'hui, les îles Malouines fonctionnent presque comme une démocratie à part entière, avec leur propre constitution, leurs lois et leur budget. Seule la politique étrangère et la défense sont assurées par la Grande-Bretagne. Vestige du colonialisme, un gouverneur représente la couronne britannique et discute avec le Parlement local. Pour les Argentins, les "Islas Malvivas son Argentinas" («les îles Malouines sont argentines»), car la souveraineté territoriale de l'archipel lui appartient depuis 1820, alors que l'Espagne cédait ces îles au gouvernement de Buenos Aires. Le 2 janvier 1833, les Britanniques occupèrent militairement l'archipel et se l'approprièrent unilatéralement.|
La présidente argentine, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, a dénoncé la «militarisation de l’Atlantique-Sud» et le «piratage de ses ressources pétrolières» de la part du Royaume-Uni. Dans une lettre adressée au premier ministre britannique et datée du 3 janvier 2013, Mme Kirchner demandait au Royaume-Uni de négocier la restitution des îles Malouines à l'Argentine.
Néanmoins, le gouvernement argentin ne remet pas en question les Accords de Madrid, signés en 1990 par le président Carlos Menem (1989-1999) et qui cédait un million de kilomètres carrés de mer territoriale au Royaume-Uni; il ne reconsidère pas non plus la Loi de protection des investissements britanniques. Et il continue de payer scrupuleusement la dette envers les banques anglaises et de subventionner les sociétés britanniques.
Selon le Comité de la décolonisation de l'ONU, il existe actuellement seize territoires colonisés en litige. Dix d'entre eux sont britanniques : les Malouines, Gibraltar (revendiqué par l'Espagne), Anguilla, les îles Vierges britanniques, les îles Caïman, Montserrat, les îles Turks-et-Caïcos, l'île de Sainte-Hélène, les Bermudes et l'île Pitcairn dans le Pacifique.
La population des îles Malouines est de 2800 habitants, auxquels il faut ajouter la présence de quelque 2000 soldats britanniques. La capitale Stanley regroupe à elle seule les trois quarts de la population (environ 2200 habitants), le reste étant dispersé sur les deux îles principales et sur quelques îles avoisinantes (environ 600 habitants); seulement quinze îles sont habitées sur les 200 que compte l’archipel. La population des Malouines est très majoritairement d'origine britannique ou provient de l'île Sainte-Hélène (Afrique). Seule une petite partie de la population est d'origine chilienne (une centaine d'individus) ou japonaise (auparavant 25 individus, mais pratiquement disparue maintenant). Autrement dit, les insulaires dont majoritairement des Blancs, mais il y a aussi des Noirs saint-hélèniens et des Hispaniques chiliens. Les insulaires de souche, tous des éleveurs de moutons, des pêcheurs, ou des descendants de militaires et de fonctionnaires, sont appelés kelpers («habitants des varechs») ou campers («campeurs»), selon qu'ils habitent le littoral ou les régions intérieures. Autrement dit, les Islanders ne constituent guère une population «autochtone», car comme dans toute enclave il s'agit d'une population «externe» qui y fut implantée. D'ailleurs, presque tous sont des descendants de Britanniques, mais avec un niveau de vie supérieur à celui des Anglais européens, et protégés par une troupe permanente de soldats britanniques.
En plus des insulaires des Malouines, il existe un contingent d'environ 2000 militaires britanniques, généralement membres de la Royal Air Force (RAF). Ils sont massivement cantonnés à la base de Mount Pleasant et certains à Mont Kent, mais vivent complètement à l'écart de la population. Les militaires ne résident que de quatre à six mois sur l'île de la Falkland orientale et sont autosuffisants en termes d'approvisionnements et de divertissements. Ils n'ont à peu près aucun contact avec la population de souche. À part les Chiliens (espagnol) et les très rarissimes Japonais, tous parlent l'anglais britannique. Forcément, en tant que que colonie britannique, l'archipel des Malouines a l'anglais comme langue officielle.
Le premier découvreur européen des îles aurait été, selon les Argentins, le navigateur espagnol Esteban Gomez (1520); pour les Britanniques, ce fut John Davies en 1592. En 1600, le navigateur hollandais Sebald Van Weert avait accosté sur les îles et les avait nommées îles Sebald. En 1690, le capitaine John Strong, un Anglais, navigua sur le détroit entre la Falkland orientale et la Falkland occidentale, et lui donna le nom de détroit de Falkland (d'après Lucius Cary, deuxième vicomte de Falkland).
3.1 Les Malouines françaises
Grâce à un capital familial, le comte Louis-Antoine de Bougainville (1729-1811), un Français, qui avait été aide de camp du marquis de Montcalm, fonda la Compagnie de Saint-Malo pour la colonisation des Malouines. Il avait comme objectif de relocaliser les Acadiens déportés de la Nouvelle-Écosse ayant transité par la France. En 1763, de Bougainville prit possession de la Falkland orientale au nom de Louis XV et y installa des Acadiens chassés du Canada par les Britanniques (lors de la déportation des Acadiens). L'année suivante, d'autres colons acadiens et français venus de Saint-Malo (d'où le nom de Malouines) s'ajoutèrent à la petite communauté naissante. Les Acadiens et les Français défrichèrent le sol et fondèrent un petit bourg nommé Port-Louis. En 1765, des Britanniques s'installèrent sur la Falkland occidentale. Mais les Espagnols s'insurgèrent contre cette présence «illégale» des Français et des Anglais parce que les Malouines faisaient partie de leur vice-royaume de Lima. Soucieux d´éviter un conflit avec l'Espagne alliée, Louis XV céda ses droits sur l'archipel en vendant la petite colonie aux Espagnols. Le 25 mars 1767, trois bâtiments de la Marine française vinrent rapatrier la colonie fondée par Bougainville, qui écrivit alors:
|Le ler avril (1767), je livrai notre établissement aux Espagnols qui en prirent possession en arborant l'étendard d'Espagne, que la terre et les vaisseaux saluèrent de vingt et un coups de canon au lever et au coucher du soleil. J'avais lu aux Français habitants de cette colonie naissante une lettre du roi, par laquelle Sa Majesté leur permettait d'y rester sous la domination du roi catholique. Quelques familles profitèrent de cette permission ; le reste, avec l'état-major, fut embarqué sur les frégates espagnoles, lesquelles appareillèrent pour Montevideo le 27 au matin [...].|
Presque toute la colonie repartit à bord des vaisseaux français, mais une trentaine d'Acadiens restèrent sur l'île où vivent probablement encore leurs descendants. En 1774, les Britanniques quittèrent les îles pour des raisons économiques. Lire aussi l'article de «La nouvelle Acadie»: les lieux de déportation et d'exil des Acadiens.
3.2 Les Malouines espagnoles
Les Islas Malvinas restèrent donc espagnoles jusqu'en 1811. Quelques années plus tard, soit en 1816, l'Argentine se libéra de la tutelle espagnole et, en 1820, revendiqua la souveraineté sur les Islas Malvinas. Selon les Argentins, le nouvel État devait hériter automatiquement de tous les droits espagnols de la région, ce qui incluait les Malvinas (Malouines).
Les autorités argentines y installèrent un gouverneur et une petite colonie pénitentiaire. Toutefois, afin d'éviter la prise des îles par les Américains, les Britanniques reprirent les Malouines aux Argentins en janvier 1833, sans devoir tirer un seul coup de feu. Puis ils expulsèrent les habitants et soutinrent n’avoir jamais renoncé à leurs droits, ce qui n'empêcha pas l'Argentine de maintenir ses revendications, en vain.
3.3 Les Malouines anglaises
En 1837, les Malouines/Malvinas s'appelèrent officiellement Falkland Islands et obtinrent officiellement le statut de «colonie britannique». Les îles Falkland (Malouines, en français) connurent ensuite une longue période de paix durant un siècle et demi. Pendant les deux grandes guerres mondiales, les îles démontrèrent leur grande valeur stratégique. En décembre 1914, un escadron de la marine britannique basé à Stanley combattit la flotte allemande et reprit le contrôle de l’Atlantique-Sud. En décembre 1939, la bataille de River Plate fut remportée par un groupe de croiseurs de la Royal Navy; après le conflit, un des navires mouilla à Port Stanley pour des réparations. Les insulaires continuèrent d'élever leurs moutons et à parler l'anglais.
3.4 La guerre des Malouines
Les négociations en vue d'un règlement du conflit argentino-britannique sur la souveraineté des îles Malouines commencèrent au milieu des années 1960 aux Nations unies. Les discussions étaient encore en cours en avril 1982, lorsque les forces argentines (plus de 10 000 soldats) envahirent et occupèrent toutes les îles britanniques (les Malouines, la Géorgie-du-Sud et la Sandwich-du-Sud) pendant environ dix semaines dans une tentative de régler la question par la force. Sur les places publiques de Buenos Aires, les combattants argentins étaient salués en héros. Le président argentin de l'époque, Eduardo Duhalde (de 2002 à 2003), avait pourtant déclaré : «Les Malouines sont nôtres et nous allons les récupérer, pas en faisant la guerre, mais par le travail, la foi et la persévérance... Il n'y a pas de titre de possession plus fort que celui octroyé par le sang.»
Mais l'enthousiasme des Argentins suscita l'humiliation et la colère des Britanniques qui décidèrent de riposter. Ce fut la «guerre des Malouines» (blocus maritime et attaque de la flotte argentine) au terme de laquelle l'Argentine fut vaincue par les forces britanniques et se rendit le 14 juin 1982. Trois jours après la capitulation argentine, le général Leopoldo Galtieri démissionnait de la présidence de la République argentine; il avait lancé son pays dans l'aventure nationaliste dans l'espoir de sauver la dictature militaire menacée par la crise économique et les mobilisations syndicales. Il croyait aussi que les Britanniques ne protesteraient que pour la forme, car Londres s'était bel et bien désintéressé du sort de ces îles déjà qualifiées par Samuel Johnson au XVIIe siècle «de rude inhospitalier et coûteux appendice aux possessions de la Couronne». Toutefois, la junte militaire argentine avait mal évalué la puissance militaire nettement supérieure de la Grande-Bretagne. Le bilan de l'affrontement pour les Malouines s'éleva à 904 morts, 649 Argentins, 255 Britanniques et trois Islanders. Quelques mois plus tard, la dictature argentine s'écroula, victime de la violence qu'elle avait déclenchée contre sa population.
Loin d'être une crise sans importance, la guerre des Malouines a laissé un souvenir resté vivace tant en Argentine qu'en Grande-Bretagne, ce qui a suscité des rancœurs patriotiques tenaces. Pour les Argentins, la Grande-Bretagne aurait fait la guerre et sacrifié des vies, non pas pour les bergers des Malouines, mais plutôt pour miser sur le potentiel minier et pétrolier de la Péninsule, voire pour renforcer l'orgueil britannique, ce qui leur paraît encore plus «stupide». Pour la Grande-Bretagne, la stratégie de la réplique militaire à l'Argentine de la part de la «Dame de fer» (Margaret Thatcher, alors première ministre) correspondait à une volonté de susciter l'orgueil national afin de faire oublier le chômage, l'austérité, le problème irlandais et renforcer son propre prestige auprès des électeurs en cas de victoire. De fait, Margaret Thatcher allait tirer profit d'un conflit qui, détournant les préoccupations de la population britannique frappée par sa politique antisociale, lui permettra, grâce à l'élan de fierté nationaliste, de gagner les élections suivantes.
3.5 Le retour de la paix
Depuis la Constitution de 1985, les îles Malouines sont administrées par un gouverneur britannique et un conseil législatif de dix membres. Les relations diplomatiques entre l'Argentine et la Grande-Bretagne n'ont repris qu'en 1990. En juillet 1999, les deux pays signèrent un accord dans le but de réduire les tensions liées au conflit des Malouines. Cet accord précisait que les îles Malouines et l'Argentine devront coopérer en matière de pêche et de conservation du milieu naturel; que les citoyens argentins pourront entrer aux Malouines avec un passeport (sous réserve de l'autorisation du gouvernement des Malouines); qu'un mémorial pour les victimes argentines du conflit sera construit aux Malouines; que les deux gouvernements vont continuer d'étudier les modalités et le coût du nettoyage des mines anti-personnel laissées par le conflit (plus de 25 000 mines). Mais une disposition linguistique du traité mérite d'être soulignée. Le paragraphe 2 de l'article IV de l'accord précise ce qui suit:
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Article IV
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2) The Argentine Government is prepared to look at the question of toponomy in the Falkland Islands. To that end it will continue to consult the appropriate national institutions.
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Article IV
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2) Le Gouvernement argentin est prêt à reconnaître la question de toponymie dans les îles Malouines. À cette fin, il continuera à consulter les établissements nationaux appropriés.
Cette disposition signifie en clair que le gouvernement argentin s'engage à ne plus faire mention des toponymes espagnols qui avaient été imposés par décret de la part du général Galtieri. Cela dit, la question de la souveraineté des Malouines demeure encore aujourd’hui une question d'actualité. D'une part, le conflit lui-même a prouvé la détermination du Royaume-Uni à conserver et à soutenir les Malouines, d'autre part, les relations entre l’Argentine et la Grande-Bretagne sont en voie de normalisation. Paradoxalement, les efforts de Londres pour diminuer les tensions avec l'Argentine sont mal perçus par la majorité des habitants des Malouines. Ils sont le sentiment d'être abandonnés par la mère patrie et qu'ils n'ont guère la possibilité d’influencer les Britanniques qui conservent la responsabilité de la défense et de la politique extérieure des îles. Jusqu'en 1985, la Géorgie-du-Sud (3755 km²), une île située à quelque 1300 km au sud-est des îles Malouines, et les îles Sandwich-du-Sud (337 km²), à environ 750 km au sud-est de la Géorgie-du-Sud, furent sous la dépendance du gouvernement des Malouines, avant de devenir une colonie britannique distincte.
Aujourd'hui, l'économie n'est plus basée exclusivement sur l'élevage du mouton, mais sur le tourisme et le pêche au calmar. En réalité, le gouvernement local vend des permis d'exploitation aux navires étrangers. Celles-ci rapportent annuellement plus de 30 millions d'euros au gouvernement des Falkland, ce qui a permis de financer de gros projets d'infrastructures, tels les routes et les édifices publics. Quant au potentiel pétrolier, les insulaires ne cherchent même plus, tant cette hypothèse leur paraît aujourd'hui farfelue. Néanmoins, cette éventualité n'a fait qu'aiguiser l'intérêt pour cet archipel battu par les vents, peuplé de 2800 habitants et 500 000 moutons, où sont stationnés près de 2000 militaires. Pour sa part, l'Argentine interdit les bateaux se dirigeant vers le territoire de mouiller dans ses ports. Elle poursuit également en justice les compagnies pétrolières de la zone dont les activités d'exploration ont été déclarées «clandestines».
3.6 Le référendum de 2013
En mars 2013, plus de 70 % des quelque 2000 électeurs des îles Malouines ont pris part à un référendum destiné à montrer à l’Argentine et au reste du monde que l’archipel est déterminé à demeurer un territoire britannique. La question posée par le référendum était la suivante: «Est-ce que vous souhaitez que les îles Malouines conservent leur statut politique actuel de territoire d’outre-mer du Royaume-Uni?» Aucune autre solution, comme l’indépendance complète ou une certaine relation politique avec l’Argentine, n’a été proposée aux Islanders. Les habitants des îles Malouines ont, sans surprise, voté très massivement, soit à 99,8 %, en faveur du maintien dans le giron britannique. Seuls trois votes se sont exprimés contre parmi les 1517 électeurs.
Quant à l'Argentine, elle a qualifié le référendum comme une «tentative britannique de manipulation» et prévenu qu'il ne mettra pas un terme au différend sur la souveraineté. Pour Buenos Aires, les Islanders constituent une «population implantée» par les Britanniques et ne peuvent revendiquer le droit à l'autodétermination.
Le gouvernement local des Malouines ("Falkland Islands Government" : le FIG) n'a élaboré aucune politique linguistique particulière. Il pratique donc la non-intervention en matière de langue. À l'image de la mère patrie, la Constitution du 3 octobre 1985 (modifiée en 1997 et 1998) ne proclamait aucune langue officielle. La nouvelle Constitution du 5 novembre 2008 (entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 2009) ne proclame pas davantage de langue officielle, mais le texte fait allusion à l'arrestation et à la détention des personnes, lesquelles doivent être informées dans une langue qu'elles comprennent des motifs de leur arrestation ou de leur détention.
Constitution des îles Malouines de 2008
Article 1er
Article 5
5)
Quiconque est arrêté ou détenu doit être informé, dès qu'il est
raisonnablement possible de le faire, et
dans une langue qu'il comprend,
de ses droits en vertu du paragraphe 4; et celui-ci doit aussi avoir
le droit et doit être informé, au moment même où il en a le droit,
de se taire et de recevoir les informations par le moyen le plus
rapide possible afin de connaître les motifs de arrestation et du
lieu de celui-ci.
Article 16
De plus, la loi du Royaume-Uni s'appliquant aux Malouines sur le Tribunal pénal international de 2001, appelée aussi "ordonnance de 2009" impose au tribunal que tout justiciable a le droit d'être informé dans une langue qu'il comprend parfaitement et a le droit, par conséquent, aux services d'un interprète:
Article 15
Procédure
lorsque le tribunal rend l'ordre
Article 55
L'anglais reste, bien sûr, la langue officielle de ce territoire d'outre-mer parce que c'est également la langue officielle de facto du Royaume-Uni. D'ailleurs, plusieurs autres lois du Royaume-Uni s'appliquent aux Falkland, dont la Loi sur la nationalité britannique (1981), la Loi sur la marine marchande (1995), la Loi sur la nationalité, l'immigration et le droit d'asile (2002) et la Loi sur l'éducation (2002). Ces lois imposent l'anglais pour obtenir la citoyenneté britannique, pour travailler dans la marine marchande ou recevoir son instruction.
4.1 L'anglais, langue de l'État
Le gouvernement local perpétue l'usage en vigueur depuis le début de la colonie en 1837. L'anglais est la seule langue admise au FIG, dans l'Administration, les tribunaux et l'éducation.
Quant aux écoles, c'est l'anglais qui sert d'unique langue d'enseignement. D'ailleurs, le système est entièrement calqué sur le système britannique, y compris les manuels. L’école est gratuite et obligatoire pour tous les enfants âgés de 5 à 16 ans. Le Falkland Islands Government fournit des professeurs, du matériel et des fournitures. Deux écoles à Stanley dispensent l’éducation des enfants pendant toute leur scolarité et trois petits établissements fonctionnent dans de grandes fermes (Port Howard, Goose Green et North Arm). Les jeunes enfants qui vivent dans des fermes isolées reçoivent des cours individuels ou en famille par des professeurs itinérants durant deux semaines toutes les six semaines. Les petits établissements et les professeurs itinérants sont épaulés par le Camp Education Unit basée à Stanley. Cette unité diffuse des leçons individuelles quotidiennes par le réseau radio ou le téléphone, et vient ainsi en aide aux enfants en leur donnant des devoirs entre les visites des professeurs. Les enfants plus âgés suivent des cours à Stanley et vivent dans des pensions de familles. Pour des études universitaires, les étudiants se rendent généralement en Grande-Bretagne.
Quant aux nouveaux immigrants, le Département de l'éducation ("Education Department") songe à développer pour eux des cours d'anglais langue seconde.
4.2 Les médias
Tous les médias fonctionnent en anglais. Le seul journal local, le Penguin News, est diffusé en anglais. La station de télévision locale (FIBS : Falkland Islands Broadcasting Station) n'est disponible qu'en anglais, de même que la radio (BFBS Radio et BFBS1 Falkland); des émissions de la BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) sont également disponibles en anglais.
Comme dans tout le Royaume-Uni, l'unilinguisme anglais est omniprésent dans le fonctionnement de l’État. Les îles Malouines abritent une petite communauté essentiellement anglophone et de culture britannique. On ne voit pas comment la situation linguistique pourrait être autrement, et ce, d'autant plus que les communications avec le continent sud-américain sont quasiment coupées. En somme, la politique linguistique de ces îles n'apparaît pas du tout coercitive pour ses habitants et reste ce qu'elle a toujours été: la non-intervention.
Dernière
mise à jour:
17 déc. 2015
Les territoires britanniques d'outre-mer

Question: when did argentina become independent from the spanish

After that, the islands changed several sovereigns that moved from the English, French, Spanish, etc.

when did argentina become independent from the spanish

Question: when did the spanish take over the falklands islands

when did the spanish take over the falklands islands

Question: the falklands islands are part of which country

the falklands islands are part of which country

Question: who ruled the falklandski rat in 1811

Question: what is the name of the island in the falklands

what is the name of the island in the falklands

Question: who ruled the falklands in 1811

Question: how long did argentina control the falklands

četiri godine kasnije preuzela suverenitet

how long did argentina control the falklands

After that , the islands changed several sovereigns that moved from the English , French , Spanish , etc .

By 1811 the Malvinama was ruled by the Spanish , of which in 1816 Argentina became independent and four years later took over sovereignty over the island .

Nakon toga, otočje je promijenilo nekoliko suverena koji su se kretali od Engleza, Francuza, Španjolaca itd.

After that, the islands changed several sovereigns that moved from the English, French, Spanish, etc. By 1811 the Malvinama was ruled by the Spanish, of which in 1816 Argentina became independent and four years later took over sovereignty over the island.

After that, the islands changed several sovereigns that moved from the English, French, Spanish, etc.

These negotiations went quite slowly, so at the beginning of the 1980s the then Argentine military hunta under the leadership of General Leopold Galtierius decided to break the territorial conflict by armed means to turn the attention of the public from the catastrophic economic crisis and tens of thousands of dead and missing in the Floating War against the Left.

