Rat u Vijetnamu (vijetnamski: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, također poznat i pod nazivom Drugi indokineski rat, a u Vijetnamu poznat pod nazivima Rat za otpor protiv Amerike ili jednostavnije Američki rat) bio je oružani sukob u eri tzv. hladnoga rata koji se odvijao na prostorima država Vijetnama, Laosa i Kambodže u razdoblju od 1. studenog 1955. pa sve do pada Sajgona 30. travnja 1975. godine. Taj rat zapravo je nastavak Prvog indokineskog rata (1946. – 1954.), a vodio se između Sjevernog Vijetnama – čiji su saveznici bili tadašnji Sovjetski Savez, Kina i ostale komunističke države – te vlade Južnog Vijetnama – čiji su najjači saveznik bile Sjedinjene Američke Države i druge antikomunističke zemlje. Fronta nacionalnog oslobođenja Južnog Vijetnama (Vietkong) koja je surađivala sa Sjevernim Vijetnamom učestalo je vodila gerilski rat protiv antikomunističkih snaga u regiji dok je vojska Sjevernog Vijetnama ulazila u konvencionalnije sukobe i često slala satnije s velikim brojem vojnika u bitke.

Kako je rat trajao tako se uloga Vietkonga smanjivala, a uloga vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama povećavala. Američke snage i snage Južnog Vijetnama oslanjale su se na svoju zračnu superiornost i veliku borbenu moć zahvaljujući kojoj su pronalazili i uništavali razne operacije uključujući pješaštvo, artiljeriju i zračne napade. Tijekom rata, SAD su se koristile strategijom bombardiranja Sjevernog Vijetnama, a kao posljedica toga zračni prostor te države postao je najstrože branjeno područje u svijetu.

Američka vlada gledala je na američko uplitanje u rat kao na sprečavanje razvoja komunizma u Sjevernom Vijetnamu. To je bio dio veće strategije čiji je cilj bio spriječiti razvoj komunizma općenito. Prema američkoj domino teoriji, kada bi jedna zemlja postala komunistička, ostale zemlje regije bi je slijedile, a američka politika smatrala je komunističku prevlast nad cijelim Vijetnamom neprihvatljivom. S druge strane, vlada Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkong borili su se za ujedinjenje Vijetnama pod komunističkom vladavinom. Oni su na sukob gledali kao na kolonijalni rat kojeg su u početku morali voditi s Francuskom, a nakon toga sa SAD-om jer je Francusku podupirala vlada SAD-a, a kasnije i Južni Vijetnam koji su smatrali američkom marionetskom državom.

Od 1950. godine američki vojni savjetnici počeli su dolaziti u područje koje je tada bilo poznato kao Francuska Indokina. Ranih 60-ih godina prošlog stoljeća američka umiješanost u sukob je eskalirala s utrostručenjem vojnih trupa 1961. te ponovno 1962. godine.Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 1, 25th Aviation Battalion website. Nakon incidenta u Tonkinškom zaljevu 1964. godine tijekom kojeg se američki vojni brod sukobio s brzim gliserima Sjevernog Vijetnama, a nakon kojeg je donijeta Rezolucija o Tonkinškom zaljevu koja je američkom predsjedniku dala autorizaciju za povećanje vojne prisutnosti SAD-a u tom području, broj trupa SAD-a ponovno je povećan. Redovne američke borbene jedinice raspoređivane su od 1965. godine. Operacije su prešle međunarodne granice: pogranična područja Laosa i Kambodže američke snage učestalo i snažno su bombardirale pogotovo na vrhuncu svoje umiješanosti u sukob 1968. godine, iste godine kada su komunističke snage započele s velikom ofenzivom Tet. Ta ofenziva čiji je cilj bio svrgnuti vladu Južnog Vijetnama pokazala se neuspješnom, ali označila je prekretnicu rata budući je od tada američka javnost počela ozbiljno sumnjati u izjave svoje vlade o uspješnom progresu rata.

Američka razočaranost ratom dovela je do velikog povlačenja američkih kopnenih snaga kao dio politike poznate pod nazivom Vijetnamizacija čiji je cilj bio okončanje američke umiješanosti u rat te prebacivanje borbe s Komunistima na južne Vijetnamce. Unatoč mirovnom sporazumu iz Pariza kojeg su potpisale sve zaraćene strane u siječnju 1973. godine, sukobi su se nastavili. U SAD-u i većem dijelu zapadnog svijeta razvio se veliki antiratni pokret. Taj pokret postao je dijelom Kontrakulture 60-ih godina prošlog stoljeća.

Direktna američka umiješanost u sukob službeno je završila 15. kolovoza 1973. godine kao rezultat novog zakona Case-Church kojeg je donio i proveo američki Kongres.. Nakon što su u travnju 1975. godine snage Sjevernog Vijetnama zauzele Sajgon, sukob je službeno okončan, a sljedeće godine Sjeverni i Južni Vijetnam postali su ujedinjeni. Tijekom rata ljudski gubitci na svim stranama bili su masovni. Procjenjuje se da se broj poginulih Vijetnamaca (vojnika i civila) kreće između 800 tisućaCharles Hirschman et al., "Vietnamese Casualties During the American War: A New Estimate," Population and Development Review, prosinac 1995. i 3,1 milijun.Associated Press, 3. travnja 1995., "Vijetnam kaže da je u borbi za sjever poginulo 1,1 milijun ljudi." Uz to procjenjuje se da je poginulo 200 do 300 tisuća Kmera,Heuveline, Patrick (2001). "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality in Cambodia." In Forced Migration and Mortality, eds. Holly E. Reed and Charles B. Keely. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press..Banister, Judith, and Paige Johnson (1993.). "After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia." In Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, ed. Ben Kiernan. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. 20 do 200 tisuća pripadnika Lao narodaWarner, Roger, Shooting at the Moon (1996.), str. 366, procjenjuje 30,000 Hmong.Obermeyer, "Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia", British Medical Journal, 2008., procjenjuje ukupno 60,000 mrtvih.T. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule, (1996.), procjenjuje 35,000 mrtvih.Small, Melvin & Joel David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816–1980, (1982.), procjenjuje 20,000 mrtvih.Taylor, Charles Lewis, The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, procjenjuje 20,000 mrtvih., koji procjenjuje 200,000 žrtava do 1973. te preko 58 tisuća američkih vojnika.

 Nazivi za sukob
Ratni sukob u Vijetnamu ima nekoliko različitih imena. Najčešći u upotrebi na hrvatskom jeziku je Vijetnamski rat ili Rat u Vijetnamu odnosno Vietnam War na engleskom jeziku. Rat se također naziva i Drugim indokineskim ratom te Vijetnamskim konfliktom.

Budući se u samoj Indokini dogodilo nekoliko različitih sukoba, ovaj rat je prvenstveno poznat po imenima njegovih protagonista kako bi ga se razlikovalo od ostalih.Moore, Harold. G and Joseph L. Galloway We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (str. 57). Na vijetnamskom jeziku rat je poznat pod imenom Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (Rat za otpor protiv Amerike). Također je poznat i pod nazivom Chiến tranh Việt Nam (Vijetnamski rat).

Primarne sukobljene strane u ratu su s jedne strane bile vojska Republike Vijetnam i američka vojska te, s druge strane, narodna vojska Vijetnama (najčešće nazivana vojska Sjevernog Vijetnama) i Vietkong, južno-vijetnamska komunistička gerilska vojska.

 Pozadina sukoba do 1949. godine
Francuska je kasnih 50-ih godina 19. stoljeća započela s okupiranjem Indokine, a situacija se smirila tek 1893. godine.Ooi, Keat Gin. Southeast Asia: a historical encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor. ABC-CLIO; 2004. . str. 520.Rai, Lajpat. Social Science. FK Publications; . str. 22.Dommen, Arthur J.. The Indochinese experience of the French and the Americans: nationalism and communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Indiana University Press; 2001. . str. 4–19. Prema mirovnom sporazumu Huế iz 1884. godine Francuska je ustanovila kolonijalnu vlast nad Vijetnamom sljedećih sedam desetljeća. Unatoč vojnom otporu, do 1888. godine područja današnjih država Kambodže i Vijetnama postala su francuska kolonija pod imenom Francuska Indokina (Laos je kasnije također postao dijelom te kolonije).. Tijekom ovog perioda oformilo se nekoliko različitih vijetnamskih pokreta otpora poput Vijetnamske nacionalističke stranke koja je pokrenula propalu pobunu Yên Bái 1930. godine, ali nitko nije bio uspješan sve do pojave Viet Minha, organizacije osnovane 1941. godine koju je kontrolirala Komunistička stranka Vijetnama, a koju su zajednički financirale SAD i Kuomintang u svojoj borbi protiv japanske okupacije..

Godine 1940., tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata, Njemačka je porazila Francusku. Francuska država (u to vrijeme poznata pod nazivom Višijska Francuska) bila je marionetska država Nacističke Njemačke. Francuske kolonijalne vlasti u Francuskoj Indokini brzo su se podložile Višijskom režimu. U rujnu 1940. godine, Japan je napao Indokinu. Nakon prekida ratovanja i početka japanske okupacije, francuske kolonijalne vlasti počele su surađivati s Japanom. Iako je Francuska nastavila voditi poslove u Indokini, u konačnici se sva moć odlučivanja nalazila u rukama Japanaca.

Koalicija Viet Minh osnovana je kao organizacija koja će se boriti za neovisnost od Francuske, ali koja se također protivila i japanskoj okupaciji 1945. godine iz istih razloga. SAD i Kuomintang podupirali su koaliciju u njihovoj borbi protiv Japana. Međutim, u početku nisu imali dovoljno vojne snage kako bi se upuštali u prave bitke. Za vođu Viet Minha, Ho Ši Mina sumnjalo se da je komunist pa ga je Kuomintang pritvorio na godinu dana.

Francuska i japanska dvostruka okupacija Indokine nastavila se sve dok njemačke trupe nisu bile izbačene iz Francuske pa su kolonijalne vlasti Francuske Indokine započele tajne razgovore sa slobodnim Francuzima. Bojeći se da više neće moći vjerovati francuskoj vlasti, japanska vojska zarobila je francuske vlasti i snage dana 9. ožujka 1945. godine. i kreirala marionetsku državu Vijetnamsko carstvo pod vladavinom Baoa Đaija.

Tijekom 1944. i 1945. godine Sjeverni Vijetnam pogodila je masovna glad zbog kombinacije lošeg vremena i francusko-japanske eksploatacije (Francuska Indokina trebala je opskrbljivati Japan žitom). Procjenjuje se da je u to vrijeme od gladi umrlo između 400 tisuća i 2 milijuna ljudi (od sveukupne populacije od 10 milijuna ljudi na tom području).. Iskoristivši administracijsku rupu. koja je nastala francuskim zarobljeništvom, organizacija Viet Minh je u ožujku 1945. godine nagovorila stanovništvo da započne s pljačkanjem skladišta hrane te odbijanjem plaćanja poreza.. Sve to rezultiralo je pljačkom između 75 i 100 skladišta.. Ova pobuna protiv masovne gladi i vlasti koja je dijelom bila odgovorna za njezin nastanak učvrstila je popularnost Viet Minha pa su u tom periodu prikupili izrazito veliki broj članova.

Dana 22. kolovoza 1945. godine, nakon japanske kapitulacije, agenti Ureda za strateške usluge Archimedes Patti i Carleton B. Swift Jr. u pratnji predstavnika francuske vlade Jeana Saintenyja došli su u Hanoi na milosnu misiju kako bi oslobodili zarobljene francuske vojnike.Interview with Carleton Swift, 1981, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-9dc948-interview-with-carleton-swift Iako su se japanske trupe neslužbeno predale (službena kapitulacija dogodit će se 2. rujna 1945. godine u Tokiju) oni su još uvijek bili jedina sposobna snaga koja je mogla održavati zakon i red pa su ostali na vlasti te zatvorili francuske kolonijalne trupe i Saintenyja.

Tijekom mjeseca kolovoza japanske trupe ostale su neaktivne pa su Viet Minh i ostale nacionalističke skupine preuzele javne zgrade i oružja čime je započela tzv. Kolovoška revolucija. Agenti Ureda za strateške usluge nekoliko su se puta sastali s Ho Ši Minom i drugim članovima Viet Minha tijekom ovog razdoblja,Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-bf3262-interview-with-archimedes-l-a-patti-1981 a dana 2. rujna 1945. godine Ho Ši Min je pred mnoštvom od 500 tisuća ljudi u Hanoiju proglasio ustanovljenje Demokratske Republike Vijetnam. Na početku svog govora Ho Ši Min je parafrazirao američki Ustav: "Svi ljudi rođeni su jednakima. Kreator nam je svima dao nepovrediva prava: pravo na život, pravo na slobodu i pravo na ostvarenje sreće."

Kolovoškom revolucijom Viet Minh je preuzela vlast u Vijetnamu. Prema Gabrielu Kolku, Viet Minh je uživala veliku potporu javnosti,. premda je Arthur J. Dommen upozoravao na "romantični pogled" njihovog uspjeha: "Viet Minhovo korištenje terora je bilo sistematsko... Stranka je sastavila listu onih koji su trebali biti smaknuti bez čekanja."Dommen, Arthur J. (2001), The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans, Indiana University Press, str. 120. "Prema jednoj procjeni, masakrirano je oko 15 tisuća nacionalista" u ljeto 1946. godine (str. 154). Uz to, do kraja Prvog indokineskog rata "organizacija Viet Minh ubila je od 100 do 150 tisuća civila" (str. 252). Nakon poraza u ratu, japanska imperijalistička vojska dala je Vijetnamcima oružje, a službenike Višijske Francuske i njezine vojne zapovjednike držala je u zatočeništvu mjesec dana nakon kapitulacije. Viet Minh je regrutirala više od 600 japanskih vojnika i dala im zadatak obučiti Vijetnamske vojnike ili nad njima zapovijedati.
thumb|upright|left|Japanski mornarički časnik predaje svoj mač britanskom poručniku u Sajgonu 13. rujna 1945. godine.
Međutim, saveznici koji su izašli kao pobjednici u Drugom svjetskom ratu - Velika Britanija, Sjedinjene Države i Sovjetski Savez - složili su se jednoglasno da područje i dalje pripada Francuskoj. Budući da Francuzi nisu imali snage odmah preuzeti Vijetnam, saveznici su se složili da će Britanske snage okupirati južni dio, dok će Kuomintang doći sa sjevera. Trupe Kuomintanga ušle su u zemlju sjeverno od 16-e paralele dana 14. rujna 1945. godine kako bi razoružale japanske trupe. Kada su se Britanske trupe iskrcale na jugu, naoružale su zarobljene francuske snage kao i dio japanskih trupa koje su kapitulirale, a sve u svrhu ponovnog zauzimanja južnog Vijetnama budući to nisu mogle učiniti same.

Na nagovor Sovjetskog Saveza, Ho Ši Min je u početku pokušao pregovarati s Francuzima koji su polako počinjali ponovno preuzimati kontrolu nad područjem.. U siječnju 1946. godine organizacija Viet Minh pobijedila je na izborima diljem središnjeg i sjevernog Vijetnama.. Dana 6. ožujka 1946. godine Ho je potpisao sporazum kojim dopušta francuskim snagama da zamijene snage Kuomintanga u zamjenu za francusko priznavanje Demokratske Republike Vijetnam kao "slobodne" republike unutar francuske unije. Francuzi su došli u Hanoi u ožujku, a u studenom iste godine svrgnuli su i protjerali organizaciju Viet Minh iz grada. Britanske snage napustile su područje 26. ožujka 1946. ostavivši Vijetnam u potpunosti u rukama Francuza. Uskoro poslije toga, Viet Minh je započela s gerilskim ratom protiv francuskih vojnih jedinica i tako je započeo Prvi indokineski rat.

Rat se uskoro proširio na Laos i Kambodžu gdje su Komunisti prema modelu Viet Minha organizirali pokrete Pathet Lao i Khmer Serei.. U to je vrijeme u svijetu započela era hladnog rata što je, pak, značilo nemogućnost ponovnog zbližavanja velikih zapadnih sila i Sovjetskog Saveza - donedavnih saveznika u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Borba Viet Minha bila je otežana zbog nedostatka oružja; ova situacija promijenila se 1949. godine kada je Komunistička stranka Kine pobijedila u Kineskom građanskom ratu te bila slobodna opskrbiti oružjem svoje saveznike u Vijetnamu.

 Odlazak Francuza (1950. – 1954.)
U siječnju 1950. godine Kina i Sovjetski Savez priznali su Demokratsku Republiku Vijetnam sa sjedištem u Hanoiju kao legitimnu vladu Vijetnama. Sljedećeg mjeseca SAD i Velika Britanija priznale su kao legitimnu vijetnamsku vladu Državu Vijetnam sa sjedištem u Sajgonu koja se nalazila pod patronatom Francuske, a na čijem je čelu bio bivši car Bao Đai.. Korejski rat koji je započeo u lipnju 1950. godine uvjerio je mnoge u Washingtonu da je rat u Indokini bio primjer komunističkog širenja pod vodstvom Sovjetskog Saveza.Pentagon Papers, Gravel, ed, Chapter 2, 'U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War', str. 54.
thumb|left|Francuski vojnici bore se protiv Viet Minha 1952. godine.
U srpnju 1950. godine kineski vojni savjetnici započeli su pomagati Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, str. 14. Routledge (2002.). Njihovo oružje, stručnost i radna disciplina preobratili su Viet Minh iz gerilske postrojbe u regularnu vojsku. U rujnu iste godine, SAD su oformile vojnu savjetodavnu jedinicu kao odgovor na francuski poziv za pomoć i savjete u vezi strategije, kao i za obučavanje vijetnamskih vojnika.. Do 1954. godine, SAD su potrošile milijardu dolara pomažući francuskim vojnim naporima na taj način pokrivši gotovo 80% ukupnog troška rata.Zinn, A People's History of the United States, str. 471.

Tijekom ovog razdoblja Francuzi i Amerikanci također su razgovarali i o mogućnosti korištenja tri taktička nuklearna oružja, ali izvještaji o tome koliko su ti razgovori bili ozbiljni i između koga su se odvijali i danas su samo insinuacije.Vietnam The Ten Thousand Day War, Thames 1981, Michael Maclear, str. 57.Vietnam at War: The History: 1946–1975, , str. 263. Prema jednoj verziji plana tzv. Operacije Strvinar (eng. Operation Vulture), Amerikanci bi iz svojih baza u regiji poslali 60 bombardera B-29 te još dodatnih 150 borbenih zrakoplova s obližnje flote kako bi bombardirali pozicije zapovjednika Viet Minha Võa Nguyêna Giápa. Plan je uključivao opciju korištenja tri atomska oružja koja bi se bacila na navedene pozicije. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, tadašnji predstojnik američkog združnog stožera, dao je svoju potporu korištenju nuklearnog oružja. Američki borbeni zrakoplovi B-29, B-36 i B-47 mogli su izvršiti nuklearni napad kao i nosač zrakoplova iz američke flote.Dien Bien Phu, Air Force Magazine 87:8. kolovoza 2004.

Američki nosači zrakoplova došli su u Tonkinški zaljev tijekom razgovora o korištenju nuklearnog oružja te od tamo slali zrakoplove u izviđanje iznad grada Điện Biên Phủ. Prema tadašnjem Potpredsjedniku SAD-a Richardu Nixonu, plan je uključivao da članovi združnog stožera naprave nacrt korištenja tri mala taktička nuklearna oružja kao pomoć Francuzima. Nixon, tzv. "ratni jastreb" za Vijetnam, predložio je da će SAD vjerojatno morati "slati svoje dečke". Tadašnji Predsjednik SAD-a Dwight D. Eisenhower smatrao je da se Amerika ne bi trebala miješati u sukob bez Britanske potpore koji su u to vrijeme bili protiv takvog plana. U konačnici, uvjeren da su politički rizici preveliki u odnosu na mogući dobitak, Eisenhower je odbio mogućnost nuklearne intervencije. Eisenhower je bio general s pet zvjezdica i bio je izrazito oprezan u vezi miješanja SAD-a u rat u Aziji.The U.S. Navy: a history, Naval Institute Press, 1997., Nathan Miller, , str. 67. – 68..

U međuvremenu je Viet Minh dobila krucijalnu potporu od Sovjetskog Saveza i Kine. Kineska potpora tijekom Prvog indokineskog rata 1950. godine omogućila je slanje namirnica iz Kine direktno u Vijetnam. Tijekom cijelog trajanja sukoba, američke obavještajne službe bile su skeptične oko francuskih šansi za uspjeh.The Pentagon Papers. Gravel, ed. vol. 1, str. 391. – 404.

Opsada Điện Biên Phủa označila je kraj francuske uključenosti u Indokini. Giapove snage Viet Minha snažno su porazile francusku vojsku pa se 7. svibnja 1954. godine francuski vojni garnizon predao. Od 12 tisuća zarobljenih Francuza samo ih je 3 tisuće preživjelo."William C. Jeffries (2006). Trap Door to the Dark Side". str. 388.  Na Ženevskoj konvenciji, Francuska je dogovorila prekid vatre s Viet Minhom, a Kambodži, Laosu i Vijetnamu odobrena je nezavisnost.

 Tranzicijski period
thumb|right|Ženevska konvencija, 1954. godine
Vijetnam je privremeno bio podijeljen na 17-oj paraleli, a po odredbama Ženevske konvencije civili su u razdoblju od 300 dana mogli neometano prelaziti granicu dvaju privremenih država. Planirano je da se 1956. godine održe izbori u cijeloj državi nakon kojih bi se ustanovila jedinstvena vlada.Službena objava za medije Ambasade Republike Vijetnam, citirana iz odjela za informiranje u Washingtonu, vol I. br. 18 (od 22. srpnja 1955.) i br. 20 (od18. kolovoza 1955.), u 19. poglavlju knjige autora Gettleman, Franklin i Young, Vietnam and America: A Documented History, str. 103–105. Oko milijun sjevernjaka, uglavnom manjinskih Katolika, pobjegla je na jug u strahu od progona Komunista,Jacobs, str. 45–55. a njihovoj odluci o bijegu pomogla je i američka propaganda koja se koristila sloganima poput "Djevica Marija odlazi na jug"; SAD su također financirale 93 milijuna dolara u program preseljenja koji je uključivao prijevoz izbjeglica s američkom flotom.Vietnam Divided by B.S.N. Murti, Asian Publishing House, 1964. Prebjeglo bi još minimalno dva milijuna ljudi da ih organizacija Viet Minh nije spriječila.. Izbjeglice sa sjevera, uglavnom Katolici, trebali su postati snažna antikomunistička izborna jedinica za režim Ngôa Đìnha Diệma.. Diem je kasnije mjesta svoje administracije popunio uglavnom Katolicima iz sjevernog i središnjeg dijela države.

Osim Katolika koji su odlazili na jug, oko 130 tisuća "revolucionara" počelo je dolaziti na sjever očekujući se vratiti na jug u roku od dvije godine.. Viet Minh ostavila je između 5 i 10 tisuća profesionalnih revolucionara na jugu kao "političko-vojnu substrukturu čiji je cilj bio iredentizam".1 Pentagon Papers (The Senator Gravel Edition), 247, 328 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971.). Posljednji francuski vojnici trebali su napustiti Vijetnam u travnju 1956. godine. U isto vrijeme Kina je završila s povlačenjem svojih trupa iz Sjevernog Vijetnama. Oko 52 tisuće vijetnamskih civila preselilo se s juga na sjever.John Prados, The VVA Veteran, siječanj/veljača 2005. Preuzeto 21. siječnja 2007.

Između 1953. i 1956. godine vlada Sjevernog Vijetnama pokrenula je razne agrarne reforme uključujući "smanjenje najma" i "reformu posjeda". Te reforme donesene su kako bi se stalo na kraj zemljoposjednicima. Otkriveni dokumenti Politburoa potvrđuju da su barem jedan od tisuću sjevernih Vijetnamaca (otprilike 14 tisuća ljudi sveukupno) bili predviđeni za smaknuće zbog ranije kampanje "smanjenja najma"; broj poginulih tijekom puno radikalnije "reforme posjeda" bio je znantno veći.Alec Holcombe, Politburo's Directive Issued on 4 May 1953, on Some Special Issues regarding Mass Mobilization Journal of Vietnamese Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2010), pp. 243–247, quoting a translated Politburo directive from 4 May 1953. This directive was published in Complete Collection of Party Documents (Van Kien Dang Toan Tap), a 54 volume work authorized by the Vietnamese Communist Party. U to su vrijeme zemljoposjednici činili 5,68% ukupnog stanovništva, ali za većinu njih kazna je bila puno manja od smaknuća. Prema službenim dokumentima iz tog vremena, otprilike 172,008 ljudi pogubljeni su kao "zemljoposjednici" tijekom "reforme posjeda" od kojih se za njih 123,266 (odnosno 71,66%) kasnije ustanovilo da su bili pogrešno klasificirani kao zemljoposjednici.The History of the Vietnamese Economy (2005.), Vol. 2, edited by Dang Phong of the Institute of Economy, Vietnamese Institute of Social Sciences.

U međuvremenu je na jugu ustanovljena Država Vijetnam s Bao Đaijem kao njezinim carom i Ngôm Đìnhom Diệmom kao njezinim premijerom (imenovan u srpnju 1954. godine). Niti SAD niti Država Vijetnam nisu potpisali ništa 1954. godine na Ženevskoj konvenciji. Uz poštovanje prema pitanju ujedinjenja, nekomunistička vijetnamska delegacija snažno se protivila bilo kakvoj podjeli Vijetnama, ali su izgubili nakon što su Francuzi prihvatili prijedlog delegata Viet Minha Phạma Văna ĐồngaThe Pentagon Papers (1971.), Beacon Press, vol. 3, str. 134. koji je predložio da Vijetnam ujedine izbori koji bi se održali pod nadzorom "lokalnih komisija".The Pentagon Papers (1971.), Beacon Press, vol. 3, str. 119. Amerikanci su se tome usprotivili onime što danas zovemo "Američki plan", a koji su podržavali Južni Vijetnam i Velika Britanija.The Pentagon Papers (1971.), Beacon Press, vol. 3, str. 140. Taj plan je podrazumijevao izbore za ujedinjenje pod nadzorom Ujedinjenih Naroda, ali ga je odbila sovjetska delegacija.

Američki predsjednik Eisenhower 1954. godine je napisao: "Nikada nisam razgovarao niti se dopisivao s nekim tko je nešto znao o situaciji u Indokini, a tko nije mislio da bi, da su izbori održani u vrijeme borbi, vjerojatno osamdeset posto populacije radije glasalo za Komunista Ho Ši Mina za svoga vođu nego za državnika Baa Đaija. Nedostatak vodstva i želje Baa Đaija bio je najveći faktor osjećaja koji je prevladavao kod mnogih Vijetnamaca o tome da se nemaju za što zapravo boriti."Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change. Garden City, New Jersey. Doubleday & Company, 1963., str. 372. Međutim, prema dokumentima iz Pentagona u razdoblju od 1954. do 1956. godine "Ngô Đình Diệm je zbilja uspio učiniti čuda" u Južnom VijetnamuThe Pentagon Papers (1971.), Beacon Press, vol. 3, str. 252.: "Gotovo je sigurno da bi do 1956. godine udio onih koji bi ranije možda glasali za Hoa - u slobodnim izborima protiv Diema - bio puno manji od osamdeset posto."The Pentagon Papers (1971.), Beacon Press, vol. 3, str. 246. Godine 1957. nezavisni promatrači iz Indije, Poljske i Kanade koji su radili pod okriljem međunarodne kontrolne komisije ustanovili su da pošteni, nepristrani izbori nisu mogući, a također su naveli da se niti Sjeverni niti Južni Vijetnam ne pridržavaju potpisanog sporazuma o primirju. navodi: "Izbori nisu održani. Južni Vijetnam, koji nije potpisao Ženevski sporazum, nije vjerovao Komunistima Sjevernog Vijetnama u njihovom obećanju da će održati pravedne izbore. U siječnju 1957. godine, međunarodna kontrolna komisija koja se sastojala od promatrača iz Indije, Poljske i Kanade jednoglasno se složila u svom izvještaju da se niti Južni niti Sjeverni Vijetnam nisu pridržavali potpisanog sporazuma o primirju. Nakon odlaska Francuske, tradicionalna borba za prevlast između sjevera i juga ponovno se nastavila."

Diem je skupa sa svojim bratom Ngôm Đìnhom Nhuom namjestio rezultate referenduma o budućnosti Države Vijetnam održanog 23. listopada 1955. godine i sebi pripisao 98,2% glasova, uključujući čak 133% iz Sajgona. Njegovi američki savjetnici predložili su mu da mu margina pobjede bude između "60 i 70 posto". Diem je, međutim, gledao na izbore kao na test autoriteta.. Tri dana kasnije proglasio je Južni Vijetnam nezavisnom državom pod imenom Republika Vijetnam te proglasio sebe njezinim predsjednikom.Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War str. 19. Nešto slično napravili su Ho Ši Min i ostali komunistički službenici koji su dobili 99% glasova na "izborima" u Sjevernom Vijetnamu.

Administracija Predsjednika Eisenhowera bila je prva koja je predložila teoriju "domino efekta" čija je definicija bila da bi sve države regije slijedile onu koja bi prva pala pod sistem Komuinizma.. John F. Kennedy, tadašnji američki senator, u svom govoru američkim prijateljima Vijetnama je rekao: "Burma, Tajland, Indija, Japan, Filipini te očigledno Laos i Kambodža su među onim državama čija bi sigurnost bila ugrožena kada bi se crvena plima Komunizma prelila u Vijetnam."John F. Kennedy. "America's Stakes in Vietnam ". Govor američkim prijateljima Vijetnama iz lipnja 1956. godine.

 Razdoblje predsjednika Diema (1955. – 1963.)
thumb|right|Američki predjednik Dwight D. Eisenhower i državni tajnik John Foster Dulles dočekuju predsjednika Ngôa Đìnha Diệma iz Južnog Vijetnama u Washingtonu dana 8. svibnja 1957. godine.
 Vladavina
Kao pobožni Rimokatolik, Diem je bio gorljivi antikomunist, nacionalist i društveni konzervativac. Povjesničar Luu Doan Huynh napisao je da je "Diem predstavljao uskogrudni i ekstremistički nacionalizam pomiješan s autokracijom i nepotizmom".. Zbog toga što su bili Budisti, mnogo Vijetnamaca izražavalo je svoju zabrinutost Diemovoj posvećenosti zemlje Djevici Mariji.

Početkom ljeta 1955. godine, Diem je lansirao kampanju "Odbacimo Komunizam" tijekom koje su svi oni za koje se sumnjalo da su Komunisti ili na bilo koji način protiv nove vlade bili uhićeni, zatvoreni, mučeni ili pogubljeni. Organizirao je smrtne kazne za sve one koji su sudjelovali u "komunističkim akcijama" u kolovozu 1956. godine. Povjesničar Gabriel Kolko napisao je da je otprilike 12 tisuća ljudi za koje se sumnjalo da djeluju protiv Diema ubijeno između 1955. i 1957. godine, a da se do kraja 1958. godine otprilike 40 tisuća političkih zatvorenika nalazilo u zatvorima.. Međutim, drugi povjesničar Guenter Lewy smatra da su ove brojke pretjerane te da se u zatvorima u cijeloj državi nije nalazilo više od 35 tisuća ljudi okrivljenih za sve zločine, a ne samo komunističke..

U svibnju 1957. godine Diem je otišao u desetodnevni posjed SAD-u. Predsjednik Eisenhower dao mu je svoju podršku, a u New Yorku je čak organizirana parada u Diemovu čast. Premda je Diem javno bio veličan, državni tajnik John Foster Dulles je u privatnosti iznosio tvrdnje da je Diem izabran isključivo radi nedostatka bolje alternative..

Bivši Ministar obrane Robert McNamara u knjizi Argument Without End iz 1999. godine napisao je da novi američki zaštitnici Republike Vijetnam nisu imali blagog pojma o vijetnamskoj kulturi. Znali su jako malo o njihovom jeziku i općenito dugoj povijesti te zemlje. Postojala je tendencija priključenja američkih motiva vijetnamskim akcijama, ali je Diem upozoravao da je iluzija vjerovati da će slijepo kopiranje zapadnjačkih metoda riješiti probleme u Vijetnamu.

 Pobune na jugu (1954. – 1960.)
thumb|right|upright=.9|Ho Ši Minov put kojim se opskrbljivao Vietkong.
Između 1954. i 1957. godine događao se veliki broj pobuna u selima na jugu koje je Diemova vlada uspjela ugušiti. U prvoj polovici 1957. godine u Južnom Vijetnamu vladao je mir po prvi puta nakon više od deset godina. Međutim, od sredine te godine pa sve do 1959., nasilje se povećavalo premda ga vlada "nije smatrala organiziranom kampanjom zbog toga što je neposluh bio previše raštrkan kako bi ugrozio glavne vladine izvore". Ipak, rane 1959. godine Diem je počeo smatrati navedeno nasilje organiziranom kampanjom i donio je Zakon 10/59 koji je bilo kakav oblik "političkog nasilja" kažnjavao smrću ili oduzimanjem imovine.Excerpts from Law 10/59, 6. svibnja 1959 . Postojali su neki ogranci bivše organizacije Viet Minh čiji je glavni cilj bio održati izbore obećane Ženevskom konvencijom, a koji su doveli do neodobrenih štrajkova koji nisu bili povezani s drugim komunističkim i antivladinim akcijama.

U prosincu 1960. godine službeno je osnovana Fronta nacionalnog oslobođenja Južnog Vijetnama s ciljem ujedinjenja svih antivladinih aktivista, uključujući i one koji se nisu izjašnjavali Komunistima. Prema izvještajima iz Pentagona, Fronta nacionalnog oslobođenja Južnog Vijetnama (FLN) "stavila je naglasak na povlačenje američkih savjetnika i općenito američkog utjecaja iz Južnog Vijetnama, na zemljišne reforme i oslobođenje od trenutne Vlade te na koaliciju vlade i neutralizaciju cijelog Vijetnama". Imena vođa ove organizacije uglavnom su držana u tajnosti.

Razlog konstantnog oživljavanja FLN-a bili su klasni odnosi na selima. Velika većina populacije Vijetnama živjela je na selima gdje je najveći problem bila zemljišna reforma. Organizacija Viet Minh smanjila je najam i dugove te zakupljivala komunalna zemljišta uglavnom siromašnijim seljacima. Diemova vlada vratila je zemljoposjednike u sela. Ljudi koji su do tada obrađivali zemlju na kojoj su se godinama nalazili morali su je vratiti zemljoposjednicima i uz to platiti najam za nekoliko godina unatrag dok zemljoposjednika nije bilo. Vojska Južnog Vijetnama se brinula za to da seljaci plate najam.