Il y a trente ans, le 2 avril, était déclenchée la guerre des Malouines entre l'Argentine et le Royaume-Uni. Le conflit provoqua la chute de la dictature argentine et suscita un regain de popularité de Margaret Thatcher au Royaume-Uni. Mais l'histoire de ce conflit, encore irrésolu et même aggravé ces derniers mois, remonte bien avant 1982.
- Que sont les îles Malouines ?
Les îles Malouines (Falkland Islands en anglais, Islas Malvinas en espagnol) sont un archipel de l'Atlantique Sud situé à 480 km des côtes de l'Argentine. La superficie de l'archipel est 12 173 km2 pour une population d'environ 3 000 habitants, dont les deux tiers résident dans la capitale, Port Stanley. Elles sont liées aux îles voisines de la Géorgie du Sud et des îles Sandwich du Sud.
- Quel pays s'est le premier installé sur ces îles ?
Découvertes par l'explorateur portugais Ferdinand Magellan en 1520, elles sont occupées pour la première fois en 1764 par une colonie française de pêcheurs de Saint-Malo, menée par le navigateur Louis Antoine de Bougainville, avant d'être remises par la France à l'Espagne en 1767. Mais dans le même temps, les Anglais comprennent l'importance stratégique du territoire et l'occupent à partir de 1766. En 1770, les Espagnols débarquent en force sur les îles et chassent les Anglais, avant qu'un accord trouvé entre les deux pays n'autorise finalement les Anglais à se réinstaller.
Par la suite, les Malouines restent quasiment inhabitées. Après l'indépendance de l'Argentine en 1816, le pays reprend à son compte les revendications espagnoles sur les îles. Il y installe notamment une colonie pénitentiaire en 1832. Mais en 1833, une cannonière britannique chasse les autorités argentines. Le Royaume-Uni conquiert à nouveau l'archipel et y implante progressivement des colons. Malgré cela, l'Argentine maintient le principe de sa souveraineté.
En 1965, après l'application de la Déclaration des Nations unies sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays coloniaux, les négociations commencèrent entre l'Argentine et le Royaume-Uni, sans grande avancée. En 1976 toutefois, le comité juridique interaméricain, organe consultatif de l'Organisation des Etats américains, déclare l'existence d'un "droit de souveraineté irréfutable" de l'Argentine sur les Malouines.
- Comment a été déclenchée la guerre des Malouines ?
L'Argentine, dictature militaire depuis 1976, fait face à des problèmes économiques graves, avec une inflation annuelle à 140 %, quand le général Leopoldo Galtieri parvient au pouvoir en 1981. Pour galvaniser le pays confronté à la crise, le dictateur dépêche une force amphibie qui envahit les îles à l'aube du 2 avril 1982. A l'annonce du débarquement, le pays est en liesse : les écoliers manifestent et une foule gagne la place centrale à Buenos Aires.
En pleine guerre froide, la junte au pouvoir est l'alliée des Etats-Unis. Elle participe à la lutte contre les guérillas en Amérique centrale. Elle table de ce fait sur une neutralité bienveillante de Washington, qui permettrait une issue diplomatique à la crise, sous l'égide de l'ONU. Mais c'est sans compter la poigne de la première ministre britannique, Margaret Thatcher, qui écarte toute possibilité de négociation et qui expédie une flotte récupérer les îles, contraignant Washington à la soutenir.
Le Daily Telegraph publie une vidéo filmée par un jeune Ecossais enrôlé comme opérateur radio :
Prise de court, la junte doit improviser les préparatifs d'une guerre qu'elle n'avait pas prévue. L'armée argentine, spécialisée dans la répression intérieure et s'appuyant aux Malouines sur des appelés sans formation (sept soldats sur dix), n'est pas prête pour combattre une armée professionnelle et bien équipée. Les appelés vont souffrir de la faim et du froid. Pire, ils seront souvent torturés par leurs propres supérieurs ; ces mêmes gradés qui les abandonneront en première ligne. Trente ans après, certains soldats viennent de porter plainte pour obtenir que leurs officiers de l'époque soient enfin jugés.
Lire les témoignages dans Pagina 12 : "On me faisait manger mes propres excréments" et "Froid et faim dans les îles"
Après avoir repris la Géorgie du Sud, les Britanniques instaurent le 30 avril 1982 un blocus aérien et naval sur les Malouines. Ils débarquent dans la baie de San Carlos le 21 mai et, malgré une contre-attaque de l'aviation argentine, y établissent une tête de pont. Le 14 juin, c'est l'entrée à Port Stanley ; les forces argentines des Malouines se rendent dans la nuit. La guerre, qui fait 649 morts argentins et 255 britanniques, ouvre la voie au retour dès l'année suivante de la démocratie en Argentine et accroît considérablement la popularité de Mme Thatcher.
Lire le portrait dans The Telegraph : "Simon Weston, gueule cassée britannique de la guerre"
- Quels sont les arguments des deux pays pour en revendiquer la souveraineté ?
Le Royaume-Uni met en avant l'origine britannique des habitants, le fait qu'il administre le territoire depuis 1833 et le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes. L'Argentine, de son côté, plaide qu'elle a hérité des Malouines à son indépendance en 1816. Et elle met en avant la proximité de ces îles avec ses côtes.
Lire sur le site de la BBC : "Quelles sont les revendications qui s'affrontent ?"
- Que souhaitent les habitants des îles Malouines ?
Les habitants des Malouines ont à maintes reprises fait connaître leur souhait de rester britanniques, selon le Foreign Office britannique, qui cite notamment un sondage argentin, mené en 1994, révélant que 87 % d'entre eux seraient opposés à toute discussion avec l'Argentine sur leur souveraineté. Pour l'Argentine, au contraire, le principe d'auto-détermination des peuples ne peut s'appliquer aux Malouines, dans la mesure où il n'existe pas de relation légitime entre la population et le territoire concerné.
- Quelle est la position des dirigeants actuels de l'Argentine et du Royaume-Uni ?
Depuis quelques mois, les relations se sont tendues entre les deux pays avec une véritable "guerre des mots" opposant Londres et Buenos Aires. Le premier ministre britannique David Cameron a dénoncé lundi "l'acte d'agression" commis par l'Argentine il y a trente ans, destiné à "voler la liberté" des habitants des îles. "Nous sommes à juste titre fiers du rôle joué par le Royaume-Uni pour redresser un tort fondamental. Les habitants des Falklands peuvent être à juste titre fiers de l'avenir stable et prometteur qu'ils construisent depuis 1982", a-t-il ajouté.
Dans le camp adverse, des groupes politiques de gauche devaient manifester, lundi 2 avril, devant l'ambassade britannique à Buenos Aires, "symbole du colonialisme impérialiste qui a usurpé à nouveau [il y a trente ans] ces territoires par la force, comme en 1833", ont-ils souligné dans un communiqué.
Lire notre article : "L'Argentine commémore la guerre des Malouines"
- En quoi les ressources naturelles jouent-elles un rôle dans ce conflit ?
Après des conflits autour de la pêche dans la zone, c'est la découverte de pétrole en 2010 – un champ de 350 millions de barils dans des fonds relativement peu profonds, dont l'exploitation pourrait avoir lieu dès 2016 – qui ravive les tensions autour de l'archipel. Cristina Kirchner, la présidente argentine, multiplie les pressions économiques et politiques et a annoncé qu'elle va porter plainte contre les compagnies qui prospectent les fonds sous-marins des Malouines. Sont notamment concernées trois petites sociétés britanniques : Desire Petroleum, Falkland Oil and Gas, Rockhopper Exploration.
D'autres puits sont également en cours d'exploration, dans des conditions plus difficiles – 2 000 m de profondeur – mais sur des gisements au potentiel plus prometteur. Selon les scénarios, cette manne pourrait rapporter aux Malouines entre 10 et 140 milliards d'euros sur vingt-cinq ans.
Lire notre article : "Le pétrole des Malouines relance la guerre froide entre Londres et Buenos Aires"
Pour aller plus loin :
- Chronologie de la guerre des Malouines (BBC)
- "Le Royaume-Uni peut-il toujours défendre les Malouines ?" (BBC)
- "Le point de vue des habitants de l'île trente ans après la guerre" (vidéo, BBC)
- "Une vie paisible au centre de tensions politiques" (Clarin)
- "La guerre des Malouines a rendu Margaret Thatcher célèbre" (The Guardian)
- "J'espère que nous ferions la même chose si nous le devions", le témoignage de la veuve du lieutenant-colonel Herbert "H" Jones, héro britannique de la guerre (The Telegraph)
- "Le ministre britannique des affaires étrangères accuse l'Argentine d'intimider les habitants des Malouines" (The Telegraph)
Voir les contributions

Question: who was the leader of the argentine military hunta at the beginning of the

who was the leader of the argentine military hunta at the beginning of the

Question: who was the commander of the argentine military hunta at the beginning of the

who was the commander of the argentine military hunta at the beginning of the

Question: when did the falklands war start and end

when did the falklands war start and end

Question: when did the falklands rat war start and end

početkom 1980-ih tadašnja argentinska vojna hunta pod vodstvom generala Leopolda Galtierija odlučila teritorijalni spor prekinuti oružanim putem kako bi pažnju javnosti skrenula s katastrofalne ekonomske krize i desetina tisuća mrtvih i nestalih u Prljavom ratu protiv ljevice .

when did the falklands rat war start and end

Question: how did argentina break the falklandski rat war

how did argentina break the falklandski rat war

Question: what was the main cause of the falklandski rat

what was the main cause of the falklandski rat

Question: how many people died in the floating war against the left

desetina tisuća mrtvih i nestalih u Prljavom ratu protiv ljevice .

how many people died in the floating war against the left

These negotiations went quite slowly , so at the beginning of the 1980s the then Argentine military hunta under the leadership of General Leopold Galtierius decided to break the territorial conflict by armed means to turn the attention of the public from the catastrophic economic crisis and tens of thousands of dead and missing in the Floating War against the Left .

After the initial uncertainty and shock, the British government Margaret Thatcher decided to return the islands armed by: "This is the background against which we must make decisions and consider the best measures we can take.

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Summary of
Main Participating Military Bases in Britain
NORTHWOOD
(Task Force HQ)
ROYAL
NAVY
Culdrose (HMS Seahawk)
Devonport (HMS Drake)
Faslane (HMS Neptune - SSN's)
Gosport (HMS Dolphin)
Portland (HMS Osprey)
Portsmouth (HMS Nelson)
Rosyth (HMS Cochrane)
Yeovilton (HMS Heron)
ROYAL MARINES
Arbroath (45 Cdo RM)
Plymouth (3 Cdo Bde RM, incl. 40 & 42 Cdo)
RM Poole
BRITISH ARMY
Aldershot (2 & 3 Para)
Church Crookham (1/7 Gurkhas)
Hereford (SAS)
London (2 Scots & 1 Welsh Guards)
Marchwood (RCT)
Middle Wallop (AAC)
Netheravon (AAC)
Sennybridge (5th Inf Bde training)
ROYAL AIR FORCE
Brize Norton (VC10?s)
Coningsby (Phantoms)
Kinloss (Nimrod MR2?s)
Lyneham (Hercules)
Marham (Victors)
Odiham (Chinooks)
St Athan (maintenance)
St Mawgan (Nimrod MR1?s)
Waddingtons (Vulcans)
Wittering (Harrier GR3?s)
Wyton (Nimrod R1?s)
Summary of
Main British Commanders (Honours awarded in
brackets)
|
||DEFENCE
STAFF,
WHITEHALL, LONDON
|
Admiral of the Fleet Sir (later Baron)
Terence Lewin, Chief of the Defence Staff,
Admiral Sir Henry Leach, Royal Navy,
General Sir Edwin Bramall, Army,
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham, Royal Air
Force
TASK FORCE
COMMANDERS, NORTHWOOD
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse (GBE), Task
Force Commander,
Major General J J Moore (KCB) MC and bar RM, Land
Forces Deputy,
and later
Lieut General Sir Richard Trant,
Air Marshal Sir John Curtiss (KBE), Air Commander,
Vice Admiral P G M Herbert, Flag Officer
Submarines
SOUTH
ATLANTIC COMMANDERS
Rear Admiral J F Woodward (KCB), Carrier Battle
Group,
Commodore M C Clapp (CB), Amphibious Task Group,
Brigadier J H Thompson (CB) RM, Landing Force Task
Group and 3 Commando Brigade RM,
Followed by:
Major General Moore RM, Land Forces Falklands
Islands,
Brigadier M J A Wilson MC, 5th Infantry Brigade
Eventual British
Casualties and Losses in Major Equipment
Four warships and a
landing craft,
One fleet auxiliary and one merchantman,
23 Navy, seven RAF, three Marine and one Army
helicopters and aircraft.
One thousand of the men taking part were killed or
wounded.
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British Aims
and Outcome - Once the decision was taken to
launch "Operation Corporate" and dispute the Argentine
invasion by force if necessary, Britain's military power
was rapidly mobilised. Commanders were appointed and
from bases thoughout the country, the highly
technological ships and aircraft were readied and
despatched to transport and support a limited number of
professional Marines, Paras and Guardsmen. Fighting as
infantrymen, they re-took the Falklands the hard way,
and at the end of an 8,000 mile long logistical
nightmare and lengthy chain of command. Directly
responsible to the
British Cabinet for all military aspects was the Defence
Staff at Whitehall not far from Downing Street with its
Chief, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin and the
other service heads. Working out of Northwood,
Middlesex, just outside London were the Task Force
Commanders led by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse,
Commander-in-Chief Fleet, who in turn controlled events
in the South Atlantic through the commanders on the
spot. Taking part
in this vast undertaking were nearly 30,000 men and a
few women, and a large proportion of Britain's Navy and
Marines, fleet auxiliaries and merchantmen, aircraft and
helicopter squadrons, plus five Army battalions and
supporting arms.
Nuclear-powered
hunter-killer submarine HMS Conqueror, one of the
first Royal Navy
Up to the final Argentine
surrender, each of the ships, aircraft squadrons and main
military units, as they entered the South Atlantic for the
FIRST time in the campaign are introduced below. Ships
lost are in blue CAPITALS, damaged in
lower case blue letters:
warships to reach South Georgia and then the Falklands
area. She torpedoed and sank the
Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano" on the 2nd May
1982
Submarines
reaching the Falkland's Area, early April to May
Nuclear
submarines "Spartan", "Splendid", "Conqueror",
"Courageous"(?), "Valiant" and conventionally powered
"Onyx", with some SBS.
RAF
Squadrons reaching or deploying to Ascension, early
April to May
VC.10
transports of 10 Sqdn, Hercules transports of 24, 30,
47 and 70 Sqdns,
Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft of 42(TB),
51(?), 120, 201 and 206 Sqdns,
Victor tankers of 55 and 57 Sqdns,
Vulcan bombers of 44, 50 and 101 Sqdns,
Harrier GR.3 attack aircraft of 1(F),
Chinook helicopter of 18 and a
Sea King of 202,
Phantom fighters of 29(F) Sqdns,
Units of the RAF Regiment.
South
Georgia recaptured ("Operation Paraquat") on 25th
April
Naval forces
- Destroyer "Antrim", Frigates "Brilliant",
"Plymouth", Ice patrol ship "Endurance", RFA's
"Tidespring" and (earlier) "Brambleleaf" and "Fort
Austin".
Land forces - M Coy 42 Cdo RM, SBS RM and D Sqdn 22nd
SAS.
Carrier
Battle Group starting attacks on Falklands, 1st May
Naval forces
- Carriers "Hermes", "Invincible", Destroyers
"Glamorgan", "COVENTRY", "Glasgow", "SHEFFIELD",
Frigates "Broadsword", "Alacrity", "Arrow", "Yarmouth"
and RFA's "Olmeda" and "Resource". Joined later in May
by destroyer "Exeter", frigate "Ambuscade" and RFA
"Regent".
Carrier aircraft - Sea Harriers of Nos.800 and 801,
anti-submarine and assault Sea King helicopters of
Nos.820, 826 and 846 NAS; and later, Sea Harriers of
No.809 and RAF Harrier GR.3's of 1(F) Squadrons.
Land forces - SBS RM, D and G Sqdns 22nd SAS.
Amphibious
Group reaching the TEZ, followed by Landings in San
Carlos Water ("Operation Sutton") on 21st May
Naval forces
- including Assault ships "Fearless", "Intrepid",
Frigates "ARDENT", "Argonaut" and later "ANTELOPE",
RFA's "Stromness", "Tidepool", LSL's "SIR GALAHAD",
"Sir Geraint", "Sir Lancelot", "Sir Percivale", "Sir
Tristram" and (later) "Sir Bedivere", Transports
"Canberra", "Elk", "Europic Ferry", "Norland", and
Aircraft and helicopter support ship "ATLANTIC
CONVEYOR".
Land forces -
3 Commando Brigade RM including 40, 42 and 45 Cdo RM
and 2 and 3 Para, and 3 CBAS Gazelle and Scout
helicopters.
Other
Ships and Helicopter Squadrons supporting the Task
Force up to the End of May
At Ascension
RMAS mooring vessel "Goosander" and Tanker "Alvega";
also Detached despatch vessel "Dumbarton Castle".
Tanker Holding Areas in the South Atlantic and in Tug,
Repair and Logistics Area (TRALA)
RFA tankers "Appleleaf", Pearleaf and "Plumleaf" plus
Tankers "Anco Charger", "Eburna", Eight British
Petroleum "British" tankers, and Water tanker "Fort
Toronto".
Operating in Falklands area
Hospital ship "Uganda" and Ambulance ships "Hecla",
"Herald" and "Hydra" in Red Cross Box (RCB), Repair
ship "Stena Seaspread" and Tugs "Irishman",
"Salvageman", "Yorkshireman" in TRALA.
Reaching South Georgia
Requisitioned minesweepers "Cordella", "Farnella",
"Junella", "Northella" and "Pict", RFA tanker "Blue
Rover", RMAS tug "Typhoon", Detached despatch vessels
"Iris" and "Leeds Castle", Ammo ship "Lycaon" and
Stores ship "Saxonia".
Other Helicopters
Sea Kings of No.824 and also 846, Wessex of Nos.737,
845 and 848, Lynx of No.815 and Wasps of No.829 NAS on
warships, RFA's and merchantmen, together with one RAF
Chinook of 18 Sqdn.
"Bristol"
Group arriving in TEZ, late May
Destroyers "Bristol", "Cardiff", Frigates
"Active", "Avenger", "Andromeda", "Minerva",
"Penelope", RFA's "Bayleaf" and "Olna".
5th
Infantry Brigade reaching South Atlantic late May to
join Advance on Stanley, early June
Land forces - 5th Infantry Brigade including 2
Scots and 1 Welsh Guards, 1/7 Gurkha Rifles and
Gazelle and Scout helicopters of 656 Sqdn AAC.
Transports - "Queen Elizabeth 2", "Baltic Ferry" and
"Nordic Ferry".
Other
Ships and Helicopter Squadrons arriving to support
Task Force up to Surrender
RFA's "Engadine" and "Fort Grange", Merchantmen
"Atlantic Causeway", "Balder London", "Contender
Bezant", "Geestport", "St. Edmund", "Tor Caledonia"
and "Wimpey Seahorse",
Sea Kings of No.825 and Wessex of No.847 NAS.

Question: who was the british prime minister at the time of the falklandski

who was the british prime minister at the time of the falklandski

Question: what did margaret thatcher say about the falklandski rat

This is the background against which we must make decisions and consider the best measures we can take

putem:""Ovo je pozadina nasuprot koje moramo donositi odluke i razmotriti najbolje mjere koje možemo poduzeti

This is the background against which we must make decisions and consider the best measures we can take

what did margaret thatcher say about the falklandski rat

Question: who decided to return the falklandski rat

who decided to return the falklandski rat

Question: what was the initial state of the falklandski rat

what was the initial state of the falklandski rat

Question: what nationality was margaret thatcher when she returned the falklandski rat to

what nationality was margaret thatcher when Falklandski rat returned the falklandski rat to

Question: what was the meaning of the falklandski rat

This is the background against which we must make decisions

putem:""Ovo je pozadina nasuprot koje moramo donositi odluke

This is the background against which we must make decisions

what was the meaning of the falklandski rat

After the initial uncertainty and shock , the British government Margaret Thatcher decided to return the islands armed by : " This is the background against which we must make decisions and consider the best measures we can take .

Ces documentaires de deuxième partie de soirée sur France 3 ont pour vertu de nous remettre en tête des histoires un peu oubliées. Avec un super conteur : Patrick Pesnot (celui des Rendez-vous avec X). Au programme ce mercredi, l'affaire des missiles Exocet.
Rappel des faits : nous sommes en avril 1982, les Argentins se lancent à l'assaut des îles Malouines, possession britannique qu'ils revendiquent. Les Anglais envoient sur place leurs forces navales qui coulent un navire de guerre rival et tuent 300 marins. Pour frapper un grand coup, l'Argentine décide d'utiliser les missiles Exocet qu'elle a achetés à l'entreprise française Aerospatiale. La France a bien imposé un embargo sur la vente des Exocet mais cinq ont déjà été livrés. Et surtout Paris a oublié l'assistance envoyée sur place pour faire le SAV et rendre les missiles opérationnels. Elle n'arrêtera pas sa mission. Résultat : le destroyer anglais Sheffield coule le 4 mai 1982 après avoir été touché par un Exocet. Embarras de la France. Colère du Royaume-Uni. L'épisode servira cyniquement comme preuve de l'efficacité des Exocet. Pour en vendre d'autres…

Question: who did the british support in the falklandski rat

who did the british support in the falklandski rat

Question: how many troops were in the falklandski rat

how many troops were in the falklandski rat

Question: what were the names of the two aircraft carriers that were sent to the south atl

HMS Invincible i HMS Hermes ) poslana je u Južni Atlantik , a kasnije su im se pridružile

what were the names of the two aircraft carriers that were sent to the south atl

Question: how many aircraft carriers did britain send to the south atlantic

how many aircraft carriers did britain send to the south atlantic

Question: where was the falklandski rat sent to after world war ii

where was the falklandski rat sent to after world war ii

Question: who was sent to the south atlantic in 1982

who was sent to the south atlantic in 1982

Question: where was the falklandski rat sent to during the war

where was the falklandski rat sent to during the war

The Navy squadron with two aircraft carriers ( HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes ) was sent to the South Atlantic , and later the ground forces of about 5,000 people joined them .

The UK has also launched a diplomatic offensive – although Latin American and unsound countries ( including the SFRJ ) were mainly opposed to Argentina , the British managed to deliver the UN resolution that demanded the Argentine withdrawal and support from their partners in the EEA .

The Navy squadron with two aircraft carriers (HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes) was sent to the South Atlantic, and later the ground forces of about 5,000 people joined them. The UK has also launched a diplomatic offensive – although Latin American and unsound countries (including the SFRJ) were mainly opposed to Argentina, the British managed to deliver the UN resolution that demanded the Argentine withdrawal and support from their partners in the EEA.

§ Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Jopling.]11.19 am
§ The Prime Minister (Mrs. Margaret Thatcher)
The House meets this Saturday to respond to a situation of great gravity. We are here because, for the first time for many years, British sovereign territory has been invaded by a foreign power. After several days of rising tension in our relations with Argentina, that country's armed forces attacked the Falkland Islands yesterday and established military control of the islands.
Yesterday was a day of rumour and counter-rumour. Throughout the day we had no communication from the Government of the Falklands. Indeed, the last message that we received was at 21.55 hours on Thursday night, 1 April. Yesterday morning at 8.33 am we sent a telegram which was acknowledged. At 8.45 am all communications ceased. I shall refer to that again in a moment. By late afternoon yesterday it became clear that an Argentine invasion had taken place and that the lawful British Government of the islands had been usurped.
I am sure that the whole House will join me in condemning totally this unprovoked aggression by the Government of Argentina against British territory. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear".] It has not a shred of justification and not a scrap of legality.
It was not until 8.30 this morning, our time, when I was able to speak to the governor, who had arrived in Uruguay, that I learnt precisely what had happened. He told me that the Argentines had landed at approximately 6 am Falkland's time, 10 am our time. One party attacked the capital from the landward side and another from the seaward side. The governor then sent a signal to us which we did not receive.
Communications had ceased at 8.45 am our time. It is common for atmospheric conditions to make communications with Port Stanley difficult. Indeed, we had been out of contact for a period the previous night.
The governor reported that the Marines, in the defence of Government House, were superb. He said that they acted in the best traditions of the Royal Marines. They inflicted casualties, but those defending Government House suffered none. He had kept the local people informed of what was happening through a small local transmitter which he had in Government House. He is relieved that the islanders heeded his advice to stay indoors. Fortunately, as far as he is aware, there were no civilian casualties. When he left the Falklands, he said that the people were in tears. They do not want to be Argentine. He said that the islanders are still tremendously loyal. I must say that I have every confidence in the governor and the action that he took.
I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment.
Argentina has, of course, long disputed British sovereignty over the islands. We have absolutely no doubt about our sovereignty, which has been continuous since 1833. Nor have we any doubt about the unequivocal wishes of the Falkland Islanders, who are British in stock 634 and tradition, and they wish to remain British in allegiance. We cannot allow the democratic rights of the islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina.
Over the past 15 years, successive British Governments have held a series of meetings with the Argentine Government to discuss the dispute. In many of these meetings elected representatives of the islanders have taken part. We have always made it clear that their wishes were paramount and that there would be no change in sovereignty without their consent and without the approval of the House.
The most recent meeting took place this year in New York at the end of February between my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham, (Mr. Luce) accompanied by two members of the islands council, and the Deputy Foreign Secretary of Argentina. The atmosphere at the meeting was cordial and positive, and a communiqué was issued about future negotiating procedures. Unfortunately, the joint communiqué which had been agreed was not published in Buenos Aires.
There was a good deal of bellicose comment in the Argentine press in late February and early March, about which my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs expressed his concern in the House on 3 March following the Anglo-Argentine talks in New York. However, this has not been an uncommon situation in Argentina over the years. It would have been absurd to dispatch the fleet every time there was bellicose talk in Buenos Aires. There was no good reason on 3 March to think that an invasion was being planned, especially against the background of the constructive talks on which my hon. Friend had just been engaged. The joint communiqué on behalf of the Argentine deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and my hon. Friend read:The meeting took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for procedures to make better progress in this sense.There had, of course, been previous incidents affecting sovereignty before the one in South Georgia, to which I shall refer in a moment. In December 1976 the Argentines illegally set up a scientific station on one of the dependencies within the Falklands group—Southern Thule. The Labour Government attempted to solve the matter through diplomatic exchanges, but without success. The Argentines remained there and are still there.
Two weeks ago—on 19 March—the latest in this series of incidents affecting sovereignty occurred; and the deterioration in relations between the British and Argentine Governments which culminated in yesterday's Argentine invasion began. The incident appeared at the start to be relatively minor. But we now know it was the beginning of much more.
The commander of the British Antartic Survey base at Grytviken on South Georgia—a dependency of the Falkland Islands over which the United Kingdom has exercised sovereignty since 1775 when the island was discovered by Captain Cook—reported to us that an Argentine navy cargo ship had landed about 60 Argentines at nearby Leith harbour. They had set up camp and hoisted the Argentine flag. They were there to carry out a valid commercial contract to remove scrap metal from a former whaling station.
The leader of the commercial expedition, Davidoff, had told our embassy in Buenos Aires that he would be going 635 to South Georgia in March. He was reminded of the need to obtain permission from the immigration authorities on the island. He did not do so. The base commander told the Argentines that they had no right to land on South Georgia without the permission of the British authorities. They should go either to Grytviken to get the necessary clearances, or leave. The ship and some 50 of them left on 22 March. Although about 10 Argentines remained behind, this appeared to reduce the tension.
In the meantime, we had been in touch with the Argentine Government about the incident. They claimed to have had no prior knowledge of the landing and assured us that there were no Argentine military personnel in the party. For our part we made it clear that, while we had no wish to interfere in the operation of a normal commercial contract, we could not accept the illegal presence of these people on British territory.
We asked the Argentine Government either to arrange for the departure of the remaining men or to ensure that they obtained the necessary permission to be there. Because we recognised the potentially serious nature of the situation, HMS "Endurance" was ordered to the area. We told the Argentine Government that, if they failed to regularise the position of the party on South Georgia or to arrange for their departure, HMS "Endurance" would take them off, without using force, and return them to Argentina.
This was, however, to be a last resort. We were determined that this apparently minor problem of 10 people on South Georgia in pursuit of a commercial contract should not be allowed to escalate and we made it plain to the Argentine Government that we wanted to achieve a peaceful resolution of the problem by diplomatic means. To help in this, HMS "Endurance" was ordered not to approach the Argentine party at Leith but to go to Grytviken.
But it soon became clear that the Argentine Government had little interest in trying to solve the problem. On 25 March another Argentine navy ship arrived at Leith to deliver supplies to the 10 men ashore. Our ambassador in Buenos Aires sought an early response from the Argentine Government to our previous requests that they should arrange for the men's departure. This request was refused. Last Sunday, on Sunday 28 March, the Argentine Foreign Minister sent a message to my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary refusing outright to regularise the men's position. Instead it restated Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their dependencies.
My right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary then sent a message to the United States Secretary of State asking him to intervene and to urge restraint.
By the beginning of this week it was clear that our efforts to solve the South Georgia dispute through the usual diplomatic channels were getting nowhere. Therefore, on Wednesday 31 March my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary proposed to the Argentine Foreign Minister that we should dispatch a special emissary to Buenos Aires.
Later that day we received information which led us to believe that a large number of Argentine ships, including an aircraft carrier, destroyers, landing craft, troop carriers and submarines, were heading for Port Stanley. I 636 contacted President Reagan that evening and asked him to intervene with the Argentine President directly. We promised, in the meantime, to take no action to escalate the dispute for fear of precipitating—[Interruption]—the very event that our efforts were directed to avoid. May I remind Opposition Members—[Interruption]—what happened when, during the lifetime of their Government——
§ Mr. J. W. Rooker (Birmingham, Perry Barr)
We did not lose the Falklands.
§ The Prime Minister
—Southern Thule was occupied. It was occupied in 1976. The House was not even informed by the then Government until 1978, when, in response to questioning by my hon. Friend the Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), now Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) said:We have sought the resolve the issue though diplomatic exchanges between the two Governments. That is infinitely preferable to public denunciations and public statements when we are trying to achieve a practical result to the problem that has arisen."—[Official Report, 24 May 1978; Vol. 950, c. 1550–51.]
§ Mr. Edward Rowlands (Merthyr Tydfil)
The right hon. Lady is talking about a piece of rock in the most southerly part of the dependencies, which is completely uninhabited and which smells of large accumulations of penguin and other bird droppings. There is a vast difference—a whole world of difference—between the 1,800 people now imprisoned by Argentine invaders and that argument. The right hon. Lady should have the grace to accept that.
§ The Prime Minister
We are talking about the sovereignty of British territory—[Interruption]—which was infringed in 1976. The House was not even informed of it until 1978. We are talking about a further incident in South Georgia which—as I have indicated—seemed to be a minor incident at the time. There is only a British Antarctic scientific survey there and there was a commercial contract to remove a whaling station. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that had I come to the House at that time and said that we had a problem on South Georgia with 10 people who had landed with a contract to remove a whaling station, and had I gone on to say that we should send HMS "Invincible", I should have been accused of war mongering and sabre rattling.
Information about the Argentine fleet did not arrive until Wednesday. Argentina is, of course, very close to the Falklands—a point that the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil cannot and must not ignore—and its navy can sail there very quickly. On Thursday, the Argentine Foreign Minister rejected the idea of an emissary and told our ambassador that the diplomatic channel, as a means of solving this dispute, was closed. President Reagan had a very long telephone conversation, of some 50 minutes, with the Argentine President, but his strong representations fell on deaf ears. I am grateful to him and to Secretary Haig for their strenuous and persistent efforts on our behalf.
On Thursday, the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Perez De Cuellar, summoned both British and Argentine permanent representatives to urge both countries to refrain from the use or threat of force in. the South Atlantic. Later that evening we sought an emergency meeting of the Security Council. We accepted the appeal of its President for restraint. The Argentines 637 said nothing. On Friday, as the House knows, the Argentines invaded the Falklands and I have given a precise account of everything we knew, or did not know, about that situation. There were also reports that yesterday the Argentines also attacked South Georgia, where HMS "Endurance" had left a detachment of 22 Royal Marines. Our information is that on 2 April an Argentine naval transport vessel informed the base commander at Grytviken that an important message would be passed to him after 11 o'clock today our time. It is assumed that this message will ask the base commander to surrender.
Before indicating some of the measures that the Government have taken in response to the Argentine invasion, I should like to make three points. First, even if ships had been instructed to sail the day that the Argentines landed on South Georgia to clear the whaling station, the ships could not possibly have got to Port Stanley before the invasion. [Interruption.] Opposition Members may not like it, but that is a fact.
Secondly, there have been several occasions in the past when an invasion has been threatened. The only way of being certain to prevent an invasion would have been to keep a very large fleet close to the Falklands, when we are some 8,000 miles away from base. No Government have ever been able to do that, and the cost would be enormous.
§ Mr. Eric Ogden (Liverpool, West Derby)
Will the right hon. Lady say what has happened to HMS "Endurance"?
§ The Prime Minister
HMS "Endurance" is in the area. It is not for me to say precisely where, and the hon. Gentleman would not wish me to do so.
Thirdly, aircraft unable to land on the Falklands, because of the frequently changing weather, would have had little fuel left and, ironically, their only hope of landing safely would have been to divert to Argentina. Indeed, all of the air and most sea supplies for the Falklands come from Argentina, which is but 400 miles away compared with our 8,000 miles.
That is the background against which we have to make decisions and to consider what action we can best take. I cannot tell the House precisely what dispositions have been made—some ships are already at sea, others were put on immediate alert on Thursday evening.
The Government have now decided that a large task force will sail as soon as all preparations are complete. HMS "Invincible" will be in the lead and will leave port on Monday.
I stress that I cannot foretell what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds. That will depend on the situation at the time. Meanwhile, we hope that our continuing diplomatic efforts, helped by our many friends, will meet with success.
The Foreign Ministers of the European Community member States yesterday condemned the intervention and urged withdrawal. The NATO Council called on both sides to refrain from force and continue diplomacy.
The United Nations Security Council met again yesterday and will continue its discussions today. [Laughter.] Opposition Members laugh. They would have been the first to urge a meeting of the Security Council if we had not called one. They would have been the first to urge restraint and to urge a solution to the problem by diplomatic means. They would have been the first to accuse us of sabre rattling and war mongering.
§ Mr. Tam Dalyell (West Lothian)
The right hon. Lady referred to our many friends. Have we any friends in South America on this issue?
§ The Prime Minister
Doubtless our friends in South America will make their views known during any proceedings at the Security Council. I believe that many countries in South America will be prepared to condemn the invasion of the Falklands Islands by force.
We are now reviewing all aspects of the relationship between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Argentine chargé d'affaires and his staff were yesterday instructed to leave within four days.
As an appropriate precautionary and, I hope, temporary measure, the Government have taken action to freeze Argentine financial assets held in this country. An order will be laid before Parliament today under the Emergency Laws (Re-enactments and Repeals) Act 1964 blocking the movement of gold, securities or funds held in the United Kingdom by the Argentine Government or Argentine residents.
As a further precautionary measure, the ECGD has suspended new export credit cover for the Argentine. It is the Government's earnest wish that a return to good sense and the normal rules of international behaviour on the part of the Argentine Government will obviate the need for action across the full range of economic relations.
We shall be reviewing the situation and be ready to take further steps that we deem appropriate and we shall, of course, report to the House.
The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House.
§ Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale)
It was obviously essential that the House of Commons should be recalled on this occasion. I thank the Prime Minister for the decision to do so. I can well understand the anxiety and impatience of many of my hon. Friends on the Back Benches who voted in the Division a few minutes ago and who desire to have full and proper time to examine all the aspects of this issue. I shall return to that aspect of the matter in a few minutes.
I first wish to set on record as clearly as I possibly can what we believe to be the international rights and wrongs of this matter, because I believe that one of the purposes of the House being assembled on this occasion is to make that clear not only to the people in our country but to people throughout the world.
The rights and the circumstances of the people in the Falkland Islands must be uppermost in our minds. There is no question in the Falkland Islands of any colonial dependence or anything of the sort. It is a question of people who wish to be associated with this country and who have built their whole lives on the basis of association with this country. We have a moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty to ensure that that is sustained.
639 The people of the Falkland Islands have the absolute right to look to us at this moment of their desperate plight, just as they have looked to us over the past 150 years. They are faced with an act of naked, unqualified aggression, carried out in the most shameful and disreputable circumstances. Any guarantee from this invading force is utterly worthless—as worthless as any of the guarantees that are given by this same Argentine junta to its own people.
We can hardly forget that thousands of innocent people fighting for their political rights in Argentine are in prison and have been tortured and debased. We cannot forget that fact when our friends and fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands are suffering as they are at this moment.
On the merits of the matter, we hope that the question is understood throughout the world. In that respect I believe that the Government were right to take the matter to the United Nations. It would have been delinquency if they had not, because that is the forum in which we have agreed that such matters of international right and international claim should be stated.
Whatever else the Government have done—I shall come to that in a moment—or not done, I believe that it was essential for them to take our case to the United Nations and to present it with all the force and power of advocacy at the command of this country. The decision and the vote in the United Nations will take place in an hour or two's time. I must say to people there that we in this country, as a whole, irrespective of our party affiliations, will examine the votes most carefully.
I was interested to hear how strongly the President of France spoke out earlier this morning. I hope that every other country in the world will speak in a similar way.
If, at the United Nations this afternoon, no such declaration were made—I know that it would be only a declaration at first, but there might be the possibility of action there later—not merely would it be a gross injury to the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands, not merely would it be an injury to the people of this country, who have a right to have their claims upheld in the United Nations, but it would be a serious injury to the United Nations itself. It would enhance the dangers that similar, unprovoked aggressions could occur in other parts of the world.
That is one of the reasons why we are determined to ensure that we examine this matter in full and uphold the rights of our country throughout the world, and the claim of our country to be a defender of people's freedom throughout the world, particularly those who look to us for special protection, as do the people in the Falkland Islands.
I deal next with the Government's conduct in the matter. What has happened to British diplomacy? The explanations given by the right hon. Lady, when she managed to rise above some of her own party arguments—they were not quite the exclusive part of her speech—were not very full and not very clear. They will need to be made a good deal more ample in the days to come.
The right hon. Lady did not quote fully the response of Lord Carrington, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, at his press conference yesterday. She referred to the Minister of State, who, according to Lord Carrington,had just been in New York discussing with Mr. Ross, his opposite number, the question of resumption of talks with the 640 Argentine Government about the problems of the Falkland Islands. And they had had a talk and come to an agreement. Mr. Ross went back to the Argentine and a number of things came up and they sent a message which"——I emphasise the words——I have not yet had time to reply to.Lord Carrington added:So there was every reason to suppose that the Argentines were interested in negotiations.Those talks took place on 27 February. The right hon. Lady gave an account of these negotiations. But from what has happened it seems that the British Government have been fooled by the way in which the Argentine junta has gone about its business. The Government must answer for that as well as for everything else.
What about British communications and British intelligence? The Guardian states today in a leading article:This country devotes a greater proportion of its annual output to its armed forces than any other Western country, with the exception of the United States. It has extensive diplomatic and intelligence gathering activities. And all of that gave Mrs. Thatcher, Lord Carrington and Mr. Nott precisely no effective cards when the Argentine navy moved.I should be very surprised to hear, because of some of the previous debates and discussions on the crises that have arisen with the Argentine, that the British Government did not have better intelligence than that. So good was our intelligence that, although the Prime Minister now tells us that the invasion took place at 10 am yesterday, the Lord Privy Seal—I know that he has apologised for some of his remarks—told the House of Commons and the British people:We are taking appropriate military and diplomatic measures to sustain our rights under international law and in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations charter."—[Official Report, 2 April 1982; Vol. 21, c. 571.]When he was saying that, it was the Argentine Government who were taking appropriate military, not diplomatic, measures to enforce their will.
The right hon. Lady, the Secretary of State for Defence and the whole Government will have to give a very full account of what happened, how their diplomacy was conducted and why we did not have the information to which we are entitled when expenditure takes place on such a scale. Above all, more important than the question of what happened to British diplomacy or to British intelligence is what happened to our power to act. The right hon. Lady seemed to dismiss that question. It cannot be dismissed. Of course this country has the power to act—short, often, of taking military measures. Indeed, we have always been told, as I understand it, that the purpose of having some military power is to deter. The right to deter and the capacity to deter were both required in this situation.
The previous Government had to deal with the same kind of dictatorial regime in the Argentine, the same kind of threat to the people of the Falkland Islands, and the same kinds of problems as those with which the Goverment have had to wrestle over the past weeks and months. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) compressed the whole position into the question that he put to the Government only last Tuesday. I shall read his remarks to the House, and I ask the House to mark every word. This was no factious Opposition. This was an Opposition Member seeking to sustain the Government if the Government were doing their duty.
My right hon. Friend said: 641I support the Government's attempts to solve the problem by diplomatic means, which is clearly the best and most sensible way of approaching the problem, but is the Minister aware that there have been other recent occasions when the Argentinians, when beset by internal troubles, have tried the same type of tactical diversion? Is the Minister aware that on a very recent occasion, of which I have full knowledge, Britain assembled ships which had been stationed in the Caribbean, Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean, and stood them about 400 miles off the Falklands in support of HMS "Endurance", and that when this fact became known, without fuss and publicity, a diplomatic solution followed? While I do not press the Minister on what is happening today, I trust that it is the same sort of action."—[Official Report, 30 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 198.]The House and whole country have the right to say the same thing to the Government. The people of the Falkland Islands have an even greater right to say it than ourselves. The right hon. Lady has not answered that question. She has hardly attempted to answer it. It is no answer to refer to the matter so effectively disposed of by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands), who has much knowledge of these matters. It is, of course, a very different question.
No one can say for certain that the pacific and honourable solution of this problem that was reached in 1977 was due to the combination of diplomatic and military activity. These things cannot be proved. There is, however, every likelihood that that was the case. In any event, the fact that it worked on the previous occasion was surely all the more reason for the Government's seeking to make it work on this occasion, especially when, according to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs—I refer again to the diplomatic exchanges—it had been going on for some time. According to the diplomatic exchanges, the Argentine Government were still awaiting an answer from the Secretary of State on some of the matters involved.
The right hon. Lady made some play, although not very effectively, with the time it takes to get warships into the area. We are talking about events several weeks ago. All these matters have to be answered. They cannot be answered fully in this debate. There will have to be another debate on the subject next week. Whether that debate takes the form of a motion of censure, or some other form, or perhaps takes the form of the establishment of an inquiry into the whole matter, so that all the evidence and the facts can be laid before the people of this country, I have not the slightest doubt that, at some stage, an inquiry of that nature, without any inhibitions and restraints, that can probe the matter fully will have to be undertaken.
I return to what I said at the start of my remarks. We are paramountly concerned, like, I am sure, the bulk of the House—I am sure that the country is also concerned—about what we can do to protect those who rightly and naturally look to us for protection. So far, they have been betrayed. The responsibility for the betrayal rests with the Government. The Government must now prove by deeds—they will never be able to do it by words—that they are not responsible for the betrayal and cannot be faced with that charge. That is the charge, I believe, that lies against them. Even though the position and the circumstances of the people who live in the Falkland Islands are uppermost in our minds—it would be outrageous if that were not the case—there is the longer-term interest to ensure that foul and brutal aggression does not succeed in our world. If it does, there will be a danger not merely to the Falkland Islands, but to people all over this dangerous planet.
§ Mr. Speaker
Order. I remind the House that two hours remain for this debate. I appeal to those Privy Councillors who may be called not to take advantage of the fact that they are being called early because they are Privy Councillors. I ask everyone to bear in mind that almost all hon. Members have indicated that they would like to speak.
§ Mr. Edward du Cann (Taunton)
There are times, Mr. Speaker, in the affairs of our nation when the House should speak with a single, united voice. This is just such a time. The Leader of the Opposition spoke for us all. He did this nation a service when, in clear and unmistakable terms, he condemned what he called this brutal agression and when he affirmed the rights of the Falkland islanders to decide their own destiny. I warmly applaud that part of his speech. I resent and reject his charge of betrayal.
I have a single simple point to make and I can make it shortly. It is right that the House should also, at this moment of crisis for our nation and for the Government, pledge full support to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and her colleagues in their heavy and awesome responsibility. As the Leader of the Opposition said, we must do what is necessary and what is right. However, let us see that what we do is well done.
Undoubtedly, there will be questions to be asked. There will also be questions to be answered. I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that there will be a need for a full account of this affair. However, some of those questions can and should be listed shortly now.
It is astounding that, for all our defence expenditure, which in absolute and proportional terms is huge, and for all our capacity for diplomatic activity and intelligence, we appear to have been so woefully ill prepared. It is extraordinary that conventional forces were not deployed on standby against an occupation.
The rule should surely be that the defence of our realm begins wherever British people are. Defence of the realm begins wherever they travel on their lawful occasions and wherever they may be threatened. The apparent assumption that the problem could be resolved only by diplomatic means was surely fatuous. However, if we have no inquests as yet, it must surely be said now that this incident demands a revision of the United Kingdom's defence strategy, some aspects of which have made many hon. Members and others outside the House decidedly nervous.
However, let us declare and resolve that our duty now is to repossess our possessions and to rescue our own people. Our right to the Falkland Islands is undoubted. Our sovereignty is unimpeachable. British interest in that part of the world, in my judgment, is substantial. It 'As substantial in the Falkland Islands, however trivial the figures may appear to be. It is substantial in the sea, which has yet to yield up its treasures. It is also substantial in Antarctica. The British interest would be substantial even if we were discussing the affairs of just one fellow citizen.
We must rally support to our position and cause. I entirely agree with the Leader of the Opposition that this nation has always been prompt to condemn dictatorship, to ally ourselves and fight against it and fight against aggression. Of course, we must explore every diplomatic and legal means to recover what is legitimately ours.
643 Every day now is crucial, for every day that the fait accompli is accepted, the harder it will be to remove it: ask the peoples of Afghanistan, Hungary or Poland about that.
The world must face the fact that if one tolerates a single act of aggression, one connives at them all. In the United Kingdom, we must accept reality. For all our alliances and for all the social politenesses which the diplomats so often mistake for trust, in the end in life it is self-reliance and only self-reliance that counts. Suez, when I first came into the House 25 and more years ago, surely taught us that not every ally is staunch when the call comes. We have one duty only, which we owe to ourselves—the duty to rescue our people and to uphold our rights. Let that be the unanimous and clear resolve of the House this day.
Let us hear no more about logistics—how difficult it is to travel long distances. I do not remember the Duke of Wellington whining about Tones Vedras. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear. "] We have nothing to lose now except our honour. I am clear that that is safe in the hands of my right hon. Friend.
§ Mr. J. Enoch Powell (Down, South)
I want to preface the few things I wish to say to the House with an appeal which I direct particularly and personally to the Prime Minister. It would be grotesque, at a time when, in circumstances of crisis, we are deliberating about the protection of a remote portion of British territory and of the British people, that we should at the same time be engaged in following up proposals which those in a part of the United Kingdom believe—the right hon. Lady is aware of the reasons why they believe—are designed eventually to detach them from being part of the United Kingdom. I assume that she will have already given instructions—if she has not, I appeal to her to do so—that the proposals which were to have been produced on Monday will be deferred until a more timely occasion.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) that the House today is not primarily concerned with inquests—there will be a time for inquests and more abundant material for them—but with what is now to be done. Those who take part in this debate ought to declare clearly what they believe ought now to be done.
Nevertheless, there is a matter of the immediate past where our answer will cast light on what we intend to do and what our spirit is. The Secretary of State for Defence was asked yesterday:if the British Marines had been given orders to surrender if outnumbered".He is reported as having said "Of course not"—He insisted that 'no British soldier ever surrenders.'Whatever other inquiries there are, there has to be a court martial and an inquiry to establish the circumstances in which what the Secretary of State for Defence evidently regarded as right and expected did not happen, with consequent infamy to this country.
The Leader of the Opposition was undoubtedly——
§ Mr. Mark Lennox-Boyd (Morecambe and Lonsdale)
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On a matter of this sensitivity, the record should be put straight. Was not the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) relying on a quotation from a newspaper?
§ Mr. Speaker
That is not a point of order for me. The right hon. Gentleman must be allowed to continue.
§ Mr. Powell
I agree with everything that the Leader of the Opposition said with regard to the Government's application to the United Nations. It was clearly right that we should place this matter, as we are in duty bound to do, before that forum; but when the sovereign territory of a country is invaded without warning, without provocation and without excuse, there is nothing which requires us to wait upon the decisions or upon the conditions or upon the deliberations or upon the resolutions of the United Nations before we take the appropriate steps which ought to follow.
It is an ironical coincidence that the name of one of the ships which may be involved, the "Invincible", was also the name of the capital ship of which the dispatch from home waters to the Falkland Islands in December 1914 resulted in the destruction of Von Spee's squadron. On that occasion the German admiral, when he came up within sight of Port Stanley, made a mistake which proved fatal to him and to his sailors. Instead of closing with the enemy he stood off.
There is only one reaction which is fit to meet unprovoked aggression upon one's own sovereign territory; that is direct and unqualified and immediate willingness—not merely willingness, but willingness expressed by action—to use force. The Government have set in train measures which will enable them to do that; but there must be nothing which casts doubt upon their will and their intention to do it.
A few days ago I put a question to the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with regard to opinion in this country. I asked him whether it wasthe Government's view that public opinion in this country would support, if necessary, the use of force to maintain British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the dependencies.The hon. Gentleman explained to me afterwards that he had clearly heard the first part of my question, but he did reply to it:I should firmly point out that we claim and have sovereignty over the area and there is no shadow of doubt that, if it comes to the point, it will be our duty to defend and support the islanders to the best of our ability."—[Official Report, 30 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 165.]The Government have failed to do that duty. They have manifestly failed. They have failed in the face of the world.