 Uključenost Sjevernog Vijetnama u pobune
Povjesničari imaju različita tumačenja u vezi direktne umiješanosti Sjevernog Vijetnama u organiziranju i pomoći kod pobuna u Južnom Vijetnamu prije 1960. godine. Kahin i Lewis o tome pišu:

S Kahinom i Lewisom se slaže i povjesničar Arthur Schlesinger Jr. koji ističe da je "Komunistička stranka Sjevernog Vijetnama tek u rujnu 1960. godine dala svoj službeni blagoslov za pobune i nazvala ih oslobođenjem juga od američkog imperijalizma".

Za razliku od gore navedenog, Jeffery Race je intervjuirao nekoliko komunističkih prebjega koji su ovakve demante smatrali "vrlo zabavnima" i koji su "uz humor komentirali da je Komunistička stranka Sjevernog Vijetnama očigledno bila pretjerano uspješna u skrivanju svoje uloge u pobunama".Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (University of California Press, 1972), str. 107., 122. James Olson i Randy Roberts ističu da je Sjeverni Vijetnam odobrio malu pobunu u prosincu 1956. godine. Kako bi se suzbila optužba da je Sjeverni Vijetnam prekršio odredbe Ženevske konvencije, tijekom komunističke propagande neovisnost FLN-a je konstantno bila naglašavana.

U ožujku 1956. godine južnjački komunistički vođa Le Duan predstavio je ostalim članovima Politburoa u Hanoiju plan oživljavanja pobune pod nazivom "Put do Juga" (The Road to the South), ali budući su se u to vrijeme i Kina i Sovjetski Savez protivili konfrontaciji, njegov je plan bio odbijen. Međutim, vodstvo Sjevernog Vijetnama odobrilo je privremene mjere da se oživi južnjačka pobuna u prosincu 1956. godine. Komunističke snage nalazile su se pod jednom komandnom strukturom sve do 1958. godine.Military History Institute of Vietnam,(2002) Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. University Press of Kansas. str. 68. . Komunistička stranka Sjevernog Vijetnama na svojoj sjednici u siječnju 1959. godine odobrila je "rat ljudi" na jugu, a u svibnju iste godine osnovala je Grupu 559 koja bi održala i proširila Ho Ši Minov put koji je obuhvaćao i područje Laosa. Prve godine navedene operacije tim putem poslano je oko pet stotina ljudi.Victory in Vietnam, p. xi. Prva isporuka oružja tim putem ostvarena je u kolovozu 1959. godine..

Te iste godine Sjeverni Vijetnam je napao Laos, a do 1961. godine koristio je gotovo 30 tisuća ljudi koji su trebali sagraditi puteve invazije kroz Laos i Kambodžu.The Economist, 26. veljače 1983. Oko 40 tisuća komunističkih vojnika infiltriralo se na jug u razdoblju od 1961. do 1963. godine. Sjeverni Vijetnam poslao je 10 tisuća vojnika svoje vojske da napadnu jug 1964. godine, a do sljedeće godine ova brojka popela se na stotinu tisuća vojnika.Washington Post, 23. travnja 1985.

 Razdoblje predsjednika Kennedyja (1961. – 1963.)
Na američkim predsjedničkim izborima 1960. godine senator John F. Kennedy porazio je tadašnjeg potpredsjednika Richarda Nixona. Premda je predsjednik Eisenhower upozoravao Kennedyja na Laos i Vijetnam, u to vrijeme Europa i Latinska Amerika "bili su mu u većem vidokrugu nego Azija".. Tijekom svog prvog obraćanja naciji za vrijeme inauguracije, Kennedy je dao ambicioznu zakletvu da će "platiti bilo koju cijenu, nositi bilo kakav teret, suočiti se s bilo kakvim poteškoćama, podržati svakog prijatelja i usprotiviti se svakom neprijatelju kako bi osigurao opstanak i uspjeh slobode".The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. Inauguracija Predsjednika Johna F. Kennedyja. U lipnju 1961. godine vodio je žestoke pregovore sa sovjetskim premijerom Nikitom Hruščovom tijekom njihovog sastanka u Beču na kojem su razgovarali o glavnim problemima između SAD-a i Sovjetskog Saveza.
thumb|right|Prikaz vojnih regija Južnog Vijetnama 1967. godine.
Kennedyjeva administracija uglavnom je ostala privržena vanjskoj politici hladnog rata koju je naslijedila od Trumanove i Eisenhowerove administracije. Godine 1961. SAD su imale oko 50 tisuća trupa u Koreji, a Kennedy se suočio s krizom na tri različite fronte - neuspjeh Invazije u Zaljevu svinja, izrada Berlinskog zida i pregovorima između prozapadnjačke vlade Laosa i komunističkog pokreta Pathet Lao.: "Kennedy je zaobišao Laos čiji neravan teren nije bio bojišnica za američke vojnike." Ove krize uvjerile su Kennedyja da bi još jedan poraz SAD-a u pokušaju dobivanja kontrole i sprečavanja razvoja Komunizma mogao dokrajčiti američki kredibilitet kod njegovih saveznika te uništiti američku reputaciju. Zbog toga je Kennedy bio prisiljen "povuči crtu u pijesku" i spriječiti komunističku pobjedu u Vijetnamu. Odmah nakon sastanka s Hruščevom u Beču, Kennedy je Jamesu Restonu iz New York Timesa izjavio: "Sada imamo problem učiniti našu moć vjerodostojnom, a Vijetnam izgleda kao pravo mjesto za to."The case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam Presidential Studies Quarterly.Mann, Robert. A Grand Delusion, Basic Books, 2002.

U svibnju 1961. godine američki potpredsjednik Lyndon B. Johnson posjetio je Sajgon i entuzijastično proglasio Diema "Winstonom Churchillom Azije".. Upitan zbog čega je dao taj komentar, Johnson je odgovorio: "Diem je naš jedini dečko kojeg tamo imamo". Johnson je uvjerio Diema da će mu osigurati još više borbenih snaga kako bi se odupro Komunistima.

Kennedyjeva politika prema Južnom Vijetnamu ležala je na pretpostavci da će Diem i njegove snage u konačnici sami poraziti gerilu. Bio je protiv slanja američkih borbenih snaga te izjavio da bi "slanje velikog broja američkih postrojbi u taj dio svijeta danas, premda bi u početku moglo imati pozitivne vojne učinke, u godinama koje slijede moglo dovesti do štetnih političkih i vojnih posljedica". Međutim, kvaliteta vojske Južnog Vijetnama nije se podigla. Loše rukovodstvo, korupcija i političke promocije igrale su veliku ulogu u slabljenju vojske Južnog Vijetnama. Učestalost gerilskih napada samo je bilo dodatno ulje na vatru. Dok je podrška Vietkongu iz Hanoija igrala značajnu ulogu, nesposobnost vlade Južnog Vijetnama ipak je bila najviše odgovorna za nastalu krizu..

Kennedyjevi savjetnici Maxwell Taylor i Walt Rostow predložili su mu da pošalje američke snage u Južni Vijetnam prerušene u radnike koji se bore protiv poplava. On je tu ideju odbio, ali je ponovno pojačao vojnu pomoć. U travnju 1962. godine John Kenneth Galbraith upozorio je Kennedyja na "opasnost da ćemo zamijeniti Francuze kao nova kolonijalna sila u tom dijelu svijeta i krvariti kao što su krvarili i Francuzi".John Kenneth Galbraith. "Memorandum Predsjedniku Kennedyju od Johna Kennetha Galbraitha u vezi Vijetnama, poslan 4. travnja 1962. The Pentagon Papers. Gravel. ed. Boston, Massachusetts Beacon Press, 1971., vol. 2. str. 669. – 671. Do studenog 1963. godine u Južnom Vijetnamu nalazilo se 16 tisuća američkog vojnog osoblja, dok je u razdoblju Eisenhowerove administracije tamo bilo svega njih 900.

Kasne 1961. godine pokrenut je tzv. Strategic Hamlet Program. Radilo se o programu kojeg su zajedno pokušali provesti SAD i Južni Vijetnam, a čiji je cilj bio pokušaj preseljenja populacije iz zaselaka u izgrađene kampove. Program je započeo početkom 1962. godine, a uključivao je nekoliko prisilnih preseljenja i segregaciju ruralnih stanovnika Južnog Vijetnama u nove zajednice gdje bi seljaci bili izolirani od komunističkih pobuna. SAD i Južni Vijetnam nadali su se da će ove nove zajednice pružiti sigurnost seljacima i pojačati vezu između njih i centralne vlade. Međutim, do studenog 1963. godine program je oslabio, a službeno je okončan 1964. godine.

Dana 23. srpnja 1962. godine četrnaest nacija uključujući Kinu, Južni Vijetnam, Sovjetski Savez, Sjeverni Vijetnam i SAD potpisalo je sporezum kojim se obećava poštovanje neutralnosti Laosa.Međunarodni sporazum o neutralnosti Laosa.

 Svrgnuće i atentat na predsjednika Diema
thumb|right|Konvoj američkih tenkova tijekom Vijetnamskog rata.
Nesposobnost vojske Južnog Vijetnama najbolje se vidjela na primjeru izgubljene bitke kod Ap Baca dana 2. siječnja 1963. godine u kojoj je mala skupina pripadnika Vietkonga uspjela odbiti puno veće i bolje opremljene snage Južnog Vijetnama čiji mnogi zapovjednici uopće nisu niti željeli stupiti u borbu.. Povjesničar James Gibson zaključio je: "Strategijski plan zaselaka je propao... Režim Južnog Vijetnama bio je nesposoban pridobiti seljake zbog svoje povezanosti sa zemljoposjednicima. U smislu relativno stabilnog političkog saveza i funkcionalne birokracije, "režim" nije postojao. Umjesto toga građanska vlada i vojne operacije su praktički prestale. Fronta nacionalnog oslobođenja Južnog Vijetnama (Vietkong) napravila je veliki pomak unaprijed i bila je blizu proglašenja privremene revolucionarne vlade u velikim područjima."James Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam (Boston/New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.), str. 88.

U spomenutoj bitci snage Južnog Vijetnama prevodio je general Huỳnh Văn Cao, najodaniji Diemov čovjek. Cao je bio Katolik koji je do čina generala više stigao zbog religije i vjernosti nego zbog svojih vlastitih sposobnosti, a njegov glavni posao je bio suzbiti pobune; tijekom jednog komunističkog napada čak je i povraćao. Neki političari u Washingtonu počeli su zaključivati da je Diem nesposoban poraziti Komuniste te da bi čak mogao sklopiti i sporazum s Ho Ši Minom. Činilo se da je jedino što želi suzbiti pobune, a postao je i paranoičan nakon pokušaja atentata 1960. i 1962. godine koje je znao donekle pripisivati i samom SAD-u. Robert F. Kennedy je izjavio: "Diem nije želio napraviti niti najmanji ustupak. Postao je čovjek kojeg je bilo teško urazumiti..."Intervju uživo Johna Bartlowa Martina. Was Kennedy Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? New York City. John F. Kennedy Library, 1964., Vrpca br. V, čin 1.

Nezadovoljstvo Diemovom politikom još više je došlo do izražaja nakon pucnjave u gradu Huếu tijekom koje je ubijeno devetero Budista koji su protestirali protiv zabrane postavljanja Budističke zastave na Budin rođendan. Rezultat pucnjave bili su masovni prosvjedi protiv diskriminatorske politike koja je davala prednost Katoličkoj Crkvi i njezinim sljedbenicima. Diemov stariji brat Ngô Đình Thục bio je Nadbiskup Huếa koji je agresivno "zamaglio" odvojenost Crkve i države. Thucove proslave raznih obljetnica prije Budinog rođendana uglavnom je financirala vlada, a Vatikanske zastave bile su ponosno podignute. Tijekom Diemove vladavine također su postojali izvještaji i svjedočanstva o uništavanju budističkih Pagoda koje su počinjavali katolički paramilitarci. Diem je, međutim, odbio ustupiti budstičkoj većini ili preuzeti odgovornost za njihovu smrt. Dana 21. kolovoza 1963. specijalne postrojbe vojske Južnog Vijetnama pukovnika Lêa Quanga Tunga, odane Diemovom mlađem bratu Ngôu Đìnhu Nhuu pretresale su pagode diljem Vijetnama uzrokujući oštećenja i uništenja tih građevina te smrt stotina ljudi.
right|thumb|John F. Kennedy i Robert McNamara.
thumb|Fotografija Ngôa Đìnha Diệma nakon smaknuća u pobuni 1963. godine.
thumb|left|Uništeni tenk M48A3 Patton.
Sredinom 1963. godine američki dužnosnici počeli su razmatrati mogućnost promjene režima. Državno tajništvo Sjedinjenih Američkih Država uglavnom je bilo za podizanje puča, dok je Ministarstvo obrane i dalje favoriziralo Diema. Kao glavna stvar u predloženim promjenama postavljeno je uklanjanje Diemovog mlađeg brata Nhua koji je kontrolirao tajnu policiju i specijalne postrojbe, a na kojeg se gledalo kao na glavnog i odgovornog čovjeka za budističku represiju te kao na arhitekta Ngoove obiteljske vladavine. Ovaj prijedlog prenijet je američkoj ambasadi u Sajgonu putem tzv. Telegrama 243.

Središnja obavještajna agencija (CIA) nalazila se u kontaktu s generalima koji su planirali ukloniti Diema. Rečeno im je da se SAD neće protiviti takvom potezu niti će kazniti generale prekidanjem pomoći. Predsjednik Diem je uklonjen s vlasti i smaknut skupa sa svojim bratom dana 2. studenog 1963. godine. Kada je predsjednik Kennedy o navedenom bio obaviješten, prema izjavi Maxwella Taylora "samo je izjurio iz sobe sa šokiranim i zaprepaštenim izrazom na licu.". On nije odoborio Diemovo ubojstvo. Američki ambasador u Južnom Vijetnamu, Henry Cabor Lodge, pozvao je vođe pobune u ambasadu i čestitao im. Ambasador Lodge obavijestio je Kennedyja da "su trenutačni izgledi da rat neće još dugo trajati"..

Nakon puča uslijedio je kaos. Hanoi je iskoristio priliku i pojačao svoju potporu gerilskim borcima. Južni Vijetnam ušao je u period ekstremne političke nestabilnosti budući je u brzoj sukcesiji jedna vojna vlada smijenjivala drugu. Komunisti su na svaki novi režim u Južnom Vijetnamu gledali kao na novu američku marionetu; bez obzira na Diemove nedostatke, njegova reputacija kao nacionalista (kako je Robert McNamara kasnije ustvrdio) bila je besprijekorna..

Američki vojni savjetnici nalazili su se na svakom nivou vojnih snaga Južnog Vijetnama. Međutim, bili su kritizirani zbog ignoriranja političke prirode pobune.. Kennedyjeva administracija željela se fokusirati na pomirenje i "pobjedu korištenjem srca i uma" naroda. Ipak, vojni stratezi u Washingtonu bili su protivnici bilo kakve druge uloge američkih savjetnika osim one konvencionalne - obučavanjem vojnih trupa.. General Paul Harkins, zapovjednik američkih snaga u Južnom vijetnamu, povjerljivo je prognozirao pobjedu do Božića 1963. godine.. CIA je, međutim, bila manje optimistična upozoravajući da je "Vietkong de facto i dalje u većinskoj kontroli sela Južnog Vijetnama te da postepeno povećava i uspijeva u svojim naporima".

Paravojni službenici iz Odjela za posebne aktivnosti CIA-e trenirali su i predvodili Hmong plemena iz Laosa u Vijetnam. Domaće snage imale su se u desecima tisuća i vodile su direktne misije, vođene paravojnim službenicima, protiv komunističkih snaga Pathet Laoa i njihovih pristalica iz Sjevernog Vijetnama.U.S. Special Forces: A Guide to America's Special Operations Units : the World's Most Elite Fighting Force, By Samuel A. Southworth, Stephen Tanner, Published by Da Capo Press, 2002., . CIA je također vodila i tzv. Phoenix Program te posebnu vojnu skupinu čije je originalno ime bilo Special Operations Group, ali koje je kasnije promijenjeno zbog tajnosti njihovih misija.Shooting at the Moon by Roger Warner – The history of CIA/IAD'S 15-year involvement in conducting the secret war in Laos, 1960.– 1975., and the career of CIA PMCO (paramilitary case officer) Bill Lair.

 Razdoblje predsjednika Johnsona (1963. – 1969.)
thumb|left|upright|Američki B-66 razarač i četiri F-105 Thunderchiefa bacaju bombe na Sjeverni Vijetnam tijekom operacije Rolling Thunder.
Nakon što je 22. studenog 1963. godine ubijen predsjednik Kennedy, dotadašnji potpredsjednik Lyndon B. Johnson preuzeo je predsjedničke ovlasti i u početku svog mandata pitanje Vijetnama nije smatrao prioritetom budući je više pažnje posvećivao svojim programima "Veliko društvo" (eng. Great Society) te drugim društvenim reformama. Predsjednički pomoćnik Jack Valenti se prisjeća: "U to vrijeme pitanje Vijetnama nije bilo veće od ljudske šake na obzoru. Jedva da smo i diskutirali u vezi Vijetnama budući tada to još nije bila velika stvar.".Johnson nije imao povjerenja u mnoge članove iz Kennedyjevog kabineta zbog toga što ih nije upoznao u ranoj fazi Kenneyjevog predsjedništva; za njega, ljudi poput W. Averella Harrimana i Deana Achesona govorili su nekim drugim jezikom.Nedugo nakon atentata na Predsjednika Kennedyja, kada je McGeorge Bundy nazvao LBJ-a na telefon, ovaj mu je uzvratio: "K vragu, Bundy. Rekao sam ti da ću te zvati kada ću te trebati". Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.), 13.

Dana 24. studenog 1963. godine Johnson je izjavio da "bitka protiv Komunizma... mora biti udružena... snagom i odlučnošću.".Pred malom skupinom koja je uključivala i Henryja Cabota Lodgea Jr.-a, novi Predsjednik također je rekao: "Moramo se prestati igrati policajaca i provalnika (referenca na Diemovo propalo vodstvo) i vratiti se... dobivanju rata... recite generalima u SAjgonu da Lyndon namjerava ostati pri našoj riječi... ostvarivanja pobjede protiv komunističke urote." Ta zakletva došla je u vrijeme kada se situacija u Južnom Vijetnamu počela pogoršavati, pogotovo na mjestima poput Mekong Delte zbog posljednje pobune protiv Diema.: "U mjestu imena Hoa Phu, na primjer, strateški program zaselaka koji je prethodnog ljeta stvoren sada je izgledao kao da ga je pogodio uragan. Razgovarajući putem prevoditelja, lokalni čuvar mi je objasnio da je šačica agenata Vietkonga ušla jedne noći u zaselak i rekla seljacima da ga unište te da se vrate u svoja rodna sela. Seljaci su poslušali naredbe bez pitanja." Johnson je obrnuo Kennedyjevu politiku distanciranja od Vijetnama pa je umjesto povlačenja 1000 vojnih snaga do kraja 1963. godine (Kennedyjeva rezolucija od 11. listopada)National Security Action Memorandum NSAM 263   (11. listopada 1963.) . dana 26. studenog donio svoju rezolucijuNSAM 273   (26. studenog 1963.) . kojom je proširio ratno djelovanje.

Vojno revolucionarno vijeće koje se sastalo umjesto snažnih vođa Južnog Vijetnama sastojalo se od 12 članova čiji je voditelj bio general Duong Van Minh kojeg je novinar Stanley Karnow kasnije opisao kao "oličenje letargije".. Američki ambasador u Južnom Vijetnamu Lodge, frustriran završetkom godine, poslao je telegram u vezi Minha: "Hoće li on biti dovoljno jak da preuzme stvar u svoje ruke?" Već u siječnju 1964. godine general Nguyễn Khánh svrgnuo je režim generala Minha.. U kratkom vremenu dogodilo se još nekoliko što uspješnih, što neuspješnih pučeva koji su doprinosili vojnoj nestabilnosti države.
thumb|upright|Navodni aktivist Vietkonga na ispitivanju, zarobljen tijekom napada na američku bazu blizu granice s Kambodžom.
Dana 2. kolovoza 1964. godine američki vojni razarač USS Maddox je, tijekom obavještajne misije uzduž obale Sjevernog Vijetnama, navodno zapucao i oštetio nekoliko torpedo brodova koji su se nalazili na misiji uhođenja u Tonkinškom zaljevu.. Dva dana kasnije prijavljen je drugi napad u istom području, ali ovaj put na američke razarače USS Turner Joy i USS Maddox. Okolnosti napada bile su mutne. Lyndon Johnson rekao je državnom podtajniku Georgeu Ballu da su "ti mornari možda pucali na leteće ribe.".

Navodni drugi napad na američku mornaricu doveo je do osvetničkog zračnog napada, pa je američki Kongres odobrio rezoluciju Tonkinškog zaljeva dana 7. kolovoza 1964. godine. koju je potpisao Johnson, a koja mu je dala ovlast da može krenuti s vojnim operacijama duž jugoistočne Azije bez prethodne objave rata.. Premda su članovi Kongresa u to vrijeme nijekali da se radi o službenoj objavi rata, Tonkinška rezolucija dala je Predsjedniku jednostranu moć kretanja u rat, ako bi on to smatrao neophodnim. Istoga mjeseca, Johnson je izjavio da on "...ne šalje američke dečke da vode rat za koji smatram da ga trebaju voditi dečki iz Azije kojima je zadatak očuvati vlastitu zemlju.".

Otvoreni dosjei Nacionalne agencije za sigurnost iz 2005. godine, međutim, otkrili su da nije bilo nikakvog napada 4. kolovoza. Već ranije je cijeli događaj doveden u pitanje. Louise Gerdes je napisala: "Incident u Tonkinškom zaljevu je često citirani primjer načina na koji je Johnson obmanjivao američki narod kako bi od njih dobio potporu za vanjsku politiku Vijetnama."Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War str. 25. Ipak, George C. Herring ističe da McNamara i Pentagon "nisu svjesno lagali o navodnim napadima, već da su očigledno bili raspoloženi za odmazdu te da su djelovali na temelju dostupnih 'dokaza' koji su ukazivali na ono u što su oni u tom trenutku željeli vjerovati da se dogodilo.".

Početkom 1959. godine snage Vietkonga imale su 5 tisuća ljudi, a do kraja 1964. godine taj broj narastao je na gotovo 100 tisuća vojnika... Samo između 1961. i 1964. godine vojna snaga podigla se s oko 850 tisuća na gotovo milijun ljudi.. Brojke poslanih američkih vojnika u istom periodu su bile potpuno drugačije; s početnih 2 tisuće 1961. godine broj se naglo podigao na 16 i pol tisuća 1964. godine.The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam by George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, Delta Books, 1967. Početkom 1965. godine, Vietkong je uništio otprilike 7559 vijetnamskih zaselaka.

Vijeće za nacionalnu sigurnost predložilo je bombardiranje Sjevernog Vijetnama u tri čina. Dana 2. ožujka 1965. godine, nakon napada na američke barake u kojima su bili stacionirani Marinci u Pleikuu započele su operacije Flaming Dart, Rolling Thunder i Arc Light.Nalty 1998., str. 97., 261. Namjera navedenih bombaških kampanja kojima se prijetilo uništiti zračnu obranu Sjevernog Vijetnama i njegovu industrijsku infrastrukturu, a koje će u konačnici trajati pune tri godine, bila je prisiliti snage Sjevernog Vijetnama da prestanu davati svoju podršku Vietkongu. Bombardiranje je također služilo i u svrhu podizanja morala trupa Južnog Vijetnama.Earl L. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991., str. 89. U razdoblju između ožujka 1965. i studenog 1968. godine, samo operacija Rolling Thunder potapala je sjeverni dio države s milijunima projektila, raketa i bombi..

Sjeverni Vijetnam nije bilo jedino područje bombardiranja. Tijekom navedenog razdoblja provedene su i druge operacije na drugim područjima, poput operacija Commando Hunt čiji su cilj bili drugi dijelovi Vietkonga i infrastrukture vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama. Ta područja uključivala su Ho Ši Minov put koji je prolazio kroz Laos i Kambodžu. Međutim, cilj sprečavanja Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga nikada nije postignut. Jedan zapovjednik je napisao "da se ovdje radi o političkom ratu za koji je potrebno diskriminirati ubojstva. Najbolje oružje... bio bi nož... Najgore oružje je zrakoplov.". Tadašnji Predsjednik združnog stožera američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva Curtis LeMay, međutim, dugo vremena zagovarao je nanošenje poražavajućeg udara Vijetnamu bombardiranjem te napisao da bi "Komuniste trebalo bombardirati sve dok ih ne vratimo u Kameno doba."Gen. Curtis E LeMay.

 Eskalacija sukoba
thumb|Vijesti u filmu o napadu na američku zračnu bazu te američki odgovor na napad iz 1965. godine.
thumb|upright|Seljaci za koje se sumnja da su pripadnici Vietkonga nalaze se u zarobljeništvu američke vojske 1966. godine.
Nakon nekoliko uzastopnih napada odlučeno je da baze američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva trebaju veću zaštitu budući se činilo da im vojska Južnog Vijetnama sama ne može pružiti sigurnost. Dana 8. ožujka 1965. godine u Južni Vijetnam poslano je tri tisuća Američkih marinaca. Ovo je ujedno označilo početak američkog ratovanja u Vijetnamu. U to vrijeme američko javno mnijenje većinski je bilo za slanje trupa u jugoistočnu Aziju.

U izjavi sličnoj onoj koju je dao Francuzima gotovo dva desetljeća ranije, Ho Ši Min je upozorio da ako "Amerikanci žele ratovati narednih dvadeset godina, tada ćemo ratovati narednih dvadeset godina. Ako žele mir, sklopit ćemo mir i pozvati ih na poslijepodnevni čaj".. Prema očitovanju prvog zamjenika ministra vanjskih poslova Trana Quanga Coa, primarni cilj rata bio je ujediniti Vijetnam i osigurati njegovu nezavisnost. Drugi su smatrali da politika Sjevernog Vijetnama nije bila srušiti ostale nekomunističke vlade jugoistočne Azije.. Međutim, izvještaji iz Pentagona upozoravali su na "opasan period vijetnamskog širenja... Laos i Kambodža bile su lake mete takvog Vijetnama... Tajland, Malezija, Singapur pa čak i Indonezija mogli bi biti sljedeći."The Pentagon Papers (Beacon Press, 1971.), vol. 1, str. 52.

Početni zadatak Marinaca bio je striktno obrambeni. U ožujku 1965. godine poslano je 3,500 marinaca, a ta brojka je samo do prosinca iste godine narasla na čak 200 tisuća.. Američka vojska dugi niz godina obučavala se isključivo za ofenzivno ratovanje. Bez obzira na politiku, zbog svog vojničkog obrazovanja američki zapovjednici nisu bili prikladni za vođenje obrambenih misija. U prosincu 1964. godine snage Južnog Vijetnama teško su poražene u bitci kod Bình Giã. Iako su ranije komunističke snage provodile gerilske taktike, u ovoj bitci porazile su jake južnovijetnamske trupe konvencionalnim načinom ratovanja.. Kasnije je vojska Južnog Vijetnama ponovno poražena u lipnju 1965. godine u bitci kod Đồng Xoàija..
right|thumb|Američki vojnici u selu traže pripadnike Vietconga.
Dezerterstvo se pojačavalo, a moral vojnika je opadao. General William Westmoreland izvijestio je američkog admirala Granta Sharpa Jr-a. da je situacija kritična. Izjavio je: "Uvjeren sam da američke trupe sa svojom energijom, mobilnošću i borbenom moći mogu uspješno preuzeti bitku protiv Vietkonga".U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 4, str. 7. Uz ovaj prijedlog, Westmoreland je zagovarao još agresivnije slanje američkih trupa te stavljanje vojske Južnog Vijetnama "sa strane" kako bi Amerikanci preuzeli stvar u svoje ruke. Ignorirajući vojsku Južnog Vijetnama, američka involviranost u sukob postala je puno jača.. Westmoreland je zamislio plan dobivanja rata u tri faze:

Prva faza - predanost američkih snaga (i ostalih snaga slobodnog svijeta) radi zaustavljanja gubitničkog trenda do kraja 1965. godine.
Druga faza - snažne ofenzivne akcije američkih trupa i njihovih saveznika kako bi se uništila gerila i druge organizirane neprijateljske snage. Ova faza završila bi nakon što bi neprijatelj postao istrošen, stavljen u obrambenu poziciju i izbačen iz velikih naseljenih područja.
Treća faza - za slučaj neprijateljske ustrajnosti, uslijedio bi period od dvanaest do osamnaest mjeseci nakon druge faze kako bi se konačno uništile sve neprijateljske snage u ostalim manje naseljenim područjima.U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 5, str. 8. – 9.

Predsjednik Johnson je navedeni plan odobrio, a njegovo odobravanje značilo je veliko odstupanje od inzistiranja prijašnje administracije da je vlada Južnog Vijetnama sama odgovorna za poražavanje gerile. Westmoreland je predvidio pobjedu do kraja 1967. godine.U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 4, str. 117. – 119. i vol. 5, str. 8. – 12. Johnson, međutim, o navedenoj promjeni u strategiji ratovanja nije obavijestio medije već je umjesto toga naglašavao kontinuitet.Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1966., vol. 2, str. 794. – 799.
thumb|right|Sovjetski premijer Alexei Kosygin s američkim predsjednikom Lyndonom B. Johnsononm na konferenciji u Glassborou tijekom koje su razgovarali o mogućnosti postizanja mirovnog sporazuma.
Uskoro su američki vojnici krenuli na odrađivanje jednogodišnjih tura u Vijetnamu bez pretjerano iskusnog vodstva. Jedan promatrač je napisao: "Nismo bili u Vijetnamu 10 godina, već tijekom jedne godine 10 puta." Kao rezultat vremenskog trajanja vojnog roka, programi obučavanja vojnika bili su skraćeni.
thumb|left|Ho Ši Minov put koji prolazi kroz Laos, 1967. godine.
Washington je počeo ohrabrivati svoje saveznike da i oni pošalju trupe pa su Australija, Novi Zeland, Južna Koreja, Tajland i Filipini. to i učinili. Međutim, veliki NATO saveznici Kanada i Velika Britanija odbili su zahtjev iz Washingtona za slanjem svojih trupa u Vijetnam.Peter Church. ed. A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore, John Wiley & Sons, 2006., str. 193. Amerikanci i njihovi saveznici uskoro su započeli s nizom kompleksnih vojnih operacija poput operacija Masher, Attleboro, Cedar Falls i Junction City. Međutim, komunistički pobunjenici ostali su jaki i demonstrirali su veliku taktičku fleksibilnost.

U međuvremenu se dolaskom na čelo države premijera Nguyena Caoa Kyja politička situacija u Južnom Vijetnamu počela stabilizirati. S njim je na čelo došao i šef države general Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Njihovim dolaskom završila je serija pučeva koji su se znali događati i po par puta godišnje. Godine 1967. Thieu je postao predsjednik, a Ky njegov zamjenik nakon namještenih izbora. Premda su nominalno bili građanska vlada, Ky je trebao održati moć koristeći vojsku. Ipak, Theiu ga je nadmudrio tako što je vojničke činove davao generalima iz svoje frakcije. Thieu je također bio osumnjičen za ubojstva Kyjevih lojalista, premda je tvrdio da se radilo o vojnim nesrećama. Nepovjerljivi i neodlučni Thieu je ostao predsjednik sve do 1975. godine, nakon što je pobijedio na izborima 1971. godine na kojima je bio jedini kandidat..

Johnsonova administracija se prema vlastitim medijima koristila "politikom minimalne iskrenosti".. Državni službenici koji su obavještavali medije o vojnim operacijama uglavnom su davali priče koje su naglasak stavljale na progres samog rata. Tijekom vremena, upravo je ova politika snažno utjecala na promjenu mišljenja javnosti o samom ratu. Postepeno su se vijesti o ratu u medijima i vijesti koje su dolazile iz Pentagona u mnogome počele razlikovati, a sve to počelo je stvarati rupu u kredibilitetu američke javnosti prema vlastitoj vladi.
thumb|left|Američki vojnik priprema se ući u tunel Vietkonga.
 ofenziva Tet
Krajem 1967. godine komunističke snage namamile su američke u zaleđe sela Đắk Tô u bitku za Khe Sanh, mjesto na kojem su se SAD željele boriti zbog toga što su tamo mogle u potpunosti upotrijebiti svoju borbenu moć ne bojeći se za eventualne civilne žrtve. Međutim, dana 31. siječnja 1968. godine vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga prekršile su primirje koje je tradicionalno bilo povezano s blagdanom Tet (vijetnamskom Novom godinom) i krenule u najveću bitku Vijetnamskog rata, tzv. ofenzivu Tet u nadi da će njome izazvati narodni ustanak. Preko 85 tisuća trupa napalo je preko 100 gradova uključujući napade na sjedište generala Williama Westmorelanda i američku ambasadu u Sajgonu..
thumb|right|Američki marinci tijekom operacije Allen Brook 1968. godine.
Premda su američke snage i snage Južnog Vijetnama u početku bile šokirane razmjerom urbane ofenzive, vrlo brzo su uzvratile i desetkovale redove Vietkonga. U bivšem glavnom gradu Hueu, zajedničke trupe Vietkonga i vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama zauzele su imperijalističku tvrđavu i većinu grada te masakrirali preko 3 tisuće nenaoružanih tamošnjih civila. Kasnije u tzv. bitci kod Huea, američke snage koristile su masivnu borbenu moć i ostavile 80 posto grada u potpunim ruševinama.. Niže na jugu, u gradu Quảng Trị, članovi američke vojske ubili su preko 600 pripadnika vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietconga u i oko grada. Za to vrijeme u Sajgonu tisuću pripadnika Vietkonga tri tjedna je odolijevalo napadima američke i južno-vijetnamske vojske od 11 tisuća vojnika.

Međutim, ofenziva Tet imala je drugu posljedicu koja u početku nije bila razmatrana. General Westmoreland postao je javno lice Vijetnamskog rata u SAD-u. Tri puta se nalazio na naslovnici časopisa Time, a 1965. godine proglašen je "Osobom godine" (eng. Man of the Year)."The Guardians at the Gate", Time 7. siječnja 1966., vol. 87, br.1. Časopis Time ga je opisao kao "snažnu personifikaciju američkog vojnika... koji je pisao povijest, smišljao planove bitaka i ulio... svojim podređenima vlastitu ideologiju u vezi američke pomoći i odgovornosti". Šest tjedana nakon početka ofenzive Tet "podrška javnosti u vezi njegovog ratnog učinka pala je s 48 na 36 posto i, što je još dramatičnije, podrška njegovom načinu ratovanja pala je s 40 na 26 posto".Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1986), p. 546

Još u studenom 1967. godine Westmoreland je javnim nastupima pokušao poboljšati klonulu javnu podršku Johnsonovoj administraciji.Witz The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War str. 1. – 2. Tako je u govoru pred nacionalnom novinarskim klubom rekao da je postignuta točka rata "u kojoj se kraj nazire".Larry Berman. Lyndon Johnson's War. New York, W.W. Norton, 1991., str. 116. Upravo zbog toga javnost je bila još više šokirana i zbunjena kada je te njegove izjave ofenziva Tet u potpunosti opovrgnula. Zahvaljujući upravo toj ofenzivi, američki mediji i javnost koji su do tada u većini slučajeva podržavali američke napore u Vijetnamu sada su se okrenuli protiv Johnsonove administracije, jer se stvorila rupa u kredibilitetu prema vlastitoj vladi.

Premda je ofenziva Tet u smislu žrtava i kontrole teritorija označila veliku pobjedu savezničkih trupa, u smislu strateških posljedica značila je čisti poraz: postala je prekretnica američkog uplitanja u Vijetnamski rat zbog toga što je imala duboki utjecaj na (ne)podržavanje sukoba u samom SAD-u. Unatoč vojnom porazu komunističkih snaga, ofenziva Tet postala je njihova politička pobjeda i označila je kraj ere predsjednika Lyndona B. Johnsona koji je - zbog toga što mu je podrška javnosti pala s 48 na 36 posto - odlučio ne izaći na sljedeće predsjedničke izbore. James Witz je napisao: "ofenziva Tet je bila kontradiktorna izjavama Johnsonove administracije i vojske o progresu rata". ofenziva je također označila i obavještajni neuspjeh na razini Pearl Harbora.Harold P. Ford. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers str. 104. – 123. Novinar Peter Arnett, međutim, citirao je službenika kojeg nije htio identificirati, a koji je za selo Ben TreSurvivors Hunt Dead of Bentre, Turned to Rubble in Allied Raids nytimes.com. izjavio: "Bilo je potrebno uništiti to selo kako bi ga se spasilo.""Peter Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1. travnja 2003.
thumb|right|Pripadnici Vietkonga i vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama koje su ubili vojnici američkih zračnih snaga u napadu na zračnu bazu Tan Son Nhut tijekom ofenzive Tet.
Walter Conkite je u svom editorijalu rekao: "Reći da smo danas bliže pobjedi je, sukladno dokazima, vjerovati optimistima koji su griješili u prošlosti. Predložiti da smo na rubu poraza je odlazak u neopravdani pesimizam. Međutim, reći da se nalazimo u pat poziciji čini se kao jedini realističan, iako ne i zadovoljavajući, zaključak".. Nakon Cronkiteovog javljanja na televiziji, predsjednik Johnson je navodno rekao: "Ako sam izgubio Cronkitea, izgubio sam srednju Ameriku".

Westmoreland je postao načelnik glavnog vojnog stožera u ožujku 1968. godine nakon što je svaki otpor bio ugašen. Tehnički se radilo o promociji, ali je njegova pozicija postala neodrživa zbog navedene ofenzive te zbog činjenice što je u medije procurio njegov zahtjev za slanje dodatnih 200 tisuća vojnika. Westmorelanda je naslijedio njegov zamjenik Creighton Abrams, zapovjednik manje sklon istupima u medijima.Sorely 1999., str. 11. – 16.

Dana 10. svibnja 1968. godine, unatoč malim očekivanjima, započeli su mirovni pregovori između SAD-a i Sjevernog Vijetnama u Parizu. Pregovori su se odugovlačili pet mjeseci, sve dok Johnson nije dao naredbu za prestanak bombardiranja Sjevernog Vijetnama.

Povjesničar Robert Dallek je napisao: "Johnsonova eskalacija sukoba u Vijetnamu podijelila je Amerikance u dva ratna stožera... koštala 30 tisuća američkih života do trenutka dok on nije izašao iz predsjedničkog ureda i praktički uništila njegovo predsjedništvo...".Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War str. 27. Njegovo odbijanje slanja dodatnih trupa u Vijetnam viđeno je kao priznanje da je rat izgubljen.Command Magazine Issue 18, str. 15. S druge strane gledišta, može se reći da je odbijanje slanja trupa bio i taktički potez kojim se htjelo reći da se rat nije mogao dobiti dodatnom eskalacijom, barem ne po cijenu koja bi bila prihvatljiva američkom narodu. Ministar obrane Robert McNamara je rekao: "Opasna iluzija američke pobjede u tom trenutku bila je mrtva.".

Rat u Vijetnamu bilo je glavno političko pitanje tijekom predsjedničkih izbora 1968. godine. Te izbore dobio je republikanski kandidat Richard Nixon.

 Razdoblje predsjednika Nixona (1969. – 1972.)
 Vijetnamizacija
Veliki gubitci komunističkih trupa tijekom Ofenzive Tet omogućile su američkom predsjedniku Richardu Nixonu da započne s povlačenjem američkih snaga iz Vijetnama. Njegov plan, nazvan Nixonova doktrina, uključivao je obučavanje vojske Južnog Vijetnama kako bi oni samostalno mogli obraniti svoju državu. Takva politika uskoro je postala poznata pod drugim imenom - Vijetnamizacija. Vijetnamizacija je imala mnogo sličnosti s politikom Kennedyjeve administracije uz jednu bitnu iznimku: dok je Kennedy inzistirao da se vojska Južnog Vijetnama bori sama, Nixon je pokušao limitirati opseg konflikta.

Nixon je izjavio: "Večeras najavljujem planove za povlačenje dodatnih 150 tisuća američkih trupa čiji povratak se očekuje do proljeća sljedeće godine. Na taj način smanjit ćemo naše prisustvo u Vijetnamu za sveukupno 265,500 vojnika - puno ispod broja vojnika koji je postojao kada smo prije 15 mjeseci preuzeli predsjedništvo." Dana 10. listopada 1969. godine Nixon je naredio zrakoplovnoj eskadrili B-52 naoružanoj nuklearnim oružjem da odlete do sovjetske granice, a sve u cilju kako bi - koristeći se svojom tzv. teorijom luđaka (eng. Madman Theory) - uvjerio Sovjetski Savez da je sposoban učiniti sve što je potrebno ne bi li okončao rat u Vijetnamu.

Nixon je također tražio pregovore. Glavni zapovjednik oružanih snaga na bojišnici Creighton Abrams zbog toga je radio na malim vojnim operacijama, usmjerenim prema komunističkoj logistici te na bolji način koristio vlastitu borbenu moć i bolje surađivao s vojskom Južnog Vijetnama. Nixon je također započeo s tzv. detantom sa Sovjetskim Savezom te Kinom. Takav način vođenja politike pomogao je smanjenju globalnih tenzija te smanjenju prijetnji upotrebe nuklearnih oružja obiju supersila. Međutim, Nixon je bio razočaran što Sovjetski Savez i Kina nastavljaju s opskrbljavanjem vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama. U rujnu 1969. godine Ho Ši Min je umro u 79. godini života.

Cijelo to vrijeme antiratni pokret u SAD-u dobiva na sve jačoj snazi. Nixon je pokušao utjecati na američku "tihu većinu" za koju je mislio da i dalje podržava rat bez da to izjavljuje u javnosti. Međutim, nakon medijskog otkrića masakra u Mai Laiju tijekom kojeg je američki vod silovao i ubio nedužne civile, te nakon incidenta s osmoricom vojnika iz specijalnih postrojbi koji su uhićeni zbog ubojstva navodnog dvostrukog agenta, izbili su novi nacionalni i međunarodni protesti protiv rata. Početkom 1970. godine američke vojne trupe počele su se povlačiti iz pograničnih područja gdje se odvijalo najviše bitaka te su stacionirane na obali i u unutrašnjosti, a sve to uzrokovalo je pad u broju žrtava te godine u odnosu na 1969. godinu za više od 50 posto.

 Kambodža i Laos
Još od 1955. godine princ Norodom Sihanouk proglasio je Kambodžu neutralnom, ali su Komunisti koristili njezino tlo kao bazu pa je Sihanouk tolerirao njihovu prisutnost zbog toga što nije želio biti uvučen u širi sukob u regiji. Međutim, pod pritiskom Washingtona ovu politiku promijenio je 1969. godine pa vijetnamski komunisti više nisu bili dobrodošli. Predsjednik Nixon iskoristio je tu priliku za masivnu bombašku kampanju naziva Operacija Menu usmjerenu protiv komunističkih utočišta uzduž kambodžanske i vijetnamske granice. Samo je pet visoko odlikovanih dužnosnika znalo za navedenu operaciju.

Godine 1970. princa Sihanouka svrgnuo je proamerički premijer Lon Nol. Na zahtjev zamjenika vođe Crvenih Kmera Nuona Chee Sjeverni Vijetnam napao je Kambodžu 1970. godine. SAD i vojska Južnog Vijetnama nakon toga ušli su u Kambodžu kako bi napali vojsku Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkong te pokušali zaustaviti komunističko okruženje u glavnom gradu Phnom Penhu. Ovaj upad označio je početak antiratnih protesta diljem SAD-a zbog toga što je Nixon ranije obećao smanjenje američke angažiranosti u sukobu. Pripadnici nacionalne garde ubili su četvero studenata tijekom protesta u državi Ohio na sveučilištu Kent State što je uzrokovalo daljnju javnu srdžbu u SAD-u. Budući da Nixonova administracija nije reagirala na navedeni incident onako kako je javnost to očekivala, antiratni pokret uzeo je sve više maha. Za to vrijeme, američke zračne snage nastavile su sa žestokim bombardiranjem Kambodže kao podrška tamošnjoj vladi, a sve kao dio operacije naziva Freedom Deal.

Godine 1971. New York Times domogao se izvještaja iz Pentagona (tzv. Pentagon Papers). Tajni dokumenti otkrili su kompletnu povijest američke upletenosti u sukob u Vijetnamu, a sve uz odobrenje Ministarstva obrane čime se došlo do zaključka da je američka javnost godinama bila izložena zabludi. Vrhovni sud SAD-a presudio je da je objava tajnih dokumenata bila legalna.

U veljači 1971. godine vojska Južnog Vijetnama krenula je u operaciju Lam Son 719 čiji je cilj bilo presijecanje Ho Ši Minovog puta u Laosu. U prividno neutralnom Laosu dugo je trajao građanski rat u kojem su se sukobili pripadnici Lao naroda koje su podupirale SAD i Pathet Lao sa svojim saveznicima iz Sjevernog Vijetnama. Nakon što su naišli na otpor tijekom operacije, snage Južnog Vijetnama povukle su se u konfuziji. Počeli su bježati preko polja koja su bila prekrivena njihovim vlastitim mrtvim vojnicima. Kada su potrošili rezerve goriva, vojnici su napustili svoja vozila i pokušali se ukrcati na američke helikoptere koji su poslani kako bi pokupili ranjene. Mnogo vojnika Južnog Vijetnama vješalo se za skije helikoptera u očajničkom pokušaju da spase vlastite živote. Američke letjelice morale su uništiti ostavljenu vojnu opremu, uključujući i tenkove, kako ista ne bi došla u neprijateljske ruke. Polovica trupa vojske Južnog Vijetnama je u navedenoj operaciji ubijena ili zarobljena. Sama operacija bila je totalni fijasko i označila je potpuni potop Vijetnamizacije. Karnow je napisao: "Ovdje se radilo o zabludi monumentalne prirode. Vrhovne zapovjednike oružanih snaga Južnog Vijetnama obučavali su Amerikanci deset, pa čak i petnaest godina od kojih su mnogi otišli na obučavanje u Sjedinjene Države, ali na kraju se ispostavilo da nisu puno naučili."

Godine 1971. Australija i Novi Zeland povukli su svoje vojnike iz Vijetnama. Američke trupe dodatno su se smanjile na 196,700 vojnika uz rok od povlačenja još 45 tisuća vojnika do veljače 1972. godine. Kako su se antiratni prosvjedi širili SAD-om, u vojnim redovima širila se razočaranost i loša disciplina uključujući konzumiranje droge i dezerterstvo.

Vijetnamizacija je ponovno testirana 1972. godine za vrijeme Uskrsne ofenzive kada je vojska Sjevernog Vijetnama napala Južni Vijetnam. Vojska Sjevernog Vijetnama skupa s Vietkongom brzo je osvojila sjeverne provincije i u koordinaciji s ostalim snagama iz Kambodže prijetila prepoloviti zemlju na pola. Za to vrijeme povlačenje američkih trupa se nastavilo, ali američke zračne snage odradile su Operaciju Linebacker i bombaškim napadima uspjele zaustaviti ofenzivu. Međutim, u tom trenutku postalo je jasno da bez američke zračne potpore Južni Vijetnam nije mogao preživjeti. Posljednje američke trupe na tlu povučene su do kraja ožujka 1973. godine; američka mornarica i zračne snage ostale su u Tonkinškom zaljevu kao i u Tajlandu i Guamu.

 Predsjednički izbori 1972. i mirovni pregovori u Parizu
Vijetnamski rat bio je glavna tema predsjedničkih izbora 1972. godine. Nixonov suparnik George McGovern u svojoj je kampanji bio za povlačenje svih snaga iz Vijetnama. Nixonov savjetnik za nacionalnu sigurnost, Henry Kissinger, nastavio je s tajnim pregovorima s Le Ducom Thoom iz Sjevernog Vijetnama. U listopadu 1972. godine postigli su dogovor.

Međutim, predsjednik Južnog Vijetnama Thieu zahtijevao je goleme izmjene mirovnog sporazuma. Kada su detalji sporazuma postali javni u Sjevernom Vijetnamu, Nixonova administracija smatrala je da Sjever želi osramotiti predsjednika. Pregovori su stali na mrtvoj točki, a Hanoi je tražio nove izmjene. Kako bi pokazao svoju potporu Južnom Vijetnamu i prisilio Hanoi da se vrati za pregovarački stol, Nixon je naredio novu Operaciju Linebacker II koja se sastojala od žestokog bombardiranja gradova Hanoi i Haiphong u razdoblju od 18. do 29. prosinca 1972. godine. U ofenzivi je uništen veliki dio preostale gospodarstvene i industrijalne moći Sjevernog Vijetnama. Paralelno s ovim napadima, Nixon je vršio pritisak na Thieua da pristane na uvjete dogovora, prijeteći da će prekršiti jednostrani mir i u potpunosti prestati davati toliko potrebnu američku pomoć.

Dana 15. siječnja 1973. godine Nixon je najavio prestanak ofenzivnih akcija protiv Sjevernog Vijetnama. Mirovni sporazum u Parizu o "završetku rata i ponovnom postizanju mira u Vijetnamu" potpisan je 27. siječnja 1973. godine te je na taj način službeno okončana američka upletenost u Vijetnamski sukob. Prekid vatre obznanjen je i u Sjevernom i u Južnom Vijetnamu, a američki ratni zarobljenici pušteni su na slobodu. Dogovor je garantirao teritorijalni integritet Vijetnama (poput onoga koje je garantirala Ženevska konvencija iz 1954. godine) te nacionalne izbore na sjeveru i jugu zemlje. Prema potpisanom mirovnom dogovoru, američke snage imale su period od šezdeset dana za potpuno povlačenje s teritorija Vijetnama. "Ovaj članak", ističe Peter Church "zapravo je jedini u cijelom pariškom mirovnom sporazumu koji je u potpunosti ispoštovan".

 Protivljenje američkom uplitanju u Vijetnamski rat (1962. – 1973.)
left|thumb|Antiratne demonstracije 1967. godine.
thumb|Protesti protiv rata u Washingtonu dana 24. travnja 1971. godine.
Tijekom trajanja Vijetnamskog rata veliki dio američke populacije protivio se američkom uplitanju u sukob u Južnom Vijetnamu. Javno mnijenje u vezi uplitanja u sukob snažno se okrenulo protiv rata nakon 1967. godine, a do 1970. tek trećina Amerikanaca vjerovala je da SAD nisu pogriješile sa slanjem vlastitih trupa da se bore u Vijetnamu.Lunch, W. & Sperlich, P. (1979). The Western Political Quarterly. 32(1). str. 21. – 44.

Gotovo trećina američke populacije snažno se protivila ratu. Danas je moguće specificirati točno određene grupe koje su predvodile antiratni pokret i njihove razloge zbog čega su to radili. Mnogi mladi ljudi protestirali su zbog toga što su upravo oni bili ti koji su mogli biti unovačeni i otići u taj dio jugoistočne Azije, dok su ostali bili protiv rata zbog rasta popularnosti samog antiratnog pokreta u smislu tzv. Kontrakulture 60-ih i općenite kulture konzumiranja droge u američkom društvu tog doba te slušanja glazbe koja je u to vrijeme bila na vrhuncu popularnosti.

Neki zagovornici mirovnog pokreta tražili su jednostrano povlačenje američkih snaga iz Vijetnama. Jedan od glavnih razloga tog mišljenja bilo je to da bi povlačenje trupa pridonijelo stabilizaciji regije, a samim time bi se automatski smanjilo krvoproliće. Rano protivljenje američkom uplitanju u Vijetnamski sukob svoju je inspiraciju crpilo iz Ženevske konvencije 1954. godine. Na američku potporu Diemovom režimu gledalo se kao na osujećivanje demokracije kakvom se Amerika inače ponosi. John F. Kennedy, dok je još bio senator, protivio se američkom uplitanju u Vijetnam.

Protivljenje uplitanju u Vijetnamski sukob ujedinilo je grupe koje su se protivile američkom antikomunizmu i imperijalizmu.Louis B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate; str. 54. –55.; Hardcover: 430 pages; Publisher: Lexington Books (13. listopada 2011.); . Ostali, poput Stephena Spira protivili su se ratu na temelju Teorije pravednog rata. Neki su pokušavali pokazati solidarnost prema ljudima iz Vijetnama, poput Normana Morrisona koji je imitirao djela Thícha Quảnga Đứca. U televizijskom programu od 15. svibnja 1965. godine, Eric Severeid je, javljajući se za CBS, održao debatu između McGeorgea Bundyja i Hansa Morgenthaua čiji je cilj bio ukazati na glavne ratne interese SAD-a u to vrijeme s pitanjima: "1. Koje je opravdanje američke prisutnosti u Vijetnamu - zašto smo uopće tamo?; 2. Koja je fundamentalna priroda ovog rata? Radi li se o agresiji Sjevernog Vijetnama ili je to građanski rat među ljudima Južnog Vijetnama?; 3. Na koji način je vlast komunističke Kine uopće upletena u sukob u Vijetnamu i koji su njezini daljnji planovi?; 4. Koje su alternative našoj trenutnoj politici u Vijetnamu?"Louis B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate; str. 53. – 54.; Hardcover: 430 pages; Publisher: Lexington Books (13. listopada 2011.); .Videorecording of entire debate proceedings available at the Museum of Radio and Television in New York City.

Protivljenje ratu u nekim trenucima išlo je toliko daleko da su organizirane ulične demonstracije kako bi se pokušalo promijeniti političko mišljenje prema sukobu. Dana 15. listopada 1969. godine, masovni prosvjed diljem SAD-a nazvan Vijetnamski moratorij privukao je milijune Amerikanaca na ulice.1969: Millions march in US Vietnam Moratorium. BBC On This Day. Na demokratskoj nacionalnoj konvenciji 1968. godine izbili su nemiri tijekom protesta protiv rata.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413. Nakon što su u javnost procurile informacije o masakru u selu Mai Lai 1968. godine antiratni pokret dobio je još više članova, a neki ratni veterani pridružili su se pokretu nazvanom Vijetnamski veterani protiv rata. Fatalna pucnjava koja se dogodila na sveučilištu Kent State 1970. godine u kojoj je poginulo četvero studenata dovela je do masovnih protesta na sveučilištima diljem SAD-a. Antiratni prosvjedi završili su kada su se posljednje američke trupe povukle iz Vijetnama, nakon potpisanog mirovnog sporazuma u Parizu 1973. godine. Južni Vijetnam ostavljen je da se brani sam, a kao posljedica toga mnogi stanovnici tog dijela svijeta pobjegli su upravo u Sjedinjene Države.Immigration in US history |url=http://crfimmigrationed.org/index.php/immigration-in-us-history |chapter=History Lesson 8: Refugees From Vietnam and Cambodia |chapter-url=http://crfimmigrationed.org/index.php/lessons-for-teachers/147-hl8 |publisher=Constitutional Rights Foundation

 Odlazak Amerikanaca (1973. – 1975.)
thumb|left|Antiratni prosvjedi
Tijekom posljednjih godina Vijetnamizacije Sjedinjene Države započele su s drastičnim smanjivanjem vlastitih trupa u Južnom Vijetnamu. Mnogo je trupa povučeno iz regije, a 5. ožujka 1971. SAD su u bivšu bazu Fort Bragg u Sjevernoj Karolini vratile 5. grupu Specijalnih snaga koja je bila prva američka jedinica poslana u Južni Vijetnam.

Prema mirovnom sporazumu iz Pariza potpisanog između ministra vanjskih poslova Sjevernog Vijetnama Lêa Đứca Thọa, američkog državnog tajnika Henryja Kissingera i južnovijetnamskog predsjednika Thieua, američke vojne snage povukle su se iz Južnog Vijetnama, a došlo je i do razmjene ratnih zarobljenika. Sjevernom Vijetnamu bilo je dopušteno da nastavi opskrbljivati komunističke trupe na jugu, ali samo zamjenjujući potrošeni materijal. Kasnije te godine Kissinger i Thọ dobili su Nobelovu nagradu za mir, ali ju je vijetnamski pregovarač odbio primiti uz komentar da pravi mir još uvijek nije postignut.

Komunističke vođe nadale su se da će potpisani sporazum o prekidu vatre otići na njihovu stranu. Međutim Sajgon je započeo potiskivati Vietkong potpomognut američkom pomoći koju je dobio prije nego što je sporazum stupio na snagu. Prema memoarima Trầna Văna Tràa zbog toga su Komunisti krenuli s novom strategijom organiziranja serije sastanaka u Hanoiju tijekom ožujka 1973. godine..

Kao vrhovni zapovjednik Vietkona, Tra je sudjelovao u nekoliko takvih sastanaka. Nakon prestanka američkog bombardiranja Sjevernog Vijetnama, rad na Ho Ši Minovom putu te ostalim logističkim strukturama mogao se nastaviti. Logistika se nastavljala sve dok Sjever ne bi došao u poziciju napraviti masovnu invaziju na Jug, a koju je planirao tijekom sušne sezone 1975./76. godine. Tra je izračunao da bi to mogao biti posljednji pokušaj Hanoija da udari na južnjake prije nego Sajgon bude u potpunosti pripravan za bitku.
thumb|right|300px|Karta SAD-a koja pokazuje pobjedu predsjednika Richarda Nixona na predsjedničkim izborima 1972. godine u 49 od sveukupno 50 država.
Na predsjedničkim izborima 1972. godine održanim u studenom, demokratski kandidat George McGovern izgubio je 49 od sveukupno 50 država od predsjednika Richarda Nixona. Dana 15. ožujka 1973. godine predsjednik Nixon natuknuo je da će se SAD ponovno uplesti u sukob ako Komunisti naruše prekid vatre. Međutim, javnost i Kongres SAD-a nisu podupirali predsjednika pa je u travnju za američkog ambasadora u Vijetnamu Nixon postavio Grahama Martina. Upravo njegovo postavljanje za ambasadora bio je rani signal da je Washington odustao od Vijetnama. Tijekom njegovog saslušanja u lipnju 1973. godine, ministar obrane James R. Schlesinger izjavio je da predlaže nastavak američkog bombardiranja Sjevernog Vijetnama u slučaju da Sjeverni Vijetnam krene s velikom ofenzivom prema Južnom Vijetnamu. Dana 4. lipnja 1973. godine američki Senat donio je tzv. Case-Church amandman kako bi spriječio takvu intervenciju..

Naftna kriza u listopadu 1973. godine koja je uslijedila nakon Jomkipurskog rata u Egiptu uzrokovala je znatnu štetu u gospodarstvu Južnog Vijetnama. Vietkong je nastavio sa svojim ofenzivnim operacijama kada je započela sezona suše i do siječnja 1974. godine ponovno zauzela teritorij kojeg je izgubila u prethodnoj sušnoj sezoni. Nakon dva sukoba u kojem je poginulo 55 pripadnika vojske Južnog Vijetnama, predsjednik Thieu je dana 4. siječnja 1974. godine obznanio da je rat ponovno započeo te da mirovni sporazum u Parizu više nije na snazi. Tijekom trajanja prekida vatre poginulo je preko 25 tisuća ljudi iz Južnog Vijetnama.
thumb|Nedavno pušteni američki ratni zarobljenici iz zatvoreničkih logora Sjevernog Vijetnama 1973. godine.
Dana 9. kolovoza 1974. godine Gerald Ford preuzeo je predsjedništvo SAD-a nakon što je predsjednik Nixon podnio ostavku zbog Watergate skandala. U to vrijeme Kongres SAD-a je smanjio financijsku pomoć Južnom Vijetnamu s jedne milijarde dolara na 700 milijuna dolara. Te iste godine izabran je novi Kongres SAD-a u kojem su dominirali demokrati koji su bili još odlučniji konfrontirati se s predsjednikom u vezi rata. Kongres je odmah izglasao restrikcije za financiranje i vojnu aktivnost tijekom 1975. godine uz uvjet da do 1976. godine SAD u potpunosti raskinu bilo kakve veze sa sukobom u Vijetnamu.

Uspjeh ofenzive 1973./74. tijekom sezone suše inspirirao je Traa da se u listopadu 1974. godine vrati u Hanoi i zatraži veću ofenzivu tijekom sljedeće sušne sezone. Ovoga puta Tra je mogao putovati autocestom što je bila znatna promjena u odnosu na dane kada su se za putovanja koristile nesigurne planinske ceste Ho Ši Minovog puta.. Giap, ministar obrane Sjevernog Vijetnama, nije želio odobriti Traov plan zbog toga što je mislio da bi veća ofenziva mogla nanovo isprovocirati američku reakciju te tako narušiti njegov plan za veliku invaziju planiranu 1976. godine. Tra je zbog toga zatražio pomoć od prvog tajnika La Duana koji je odobrio operaciju koja je zahtijevala ograničenu ofenzivu iz Kambodže u provinciju Phước Long. Cilj napada bio je riješiti logističke probleme, izazvati reakciju snaga Južnog Vijetnama, ali i vidjeti hoće li se Amerika ponovno uplesti u sukob.

Dana 13. prosinca 1974. godine snage Sjevernog Vijetnama napale su rutu 14 provincije Phước Long. Phuoc Binh, glavni grad provincije, pao je 6. siječnja 1975. godine. Predsjednik Ford očajnički je pokušao od svog Kongresa dobiti odobrenje za sredstva kako bi pomogao vojsci Južnog Vijetnama prije nego bude pregažena, ali Kongres je to odbio učiniti. Pad Phuoc Binha i nedostatak američkog odgovora na napad ostavio je vojsku Južnog Vijetnama potpuno demoraliziranom.

Brzina uspjeha nagnala je Politburo da preispita svoju strategiju. Odlučeno je da će operacije u središnjem gorju biti povjerene generalu Vănu Tiếnu Dũngu te da bi se Pleiku trebao zauzeti, ako bi to bilo moguće. Prije nego što je otišao na Jug, Le Duan je rekao Dungu: "Nikada prije nismo imali tako savršene vojne i političke uvjete ili takvu stratešku prednost kao što ih imamo sada."Clark Dougan, David Fulgham et al., The Fall of the South. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985., str. 22.

Početkom 1975. godine Južni Vijetnam imao je tri puta više artiljerije i dva puta više tenkova i ostalih naoružanih vozila nego njegovi neprijatelji. Također je imao i 1400 zrakoplova, a bio je i duplo brojniji u samim vojnim jedinicama od svojih komunističkih neprijatelja.The End of the Vietnam War, 30 Years Ago  by Gabriel Kolko, CounterPunch 30. travnja / 1. svibnja 2005. Međutim, rast cijene nafte značio je da je većina toga bila neupotrebljiva. Bili su suočeni s dobro organiziranim, izrazito odlučnim i solidno financiranim Sjevernim Vijetnamom. Većina materijala i financija Sjevernog Vijetnama dolazila je iz komunističkog bloka. Unutar Južnog Vijetnama zavladao je kaos. Odlazak američke vojske kompromitirao je njihovu gospodarsku ovisnost o američkoj financijskoj pomoći i američkim trupama. Južni Vijetnam također je trpio od globalne rececije uzrokovane naftnom krizom.

 Finalna ofenziva Sjevernog Vijetnama
Nakon što se sjeverni dio zemlje našao pod njihovom kontrolom, Politburo je naredio generalu Dungu da krene u finalnu ofenzivu prema Sajgonu. Prema operativnom planu Ho Ši Minove kampanje, Sajgon je trebao biti zauzet prije 1. svibnja budući su u Hanoiju željeli izbjeći nadolazeći monsun koji bi u teoriji mogao pomoći snagama Južnog Vijetnama za pregrupiranje i jaču obranu njihovog glavnog grada. Moral snaga Sjevernog Vijetnama zbog posljednjih pobjeda bio je na visokoj razini i uskoro su zauzeli Nha Trang, Cam Ranh i Da Lat.

Dana 7. travnja tri divizije Sjevernog Vijetnama napale su grad Xuan Loc koji se nalazi 64 kilometara istočno od Sajgona. Snage Sjevernog Vijetnama u bitci kod Xuan Loca naišle su na žestoki otpor 18. divizije Južnog Vijetnama koja je bila brojčano nadjačana šest naprema jedan. U sljedeća dva krvava tjedna vodit će se žestoke bitke tijekom kojih će snage Južnog Vijetnama pokušati zadržati prodor Sjevernjaka. Međutim, do 21. travnja izmučeni garnizon morao se povući prema Sajgonu.

Istoga dana ogorčeni predsjednik Thieu dao je ostavku uz izjavu da su Sjedinjene Države izdale Južni Vijetnam. U oštrom verbalnom napadu rekao je da ga je američki državni tajnik Henry Kissinger prevario te nagovorio da potpiše mirovni sporazum u Parizu prije dvije godine obećavši mu vojnu pomoć koju mu je kasnije uskratio. Nakon što je prenio predsjedničke ovlasti na Trầna Văna Hươnga, Thieu je 25. travnja otišao u Tajvan. U isto vrijeme, tenkovi Sjevernog Vijetnama došli su do Biên Hòa i okrenuli se prema Sajgonu, usput uništavajući izolirane trupe Južnog Vijetnama. Do kraja travnja snage Južnog Vijetnama poražene su na svim frontama osim u regiji Mekong Delta. Tisuće izbjeglica krenule su u najjužnije predjele zemlje bježeći pred komunističkim jurišem. Dana 27. travnja stotinu tisuća vojnika Sjevernog Vijetnama okružilo je Sajgon. Grad je branilo 30 tisuća pripadnika vojske Južnog Vijetnama. Kako bi ubrzali kolaps grada i stvorili paniku, vojnici Sjevernog Vijetnama granatirali su aerodrom i prisilili njegovo zatvaranje nakon čega je veliki broj civila shvatio da više nigdje ne mogu pobjeći.

 Pad Sajgona
Kaos, nemir i panika izbili su na ulicama Sajgona dok su histerični državni dužnosnici i civili Južnog Vijetnama pokušali pobjeći iz grada. Proglašeno je izvanredno stanje. Američki helikopteri započeli su s evakuacijom Južnih Vijetnamaca, američkih i stranih državljanja iz raznih dijelova grada te iz američke ambasade. Američki ambasador Graham Martin je s tzv. operacijom Frequent Wind čekao do posljednjeg mogućeg trenutka zbog svojih uvjerenja da će obrana Sajgona izdržati te da će se moći postići politički dogovor.

Ministar obrane Schlesinger ranog jutra 29. travnja 1975. godine objavio je da je posljednji helikopter iz Sajgona evaukirao američko diplomatsko, vojno i civilno osoblje. Operacija Frequent Wind bila je vjerojatno najveća helikopterska evakuacija u povijesti. Započela je 29. travnja u očajničkoj atmosferi dok se histerični narod Vijetnamaca otimao za ograničeni prostor. Martin je molio Washington da pošalje 700 milijuna dolara pomoći kako bi se pokušale mobilizirati svježe vojne snage. Međutim, američko mišljenje o ovom sukobu već je odavno bilo izrečeno.

Za to vrijeme u SAD-u na Južni Vijetnam se gledalo kao na propalu državu. Predsjednik Gerald Ford je u televizijskom obraćanju od 23. travnja izjavio da je Vijetnamski rat završio te da je s njim završila i sva američka pomoć. Operacija Frequent Wind nastavila se bez prestanka dok su tenkovi Sjevernog Vijetnama probili zadnje linije obrane i ušli u predgrađe Sajgona. Ranog jutra 30. travnja 1975. godine posljednji američki marinci evaukirani su helikopterom iz ambasade, dok su civili preplavili područje ambasade u očajničkim pokušajima da se ukrcaju. Ironija je da su mnoge od njih zaposlili upravo Amerikanci koji su ih sada ostavili vlastitoj sudbini.

Tog istog dana, trupe Sjevernog Vijetnama ušle su u Sajgon i brzo savladale svaki otpor te zauzele ključne zgrade. Otprilike oko 11:30 sati po lokalnom vremenu tenk iz 324. divizije razbio je vrata palače Independence na kojoj se nekoliko minuta potom započela vijoriti zastava Vietkonga. Predsjednik Dương Văn Minh, koji je naslijedio to mjesto od Huonga dva dana ranije, bio je prisiljen predati se.

 Afroamerikanci u Vijetnamu
thumb|190px|Ranjenom Afroameričkom vojniku ukazuje se pomoć 1968. godine.
Iskustva Afroameričkog vojnog osoblja tijekom Vijetnamskog rata dobila su značajnu pozornost. Na primjer, internetska stranica African-American Involvement in the Vietnam War sadržava popriličan broj primjera takve pozornosti kao i knjiga i televizijski izvještaji autora Wallacea Terryja.

Epigraf Terryjeve knjige naslova Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans iz 1984. godine uključuje sljedeći citat: "Intuicija mi govori da Afroamerički vojnik ima puno bolje razumijevanje o tome o čemu se u ovom ratu radi od bilo kojeg bijelog vojnika" - general William C. Westmoreland, Sajgon, 1967. godine. Uvod knjige također uključuje i obzervacije o utjecaju rata na crnačku zajednicu općenito te posebno na Afroameričke vojnike koji su služili vojni rok tijekom sukoba. Što se potonjeg tiče, autor pogotovo upućuje na sljedeće: veću proporciju ratnih žrtava Afroameričkih vojnika u Vijetnamu nego bilo kojih drugih američkih vojnika drugih rasa, različito ponašanje crnačkih vojnih karijerista prema običnim crnim vojnicima, diskriminaciju na koju su nailazili Afroamerički vojnici "na fronti u smislu dobivanja odličja, promocije ili vojnih zadataka" kao i činjenicu što su morali izdržavati situacije poput "rasnih uvreda, paljenja križeva i zastava Konfederacije koje su nosili njihovi bijeli kolege" te iskustva crnih vojnika u kontinentalnom dijelu Amerike tijekom rata i nakon američkog povlačenja iz sukoba. Nakon što je rat završen došlo se do brojke od 12,5 posto poginulih Afroameričkih vojnika tijekom sukoba.Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam: American Combat

 Ratni zločini
thumb|right|Žrtve masakra Mai Lai.
Tijekom trajanja Vijetnamskog rata počinjen je veliki broj ratnih zločina. Odgovornih za ratne zločine bilo je na objema sukobljenim stranama, a zločini su uključivali silovanja, masakre nad civilima, bombardiranje civilnih ciljeva, terorizam i široku uporabu mučenja i ubijanja ratnih zarobljenika. Dodatni slični zločini uključivali su pljačke, palež i uništavanje imovine koja se nije smatrala vojnom potrebom.