The Prime Minister, shortly after she came into office, received a soubriquet as the "Iron Lady". It arose in the context of remarks which she made about defence against the Soviet Union and its allies; but there was no reason to suppose that the right hon. Lady did not welcome and, indeed, take pride in that description. In the next week or two this House, the nation and the right hon. Lady herself will learn of what metal she is made.
§ Sir Nigel Fisher (Surbiton)
Hitherto, Britain's policy for the Falkland Islands has been genuinely bipartisan. Neither side of the House has ever made any attempt in the long drawn out negotiations with the Argentine to make party political capital. We have all been united in our support of the Falkland Islands, but I must honestly say to my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench that they cannot have expected a bipartisan reaction from the Opposition 645 today. Indeed, Ministers will not escape criticism from Conservative Members as well as from Opposition Members.
Wherever the blame may lie, no one can deny that the islanders have been let down and that Britain has been humiliated. What can now be done? One's natural instinct is to get the invaders out, but it is much easier said than done. Logistically it would be very difficult and it would take a considerable time—I understand about two weeks—but far more serious would be the consequence for the islanders themselves.
A full-scale battle for the Falkland Islands would mean that the islanders, including women and children, would be caught in the crossfire and many of them killed. We could avoid that by leaving the Argentine land forces in possession and confining our retaliation to a battle at sea. But then what? We could not keep our warships in the area indefinitely, with no base from which to supply them.
The truth is that we have been pre-empted, as we were in Norway by the Germans in 1940, and that led to the fall of Mr. Chamberlain's Governmment. Of course, I do not suggest that the same situation should apply today[Interruption.]—but we are entitled to a full explanation of these events and, as soon as security considerations permit, to a clear indication from Ministers as to what action is now proposed.
As a first step, all available sanctions against the Argentine should, of course, be taken. For example, I understand that the people of the Argentine are great football enthusiasts. The very least we should do is to ensure the exclusion of the Argentine from the World Cup. [Interruption.] I am not, of course, suggesting that that would induce the Argentine to withdraw from the islands, but the Argentine should be made aware of world condemnation of its unprovoked aggression in every way open to us, just as we did after the invasion of Afghanistan with regard to our athletes going to Moscow.
Whatever action is decided upon, this is a deeply depressing and distressing episode. We have failed—and failed lamentably—to defend the integrity of one of Britain's few remaining colonies. It is difficult to understand why Ministers apparently did not understand the gravity of the threat to the islands. Therefore, I must ask one question. I appreciate that sending a task force of the size required in this instance is a very expensive operation. However, I hope that the fact that no task force was sent in time was not due to economic considerations. I must ask my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who will reply to the debate, to assure the House that that was not the reason for his lack of action. Will he specifically say that any intelligence indicators and threat assessments about early preparation, either overt or covert, were not disregarded by the Government for political or economic reasons? If our intelligence from the Argentine was as good as it should and used to be, we should have done some contingency planning and had ships and men there in good time to resist the Argentine landing. It is always much easier to stop something happening than to rectify it when it has happened.
The Government can be excused only if our intelligence was very bad and if we genuinely did not know that an invasion was a possibility. That would be some sort of excuse, but not a very good one. Either way, we have been humiliated. Ministers have much to answer for today to the House, to the country and to the loyal people of the Falkland Islands.
§ Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport)
The Government have the right to ask both sides of the House for the fullest support in their resolve to return the Falkland Islands and the freedom of the islanders to British sovereignty. They will get that support and they deserve it in every action that they take in the Security Council and elsewhere. However, the Government must restore the confidence of the country and the House in their ability to carry out that mission.
I agree with the Leader of the Opposition that this is not the time to have an examination. There will come a time when an inquiry will be necessary and we must examine in great detail all that has happened or not happened during the past six weeks. However, it is necessary to examine a central question: why was no preparatory action taken a month ago? It cannot be said that this is a question of intelligence. Our own newspapers were carrying major stories. On 25 February The Guardian carried a story entitled:Falklands raid hint by Argentine army.On 5 March there was the headline in The Times:Argentina steps up Falklands pressure".There was ample warning that the position was deteriorating. We knew of the horror of the military junta in the Argentine and we knew of its actions. Only a few days ago, 3,000 political prisoners were taken, only to be released amid the euphoria of the invasion of the Falkland Islands. We knew that the military were jockeying for position in the navy, the army and the air force. We have known that for many years. It was for that reason four years ago, when a similar position developed, that naval forces were sent.
The Secretary of State for Defence, in his press conference with the Foreign Secretary yesterday, said:If we had made an earlier move to prepare the task force we would have precipitated, quite possibly, a military response—the very kind of thing by the Argentinians that we tried to avoid.The question that the Foreign Secretary, more than the Secretary of State for Defence, must answer is why no action was taken. On the precedent of the past, it was possible to deploy a naval force and to bring it back without any publicity. It was possible to use it in negotiations with the Argentines, knowing full well that we had behind us a naval force and the capacity to stop invasion.
I say to the Prime Minister—the Leader of the Opposition fairly mentioned this fact—that the Prime Minister of the day took complete control of that issue. On my recommendation, the Secretary of State for Defence deployed the forces, but that small Cabinet meeting discussed the rules of engagement and the possibility of having to intervene were a naval force to come on to the Falkland Islands. That is the reality that the Prime Minister must now face.
Enough of the past. This is not a moment for censure. The reality is that our naval forces will set sail, which I support. I say to the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) that I am sure that the Royal Marines conducted themselves in the Falkland Islands in the best spirit of the Royal Marines.
The question that we must now ask is how we can restore confidence. There have been rumours in the newspapers that the Secretary of State for Defence tendered his resignation, only for it to be refused. I would have expected no less of him, because he is a man of 647 honour. Ministers must now consider their position and the quality and strength of the Government during the next few critical weeks.
Absent from the debate have been any positive suggestions. The Prime Minister is entitled to know where the House hopes she will now guide the country. There is much to be said for declaring our right to a 200-mile limit round the Falkland Islands. It would be perfectly compatible with international law to declare that no Argentine vessel should appear within that limit and that, if it did, the British Navy would take action.
The precedent for the use of peaceful military action is the Cuban missile crisis and the use of a naval blockade. We still have a very strong Navy, but only just. We have the capacity to put a naval blockade on that 200-mile limit and to enforce it as long as we have hunter-killer submarines there. I hope that the Secretary of State for Defence can breach one aspect of security and let us know that there is a hunter-killer submarine in the area. If not, the House and the Argentines should assume that it is very nearly there. The hunter-killer submarine could effectively take action, if necessary. The Argentine Government should have fair warning to remove their vessels from the area. It is necessary to back up our diplomacy with the resolution and the capacity to deploy our forces.
We all know that there will be great difficulties in a resisted offence against the Falkland Islands. There are massive forces on the islands, but nothing said in the House should exclude any possibility of repossessing them. I believe that they will be repossessed by a combination of firm diplomacy backed by the use of the Navy. They are far away and there are logistic difficulties, but we should not make too much of those. Perhaps we can call on some of our Commonwealth friends in New Zealand and Australia to help us—at least with refuelling.
The Prime Minister misjudged the atmosphere of the House most seriously. It is now necessary for the message to come from the House that we are grossly dissatisfied with the conduct of the Government during the past month. We shall sustain them despite that, because we recognise that our service men's lives might be put at risk.
§ Mr. Dalyell
Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
§ Dr. Owen
No. There is no question of anyone in the House weakening the stance of the Government, but the Prime Minister must now examine ways of restoring the Government's authority and ask herself why Britain has been placed in such a humiliating position during the past few days.
§ Mr. Dalyell
rose——
§ Dr. Owen
The right hon. Lady said that it would have been absurd to send forces, but I do not agree. It would have been the right decision a month ago. The absence of that decision has meant humiliation. The House must now resolve to sustain the Government in restoring the position.
§ Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion)
The third naval power in the world, and the second in NATO, has suffered a humiliating defeat. It is always painful in a state of war to criticise a Government, particularly a 648 Government of one's own friends, but the purpose of recrimination at a time like this is to prevent the repetition of error.
On television yesterday my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary said that diplomacy was the only instrument that the Government had to hand. I fear that my noble Friend on this occasion, as on others, confuses diplomacy with foreign policy. Diplomacy is the day-to-day handling of conferences and international relations. Foreign policy involves having a clear aim and making sure that one has the means to carry out that aim.
We supposed, and we were told, that the aim was to maintain British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, but I am bound to say, having followed the earlier negotiations of my hon. Friend the Member for Cirencester and Tewkesbury (Mr. Ridley), and having had some experience of the Foreign Office's views about the Falkland Islands, that that aim was pursued with singularly little conviction. As for the means, they were non-existent. After the withdrawal from Simonstown, we no longer had a fleet almost permanently in the South Atlantic, but no attempt was made to carry out the main recommendation of the Shackleton committee to enlarge the airfield so that, when weather conditions allowed, we could have reinforced the Falkland Islands with a big enough garrison in a time of crisis.
Beyond that, a number of us have been pleading over the years that our defence forces should not only be tailored to the NATO requirements but should be prepared and strong enough to defend our interests outside the specifically NATO area. That advice was not heeded by the Government. Quite the contrary. They proposed to cut back the Navy and, more particularly, HMS "Endurance" and HMS "Invincible". These, ironically, are now two of the ships that are most mentioned in plans for the forthcoming operations. We were told that the cuts were inevitable because of cost. I can only say to the Government that the consequences of our defeat yesterday will be a good deal more expensive than would have been the cost of maintaining those ships.
At the same press conference, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence said that no amount of intelligence could have guided the Government to a different course. I do not understand that. It was in February, well within sailing time to the islands, that the Argentine Government first began to speak in a tone which all of us who know anything about the Falkland Islands detected as quite unusually aggressive. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that even if we had begun to send ships from the time of the landing in South Georgia, they would not be there yet. That is quite true, but they would be halfway there. That would be something. I find it hard to understand, unless our intelligence services have been wholly undermined, how they could have failed to detect the extensive preparations that must have been necessary in the Argentine.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has done her best to serve as an air-raid shelter for her colleagues directly responsible, and that she has done with her customary loyalty. However, we should recognise that we have suffered the inevitable consequences of the combination of unpreparedness and feeble counsels.
We have lost a battle, but have not lost the war. It is the old saying that Britain always wins the last battle. It will not be an easy task. It is not just that the sea voyage for our ships is long, but that the international waters will 649 beome rougher as the days go by. Pressures will be exerted. We shall be told "Why not try for a reasonable compromise?" and "On no account use force". We already see that in the Daily Mirror and The Guardian this morning. Or we shall be told to think about our economic interests in the Argentine. All those things will be said.
I do not want to propose a strategy today. This is not the occasion for an armchair strategy. However, I seek from the Government today—and if not today, certainly in the debate that the Leader of the Opposition says he will demand next week—two simple assurances. The first is that we are determined to make the Argentine dictator disgorge what he has taken—by diplomacy if possible, by force if necessary. The second is an undertaking that between now and the publication of the annual defence review the Government will re-examine carefully and closely the plans that they already have in mind; that they will undertake to maintain not only HMS "Endurance" and HMS "Invincible", but make sure that, in all three Services, we have a capability of looking after our interests outside the NATO area as well as within it. Nothing else will restore the credibility of the Government or wipe the stain from Britain's honour.
§ Mr. Edward Rowlands (Merthyr Tydfil)
I wish to put some basic and serious questions to the Government, but first I want to say that our thoughts and prayers at this time must be with the islanders. Most of us who have been to the Falkland Islands, and those who have been involved in the issue over many years, have built up a host of friendships, ties and acquaintanceships. I have a goddaughter who lives in Port Stanley with her mother, Valerie Clarke. We know also Adrian Monck and Willy Bowles, whom many hon. Members have met. The idea that they are in the hands of Argentine marines should offend us all.
There should be no petty party arguments about Southern Thule. This is a far greater and more serious issue. Indeed, the Prime Minister fell far short of the occasion. If the right hon. Lady meets the islanders, which I hope she will do—and I hope that we shall succeed in freeing them—she will find that they are passionate believers in parliamentary democracy. They listen to and watch everything that we say and do in the House. It is one of their most remarkable characteristics. Even the most obscure written parliamentary question is followed and debated in the Falkland Islands.
How will the islanders hear about this debate today? How will they find out the message that will come from the House? What arrangements will the Government make to ensure that they hear what the House says about their present plight? That is desperately important, because it brings home to us the terrible tragedy that has engulfed them in the last 48 hours.
Having been involved in a handful of crises and incidents during four and a half years of negotiations with the Falkland Islands and with the Argentine Government, I can say that I try to follow these affairs closely. In view of the bipartisan spirit that generally prevails when we handle these issues, I deeply regret saying that I have failed to understand completely the Government's handling of the crisis over the past six to eight weeks. I profoundly reject the suggestion made by the Prime 650 Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence that we could not have foreseen what was happening.
Anyone who has dealt with these issues over the years will know that there are a number of tell-tale signs. Apparently, the negotiations in New York with the deputy Foreign Minister were cordial and constructive. However, two days later, in the official Argentine press, the military authorities issued a completely different view and line about the negotiations. Surely that was one of the most important tell-tale signs. That was the time to wake up and worry. That happened in February. There were tell-tale signs in February of a major potential hazard. In my view, it was reprehensible not to cover that position by political and military action.
Secondly, I have great difficulty in understanding how the intelligence failed. Our intelligence in Argentina was extremely good. That is why we took action in 1977. We found out that certain attitudes and approaches were being formed. I cannot believe that the quality of our intelligence has changed. Last night the Secretary of State for Defence asked "How can we read the mind of the enemy?" I shall make a disclosure. As well as trying to read the mind of the enemy, we have been reading its telegrams for many years. I am sure that many sources are available to the Government, and I do not understand how they failed to anticipate some of the dangers that suddenly loomed on the horizen.
I shall pose a difficult question for the Secretary of State—[HON. MEMBERS: "Where is he?".]—or the Prime Minister.
§ Mr. Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield, East)
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it not a great discourtesy to the House for the Secretary of State for Defence in a debate such as this to absent himself from the House for a very long time?
§ Mr. Speaker
That is not a point of order for me.
§ Mr. Rowlands
The United States is very close to the Argentine regime. Bearing in mind the reports in diplomatic circles and those that appeared in the newspapers last week, did the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence receive advice or suggestions from the Americans that there would be a growing problem with the Argentinian regime? I should be surprised to learn that there was not some information or evidence picked up by other authorities apart from our own. That is why I cannot understand what has happened in the past few days. I cannot condone or support the Government if they received any notification or warning signals that subsequently they refused to heed.
I shall refer to the action that was taken in 1977 because in some ways it underlines the indictment that I make of the Government's handling of the crisis, which has led to the imprisonment of 1,850 British citizens on the Falkland Islands. We deployed forces in 1977 because we discovered that there were to be major problems in the negotiations. At that time I was an inexperienced Minister and therefore I approached the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), and put to him the thought that perhaps has been in the minds of the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary over the past 24 hours. I put it to my right hon. Friend that the deployment of force could be an over-reaction that would lead to a reaction that would 651 trigger a host of uncontrollable events. This seems to have been the state of mind that has prevailed within the Government over the past week or two.
My right hon. Friend asked me, "Can you guarantee or assure me that there will not be a threatened invasion and that you will be able to keep the talks going?". I replied, "No, Prime Minister, I cannot guarantee that". My right hon. Friend responded by saying "Let me remind you of an old truth: it is better to be safe than sorry". I believe passionately that the Government would have been better safe than sorry.
High office brings privileges and responsibilities. It brings the responsibility of making crucial judgments and decisions, which has fallen upon the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence over the past week or two. I am not a natural opponent of the Foreign Secretary. I have admired his handiwork in Zimbabwe and in other areas. However, he and the Secretary of State for Defence made a massive misjudgment over the past three or four weeks.
What should the House say to the Government? First, it should remind the Government that successive Governments and successive Parliaments have upheld the principle that the wishes, interests, rights, security and safety of the Falkland Islanders are paramount. Secondly, we should charge both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary to proceed as speedily as possible to restore to the Falkland Islanders their rights, safety and security as urgently as possible. However, if they cannot, and if it turns out that as a result of their massive misjudgment over the past few days they have failed the islanders and Parliament, they should go. The islanders have already paid a high price for the initial set of blunders. They have lost their freedom for the first time for 150 years. The guilty men should not go scot free if we do not retrieve the islands as quickly as possible.
§ Mr. Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South-West)
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister should go forth from this debate strengthened, reassured and grateful. She has heard from both sides of the House a unanimous sentiment and a united voice.
I have never been more impressed by the eloquence and oratory of the Leader of the Opposition than I was today. For once he truly spoke for Britain, and so, too, did the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), They were constructive, statesmanlike, sensible speeches. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister realises that she will have the fortification that a previous Conservative Prime Minister at a time of grave international crisis did not have. If she feels that it is necessary, and if it becomes necessary, to use force, it will be used with the united and unanimous backing of the House of Commons, every Member of which looks upon the 1,850 Falkland Islanders as he or she looks upon his or her constituents. In a sense, that is what they are, and we must do something to protect and preserve them.
But what a blunder, what a monumental folly, that the Falkland Islanders should be incarcerated in an Argentine gaol. That is what it amounts to. It is always better to anticipate than to react. It is always easier to anticipate than to react. The great blunder—we shall all want 652 detailed explanations—was that the Government failed to anticipate, and they will now have the greatest difficulty in knowing how to react.
The right hon. Member for Devonport made some sensible, constructive and workable suggestions but he knows, and we all know, that it will be much more difficult to implement them. It will require greater courage to bombard or sink Argentine ships than to have landed 2,000 marines two weeks ago, which could have been done. Someone has blundered. I do not know who and I do not know how, but I have my suspicions, and they are directed inevitably—and regretfully—at both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary.
It was not right that the Foreign Secretary should have been absent from the United Kingdom during this week—a time when it was becoming increasingly and abundantly plain that we were on the brink of a grave international crisis. These things must be said because we are talking about redeeming a situation. We are talking about restoring credibility. That is restoring the credibility not merely of a set of politicians and of a Government, but of our nation. We must all be determined to do that.
I should like to know why NATO, of which we are a member, issued an appeal, as the Prime Minister told us, to both sides asking them to refrain from hostility at a time when the invasion had apparently already taken place or was under way. I should also like to know why we attach so much importance to a telephone call made by the President of the United States. I should like to be assured that the President of the United States will stand four square with Britain, in a way that his predecessor did not in 1956.—[AN HON. MEMBER: "If my hon. Friend believes that, he will believe anything."]—My hon. Friend intervenes with a jocular aside at a time when we are not predisposed to be jocular. This is one of the most critical moments in the history of our country since the war.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and her colleagues must look again at the defence strategy and capability of this country. If we are incapable of deterring and preventing a jumped-up junta of barbarous men from inflicting an appalling regime on British subjects, we must surely question the whole strategy that has been explained to the House in recent months.
I should think that there will be some anxious people in Gibraltar today. [AN HON. MEMBER: "And in Hong Kong."] There will also be anxious people in Hong Kong. There will be many anxious people who have felt for a long time that we were taking too cavalier an attitude towards the role of the Royal Navy and who will demand that we rethink some of the things that we have propounded in recent weeks.
The whole House owes an indebtedness to my hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) for his courage and prescience. I hope that what he has said will be heeded more than it has been recently.
However, it is not too late to restore the credibility of the Government. It is desperate that we should do so. People said to me last night and this morning, "We thought, above all, that we could sleep safely while your Government were in power." [Interruption.] That is no cause for hilarity. The Conservative Party has traditionally and rightly prided itself on its attitude towards defence. The Conservative Party has always rightly and properly placed defence at the head of its priorities when confronting the electorate. The electorate expects more of us than we have delivered up to now.
653 Therefore, our united resolve from today must be to utilise the unanimity that has been expressed in the debate. We should be grateful to the Leader of the Opposition and to the right hon. Member for Devonport for their support. We should resolve to present a united front, to know that we will not shirk, however distasteful the use of force may be, from trying to retrieve the situation, to free those prisoners and to restore to their proper territorial integrity those islands, which are bleak and barren, but which are dear to those who live on them, because they personify and embody the freedom that we also enjoy. That must be our task. If the Government fail in leading us along that line, many of us will have to question our position on the Government Benches.
§ Mr. Arthur Bottomley (Middlesbrough):
In view of your appeal, Mr. Speaker, I shall confine my remarks about this unhappy affair to a sentence or two.
A few years ago at a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting the Falkland Islands representatives said that at some time the Argentine might try to take the islands by force and that Britain should be prepared. Regrettably, we were not. May I ask the Prime Minister whether she has already assured our friends, and the Commonwealth in particular, that, so long as the Falkland Islands and their inhabitants wish to remain in the 'Commonwealth, Britain will see that they do so?
§ Mr. Raymond Whitney (Wycombe)
I should like to offer a few words which I know will not be popular in the House, but they are based on three years' work in Argentina, trying to avoid the eventuality that now confronts us. [HON. MEMBERS: "For the Foreign Office."] That is right.
§ Mr. Teddy Taylor (Southend, East)
The Foreign Office was not working for Britain.
§ Mr. Whitney
I utterly refute that. I was working both for Britain and for the interests of the islanders.
Between 1970 and 1972 we negotiated a communications agreement which seemed to offer the promise of a long-term resolution of the dispute and to be very much in the interests of the Falkland Islanders and absolutely in tune with their wishes. I am referring to the opening up of links with the Argentine in terms of travel, medical cover, educational and postal facilities and holidays. All those things now seem trivial and irrelevant, but in those days they seemed to offer hope of a gradual resolution of the crisis that has gone on for so long. That effort was made against the background of a large British community in Argentina, which was also trying to help the people of the Falkland Islands out of the dreadful situation. However, we now face the situation that all of us were trying hard to avoid.
Recriminations about what might have happened over the past months are not profitable today in this fevered climate. We must consider carefully what action we should take. I should like to offer a few considerations, which I hope very much the Government will bear in mind as the fleet steams towards the South Atlantic.
The reputation of this Government is based on courage and realism. [Interruption.] Opposition Members may laugh, but no one in the country doubts that the Government pursue their aims with courage and recognise 654 not the world as we would like it to be but as it is. It would not necessarily be courageous to respond instinctively as Britons, with our natural patriotic instincts. That would not be true courage. It is not courage to respond to all the editorial writers and to all the people in the pubs who understandably and rightly are saying this lunchtime, "What a dreadful and despicable thing has happened." Of course it is dreadful and despicable that the self-determination principle which for 60 years has been the major guiding idea of international relations—
§ Sir Frederick Burden (Gillingham)
We are not responding to the newspapers. We are responding to an act of naked aggression against the Falkland Islands, which are occupied by British people. We are not prepared to see them annexed in this way.
§ Mr. Whitney
I recognise the point that my hon. Friend has made. I am asking the Government to take into account a number of considerations which will take at the forefront of importance the interests and future of the Falkland islanders and also the reputation and tradition of our country. Therefore, we must consider these events carefully.
The easy way would be to respond thoughtlessly. I should like to outline to the Government the real problems that we shall face when we move in. Are we ready as a nation, and shall we continue to be ready, to accept the military implications of what is involved in a landing on the islands? If we are, well and good, but are we ready to maintain that effort not for a week, not for a month, but for years? Or, if we speak of a blockade, are we ready to accept the implications of that for the Falkland Islanders now under the Argentine military occupation, or, I may say, for the large British community in Argentina? Are we ready to accept those considerations? It may be that we are, but I hope that we shall consider them carefully.
If we pursue the idea of a blockade, can we maintain, and are we capable of maintaining also, the necessary air cover, because, as the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said, a naval blockade is not adequate in itself. An air blockade will also be necessary. These are the questions that we must ask courageously.
§ Mr. Alan Clark (Plymouth, Sutton)
My hon. Friend has omitted to state that Argentina is a bankrupt totalitarian country with an inflation rate of 130 per cent. and in an exceedingly precarious social condition. It has no capacity for replacing equipment that is destroyed. It has no capacity for buying, building or launching ships to replace those that are sunk. It has no capacity for replacing ammunition. Yet my hon. Friend is talking as though this were a head-on confrontation with a world power.
§ Mr. Whitney
There are many things that I have omitted to state clearly. In the time available, even if it were within my power and knowledge, I cannot give a complete analysis of the military and geopolitical implications. But I must ask my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. Clark), who is himself a military specialist, whether we are ready to maintain at 8,000 miles' distance the scale of military operation involved 200 or 300 miles from the Argentine mainland.
§ Mr. Whitney
I am sorry not to give way but I have already given way enough. It may be that we are prepared to maintain that scale of operation, but I hope very much that my hon. Friends will think about it very carefully.
§ Mr. Harry Greenway (Ealing, North)
rose——
§ Mr. Whitney
I am sorry, but I cannot give way again. I believe that there are alternative ways in which the interests of the Falkland Islanders can be protected and I feel that these can be achieved by negotiation. I recognise that at this time the two efforts must go hand in hand, but let us not get led astray so that we lose the whole opportunity of negotiating a peaceful settlement, a settlement not only in the interests of the Argentines and the Falkland Islanders but in the interest of the honour of this country as well.
§ Sir John Biggs-Davison (Epping Forest)
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. At a time of emergency like this, if defeatism of this kind is to be spoken, should it not be done in secret session? Would it be in order to spy strangers?
§ Mr. Speaker
I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not.
§ Mr. Whitney
I wholly reject any suggestion of defeatism from my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Sir J. Biggs-Davison). But I earnestly implore the House to think very carefully, so that we make sure that we are ready to take and answer the challenges of the questions that are there. They will not go away if they are not enunciated. If we show that we are ready to overcome these immense problems and at the same time pursue our diplomatic efforts, it is not defeatism but realism and the avoidance of another humiliation for our country.
§ Mr. Speaker
Order. I understand that it is hoped to begin the Front Bench speeches at twenty-five minutes past 1. I hope that hon. Members who are called will bear that in mind.
§ Mr. Russell Johnston (Inverness)
The hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney) must face the fact that this is without doubt a very shameful day for this country. The sort of view he put echoed in a strange way what I found, to my horror, in the editorial in The Guardian today. I shall quote it:Reality number two is that the Falkland Islands do not represent any strategic or commercial British interest worth fighting over (unless one believes reports of crude oil under its off-shore waters).It is shocking that in a great newspaper such as The Guardian the view should be put that the only things worth fighting over are commercial matters and not the rights and freedoms of individual people. Every newspaper that I saw today showed pictures of President Galtieri with his thumbs up. To see that barbarous man rejoicing made me both depressed and angry—depressed that he had been given the opportunity, and angry at our neglect of a small group of people who unquestionably have trusted us and to whose trust we have not responded.
I shall say nothing at this stage about the Government's lack of preparedness, as that ground has been well covered. I add just one point to the constructive intervention of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands). It is not just a matter of our apparent inability 656 to sustain an effective intelligence-gathering operation. What about the Americans, our allies? Surely the Americans have an effective intelligence-gathering operation in the Argentine. Surely, too, they should be in a position to tell us what is happening. If they do not do so, that is a matter for anxiety within the alliance.
I am a member of the Falkland Islands Association. I also have several constituents who have lived in the Falkland Islands and have families there. One knows of the islanders' loyalty and also of the sustained low profile adopted by successive British Governments in relation to the Falkland Islands. We have looked weak in the Falkland Islands for a long time. The Foreign Office has not been the friend of the Falkland Islands. As the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) said, they have been starved of money, with the result that a situation has now arisen in which vast amounts of money will have to be spent and in which results may be very difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, this is where the buck stops.
§ Mr. David Ennals (Norwich, North)
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that decisions about the Falkland Islands or anything else to do with foreign policy are made by Ministers, not by civil servants? Civil servants may give wrong advice, but Ministers take the decisions. Will he also accept that Foreign Office Ministers in the Labour Government, of whom I was one for two years, with responsibility for the Falkland Islands stood solidly by our commitments and moved not an inch from our standing for what the people of the Falkland Islands themselves believed in?
§ Mr. Johnston
I do not agree that this country has given adequate economic sustenance to the Falkland Islands for a considerable period.
In conclusion, as many other hon. Members wish to speak, I support the Government in sending the task force announced by the Prime Minister. Clearly, it must be of sufficient size to operate a blockade. I also agree with the right hon. Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) that, if we are to act at all, we must act swiftly. Clearly, that has consequences. The hon. Member for Wycombe was right to refer to the position of British citizens in the Argentine. Will the Government tell us how many such citizens there are? We must face the fact that this must have consequences for them. Even more serious, however, are the consequences of allowing this type of unprovoked aggression to pass without response. The Government have an enormously difficult task, but some of it is of their own making. They must now face up to it, and in doing so they will have our support.
§ Mr. Speaker
Order. I understand that the winding-up speeches are to begin at 1.30 pm and not at 1.25 pm.
§ Sir John Eden (Bournemouth, West)
The most important point to emerge from the debate came in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when she affirmed that the Falkland Islands remain British territory and she committed the Government to freeing them from occupation and returning them to British sovereignty.
Like many hon. Members, I have long suspected that elements within the Foreign Office have been wanting to be rid of what they have regarded as a tiresome problem. The one factor that has so far prevented that has been the 657 resolution of Ministers that it should not be so, but there has been a basic weakness within the Administration and that has undermined our negotiating position and has deprived us of the possibility of having an alternative fallback plan.
I hope that we shall never again hear about the dangerous doctrine that we cannot deploy force while talks are under way. Whatever the pressures against decisive action, which will undoubtedly be mounted in the international arena over the next few days and weeks, I hope that my right hon. Friend, who has now taken direct charge of these matters, will ensure that the Government's commitment is carried through to the earliest possible fulfilment, for the credibility of the Government and the honour of the country demand nothing less.
§ Mr. Donald Stewart (Western Isles)
Like the hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston), I, too, have constituents who have worked in the Falkland Islands. In fact, some of their families are there now. For many years, I, too, have been a member of the Falkland Islands Association.
Many of us have pressed Governments of both parties to do something for these people, and when this incident is passed we hope that a more realistic view will be taken of what they are entitled to.
I was interested in the comments of the right hon. Member for Bournemouth West (Sir J. Eden) about the Foreign Office, because one wonders on which side it has operated. That was illustrated by the Prime Minister's use of the phrase "discussing a dispute". There was no dispute. A wholly unfounded claim was made by the Argentine over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. By regarding the matter as a dispute, we started from a position of weakness.
It is clear that there has been a lack of intelligence, information and preparedness, but, as other hon. Members have said, this is not the time to go into that. The fact remains that for many years successive Governments have given the people of the Falkland Islands an assurance that their interests would be protected. They are entitled to the right to self-determination, and they have said quite clearly that they have no wish to be taken under the wing of the Argentine.
Other hon. Members have said that everyone ought to declare where he stands. I hope that this matter can be resolved without force, but if force is necessary, so be it.
§ Sir Peter Emery (Honiton)
With perhaps one exception the House has been absolutely unanimous in the view that the message for the Government and the rest of the world is that the British House of Commons is determined to ensure that the British Falkland Islands people shall be removed from the yoke of the Argentine Government.
I think that the Prime Minister's statement has been somewhat lost in the debate. She made it absolutely clear that a Navy task force was being assembled and that orders were being given for that to proceed.
It is obvious that that force cannot arrive to take action for a number of days—perhaps even 10 days or a fortnight. Two things must be certain—that any military action taken by Britain must be 99.9 per cent. certain of being victorious. We must risk nothing that could bring about 658 defeat. That is why the dangerous thought of the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen)—that we should send a submarine to wander around without naval cover—was not very sensible.
Secondly, may I put it to the Prime Minister that, in the period before the task force arrives, we should announce to the world that we expect, and we shall take positive action to ensure, that every diplomatic, trade and economic pressure is brought to bear upon the Argentines in order that they should withdraw before action becomes necessary.
The use of the United Nations in this matter is the proper and accepted use of that body. If that action of withdrawal has not been taken within the 10 or 14 days stipulated by the Government, a state of war should exist between Argentina and Britain. Confidence in the Government—which I have in my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—can be adequately restored. The British people expect the Government to be able to defend our people wherever they are in the world. Whatever difficulties there may be, those are facts which we must understand. We must pursue every diplomatic measure that we can first of all, but after that there is only one possible action.
§ Mr. Douglas Jay (Battersea, North)
I want briefly to say only three things. First, in spite of all that we have heard today, I find it inexplicable that the Government made no preparations and, apparently, did not know what was going on throughout the whole of last month. Not only were there the usual press reports and all the normal signs, but the Government were repeatedly warned in the House—notably by my right hon. Friend the Member fir Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), who raised the matter as soon as the withdrawal of HMS "Endurance" was announced. It is now two and a half weeks since l asked the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, what defence forces we had in the Falkland Islands besides HMS "Endurance". I had hoped that that was a hint that if we had not any, we should have pretty soon.
The whole story will inevitably lead some people to think that the Foreign Office is a bit too much saturated with the spirit of appeasement. I hope that, apart from anything else, the Foreign Office will now examine its conscience, if it has one.
Secondly, I trust that this event will put an end to the policy of unilateral disarmament of the Royal Navy, which the Government have been carrying on. Unilateral disarmament always invites aggression, and unilateral disarmament of the Navy has invited aggression in this case. I hope that we will hear no more about cash limits in the next few weeks and that there will be no cash limits on any effective action that we now take.
Thirdly, I do not believe that diplomacy is enough in this situation. The Secretary of State for Defence made an extraordinary statement on television last night. He said that if we took any military preparatory action it would spoil our efforts at diplomacy. Exactly the opposite is true. Diplomacy can succeed only if it is visibly supported by effective action.
Effective action is necessary for two reasons. First, the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands are at stake. It does not matter how the British forces originally got 659 there 150 years ago. What matters now is that these people wish to remain British, and that is the right of self-determination.
Secondly, surely, as the whole history of this century has shown, if one gives way to this sort of desperate, illegal action, things will not get better, but will get worse. Therefore, if the Government act effectively they will have the support of the House and the country. But if they do not, they will be unreservedly condemned.
§ Sir Bernard Braine (Essex, South-East)
This remarkable debate has been characterised by high-calibre speeches showing acute perception of the problem. Until my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. Witney) spoke, I thought that the House was speaking with one voice in a moment of national crisis, warning the Government and expecting them to act. My hon. Friend is entitled to his view, but he seemed to be asking the Government to bear certain weighty considerations in mind with the object, no doubt, of pulling them back from any punitive action that they may wish to take to restore our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. However, I find it odd that my hon. Friend, who has served in Buenos Aires, should omit to mention the most important consideration of all. We are dealing here not with a democratic country that has some claim to the Falkland Islands—with which the matter could be thrashed out in a civilised way—but with a Fascist, corrupt and cruel regime.
I have spent the past few years in fruitless negotiations with the Argentine ambassador about women and mothers of young children who have been picked up by the secret police and who have been spirited away. They are now among the disappeared ones. They have not been arrested for any criminal offence. They have never been brought to trial. Indeed, they may no longer be alive. They were seized simply because they were related to people who stood in the way of Argentina's Fascist governors.
The very thought that our people, 1,800 people of British blood and bone, could be left in the hands of such criminals is enough to make any normal Englishman's blood—and the blood of Scotsmen and Welshmen—boil, too.
This is not a day for judgments to be made. True, it is a sad day, but not one for judgment yet. The Prime Minister was frank and open with the House. At present, none of us 'expects the Government to reveal the dispositions of our forces and any decisions that they may have taken. We do not expect that, but we do expect results. Unless firm and effective action is taken within a reasonable period of time to remove the invaders and to restore the islands to British sovereignty, the effect on the Government's standing will be dire. They will not be able to rely on my support. However, reading between the lines of the Prime Minister's remarks today, I venture to think that the right decisions have been taken. We must now wait upon events.
This crisis did not come upon us suddenly in the night. I stood at the Dispatch Box some 14 years ago and extracted a promise from the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart—now Lord Stewart of Fulham—that in no circumstances would there be a transfer of sovereignty unless the Falkland Islanders so wished. Since then, we 660 have had weasel words from successive Foreign Office Ministers. One after the other has said the same thing, but they have acted in a way that has driven the Falkland Islanders into dependence on the Argentine for communication with the outside world. In other words, policy has not matched up to the assurances that have been given to Parliament. That sort of thing has happened before and may happen again. However, we must be on the qui vive. Such things happen too often. Parliament must be taken into the confidence of the Government of the day.
The time for weasel words has ended. I expect action from the Government; and I hope that we shall get it. However, let there be no misunderstanding. Unless the Falkland Islands are quickly restored to lawful British sovereignty, and unless their people are freed from the dreadful shadow under which they have lived for a decade or more, the effect on the Government will be dire.
§ Mr. George Foulkes (South Ayrshire)
I find it difficult to understand why the British Government were not aware of something of which the people of the Argentine seemed to be aware. Yesterday there appeared on the streets of towns and cities in the Argentine a newspaper entitled "Seven Days". That newspaper had all the details of the invasion. Therefore, I find it difficult to understand why the British Government did not know what was happening.
It is a question not only of the intelligence service that we have heard so much about and pay so much for, but of what our embassy was saying to us. I should like to know—I hope that we shall have an answer today from the Secretary of State—what our embassy was telling us about what was happening in Argentina. I should like to know what was the Foreign Office's interpretation of what the embassy was saying.
Many people have already said this, but it bears repeating by someone who went on a deputation to Cuba—allegedly briefed by the Foreign Office. When we arrived in Cuba, we found that we knew nothing about NATO exercises and the participation of a British nuclear submarine in those NATO exercises because the Foreign Office had failed to tell us about them. That is the Foreign Office that has been advising on this matter.
I must say that I have some reservations. I know that remark will not fall easily on the ears of hon. Members. Indeed, the words of the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney) did not do so. I have some reservations about what seems to have been emerging, almost unanimously, as the view of the House.
I have some worries about how we can take effective action. It ought and needs to be said that, if we are to take effective action, we must examine the consequences. Inevitably, thousands of Argentines will be killed. We may not wish to weep any tears over them, but thousands of British troops will be killed as well. We must face those consequences. Inevitably, there will be recriminations against British people in the Argentine. If we know anything about the Argentine Government, we must know that.
What is more, can anyone with military knowledge tell me how we can retake the Falkland Islands without loss of life to the men, women and children whom we are saying that we are interested in protecting?
§ Mr. Foulkes
I can think of no way round the problem.
§ Mr. Foulkes
My gut reaction is to use force. Our country has been humiliated. Every hon. Member must have a gut reaction to use force, but we must also be sure that we shall not kill thousands of people in the use of that force. I am in favour of the firmest possible diplomatic action and sanctions against the Argentine. I am in favour of asking the United States and all our allies to unite against the Argentine. However, I am against the military action for which so many have asked because I dread the consequences that will befall the people of our country and the people of the Falkland Islands.
§ Mr. John Silkin (Deptford)
My right hon. Friend the leader of the nation——[Interruption.] He soon will be. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition spoke for the nation when he talked about the Falkland Islanders and the fact that the whole House, whatever other views that we may have, is thinking of them at this moment. Yes, as the Prime Minister said, they have the right to be free. We also believe that they have the right to be defended, and there are one or two questions that need to be asked about this.
The truth of the matter is very simple. Today, I agree, is not a day of judgment—we cannot have recriminations—but it is a day of questions. It is on those questions and on the answers to those questions that this House must make its judgment in the debate that I hope will take place next week. It is essential that those questions should be answered.
Our thoughts are with our fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands. I share the concern expressed by many right hon. and hon. Members that what has taken place is the aggression of a Fascist dictatorship and a Fascist junta whose latest leader, General Galtieri, is probably the worst of the bunch of its leaders—a man who wears upon his chest the medals that he won in repressing his own people. When he says to us that he will respect the rights and property and, above all, the lives and freedom of our people, we have a right to wonder whether that is true in view of what he does to his own people. These are the important questions that we have to ask.
In those circumstances, I make one appeal above all others to the Government. Let us ensure that our dear fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands are kept in touch with us as much as possible. Let us extend our broadcasts. I do not know the technicalities that are involved. But let them hear our voice. Let them know they are not deserted. Let them know that we are thinking of them. That must be the first consideration. We must give them what advice we can in what are difficult times for them. They may be tempted to do things that it may not be prudent for them to do and that may interfere with our own plans. We must keep in touch with them whatever happens.
The Opposition agree absolutely with the Government that all the diplomatic measures necessary in the United Nations Security Council must be taken. We must press ahead with those diplomatic considerations as rapidly as possible. I do not know how many friends we may get. Those that we can get we must get. I have been cheered by the reaction of the French and the Irish.
662 When it comes to anything else, I wish to speak frankly to the House. I have said that this must not be a day of judgment or a day of recrimination. It is, however, a day of solid questioning. We are being asked to support the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary of State for Defence in what may or may not be a dangerous and difficult operation when all the indications are that heretofore they have blundered and bungled over the defence of the Falkland Islands. Had they acted speedily, with effect and force, and also, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Sparkbrook (Mr. Hattersley) says, with foresight, this whole danger might never have occurred. It is right, before we give the Government any trust whatever, that we should ask and receive answers to three vital sets of questions.
Is it not a fact that all—no, not all, but largescale—signals were being received by the Argentine junta that we did not perhaps mind so much, wrongly, I know, what might become of the Falkland Islands? It is within the recollection of the House that, in December 1980, the then Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices met a very cold reception in the House over the manner in which he had been speaking to people in the Falkland Islands. He had been saying to them, "We are talking over with the Argentines the question of giving them your land and leasing it back. What do you think of that?" The House gave a very clear view. What, however, was the view taken in Buenos Aires? Was this not perhaps a signal to Buenos Aires that the will of the British Government and the British people was weakening? Was that not the first signal? One can turn to other signals. I have heard twice that the talks that took place at the end of February this year between the present Minister of State and his Argentine opposite number were cordial and positive. Cordial and positive for whom? What sort of effect did that have on the Argentines? Therefore, the first question that the right hon. Gentleman must answer when he replies is this: what was the substance of those talks, which were so cordial and positive that they have ended up with an Argentine invasion of British territory in the Falkland Islands?
There are also other signals such as the small question of HMS "Endurance". On 9 February this year—the Prime Minister has something to answer for on this matter—my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) asked:is the Prime Minister aware that the Government's decisions to withdraw and pay off HMS 'Endurance' when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have serious consequences?He continued:Is she further aware that this stale old proposition was put to me on more than one occasion when I was Prime Minister and after considering it I turned it down flat? Will she please do the same?The right hon. Lady replied:The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that there are many competing claims on the defence budget … My right hon. Friend therefore felt that other claims on the defence budget should have greater priority."—[Official Report, 9 February 1982; Vol. 17, c. 856–57.]What about the Secretary of State for Defence? This has been a long week, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Sir H. Wilson) once said that a week was a very long time in politics. This week started with the Trident debate and is ending with the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.
663 On 29 March, Monday last, at a time when the Prime Minister assured us—I shall come to timing in a moment—that the British Government were becoming well aware of Argentine intentions and beginning to counter them, the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed) intervened in the speech of the Secretary of State for Defence and said:Will my right hon. Friend answer this riddle, which is worrying many people: how can we apparently afford £8,000 million to meet a threat in 13 years' time, which may possibly be true, when we cannot afford £3 million to keep HMS 'Endurance' on patrol to meet a threat that is facing us today?The answer to the riddle came from the Secretary of State for Defence. He said:I do not intend to get involved in a debate about the Falkland Islands now.This was last Monday. He continued:These issues are too important to be diverted into a discussion on HMS 'Endurance'."—[Official Report, 29 March 1982; Vol. 21, c. 27.]Whatever the Secretary of State's personal position, these signals were being heard loud and clear in Buenos Aires. The Argentines felt that Her Majesty's Government were no longer in a position or had the will to protect their fellow citizens in the Falkland Islands.
We were told that the Government were taken by surprise and, the Prime Minister said, rightly by surprise. She asked how we could respond to every possible threat from the Argentine. There have certainly been many threats, increasingly in recent years, but many threats over the past 150 years.
There is a second question that the right hon. Gentleman must answer. In December last year, when this present bargain basement Mussolini, Galtieri, seized power in the Argentine, he never made any pretence about what he intended to do. Not a day went by when he did not talk about recovering the Falkland Islands. He was the kind of man—we ought to have known it—who meant it.
Again, as the right hon. Gentleman said on 25 February and at the beginning of March, we were getting clearer and clearer indications that such an invasion was imminent. Where was the Foreign Office and where was the Foreign Secretary when all this was happening? Why did the Foreign Office not alert the Secretary of State for Defence? If it did not alert him, why did he not alert himself? It is extraordinary that we are spending £14.5 billion a year on defence, yet apparently were not ready, when the Argentine fleet set sail, although we had five or six weeks' notice of its intentions, to defend our people in the Falkland Islands.
Therefore, we have a right to ask a third question of the Secretary of State for Defence. Were we not utterly unprepared by him for what was to come? Should we not have been prepared and should we not, in defence terms, have been ready to meet the attack? Why was it so long before we began to answer the threats that were being made—so long that even now we are apparently still assembling a task force?
I know that there are one or two of our ships—perhaps even a hunter-killer submarine or two—heading for the Falkland Islands, but we have had the time in which to be there. As has been pointed out twice—by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), who was Foreign Secretary at the time, and by my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands)—when my 664 right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East was Prime Minister, quietly and efficiently and in good time—that was the point—we assembled a fleet with which to say to the Argentinians "You shall not take the Falkland Islands from the British people who live there." We said it then. Why could we not say it now?
Why were we not prepared for what has happened? Why did the Secretary of State for Defence, as recently as last Monday, find himself in the position of saying that this was a tiny matter and a matter of no importance compared with the vital matters of Britain's defence, as he saw it, in 13 years' time?
The Secretary of State uses one adjective over and over again—"credible". "We must", he says, "have a credible defence force. We must have a credible defence policy". His policy is so credible that the dictator of Argentine is able to send his ships, invade our territory and then establish a military aggression in those islands.
So the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Prime Minister herself have something to answer for. This is a collective decision of the three most guilty people in the Government. I acquit most of the others. They probably did not know what was going on. They probably believed that we were capable of defending the Falkland Islands and that the British people who live in those islands could sleep easily at night because they would be protected, as they had been under the previous Labour Government and, to be fair, under Administrations before that. So it is those three Ministers who are on trial today. It is not the moment for judgment, it is not the moment for recriminations, but it is the moment when those questions must be put and answered.
I fear something else. Unless those questions are answered—and answered very carefully—something else may happen. The House will know that the official Opposition do not believe that Britain has a credible—if I may borrow the Secretary of State's adjective—defence policy. We do not believe that the conventional forces—and in particular the naval and air strength of our country—are in the strength that they ought to be. This he knows, but I remind him that there are other people who are also listening. The dictator of the Argentine was busy listening for the signals. The Secretary of State must remember that there are other and nearer colonies which may suffer unless we take the necessary steps now.
The Government, as I have said, are on trial. We are not prepared to give them a blank cheque, and we would be foolish to do so unless they show that they are capable of answering those questions. If they are not capable of answering them, I say to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence, "The sooner you get out the better."
§ The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott)
I wish to join the right hon. Member for Deptford (Mr. Silkin) in saying that today all our thoughts are with the British people of the Falkland Islands. I know that the whole House agrees with him on that.
Two main criticisms of the Government have emerged in the debate, certainly in my area of responsibility. There will be another debate on the subject very soon, so I cannot answer every point made by my hon. Friends. The first main criticism is that in some way the changes that we have made to our Naval programme and our other defence 665 arrangements have diminshed our capability to respond to such a crisis. The second criticism is that the specific events that developed 14 days ago in South Georgia have caught us unprepared militarily.
The pledge of the right hon. Member for Deptford yesterday that we could count on the support of the official Opposition was welcome. Of course, there is much criticism of the Government on both sides of the House, but I hope that we can unite behind our Armed Forces and that they will have the full backing of the House in the difficult circumstances that we face. It is clear that the whole House accepts that the guarantee of political integrity granted to the Falkland Islands by successive Governments has been breached by an act of flagrant territorial agression in the face of a determined diplomatic effort to solve the problem peacefully—without any sabre-rattling by the British Government. Our attempt to achieve a peaceful resolution of a long-standing dispute stretching back for many years under Governments of both parties might have been expected to appeal to the Leader of the Opposition. He welcomed our peaceful attempts to resolve the dispute. We shall all remember that, speaking for the whole House, he said that we would not wish to see foul brutal agression succeed anywhere in the world. My right hon. Friend the Member for Taunton (Mr. du Cann) and the whole House applauded him for that remark, which we shall remember.
I wish to dispose of the question raised by the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) about the conduct of the Royal Marines at Port Stanley. He referred to what I said at a press conference yesterday. I was asked:Will the Royal Marines be told to surrender?I took that to mean, naturally, that they would be told to surrender without a fight. I replied:Of course not. No British soldier would be ordered to surrender.By that, I meant without a fight. What else would anyone have answered at such a press conference?
The other major criticism that has been echoed on both sides of the House is that we should have reacted earlier with the despatch, either covertly or overtly, of some surface ships. There are two questions on that issue. First, should we have despatched earlier than we did a Naval task force? [HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] Secondly, should we have deployed covertly some frigates, as the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) did in 1977? With the wisdom of hindsight, the despatch of a large surface task force sufficient to deter or destroy the Argentine navy might have given pause to the Argentines. [Interruption.] Perhaps the House will allow me to argue the point through. As the incident at South Georgia began just 14 days ago, such a task force would not have reached the Falkland Islands in order to perform its task. It is impossible, as the right hon. Gentleman said, to know what psychological impact such a force might have had on Argentine intentions, but certainly in deterrence terms, had it been successful, that large task force would have had to remain perhaps indefinitely in Falkland waters, in detriment to its other tasks. But, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in opening this debate, we were throughout seeking a peaceful solution through the United Nations and by other means.
§ Viscount Cranborne (Dorset, South)
rose——
§ Mr. Nott
I have only a few minutes in which to answer this debate. The Prime Minister said in opening this debate that we were throughout seeking a peaceful solution to this 666 dispute, and such an act, at a moment when we might have been going to the United Nations, would have seemed highly provocative and would probably—[Interruption.]
§ Mr. Griffiths
rose——
§ Mr. Speaker
Order. It is clear that the Minister will not give way. He is now prepared to give way.
§ Mr. Griffiths
I have this precise question to put to my right hon. Friend, and I speak as one of his supporters. Understanding full well, as I do, the psychological difficulties of a large surface fleet, why did he not put the hunter-killer submarines on station two weeks ago?
§ Mr. Nott
If my hon. Friend will allow me to continue with what I was saying. The other option would have been the deployment of a small force insufficient to resist the Argentine Navy, as was done in 1977. May I comment first on this particular proposal, because there seems to be a difference of view between the then Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary about the events in 1977. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East said that this force in 1977 became known and that a diplomatic solution followed, whereas the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said yesterday on the radio that it was done in total secrecy—[Interruption]—but he added that it gave him confidence in his negotiations, whatever that might mean. [Interruption.]
§ Mr. Speaker
Order.
§ Mr. Nott
Presumably to deter, the presence of the force must have been known. If so, to have sent it, then it would have had precisely the same objections to a peaceful solution. [Interruption.] If this were a covert deployment, which I believe that it was, it could not have deterred if its presence was not known; and even if the size of the force had been revealed, it could have provided nothing more than a tripwire of exactly the same kind provided by HMS "Endurance" and provided by the Royal Marine garrison on Port Stanley.
§ Mr. Foot
The right hon. Gentleman is trying to say that there was some difference of opinion, but it was clearly stated by my right hon. Friend when the fact became known without fuss and publicity, and it had a success. That is the difference. What happened in 1977 was a success. This is a terrible failure.
§ Dr. Owen
If the right hon. Gentleman as Secretary of State for Defence has not understood the value to a Foreign Secretary of being able to negotiate in a position of some military influence and strength, he should not be Secretary of State for Defence.
§ Mr. Nott
Of course I understand that. However, as the Leader of the Opposition said, there can be no evidence that the position of the frigates in the South Atlantic at that time brought about the settlement of that dispute.
Several hon. Members have spoken of the problems that we now face. I do not seek to hide from Parliament the formidable difficulties with a crisis 8,000 miles away. However, the United Kingdom has the ability to mount a major naval task force and to sustain it for a period at that 667 distance. The charge that the Royal Navy cannot do this is flagrantly and patently untrue. We have that capability, as will certainly be evident, and it amounts to a formidable force which no other nation in the world possesses with the exception of the Soviet Union and the United States.
If we were unprepared, how is it that from next Monday, at only a few days' notice, the Royal Navy will put to sea in wartime order and with wartime stocks and weapons? That force will include the carriers HMS "Invincible" and HMS "Hermes", the assault ship HMS "Fearless" and a number of destroyers and frigates armed with anti-surface and anti-air missiles, together with afloat support. A strong force of Royal Marine commandos and a large number of Sea Harriers and anti-submarine and troop-carrying helicopters will also be embarked.
I suggest that no other country in the world could react so fast and the preparations have been in progress for several weeks. We were not unprepared. I must make it clear to my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) that the carrier, HMS "Illustrious" is now undergoing sea trials. She will be joining the carrier HMS "Ark Royal" and we shall retain an out-of-area capability during the 1980s and 1990s to deal with this sort of problem—[Interruption.]
§ Mr. Speaker
Order. The Minister should be allowed to be heard.
§ Mr. Nott
I conclude by saying—[Horn. MEMBERS: "Resign".]—that the Government do not pretend that the 668 situation is anything but extremely grave. The resolution of this problem will undoubtedly be all the more difficult since the occupation. We intend to solve the problem and we shall try to solve it continuingly by diplomatic means, but if that fails, and it will probably do so, we shall have no choice but to press forward with our plans, retaining secrecy where necessary and flexibility to act as circumstances demand.
The military problems are formidable, but they are certainly not insoluble because of the professionalism, the preparedness and the quality of our defences, which for our nation's size are unique in the free world. I do not believe the claim that the new Labour Party, with its well-known and well-advertised anti-defence bias and lack of commitment to defence spending, would have done any better. The Government will accept criticism—[HON. MEMBERS: "Resign".] But I believe——
§ Mr. Speaker
Order. There is less than a minute left for the Secretary of State.
§ Mr. Nott
I believe that the Government will have the support of the opposition parties in what we now intend to do. We can at least—and I should like to say this—give to the Armed Forces the unanimous backing of this House in the difficult task that they are being asked to undertake.
§ It being Two o'clock, MR. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Order this day.
§ Adjourned accordingly till Monday next, pursuant to the Resolution of the House of Friday 2 April.