 Ratni zločini Sjevernog Vijetnama, Vietkonga i Crvenih Kmera
Pobunjenici Vietkonga navodno su odsijecali genitalije voditeljima sela i šivali ih u njihovim krvavim ustima, odsijecali jezike bespomoćnim žrtvama, gurali koplja bambusa kroz jedno i drugo uho, otvarali utrobe trudnih žena, ubijali djecu, sjekli muškarce i žene na komade i odsijecali prste maloj djeci koja su se pokušala obrazovati. Prema izvještajima američkog senata, odredi su dobivali mjesečne kvote za ubojstva.U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, The Human Cost of Communism in Vietnam  (1972.), str.49. Bivši načelnik CIA-e u Sajgonu Peed De Silva napisao je da su se od rane 1963. godine postrojbe Vietkonga koristile metodama vađenja utroba i drugim, a sve u svrhu psihološkog načina rata.
thumb|right|Žrtve masakra u gradu Huế.
Prema procjeni Guentera Lewyja, odredi Vietkonga ubili su najmanje 37 tisuća civila u Južnom Vijetnamu te redovno provodili teror na dnevnoj bazi.. Ami Pedahzur je napisao da je "ukupan broj i obim terorizma kojeg je provodio Vietkong jednak ili čak veći od najvećih terorističkih kampanja vođenih bilo gdje u svijetu u zadnjoj trećini 20. stoljeća".Pedahzur, Ami (2006), Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, Taylor & Francis, str.116. Najpoznatija zvjerstva koja je počinio Vietkong uključuju masakr preko tri tisuće nenaoružanih civila u gradu Huếu tijekom Ofenzive Tet te spaljivanje stotina civila bacačima plamena u masakru Đắk Sơn. Na putu za Tuy Hòu 1975. godine ubijeno je ili oteto gotovo 155 tisuća izbjeglica koje su bježale od posljednje tzv. Proljetne ofenzive Sjevernog Vijetnama.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, str. 318–9. Prema Rummelu, trupe Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga ubile su između 106 i 227 tisuća civila u Južnom Vijetnamu.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997. Sjeverni Vijetnam također je bio poznat po nehumanom i užasnom tretmanu američkih ratnih zraobljenika od kojih je najpoznatiji bio zatvor Hỏa Lò (drugog imena Hanoi Hilton) u kojem su se provodile drastične metode mučenja čiji je cilj bio dobivanje "informacija"..

Pobunjenici Crvenih Kmera također su navodno počinili stravične zločine tijekom Vijetnamskog rata. Ti zločini uključuju ubojstva civila i ratnih zarobljenika na način da su im odsijecane glave i to svaki dan po malo, uništavanje budističkih hramova i ubijanje monaha, napadi na izbjegličke logore uz namjerno ubijanje malih beba, otmicu i smaknuća novinara te sustavno granatiranje grada Phnom Penha više od godinu dana. Novinarski iskazi govorili su u prilog granatiranju Crvenih Kmera koji su "gotovo kontinuirano mučili glavni grad" uz "nasumične smrti i osakaćivanje" gotovo 2 milijuna zatočenih civila.

Odredi Crvenih Kmera nasilno su evakuirali cijeli grad nakon što su ga preuzeli u onome što je kasnije opisano kao "koračanje prema smrti": Francois Ponchaud je napisao: "Nikada neću zaboraviti invalida koji nije imao niti ruke niti noge, a koji se kretao po zemlji poput slomljenog crva; ili oca u plaču koji u naručju nosi svoju 10-godišnju djevojčicu omotanu s plahtom oko njegovog vrata poput remena; ili muškarca čije je stopalo visjelo s ostatka noge povezano s ničim osim s njegovom vlastitom kožom". John Swain je napisao da su pripadnici Crvenog Kmera "iznosili pacijente iz bolnica poput smeća na ulice... U pet godina ratovanja, ovo je bio najveći karavan ljudske mizerije koji sam ikada vidio."

 Američki ratni zločini
Godine 1968. pod okriljem Pentagona osnovana je Radna skupina za ratne zločine Vijetnamskog rata utemeljena nakon masakra u selu Mai Lai, a kako bi se pokušala ustanoviti istinitost rastućih tvrdnji o ratnim zločinima koje su počinile američke vojne snage u Vijetnamu tijekom trajanja Vijetnamskog sukoba.

Istraga je u konačnici imala preko 9 tisuća istraživačkih dosjea, svjedočanstava pod zakletvom i statusnih izvještaja glavnih vojnih zapovjednika na temelju kojih je potvrđeno 320 različitih incidenata. Navedeni slučajevi uključivali su 7 masakara počinjenih u razdoblju od 1967. do 1971. godine u kojima je ubijeno minimalno 137 civila; 78 drugih napada na ciljeve koji se nisu nalazili u direktnoj borbi, a koji su uključivali najmanje 57 mrtvih, 56 ranjenih i 15 seksualno napastovanih civila; 141 slučaj američkih vojnika koji su mučili civile ili ratne zarobljenike tukući ih rukama, štapovima ili palicama, polijevali ih vodom ili davali elektrošokove. Istraživano je preko 800 navodnih zvjerstava, ali su u konačnici samo 23 vojnika osuđena za optužbe te su odslužili kazne manje od godine dana.US army continues to avoid legacy of concealed Vietnam crimes, Global Times | 27. rujna 2012. 0:30:03, by James Palmer,  Izvještaj Los Angeles Timesa na temelju dosjea iz arhive zaključuje da ratne zločine nisu počinjavale samo neke vojne skupine, već da su se zločini događali u svakom vodu koji je bio aktivan u Vijetnamu.

Godine 2003. serija istraživačkih izvještaja Toledo Bladea otkrila je veliki broj neprijavljenih američkih ratnih zločina pogotovo onih koje su počinile posebne jedinice Tiger Force.16. studenog 2003, "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network Neki od najnasilnijih ratnih zločinaca bili su Sam Ybarra"Slično, Toledo Blade stavlja posebnu pozornost na Sama Ybarru, "ozloglašenog sumnjivca" koji se spominje u sedam od sveukupno trideset ratnih zločina koje su počinile strane jedinice Tiger Force uključujući silovanje i fatalno probadanje 13-godišnje djevojčice te brutalno ubojstvo 15-godišnjaka." 16. studenog 2003., "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network i narednik Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."Čuo sam da je Bumgarner to radio i ranije - postavljao oružja na tijela za koje se sumnjalo da su imali bilo kakav vojni status. Čuo sam nekoliko glasina o tome kako je Bumgarner ubijao nenaoružane ljude. Prije nekoliko tjedana čuo sam da je Bumgarner ubio vijetnamsku djevojčicu i dva mala dječaka koji su bili nenaoružani." 16. studenog 2003., "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network
thumb|Pripadnik Vietkonga, zatvorenik kojeg su 1967. godine uhitile američke vojne postrojbe, a koji čeka na ispitivanje.
Godine 1971. kasniji američki predsjednički kandidat John Kerry svjedočio je pred američkim senatom i izjavio da je preko 150 američkih veterana svjedočilo tijekom istrage naziva Winter Soldier, a koji su u detalje opisali ratne zločine počinjene u Jugoistočnoj Aziji.

"Pričali su nam o događajima iz vremena kada su osobno silovali, odsijecali uši i glave, vezali genitalije žicama od telefona i puštali struju, odsijecali udove, dizali tijela u zrak, nasumično pucali na civile, sravnjavali sela u maniri Džingisa Kana, pucali na stoku i pse iz zabave, trovali zalihe hranom i općenito uništavali zaselke Južnog Vijetnama uz dodatak normalnom ratnom uništavanju.".

Prema procjeni političkog znanstvenika R. J. Rummela, američke vojne trupe ubile su oko 6 tisuća vijetnamskih civila tijekom Vijetnamskog rata. Što se, pak, zločina Južnog Vijetnama tiče, u razdoblju od 1964. do 1975. godine Rummel procijenjuje da je otprilike 1500 ljudi ubijeno tijekom prisilnog preseljavanja 1 200 000 civila i da je dodatnih 5 tisuća zatvorenika umrlo zbog lošeg tretmana te da je vojska Južnog Vijetnama pogubila oko 30 tisuća onih koje je smatrala Komunistima ili koji su se borili za "krivu stvar". Dodatnih 6 tisuća civila poginulo je zbog razornih bombardiranja. Procjenjuje se da su trupe Južnog Vijetnama sveukupno uzrokovale između 42 i 118 tisuća smrti.Rummel 1997 Lines 540, 556, 563, 566, 569, 575

U svojoj knjizi Kill Anything that Moves iz 2013. godine autor Nick Turse objašnjava da su nemilosrdan nagon prema što većem broju mrtvih tijela, raširena upotreba slobodne paljbe u regiji, pravila vođenja borbe u kojima su civili koji su bježali pred vojnicima ili helikopterima bili smatrani pripadnicima Vietkonga te općenito raširen prijezir vijetnamskog naroda prema Amerikancima doveli do masovnih civilnih žrtava i endemskih ratnih zločina koje su počinile američke trupe.. Jedan takav primjer kojeg Turse citira je onaj iz operacije Speedy Express koju je provela 9. pješačka divizija, a koju je John Paul Vann opisao kao "mnogi Mai Laievi". Detaljan citat:

 Ratni zločini Južne Koreje
Vojne snage Južne Koreje također su odgovorne za ratne zločine počinjene u vrijeme Vijetnamskog rata. Jedan od masakara bio je onaj u Tây Vinh tijekom kojeg su postrojbe Južne Koreje ubile 1200 nenaoružanih civila u razdoblju od 12. veljače do 17. ožujka 1966. godine u selu Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), jednoj od provincija Južnog Vijetnama. Drugi primjer južnokorejskih ratnih zločina je masakr u Gò Dàiju gdje je ubijeno 380 civila dana 26. veljače 1966. godine.

 Posljedice sukoba
 Događaji u jugoistočnoj Aziji
thumb|upright|right|Izbjeglice bježe iz Vijetnama 1984. godine.
Dana 2. srpnja 1976. godine Sjeverni i Južni Vijetnam službeno su ujedinjeni u Socijalističku Republiku Vijetnam. Nakon komunističkog preuzimanja između milijun i dva i pol milijunaDesbarats, Jacqueline.  "Repression in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Executions and Population Relocation", iz The Vietnam Debate (1990.) autora Johna Mortona Moorea.  "Zbog izjave Nguyena Coa Tacha iz 1985. godine sada znamo da je dva i pol milijuna, a ne samo jedan milijun ljudi poslano u logore za preodgoj... zapravo, vjerojatno je više od 100 tisuća Vijetnamaca bilo žrtvama izvansudskih smaknuća u posljednjih deset godina... vjerojatnije je minimalno milijun Vijetnamaca bilo žrtvama prisilnog premještanja stanovništva." Južnih Vijetnamaca poslano je u logore za preodgoj, a procjenjuje se da je tamo umrlo oko 165 tisuća zatvorenika.Anh Do and Hieu Tran Phan, Camp Z30-D: The Survivors, Orange County Register, 29. travnja 2001.Također pogledati Nghia M. Vo, The Bamboo Gulag: Political Imprisonment in Communist Vietnam (McFarland, 2004.) Pogubljeno je između 50 i 100 tisuća Južnih Vijetnamaca.Morris, Stephen J. Glastnost and the Gulag: The Numbers Game, Vietnam Commentary, svibanj - lipanj 1988.Human Events, 27. kolovoza 1977. Analitičar političkih egzekucija R. J. Rummel procijenio je da je otprilike 50 tisuća stanovnika Južnog Vijetnama koji su bili poslani u "nove ekonomske zone" umrlo od prisilnog rada od sveukupno jednog milijuna ljudi koji su se tamo nalazili. Prema informacijama UNHCR-a između 200 i 400 tisuća Vijetnamaca umrlo je u čamcima i brodovima na moru pokušavajući prebjeći iz Vijetnama.Associated Press, 23. lipnja 1979., San Diego Union, 20. srpnja 1986. Vidjeti još Nghia M. Vo, The Vietnamese Boat People (2006.), 1954. i 1975. – 1992., McFarland.

Glavni grad Kambodže, Phnom Penh, pao je pod komunističku vlast Crvenih Kmera dana 17. travnja 1975. godine. Pod vodstvom Pola Pota Crveni Kmeri u konačnici će od sveukupne populacije od osam milijuna stanovnika ubiti između 1 i 3 milijuna Kambodžanaca u tzv. Poljima smrti.Heuveline, Patrick (2001.). "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality in Cambodia." In Forced Migration and Mortality, eds. Holly E. Reed and Charles B. Keely. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Heuveline suggests that a range of 1.17–3.42 million people were killed. Minimalno 1 386 734 žrtvava pronađeno je u masovnim grobnicama dok se prema demografskoj analizi može zaključiti da je politika toga režima uzrokovala između 1,7 i 2,5 miljiuna prisilnih smrti (uključujući smrti uzrokovane bolešću ili glađu). Nakon učestalih pograničnih sukoba 1978. godine, Vijetnam je napao Kambodžu i svrgnuo režim Crvenih Kmera u kambodžansko-vijetnamskom ratu. Vijetnamci su postavili novu vladu koju su vodili prebjezi iz Crvenih Kmera, a koja je ubila desetke tisuća i porobila stotine tisuća stanovnika..

Kao odgovor na navedeno, Kina je napala Vijetnam 1979. godine. Te dvije zemlje vodile su kratki pogranični rat poznat pod imenom kinesko-vijetnamski rat. Od 1978. do 1979. godine otprilike 450 tisuća etničkih Kineza napustilo je Vijetnam koristeći brodove kao izbjeglice ili su bili izbačeni duž granice s Kinom.Vietnam (03/09). U.S. Department of State.

U prosincu 1975. godine komunistički Pathet Lao svrgnuo je rojalističku vladu Laosa i uspostavio Demokratsku republiku Lao naroda. Konflikti između pobunjenika Hmonga i Pathet Laoa nastavili su se, ali u izoliranim slučajevima. Vlada Laosa je skupa s vojskom republike VijetnamJane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942. – 1992. (Indiana University Press, 1999.), str. 337. - 460. optužena za počinjenje genocida protiv naroda Hmong - od sveukupno 400 tisuća ljudi ubijeno je njih gotovo 100 tisuća.Forced Back and Forgotten (Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, 1989.), str. 8.Statistics of Democide Rudolph Rummel U razdoblju od 1975. do 1996. godine u Sjedinjene Države naselilo se otprilike 250 tisuća Lao izbjeglica iz Tajlanda, uključujući i 130 tisuća pripadnika naroda Hmong.Laos (04/09). U.S. Department of State.

Tijekom Indokineske izbjegličke krize preko 3 milijuna ljudi napustilo je Vijetnam, Laos i Kambodžu. Većina zemalja Azije nije htjela prihvatiti te izbjeglice koje su uglavnom bježale brodovima."Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region". Stephen Castles, University of Oxford. Mark J. Miller, University of Delaware. Srpanj 2009. Između 1975. i 1998. godine procijenjeno je da je 1,2 milijuna izbjeglica iz Vijetnama i ostalih južnoistočnih azijskih zemalja pobjeglo u Sjedinjene Države, dok su Kanada, Australija i Francuska prihvatile preko 500 tisuća. Kina je prihvatila oko 250 tisuća izbjeglica. Godine 1988. Vijetnam je pogodila masovna glad koja je utjecala na milijune stanovnika.Crossette, Barbara, Hanoi, Citing Famine Fears, Seeks Emergency Aid, The New York Times, 15. svibnja 1988. U Aziji je Vijetnam igrao sličnu ulogu kao Kuba u Latinskoj Americi: podupirao je lokalne revolucionarne grupe te bio sjedište sovjetskog komunističkog stila.Van, Canh Nguyen; Cooper, Earle (1983.). Vietnam under Communism, 1975. – 1982., str. 229. Hoover Press. .

Ostaci rata (uglavnom eksplozivne naprave) i danas ubijaju ljude. Prema podacima vijetnamske vlade otprilike 42 tisuće ljudi poginulo je od zaostalih mina i drugih eksplozivnih naprava nakon završetka sukoba.Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (28. travnja 2011.) Godine 2012. prema izvještajima aktivista i vladinih službenih dokumenata od bombi i ostalih eksplozivnih naprava skrivenih tijekom rata poginulo je oko 500 ljudi u Vijetnamu, Laosu i Kambodži.

Kemijska supstanca poznata pod imenom Agent Orange i druge vrste kemikalija također su uzele veliki broj žrtava i odgovorne su za ozljede stanovništva tijekom godina nakon završetka sukoba, uključujući i američke zrakoplovne snage koje su s njima baratale. Dana 9. kolovoza 2012. Sjedinjene Države i Vijetnam započeli su zajedničku operaciju čišćenja toksičnih kemikalija na dijelu međunarodnog aerodroma Danang što je označilo prvo američko uplitanje u čišćenje kemijske supstance Agent Orange u Vijetnamu od završetka sukoba.

 Posljedice za SAD
thumb|Prosvjedi protiv Vijetnamskog rata ispred Pentagona u listopadu 1967. godine.
U razdoblju nakon rata Amerikanci su se borili sami sa sobom kako bi absorbirali lekcije svog vojnog uplitanja.Gerdes (ed). Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War str. 14. – 15. Jedan od glavnih vojnih arhitekata sukoba, general Maxwell Taylor, je napisao: "Prvo i osnovno - mi nismo poznavali sami sebe. Mislili smo da odlazimo u još jedan Korejski rat, ali ovo je bila potpuno drugačija zemlja. Drugo - nismo poznavali naše južnovijetnamske saveznike... A o Sjevernom Vijetnamu znali smo gotovo ništa. Tko je uopće bio Ho Ši Min? Nitko to zapravo nije znao. Dok ne upoznamo svog neprijatelja, svoje saveznike i sami sebe, bolje nam je da se držimo podalje od ovog prljavog posla. To je vrlo opasno.".Taylor paraphrases Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press, 1963. Predsjednik Ronald Reagan izmislio je termin Vijetnamski sindrom kako bi opisao nevoljkost američke javnosti i političara da podupiru američke međunarodne intervencije poslije Vijetnama.

Prema nekim mišljenjima "odgovornost ultimativne propasti ove politike (američkog povlačenja iz Vijetnama) ne leži u onima koji su se borili, već u onima koji su sjedili u Kongresu...". Suprotno tome, službena povijest američke vojske ističe: "Činilo se kao da su vojne taktike često postojale same za sebe, a ne kao dio veće strategije i ciljeva. U Vijetnamu je vojska doživjela taktičke uspjehe i strateške neuspjehe... Naslijeđe Vijetnamskog rata može biti lekcija da jedinstvene povijesne, političke, kulturološke i drušvene faktore uvijek uništi vojska... Uspjeh ne počiva samo na vojnom progresu već i na točnoj analizi prirode određenog sukoba, razumijevanju neprijateljske strategije i procjeni jačine i slabosti saveznika. Nova poniznost i sofisticiranost mogli bi stvoriti najbolje dijelove kompleksnog naslijeđa koje ostaje vojsci nakon dugačkog i žestokog rata u Vijetnamu".
left|thumbnail|upright|Mladi Američki marinac čeka na plaži tijekom iskrcavanja u Da Nangu, 3. kolovoza 1965. godine.
Američki državni tajnik Henry Kissinger u tajnom memorandumu predsjedniku Geraldu Fordu napisao je: "Što se vojne taktike tiče moramo iznijeti zaključak da naše oružane snage nisu bile spremne za ovakvu vrstu rata. Čak niti specijalne postrojbe koje su stvorene za ovakvo ratovanje nisu uspjele u svom zadatku." Čak je i ministar obrane Robert McNamara zaključio da je "mišljenje o vojnoj pobjedi američkih snaga u Vijetnamu bila opasna iluzija.".

Pojavile su se sumnje u efikasnost velikih, razornih i dugotrajnih bombardiranja. Predstojnik vojnog stožera Harold Keith Johnson je napisao: "Ako smo išta naučili iz Vijetnama, naučili smo da zračna sila ne može riješiti stvar."Quoted in Bob Buzzano.  Čak je i general William Westmoreland priznao da je bombardiranje bilo izrazito neefikasno. Zaključio je: "I danas sumnjam da bi Sjeverni Vijetnam popustio."

Nemogućnost dovođenja Hanoija za pregovarački stol također je ukazala na još jednu lošu procjenu SAD-a. Sjevernjački vođe bili su sastavljeni od čvrstih Komunista koji su se borili preko trideset godina. Porazili su Francuze, a njihova ustrajnost kao nacionalista i komunista bila je jaka. Ho Ši Min je navodno rekao: "Možete ubiti deset mojih ljudi za svakog jednog kojeg ubijem ja... Ali čak i u takvim okolnostima vi ćete biti ti koji će izgubiti, a ja ću izaći kao pobjednik.".
thumb|Marincu previjaju rane tijekom operacija u gradu Hue 1968. godine.
Vijetnamski rat također je doveo u pitanje amerčku vojnu doktrinu. General marinaca Victor H. Krulak izrazito je kritizirao Westmorelandovu strategiju nazvavši je "gubitkom američkih života... s malom šansom za uspjeh." Uz to pojavile su se i sumnje u mogućnost američkog vojnog obučavanja stranih vojski. Između 1965. i 1975. godine SAD su potrošile 111 milijardi dolara na rat (Order Code RS22926, see table on page 2/5). što je rezultiralo velikim saveznim deficitom budžeta.

U Vijetnamskom ratu sudjelovalo je preko 3 milijuna Amerikanaca od kojih je otprilike 1,5 milijuna sudjelovalo u pravim bitkama."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory". Stanford University. James E. Westheider je napisao: "Na vrhuncu američke upletenosti u sukob 1968. godine, u Vijetnamu se nalazilo 543 tisuće američkog vojnog osoblja, ali samo 80 tisuća njih smatralo se borbenim trupama.". Od Drugog svjetskog rata vojnu obvezu u SAD-u kontrolirao je sam Predsjednik, ali je to završilo 1973. godine.

Do kraja rata sveukupno je poginulo 58,220 Amerikanaca, više od 150 tisuća bilo ih je ranjeno, a minimalno 21 tisuća završila je s nekim oblikom invaliditeta.The War's Costs. Digital History. Prosječna starost američkih trupa ubijenih u Vijetnamu je iznosila 23,11 godina starosti.Combat Area Casualty File, November 1993. (The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Prema Daleu Kueteru "od svih ubijenih Amerikanaca, 86,3 posto je bilo bijelaca te 12,5 posto Afroamerikanaca i pripadnika drugih rasa." Otprilike 830 tisuća vijetnamskih veterana obolilo je od nekog stupnja PTSP-a poslije sukoba. Procjenjuje se da je otprilike 125 tisuća Amerikanaca pobjeglo u Kanadu kako bi izbjegli odlazak u rat te da je dodatnih 50 tisuća vojnika dezertiralo.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters. Pacific News Service. 28. lipnja 2005. Predsjednik Jimmy Carter je 1977. godine potpisao puni i bezuvjetni oprost svima onima koji su bježali ili dezertirali tijekom Vijetnamskog rata. By The President of the United States of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations of the Selective Services Act, 4 August 1964 To 28 March 1973. 21. siječnja 1977.

Do 2013. godine američka vlada na vijetnamske veterane i njihove obitelji i preživjele troši više od 22 milijarde dolara godišnje.

 Broj žrtava
Procjene ukupnog broja žrtava Vijetnamskog sukoba variraju ovisno o izvorima, a prema jednom od njih sveukupno je poginulo 3,8 milijuna ljudi tijekom rata.Prema dostupnim podacima u razdoblju od 1955. do 2002. godine zabilježeno je 5,4 milijuna nasilnih smrti uslijed vođenja ratova... 3,8 milijuna samo u Vijetnamu. Između 195 i 430 tisuća civila iz Južnog Vijetnama te između 50 i 65 tisuća civila Sjevernog Vijetnama poginulo je u ratu. Tijekom sukoba Vietkong je izgubio između 171,331 i 220,357 ljudi.. Službena brojka Ministarstva obrane SAD-a o ubijenim komunističkim snagama tijekom Vijetnamskog rata između 1965. i 1974. godine iznosi 950,765. Službenici ministarstva vjeruju da je taj broj napumpan za minimalno 30 posto. Uz to, Guenter Lewy ističe da su jedna trećina ubijenih "neprijatelja" najvjerojatnije civili te zaključuje da je stvarna brojka smrti komunističkih vojnih snaga vjerojatno bliža brojci od 444 tisuće. Prema detaljnoj demografskoj studiji izračunato je da se sveukupna brojka smrti svih sudionika vijetnamskog sukoba kreće između 791 000 i 1 141 000 žrtava. Između 240 i 300 tisuća Kambodžanaca, oko 60 tisuća pripadnika Lao naroda. te 58,220 tisuće Amerikanaca poginulo je tijekom rata u Vijetnamu.

 Popularna kultura
Vijetnamski rat korišten je za potrebe televizije, filma, videoigara i literature u zemljama sudionicama sukoba. U američkoj popularnoj kulturi izraz Ludi vijetnamski veteran (eng. Crazy Vietnam Veteran) koji opisuje izluđenog ili mentalno poremećenog čovjeka zbog njegovih osobnih iskustava u sukobu postao je čest izraz u upotrebi nakon rata.

Jedan od prvih velikih filmova o Vijetnamskom ratu je bio proamerički Zelene beretke iz 1968. godine redatelja i glavnog glumca Johna Waynea. Tijekom 70-ih i 80-ih godina prošlog stoljeća snimljen je niz filmova čija se tema na ovaj ili onaj način doticala sukoba u Vijetnamu uključujući Lovca na jelene redatelja Michalea Cimina iz 1978. godine, Apokalipsu danas redatelja Francisa Forda Coppole iz 1979. godine, Vod smrti redatelja Olivera Stonea iz 1986. godine (temeljenog na njegovim osobnim iskustvima), Full Metal Jacket redatelja Stanleyja Kubricka iz 1987. godine, Hamburger Hill iz 1987. godine i Žrtve rata iz 1989. godine. Noviji filmovi koji se dotiču teme Vijetnamskog rata su Bili smo vojnici iz 2002. te Rescue Dawn iz 2007. godine.

Rat je također znatno utjecao i na generaciju glazbenika u Vijetnamu i SAD-u s obje strane - antiratne i pro/antikomunističke. Glazbena skupina Country Joe and the Fish snimila je pjesmu I-Feel-Like-I'm-Fixin'-To-Die Rat / The "Fish" Cheer iz 1965. godine koja je brzo postala jedna od najutjecajnijih himni antiratnih prosvjeda.

Trinh Cong Son bio je poznati kantautor iz Južnog Vijetnama poznat po svojim antiratnim pjesmama.

 Vidi još
 Tuneli Cu Chija
 Ho Ši Minov put

 Izvori

 Bilješke

 Literatura
 Primarni izvori

Carter, Jimmy. By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act, 4. kolovoza 1964. do 28. ožujka 1973. (21. siječnja 1977.)
Central Intelligence Agency. "Laos ", CIA World Factbook'''
Cora Weiss Collection (materijali koji se odnose na otpor prema ratu i mirovne aktivnosti tijekom Vijetnamskog rata), Lloyd Sealy Library Special Collections, John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change. (1963.) predsjednički politički memoar
Ho, Chi Minh. "Vietnam Declaration of Independence", Selected Works. (1960. – 1962.)
LeMay, General Curtis E. and Kantor, MacKinlay. Mission with LeMay (1965.) autobiografija kontroverznog bivšeg Predsjednika združnog stožera američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva
Kissinger, United States Secretary of State Henry A. "Lessons on Vietnam", (1975.) secret memoranda to U.S. President Ford

McCain, John. Faith of My Fathers: A Family Memoir (1999.) :Marshall, Kathryn. In the Combat Zone: An Oral History of American Women in Vietnam, 1966–1975 (1987.)
Martin, John Bartlow. Was Kennedy Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? (1964.) oralna povijest za Knjižnicu Johna F. Kenneyja, vrpca V, čin 1.
Myers, Thomas. Walking Point: American Narratives of Vietnam (1988.)Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965 (1966.) službeni dokumenti američkih predsjednika.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. (1978.) svjedočanstva iz prve ruke o Kennedyjevoj administraciji jednog njezinog predstavnika
Sinhanouk, Prince Norodom. "Cambodia Neutral: The Dictates of Necessity." Foreign Affairs. (1958.) opisuje geopolitičku situaciju Kambodže
Tang, Truong Nhu. A Viet Cong Memoir (1985.)
Terry, Wallace, ed. Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans (1984.)
- Ukupno stranica: 350
The landmark series Vietnam: A Television History, first broadcast in 1983, is a special presentation of the award-winning PBS history series, American Experience.The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed. 5 vol 1971.); kombinacija narativnih i tajnih dokumenata koje je prikupio Pentagon. excerpts
U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (kolekcija službenih tajnih dokumenata)
U.S. Department of Defense and the House Committee on Armed Services. U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1945. – 1967. Washington, D.C. Department of Defense and the House Committee on Armed Services, 1971., 12 volumes.

 Sekundarni izvori

Angio, Joe. Nixon a Presidency Revealed (2007.) Televizijski dokumentarac History Channela

Baker, Kevin. "Stabbed in the Back! The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (lipanj 2006.)

———. The Counterinsurgency Era (1977.) povijest uplitanja Kennedyjeve administracije u Južni Vijetnam.
Brigham, Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History interaktivna web stranica PBS-a

Buckley, Kevin. "Pacification's Deadly Price", Newsweek, 19. lipnja 1972.
Buzzanco, Bob. "25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam", The Baltimore Sun (17. travnja 2000.)

Church, Peter ed. A Short History of South-East Asia (2006.).
Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970.) bilješke o događajima iz Washingtona.

Duiker, William J. (1996.). The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam.
Duncanson, Dennis J. (1968.). Government and Revolution in Vietnam.

Fincher, Ernest Barksdale, The Vietnam War (1980.).
Ford, Harold P. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962. – 1968. (1998.).
Gerdes, Louise I. ed. Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005.).
Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History. (1995.).
Hammond, William. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968 (1987); Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973 (1995.). Potpuna povijest rata američke vojske; puno šire nego što naslov govori.

Hitchens, Christopher. The Vietnam Syndrome.

Khong, Yuen Foong (1992). Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton University Press.

Lawrence, Mark Atwood (2008). The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford University Press.
Leepson, Marc ed. (1999). Dictionary of the Vietnam War. New York: Webster's New World.

Moss, George D. Vietnam (4th ed 2002) textbook.

Major General Spurgeon Neel. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history

Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998) New York: Barnes and Noble.

Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The Twenty-Five Year War (1984.), vojna povijest starijeg američkog generala.

Schell, Jonathan. The Time of Illusion (1976.).
Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941. – 1975. (1997.).

Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999.), temeljena na još uvijek povjerljivim audio zapisima sastanaka američkih zapovjednika u Vijetnamu,
Spector, Ronald. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992.), vrlo široki pregled 1968. godine

Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982.),  (225 stranica)

Tucker, Spencer. ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1998.) 3 vol. reference set; also one-volume abridgement (2001).

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991.).

Xiaoming, Zhang. "China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment", China Quarterly.'' izdanje br. 184, (prosinac 2005.)

 Vanjske poveznice
 American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War
 Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primarni izvor američke involviranosti
 Fallout of the War iz Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
 Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War
 Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army
 "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26—31.
 Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College
 The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972
 Timeline US – Vietnam (1947. – 2001.)
 The U.S. Army in Vietnam službena povijest vojske SAD-a
 The Vietnam War na History Channelu
 UC Berkeley Library Social Activism Sound Recording Project: Anti-Vietnam War Protests
 Vietnam Casualties database searchable by first name, last name and location
 Vietnam War Bibliography  pokriva internetske i objavljene izvore
 Vietnam war timeline  sveobuhvatna vremenska crta Vijetnamskog rata
 Virtual Vietnam Archive – Sveučilište Texas Tech
 A Vietnam Diary’s Homecoming Video kojeg je producirao PBS

Kategorija:Ratovi
Kategorija:Vijetnamska vojna povijest
Kategorija:Hladni rat
Kategorija:Povijest SAD-a (1945. – 1989.)

The Vietnam War (Vietnam: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, also known as the Second Indonesian War, and in Vietnam known as the War for Resistance against America or simpler American War) was an armed conflict in the era of the so-called Cold War that took place in the spaces of the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the period from 1 November Because of the wounded presence of American troops in Vietnam the date of the start of the Vietnam War and today is controversial.

In 1998, after a detailed review by the U.S. Department of Defense and through the efforts of the family of Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr., the official date of the start of the Vietnam War to the U.S. Government was changed to 1 November 1955.