I emphasize that I can’t forecast what orders the operating group will receive in the following.

This will depend on how the situation will evolve over time.

Question: why is it difficult to predict what orders the operating group will receive

kako će se situacija s vremenom razvijati

I emphasize that I can’t forecast what orders the operating group will receive in the following.

This will depend on how the situation will evolve over time.

why is it difficult to predict what orders the operating group will receive

Question: when does the falklandski rat become an operating group

when does the falklandski rat become an operating group

Question: what determines what orders the operating group will receive over time

kako će se situacija s vremenom razvijati

what determines what orders the operating group will receive over time

Question: who gets the orders in a falklandski rat

who gets the orders in a falklandski rat

Question: what is uncertain about the falklandski rat operating group

what is uncertain about the falklandski rat operating group

Question: what determines what orders the operating group will receive

how the situation will evolve over time.

kako će se situacija s vremenom razvijati .

how the situation will evolve over time .

what determines what orders the operating group will receive

Question: how does the falklandski rat affect operating group orders

how does the falklandski rat affect operating group orders

Question: why is it difficult to predict the future of the falklandski rat

why is it difficult to predict the future of the falklandski rat

I emphasize that I ca n’t forecast what orders the operating group will receive in the following .

This will depend on how the situation will evolve over time .

Naglašavam da ne mogu prognozirati kakve će naredbe operativna grupa dobivati u nastavku.

To će ovisiti o onome kako će se situacija s vremenom razvijati.

I emphasize that I can’t forecast what orders the operating group will receive in the following. This will depend on how the situation will evolve over time.

I emphasize that I can’t forecast what orders the operating group will receive in the following.

This will depend on how the situation will evolve over time.

A number of Argentine Croats took part in the war, mainly as pilots of the Argentine Air Force.