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The Vietnam War or Second Indochina War
The Vietnam War or Second Indochina War (also known colloquially as Vietnam or Nam as well as the American War to the Vietnamese)
By: Ann Anderson
After France's attempted recolonization of Indochina was defeated in 1954 by the Viet Minh at the battle of Điện Biên Phủ, an agreement to temporarily partition the country in two with a de-militarized zone (DMZ) was reached at the Geneva Conference (1954). The Vietnam War ostensibly began as a civil war between feuding governments. Being Western-oriented and perceived as less popular than Hồ Chí Minh's northern government, the South Vietnam government fought largely to maintain its governing status within the partitioned entity, rather than to "unify the country" as was the goal of the North. Fighting began in 1957 and with U.S. and Soviet-Chinese involvement would steadily escalate and spill over into the neighboring Indochinese countries of Cambodia and Laos.
The Geneva partition was not a natural division of Vietnam and was not intended to create two separate countries. But the South government, with the support of the United States, blocked the Geneva scheduled elections for reunification. In the context of the Cold War, and with the recent Korean War as a precedent, the U.S. had feared that a reunified Vietnam would elect a Communist government under the popular Hồ Chí Minh, either freely or fraudulently.
South Vietnam and its Western allies portrayed the conflict as based in a principled opposition to communism —to deter the expansion of Soviet-based control throughout Southeast Asia, and to set the tone for any likely future superpower conflicts. The North Vietnamese government and its Southern dissident allies (NLF) viewed the war as a struggle to reunite the country and to repel a foreign aggressor —a virtual continuation of the earlier war for independence against the French.
After fifteen years of protracted fighting and massive civilian and military casualties, major direct U.S. involvement ended with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973. Fighting between Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces against the dominant combined People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and NLF forces would soon bring an end to the RVN and the war on April 30, 1975. With the Northern victory, the country was reunified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) with a communist-controlled government based in Hanoi.
Overview
A precise timeline of the Vietnam War is difficult to determine. Some consider the Vietnam War to have been a continuous conflict beginning with the French attempt to reestablish colonial control in 1946 and continuing until the fall of Saigon in 1975. Others divide the conflict into two separate wars, the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and the Second Indochina War between North Vietnam on the one side and South Vietnam and its allies, most importantly the United States, on the other. Many experts consider the Vietnam War to have just been one front in the larger Cold War.
The First Indochina War may be said to have begun in 1946 with the writing of the Vietnamese constitution and to have ended in 1954 with the Geneva Peace Accord. The U.S. involvement in the conflict is less distinct. The United States had supported Vietnamese guerrillas against the Japanese during World War II, and provided aid to the French in the early 1950s. A US military presence was established in South Vietnam following the 1954 Peace Accord. As US advisors were drawn into battles between North and South Vietnamese forces the US involvement escalated. Many US citizens view the Vietnam War as beginning with the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in 1964. The Vietnam War Memorial reports American casualties as early as 1957.
The ground war was fought in South Vietnam and the border areas of Cambodia and Laos (see Secret War). The air war was fought there and in the strategic bombing (see Operation Rolling Thunder) of North Vietnam. Commando raids or secret operations were conducted by US or South Vietnamese forces in the north but there was never any full-scale ground fighting north of the 17th parallel (For more details of the events during the war, see: Timeline of the Vietnam War.) A coalition of forces fought for South Vietnam, including its army the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (or ARVN), the United States, South Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Participation by the South Korean military was financed by the United States, but Australia and New Zealand fully funded their participations. The United Kingdom and Canada did not participate in the war militarily, although a few of their citizens volunteered to join the US forces and Canada led peace talks between the two countries for years. The Spanish government sent a small group of military medical personnel from 1966 to 1971. The North Vietnamese government directed the fighting against that of South Vietnam, using forces including their People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, better known in the U.S. as the NVA) and the guerrilla forces of the National Liberation Front, better known as the Viet Cong. The USSR provided military and financial aid, along with diplomatic support to the North Vietnamese as did the People's Republic of China. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and North Korea provided minor assistance through provision of supplies and armor. North Vietnamese pilots and other specialized members of the PAVN often received training in the USSR or in North Korea, as did many of their Southern counterparts in Arizona or Hawaii.
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Question: when did the vietnam war start and end

The Vietnam War (Vietnam: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, also known as the Second Indonesian War, and in Vietnam known as the War for Resistance against America or simpler American War) was an armed conflict in the era of the so-called Cold War that took place in the spaces of the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the period from 1 November Because of the wounded presence of American troops in Vietnam the date of the start of the Vietnam War and today is controversial.

In 1998, after a detailed review by the U.S. Department of Defense and through the efforts of the family of Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr., the official date of the start of the Vietnam War to the U.S. Government was changed to 1 November 1955.

Question: when was the official date of the vietnam war changed

when was the official date of the vietnam war changed

Question: what is another name for the vietnam war

Drugi indokineski rat , a u Vijetnamu poznat pod nazivima Rat za otpor protiv Amerike ili jednostavnije Američki rat ) bio je oružani sukob u eri tzv . hladnoga rata koji se odvijao

what is another name for the vietnam war

Question: what was the name of the war in vietnam

Rat za otpor protiv Amerike ili jednostavnije Američki rat ) bio je oružani sukob u eri tzv . hladnoga rata koji se odvijao

Question: what was the vietnam war also known as

Rat za otpor protiv Amerike ili jednostavnije Američki rat ) bio je oružani sukob u eri tzv . hladnoga rata koji se odvijao

The Vietnam War ( Vietnam : Chiến tranh Việt Nam , also known as the Second Indonesian War , and in Vietnam known as the War for Resistance against America or simpler American War ) was an armed conflict in the era of the so - called Cold War that took place in the spaces of the states of Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia in the period from 1 November Because of the wounded presence of American troops in Vietnam the date of the start of the Vietnam War and today is controversial .

In 1998 , after a detailed review by the U.S. Department of Defense and through the efforts of the family of Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr. , the official date of the start of the Vietnam War to the U.S. Government was changed to 1 November 1955 .

Rat u Vijetnamu (vijetnamski: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, također poznat i pod nazivom Drugi indokineski rat, a u Vijetnamu poznat pod nazivima Rat za otpor protiv Amerike ili jednostavnije Američki rat) bio je oružani sukob u eri tzv. hladnoga rata koji se odvijao na prostorima država Vijetnama, Laosa i Kambodže u razdoblju od 1. studenog Zbog rane prisutnosti američkih trupa u Vijetnamu datum početka Vijetnamskog rata i danas je diskutabilan. Godine 1998. nakon detaljnog pregleda koji je uradilo Ministarstvo obrane SAD-a i kroz napore obitelji Richarda B. Fitzgibbona Jr., službeni datum početka Vijetnamskog rata prema Vladi SAD-a je promijenjen u 1. studenog 1955. godine.

Rat u Vijetnamu (vijetnamski: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, također poznat i pod nazivom Drugi indokineski rat, a u Vijetnamu poznat pod nazivima Rat za otpor protiv Amerike ili jednostavnije Američki rat) bio je oružani sukob u eri tzv. hladnoga rata koji se odvijao na prostorima država Vijetnama, Laosa i Kambodže u razdoblju od 1. studenog Zbog rane prisutnosti američkih trupa u Vijetnamu datum početka Vijetnamskog rata i danas je diskutabilan.

Godine 1998. nakon detaljnog pregleda koji je uradilo Ministarstvo obrane SAD-a i kroz napore obitelji Richarda B. Fitzgibbona Jr., službeni datum početka Vijetnamskog rata prema Vladi SAD-a je promijenjen u 1. studenog 1955. godine.

The Vietnam War (Vietnam: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, also known as the Second Indonesian War, and in Vietnam known as the War for Resistance against America or simpler American War) was an armed conflict in the era of the so-called Cold War that took place in the spaces of the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the period from 1 November Because of the wounded presence of American troops in Vietnam the date of the start of the Vietnam War and today is controversial. In 1998, after a detailed review by the U.S. Department of Defense and through the efforts of the family of Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr., the official date of the start of the Vietnam War to the U.S. Government was changed to 1 November 1955.

The Vietnam War (Vietnam: Chiến tranh Việt Nam, also known as the Second Indonesian War, and in Vietnam known as the War for Resistance against America or simpler American War) was an armed conflict in the era of the so-called Cold War that took place in the spaces of the states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the period from 1 November Because of the wounded presence of American troops in Vietnam the date of the start of the Vietnam War and today is controversial.

In 1998, after a detailed review by the U.S. Department of Defense and through the efforts of the family of Richard B. Fitzgibbon Jr., the official date of the start of the Vietnam War to the U.S. Government was changed to 1 November 1955.

Other dates of the start of the conflict include events when Hanoi authorized the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to start with smaller rebellions in December 1956. while some consider the date of 26 September 1959 as the official start of the war when the first battle between Vietnam and the military of South Vietnam took place.Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, pp. 314. – 346.

Department of International Relations, Mount Holyoke College.

name="start date"}} until the fall of Sajgona on April 30, 1975.

Question: where did rat u vijetnamu take place

Other dates of the start of the conflict include events when Hanoi authorized the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to start with smaller rebellions in December 1956. while some consider the date of 26 September 1959 as the official start of the war when the first battle between Vietnam and the military of South Vietnam took place.Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, pp. 314. – 346.

Department of International Relations, Mount Holyoke College.

name="start date"}} until the fall of Sajgona on April 30, 1975.

Question: where did the vietnam war start and end

Question: what is the name of the book that chronicles the history of the vietnam

what is the name of the book that chronicles the history of the vietnam

Other dates of the start of the conflict include events when Hanoi authorized the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to start with smaller rebellions in December 1956 . while some consider the date of 26 September 1959 as the official start of the war when the first battle between Vietnam and the military of South Vietnam took place . Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam , 1954–1960 , The Pentagon Papers ( Gravel Edition ) , Volume 1 , Chapter 5 , ( Boston : Beacon Press , 1971 ) , Section 3 , pp . 314 . – 346 .

Department of International Relations , Mount Holyoke College .

name="start date " } } until the fall of Sajgona on April 30 , 1975 .

Ostali datumi početka sukoba uključuju događaje kada je Hanoi ovlastio snage Vietkonga u Južnom Vijetnamu da započnu s manjim pobunama u prosincu 1956. godine,. dok neki smatraju datum 26. rujna 1959. godine kao službeni početak rata kada se odvila prva bitka između Vietkonga i vojske Južnog Vijetnama.Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, str. 314. – 346.; International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College. name="start date"}} pa sve do pada Sajgona 30. travnja 1975. godine.

Ostali datumi početka sukoba uključuju događaje kada je Hanoi ovlastio snage Vietkonga u Južnom Vijetnamu da započnu s manjim pobunama u prosincu 1956. godine,. dok neki smatraju datum 26. rujna 1959. godine kao službeni početak rata kada se odvila prva bitka između Vietkonga i vojske Južnog Vijetnama.Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, str. 314. – 346.;

International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College.

name="start date"}} pa sve do pada Sajgona 30. travnja 1975. godine.

Other dates of the start of the conflict include events when Hanoi authorized the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to start with smaller rebellions in December 1956. while some consider the date of 26 September 1959 as the official start of the war when the first battle between Vietnam and the military of South Vietnam took place.Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, pp. 314. – 346. Department of International Relations, Mount Holyoke College. name="start date"}} until the fall of Sajgona on April 30, 1975.

Other dates of the start of the conflict include events when Hanoi authorized the Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam to start with smaller rebellions in December 1956. while some consider the date of 26 September 1959 as the official start of the war when the first battle between Vietnam and the military of South Vietnam took place.Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 1, Chapter 5, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Section 3, pp. 314. – 346.

Department of International Relations, Mount Holyoke College.

name="start date"}} until the fall of Sajgona on April 30, 1975.

This war was in fact the continuation of the First Indonesian War (1946-1954) and led between Northern Vietnam – whose allies were then the Soviet Union, China and other Communist states – and the governments of Southern Vietnam – whose strongest allies were the United States and other anti-communist countries.

Vietnam War
Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.Join Britannica's Publishing Partner Program and our community of experts to gain a global audience for your work!
- Date:
- 1954 - 1975
- Participants:
- United States Viet Cong
- Context:
- Indochina wars
Why did the Vietnam War start?
Was the Vietnam War technically a war?
Who won the Vietnam War?
How many people died in the Vietnam War?
Vietnam War, (1954–75), a protracted conflict that pitted the communist government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam, known as the Viet Cong, against the government of South Vietnam and its principal ally, the United States. Called the “American War” in Vietnam (or, in full, the “War Against the Americans to Save the Nation”), the war was also part of a larger regional conflict (see Indochina wars) and a manifestation of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies.
At the heart of the conflict was the desire of North Vietnam, which had defeated the French colonial administration of Vietnam in 1954, to unify the entire country under a single communist regime modeled after those of the Soviet Union and China. The South Vietnamese government, on the other hand, fought to preserve a Vietnam more closely aligned with the West. U.S. military advisers, present in small numbers throughout the 1950s, were introduced on a large scale beginning in 1961, and active combat units were introduced in 1965. By 1969 more than 500,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and China poured weapons, supplies, and advisers into the North, which in turn provided support, political direction, and regular combat troops for the campaign in the South. The costs and casualties of the growing war proved too much for the United States to bear, and U.S. combat units were withdrawn by 1973. In 1975 South Vietnam fell to a full-scale invasion by the North.
The human costs of the long conflict were harsh for all involved. Not until 1995 did Vietnam release its official estimate of war dead: as many as 2 million civilians on both sides and some 1.1 million North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters. The U.S. military has estimated that between 200,000 and 250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers died in the war. In 1982 the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was dedicated in Washington, D.C., inscribed with the names of 57,939 members of U.S. armed forces who had died or were missing as a result of the war. Over the following years, additions to the list have brought the total past 58,200. (At least 100 names on the memorial are those of servicemen who were actually Canadian citizens.) Among other countries that fought for South Vietnam on a smaller scale, South Korea suffered more than 4,000 dead, Thailand about 350, Australia more than 500, and New Zealand some three dozen.
Vietnam emerged from the war as a potent military power within Southeast Asia, but its agriculture, business, and industry were disrupted, large parts of its countryside were scarred by bombs and defoliation and laced with land mines, and its cities and towns were heavily damaged. A mass exodus in 1975 of people loyal to the South Vietnamese cause was followed by another wave in 1978 of “boat people,” refugees fleeing the economic restructuring imposed by the communist regime. Meanwhile, the United States, its military demoralized and its civilian electorate deeply divided, began a process of coming to terms with defeat in what had been its longest and most controversial war. The two countries finally resumed formal diplomatic relations in 1995.

Question: when did rat vijetnamu end in vietnam

This war was in fact the continuation of the First Indonesian War (1946-1954) and led between Northern Vietnam – whose allies were then the Soviet Union, China and other Communist states – and the governments of Southern Vietnam – whose strongest allies were the United States and other anti-communist countries.

Question: where did the vijetnamu war take place

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a continuation of which war

rat u vijetnamu was a continuation of which war

Question: when did the first indonesian war take place

when did the first indonesian war take place

Question: who were southern vietnam's strongest allies

United States and other anti-communist countries

Sjedinjene Američke Države i druge antikomunističke zemlje

United States and other anti - communist countries

who were southern vietnam's strongest allies

Question: who were the strongest allies of southern vietnam

who were the strongest allies of southern vietnam

Question: who was involved in the vijetnamu war

This war was in fact the continuation of the First Indonesian War ( 1946 - 1954 ) and led between Northern Vietnam – whose allies were then the Soviet Union , China and other Communist states – and the governments of Southern Vietnam – whose strongest allies were the United States and other anti - communist countries .

International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College. name="start date"}} pa sve do pada Sajgona 30. travnja 1975. godine. Taj rat zapravo je nastavak Prvog indokineskog rata (1946. – 1954.), a vodio se između Sjevernog Vijetnama – čiji su saveznici bili tadašnji Sovjetski Savez, Kina i ostale komunističke države – te vlade Južnog Vijetnama – čiji su najjači saveznik bile Sjedinjene Američke Države i druge antikomunističke zemlje.

Taj rat zapravo je nastavak Prvog indokineskog rata (1946. – 1954.), a vodio se između Sjevernog Vijetnama – čiji su saveznici bili tadašnji Sovjetski Savez, Kina i ostale komunističke države – te vlade Južnog Vijetnama – čiji su najjači saveznik bile Sjedinjene Američke Države i druge antikomunističke zemlje.

Department of International Relations, Mount Holyoke College. name="start date"}} until the fall of Sajgona on April 30, 1975. This war was in fact the continuation of the First Indonesian War (1946-1954) and led between Northern Vietnam – whose allies were then the Soviet Union, China and other Communist states – and the governments of Southern Vietnam – whose strongest allies were the United States and other anti-communist countries.

This war was in fact the continuation of the First Indonesian War (1946-1954) and led between Northern Vietnam – whose allies were then the Soviet Union, China and other Communist states – and the governments of Southern Vietnam – whose strongest allies were the United States and other anti-communist countries.

On the other hand, the government of North Vietnam and Vietnam fought for the unification of Vietnam under the communist rule.

They looked at the conflict as a colonial war that they had to lead with France, and then with the United States because France was supported by the government of the United States, and later South Vietnam which they considered an American marionette state.

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About the
Vietnam War
Between
1945 and 1954, the Vietnamese waged an anti-colonial war against
France and received $2.6 billion in financial support from the United
States.
The French defeat at the Dien Bien Phu was followed by a peace conference
in Geneva, in which Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam received their independence
and Vietnam was temporarily divided between an anti-Communist South
and a Communist North. In 1956, South Vietnam, with American backing,
refused to hold the unification elections. By 1958, Communist-led guerrillas
known as the Viet Cong had begun to battle the South Vietnamese
government.
To support
the Souths government, the United States sent in 2,000 military
advisors, a number that grew to 16,300 in 1963. The military condition
deteriorated, and by 1963 South Vietnam had lost the fertile Mekong
Delta to the Vietcong. In 1965, Johnson escalated the war, commencing
air strikes on North Vietnam and committing ground forces, which numbered
536,000 in 1968. The 1968 Tet Offensive by the North Vietnamese turned
many Americans against the war. The next president, Richard Nixon, advocated
Vietnamization, withdrawing American troops and giving South Vietnam
greater responsibility for fighting the war. His attempt to slow the
flow of North Vietnamese soldiers and supplies into South Vietnam by
sending American forces to destroy Communist supply bases in Cambodia
in 1970 in violation of Cambodian neutrality provoked antiwar protests
on the nations college campuses.
From 1968
to 1973 efforts were made to end the conflict through diplomacy.
In January 1973, an agreement reached and U.S. forces were withdrawn
from Vietnam and U.S. prisoners of war were released. In
April 1975, South Vietnam surrendered to the North and Vietnam
was reunited.
CONSEQUENCES:
1.
The Vietnam War cost the United States 58,000 lives and 350,000 casualties.
It also resulted in between one and two million Vietnamese deaths.
2.
Congress enacted the War Powers Act in 1973, requiring the president
to receive explicit Congressional approval before committing American
forces overseas.
It was
the longest war in American history and the most unpopular American
war of the twentieth century. It resulted in nearly 60,000 American
deaths and an estimated 2 million Vietnamese deaths. Even today, many
Americans still ask whether the American effort in Vietnam was a sin,
a blunder, a necessary war, or a noble cause, or an idealistic, if failed,
effort to protect the South Vietnamese from totalitarian government.
A succinct
history of the Vietnam War
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/database/subtitles.cfm?titleID=71
Declaration
of Independence, Democratic Republic of Vietnam. September 2, 1945
http://www.vwip.org/articles/declar01.htm
Documents
relating to the Vietnam War
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam.htm
Maps:
Featured
Map: Vietnam Online
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/refer/maps.html
Maps
of Vietnam
http://www.english.uiuc.edu/maps/vietnam/maps.htm
Cold
War Knowledge BankInteractive Map: Vietnam
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Images:
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for more images.
Timelines:
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PBS:
Timeline
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http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/
and
Vietnam
Online
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/time/index.html
Fact sheets and lesson plans:
Fact sheetmaybe
an s2:
The
Tumultuous 1960s
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/historyonline/us38.cfm
Recommended
lesson plan:
Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/teachers
Fact checks:
Test
your knowledge about the Vietnam War
Recommended readings:
George
Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975
A
balanced account of American involvement in Vietnam.
Learn
more: Vietnam War Bibliography
Recommended
film{maybe an s} :
Platoon
Based on director Oliver Stones experiences as an infantryman
in Vietnam, this film offers a harrowing and heartbreaking glimpse
into what it was like to be a soldier during the Vietnam war.
Comprehensive
reviews of this movie:
http://www.rottentomatoes.com/movie-1016405/
Learn
more:
Hollywood
and Vietnam
Recommended
Web site:
The
Wars for Vietnam
http://vietnam.vassar.edu/
This
site provides an informative overview of the history of the war supplemented
with primary source documents
Vietnam
Documents
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/vietnam.htm
A collection of documents relating to U.S. involvement in Vietnam
and the United States from 1941 to the fall of Saigon.
To
learn more
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Question: who was involved in the rat vijetnamu war

On the other hand, the government of North Vietnam and Vietnam fought for the unification of Vietnam under the communist rule.

They looked at the conflict as a colonial war that they had to lead with France, and then with the United States because France was supported by the government of the United States, and later South Vietnam which they considered an American marionette state.

who was involved in the rat vijetnamu war

Question: what was the conflict between north vietnam and france called

what was the conflict between north vietnam and france called

Question: what type of rule did north vietnam have

what type of rule did north vietnam have

Question: what type of state was south vietnam

Question: which country supported south vietnam in the war of independence

which country supported south vietnam in the war of independence

Question: what type of rule did north vietnam fight for

what type of rule did north vietnam fight for

On the other hand , the government of North Vietnam and Vietnam fought for the unification of Vietnam under the communist rule .

They looked at the conflict as a colonial war that they had to lead with France , and then with the United States because France was supported by the government of the United States , and later South Vietnam which they considered an American marionette state .

S druge strane, vlada Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkong borili su se za ujedinjenje Vijetnama pod komunističkom vladavinom. Oni su na sukob gledali kao na kolonijalni rat kojeg su u početku morali voditi s Francuskom, a nakon toga sa SAD-om jer je Francusku podupirala vlada SAD-a, a kasnije i Južni Vijetnam koji su smatrali američkom marionetskom državom.

S druge strane, vlada Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkong borili su se za ujedinjenje Vijetnama pod komunističkom vladavinom.

Oni su na sukob gledali kao na kolonijalni rat kojeg su u početku morali voditi s Francuskom, a nakon toga sa SAD-om jer je Francusku podupirala vlada SAD-a, a kasnije i Južni Vijetnam koji su smatrali američkom marionetskom državom.

On the other hand, the government of North Vietnam and Vietnam fought for the unification of Vietnam under the communist rule. They looked at the conflict as a colonial war that they had to lead with France, and then with the United States because France was supported by the government of the United States, and later South Vietnam which they considered an American marionette state.

On the other hand, the government of North Vietnam and Vietnam fought for the unification of Vietnam under the communist rule.

They looked at the conflict as a colonial war that they had to lead with France, and then with the United States because France was supported by the government of the United States, and later South Vietnam which they considered an American marionette state.

Since the 1950s, U.S. military counselors began to arrive in an area that was then known as the French Indochina.

Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 1 | Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 2 | Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 3 | Vietnam War Statistics And Facts 4 | Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 5 | Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 6 | Service Numbers | Service Numbers 2
Vietnam War Statistics and Facts 1
Church Committee Report On Diem Coup-1963
1. SUMMARY
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence. Before the Committee indicates that the
United States government offered encouragement for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations. Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese
generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup.
On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") outlined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing the government in the near future. The Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that, informed ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart 2 of this possibility
"We do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which would rip the Army and the country assunder." (CIA cable, Saigon Station to DCI. 70/5/63) Upon being informed, Director Monet sent two cables. The first stated "[the cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination," and the second directed that the recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore." (CIA cable, DC1 to Saigon, 10/5/63; CIA cable, DC1 to Saigon, 10/6/63)
2. THE ABORTIVE COUP OF AUGUST 1963
On May 8,1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue fired on Buddhists celebrating Buddha's birthday (and carrying the Buddhist flag contrary to edicts proscribing the flying of religious flags) killing nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the Diem regime.2
On May 18, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting met with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired him to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapture public confi-
1 Trueheart is currently a consultant to the Select Committee.
2 Senator Gravel Edition. The Pentagon Paper, The Defense Department History United States Decision-making on Vietnam. pp. 207-208. Volume II. Becton Press. Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon Papers). Former Public Affairs 0fficer of the U.S. Embassv in Saigon, John Mecklin, in his book. Nation in Torment. An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam. Doubleday and Company, 1965 (hereinafter cited a8 Mecklin),at pages 158-60 described the vulnerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration
during this period noting that it “offered a classic opportunity for a Communist sleeper play.”
(217)
(218)
dence. These steps included admitting responsibility for the Hue incident, compensating t.he victims, and reaffirming religious equality in the country. On June 8, Madame Nhu, the wife of Diem?s brother, Nhu, publicly accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents. Trueheart, in the absence of Ambassador Noltin protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to disassociate the United States from any repressive measures against the Buddhists in the future. (Pentagon Papers, p. 308) Shortly thereafter, Madame Nhu
com
mented on the self-immolation of Quang Due and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart told Diem that Quang DUC'S suicide
had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would break with his government if he did not. solve the Buddhist problem.(Pentagon Papers, p. 208)
Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon1 testified that the Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the Diems regime. (Conein, 6/20/T& pp. 42-44) These events led the United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)
By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed on the necessity for a coup.2
In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting, Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview with the columnist, Marrerite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory and asked for harmony and support of the government.
Shortly after midnight on August 21,1963, Nhu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p. 210) 3
On August 24,1963, the State Department sent a cable (Deptel243) to the new Ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and was approved by President Kennedy. (Pentagon Papers, p. 235) Dephl 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take "prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists :
We must at the same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN [South Vietnamese Government] militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize re-
1Conein testified that he had known the generals involved in the coup "for many gears. Some of them I had known back even in World War II. Some of them were in powerful positions. and I was able to talk ,to them on a person to person basis, not as a government official.? (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 17.)
2 Conein's After-Action Report stated that: "The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report, 11/l/63, p. 10.)
3Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur when no American Ambassador was in Vietnam (Noltlng had left a few days before and his replacement. Henry Cabot Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 21).
(219)
quires removal of the Nhus from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhus but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism * * *. Concurrently with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary. A cable on Aupust 25 reported the result of a conference among a station representative. Lodge. Trueheart, General Harkins [Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)] and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions," (I.G. Report, C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.
Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government.1 (Pentagon Papers, p. 212) Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officer Conein and another CIA officer were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose." (DC1 to Saigon, 8/26/63).
A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve the United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend United States, aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated :
I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support. We will do all 14!hat we can to help you conclude this operation successfully. Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change, as I must also bear the full responsibility for this operation and its consequences. (Cable, President Kennedy to Lodge 8/29/63)
In a reply cable, Lodge stated:
1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change course at any time. Of course I will always respect that right.
2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of its own. Should this happen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the "go signal" may be given by the generals. (Cable, Lodge to President Kennedy, 8/30/63)
1 In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals" effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the "kiss of death" to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman. (8/26/63).
(220)
A cable from Saigon dated August 31,1963, stated :
This particular Coup is finished. Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces. There is little doubt that GVN [South Vietnamese Government] aware US role and may have considerable detail. (CIA Cable, Sta. to Hq. 8/311/63)
Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations between the United States representatives and the generals. Big Minh who had initial doubts about the strength of, American support, grew in confidence.
3. THE NOVEMBER 1963 COUP
American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell, in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course. (Pentagon Papers, p. 214) Lodge suggested a study to determine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the regime. (Pentagon Papers, p. 214) On September 12, with White House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its repressive handling of t he Buddhist problem and calling for an end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were curtailed. (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215)
In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diems actions, recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting to salvage as much as possible.
It was decided to adopt the first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers, p. 215)
On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington and presented their findings to the National Security Council. Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by the end of the year, ending support for the forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The President promptly approved the recommendations. (Pentagon Papers, pp. 215-216)
On October 3, Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action 1 one of which was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can. (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63) The Station cabled on October 5 that it had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle." (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63)
1The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.
221
A cable from the CIA Director to Saigon responded that :
(W) e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime. et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. "However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."
McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that 'our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it,." (McCone, 6/6/75, p.62) He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude." (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 62) McCone testified:
I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them
very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did. (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 62-66)
McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to." He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands-off" recommendation. (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 62-63)
McCone cabled the Station on October 6 :
McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore (Cable, CIA to Saigon, 10/6/63)
In response, the CL4 Station in Saigon cabled Headquarters :
Action taken as directed. In addition, since DC&I Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at Mcone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Dodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion. (Cable, Saigon to CIA, 10/7/63)
Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,2 testified that he was first told of McCone?s response to the assassination alternative by ambassador Lodge around October 20. (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 35) Conein testified (but did not so indicate in his detailed After-action Report) that he then told General Don that the United States opposed assassination, and that the General responded, "Alright, you don't like it, we won't talk about it anymore." (Conein,6/20/75, p. 36)
222
The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV operations chief) informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending aid to the Special Forces units responsible for the pagoda raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under Joint General Staff (JGS) command. (Pentagon Papers, p. 217) On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American requests. (Pentagon Papers, p. 219)
On Oct.ober 28, Conein met with General Don, who had received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the United States on October 31. (LG. Report, C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219)
On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely in Vietnamese hands. General Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition to the coup to General Taylor. (Pentagon Papers, p. 220) A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern and stated that "we cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63) A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed
Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolvement and somewhat less strict neutrality." (Pentagon Papers, P* 220)
Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was given only four minutes warning before the coup began. (Cable, MACV to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11/l/63) An aide to Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters (approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits to those killed in the coup. (Conein, 6/20/75, p. 72) 1
Conein was at the Joint General Staff headquarters during most of the coup. (I.G. Report, C, pp. 4142) At I:40 p.m., the Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe departure. (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15) The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4: 3O pm. the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern for Diem's safety. (Pentagon Papers, p. 221)
According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered
the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to sur-
1Passing money to the coup leaders was considered sometime prior to the coop. On October 29. Lodge cabled that a request for funds should be anticipated. (Cables, Lodge to State, 10/29/63, and 10/30/63) Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe in his house.
223
render half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the earth,". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched on the Presidential Guards barracks. (Conein After-Action Report, 11/l/63, pp. 17-18)
At 6: 20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace at 8 :00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present. (Conein After-Action Report, 11/l/63, p. 24)
Conein testified that he left the, JGS headquarters amidst preparations by the Vietnamese generals to house Diem and Nhu there under proper security. After his return home he received a telephone call and was told to come to the Embassy. At the Embassy he was told that orders had come from the President of the United States to locate Diem. He further testified that he returned to JGS headquarters about 10 30 a.m. and asked General Big Minh where Diem was. After some discussion, Conein stated, Minh said that they were behind the General Staff Headquarters, but professed that they had died by their own hand. Minh offered to show the bodies to Conein but Conein declined because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests. (Conein, 6/20/75, pp. 55-57).
The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.l There is no available evidence to give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.2
1Conein speculated that Diem and Khu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and fled to a Catholic Church in Cholon. He opined that an informant must have identified them and called the General Staff headquarters. (Conein After-Action Report, l/11/63, p. 23) A CIA source stated that Diem and Nhu had left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8 :00 on the morning
of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army vehicle. (Cable, Saigon to State, 11/2/63) Minh originally told Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a church. (Conein, 6/20/75, that on November 16, 1963, 56) The Inspector General's Report states a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two
photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their backs. (I.G. Report, C, pp. 43-44) The source reported that Diem and Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being
conveyed to the Joint General Staff headquarters.
2 It must be noted that on October 30, 1963. Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by key leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saigon as a point for evacuation. (Cable, Saigon to Washington, 10/30/63) Conein was charged with obtaining the airplane. Between 6 :00 and 7 :00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to a Station Officer at the Embassy who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that a Station representative told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum. (Conein, 8/20/75. p. 54)
1961-65 106,000
1966 123,000
1967 260,000
1968 495,000
1969 459,000
1970 393,000
1971 230,000
Total 2,066,000
The Source.
Sec. of Def., Comptroller Office,
Report called "Air War in Indochina"
By Leonard Magruder
President - Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform
PART 1 of a 10 part series- Dan Rather Refuses to Debate the Issues
Part 2 of a 10 part series -Goldberg confesses to CBS bias - but leaves out Vietnam
Part 3 of a 10 part series-How The National Media Lied About The Tet Offensive
Part 4 of a 10 part series -"How CBS suppressed the Magruder expose of "The Uncounted Enemy."
Part 5 of a 10 part series -The Campaign Against PBS
Part 6 of a 10 part series -Only liberals could play in the 60's
Part 7 of a 10 part series -Issues The Media Never Touched On
Part 8 of our 10 part series -Poll showing today's students disagree with 60's protesters suppressed by "Newsday"
Part 9 of a 10 part series -An interlude on education - the primary mission of V.V.A.R.
Part 10 of our 10 part series-From a New History By a Vietnam Vet And Historian
In light of the scandal a few months ago involving Dan Rather and Democratic Party fundraising, we decided to share an incident involving him in 1986. Mr. Magruder, President of V.V.A.R. , because of his long involvement with Vietnam veterans, was invited by Dr. Theodore Kennedy, Professor of Anthropology at the New York State University at Stony Brook, to help him put together the largest symposium on Vietnam ever assembled. "As National Coordinator Mr. Magruder has responsibilities for helping design the program and contacting and inviting some of the leading figures of the Vietnam period to speak." (Lawrence Journal World, Oct. l0, l986) "The first of its kind in the country and a model for other universities." (Newsday, Sept. 6, 1986.) It was the most comprehensive , in-depth examination of both the war in Vietnam and the "war on the home front" ever put together, unique because of the participation of some 800 Vietnam veterans.
There were 60 speakers from all over the country, representing the military, the media, the protestors, the government, and academia. Among those invited and who spoke were Bruce Hare- Prof. of Philosophy, Stony Brook Univ., Kenneth Steadman - Director, VFW, General William C. Westmoreland, Jan Scruggs -Vietnan Veterans Memorial, Leroi Jones (Baraka)- activist and poet, Florynce Kennedy - Co-founder, N.O.W, Allen Ginsburg - poet and activist, Senator Eugene McCarthy , David Horowitz- co-editor, Ramparts, Hung Van Ho- Army of South Vietnam, and William Gibbons, National Defense Division.
The media was singularly under-represented. In the beginning Dr. Kennedy spent hours on the phone with representatives of the New York national media emphasizing the national significance of the Symposium and the need for them to cover it. When this failed Mr. Magruder wrote the following open letter to Dan Rather, reviewing the performance of CBS during the war and challenging him to a debate at the Symposium. Copies of the letter were hand-delivered by students throughout the New York media community.
Dear Mr. Rather:
As you are probably aware , numerous sociological studies have documented the fact that during the 60's the television networks were strongly biased on the subject of Vietnam in the same left/liberal direction as the universities that educated their reporters. One of the best of these studies is The News Twisters , by Edith Efron, a book that CBS desperately tried to suppress.
The quantitative data in this and other studies show that the networks consistently misinformed and even lied to the American people. Reporting by CBS, ABC, and NBC over an extended period in 1968 show a steady drumbeat of anti-government voices, unified in an assault on the war. Little or no opinion in support of the war was allowed on any of the three networks even though as late as Oct. 1969 the majority of Americans, according to pollster Lou Harris, still supported a military victory in Vietnam.
The data also shows that the networks never allowed the true neo-fascist views and tactics of the New Left and the S.D.S. to be known, protecting them as part of a larger body of "harmless" or "idealistic" youth and using them to project an image of "youth in revolt against the war" and in general actively helping to promote their Marxist version of the war. The data shows how , through biased editorial selection, the views of the left had a virtual stranglehold on opinion on the war. If fact, reporter and enemy opinion constituted a majority of opinion advocating a unilateral bombing halt. Out of 37 such statements , one third came from enemy sources. Said Senator Margaret Chase Smith, "The press has become more sympathetic to the enemy than to our own national interest." (Congressional Record, June 16, 1971). Said Theodore White, the highly respected author of The Making of the President series, "There is a new avante garde which dominates the heights of national communication and has come to despise its own countrymen and its traditions."
On occasion, as in the case of the Vietnam War, the university and the media act as an unelected counter-government, certain that they only know what is best for the nation. But if the world view that they share is in fact closer in its basic philosophical assumptions to those of totalitarianism than to those of the Judeo-Christian majority, the danger is obvious, they can misinform and mislead the country. There is, therefore, great fear abroad in the land that in another time of crisis, the university and the media, unless reformed, may again allow themselves to be manipulated by enemy propaganda or exploit the crisis to further ideological interests hostile to the national interest.
One of the most significant consequences of the Vietnam conflict was its exposure of the breakdown that has occurred in intellectual and journalistic circles with regard to objectivity and truth. The truth is that the left-liberal media, informed in its analysis of world events by the impoverished moral sensibility of secularism and hostile to traditional American values, and wanting to see Hanoi win the war to prove those values
wrong withheld information from the American people throughout the war. In particular, it created a "disaster" image of the Tet Offensive (perpetrated 15 years later in The Uncounted Enemy - CBS) because it served its ideological purposes, even in the face of incoming victorious reports from the battlefield. Said Ronald Reagan, "CBS under World War II circumstances would have been charged with treason."
The philosophy of life that allows for such blatant disregard for truth is rampant throughout the New York media and Eastern academic circles. Said Theodore White in Newsweek, "I regard the growing gap between the cult that dominates New York intellectual thought today, and the reality perceived by thoughtful people elsewhere , as a political fact of enormous importance and danger."
Part of the problem was no doubt touched upon by Carolyn Lewis, former Associate Dean of the Columbia School of Journalism when she wrote in The Washington Monthly recently, "So lacking in intellectual substance is the Columbia curriculum in journalism that students can go through the entire program without having to read a book."
Another part of the problem is revealed in two well-know studies done by Columbia University and George Washington University that show that media persons, almost all college educated and liberal, "not only differ sharply on moral issues from attitudes of the general public, but shun religion and actively seek to reform society towards their views." Search Institute, in its landmark study of the importance of religion on Capitol Hill said, "An important factor in our national ignorance of religion on Capitol Hill is the
national press. A predominant characteristic of the media elite is its secular outlook. Perhaps the reporters and commentators are unable to recognize religious influence when they see it."
It follows that they would also not be able to recognize the true danger of an ideology such as atheistic Communism. It is no accident that Howard K. Smith, the noted television newscaster, warned during the 60's that "the media is not giving a true picture of Vietnam," and that the reporters are "especially naive about Communist intentions and Ho Chi Minh." Bias in the media, he said, was "massive" and "anti-American."
The facts seem to be clear. Television networks are dominated by a world-view contemptuous of majority traditional values and they actively seek to impose their views on the rest of America. In this they serve as the propaganda arms of the academic establishment. In summary, it seems that "liberal" today means uneducated, uninformed, and naive. For the media, with the power it yields, to have no understanding of the significance of contemporary events makes it a very dangerous force in American society and clearly in need of a thorough airing of the problem.
I hope you will accept my invitation to join me in airing the problem at the Symposium - Courage." Leonard Magruder
Mr. Rather did not respond to the letter. And when the Symposium ended, the press release prepared by Mr. Magruder summarizing the findings of the Symposium was uniformly boycotted by the New York media. More on that in Part 2. Stay tuned.
Mr. Magruder is not a Vietnam veteran. As a college professor (psychology) he was outspoken over many years in support of the troops in Vietnam and the cause, and became deeply involved with them when they returned. Until he
moved to Kansas he was an Associate Member of the Suffolk , N.Y. Chapter of VVA.With the support of a number of these Vietnam vets who joined his Board
of Advisors, including the VVA chapter President, he founded Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform, a national organization with a student auxiliary at the Univ. of Kansas. He is sending out this series to regional and state Vietnam vet leaders, plus other vet leaders, vets in Congress, and the national media, to let people know what was accomplished, but was suppressed by the media.
By Leonard Magruder
In part l of this series on how the media suppressed stories related to Vietnam Mr. Magruder recounted how Dan Rather refused an invitation to debate the many issues with regard the performamce of the media during the Vietnam War at the Stony Brook University Vietnam Symposium of l986. "The media pretty well snubbed the entire event," said Mr. Magruder, who served as National Coordinator, "and when I sent out a final press release summarizing the findings of the Symposium, the largest ever held, it was completely ignored by the New York national media."
Following are extracts from that press release:
The key to the success of the Symposium was that for the first time hundreds of Vietnam veterans and students had been brought together in a direct learning situation, stimulated by an outstanding panel of speakers, 60 in all, from all over the country representing the military, the media, the government, veterans organizations, academia, and the war protestors. Funding for the project came from private individuals. Over $35,000 was raised for honorariums and speaker fees. Each session of the Symposium, most with a number of speakers, covered a different topic related to the Vietnam War. These included:
l) The History of Vietnam and American Involvement
2) How America's Youth Responded to the Call
3) The Views of Veteran Organizations (VVA,VFW,American Legion ,etc.)
4) The War as Seen by General Westmoreland
5) Protests and Counter-Protests at Home
6) The Performance of the Media
7) The Turning Points of the War
8) The Return of the Vietnam Veteran
9) The Story of the Wall by its Founders
10) The Adjustment and Reassimilation of the Veteran
11) The POW/MIA Issue
12) The Views of the South Vietnamese
13) The Lessons of the War
14) The Vietnam Veteran as Emerging Leader
In general, said Mr. Magruder in an interview, representatives of the military and government were not only highly responsive to invitations to participate, but all had given of their time at no cost. Most former war protestors who were invited, he said, either declined the invitations or had asked for fees which were in many cases prohibitive. The representatives of
the national media who were invited, such as Dan Rather, Mike Wallace, Tom Brokaw, Sam Donaldson, Peter Jennings, and Ted Koppel, did not respond, making the media singularly underrepresented.
Aspects of the war that had been neglected over the years but had been brought out by the speakers at the Symposium included; the humanitarian and idealistic dimensions of American involvement, the subversive aspects of the campus "peace" movement, the true intentions of Communist North Vietnam to conquer all of Indochina, the ruthlessness and barbaric tactics of the Viet Cong, the use of the American media to influence public opinion against the war, the succumbing of American journalists and intellectuals to Hanoi propaganda, the bravery and victorious record of the American soldier, the genuine thrust for freedom of the South Vietnamese, the abandonment by liberals in Congress of South Vietnam, the views of the Vietnam veteran towards the war protestors and the media, and the true status of the POW/MIA issue.
Asked what he thought were the main themes emerging from the Symposium, Magruder said that while he could not speak for either Dr. Kennedy or the Vietnam veterans, that as a psychologist and sociologist the themes that he saw emerging from the Symposium seemed to include at least the following five points:
l) The majority of veterans fully understood their mission in Vietnam to be to stop Communist aggression from the North, do not view their mission in Vietnam as having been "immoral", take a certain amount of pride in their accomplishments on the battlefield, and are proud to have served their country. This is quite at odds with the image perpetrated on campus and in the media of the veteran as a "dupe" of American "imperialism", waiting for the war protestors to save them. 2) The majority of veterans do not view the war protestors as having been either "idealistic" or as "moral heroes", and view their interpretation of the war as naïve, false, and damaging to their efforts. Most of them recognize that the war protests were engineered by Marxist and other ideologues on campus who were partisan to Hanoi and manipulated gullible students to further the self-interests of both groups. 3) Most veterans expressed concern over the fact that many former draft evaders and war protestors now occupy prominent positions on campus and
continue in their writings and lectures to perpetuate a false understanding of the war and its veterans offering themselves to students as a "moral elite," while in general striving to avoid debate on the issues with the veterans. 4) A majority of veterans appear to be deeply dissatisfied with the media, particularly national television, for having portrayed a view of the war more sympathetic to that of the war protestors than to the majority of
Americans including themselves. They are particularly unhappy that their considerable military achievements such as at Hue, Khe Sahn and other battlefields during the Tet and other large offensives were portrayed by the media to the American people either negatively , or as defeats, and that these impressions have never been corrected. 5) A majority of veterans appear to hold the campus and the media largely responsible for the tragic outcome of the war, and blame those two institutions for having created a false image of them and the war that made their return home very difficult.
Asked what he thought was the most significant contribution of the Symposium,
Mr. Magruder said that it was undoubtedly the changing perception by students of the Vietnam veterans from the false stereotypes of the anti-war movement and the media, to one of citizens who had acted responsibly in answering the call to duty, who successfully fought an especially difficult war to a peace treaty, and who had returned home to totally unfair treatment as a result of misinformation spread by the campus and the media.
Equally important, he said, was the change that is coming about in student perception of the war protestors and the draftdogers as considerably less than the moral heroes they portray themselves to be, as a result of becoming aware, at the Symposium, of the ideological and often self-interested motives behind their behavior.
Asked about the problems the symposium had faced Magruder said that the biggest problem was that media coverage had been scanty and biased. What little there had been focused primarily on General Westmoreland's visit, and the three articles on this in the campus newspaper had been unduly critical and harsh, causing some veterans to observe that many on campus, and in the media, seemed to be trying to avoid the issues.
Also, he said, there had been some harassment by the leftists and Marxists on campus. One professor, a well known leftist, gave a lengthy speech on the "vested economic interests" behind the war, (an idea universally hooted down by the veterans), had coached his students into giving him a standing ovation, had encouraged his students to heckle others on stage, and had lodged a complaint with the Dean about the presence on campus of the American flag in a color guard to honor General Westmoreland.
Mr. Magruder is President of Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform, the national organization and the student auxiliary at the Univ.of Kansas. Speaking in Lawrence today he said, "Looking back, it borders on a national tragedy that an event of this scope, made possible by the contributions, in terms of time, effort, and money, of so many, and designed to help the American people arrive at some correct historical conclusions with regards the war, was so neglected by the media, as well as by many on the University
faculty, who largely shunned the event.
Significant new insights on the Vietnam Era by General Westmoreland, David Horowitz, Sen. Eugene McCarthy, Bobby Seale and Al Santoli and so many others went totally unreported by the media, nor would they send representatives to engage in the dialogue. Nor has much changed . I noted yesterday a recent article by Richard Kolb, Editor-in-Chief of VFW Magazine in which he quotes Vietnam vet Milt Copulos as saying "There's a wall 10 miles high and 50 miles thick between those of us who went and those who didn't, and that wall is never going to come down." And vet David Carrad, who wrote in the Wall Street Journal," Until my generation passes from the scene, I doubt there will ever be any reconciliation of views on the war between those who went and those who did not." It is the guilt of those who didn't go that will always cause any effort to heal in a Symposium to be less than successful. For thirty years, the tissue of lies that had to be told by those who would not serve has been rotting the heart out of this society. Look at the experience of David Horowitz at Brown and Arizona State. The spirit of the leftist thugs of the 60's is still with us. For 30 years the university has been unable to
tolerate a dissenting opinion, or discuss an issue rationally, continuing to serve as the Depositer of the Lies or as Paul Hollander, noted sociologist at U. Mass. writes, "the major reservoirs of the adversary culture." Why don't our universities finally face the truth about Vietnam, rejoin and help our failing society ?"
The Tet Offensive, which was portrayed by the New York liberal media as a defeat for the U.S. was in fact, as Westmoreland and all historians agree, an almost disastrous defeat for the North Vietnamese. Not only did they lose half of the 90,000 troops they had committed to battle, the Viet Cong was virtually destroyed. Contrary to the expectations of the North, the people of the South took not one step to assist the invaders. Instead, they rose up in revulsion and resistance, with the government and the people galvanized into unity for the first time and volunteers for the South Vietnamese army almost doubling.
In the U.S., the facts made clear by the Tet Offensive, that the war was not just a "civil war", that the South clearly did not wish to live under Communist rule and welcomed American aid, and that it was the North Vietnamese who were engaged in "genocide" and "aggression" with the mass murders at Hue and the rocket attacks on helpless civilian populations, should have ended the arguments of the "peace" movement. It was the moment of truth for those in the universities and the media. They failed the test. The
lying continued with renewed fury.
The New York media, recognizing an opportunity to manipulate the news to effectively impose its view of the war on the American people now created, and deliberately sustained, an image of "disaster", even in the face of incoming battlefield reports that contradicted that image. This image was taken seriously by advisors to President Johnson, totally altering the outcome of the war at the very moment when victory might have been possible. The liberal media robbed the United States government and the American people of the ability to make critical judgments about their most vital security interests in a time of war.
The true reason for the tragic change in policy after the Tet offensive is seen in what Johnson now told Westmoreland, that to pursue the war more aggressively was politically unfeasible, that he had "no choice but to try to calm the protesters lest they precipitate an abject American pull-out." (America in Vietnam, Levy, 1978) In one of the most incredible phenomenon in the history of warfare, there was during this period, thanks to the media, no logical connection between what was actually happening in Vietnam and
response on the home front. The response to victory was despair. This is what the media calls the "psychological victory," which they themselves created.
And to their everlasting shame, the "peace" movement responded to any hint of success by American forces at Tet with panic, fearing that their own country might win the war. As presidential candidate George McGovern said to Vietnam vet and former Sec. of the Navy James Webb, "What you don't understand is that I didn't want us to win that war." (American Enterprise Mag. May/June 1997)
The April-June 1986 edition of The National Vietnam Veteran's Review had a front-page article (with photo) titled "Professor Calls for Congressional Investigation of Media's Treatment of the Vietnam War." During that period Mr. Magruder had distributed a "Request to Congress" to most members of Congress calling for a Congressional investigation into how it came about that a major American victory had been reported to the American people as a defeat .The request was supported by twelve large Vietnam veteran organizations, and General Westmoreland. As stated in the N.V.V.R. article,
"General Westmoreland, who has already made one call to the Steering Committee, stated publicly this week, "Professor Magruder's project is an extremely important issue and I support his efforts l00%."
Copies of the material Mr. Magruder sent to Congress were distributed to news organizations throughout the National Press Building in Washington, but no mention of it ever appeared in print. The media has always tried to dismiss the charge of having lied about the Tet Offensive as a right-wing fantasy, but in his material distributed to Congress Mr. Magruder quoted from 21 standard histories and commentaries on the Vietnam War, as follows:
"The enemy has been hurt badly; he committed a total of about 84,000 men. He lost 40,000 killed." (Report of General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Tet Offensive. Feb. 27, 1968) (Note: the allies lost 927. This is the disaster for the North Vietnamese that CBS called a "stalemate.")
"The Allied counter-offensive following Tet destroyed the Viet Cong based in the South and was a major defeat for the North. Yet despite this victory the press in the United States turned Tet into an American defeat." (Great Battles of the 20th Century - Sir Basil Liddell Hart)
"The Viet Cong was suffering severe casualties. .. but this situation was not being reflected in news reports or on television in the United States." (The Unmaking of a President - Herbert Schandler)
"Following Tet, the enemy was completely vulnerable (but) the most powerful country in the world did not have the will power to meet the situation. (Strategy for Defeat - Admiral Sharpe)
"The North Vietnamese regulars and the Viet Cong guerrillas were defeated utterly on the battlefield. Granted the American superiority at that time, there is at least the probability that North Vietnam forces could have been destroyed." (Crossroads of Modern Warfare - Drew Middleton)
"The impression created by the press and television coverage of the offensive was of a great defeat for the Americans and the South Vietnamese. (Why We Were in Vietnam - Norman Podhoretz)
"The war still could have been brought to a favorable end following the defeat of the enemy's Tet Offensive. But this was not to be. Press and television had created an aura, not of victory, but defeat. (A Soldier Reports- General William Westmoreland)
"Newsmen countered official claims of a Communist defeat by saying that even if it were true (which they refused to accept as they did the official account of enemy losses) the communists had achieved a psychological victory. (The Vietnam War - an international panel of historians)
"This is the only war lost in the columns of The New York Times. They created an image of South Vietnam that was as distant from the truth as not even to be a good caricature. There were those who invented, distorted, and lied. (Certain Victory - Dennis Warner)
"Visitors to the Lyndon Johnson Library are told, "While the President was reading reports from the war that made it clear that the enemy had suffered a severe military loss (Tet), newspaper and TV gave the impression that the loss was ours and that defeat was imminent." (New York Times News Service)
"COSVN, Viet Cong Headquarters, in its internal report #6, March 1968, admitted the Tet Offensive had been a failure. "We failed to seize a number of primary objectives. We also failed to hold the occupied areas. In the political field we failed to motivate the people to stage uprisings." (The Magruder Expose - Leonard Magruder)
"For the first time in modern history the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield but on the printed page and television screens never before Vietnam had the collective policy of the media sought, by graphic and unremitting distortion, the victory of the enemies of the correspondents own side." (Encounter-British journalist Robert Elegant)
"It was the massive military defeat of the Viet Cong and NVA that proved the main turning point in the United States resolve. In military terms it was a massive defeat for Giap. However, on the television screens of the United States Tet turned into a victory for the Communists." (Vietnam - Ian Beckett)
"Jack Fern of NBC suggested to producer Robert Northfield that NBC do a documentary showing that Tet was indeed a decisive military victory for the United States. "We can't," said Northfield, "Tet is already established in the public mind as a defeat." (Between Fact and Fiction - Edward J. Epstein)
"When General Westmoreland publicly announced that the Tet Offensive had been a major defeat for the Communists and a major victory for the Allied forces, a fact obvious to anyone who viewed the events dispassionately, he was treated like a self-deluding fool by the news media." (Battles and Campaigns
- Tom Carhart)
"The Tet Offensive proved catastrophic to our plans. It is a major irony of the Vietnam War that our propaganda transformed this debacle into a brilliant victory. The truth was that Tet cost us half our forces. Our losses were so immense that we were unable to replace them with new recruits." (Truong Nhu
Tang - Minister of Justice - Viet Cong Provisional Revolutionary Government -The New York Review
Oct. 21, l982)
"The military's conflict with the Saigon press corp was the crucible of the debate over the Order of Battle. But CBS chose not to explore that conflict and to have done so the network would have had to bare its own archives of the period, including Walter Cronkites's milestone commentary which declared, following Tet, that an American victory was unlikely and that a truce must be negotiated." (A Matter Of Honor - Don Kowit)
"Though it was an overwhelming victory for South Vietnam and the United States, the almost universal theme of media coverage was that we had suffered a disastrous defeat. The steady drumbeat of inaccurate stories convinced millions of Americans that we had lost a major battle." (No More Vietnams -Richard Nixon)
"The myth was created (by the media) that the war was unwinnable, and that had a decisive effect on American resolution. (War in Peace- Sir Robert Thompson)
"Rarely has contemporary crisis journalism turned out, in retrospect, to have veered so widely from reality. Essentially the dominant themes of the words and film from Vietnam added up to a portrait of defeat for the Allies, Historians, on the contrary, have concluded that the Tet Offensive resulted in a severe military-political setback for Hanoi in the South. To have portrayed such a setback for one side as a defeat for the other - in major crisis abroad - cannot be counted upon as a triumph for American journalism and it could happen again." (Big Story - 2 vols. - Peter Braestrup)
"If there is to be an inquiry related to the Vietnam War, it should be into the reasons why enemy propaganda was so widespread in this country, and why the enemy was able to condition the public to such an extent that the best educated segments of our population have given credence to the most incredible allegations." (Final Report - Chief of Military History - U.S.Government)
When does this inquiry begin ? The last four years of the war, the lives lost, and the final abandonment by the U.S. of the peoples of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, were prices paid to indulge the tantrums of the campus 'peace' movement and the New York liberal media. America, through the lack of moral and intellectual sophistication of its liberal academics and journalists had succumbed to the most successful propaganda effort the world has ever seen. How the campus and the media lied about Vietnam is the one
great trauma in the tissue of American history that has never been dealt with.
On Jan. 23, l982, eight months after Professor Magruder resigned his position at Suffolk College, N.Y. to protest that media and campus had lied about Vietnam, CBS ran a 90 minute documentary on prime time television titled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception, produced by George Crile and
narrated by Mike Wallace. The program charged that U.S. military intelligence in Vietnam under orders from General Westmoreland had conspired to deceive President Johnson , the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Congress and the American people by systematically underreporting enemy strength to make it appear that Westmoreland was winning the war. This was done, CBS claimed, through the reduction of estimates of infiltration in the five months prior to the Tet Offensive, and by deleting from the Order-of-Battle village civilians who supported the Viet Cong; the SS and the SSD. The purpose of the deception, according to CBS was to lead people into believing that the U.S. was winning a war which in fact, according to CBS, it was losing. This "conspiracy", said Mike Wallace, led to complete unpreparedness for the Tet Offensive, unnecessary loss of American soldiers, and in the final analysis, to the loss of the war.
The program was believed without reservation by almost the entire American press. "From The Nation to The Wall Street Journal" said Renata Adler in Reckless Disregard, "No serious journalist or publication called any element of the ninety-minute program into question. Editorials simply treated the broadcast as true." This was massive testimony to the nation's depth of ignorance on the Vietnam War, as a result of years of distortion by the media. They had lied so often on the subject they were in a fog.
Professor Magruder immediately recognized the large number of serious discrepancies and outright lies in the film. Stunned, he realized that CBS had just given him a classic example of the kind of lying he had just given his job to protest and immediately began research to expose the film.
On March 28, l982, 150 copies of a 21- page single spaced article documenting that the CBS film had been one long series of lies from beginning to end, were hand delivered by Mr. Magruder and his students throughout the upper echelons of the New York media, as well as sent through the mail.
Among those receiving copies at CBS, in addition to CBS executives, were Mike Wallace, Dan Rather and George Crile. Executives and newscasters such as Frank Reynolds, Sam Donaldson, Roger Mudd, Peter Jennings, Tom Brokaw, and John Chancellor of ABC and NBC also received copies, along with executives, editors, and columnists of The New York Times, Newsweek, Newsday and The Washington Post. Approximately thirty copies were delivered to leading columnists such as Tom Wicker, Harriet Van Horne, and Anthony Lewis.
The fully documented article proving that CBS had lied to the American people on a massive scale, just as they had often done during the Vietnam War, and particularly during the Tet Offensive, was immediately covered up by the entire New York liberal media establishment.
On May 29, l982, two months after the cover-up of the Magruder expose the story broke with a cover article in TV Guide, Anatomy of A Smear: How CBS Broke the Rules and 'Got' General Westmoreland , by Don Kowit and Salley Bedell, based on copies of CBS interviews for the film. The article, while not as lengthy or detailed as the Magruder expose, was nevertheless more than enough to show that the CBS documentary was in serious trouble.
The article showed that CBS had paid and then coached persons in what to say, had deliberately angered Westmoreland to make him appear guilty on film, had refused to include in the film corrections that he has requested, refused to include evidence by Walt Rostow that Johnson had been fully informed as to the increased infiltration , the upcoming Tet Offensive , and the Order-of-Battle controversy, had lied about its efforts to contact General Phillips Davidson, head of intelligence in Vietnam, and had rejected testimony by George Carver , head of CIA intelligence that would have
totally invalidated the thesis of the CBS film. It also proved that the statement in the film by Col. Gaines Hawkins that he had been given an enemy troop estimate ceiling by Westmoreland was contradicted four times by statements from Hawkins to George Crile as found in the interview transcripts and that CBS had deliberately inserted a response by Westmoreland where it did not belong in an effort to discredit him.
When General Westmoreland received his copy of the Magruder expose he wrote Professor Magruder a personal letter in which he stated, "You have done an exhaustive bit of research and I congratulate you. I am sending your letter and its enclosures to my lawyer." (letter, Sept. l3, 1982)
In his expose Magruder wrote that in the film Mike Wallace failed to tell his viewers that the entire thesis of the CBS film, based on a charge made by Sam Adams, a CIA analyst, had been thoroughly investigated and dismissed by the House Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975 and fully aired at the time in the press. Adams, a Harvard graduate sympathetic to the leftist views of antiwar leaders, and who testified on behalf of Daniel Ellsberg at his trial, had hoped by his estimate of 600,000 Viet Cong to force Johnson to pull out of the war. He strongly believed in the Marxist concept of the
'people's revolution', and consistently tried to prove through his figures that it was the 'people' who were fighting, unaided by the North, the same naive myth propagated by the campus 'peace' movement and the New York media cult.
Wallace also failed to inform his viewers that Adams, in an article in Harper's Magazine in May l975 and again at the House investigation, was primarily concerned that the CIA, not General Westmoreland, had suppressed his estimate of Viet Cong strength. The subtitle of his article was A CIA Conspiracy Against its Own Intelligence. Said Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director of the CIA from 1966 to 1969, in a letter of response to the Adams article in the July, l975 issue of Harper's, " We could perceive no merit in presenting Sam or his conclusions to the President." Wrote James Graham, of the Board of National Intelligence in the same issue of Harper's, "and his assumption that these findings were generally accepted within the CIA is a distortion of the facts." He charged Adams with conveying a "misleading impression of a single-handed and lonely struggle to get the truth out about the war to the White House against the massive opposition of countless knaves and cowards." The truth, said Graham, was that , "In my twenty five years in the CIA I never saw an analyst given more individual attention, more opportunity to present his evidence and state his case ." But his case was so bizarre that no one would buy it, except for Mike Wallace, and CBS.
Wallace failed to tell his viewers that at no time had the CIA ever taken Adam's estimate of 600,000 Viet Cong seriously. This estimate upon which the CBS film rested was dismissed by President Johnson's own Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and both branches of the CIA; the Directorate of
Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates. The key statement in the film by Wallace that the CIA was "at war with Washington to accept Adams estimate," was not true. George Crile, the producer of the CBS film, had to have know these facts. He had been editor for the Adams article in Harper's in 1975, from which all of the above statements were taken. Furthermore, all of this had to have been know by most of the liberal columnists, such as Anthony Lewis of The New York Times, who had received copies of the Magruder expose, as much of that expose was based on their own articles published at the time of the House investigation of the Adams charge. They knew that the CBS film was a smear against Westmoreland based on lies, yet they said nothing as it served their ideological purposes.
Quoting from President Johnson's memoirs, The Vantage Point, Magruder showed not only that Westmoreland had kept Johnson and the American people informed as to the conditions in Vietnam at all times, but that Johnson was fully informed of the Order-of-Battle controversy, the increased infiltration of Northern regulars, and the general timing and purpose of the approaching Tet offensive. Both Johnson and Westmoreland in their books had criticized the U.S. media for not passing on to the American people their warnings about the coming Tet Offensive. The press would later use the public dismay over Tet (which they themselves created) as an excuse to try to discredit earlier optimistic statements by Johnson and Westmoreland. The press deliberately neglected their warnings about Tet in order to set them up for criticism.
A number of sources were cited by Magruder where CBS could easily have found official military record of the increased infiltration which Mike Wallace charged Westmoreland with suppressing. He also showed that Maj. Gen. McChristian, who was portrayed in the film as having his intelligence warnings suppressed by Westmoreland, leaving the military unprepared for the Tet Offensive, was quoted by Jack Anderson in a column on Oct 31, 1975 as saying, "There was sufficient data to predict the offensive in the spring of 1968," and that Westmoreland took his information,"very seriously."
The CBS film was a final desperate attempt by the media to nail down the 'peace' movement's view of the war. It backfired miserably, resulting in complete exposure of exactly how the media, (and the university), as Mr. Magruder stated at the time of his resignation in protest, had lied about Vietnam. The falsification in the film of the Tet Offensive as a defeat was a repeat of how CBS had portrayed the offensive at the time.
So incompetent was Adams that in his article he estimated American lives lost in the Tet Offensive at 10,000. The accepted figure is 927. Magruder pointed out that a final CIA evaluation of Adams as an analyst, shortly before his resignation under pressure, described him as "marginal" at conducting research, and as having lost "balance and objectivity."
The entire thesis of the CBS-Wallace film, that it was a conspiracy by the military to conceal enemy strength to support Johnson's claim of progress that led to a devastating surprise victory by the Communists at Tet, and that the Adams estimate was then accepted, leading to Johnson's resignation and ending the war, is one long, sustained lie, as Westmoreland said, "a cruel hoax reprehensible and irresponsible." The film was an insult to the intelligence of the American people and a slander against those who served in South Vietnam, by the very ones who did the most to betray both national
interests and the American people."
On Sept. 13, 1982, General Westmoreland sued CBS for 120 million dollars for libel, labeling the film "vicious, false, and contemptible." Mr. Magruder now knew that his resignation to protest that the media had lied about Vietnam was about to be vindicated in one of the largest suits ever filed against the media. Westmoreland had stated in his letter that he had sent the expose Magruder had sent him to his lawyer, Dan Burt. On Feb. 4, 1984, Mr. Burt wrote to Mr. Magruder thanking him for his analysis. It is possible that Burt may have used the expose as a guide in planning his attack on CBS, as up until the time of the trial the Magruder expose remained prehaps the best detailed account of the lies in the film. Therefore it is understandable that it was with great satisfaction that Mr. Magruder sat back on Oct. 10, 1984 and watched (on ABC) the first of a parade of generals and colonels who would testify that CBS had lied.
The trial, which ended with an apology to Westmoreland by CBS, destroyed the credibility of CBS-News for decades to come.
This is an account of a national campaign that was waged by Mr. Magruder that forced PBS stations to show a documentary on Vietnam, narrated by Charlton Heston, that it had tried to suppress. The film detailed how CBS had misled the nation about the Tet Offensive. Martha Bayle, in The Wall Street Journal said, "Television's Vietnam: The Impact of Media", attacks the liberal bias of contemporary news coverage of the 1968 Tet Offensive. It suggests that reporters (especially TV reporters ) turned a U.S. military victory into a political and psychological defeat. PBS has refused to give air time to the film."
By spending $6000 of his own money to show the film on various television stations around the country Mr. Magruder exposed the issue creating a landslide defection on the part of station managers who had been told by PBS executives not to show the film. In addition, he wrote a letter to all 314 PBS station managers appealing to them to defy PBS Headquarters and show the film.
That summer, Mr. Magruder, along with Col. Chuck Allen, publisher/editor of the National Vietnam Veterans Review, discussed the issue in an hour long interview on CBS affiliate WFNC, Fayetteville, N.C.