Pogibija poručnika Daniela Antonija Jukića zasigurno predstavlja jednu od pojedinačno najtragičnijih epizoda rata za Falklandsko otočje. Drugoj dvojici pilota, također podrijetlom Hrvatima, sudbina je namijenila potpuno drugačiju ulogu.
Kapetan korvete Roberto Ćurilović, čiji su pretci u Argentinu doselili iz sela Pećurkovo brdo nedaleko od Duge Rese, rodio se 3. siječnja 1947. godine u glavnom gradu, Buenos Airesu. Njegov otac, Roko Ćurilović, (kasnije je promijenio ime u Roque Curilovic) emigrirao je u Argentinu 1926. godine. Roko je prvi posao našao na poslovima izgradnje električne centrale u gradu Rosario. Nakon završetka tog posla, otišao je u Buenos Aires i zaposlio se u brodogradilištu čiji je vlasnik bio također Hrvat, Mihanović (Mihanovich).
Kao čovjek velikog znanja u brodograđevnoj industriji, Roko je napredovao u struci i 1955. je godine, kad je otišao u zasluženu mirovinu, bio voditelj cjelokupne brodogradilišne radionice. U braku s Isis Taricano (čija je majka Hrvatica iz Splita) imao je samo jedno dijete, sina Roberta. Roko Ćurilović umro je 1966. godine u Argentini. Roberto je Ćurilović u službi Argentinske mornarice (ARA: Armada República Argentina) proveo 36 godina, od 1963. do 1998. godine. Zvanje vojnog pilota stekao je 1969. godine. Kao mornarički pilot ostvario je 4000 sati naleta na zrakoplovima T-28 „Fennec“, „Aermacchi“ MB-326, A-4Q „Skyhawk“, TA-4J „Skyhawk“ i „Super Etendard“.
Obučavao se, osim u Argentini, i u Australiji, Brazilu, Francuskoj te SAD-u. Rujna 1980. godine, pedeset pripadnika Argentinskog mornaričkog zrakoplovstva (Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina- COAN) iz „2. Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque“ - druga lovačko-bombarderska eskadrila mornaričkog zrakoplovstva) doputovalo je u mornaričku bazu Rochefort u Francuskoj. U grupi su bili zapovjednik postrojbe kapetan fregate, Jorge Colombo, njegov zamjenik kapetan korvete, Augusto Bedacarratz, kao i ostali piloti kapetani korvete Roberto Ćurilović, Roberto Agotegaray i Alejandro Francisco te Tenientes de Navío (poručnici bojnog broda) Luis Collavino, Julio Barrraza, Juan Rodriguez Mariani, Armando Mayora i Carlos Machetanz. Svi su piloti bili iskusni, sa stotinama sati naleta na tadašnjem osnovnom tipu aviona u naoružanju COAN-e, A-4Q „Skyhawk“.
Nakon tri mjeseca učenja francuskog jezika i terminologije, piloti su prebačeni u bazu francuskog mornaričkog zrakoplovstva (Aeronavale) Landivisiau, gdje su se sljedećih 30 dana obučavali na vježbovnom zrakoplovu „Morane-Saulnier“ MS-760 „Paris“. Tijekom boravka u ovoj bazi saznali su razlog zbog kojeg su u Francuskoj – obuka na AMD-BA (Avions Marcel Dassault – Breguet Aviation) „Super Etendard“ (u nastavku teksta SuE). Pristupilo se intenzivnoj obuci tijekom koje su piloti upoznavali oružane sustave, a posebice uporabu protubrodske rakete AM.39 „Exocet“ (u prijevodu s francuskog jezika – riba poletuša). Tečaj je završen u lipnju 1981. godine, ali su kapetan korvete Ćurilović i poručnik bojnog broda Mayora odabrani za naprednu obuku, točnije, obuku u slijetanju na francuski nosač aviona „Clemenceau“. Prvi SuE-i, njih pet (registarske oznake od 0751/3-A-201 do 0755/3- A-205), stigli su u Argentinu 17. studenog 1981. godine i predani na uporabu tijekom svečanosti u mornaričkoj bazi Espora.
Tijekom operacije „Rosario“ Ćurilović je nakratko raspoređen na jedini argentinski nosač zrakoplova „Veinticinco de Mayo“, na avione A-4Q „Skyhawk“. Nije sudjelovao u borbama tijekom zauzimanja otočja i nedugo nakon završetka operacije vraćen je u svoju matičnu postrojbu („2. Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque“). Najveći problem s kojim su se COAN piloti susreli na početku rata bio je ograničen broj aviona SuE, ali još veći je problem bio iznimno mali broj protubrodskih raketa AM.39 „Exocet“. Francuski je predsjednik Miterrand uoči rata uveo embargo na isporuku naoružanja Argentini i od naručenih 14 zrakoplova isporučeno je samo 5 i s njima isti broj raketa. Dodatni je problem bio i taj što sami avioni i rakete po dolasku iz Francuske nisu bili integrirani, što je ipak, u rekordnom roku, rješeno radom domaćih stručnjaka. Kao dodatnu pomoć britanskom flotnom sastavu, Francuzi su izveli više fingiranih napada sa svojim SuE-ima tijekom prolaska Britanaca blizu francuske obale. Na ovaj način otkrili su im kako će izgledati pravi napadi. Kao glavni cilj argentinskih SuE-a i raketa određen je britanski flotni sastav s naglaskom na uništenje najopasnijih ciljeva – nosača zrakoplova „Hermes“ (R12) i „Invincible“ (R05). Svi piloti „2. Escuadrilla“, četiri zrakoplova SuE (peti, 0751/3-A-201, ostavljen je kao izvor doknadnih dijelova i opreme za ostala četiri) i svih pet raketa 19. i 20. travnja prebazirani su na pogodniju zračnu luku Rio Grande koja se nalazi na krajnjem jugu Argentine.
Odlučeno je i da će se, zbog nedovoljnog doleta SuE, koristiti zračno punjenje gorivom iz „letećeg tankera“ KC-130H „Hercules“ koji je pripadao Argentinski zračnim snagama (FAA). Deset pilota postiglo je dogovor da se ustroje parovi, a određen je i redoslijed polazaka parova u akciju napada na brodove. Parovi su ustrojeni na način da članovi budu najviše i najniže pozicionirani piloti u eskadrili. Tako je zapovjednik u akciju išao s najniže rangiranim (i najneiskusnijim) pilotom, dok je zamjenik zapovjednika bio u paru s predzadnje rangiranim pilotom itd. Dogovoreno je da u slučaju otkazivanja napada, nakon što su avioni već u zraku, dotični par mora čekati svoju priliku nakon što se izredaju preostala četiri para. Određeno je i da svaki avion nosi po jednu raketu AM.39 „Exocet“. Prvi napadački par bili su zapovjednik Colombo i Teniente de Navío Carlos Machetanz. Njihova akcija na koju su krenuli 2. svibnja otkazana je zbog problema prilikom zračnog napajanja gorivom. Dva dana nakon toga, red je bio na Capitán de Corbeta Augustu Bedacarratzu i Teniente de Navío Armandu Mayorau, koji su u napad krenuli nakon što je motrilački zrakoplov SP-2H „Neptun“ (na kojemu je kao kopilot letio treći junak naše priče, ali o tome nešto kasnije) otkrio britanski flotni sastav 70-ak milja jugoistočno od Port Stanleya/ Puerto Argentino. U napadu koji je uslijedio potopljen je razarač „Sheffield (D-80)“ na kojemu je živote izgubio 21 član posade.
Napad koji je slijedio na argentinski dan neovisnosti, 25. svibnja, zadao je najveći gubitak invazijskim snagama, a potopljeni brod „Atlantic Conveyor “ s 14 946 tona bio je najveći britanski u ratu potopljeni brod od kraja Drugog svjetskog rata. Napadači su bili Capitán de Corbeta Roberto Ćurilović (pozivni znak „Toro“) i Teniente de Navío Julio Barrraza (pozivni znak „Mate“). Dosada se u cjelokupnoj literaturi koja opisuje spomenuti događaj pogrješno navode pozivni znakovi pilota. Tako se za Capitán de Corbeta Ćurilovića navodi netočan znak „Tito“, dok je ispravno „Toro“, a kod Teniente de Navío Julio Barrraza navodi se znak „Leo“ a ispravno je „Mate“.
Zbog poteškoća sa „zračnim tankerom“, na let koji je bio određen u 12:00h, piloti su krenuli tek u 14:30h. Ćurilović je letio na SuE-i reg. oznake 0753/3-A-203, a mladi Barazza na 0754/3-A-204. Informacije koje su piloti na predletnom sastanku dobili od CIC-a (Centro de informacion y Control s Malvina/Falklanda) govorili su o više većih ciljeva na 110 km sjeveroistočno od Port Stanleya/ Puerto Argentino. SuE su krenuli na sastanak s KC-130H (kodni naziv „Berlin“ reg. oznake TC-69) na 256 km istočno od grada Puerto Deseado. Pilot „Herculesa“ bio je bojnik Litrenta. Punjenje je prošlo u najboljem redu. Da bi zavarali neprijatelja i napali ga s nebranjene pozadine, piloti su prvo letjeli na sjever da bi potom okrenuli k istoku i na poslijetku na jug, izravno prema ciljevima, sada udaljenim 240 km. Želeći izbjeći prijevremenu detekciju s brodova, spustili su se na samo 8 do 10 metara iznad valova južnog Atlantika. Na šest minuta leta i 56 km udaljenosti od ciljeva, SuE su se popeli na veću visinu i uključili svoje „Agave“ radare kako bi otkrili ciljeve. Radari su otkrili dvije manje i jednu iznimno veliku metu (58° 38’ South, 56° 8’ West). U 16:32h i na udaljenosti od 49 kilometara oba su pilota lansirala projektile te odmah okrenuli nazad prema mjestu sastanaka i ponovog punjenja s „Herculesom“.
Prvi je lansiranje izveo Barazza, a potom i Ćurilović. Kako je Barazza prvi napravio okret, piloti su letjeli razdvojeni da bi tek nakon što su povećali visinu opet stvorili par. Povratni je let obavljen u smjeru sjeverozapada. Ispaljene su rakete za to vrijeme odabrale svoju metu te krenule prema nosaču aviona „Hermes“, zastavnom brodu britanske eskadre. Da su „Exocet“ rakete kojim slučajem pogodile i potopile ovaj, najvažniji britanski nosač zrakoplova, pitanje je kakav bi bio krajnji ishod rata. Na sreću Britanaca rakete su u zadnjoj fazi prilaska cilju primijetile veći brod, udaljen samo 2 km od nosača zrakoplova i odmah se usmjerile na njega. Radilo se o rekviriranom (mobiliziranom) kontejnerskom brodu „MV Atlantic Conveyor“. Ovaj je brod bio vjerojatno treći najvažniji u cjelokupnoj invazijskoj floti i to zbog tereta koji je bio ukrcan na njega. Dugo se vjerovalo da je samo jedna raketa pogodila brod, no najnovija istraživanja govore da su obje rakete postigle pogotke i to u lijevi bok i nadgrađe broda. U požaru koji je potom uslijedio uništena su tri helikoptera „Chinook“ HC.1, šest „Wessex“ HU.5, kao i jedan „Lynx“ HAS.2. Također, uništeni su šatori za 5000 vojnika, motori i doknadni djelovi za „Harriere“, materijal za desalinizaciju vode i dijelovi za improviziranu pistu za „Sea Harriere“. Šestog je svibnja s „Atlantic Conveyora“ odletjelo osam pričuvnih „Sea Harriera“ i šest RAF-ovih (Royal Air Force) „Harriera“ GR.3 inače bi gubitci bili još i veći.
Ukupna šteta uništenog broda i njegovog tereta bila je 370 650 000 britanskih funti. Na brodu je živote izgubilo 12 mornara uključujući i zapovjednika broda, Iana Northa, koji je tijekom akcije napuštanja broda doživio srčani udar. Zanimljivo je da je brod ovoga kapetana tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata bio dva puta potapan, jednom od njemačke podmornice, a drugi put od zrakoplova „Luftwaffe“. Izgorena i napuštena olupina „Atlantic Conveyora“ potonula je 29. svibnja. Nakon uspješno obavljenog zadatka Ćurilović i Barraza su u 18.37 h sletjeli na pistu Rio Grande. Izveli su najduži argentinski borbeni let u cijelom ratu na kojemu su SuE prevalili 2592 km i u zraku ostali 4 sata i 7 minuta. Potapanje „Atlantic Conveyora“ bez dvojbe je najveći i najvrjedniji pojedinačni uspjeh argentinske vojske u ovom ratu. Nakon rata, točnije 1990. godine, Ćurilović preuzima mjesto zapovjednika “2. Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque”. Sljedeće godine Roberto je argentinskoj mornaričkoj misiji u Europi, a godine 1995. imenovan je zapovjednikom cjelokupnog pomorskog zrakoplovstva Republike Argentine. Dvije godine nakon, 1997., postaje zapovjednik za politike i strategije argentinske mornarice.
Tijekom svoje duge službe Ćurilović je odlikovan redovima „Operaciones de Combate“ (1982.), „Honorable Congreso de la Nacion a los Combatientes“ (1983.), „Honor al Valor en Combate” (1983.), „Medalla de la Nación Argentina por el Valor en Combate“ (1984.) i „Al Mérito Naval“ (1987., odlikovanje brazilske mornarice). Nakon umirovljenja Roberto je obnašao više važnih državnih dužnosti od kojih je najvažnija državni tajnik za mornaricu u Ministarstvu obrane Argentine za ministra dr. Horacija Jaunarena (1988.-1989.). Roberto Ćurilović, “Capitan de Navio Aviador Naval (R) Veterano de Guerra”, naziv kojim se službeno ima pravo koristiti, bio je i dio izaslanstva Argentinaca kojem su Britanci dozvolili posjet spornom otočju i argentinskom vojnom groblju, 15. ožujka 2005. godine. Kao iskusni zrakoplovac i dugogodišnji zapovjednik Ćurilović je nakon umirovljenja bio poželjan zaposlenik i kao takav radio je na mjestu tehničkog i operativnog savjetnika te konzultanta u kompanijama “Framat”, “Sagem” i “Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina”.
Danas je Roberto Ćurilović zaposlen kao voditelj odjela međunarodnih programa i poslova razvoja u “Aeropuertos Argentina 2000 S.A.” te kao savjetnik u tvrtci “American International Airports LLC”. Obje tvrtke posluju u više zemalja u Latinskoj Americi, SAD-u, Europi, Sjevernoj Africi, Srednjoj Aziji i Oceaniji. Roberto je oženjen s Edithom Radalj, kćeri argentinskih Hrvata, s kojom ima kćeri Deboru i Barbaru i sina Roberta Martina koji je 2007. godine primio i hrvatske dokumente. Jedan od većih problema koje su obje strane tijekom rata za Malvine/ Falklande uočile i zbog njega trpile gubitke, bio je nedostatak zrakoplova za rano uzbunjivanje. Dok je britanski flotni sastav na poprište bitke došao svjestan ovoga hendikepa, argentinske oružane snage imale su u svom naoružanju pomorski ophodni zrakoplov SP-2H „Neptune“. Četiri polovna zrakoplova ovog tipa SAD-e je prodao COAN-u (Argentinsko mornaričko zrakoplovstvo) 1977. i 1978. godine. Isti su uključeni u „Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Exploración“ (Mornarička izvidnička eskadrila), a do početka neprijateljstava, u travnju 1982. godine, samo su još dva zrakoplova bila u letnom stanju. Posade, kojih je bilo ukupno tri, izmjenjivale su se na zadatcima na zrakoplovima registarskih oznaka 0707/ 2-P-111 i 0708/ 2-P-112.
Zapovjednik posade broj 3 bio je kapetan korvete Ernesto Proni Leston dok je njegov zamjenik i kopilot bio kapetan korvete Sergio Sepetić (Sepetich). Hrvatska obitelj Sepetić podrijetlom je iz Pule iz koje 1921. godine Ruđer (Ruggero) Sepetić seli u Argentinu. Razlozi su bili, kao i kod mnogih drugih iseljeničkih obitelji, teški socijalni i ekonomski uvjeti u poslijeratnoj Europi. Ruđer se prvo privremeno nastanjuje u Buenos Airesu, a potom za stalno u gradu Punta Alta. U obližnjoj mornaričkoj bazi „Puerto Belgrano“ nalazi posao na kojemu ostaje raditi gotovo trideset godina. U međuvremenu se oženio djevojkom njemačkog podrijetla, Fridom Klarom Kasper, a 10. srpnja 1946. godine dobili su sina Sergia. Ruđer Sepetić umro je u Argentini prosinca 1956. godine. Sergio je krenuo očevim stopama i postao pripadnikom ratne mornarice.
Godine 1969. uspješno je završio obuku za mornaričkog pilota na vježbovnom zrakoplovu tipa T-28 „Fennec“. Početkom 1982. godine oba COAN-ova zrakoplova „Neptune“ bili su u izuzetno lošem stanju – radari su im bili nepouzdani, a zmajevi istrošeni. Zrakoplovi su nabavljeni iz pričuve mornarice SAD-a bez da je na njima odrađena bilo kakva preinaka ili obnova. Mornaričko tehničko osoblje uložilo je veliki trud da bi se ovi izvidnici donekle osposobili za predstojeći ratni sukob. Osoblje su i zrakoplovi Mornaričke izvidničke eskadrile pod zapovjedništvom kapetana korvete, Julia Pereza Roce, zbog povoljnijeg položaja baze Rio Grande na samom jugu Argentine, prebazirani iz svoje stalne baze Espora.
Nakon napada i osvajanja Malvina/Falklanda, „Neptuni“ obavljaju duge zadatke izviđanja Ćurilović s udrugom roditelja poginulih ratnika u posjetu groblju na Malvinima/Falklandima i podrške svom flotnom sastavu, a posebna se pažnja posvećuje protupodmorničkom izviđanju. Britanski flotni sastav počeo je s borbenim djelovanjima prvog dana svibnja 1982. godine. Narednog dana potopljena je argentinska krstarica „ARA Belgrano“, a posada broj 3 na zrakoplovu reg. oznake 2-P-112 poslana je u potragu za preživjelima. Sepetića, Proni Lestona i njihovu posadu na ovom zadatku izmjenila je posada broj 1 koja je leteći na 2-P-111 prva pronašla preživjele mornare s nesretnog „Belgrana“. Ubrzo su i drugi zrakoplovi uključeni u akciju traganja i spašavanja, a posade obaju „Neptuna“ poslane su u potragu za navodnim britanskim opskrbnim brodovima koji su po obavještajnim podatcima dolazili iz Čilea, zemlje saveznice Velike Britanije.
U zadnjim satima 3. svibnja, ali i na rubu dopuštenog operativnog dometa SP-2H, posada broj 2 doista je uspjela otkriti tri ili četiri broda. Zbog mraka i velike udaljenosti nije bilo moguće nastaviti “uhođenje” otkrivenih brodova pa je stoga 4. svibnja već u 05.07 sati uzletio „Neptune“ 2-P-112 (kodni naziv „Mercurio“) pod vodstvom Proni Lestona (pozivni znak „Gaucho“) i Sergia Sepetića. Ovaj let imao je i pričuvnu ulogu, odnosno, trebao je nadgledati britanske brodove i svojim podatcima omogućiti sigurno slijetanje na Malvine/Falklande argentinskim opskrbnim zrakoplovima C-130 „Hercules“. Posada „Neptuna“ letjela je na maloj visini od samo 17 do 30 metara, u potpunoj radiotišini s tek povremenim “skokovima” na veću visinu pri čemu bi uključivala svoj motrilački radar AN/APS-20.
Zbog iznimne snage ovog radara od dva megavata, posada je koristila samo 50 posto njegovih potencijala. Unatoč tome, čak je pet puta morala mijenjati kristale na magnetronima koji su pregorijevali. Pravac leta često je mijenjan i osluškivane su neprijateljske ECM (elektroničke protumjere). Plan je bio da se prvo leti prema istoku, potom skrene na sjever i na kraju na zapad, prema svojoj bazi. U 07.10 ostvaren je prvi kontakt s trima do četirima brodovima koji su bili udaljeni 90 milja. Vijest je dojavljena bazi Rio Grande od kuda su odmah poletjela dva zrakoplova SuE naoružana protubrodskim raketama AM-39 „Exocet“(piloti SuE-a bili su kapetan korvete Augusto César Bedacarratz “Aries“ i poručnik fregate Armando Mayora “Boina“). Iako ih je RWR (senzor radarske ozračenosti) jasno upozoravao svjesni njihove nazočnosti, Proni Leston i Sepetić tri su sata ostali u opasnom dosegu mogućeg napada lovaca „Sea Harriera“ i dojavljivali položaje britanskog flotnog sastava. Najbliže britanskim brodovima prišli su na 60 milja. Kada su dobili povratnu informaciju da se dva odaslana SuE-a nalaze na dopunjavanju gorivom iz “zračnog tankera“ KC-130H, popeli su se na visinu od 1170 metara te u 10.35 odaslali potpune podatke o ciljevima za nadolazeće SuE i njihove „Exocete“. U 12.04 posada broj 3, koju je činilo jedanaest članova, (kapetan korvete i zapovjednik Ernesto Proni Leston, kopilot – dozapovjednik kapetan korvete, Sergio Sepetić, poručnik fregate i operativni časnik Juan Gatti, poručnik korvete i navigator Meneses, dočasnik i mehaničar Juan Carlos Heredia, dočasnik i pomoćnik mehaničara Hugo Néstor Saavedra, dočasnici i operateri ECM i radara, Aníbal Sosa i José María Pernuzzi, dočasnik i radiooperater Daniel Ernesto Yerba, kao i dva dočasnika i strijelca, Luis Ángel NÚNEZ i Luis León del Negro), sigurno je sletjela na pistu baze Rio Grande gdje ih je dočekala vijest o pogotku u razarač „Type 42“ za koji se kasnije ispostavilo da je HMS „Sheffield“.
Bio je ovo “labuđi pjev“ i jedan od posljednjih letova SP-2H jer je njihova dotrajalost i nepouzdanost postala opasna za same posade. Usprkos nepostojanju prave zamjene, oba su „Neptuna“ 15. svibnja iste godine povučena iz aktivne uporabe COAN-a i pohranjena u skladišta. Za vrijeme trajanja rata, „Ruso“, Sepetićev pozivni znak, ostvario je gotovo 200 sati borbenog naleta. Za izniman doprinos u ratu odlikovan je redom „Nación a los Combatientes de Malvinas“ i „Cruz de Oro al Mérito Naval“. Na nosač zrakoplova sletio je 98 puta,a a karijeru je 1995. godine završio s ukupno 7500 sati naleta. Kolovoza 1994. godine, Sepetić se zapošljava u argentinskoj telekomunikacijskoj tvrtci na poslovima vatrozaštite gdje ostaje sve do listopada 2007. godine kada odlazi u konačnu mirovinu. Danas Sergio Sepetić živi u gradu Olivos, provincija Buenos Aires. Oženio se srpnja 1972. godine sa Stellom Maris Coriom i danas imaju četvero djece, Sergia Ezequiela, Diega Hernána, Marinu Inés i Mariu Julianu.
>>Hrvati u ratu za Falklande: Trojica Hrvata pilota - heroji Argentine
Argentinci u Francuskoj 1979. naručili 1
Argentinci u Francuskoj 1979. naručili 14 mornaričkih zrakoplova „Super Etendard”
Da bi zamijenili flotu ipak već zastarjelih A-4Q „Skyhawk“ i ojačali udarnu oštricu jedinog argentinskog nosača zrakoplova „Veinticinco de Mayo“, vodstvo COAN-e je 1979. godine u Francuskoj naručilo 14 mornaričkih zrakoplova „Super Etendard“. Iako ih je isporučeno samo pet, ostvarili su nevjerojatne uspjehe protiv brodovlja RN (kraljevske mornarice, mornarica Velike Britanije). Tek 8. prosinca 1982. godine, nakon poništenja francuskog embarga na izvoz naoružanja i opreme Argentini, počeli su pristizati ostali naručeni SuE-i. Da su sve SuE bili u naoružanju COAN-e i opremljeni s dostatnim brojem AM.39 „Exocete“, britanski bi gubitci sigurno bili daleko teži, a i konačni bi ishod rata najvjerojatnije bio drugačiji. SuE 3-A-203 (0753) – zrakoplov koji je sudjelovao u potapanju HMS „Sheffield“ i ACL „Atlantic Conveyor“ bio je nakon rata u posebnoj “milosti” Roberta Ćurilovića.
Funkcije zapovjednika 2. Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque“, a potom i cjelokupnog mornaričkog zrakoplovstva omogućavale su mu tu privilegiju. Roberto je uživao gledajući ga dok leti i ponosno prikazuje svoje „kill-markse“. Ovaj je zrakoplov našao mjesto i u povijesti susjedne, brazilske mornarice, kao prvi mlazni avion koji je, tijekom zajedničke vojne vježbe, sletio na njihov nosač zrakoplova NAeL „Minas Gerais” 28. studenog 1993. godine. Ćurilović je, nažalost, prisustvovao i njegovom uništenju. Dana 29. svibnja 1996. godine tijekom izvođenja pokazne vježbe u mornaričkoj bazi Punta Indio (150 km udaljenoj od glavnog grada) poručnik Sergio Marquez doživio je težak udes u kojemu je izgubio život, a SuE 3-A-203 (0753) potpuno je uništen.
Svi britanski transportni helikopteri, o
Svi britanski transportni helikopteri, osim jednog „Chinooka“, potonuli su s brodom
Kontejnerski „roll-on roll-off“ brod „Atlantic Conveyor“ u vlasništvu Cunard Line-a, rekviriran (mobiliziran) je u Liverpoolu 14. travnja 1982. godine. U Devonport Naval Base (mornarička baza) modificiran je na način da je dobio improviziranu uzletno - sletnu palubu, radionicu za održavanje zrakoplova, a pregrađene su i dodatne prostorije za smještaj osoblja.
S nakrcanom vojnom opremom i zrakoplovima krenuo je put južnog Atlantika. Zadatak mu je bio opskrba britanskih invazijskih snaga. Početkom svibnja doplovio je nedaleko otočja i počeo opskrbljivati britanski borbeni sastav. Svi britanski transportni helikopteri, izuzev jednog „Chinooka“, potonuli su zajedno s brodom što je za iskrcane britanske trupe značilo da će morati prehodati cijelo
otočje (gotovo 80 km) da bi ga zauzeli.
„Neptuni” su u borbu odlazil
„Neptuni” su u borbu odlazili u stanju koje bi se moglo opisati kao “granično ispravno”
Prve „Neptune”, inačice P2V-5, COAN-a je primila u periodu od 1958.-1959. godine. Radilo se o osam polovnih „Neptuna” koje je do tada koristila Nizozemska mornarica. Pojačanja su stigla 1966. godine kada su od SAD-a kupljena četiri primjerka modernije inačice SP-2E. Posljednja primljena inačica „Neptuna” bila je već spomenuta SP-2H. Zrakoplovi su zbog američkog embarga, koji je stupio na snagu 1978. godine, bili u dosta lošem stanju. Razlog za uvođenje embarga na izvoz oružja u Argentinu bio je tzv. Prljavi rat (izraz „Prljavi rat” – na španjolskom „Guerra Sucia”).
On označava od države odobreno i provođeno nasilje nad vlastitim građanima u razdoblju od 1976. do 1983. godine. Začetnik je bio vođa vojne hunte Jorge Rafael Videla). Najveći problemi kod ovih „Neptuna” pokazali su se na dotrajalim krilima. Vrlo su brzo stoga iz uporabe povučeni 2-P-110 i 2-P-114. Tijekom rata „Neptuni” su na borbene zadatke odlazili u stanju koje bi se najblaže moglo opisati kao “granično ispravno”, a o tome najbolje govori podatak da je jedan let obavljen s karterima koji su popravljeni običnim industrijskim ljepilom! Nakon povlačenja i preostalih dvaju „Neptuna” iz uporabe, pojedine ratne zadatke preuzeli su C-130, S-2E „Trackeri” te iz Brazila novonabavljeni „Embraer“ EMB-111A „Bandeirulha“. Iskustva iz ovoga rata pokazala su argentinskoj strani nedostatke u mornaričkom izviđanju, nepostojanju zrakoplova za rano uzbunjivanje i za protuelektroničku borbu.
Zbog toga je odmah u prvim danima nakon završetka sukoba, nabavljen izvjestan broj L-188 „Electra“ opremljenih za takva zadaće. Tek 1994. godine „Neptuni” su dobili dostojnog nasljednika, zrakoplov P-3B „Orion“.
Pogođeni se „Sheffield” zapa
Pogođeni se „Sheffield” zapalio, zbog čega je poginuo 21 član njegove posade
Formacija koju je otkrila posada SP-2H (2-P-112), sastojala se od triju razarača „Type 42” HMS (D118) „Coventry”, HMS (D88) „Glasgow” i HMS (D80) „Sheffield”. Do danas ostaje nepoznat razlog zbog čega brodovi ovog flotnog sastava nisu u pomoć pozvali „Sea Harriere” koji bi zasigurno oborili nenaoružani motrilački SP-2H. Pogođeni se „Sheffield” zapalio, što je imalo za posljedicu smrt 21 člana njegove posade. Olupinu britanskog razarača u tegalj je 9. svibnja uzela fregata HMS (F101) „Yarmouth“, ali je ipak HMS (D80) „Sheffield” sutradan potonuo i to na lokaciji 52o 33’ 55’’ južno, 57o 40’ 55’’ zapadno.
U ratu je bilo još Hrvata: Pedro
U ratu je bilo još Hrvata: Pedro Vojković, Granić...
Osim ove trojice pilota u ratu je sudjelovao nemali broj Hrvata. Spomenut ćemo samo neke: Pedro Horacio Vojković koji je poginuo tijekom borbi, a bio je pripadnik 7. pješačke motorizirane regimente; Claudio Granić, koji je poginuo kao član posade potopljene krstarice ARA „General Belgrano“, zajedno s 322 ostala mornara; Horacio Humberto Bosich – pripadnik argentinskih zračnih snaga i stručnjak za protuzračnu obranu i radarske sustave.

Question: what was the largest british ship dropped in the falklands since the end

A number of Argentine Croats took part in the war, mainly as pilots of the Argentine Air Force.

what was the largest british ship dropped in the falklands since the end

Question: who was involved in the falklands war of 1982

who was involved in the falklands war of 1982

Question: what type of aircraft did corvette captain roberto avurilovic fly

what type of aircraft did corvette captain roberto avurilovic fly

Question: what type of missile was dropped on the falklands in 1982

projektila Exocet potopio SS Atlantic Conveyor , što je tada bio bio je najveći u ratu potopljeni britanski brod od kraja Drugog

what type of missile was dropped on the falklands in 1982

Question: what type of aircraft did corvette captain roberto avurilovic pilot

what type of aircraft did corvette captain roberto avurilovic pilot

Question: who were the argentine croats in the falklands war

who were the argentine croats in the falklands war

A number of Argentine Croats took part in the war , mainly as pilots of the Argentine Air Force .

Corvette Captain Roberto Ćurilović was a pilot of the Dassault Super Étendard aircraft that on May 25 , 1982 with the launch of the Exocet missile dropped the SS Atlantic Conveyor , which was then the largest in the war dropped British ship since the end of World War II .

Nekoliko argentinskih Hrvata istaknulo se u ratu, uglavnom kao piloti Argentinskog ratnog zrakoplovstva.

A number of Argentine Croats took part in the war, mainly as pilots of the Argentine Air Force. Corvette Captain Roberto Ćurilović was a pilot of the Dassault Super Étendard aircraft that on May 25, 1982 with the launch of the Exocet missile dropped the SS Atlantic Conveyor, which was then the largest in the war dropped British ship since the end of World War II.

A number of Argentine Croats took part in the war, mainly as pilots of the Argentine Air Force.