At the Vietnam Veterans parade in Chicago Magruder paid for a continuous showing of the film on in-house television throughout his four day stay at the Americana Congress Hotel, reaching the thousands of Vietnam veterans who were staying there. The afternoon of the parade about 50 vets showed up with posters that read "Media and Campus Lied About Vietnam" on one side and "PBS Show the Film" on the other and a protest was held in Grant Park. In addition, with every showing in Chicago and elsewhere viewers were urged to
use a number that Mr. Magruder had arranged for with Mr. Joseph Redota of the White House to call President Reagan and tell him what they thought about the film.
280 out of 314 stations finally showed the film. William Criswell, Station Manger of WUSI/TV, Olny, Illinois, wrote on Aug. 26, 1986, "You should be pleased to know that this station has been at sword's point with PBS powers-that-be for more than a year on the issue of bias. I have written to PBS President Bruce Christiansen and others protesting the one-sided presentation of America's role in world politics. We aired Television's Vietnam: The Impact of Media, on Monday , August l8. It will be repeated Sat., Sept. 14." A number of station managers wrote Mr. Magruder saying they were defying the ban and would show the film. Wrote Ruth Ann Barnes, Director of WNET/13 in New York, "This is to let you know we have decided to air the AIM program."
Pat Buchanan, in a handwritten note from the White House said, "All the best with your new endeavor." Anne Higgins, writing for President Reagan, said, "The President's views on this subject are well know, and he will continue to express his concern that a flawed sense of our own history can lead to mistaken judgements about present policies as well as our future
course." Reagan had written to Charlton Heston about the film, "Great, .. something every American should see - but then we know TV will never help them to see it." (AIM Report, March 1986). Mr. Magruder was happy to be able to write Reagan and tell him that the American people had now seen the film, that the cover-up had been defeated. General Westmoreland wrote, "I congratulate you on your success in the showing of the AIM film on PBS stations around the country." (letter, Sept. 24, 1986)
The Washington Inquirer of Sept. 25, 1986 said, the most dedicated in this endeavor (fighting the boycott) was Leonard Magruder, who had been campaigning on behalf of Vietnam veterans causes for the last six years. He quit his professional post to protest against the treatment of Vietnam vets . Magruder recently held a Washington press conference in which he accused the media of basing its analysis of events in Vietnam on a liberalism hostile to
the American values of freedom and democracy and which created and sustained a disaster image of the Tet Offensive." The United Press, The Washington Post, and The New York Times all sent reporters and photographers to this conference but did not report on the story when they heard that it was critical of the media performance in Vietnam.
Mr. Magruder said that while his successful national campaign to break the PBS boycott had been treated fairly in over two dozen local newspaper articles, radio, television newscasts and talk shows, the story had been suppressed at the national level. Word had gone out from PBS to contain the story. Local editors were appalled by this development. Obviously, a story about a private citizen spending thousands of dollars to successfully reverse a decision by PBS not to show a film about Vietnam was a national story. Some editors, such as Mr. Donald Gillem of The York Times-News, York, Nebraska, considered this highly unethical and made special appeals to representatives of the wire services to see that the story was carried nationally, but they were rejected. In Topeka and Kansas City the Associated Press refused to place mention of press conferences by Mr. Magruder on the day calendar, which simply informs reporters of upcoming events. In other places, such as Lincoln, Nebraska, the wire services boycotted the news conferences that were held by Mr. Magruder. "The national media," said Mr. Magruder, "went on an orgy of suppression over this issue."
"The PBS campaign," he said, "was our response to the betrayal by CBS of the Suffolk College Rally for returned Vietnam veterans. Millions of people now know how CBS lied about Vietnam . For millions of Vietnam vets Dan Rather now became the symbol of a liberal media that had lied about their efforts in Vietnam, and The CBS Evening News program slipped into third place apparently as vets turned it off." Wrote Victor Goodpasture, a columnist for The Daily Kansan, the daily newspaper of the University of Kansas, "Mr.
Magruder showed the documentary on campus last semester and also on Lawrence Cable Television. It ought to be shown to all journalism students and then discussed. It was this type of reporting that changed attitudes towards the war and eventually led to a Communist victory in South Vietnam. The media did a disservice to the American soldiers and the American people."
In a lecture at the University of Kansas following the PBS campaign Mr. Magruder said, "Thuong Nhu Tang, Minister of Justice of the Viet Cong Provisional Revolutionary Government said in an article in The New York Times of Oct. 21, 1982 that the Communist losses in the Tet Offensive were "so immense that they were unable to replace them with new recruits." They lost half their troops, some 40,000 dead. (the U.S. lost 926) But the media
portrayed this as a U.S. defeat and CBS said that the United States couldn't hope to win the war." The Daily Kansan, April 2, 1986.
The following is from material handed out by Mr. Magruder in a one-man protest in the late 60's at the University of Colorado the day after a massive and violent anti-war protest. During the 60's he did this at a number of universities.
Covered by all Denver and Boulder newspapers and television stations, the national media refused to report the protest, refusing to let Mr. Magruder join the debate on the issues of the hour. Only liberals could play. At the time Mr. Magruder, a psychologist, was Special Consultant to the State of Colorado in the field of mental retardation. But the material that he handed out that day to the students was incompatible with the media's "advocacy journalism" at a time when the most inane statements on Vietnam of obscure liberals were being given national attention.
It was this suppression of opinion contrary to views on the war by left/liberals in the university and the media, and the use of these institutions as instruments of indoctrination and propaganda that created the polarization and breakdown in national debate in the 60's leading to the tragedies in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The campus 'peace' movement
ended up on the side of tyranny and genocide. He wrote: "Nothing more enrages the academic proponents of a naturalistic, and therefore "value-free", world view than the incurable moralism of the American people. To combat the fact that the average citizen sees the present conflict in terms of morality, tyranny versus freedom, the university has conceived the ultimate hypocrisy, it has projected an absolute moral judgment, "the Vietnam War is immoral," from nihilistic philosophical foundations. The vehemence of both faculty and students, and their need to avoid dialogue at all costs, flow from the need to mask that hypocrisy, hoping the public will confuse the vehemence for certainty and go along. But adult America, all of whom are for genuine peace in the world, has not fallen for it. It has conspicuously not joined the marches because it correctly senses the true underlying message, which is, we do not believe in truth or morals, we will not sacrifice for democracy, we do not care if millions are slaughtered or enslaved, we want only to be left in peace, to pursue our sloth, our sex games, and our drugs. Certainly if South Vietnam, and with it all of Southeast Asia, falls to Communist aggression and slavery, the guilt will lie forever with the cowardly conspiracy between faculty and student hypocrisy that blunted U.S. efforts to stop that aggression."
The main issues, he said, were "The failure of the social sciences with regard to contemporary social ills, the ignorance of students on Communism and basic philosophical and theological alternatives, the indoctrination of students and their manipulation by left/liberal faculty to influence national policy, the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the student anti-war movement, and the regressive movement on campus back to witchcraft, astrology, and drugs as sources of truth and self-fulfillment." The Boulder Daily Camera.
Two months later Mr. Magruder led in a protest at the American Psychological Association Convention in Washington, D.C.. A major issue had to do with the misuse of psychology in the service of the anti-war movement: "With regard to the role of psychologists in relation to the Vietnam War, the lies about the war spread by the campus 'peace' movement and the media have had a devastating impact on the returned veteran, leaving many shocked
and creating unnecessary feelings of guilt." For many, the resulting suffering was worse than the war, and was borne in silence for years. What little help was available was found in the "rap group" where again the veteran was betrayed. Anti-war oriented psychologists encouraged veterans into becoming active in the anti-war movement and encouraged them to convert
their acts of killing in the line of duty into atrocities, so as to resonate better with the lies that by now permeated American society.
Other psychologists charged the war with having created a "killer instinct" for which there was not the slightest shred of evidence. Said the noted sociologist Charles Moskos, "psychologists tried to portray the soldiers as variously, wanton perpetrators of atrocities or proto-fascist
automatons." There was nothing in contemporary psychological or psychiatric theory, with its moral relativism, that could come to grips with the code of the soldier, "Honor, Duty, Country". The mental health community prostituted itself to forward its politics, using the suffering of the veterans to do so. The social scientists, who through their naïve secular and humanistic theories of man had played a major role on campus in betraying the war effort, now had to lie about the veterans of the war. The lying was compounding itself." The protest, which created considerable stir at the Convention, was totally ignored by the Washington media.
From one of two 15-minute special news broadcasts with Mr. Magruder on KYFC-TV in Kansas City, Missouri.
"One myth propagated by the 'peace' movement is that the American soldier, because of his involvement in an "immoral " war, would, and later did, lose the war. The truth about the progress made following the Tet Offensive, from 1968 on, was never told to the American people.
The world's foremost authority on People's Revolutionary War, the Communist developed strategy that was used in South Vietnam, is Sir Robert Thompson, who as Secretary of Defense of the Malaysian Federation defeated the Communist insurgency in that country. As observer of the Vietnam situation throughout its history, and himself critical of earlier American strategy, he nevertheless was able to report as follows to President Nixon in
1969.
"I was very impressed by the improvement in the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared to all previous visits, and especially in the security situation, both in Saigon and the rural areas. A winning position in the sense of obtaining a just peace, whether negotiated or not, and of maintaining an independent non-Communist South Vietnam has been achieved. We were most impressed by the remarkable success of the pacification program, we were able to visit areas and to walk through villages that had been under Viet Cong control for years. With increased security and improved communication, the economy is expanding rapidly. The seeds of democracy are also being planted at the village level. At the higher political level these is no question but what the government of President Thieu is not only more stable that any other government of the past few years, but that its performance is steadily improving. On the military side there has been a steady improvement in both performance and morale."
Where had all this progress come from, if not from the efforts and sacrifices of the American soldier? (For the full scope of the true tragedy of Vietnam, that it was a war that had been won and then thrown away to placate those at home who would not serve, we now have new histories that fill in what happened after 1968. None of this progress was made known to the American people by the media. Two of the most important of these books are "Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army", by Mark Woodruff, and "A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam" by Lewis Sorley
From a speech Mr. Magruder gave on the occasion, with 50 Vietnam veterans, of the symbolic retaking of Grant Park during the Chicago Parade weekend, from those who protested at the Chicago Democratic Convention in 1968 and did not serve. Mr. Magruder later presented the flag used in the event to General Westmoreland in a ceremony during the Houston Parade weekend. Although reporters from Chicago papers were present at the event, they refused to report on it, arguing that there were still too many in Chicago who were against the war. That is absurd. Former war protesters wept openly in regret in the streets, and had to be comforted by the veterans as the hugh parade, with its countless wounded, passed by. This was never mentioned by the media.
"We need to remember just how treasonous the campus 'peace' movement actually was. Commentary of Feb. 1980, reported that 28% of all college students at the time supported the Viet Cong while 51% of those in the campus 'peace' movement favored a Viet Cong victory. Said Jane Fonda to students at Michigan State on Nov. 22, 1969, "If you understood Communism you would pray on your knees that we would some day be Communists."(she obviously knew nothing about atheistic Communism) "The anti-war movement", said the S.D.S. in literature out of Antioch College, "rests on three main elements, the Trotskyites, the Communist Party, and the radical pacifists. A number of its leaders, such as Dave Dellinger, were self-confessed Communists and Marxists. 'Peace' movement leadership let North Vietnam provide tactical advice and help coordinate demonstrations.
Said Guenter Lewy in "America in Vietnam", the most comprehensive and best balanced study to date of the war, "it was obvious that many of these men and the organizations and committees they spawned were not so much for peace and against the war as they were partisans of Hanoi, whose victory they sought to hasten through achieving American withdrawal from Vietnam." For this reason, the general public had nothing but contempt for the campus 'peace' movement. A poll by the University of Michigan showed that reactions to "Vietnam war protestors" was "by a wide margin the most negative shown to any group." The Harris Poll showed, at the height of the war, that 69% of the public believed anti-war demonstrations were "acts of disloyalty against the boys fighting in Vietnam." 65% agreed that "protesters were giving aid and comfort to the Communists", and 64% felt that they were "not serious, thoughtful critics of the war, just peachiness and hippies having a ball." (Reported in "America in Our Time," by Godfrey Hodgson.)
Later, in a letter published in The Lawrence Journal World, Mr. Magruder wrote, "Robert McNamara , in his recent memoirs, said that U.S. policy in Vietnam was "gravely flawed" and the war was unwinnable. According to the enemy, it was McNamara's policies that were "flawed", and the U.S. could have won the war. Bui Tin, a colonel on the general staff of North Vietnam, and the man who accepted the surrender of South Vietnam on April l0, 1975, was recently interviewed in The Wall Street Journal. "If Johnson had granted Westmoreland's request to enter Laos and block the Ho Chi Mihn trail, Hanoi could not have won the war." It was McNamara who advised Johnson on this. On McNamara's bizarre policy of "graduated response" bombing, Bui Tin said, "It didn't worry us, we had plenty of time to prepare alternative routes and facilities." On the effectiveness of Westmoreland's strategy he said, "We were losing base areas, control of the rural population. And our main forces were being pushed out to the borders of South Vietnam." Of the crucial Tet Offensive he said, "Our losses were staggering. If American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon they would have punished us severely; we suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was."
The American people never had any idea of just how seriously the enemy was mauled. Here are the figures for just the five main offensives, from "Vietnam in Military Statistics", a major history of the Vietnam War by Micheal Clodfelter.
1968 - The Tet Offensive, U.S. -1,829 KIA (Killed In Action), South Vietnam - 2,788 KIA, Communist forces - 45,000 KIA
1969 - U.S. - 9,414 KIA, South Vietnam -21,833 KIA, Communist forces -156,954 KIA
1970 (includes Cambodian Incursion) U.S.-4,221 KIA, South Vietnam - 23,346 KIA, Communist forces - 103,638 KIA Laos Invasion (Lam Son 719 ) (with U.S. air support) South Vietnam - 3,800 KIA, Communist forces -13,668 KIA
1972 -Easter Offensive (with U.S.air support)- South Vietnam - 15,000, Communist forces - 83,000
From "Unheralded Victory", by Mark Woodruff: " During 1966 the North Vietnamese Army suffered approximately 93,000 killed. In 1967 the casualty figure climbed to over 145,000. By the early 1970's General Giap was publicly admitting that his forces had suffered at least 500,000 killed during the war. The actual number of Communist soldiers killed during the war: 1,100,000."
Compare this to approximately 58,000 American forces killed. That is a 19 to 1 ratio. How was this war lost? Certainly not on the battlefield. The media never made any of this clear to the American people. Nor did they ever make clear the enormous sacrifices of the South Vietnamese, who lost approximately 250,000 in the war.
It was McNamara's flawed policies, the impact of the campus 'peace' movement, and the media that cost America the war. Of the 'peace' movement Bui Tin said, "It gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield losses through dissent and protest America lost the ability to mobilize a will to win." As to the argument of the 'peace' movement that the Viet Cong was an independent South Vietnamese political movement, Bui Tin said, "It was set up by our Communist Party to implement a decision of the Third Party Congress of September 1960."
The 'peace' movement lied to America. Carrying the flag of the enemy it succumbed to Hanoi propaganda and ended up on the side of genocide and tyranny. As for McNamara's views, they are nothing but a cover-up for his own incompetence.
It is absolutely time to demand that the media, and the university, stop hiding out on the subject of Vietnam and re-enter into dialogue with the rest of America, especially its Vietnam veterans, as to what really happened. We cannot go into a world-wide war on terrorism with this hugh a hole in our history. Holding on to, and perpetuating myths has too great a potential for creating a lethal, paralyzing polarization. The media , and the campus, must find the courage to consider 'second thoughts', as have David Horowitz and so many others, now describing what they did in the 60's as "treason." They fell for enemy propaganda and it is time they admitted it.
As the Chief of Military History- U.S Government wrote in his Final Report, "If there is to be an inquiry related to the Vietnam War, it should be into the reasons why enemy propaganda was so widespread in this country, and why the enemy was able to condition the public to such an extent that the best educated segments of our population gave credence to the most incredible allegations."
And to tell the truth about Vietnam is by definition to bring about the long hoped for reformation of American education. The lies told in the 60's metastasized through the years to create intellectual trends on campus that are betraying the American student. These must be challenged. We can't fight a war with dummies either.
From "To the Vietnam Veteran" a speech delivered by Professor Magruder at the first rally on any American campus to honor the Vietnam veteran with over 400 persons attending. (It was at this rally that Magruder resigned his position to "protest the damage done to the veterans by the erroneous views of the left/liberals in the media and the university in the 60's and their perpetuation of these views. Although a reporter from "Newsday" was present the newspaper did not publish the event." ("The Compass", college newspaper, (May 11, 1981) "Clearly newsworthy, but because of their bias no news organization in New York would touch such a story." (Noted newscaster Bill Jorgenson - NBC-TV)
From the speech:
As Arthur Egendorf, a Vietnam veteran and principle author of the study by the Center of Policy Research on the problems of the Vietnam veteran said, "For the first time in our history homecoming was as difficult as, if not more difficult than, the battle itself." A whole new psychiatric category, "delayed stress syndrome" has become necessary to describe what was largely the impact on the returned American soldier of attitudes at home based on lies that had been told about the war by the media and academia. The Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program of Houston, in a booklet it produced to challenge these lies said, "The misinformation currently disseminated about Vietnam ultimately reflects upon the motives, convictions, values, and integrity of those who participated in the war; it is imperative that the record be set straight." (The impact of these lies is the subject of a documentary made by Mr. Magruder, How the Campus Lied About Vietnam, based on interviews with Vietnam vets and available at no cost by e-mailing Magruder44@aol.com) "Following a semester of study of the Vietnam War last year, 240 of my students, after they had received their grades so the voting would be objective, voted overwhelmingly (85%) that in their opinion the war had been justified, that there was nothing wrong in trying to save South Vietnam from Communist tyranny. It was not, they agreed, the U.S. government that had misled the nation. The campus 'peace' movement, which said that the war was "immoral", that the motive was "imperialism", that the domino theory was "absurd", that the war was only a "civil war", that Ho Chi Minh was only a
"nationalist", and that America was engaging in "aggression" and "genocide", misled the nation.
Puzzled as to why the students of this generation could see the truth so clearly, while those of the 60's could not, the students concluded that faculties, to serve their own largely leftist and Marxist ideologies, had misinformed their students, who, in turn, used the misinformation to serve their own purposes, primarily to avoid the draft.
The 'peace' movement, the students decided, was never really concerned for peace. Although it cloaked itself in an aura of great moral purpose, it in fact gave aid and comfort to the enemy, marched under the flag of the Viet Cong, allowed Hanoi to dictate its agenda, and turned its back on the American soldier. When the soldiers returned it tried to stereotype them, with the help of the media, as dupes or drug-crazed "baby killers". That those who did all the suffering in Vietnam should on their return be asked to bear additional suffering at the hands of the very ones who had betrayed them, was, the students concluded, absolutely unconscionable."
Said Mr. Magruder, who is now President of Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform at the Univ. of Kansas in Lawrence today, "I am certain that if this experiment was done again, with students free from the pressures that existed in the 60's, the results would be the same." On the failure of the media to report on the rally and this experiment he said, "The suppression of this event and experiment by the media was predictable in view of the stand taken by the students. The media (reporters from "Newsday" and "The New York Times" who were present) refused to report on the events of that day largely because of the posters the students carried which read "Abbie Hoffman Was Wrong", "War Protestors Were Wrong", "The New Left and the S.D.S. were wrong." Other posters said that Dave Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Jerry Rubin, Jane Fonda, Daniel Ellsberg, William Sloan Coffin and others were "Wrong."
As I said in my speech that day, even though there is now nothing that opponents of the war can point to today that vindicates their position, it is imperative for them that they continue to urge the nation to ignore the correct historical conclusions. To admit to having been wrong would be to face, not only guilt, but disproof of their ideological assumptions and loss of prestige and power. They must of psychological necessity take the position that they were right, the matter is over, and there is nothing to discuss, thereby leaving the Vietnam veteran to suffer for the perpetuation of their lies.
The fact that the matter is not over, and there is still plenty to discuss is seen in recent commentary on the Kerrey incident. Writes Ellen Goodman "As time goes on, "our war" recycles with less frequency, but with equal ferocity. Every time we think we have achieved that mystical/medical word "healing" something happens to remind us that the scar is a zipper, ready to reveal wounds that still lie close to the surface." Writes columnist Mark Shields, " How conflicted about their own actions are all the middle-aged males on the press bus or in positions of public and private leadership who, through the testimony of friendly physician or graduate school deferment artfully evaded the nation's military call?" The problem is academics and media persons won't let the issues be raised. For example, my current 10 part
series on Vietnam goes out by e-mail to 40 professors at the University of Kansas. Already l4 of these professors have e-mailed me back to remove them from my list. They say things like "I don't want to hear what you have to say." There is the problem. Those who opposed the war have never had the courage to try to defend their position with the veterans . Until they find that courage what Vietnam vet Milt Copulos said recently in "VFW Magazine" will no doubt continue to be true, "There's a wall 10 miles high and 50 miles thick between those of us who went and those who didn't, and that wall is never going to come down." There is then, a fault line, between those who served and those who didn't, many of the latter now entrenched in our universities, which could lead to another, even more dangerous, polarization as the current war on terrorism continues. As was stated in the Manifesto of V.V.A.R., placed on record with the White House in the late 80's, "A major lesson of Vietnam is that American foreign policy should henceforth take into consideration that the liberal university and media, largely apologists for secularism and therefore hostile to the traditional values of the American majority, have created within our society a large and dangerous bloc lacking in the intellectual and moral foundations necessary to defend freedom. The lesson of Vietnam is epitomized in the title of a book written by former Congressman John LeBoutiellier, "Harvard Hates America." Or as the noted sociologist Paul Hollander of U. Mass recently wrote, "The university is the reservoir of an adversary culture."
The entire psychology by which persons in the media and academia must continue to lie about Vietnam rests obviously on their guilt over having turned their backs on a struggle for freedom. The only solution is a massive aknowledgement of bankruptcy, betrayal and guilt by our intellectuals, especially in the humanities and the social sciences, and immediate exposure
of their basic assumptions about life and human nature to re-examination in debate with philosophers and especially theologians, because in the final analysis the conflict in the U.S. over Vietnam was ideological.
To tell the truth about Vietnam at this time is by definition, to demand a reformation of our universities as the metastasizing of the lies they told in the 60's is corrupting our entire culture.
We are almost at the end of this series on Vietnam and the media. The final part will be a selection on the media from a just finished book on the Vietnam War by one of its veterans. And there will be one part after that on the issues that cannot be discussed in today's campus newspapers, as the result of the "advocacy journalism" of the 60's continuing into our times.
But before we share that we would like to say a word about the primary mission of Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform, and that is education reform.
The first part of this report is from a one-hour talk Mr. Magruder gave on radio station KAW recently in Lawrence, Kansas. This is followed, however, by material that was not reported by the media. Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform has held four protests on the Univ. of Kansas campus in recent years. The university newspaper, The Daily Kansan would not report on the substance of any of them, showing that not much has changed.
From the radio talk:
"Those who fought for freedom for South Vietnam will continue to speak out against the growing totalitarianism on the American campus, as seen in multiculturalism, dormitory re-education, gender feminism, sensitivity training, speech codes, political correctness, historical revisionism (particularly on the Vietnam War), leftist attacks on America and democracy, postmodernism, and deconstructionism."
We also concerned about why American students rank so poorly in international competition, (19th) as well as the seriously flawed approaches to education being fostered by the social sciences, such as "approximate" spelling and math, massive grade inflation to assure "self-esteem", "look-say" over the proven superiority of phonics in reading, dropping of the multiplication table, serious historical revisionism by gender feminists, literature chosen on the accidental basis of gender, class, and race, and the attack on excellence, standards, and honors. The perpetuation of these failed approaches by the education establishment strikes us as perversity and utter folly, a total betray of its charge and something this nation should not put up with any longer. Our social scientists and educators now stand speechless before the specter of a collapse they themselves engineered. The nation is under no further obligation to indulge them with the whole future of the nation now at stake.
We are also concerned about the psycho noxious impact of humanistic psychology on students. There is significant research showing that the "psychological conditioning" courses in high schools, (sex education, values clarification, affective education, death education, drug and alcohol courses etc.) are resulting in significant rises in violence, abortion, teen-age pregnancy, AIDS , racism , drug and alcohol abuse.
The impact of the social sciences on secondary education is a growing national disaster, as the flawed theories of humanistic psychologists (Rogers, Maslow, Kohlberg, etc.) produce students who are intellectually incompetent, morally confused, sexually absorbed, and socially maladjusted. The emphasis in these theories on feelings ("trust the organism" -Rogers) to the neglect of reason is the most profound failing of 20th century psychology. This, combined with the teaching that "there is no right or wrong", is the direct cause of the rise of the sociopathic personality in our time.
The first warning that these "psychological conditioning" courses in high schools would produce sociopaths, or "killer kids", antedated the first student killing at Pearl, Mississippi by four months, and appeared in material V.V.A.R. distributed at the Univ. of Kansas in its second protest , ignored by the university newspaper. The protest also dealt with certain developments in higher educations, as follows:
"Multiculturalism"- enforced cultural relativism, rooted in a seething hostility towards the predominance of democratic and Judeo-Christian values in Western civilization, and riddled with the simplistic buzzwords of humanistic psychology. "The result can only be the fragmentation , re-segregation, and tribalization of America." - the noted liberal historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr.
"Self-esteem"- quintessential humanistic psychobabble, source of dumbed down textbooks, the deception of parents in grade inflation, and the "new racism" on campus. Creates make-believe uniqueness, an absolute barrier to personal growth.
"Sensitivity training" - the dormitory as re-education camp, teaching students "proper" beliefs about race, gender, and sexual preferences, sources of rising rates on campus of pregnancy, abortion, AIDS, and date rape. Social scientists teach students to view sex as a non-moral, non-romantic recreational activity, something like football.
"Speech Codes" - hunting licenses to track down and punish those who are not in step ideologically with the social sciences, denying students the right to disapprove of something, such as homosexuality.
"Political correctness"- forcing conformity to the moral relativism of the social scientists through administrative harassment, with immunity for left/liberal academic thugs who beat up dissident guest speakers .
"Gender feminism" - "The most destructive and fanatical movement to come down to us from the 60's. It certainly deserves its place in the halls of intellectual barbarism. Women's studies are abysmal swamps of irrational dogma and hatred." Robert Bork "Deconstructionism" - tendentious mumbo-jumbo, using the classroom to propagandize for self-congratulatory nihilism. A massive attack on conscience and the values of Western civilization.
"Postmodernism"- the New Left of the 60's come to power, with all the distinguishing characteristics of fascism; social contructionism, cultural relativism, rejection of individual identity, rejection of transcendence, science and reason. Fueled by the anti-humanism of Heidegger, who along with Paul de Man (deconstructionism) were both Nazi apologists.
We call on all the universities of America to begin reform by adopting something like the following Charter of Purpose of Bellarmine College in Lousiville, Kentucky:
"This college calls upon all member of the academic community to address themselves to ultimate questions about reality and human life: the meaning of God, freedom, society, suffering and death, care and hope. It is when men and women have come to grips with questions such as these, and have achieved some measure of careful considered response, that they begin to advance towards educational maturity."
It is the position of Vietnam Veterans for Academic Reform that by neglecting these questions the university is in the vanguard of moving society in an increasingly sociopathic direction. There is now no alternative but to acknowledge a massive moral, intellectual, and scientific bankruptcy on the part of the social sciences and the humanities and to call for immediate exposure of their basic assumptions to re-examination in debate with philosophers and especially theologians. We also call for an immediate moratorium on all psychological conditioning courses in our high schools and universities and a march by l,000,000 Vietnam veterans and 3,000,000 parents on the National Education Association in Washington in demand of reform.
The critics scoffed when the majority argued that the loss of South Vietnam to Communism would threaten America. That it has, but in a manner unforeseen. It isn't that foreign armies threaten us, it is that when Southeast Asia fell, the New Left, the S.D.S. and other radicals on campus were encouraged, strengthening the leftist attack on American values. They cowered so long in the classroom to avoid the battlefield they became tenured professors, now dominating our universities and brainwashing students with their alien and totalitarian philosophy. We call on all veterans to join us in this struggle for freedom from tyranny on a new battlefield - the university. We urge all veteran groups to be ready to march in protest when blatant oppression of student rights appear on any nearby campus, and to call in the local newspapers and complain. It is time to reclaim our educational systems from those who want only to impose on them their own alien agendas, hostile to democracy and traditional American values.
A Vietnam veteran who has just finished a new history on the Vietnam War has just given me permission to quote from his chapter on the media, but wishes however, to remain anonymous. I can think of no better way to end this series, "Vietnam and the Media" than to look at the conclusions of someone who was there,and is anaccomplished historian.
Conclusions:
There were some worthy, honest, and intelligent reporters in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Dickey Chapelle, Robert Shaplen, Liz Trotta, Peter Braestrup, Hugh Mulligan, Keyes Beech, Neil Davis, Denis Warner, were among those who objectively, and without resort to sensationalism, conveyed elements of truth, parts of the puzzle, to the American public. Their efforts notwithstanding, the fog of nonsense spewed out by others obscured and effectively censored honest, logical, comprehensive reporting, denying the American public information needed to develop accurately informed opinions. News media malfeasance was complemented by brilliant manipulative Hanoi propaganda, and a corresponding U.S. government inability or unwillingness to make a case for its own efforts. The American public could not hope to understand what was taking place, and does not today.
No one, least of all South Vietnamese, American or other allied forces, was oblivious of or happy with the endemic corruption and incompetence, yet, because of flawed and narrowly focused "reporting" the story of South Vietnam's progress and improvement remains untold. American reporters never wrote or televised stories about CDR, Phan Quang Dan, Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, Gen. Nguyen Khoa Nam, the 81st Biet Kich, the Hau Nghia RF, Col. Mach Van Truong, Gen. Le Minh Dao, Tran Ngoc Chau, Col. Ha Mai Viet, writer Nguyen Manh Con, or RVN Marine Sergeant Van Luom, who stood alone on the Dong Ha Bridge and knocked out the lead tank in an NVA armor column with a shoulder-fired antitank missile, an act, in the words of an American witness, of inspiring "defiance and bravery."
Knowing little of this, the American public was understandably disenchanted. The news media seldom, if ever, accompanied American or Australian troops on MEDCAPS or DENTCAPs (Dental Civic Action Projects extremely welcome to rural people with painful tooth conditions) In the first six months of 1969 more than 200,000 villagers received medical care and 15,000 received dental care from the 3rd U.S.Marine division alone. Instead the American public was subjected to repeated coverage of the My Lai atrocity , which, like the photo of Gen. Loan, was considered symbolic and representative of the entire war.
Wolfgang Leonhard, a Soviet commuist agent before defecting to the West, was tasked with analyzing western news media stories. He and his colleagues were puzzled over superficial news coverage predominating in the newspapers they read. "Generally, we could only shake our heads over them, and often we were exceedingly disappointed. There was usually not even mention of the really significant events that were causing endless discussions amongst ourselves and on which we were passionately eager to read a serious Western commentary. "They don't seem to know what is going on " was the main theme of our conversations when we talked to each other on the subject." One of the more tragic ironies of Vietnam and the news media failure is that there were many fascinating and positive stories to be told. The American people would have appreciated seeing hour-long specials on, for example, U.S. Marine Corps CAP units, a squad of 14 Marines living in one hamlet for their entire tour, working with and defending "their " hamlet alongside local PF. USMC CAPs had a higher voluntary extension rate than among their line unit counterparts. Why? It would have made for a good story. It would have been equally enlightening to see programs showing U.S. troops helping an orphanage, or volunteering to teach English. The American public deserved to know about a VNAF Skyraider pilot who had been shot down five times, and continued flying, despite his several fused vertebrae. They deserved to know that American forces could take on the NVA, in their own backyard, and prevail. Something might have been learned from Americans who volunteered for three, four, five, six, or even seven tours as advisors, choosing to serve in Vietnam again and again, not as bloodthirsty and uncaring killers, but as very normal, decent human beings who could eloquently and convincingly explain their motivations, which was ultimately to see Vietnamese people have a life of peace and decent government. Geopolitics and the Cold War, all relatively abstract concepts, were not a primary concern, taking a back seat to basic human concerns for that which is fair. Americans would have benefited by hearing of Captain Nguyen Quy An, Lt.Vu Tung and Warrant Officer Nguyen Quang Hien of the famed 219 Kingbees. Were it not for the action of these men, John Litter, Bob Stratliff and Wiley L . Craney, by their own testimony, would have been killed or captured after their helicopter had been shot down in Laos. They were rescued by Captain An and his crew while under fire and surrounded by NVA. Captain An would later lose both his hands by keeping control of a burning helicopter, saving the lives of others on board who would have died had the flame-engulfed chopper fallen from the sky.
Americans were mesmerized by the NVA 25-day hold on Hue City in 1968, and presumably would be similarly impressed by the 92nd Ranger Battalion 400-day stand at the remote base of Tong Le Chan. Completely cut off, resupplied only by air, the 92nd held, with ambulatory wounded refusing evacuation. Had a VA unit held out for over 400 days, surrounded and cut off, it would have made headline news. The 92nd Rangers did it and nothing was said. Had a handful of VC high school boys held off an allied attack it would also would have made headlines. A handful of high school boys did resist VC/NVA forces at the "Troung Thieu Sinh Quan", a junior high school military academy for sons of RVNAF (South Vietnamese) military fatalities. They resisted to the end in 1975, with twelve and thirteen year old boys sending younger kids home, staying in their barricaded school and fighting on. Many of them were killed and when the Communists came in they fought them. The Communists could not get into that academy. NVA forces eventually surrounded the school, threatened to level it with rockets, kill everyone inside, and negotiated a surrender. This last stand would presumably have had all the drama and "human interest" for a "big story" and had VC adolescents been involved opposing RVNAF , the story would undoubtedly have been trumpeted to the American public. To this day next to nothing has been said or printed, and the cadets at Troung Thieu Sinh Quan are not even a footnote to history.
Coverage of these stories could have gone on and should have gone side-by-side with negative reporting on corruption, civilian casualties, drug use, and other presumed universal evils of American involvement in Southeast Asia. It is neither suggested nor desired that blemishes or morally repugnant aspects be ignored or covered up. It is asserted, however, that it would have been far more honest to have contrasted examples of deplorable behavior with other aspects, not in the least rare, of which many Vietnam veterans are familiar with and participated in. Fairness and objectivity also demand that equal coverage be applied to the VC/NVA shortcomings and ruthless excesses shown in proportion to their existence and occurrence. Had all this been done the American public would have been able to understand something, and certainly much more than the psuedo-understanding derived from the "shoot-em-up-bang-bang" reporting they were continually exposed to. For any number of reasons, "positive" news did little for a reporter's career or ego, a career based on finding or inventing "stories" accentuating the negative while heightening public discontent.
Ignorance of military and Southeast Asia matters, of communist revolutionary warfare, fueled by potential for lucrative career advancement, unwilling or unable to report on South Vietnamese or Laotian troops except in cases of failure, apparently enthused by the visual impact of war and the destruction it causes, sometimes disdainful of South Vietnamese if not American troops while ignoring Australian, Korean, Thai, and New Zeland forces, the news media proved incapable of depicting Vietnam, and Hanoi's War, in its entirety . The American public saw the same "bang-bang" every year, and were misled into assuming nothing had changed, nothing was accomplished. Allied temporary defeats were portrayed as permanent setbacks, while victories and accomplishments went unreported, or were, with smug theatrics, cast aside as government propaganda.
News media misrepresentation not only misled and uninformed the American public, but also prohibited its ability to think and make logical inferences on its own.
In the final analysis, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Hanoi's war, and American involvement could not be, and cannot be, understood, in good part because of media failings, moral, intellectual, and otherwise. Without recognizing this, and knowing that what was reported was not the all-comprehensive truth of the matter, the subject itself cannot be understood. Overall, and efforts of responsible reporters notwithstanding, the nature and extent of news media failure in Vietnam exceeds that of allied military forces who were attempting to and succeeding, despite documented lies and bumbling, to stop Hanoi's War. Many people died and millions more have greatly suffered simply because the whole story was never told. And because what was portrayed in media reporting was demonstrably not, to use the famous Cronkite phrase, "the way it is."
This bitter judgement is itself based on beliefs articulated by Robert Elegant, himself a journalist : "Illusionary events reported by the press as well as real events within the press corps were more decisive that the clash of arms or the contention of idologies. For the first time in modern history, the outcome of a war was determined not on the battlefield but on the printed page , and above all, on
the television screen."
"Looking back, I believe it can be said that South Vietnam and American forces actually won the limited military struggle. They virtually crushed the Viet Cong in the South, the "native" guerillas who were directed, reinforced, and equipped from Hanoi, and thereafter they threw back the invasion by regular North Vietnamese divisions. Nonetheless, the war was finally lost to the invaders after the U.S. disengagement because the political pressures built up by the media had made it quite impossible for Washington to maintain even the minimal material and moral support that would have enabled the Saigon regime to continue effective resistance".
(Editor's note: Elegant, a highly acclaimed British reporter on Vietnam, later added these terrible words: "never before Vietnam had the collective policy of the media sought by graphic and unremitting distortion, the victory of the enemies of the correspondents own side."
Could this possibly be the truth about the performance of the U.S. media in Vietnam? In ending this series, from my extended observation and study of the media while on the home front during the war, this is certainly the way it looked to me. And many others. Said Senator Margaret Chase Smith, "The press has become more sympathetic to the enemy than to our own national interest."(Congressional Record, June 16, 1971)
292026Z APR 75
FROM: SECDEF
TO: ALL DOD COMPONENTS
SECDEF SENDS
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES:
AS THE LAST WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICANS FROM VIETNAM TAKES PLACE, IT IS MY SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO ADDRESS TO YOU, THE MEN AND WOMEN OF OUR ARMED FORCES, A FEW WORDS OF APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.
FOR MANY OF YOU, THE TRAGEDY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA IS MORE THAN A DISTANT AND
ABSTRACT EVENT. YOU HAVE FOUGHT THERE; YOU HAVE LOST COMRADES THERE; YOU
HAVE SUFFERED THERE. IN THIS HOUR OF PAIN AND REFLECTION YOU MAY FEEL THAT
YOUR EFFORTS AND SACRIFICES HAVE BEEN FOR NAUGHT.
THIS IS NOT THE CASE. WHEN THE PASSIONS HAVE MUTED AND THE HISTORY IS WRITTEN, AMERICANS WILL RECALL THAT THEIR ARMED FORCES SERVED THEM WELL. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES MORE DIFFICULT THAN EVER BEFORE FACED BY OUR MILITARY SERVICES, YOU ACCOMPLISHED THE MISSION ASSIGNED TO YOU BY HIGHER AUTHORITY. IN COMBAT YOU WERE VICTORIOUS AND YOU LEFT THE FIELD WITH HONOR.
THOUGH YOU HAVE DONE ALL THAT WAS ASKED OF YOU, IT WILL BE STATED THAT THE
WAR ITSELF WAS FUTILE. IN SOME SENSE, SUCH MAY BE SAID OF ANY NATIONAL EFFORT THAT ULTIMATELY FAILS. YET, YOUR INVOLVEMENT WAS NOT PURPOSELESS. IT WAS INTENDED TO ASSIST A SMALL NATION TO PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE IN THE FACE OF EXTERNAL ATTACK AND TO PROVIDE AT LEAST A REASONABLE CHANCE TO SURVIVE. THAT VIETNAM SUCCUMBED TO POWERFUL EXTERNAL FORCES VITIATES NEITHER THE EXPLICIT PURPOSE BEHIND OUR INVOLVEMENT, NOR THE IMPULSE OF GENEROSITY TOWARD THOSE UNDER ATTACK THAT HAS LONG INFUSED AMERICAN POLICY.
YOUR RECORD OF DUTY PERFORMED UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS REMAINS UNMATCHED. I SALUTE YOU FOR IT. BEYOND ANY QUESTION YOU ARE ENTITLED TO THE NATION'S RESPECT, ADMIRATION, AND GRATITUDE.
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
By Patrick Hayes
There's something wrong with a society where a large number of teenagers are no-nothing, uneducated, ignorant, emotionally dead and directionless garbage. Tough words? Maybe, but what words do we tell the families of slain and injured police officers, and other citizens, who have fallen pray to this tide of useless scum, living off society at the expense of us all, knowing there are no consequences for their actions? Recently, there were two handgun attacks on law enforcement officers in New Mexico by youths who thought nothing of shooting a cop. The two officers were wounded, one suspect was killed (by a veteran cop), the other wounded (by a rookie). Nationally, teen-involved shootings and shootings at police officers are on the rise. The question is, why?
Bottom line - an entire generation of teens (with more to come) are growing up without self-respect, much less respect for anyone else. They have no goals, no direction and certainly no discipline. They learn nothing from their TV shows, their computer and video games, and their Playstation II - nothing, that is, except reckless and needless violence, without consequences. And many parents of these "children" prove there are no consequences. If today's teens and twenty-something's have it so tough, how did our society survive the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the movement west and the building of a country, the Great Depression, two world wars, not to mention the centuries upon centuries of all our forefathers who had it even tougher?
Would today's teens have survived those tests of character? Obviously not. So why are we pandering to them now? Why is "discipline" a politically incorrect word to use in the same sentence as "children" or "teens"? Why don't teachers have the support of parents when those parents are told their son or daughter needs a little "guidance" - or in old-fashioned parlance - discipline? Like many other Americans, I am really tired of listening to the whining from the Left: the sociologists, the psychologists and the ever-present liberal
An apologist, telling us that everyone has an excuse for their actions. They didn't receive enough love, their mother didn't read to them, their father was aloof, or absent. So this becomes carte blanche for this societal garbage to do anything for kicks? "They're just kids, so send them to treatment rather than prison," is becoming a worn cliché, especially after these "kids" commit bloody, reckless, needless murder and other acts of violence. We have become not only a teen-violent society, but also a society of "victims"
and "losers." Andrea Yates in Texas murdered her five children in deliberate cold blood and claimed it was "a woman's thing," and received the staunch support of feminists and other left-wing activists. Her children, however, won't have the opportunity to become restless juveniles. Another prime example in this country of the completely left-wing, mindless, useless parenting are the parents of Johnny "bin" Walker, the Taliban fighter from northern California. Rather than neglected, this kid was given everything he wanted - apparently never denied anything - and still ended up in an Afghan prison where an American former Marine and CIA officer was murdered! "But," we hear, "Johnny has problems." BS! Johnny's only problem should be facing down a firing squad!
There is something inherently wrong with a society that protects the maladjusted perpetrators at the expense of the rights and freedoms of law-abiding citizens, while giving little or nothing to the few who volunteer to serve. However, at least since the draft-dodger left the White House, the current administration has moved to improve the lot of the American military - a step in the right direction, but why do these young men and women who protect our country appear to stand alone? Military obligation as a part of citizenship is as old as the Greeks, who required their young men to serve - and in serving, learned what being a citizen
really meant. Romans, from 17 to 60, considered service in the militia to be a great honor. There are still young men and women in the United States who feel it a privilege to wear their country's uniform.
But there are many others, thanks to the re-emergence of the American Left in the 1960s, who have, certainly since the Vietnam War, denigrated serving their country and fostered the "do your own thing" mentality on the youth that has grown up since the 1970s. The result, as argued previously, is another lost generation.
How many generations can we afford to lose?
Two of the elements that run through our history is that men usually have had to go to war, or at least serve their country at some point in their lives and, war or not, there was always a direction to follow, or objectives to be achieved - and historically, men gained that direction and discipline in their own lives by serving in the military. Anyone think it a little strange that the mass "problems" with teenagers began soon after the draft ended in 1973 - with the crop of Dr. Spock-guided parents? Yes, there have been extended periods of time when there was no conscription in the United States. However, there were other societal "norms" that gave
individuals their sense of dignity, discipline and direction - such as family and the extended family, a sense of belonging, a sense of honor, and a sense of personal pride. Today's "family" usually consists of a single parent with children, or a combination of two divorced families uniting - for a while - usually with a collection of confused and rootless offspring without direction, belonging, pride, and dignity and certainly without discipline. The current threat of terrorism is an aberration. The threat of violence from criminals - who are getting younger all the time - is a constant in our society.
The question is, what, as an advanced society with all the rights and privileges of such a society, do we do?
Today, we are engaged in a very violent, civilian-threatening war against worldwide terrorism. Yet, much of the military, and certainly National Guard and Reserve units, are under-strength, under-trained and under prepared for the threats the country faces.
Maybe, just maybe, the answer to both dilemmas facing the country is reintroducing conscripted service - the draft. No one would argue that the draft would immediately solve societal problems, or that the military wants society's misfits. But it may be a place to start. When you have a society that has grown so soft and ignorant that its young members know nothing of where they came, depending on a small cadre of ill-trained and ill-equipped volunteers - which continues to get smaller - to hold the line and protect them, then we invite the common threat of victimization, as we witnessed on Sept. 11, 2001. The Left will tell us that there were many reasons why we were attacked on September 11, but there is one primary reason that the attack was so successful. We, as a nation, were unprepared, we were weak and we were ignorant. We as a nation are now led by a Congress with the likes of Tom Daschle, Joe Biden, Ed Kennedy, Pat Leahy, Joe Lieberman, Chuck Shumer, and Hillary Clinton, to name but a few, none of whom has ever served a minute in uniform, who seem to be out of touch with the majority of Americans. They lack the knowledge, but more importantly, they lack the experience to be able to make, much less comprehend, decisions of life and death made on a battlefield.
Two years of conscripted military service for every male of 18 years of age would, I believe, bring the sense of direction, purpose and discipline back to a country that is adrift in a violent and threatening sea. Although the skipper and crew are sound, the ship's hull and rudder seems to be spineless and lacking direction. With a reinstated draft, it would no longer be necessary for most recruiters to be scouring the bottom of the barrel for warm bodies. From the Defense Department's position, it would no longer be necessary to lower the standards to such a level that it becomes a dangerous proposition to field such troops who are ill-trained, ill-equipped, ill-led, with a total lack of discipline. Two years of conscripted service for every able-bodied male, without college deferments or family-purchased "get out of draft" cards, would change the complexion of crime in this country. Young men would again be given direction and a meaning to their lives, if only to know that they want to do something other than serve in the military following their term. Regardless, that training would remain with them for the rest of their lives and help guide them to be productive citizens, possibly even elected officials. But at least they would learn to make that decision and have those goals, enhanced by the
self-discipline and self-respect gained in no-holds barred military environment. Once in uniform, the time-wasting "sensitivity training" and other anti-military nonsense invoked by the Clinton crowd that worked to devoid the services of their raison d'etre - to fight and win wars (or as another former Marine recently reminded me, to close with and kill the enemy) - need to be addressed. The military must get back to basics: bayonet practice and rifle marksmanship, leadership and responsibility. Pregnancy and the military is an oxymoron.
The military is not a social science laboratory. It is what keeps us protected from the barbarians at the gate. Like the Greatest Generation, we need to again produce a generation of men who believe in themselves, but more importantly, believe in their country, unlike the crop of spineless handwringers currently holding sway in the U.S. Senate.
Patrick Hayes is a contributing editor to Defense Watch. He can be reached at Gyrene65@netscape.net.