Falklandski rat, koji se 1982. godine odigrao u dotad mirnom kutku južnog Atlantika, obilježila je i uloga trojice argentinskih pilota hrvatskih korijena. Piloti Daniel Antonio Jukić, Roberto Ćurilović i Sergio Sepetić za Argentinu i danas predstavljaju heroje ovoga rata, a u nas je ta činjenica gotovo nepoznata.
U prvom dijelu ove neispričane priče donijet ćemo sve pojedinosti o tragičnoj sudbini mladog poručnika Jukića. Sukob na „zaboravljenom otočju“ Južnog Atlantika, Argentincima poznatog kao Malvinsko otočje, a Britancima kao Falklandsko otočje, započeo je 2. travnja 1982. godine desantom i napadom argentinske vojske (operacija „Rosario“) na malobrojnu britansku vojnu posadu (sastojala se od svega 69 vojnika, uglavnom marinaca).
Nakon predaje Britanaca i kratkotrajne argentinske kontrole, snage britanske vojske uspjele su vojno poraziti Argentince i ponovo uspostaviti nadzor nad otočjem, 13 000 kilometara udaljeno od Velike Britanije. Rat je nakon 74 dana okončan kapitulacijom argentinskih snaga 20. lipnja 1982. godine. U zrakoplovnoj komponenti rata istaknutu ulogu imala su tri pilota hrvatskog podrijetla: poručnik Daniel Antonio Jukić – pripadnik Argentinskih zračnih snaga te dvojica pripadnika Argentinskog mornaričkog zrakoplovstva, kapetani korvete, Roberto Ćurilović i Sergio Sepetić.
U zračnim snagama letjelo je i više pilota koji ne nose hrvatska imena, ali su im majke hrvatskog porijekla. Iako kratkotrajan, sukob je unio novine u sustave ratovanja i ustroje oružanih snaga diljem svijeta. Akcije kao što su potapanje argentinske krstarice „General Belgrano“ (C-4) u napadu britanske podmornice na nuklearni pogon „Conqueror“ (S48) (korištena su tri torpeda Mk 8 mod 4), teško oštećenje argentinske podmornice „Santa Fe“ (S-21) u akciji britanskih helikoptera „Westland Wessex“ HAS.Mk.3, potapanje britanskog razarača „Sheffield“ (D80) u prvom napadu raketama zrak – more u povijesti, nisu ostale nezapažene. Sjeme ratnoga sukoba posijano je još godine 1833. kada su britanske snage otjerale Argentince i trajno zaposjele otočje. Otada Argentinci nastoje ponovo doći u posjed spornih otoka. Do 1982. godine to su nastojali diplomatskim kanalima, no bezuspješno.
Daniel Antonio Jukić rođen je 1955. godine u Buenos Airesu. Obitelj Jukić vuče podrijetlo iz sela Hrvaca kod Sinja, otkuda je Danielov djed odselio u Argentinu 1928. godine. Danielov otac Ante (Tonći) kao dijete je zajedno s majkom i sestrom odselio k ocu u Argentinu 1938. godine. Daniel je Argentinskim zračnim snagama (Fuerza Aérea Argentina – FAA) pristupio 1. veljače 1973. godine, a 11. prosinca 1976. godine dobio je zvanje vojnog pilota. Početak rata poručnik Jukić dočekao je kao pilot na COIN zrakoplovu („Counter-insurgency“ – zrakoplov za misije sprječavanja pobune i nemira. Uz „Pucaru“ u klasi se nalaze: „Rockvello“ OV-10 „Bronco“, „Cessna“ A-37B „Dragonfly“ i dr.) domaće proizvodnje FMA IA-58 „Pucará“ (nazvan po tvrđavi lokalnog indijanskog plemena Quechua) u postrojbi „Grupo 3 de Ataque“. Mirnodopska lokacija postrojbe bila je u gradu Reconquista.
Pogrješna procjena argentinskog vojnog vrha dovela je do toga da se na otočje, u sukob visokog intenziteta, pošalju i tamo baziraju zrakoplovi „Pucará“, „Beech“ T-34 „Mentor“ i „Aermacchi“ MB-339A. „Pucará“, ali i ostali spomenuti zrakoplovi, nikada nisu bili projektirani za ratne sukobe već isključivo za borbu protiv narkokartela, pripadnika pobunjeničkih skupina i ostalih lako naoružanih neprijatelja. Drugog travnja na pistu Port Stanley (nedaleko od istoimenog glavnog grada Falklanda), sada s promijenjenim, argentinskim nazivom, Puerto Argentino, sletjela su 4 zrakoplova „Pucará” (evidencijskih oznaka A-523, A-529, A-532 i A-556). Zapovjednik ove grupe, a kasnije i cjelokupne postrojbe, službeno nazvane „Escuadron Aeromovil Pucará Malvinas“ bio je bojnik Navarro. Jedan od pilota koji su preletjeli avione s argentinskog kopna (iz baze Rio Gallegos na koju su u međuvremenu prebazirani), bio je i poručnik Jukić (avion kojim je upravljao tijekom preleta bio je A-529).
Poručnik Jukić (pozivni znak „Tauro“) izuzetno je aktivan. Neke od njegovih operacija do početka otvorenog neprijateljstva 1. svibnja na otočju jesu opitni letovi na zaplijenjenom civilnom avionu „Britten Norman BN-2 Islander“ (VP-FAY) koji je pripadao FIGAS-u (eng. Falkland Government Air Service). Prvi operativni let na avionima „Pucará“ (pratnja helikoptera „Sea King“ argentinskog pomorskog zrakoplovstva) na otočju izvele su 4. travnja posade u sastavu satnik Vila/poručnik Jukić (u zrakoplovu „Pucará“ registarskih oznaka A-556) i satnik Benitez/bojnik Navarro (u zrakoplovu „Pucará“ registarskih oznaka A-523). Dva dana nakon, iste posade s istim avionima, izvršile su prvo oružano izviđanje otočja.
Tijekom prve faze rata (do 1. svibnja) posade ovih zrakoplova ukupno su odradile 38 zadataka oružanog izviđanja. Posade „Pucará” pomogle su i prilikom kalibraže argentinskog novopostavljenog radara „Westinghouse“ TPS-43. Zbog sve većega broja argentinskih zrakoplova koji su prebaziravani na uzletište Port Stanley/ Puerto Argentino, odlučeno je da se 29. travnja 12 zrakoplova „Pucará“ premjesti na spartanski uređenu travnatu pistu na lokaciji „Goose Green“ (od Argentinaca nazvana B.A.M. – Base Aérea Militar, „Condor“). Samo dan prije, 28. travnja, Daniel je poslao zadnje pismo svojim roditeljima u kojemu im je napisao da dosta leti i da je na otočju prilično hladno: „Ovih dana očekujemo da će stvari postati ozbiljne i teške, ali ćemo sve izdržati jer smo se svih ovih godina pripremali za takav posao. Nemojte se brinuti, sve će biti dobro i uskoro ćemo svi zajedno slaviti. Volim vas puno. Daniel.“
Prvoga svibnja otpočela je napadna operacija britanskih snaga s ciljem preuzimanja kontrole nad spornim otočjem. U 04:46 britanski strateški bombarderi „Vulcan“ B. 2 napali su uzletište Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino, a već u 05:00 zapovjednik „Escuadron Pucara“, bojnik Navarro, dobio je naredbu da piloti budu u pripravnosti za napad na britanske trupe koje su iskrcane helikopterom. Navarro je dobio i obavijest da se na njegovo uzletište može očekivati napad britanskih „Harriera“ i stoga da bude u pripravnosti prebazirati sve zrakoplove na sljedeću privremenu lokaciju na otočiću Pebble (argentinski naziv za tamo uređenu pistu bio je B.A.M. Calderón). O zadatcima su obaviještene sve posade i određeni su zadatci za svaki par. Prva dva para upućena su na oružano izviđanje i potragu za navodnim helikopterskim desantom. Kod uzlijetanja drugoga para došlo je do loma prednjeg stajnog trapa na jednoj od „Pucara“ i njezino uklanjanje s piste izazvalo je kašnjenja u uzlijetanju od više od 20 minuta kod trećeg para. Kao par broj tri određeni su poručnik Hernandez te poručnik Jukić koji se pripremao za uzlijetanje na avionu registarske oznake A-527 (kodni naziv „Tigre 4“).
Prvi je na rulanje krenuo Jukić. Upravo u tom trenutku, u 08:33, improviziranu zračnu luku napali su iz smjera sjeveroistoka britanski „Sea Harrieri“ FRS.1 iz 800. eskadrile britanskog pomorskog zrakoplovstva (Fleet Air Arm-FAA). Tri britanska aviona (kapetan korvete Rod Fredericksen (ZA191), poručnik Martin Hale (XZ460) i poručnik Andy McHarg (XZ457) izbacila su ukupno 9 bombi: tri od 1000lb (454 kg) i šest kazetnih BL 755. Zemaljska posada koja se nalazila u blizini Jukićeve „Pucare“ potrčala je u zaklon, a sam Jukić ostao je bespomoćan. Po svjedočenju dr. Beraneka, liječnika Danielove zrakoplovne postrojbe, Jukića je detonacija zahvatila na samome okviru kokpita te je od siline detonacije odbačen desetak metara od zrakoplova. U pregledu tijela dr. Beranek našao je i šrapnel u Jukićevoj glavi. Kako je za predstojeću akciju Jukićev zrakoplov bio naoružan s dvama kontejnerima nevođenih 70 mm raketnih zrna, kao i s punim spremnicima za streljačko oružje, požar na avionu uzrokovao je aktiviranje cjelokupnog borbenog kompleta što je dodatno spriječilo spašavanje pilota. Zapovjednik Navarro kasnije je izjavio: „... ostatci su napravili mnogo štete i privremeno sam oglušio od siline eksplozije koja se dogodila tako blizu... Ubrzo smo shvatili da A-527 gori. Aluminijski se trup topio, a desno se krilo odlomilo. Aktivirale su se i rakete koje su se zabijale u tlo. Strjeljivo za topove i strojnice također se aktiviralo i nekontrolirano eksplodiralo. Zbog izuzetno opasne situacije akcija spašavanja morala je biti odgođena...“.
S njime je poginulo i sedam članova zemaljskog osoblja: oružari Mario Duarte, Luis Peralta i Andrés Brashich (obitelj Brashich (Brašić) podrijetlom je s poluotoka Pelješca iz sela Pijavičino), mehaničari José Maldonado i Agustín Montaño, specijalist za avioniku Juan Rodriguez i specijalist za elektroniku Miguel Carrizo kao i dva pripadnika kopnene vojske, Guillermo García i Héctor Bordón. Ranjeno je još 14 članova zemaljskog osoblja. U napadu su oštećena i četiri zrakoplova „Pucará“. Argentinska PZ obrana koja je bila smještena na letjelištu nije uspjela djelovati po napadačkim zrakoplovima jer je bila u fazi popravka i redovnog održavanja.
Jukićevu je pogibiju na neprimjeren način probala iskoristiti argentinska vojna propaganda nesuvislim pričama o „Jukićevoj junačkoj pogibiji prilikom napada na britanski nosač aviona HERMES“. Preživjeli pripadnici Jukićeve postrojbe zgražali su se nad ovim činjeničnim neistinama. Olupinu uništene „Pucará” A-527 Argentinci su sklonili s piste Goose Greena/B.A.M. Condor da ne bi otežavala korištenje iste. Nakon završetak ratnoga sukoba olupinu su pobjednici razrezali te bacili na lokalni otpad. U mirnodopskoj bazi „Pucará” „Grupo 3 de Ataque“ u gradu Reconquista (RTA/SATR) jedna ulica nosi naziv „Daniel Antonio Jukić“. Posthumno je Jukić odlikovan redom „Honor al valor en Combate“. Primer Teniente Daniel Antonio Jukić danas počiva na novom argentinskom vojnom groblju koje je sagrađeno 2004. godine na otočju za koje je položio svoj život. Anti Jukiću dopušten je posjet sinovom grobu 1998. godine.
(Nastavlja se u sljedećem broju)
Na otočje prebačena 24 aviona „Puc
Na otočje prebačena 24 aviona „Pucará”
Pucará, iako dvosjed, za trajanja rata rijetko je u akcije išao s dvama članovima posade. Na otočje su prebazirana ukupno 24 aviona. Tijekom rata 13 je komada uništeno, a 11 zarobljeno. Ovaj poražavajući podatak ne bi trebao biti relevantno mjerilo kvalitete zrakoplova, već činjenice da je vrhovno zapovjedništvo argentinske vojske pogriješilo šaljući odličan „COIN“ avion u rat protiv dobro izvježbane i odlično naoružane britanske vojske. Posade su „Pucará“ za trajanja rata obavile 186 borbenih zadataka (zemlje korisnici zrakoplova FMA IA-58 „Pucará“ jesu: Argentina, Kolumbija – kratko korištena tri primjerka, Šri Lanka i Urugvaj). Od jedanaest zarobljenih “Pucará”, Britanci su šest prebacili u muzeje diljem Velike Britanije: A-515 nalazi se u Cosford Aerospace Museum, Cosford, A-517 u Witney, Oxfordshire, A-522 u North East Air Museum, A-528 u Norfolk & Suffolk Aviation Museum, Flixton, A-533 u DERA Boscombe Down Museum, i A-549 u Imperial War Museum.
“Sea Harrieri” oborili 25 ar
“Sea Harrieri” oborili 25 argentinskih aviona
“Sea Harrieri” FRS.1 tijekom rata oborili su 25 argentinskih zrakoplova
u zračnim borbama, dok je argentinska protuzračna obrane uništila
dva „Sea Harriera”, a još četiri stradala su u letačkim nezgodama.
Argentinski zrakoplovi nisu uspjeli oboriti ni jednog britanskog lovca.
Više je čimbenika koji su omogućili ovakav “kill-to-loss ratio“. Uz bolju
obučenost britanskih pilota, bolju pokretljivost njihovih „Sea Harriera“,
prevagu na britansku stranu donio je najnoviji „Harrierov“ radar
„Blue Fox”. Ipak, najvažnije su bile rakete zrak – zrak najnovije generacije
„AIM-9L Sidewinder” kojima, inače brži argentinski lovci „Mirage”
III DA/EA i „Dagger” A, sa svojima raketama „Rafael”, „Shafrir I”, „MATRA
R530“ i „R550 Magic I”, nisu mogli parirati. „Sea Harrier” FRS.1 za
trajanja su sukoba ostvarili 1435 borbenih letova.
Britanci su angažirali 43 ratna broda
Britanci su angažirali 43 ratna broda
S obzirom na to da je područje sukoba bio falklandski arhipelag sa svojih 200-tinjak otoka i hridi, jasno je da su obje strane morale koristiti pomorske snage. Prvo je argentinska mornarica 2. travnja sa svojih osam brodova iskrcala 19 amfi bijskih vozila i oko 800 vojnika koji su vrlo brzo zauzeli ključne točke otoka. Izuzev desanta, angažman argentinske mornarice bio je zanemariv. Na to je posebice utjecalo potapanje krstarice „General Belgrano“, 2. svibnja, kada je poginuo 321 mornar, što je navelo stožer mornarice na skrivanje preostalih brodova u domaćim lukama. Teret opskrbe i podrške iskrcanim trupama pao je na manje opskrbne i ophodne brodove te na zrakoplovstvo. Britanci su pak s druge strane angažirali 43 ratna i veći broj rekviriranih civilnih brodova u želji ponovnog zauzimanja otočja. Cjelokupan fl otni sastav bio je okupljen na oko dva nosača aviona: „Hermesa“ i „Invinciblea“. Na njima su se nalazili „Sea Harrieri“ koji su bili glavna ofenzivna, ali i defanziva snaga plovnog sastava. Sraz britanskih brodova i argentinskih zrakoplova bio je skup za obje strane. Gotovo polovica od 99 izgubljenih argentinskih zrakoplova bio je uzrokovan vatrom s britanskog plovnog sastava. Zauzvrat, argentinski piloti su svojom upornošću, znanjem i nadasve hrabrošću, nadomjestili očiglednu inferiornost i zastarjelost svojih zrakoplova i u napadima na britansko brodovlje potopili sedam, a teško oštetili još devet plovila.
Otočje preplavilo 12.000 argentinskih vo
Otočje preplavilo 12.000 argentinskih vojnika
Rex Hunta. Nakon kratkotrajnog puškaranja britanske snage su se
predale. Zbog straha od mogućega sukoba s Čileom, najbolje su postrojbe
povučene s Falklanda i raspoređene na granicu s prvim susjedom.
Njihovo mjesto zauzeli su slabo uvježbani i nemotivirani novaci i rezervisti.
Čak 12.000 argentinskih vojnika preplavilo je otočje. Utvrdili su
se na ključnim pozicijama, ponajviše oko glavnog grada Port Stanleya.
Britanske kopnene snage, njih 4000, iskrcale su se 21. svibnja u zaljev
San Carlos. Krenuli su u napad na dvama pravcima. Prvi je bio usmjeren
na glavni grad, a drugi u smjeru jugozapada na mjesta Goose Green
i Darwin. Nakon žestoke borbe u kojoj je poginulo 17 Britanaca i 47 Argentinaca,
a 961 ih bilo zarobljeno, mjesta su prešla u ruke Britanaca.
Ostao je najvažniji cilj, glavni grad Port Stanley okružen s pet planina:
Mount Harriet, Mount Longdon, Wireless Ridge, Mount Tumbledown i
Two Sisters. Na ovim planinama vodila se presudna bitka. U uporabi su
bile puške, minobacači, teško topništvo, snajperi, ali i noževi, sjekire pa
čak i lopate. Najžešće borbe vođene su za Mount Longdon kada su poginula
31 argentinski i 23 britanska vojnika. Nakon preuzimanja kontrole
nad visovima, argentinska se obrana potpuno raspala. Predaja argentinskih
snaga potpisana je 14. lipnja. Britanci su zarobili 11 313 argentinskih
vojnika i otpremili ih na argentinsko tlo.
Osnovne značajke zrakoplova IA-58 &ldquo
Osnovne značajke zrakoplova IA-58 “Pucará”:
posada: 2
dužina: 14.25 m
raspon krila: 14.5 m
visina: 5.36 m
težina praznog aviona:
4020 kg
maksimalana težina na
uzlijetanju: 6800 kg
pogon: 2 × Turbomeca
Astazou XVIG od 729 kW
(978 ks)
Performanse:
maksimalna brzina: 500 km/h
krstareća brzina: 430 km/h
doseg: 3400 km
plafon leta: 10 000 m
Naoružanje:
2 topa × 20 mm Hispano-
Suiza HS.804
4 strojnice × 7.62 mm FM
M2-20
3 nosača za različita bojna
sredstva (kontejneri s topovima, bombe, rakete..) mase do 1500 kg

Question: who was the pilot of the falklandski rat

who was the pilot of the falklandski rat

Question: what was the name of the british ship sunk by the argentine hunters

HMS Sheffield nakon čega je taj brod potopljen

what was the name of the british ship sunk by the argentine hunters

Question: who was killed in the falklands war of 1982

who was killed in the falklands war of 1982

Question: when was the falklandski rat killed in 1982

when was the falklandski rat killed in 1982

Question: what type of aircraft was the falklandski rat on

Lockheed P-2 Neptune exploration aircraft

Lockheed P-2 Neptune exploration aircraft

what type of aircraft was the falklandski rat on

Question: where was the falklandski rat killed on may 4, 1982

HMS Sheffield nakon čega je taj brod potopljen

where was the falklandski rat killed on may 4, 1982

Question: on may 1, 1982, daniel antonio jukić was killed when

on may 1, 1982, daniel antonio jukić was killed when

Question: when was daniel antonio jukić killed in the falklands

when was daniel antonio jukić killed in the falklands

Sergio Sepetić was part of the crew of the Lockheed P-2 Neptune exploration aircraft which on May 4 , 1982 committed Argentine hunters to the HMS Sheffield ship after which the ship was drowned .

Daniel Antonio Jukić was killed on May 1 , 1982 as a FMA IA 58 Pucare pilot in a British Harrier attack on Goose Green .

Sergio Sepetić was part of the crew of the Lockheed P-2 Neptune exploration aircraft which on May 4, 1982 committed Argentine hunters to the HMS Sheffield ship after which the ship was drowned. Daniel Antonio Jukić was killed on May 1, 1982 as a FMA IA 58 Pucare pilot in a British Harrier attack on Goose Green.

Daniel Antonio Jukić was killed on May 1, 1982 as a FMA IA 58 Pucare pilot in a British Harrier attack on Goose Green.

Dire Straits - Brothers in Arms is inspired by the Falkland War.

Steel helmets abandoned by Argentine armed forces who surrendered at Goose Green. Photograph: PA
War, Edwin Starr once asked, what is it good for? Absolutely nothing? Not quite, Edwin. It often inspires musicians to write about something other than their chequered love lives. The Falklands conflict - which ended 25 years ago this week - was no exception. As Britain went bonkers over ownership of some tiny islands in the south Atlantic that most people had never heard of - and propelled the previously unpopular PM Margaret Thatcher towards re-election the following year - many artists felt angry enough about the lies and loss of life to make a protest in song.
1 Shipbuilding - Robert Wyatt Written "while watching people being blown to bits on TV" by Elvis Costello specifically for Robert Wyatt's voice - the most expressive since Elvis Presley's. Wyatt sings as a shipworker, knowing war brings the only hope of work. The opposite of much political song, it expresses doubt not certainty, it's sad not angry, and Wyatt doesn't shout, he sighs.
2 How Does It Feel (To Be The Mother of 1000 Dead)? - Crass After rush-releasing the flexidisc Sheep Farming In The Falklands, the Essex anarchists brilliantly nailed the motives, mendacity and madness of the "Iron Lady with the stone heart" on this single. Tory MP Tim Eggar tried to get them prosecuted under the Obscene Publications Act. Labour's Tam Dalyell even asked Maggie if she'd heard the song (she pretended not to hear). Crass also put out a cut-up tape they'd made of Maggie "admitting" to President Reagan she'd ordered the sinking of the Belgrano. The press said it must be KGB dirty tricks. Tee-hee.
3 Blue Monday - New Order The NME began the rumour that Blue Monday was about the Falklands. You know; "I see a ship and a harbour, I can and shall obey..." It almost certainly wasn't.
4 The Final Cut - Pink Floyd Roger Waters took a break from writing about moons, animals and walls to write a concept album about the Falklands. He showed a geopolitical awareness that would shame Joe Strummer: "Brezhnev took Afghanistan / And Begin took Beirut / Galtieri took the Union Jack / And Maggie over lunch one day / Took a cruiser with all hands, apparently / To make him give it back." A sales nadir, and the Floyd's final cut.
5 Brothers In Arms - Dire Straits Few listeners to the mega-selling album could have guessed the title track was about the Falklands. Hardly surprising - the lyrics sound more Mull Of Kintyre ("These mist covered mountains / Are a home now for me"). Just re-released to raise money for Falklands veterans' charity SAMA 82.
6 Buenos Aires - The Macc Lads Tragically, these boorish beer boys from Macclesfield (hence the name) were the band that caught the nation's mood - hysterical, blood-thirsty and jingoistic. "There was a load of bloody fairies in Buenos bloody Aires / With greasy hair and sweaty bums, they'd never heard of Boddington's ... They got our backs up without a doubt, time to sort those Argies out!"
7 Como Estais Amigos - Iron Maiden Heavy metal does politics! I have absolutely no idea what they were trying to say here - and only the title is in Spanish.
8 No Bombardeen Buenos Aires - Charly Garcia A song from the other side, by one of Argentina's biggest and most radical rock stars. This was - daringly - as critical of the ruling Galtieri junta as it was of Thatcher. Its title translates as "Don't bomb Buenos Aires".
9 Island of No Return - Billy Bragg The Barking troubador called the conflict "my political awakening". Bragg, briefly a squaddie himself, sings as a raw recruit baffled that he's gone from playing army games on Salisbury Plain to doing the real thing down south Atlantic way.
10 The Piccolo Snare - Super Furry Animals From 2004's Phantom Power, Gruff Rhys draws parallels between the Falklands and the lraq war; "It could be about any war, but that was a war I remembered from when I was a kid where people from my area were dying, as the media tried to maintain some ridiculous degree of jingoism." Never again, eh?

Question: what war inspired dire straits brothers in arms

Dire Straits - Brothers in Arms is inspired by the Falkland War.

what war inspired dire straits brothers in arms

Question: brothers in arms was inspired by which war

brothers in arms was inspired by which war

Question: brothers in arms is inspired by which band

brothers in arms is inspired by which band

Question: the dire straits brothers in arms was inspired by which war

the dire straits brothers in arms was inspired by which war

Question: which band was inspired by the falklands war

which band was inspired by the falklands war

Dire Straits - Brothers in Arms is inspired by the Falkland War .

Pjesma Dire Straitsa - Brothers in Arms inspirirana je Falklandskim ratom

Pjesma Dire Straitsa - Brothers in Arms inspirirana je Falklandskim ratom

Dire Straits - Brothers in Arms is inspired by the Falkland War.

Dire Straits - Brothers in Arms is inspired by the Falkland War.