Question: where did the us military counselors first arrive in india

Since the 1950s, U.S. military counselors began to arrive in an area that was then known as the French Indochina.

where did the us military counselors first arrive in india

Question: when did us military counselors arrive in vijetnamu

when did us military counselors arrive in vijetnamu

Question: who was the rat in vijetnamu based on

vojni savjetnici počeli su dolaziti u područje koje je tada bilo poznato kao Francuska Indokina .

Question: what is the job of a rat in vijetnamu

Question: who helped the rat in vijetnamu

Since the 1950s , U.S. military counselors began to arrive in an area that was then known as the French Indochina .

Od 1950. godine američki vojni savjetnici počeli su dolaziti u područje koje je tada bilo poznato kao Francuska Indokina.

Od 1950. godine američki vojni savjetnici počeli su dolaziti u područje koje je tada bilo poznato kao Francuska Indokina.

Since the 1950s, U.S. military counselors began to arrive in an area that was then known as the French Indochina.

Since the 1950s, U.S. military counselors began to arrive in an area that was then known as the French Indochina.

G and Joseph L. Galloway

We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (page 57).

In Vietnam, the war is known as the Kháng chiến anti-America (War for Resistance against America).

Question: the vietnam war was known as what

G and Joseph L. Galloway

We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (page 57).

In Vietnam, the war is known as the Kháng chiến anti-America (War for Resistance against America).

Question: what is the meaning of kháng chiến anti-america

G and Joseph L. Galloway

what is the meaning of kháng chiến anti-america

Question: what was the vietnam war known as in the south

G and Joseph L. Galloway

what was the vietnam war known as in the south

Question: what is the title of the book by joseph galloway about the viet

G and Joseph L. Galloway

what is the title of the book by joseph galloway about the viet

Question: what is the title of the book by joseph l galloway and jose

We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam

We Are Soldiers Still : A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam

G and Joseph L. Galloway

We Are Soldiers Still : A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam

what is the title of the book by joseph l galloway and jose

Question: what is the war in vietnam called

G and Joseph L. Galloway

Question: what is the title of the book by joseph l galloway we are soldiers

A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam

A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam

G and Joseph L. Galloway

A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam

what is the title of the book by joseph l galloway we are soldiers

Question: who wrote we are soldiers still a journey back to the battlefields of vietnam

G and Joseph L. Galloway

who wrote we are soldiers still a journey back to the battlefields of vietnam

We Are Soldiers Still : A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam ( page 57 ) .

In Vietnam , the war is known as the Kháng chiến anti - America ( War for Resistance against America ) .

G and Joseph L. Galloway We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (str. 57). Na vijetnamskom jeziku rat je poznat pod imenom Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (Rat za otpor protiv Amerike).

We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (str. 57).

Na vijetnamskom jeziku rat je poznat pod imenom Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (Rat za otpor protiv Amerike).

G and Joseph L. Galloway We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (page 57). In Vietnam, the war is known as the Kháng chiến anti-America (War for Resistance against America).

We Are Soldiers Still: A Journey Back to the Battlefields of Vietnam (page 57).

In Vietnam, the war is known as the Kháng chiến anti-America (War for Resistance against America).

The background of the conflict until 1949, France in the late 50s of the 19th century began with the occupation of the Indochine, and the situation calmed only in 1893.

Question: when did the rat u vijetnamu situation calm down

The background of the conflict until 1949, France in the late 50s of the 19th century began with the occupation of the Indochine, and the situation calmed only in 1893.

when did the rat u vijetnamu situation calm down

Question: when did the rat u vijetnamu conflict end

when did the rat u vijetnamu conflict end

Question: who was involved in rat u vijetnamu war

Question: who did france occupy in vijetnamu in the 19th century

who did france occupy in vijetnamu in the 19th century

Question: who was involved in rat u vijetnamu conflict

who was involved in rat u vijetnamu conflict

Question: how long did the rat vijetnamu conflict last

how long did the rat vijetnamu conflict last

Question: what started the rat u vijetnamu conflict

započela s okupiranjem Indokine , a situacija se smirila tek 1893 . godine . Ooi ,

what started the rat u vijetnamu conflict

Question: when did rat u vijetnamu take place

kasnih 50-ih godina 19 . stoljeća započela

The background of the conflict until 1949 , France in the late 50s of the 19th century began with the occupation of the Indochine , and the situation calmed only in 1893 .

Pozadina sukoba do 1949. godine Francuska je kasnih 50-ih godina 19. stoljeća započela s okupiranjem Indokine, a situacija se smirila tek 1893. godine.Ooi, Keat Gin.

Pozadina sukoba do 1949. godine Francuska je kasnih 50-ih godina 19. stoljeća započela s okupiranjem Indokine, a situacija se smirila tek 1893. godine.Ooi, Keat Gin.

The background of the conflict until 1949, France in the late 50s of the 19th century began with the occupation of the Indochine, and the situation calmed only in 1893.

The background of the conflict until 1949, France in the late 50s of the 19th century began with the occupation of the Indochine, and the situation calmed only in 1893.

The Viet Minh Coalition was founded as an organization that will fight for independence from France, but which also opposed the Japanese occupation in 1945 for the same reasons.

Question: when was the viet minh coalition formed

The Viet Minh Coalition was founded as an organization that will fight for independence from France, but which also opposed the Japanese occupation in 1945 for the same reasons.

Question: what is the name of the group that fought for independence from france

"Koalicija Viet Minh osnovana je kao organizacija koja će se boriti za neovisnost od Francuske

what is the name of the group that fought for independence from france

Question: the viet minh coalition fought for independence from which country in 1945

the viet minh coalition fought for independence from which country in 1945

Question: what did the viet minh coalition oppose in 1945

japanskoj okupaciji 1945 . godine iz istih razloga .

what did the viet minh coalition oppose in 1945

Question: who occupied vietnam in 1945

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name of which guerrilla group

rat u vijetnamu was the name of which guerrilla group

The Viet Minh Coalition was founded as an organization that will fight for independence from France , but which also opposed the Japanese occupation in 1945 for the same reasons .

Koalicija Viet Minh osnovana je kao organizacija koja će se boriti za neovisnost od Francuske, ali koja se također protivila i japanskoj okupaciji 1945. godine iz istih razloga.

Koalicija Viet Minh osnovana je kao organizacija koja će se boriti za neovisnost od Francuske, ali koja se također protivila i japanskoj okupaciji 1945. godine iz istih razloga.

The Viet Minh Coalition was founded as an organization that will fight for independence from France, but which also opposed the Japanese occupation in 1945 for the same reasons.

The Viet Minh Coalition was founded as an organization that will fight for independence from France, but which also opposed the Japanese occupation in 1945 for the same reasons.

During 1944 and 1945, North Vietnam was hit by a mass hunger due to a combination of bad weather and French-Japanese exploitation (French Indochina had to supply Japan with grain).

Question: what did japan supply north vietnam with during the war

During 1944 and 1945, North Vietnam was hit by a mass hunger due to a combination of bad weather and French-Japanese exploitation (French Indochina had to supply Japan with grain).

what did japan supply north vietnam with during the war

Question: what was the cause of the hunger in vietnam

francusko - japanske eksploatacije ( Francuska Indokina trebala je opskrbljivati Japan žitom ) .

what was the cause of the hunger in vietnam

Question: what was the cause of the rat war in vietnam

what was the cause of the rat war in vietnam

Question: when was the last time vietnam had hunger

when was the last time vietnam had hunger

Question: what did french indochina supply to north vietnam

what did french indochina supply to north vietnam

Question: who supplied japan with grain in vietnam

who supplied japan with grain in vietnam

During 1944 and 1945 , North Vietnam was hit by a mass hunger due to a combination of bad weather and French - Japanese exploitation ( French Indochina had to supply Japan with grain ) .

Tijekom 1944. i 1945. godine Sjeverni Vijetnam pogodila je masovna glad zbog kombinacije lošeg vremena i francusko-japanske eksploatacije (Francuska Indokina trebala je opskrbljivati Japan žitom).

Tijekom 1944. i 1945. godine Sjeverni Vijetnam pogodila je masovna glad zbog kombinacije lošeg vremena i francusko-japanske eksploatacije (Francuska Indokina trebala je opskrbljivati Japan žitom).

During 1944 and 1945, North Vietnam was hit by a mass hunger due to a combination of bad weather and French-Japanese exploitation (French Indochina had to supply Japan with grain).

During 1944 and 1945, North Vietnam was hit by a mass hunger due to a combination of bad weather and French-Japanese exploitation (French Indochina had to supply Japan with grain).

On 22 August 1945, after the Japanese capitulation, Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. of the Bureau of Strategic Services, accompanied by the representative of the French government, Jean Sainteny, arrived in Hanoi for a mercy mission to release the captured French soldiers.

GBH Openvault
Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Carleton Swift
Part of The Vietnam Collection.
Carleton Swift, a CIA employee, replaced Archimedes Patti as head of the O.S.S mission in Hanoi. Swift recounts why he got involved with Indochina and his experiences after he took the mission over from Patti. Swift recalls his impressions of Ho Chi Minh describing him as a slight man and Swift admits to not understand how Ho Chi Minh gained so much power. Swift discusses the way the Americans dealt with the North Vietnamese and the friendships that developed.
License Clip
- Series
- Vietnam: A Television History
- Title
Interview with Carleton Swift
- Series Description
This 13 part series covers the history of Vietnam from France's colonial control, through the 1945 revolution, to the 1975 U.S. evacuation from Saigon and the years beyond. The series' objective approach permits viewers to form their own conclusions about the war. 101--Roots of a War--Despite cordial relations between American intelligence officers and Communist leader Ho Chi Minh in the turbulent closing months of World War II, French and British hostility to the Vietnamese revolution laid the groundwork for a new war. 102--The First Vietnam War (1946-1954)--The French generals expected to defeat Ho's rag-tag Vietminh guerrillas easily, but after eight years of fighting and $2.5 billion in U.S. aid, the French lost a crucial battle at Dienbienphu--and with it, their Asian empire. 103--America's Mandarin (1954-1963)--To stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, America replaced France in South Vietnam--supporting autocratic President Ngo Dinyh Diem until his own generals turned against him in a coup that brought political chaos to Saigon. 104--LBJ Goes to War (1964-1965)--With Ho Chi Minh determined to reunite Vietnam, Lyndon Baines Johnson determined to prevent it, and South Vietnam on the verge of collapse, the stage was set for massive escalation of the undeclared Vietnam War. 105--America Takes Charge (1965-1967)--In two years, the Johnson Administration's troop build-up dispatched 1.5 million Americans to Vietnam to fight a war they found baffling, tedious, exciting, deadly and unforgettable. 106--America's Enemy (1954-1967)--The Vietnam War as seen from different perspectives: by Vietcong guerrillas and sympathizers; by North Vietnamese leaders; by rank and file; and by American held prisoner in Hanoi. 107--Tet (1968)--The massive enemy offensive at the Lunar New Year decimated the Vietcong and failed to topple the Saigon government, but led to the beginning of America's military withdrawal. 108--Vietnamizing the War (1968-1973)--President Nixon's program of troop pull-outs, stepped-up bombing and huge arms shipments to Saigon changed the war, and left GI's wondering which of them would be the last to die in Vietnam. 109--Cambodia and Laos--Despite technical neutrality, both of Vietnam's smaller neighbors were drawn into the war, suffered massive bombing, and in the case of Cambodia, endured a post-war holocaust of nightmare proportions. 110--Peace is at Hand (1968-1973)--While American and Vietnamese continued to clash in battle, diplomats in Paris argued about making peace, after more than four years reaching an accord that proved to be a preface to further bloodshed. 111--Homefront USA--Americans at home divide over a distant war, clashing in the streets as demonstrations lead to bloodshed, bitterness and increasing doubts about the outcome. 112--The End of the Tunnel (1973-1975)--Through troubled years of controversy and violence, U.S. casualties mounted, victory remained elusive and American opinion moved from general approval to general dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war. 113--Legacies--Vietnam is in the Soviet orbit, poorer than ever, at war on two fronts; America's legacy includes more than one half million Asian refugees, one half million Vietnam veterans and some questions that won't go away. Series release date: 9/1983
- Duration
00:34:17
- Asset Type
Raw video
- Media Type
Video
- Subjects
- Communism
- France--History, Military--20th century
- Cold War
- Imperialism
- Nationalism and communism
- Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American
- France--Colonies--Asia
- Vietnam War, 1961-1975
- Japan--History, Military--1868-1945
- Capitulations, Military
- Diplomacy
- United States--History--1945-
- United States--Foreign relations--1945-1989
- Indochinese War, 1946-1954
- United States--History, Military--20th century
- International relations
- Colonization
- United States. Office of Strategic Services
- Subversive activities
- National liberation movements
- Genres
- Documentary
- Topics
- War and Conflict
- Creators
- Ellison, Richard (Series Producer)
- Contributors
- Swift, Carleton (Interviewee)
- Publication Information
- WGBH Educational Foundation
- Rights Summary
No materials may be re-used without references to appearance releases and WGBH/UMass Boston contract. 2) It is the liability of a production to investigate and re-clear all rights before re-use in any project. Rights Holder: WGBH Educational Foundation
- Citation
- Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Carleton Swift,” GBH Archives, accessed October 10, 2022, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_192BA69A0BD046C48872A2C4B62AAE24.
- MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Carleton Swift.” GBH Archives. Web. October 10, 2022. <http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_192BA69A0BD046C48872A2C4B62AAE24>.
- APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Interview with Carleton Swift. Boston, MA: GBH Archives. Retrieved from http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_192BA69A0BD046C48872A2C4B62AAE24

Question: who was the french representative in vijetnamu

On 22 August 1945, after the Japanese capitulation, Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. of the Bureau of Strategic Services, accompanied by the representative of the French government, Jean Sainteny, arrived in Hanoi for a mercy mission to release the captured French soldiers.

who was the french representative in vijetnamu

Question: when did the japanese surrender rat u vijetnamu

when did the japanese surrender rat u vijetnamu

Question: where was rat u vijetnamu held in 1945

Question: where was rat u vijetnamu located in vietnam

Ureda za strateške usluge Archimedes Patti i Carleton B. Swift Jr . u pratnji predstavnika francuske

where was rat u vijetnamu located in vietnam

Question: who were the two leaders of rat u vijetnamu

Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr.

Archimedes Patti i Carleton B. Swift Jr .

Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr.

who were the two leaders of rat u vijetnamu

Question: what happened in vijetnamu during world war 2

what happened in vijetnamu during world war 2

On 22 August 1945 , after the Japanese capitulation , Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. of the Bureau of Strategic Services , accompanied by the representative of the French government , Jean Sainteny , arrived in Hanoi for a mercy mission to release the captured French soldiers .

Dana 22. kolovoza 1945. godine, nakon japanske kapitulacije, agenti Ureda za strateške usluge Archimedes Patti i Carleton B. Swift Jr. u pratnji predstavnika francuske vlade Jeana Saintenyja došli su u Hanoi na milosnu misiju kako bi oslobodili zarobljene francuske vojnike.Interview with Carleton Swift, 1981,

Dana 22. kolovoza 1945. godine, nakon japanske kapitulacije, agenti Ureda za strateške usluge Archimedes Patti i Carleton B. Swift Jr. u pratnji predstavnika francuske vlade Jeana Saintenyja došli su u Hanoi na milosnu misiju kako bi oslobodili zarobljene francuske vojnike.Interview with Carleton Swift, 1981,

On 22 August 1945, after the Japanese capitulation, Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. of the Bureau of Strategic Services, accompanied by the representative of the French government, Jean Sainteny, arrived in Hanoi for a mercy mission to release the captured French soldiers.

On 22 August 1945, after the Japanese capitulation, Archimedes Patti and Carleton B. Swift Jr. of the Bureau of Strategic Services, accompanied by the representative of the French government, Jean Sainteny, arrived in Hanoi for a mercy mission to release the captured French soldiers.

During the month of August, the Japanese troops remained inactive, so Viet Minh and other nationalist groups took over public buildings and weapons with which the so-called October Revolution began.

GBH Openvault
Vietnam: A Television History; Roots of a War; Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981
Part of The Vietnam Collection.
04/01/1981
Archimedes Patti was an officer in the United States Army and, after World War Two, the Office of Strategic Services. Mr. Patti describes the U.S. position on Southeast Asia during World War Two, and the emerging Vietnamese Independence Movement. He describes his first meetings with Ho Chi Minh and details the assistance of the Viet Minh in the war effort. He recalls the scene in Hanoi after the war and the attempts by the French to recoup their colony. He details his talks with Ho, and notes that the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence was quite similar to that of the United States. He concludes with his views of the Vietnam War from the perspective of one who understood the roots of the conflict and knew how it could have been avoided.
License Clip
- Series
- Vietnam: A Television History
- Program
- Roots of a War
- Program Number
101
- Title
Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981
- Series Description
This 13 part series covers the history of Vietnam from France's colonial control, through the 1945 revolution, to the 1975 U.S. evacuation from Saigon and the years beyond. The series' objective approach permits viewers to form their own conclusions about the war. 101--Roots of a War--Despite cordial relations between American intelligence officers and Communist leader Ho Chi Minh in the turbulent closing months of World War II, French and British hostility to the Vietnamese revolution laid the groundwork for a new war. 102--The First Vietnam War (1946-1954)--The French generals expected to defeat Ho's rag-tag Vietminh guerrillas easily, but after eight years of fighting and $2.5 billion in U.S. aid, the French lost a crucial battle at Dienbienphu--and with it, their Asian empire. 103--America's Mandarin (1954-1963)--To stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia, America replaced France in South Vietnam--supporting autocratic President Ngo Dinyh Diem until his own generals turned against him in a coup that brought political chaos to Saigon. 104--LBJ Goes to War (1964-1965)--With Ho Chi Minh determined to reunite Vietnam, Lyndon Baines Johnson determined to prevent it, and South Vietnam on the verge of collapse, the stage was set for massive escalation of the undeclared Vietnam War. 105--America Takes Charge (1965-1967)--In two years, the Johnson Administration's troop build-up dispatched 1.5 million Americans to Vietnam to fight a war they found baffling, tedious, exciting, deadly and unforgettable. 106--America's Enemy (1954-1967)--The Vietnam War as seen from different perspectives: by Vietcong guerrillas and sympathizers; by North Vietnamese leaders; by rank and file; and by American held prisoner in Hanoi. 107--Tet (1968)--The massive enemy offensive at the Lunar New Year decimated the Vietcong and failed to topple the Saigon government, but led to the beginning of America's military withdrawal. 108--Vietnamizing the War (1968-1973)--President Nixon's program of troop pull-outs, stepped-up bombing and huge arms shipments to Saigon changed the war, and left GI's wondering which of them would be the last to die in Vietnam. 109--Cambodia and Laos--Despite technical neutrality, both of Vietnam's smaller neighbors were drawn into the war, suffered massive bombing, and in the case of Cambodia, endured a post-war holocaust of nightmare proportions. 110--Peace is at Hand (1968-1973)--While American and Vietnamese continued to clash in battle, diplomats in Paris argued about making peace, after more than four years reaching an accord that proved to be a preface to further bloodshed. 111--Homefront USA--Americans at home divide over a distant war, clashing in the streets as demonstrations lead to bloodshed, bitterness and increasing doubts about the outcome. 112--The End of the Tunnel (1973-1975)--Through troubled years of controversy and violence, U.S. casualties mounted, victory remained elusive and American opinion moved from general approval to general dissatisfaction with the Vietnam war. 113--Legacies--Vietnam is in the Soviet orbit, poorer than ever, at war on two fronts; America's legacy includes more than one half million Asian refugees, one half million Vietnam veterans and some questions that won't go away. Series release date: 9/1983
- Program Description
Despite cordial relations between American intelligence officers and Communist leader Ho Chi Minh in the turbulent closing months of World War II, French and British hostility to the Vietnamese revolution laid the groundwork for a new war.
- Duration
01:17:19
- Asset Type
Raw video
- Media Type
Video
- Subjects
- Japan--History, Military
- United States--Foreign relations--1945-1989
- National liberation movements
- Hanoi (Vietnam)--History
- United States--History--1945-
- France--Colonies--Asia
- Viet Nam doc lap dong minh hoi
- United States--Politics and government
- United States. Office of Strategic Services
- Nationalism
- Decolonization
- Ho, Chi Minh, 1890-1969
- Vietnam--Politics and government
- Patti, Archimedes L. A.
- Vietnam--History--August Revolution, 1945
- France--Politics and government
- Capitulations, Military
- Vietnam War, 1961-1975
- Vietnam (Democratic Republic)
- Rice
- Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Personal narratives, American
- Genres
- Documentary
- Topics
- War and Conflict
- Creators
- Ellison, Richard (Series Producer)
- Contributors
- Patti, Archimedes L. A. (Interviewee)
- Publication Information
- WGBH Educational Foundation
- Rights Summary
No materials may be re-used without references to appearance releases and WGBH/UMass Boston contract. 2) It is the liability of a production to investigate and re-clear all rights before re-use in any project. Rights Holder: WGBH Educational Foundation
- Citation
- Chicago: “Vietnam: A Television History; Roots of a War; Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981,” 04/01/1981, GBH Archives, accessed October 10, 2022, http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_3267C58E4C104A54A0AFDF230D618AE6.
- MLA: “Vietnam: A Television History; Roots of a War; Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981.” 04/01/1981. GBH Archives. Web. October 10, 2022. <http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_3267C58E4C104A54A0AFDF230D618AE6>.
- APA: Vietnam: A Television History; Roots of a War; Interview with Archimedes L. A. Patti, 1981. Boston, MA: GBH Archives. Retrieved from http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_3267C58E4C104A54A0AFDF230D618AE6

Question: who won the battle of vijetnamu in 1968

During the month of August, the Japanese troops remained inactive, so Viet Minh and other nationalist groups took over public buildings and weapons with which the so-called October Revolution began.

Question: what was the name of the revolution in vietnam

what was the name of the revolution in vietnam

Question: in which month of the year did the vietnamese revolution take place

in which month of the year did the vietnamese revolution take place

Question: when did the vietnamese revolution start in vietnam

when did the vietnamese revolution start in vietnam

Question: who took over buildings in vietnam during october revolution

Viet Minh i ostale nacionalističke skupine

who took over buildings in vietnam during october revolution

Question: who were the main forces in vietnam during the october revolution

who were the main forces in vietnam during the october revolution

Question: who took over buildings in vijetnamu during october revolution

who took over buildings in vijetnamu during october revolution

Question: in which month of the year did the rat u vijetnamu revolution take

in which month of the year did the rat u vijetnamu revolution take

During the month of August , the Japanese troops remained inactive , so Viet Minh and other nationalist groups took over public buildings and weapons with which the so - called October Revolution began .

Tijekom mjeseca kolovoza japanske trupe ostale su neaktivne pa su Viet Minh i ostale nacionalističke skupine preuzele javne zgrade i oružja čime je započela tzv. Kolovoška revolucija.

Tijekom mjeseca kolovoza japanske trupe ostale su neaktivne pa su Viet Minh i ostale nacionalističke skupine preuzele javne zgrade i oružja čime je započela tzv. Kolovoška revolucija.

During the month of August, the Japanese troops remained inactive, so Viet Minh and other nationalist groups took over public buildings and weapons with which the so-called October Revolution began.

During the month of August, the Japanese troops remained inactive, so Viet Minh and other nationalist groups took over public buildings and weapons with which the so-called October Revolution began.

The French arrived in Hanoi in March, and in November of the same year they dismissed and dismissed the Viet Minh organization from the city.

The British forces left the territory on March 26, 1946, leaving Vietnam completely in the hands of the French.

Question: when did the british leave vietnam

26 . ožujka 1946 . ostavivši Vijetnam u potpunosti u rukama Francuza .

The French arrived in Hanoi in March, and in November of the same year they dismissed and dismissed the Viet Minh organization from the city.

The British forces left the territory on March 26, 1946, leaving Vietnam completely in the hands of the French.

Question: when did the french arrive in vietnam

Question: who took over vietnam from the british

Question: who took over vietnam from britain in 1946

who took over vietnam from britain in 1946

Question: where did the french first land in vietnam

where did the french first land in vietnam

Question: who did the french dismiss from vietnam in 1946

who did the french dismiss from vietnam in 1946

The French arrived in Hanoi in March , and in November of the same year they dismissed and dismissed the Viet Minh organization from the city .

The British forces left the territory on March 26 , 1946 , leaving Vietnam completely in the hands of the French .

Francuzi su došli u Hanoi u ožujku, a u studenom iste godine svrgnuli su i protjerali organizaciju Viet Minh iz grada. Britanske snage napustile su područje 26. ožujka 1946. ostavivši Vijetnam u potpunosti u rukama Francuza.

Francuzi su došli u Hanoi u ožujku, a u studenom iste godine svrgnuli su i protjerali organizaciju Viet Minh iz grada.

Britanske snage napustile su područje 26. ožujka 1946. ostavivši Vijetnam u potpunosti u rukama Francuza.

The French arrived in Hanoi in March, and in November of the same year they dismissed and dismissed the Viet Minh organization from the city. The British forces left the territory on March 26, 1946, leaving Vietnam completely in the hands of the French.

The French arrived in Hanoi in March, and in November of the same year they dismissed and dismissed the Viet Minh organization from the city.

The British forces left the territory on March 26, 1946, leaving Vietnam completely in the hands of the French.

In July 1950, Chinese military advisors began helping Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, p.

The Routledge (2002)

Their weapons, expertise, and labor discipline have converted Viet Minh from the guerrilla troops into a regular army.

1941
Communist activist Ho Chi Minh secretly returns
to Vietnam after 30 years in exile and organizes a nationalist organization
known as the Viet Minh (Vietnam Independence League). After Japanese troops
occupy Vietnam during World War II, the U.S. military intelligence agency
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) allies with Ho Chi Minh and his Viet
Minh guerrillas to harass Japanese troops in the jungles and to help rescue
downed American pilots.
1945
March 9, 1945 - Amid
rumors of a possible American invasion, Japanese oust the French colonial
government which had been operating independently and seize control of
Vietnam, installing Bao Dai as their puppet ruler.
Summer - Severe famine
strikes Hanoi and surrounding areas eventually resulting in two million
deaths from starvation out of a population of ten million. The famine generates
political unrest and peasant revolts against the Japanese and remnants
of French colonial society. Ho Chi Minh capitalizes on the turmoil by successfully
spreading his Viet Minh movement.
July 1945 - Following the defeat of Nazi
Germany, World War II Allies including the U.S., Britain, and Soviet
Union, hold the Potsdam Conference in Germany to plan the post-war world.
Vietnam is considered a minor item on the agenda.
In order to disarm the Japanese in Vietnam, the Allies divide the country
in half at the 16th parallel. Chinese Nationalists will move in and disarm
the Japanese north of the parallel while the British will move in and do
the same in the south.
During the conference, representatives from France request the return
of all French pre-war colonies in Southeast Asia (Indochina). Their request
is granted. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia will once again become French colonies
following the removal of the Japanese.
August 1945 - Japanese surrender unconditionally.
Vietnam's puppet emperor, Bao Dai, abdicates. Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas
occupy Hanoi and proclaim a provisional government.
September 2, 1945 - Japanese sign the surrender
agreement in Tokyo Bay formally ending World War II in the Pacific. On
this same day, Ho Chi Minh proclaims the independence of Vietnam by quoting
from the text of the American Declaration of Independence which had been
supplied to him by the OSS -- "We hold the truth that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
rights, among them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This immortal
statement is extracted from the Declaration of Independence of the United
States of America in 1776. These are undeniable truths."
Ho declares himself president of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam and pursues American recognition but is repeatedly
ignored by President Harry Truman.
September 13, 1945 - British forces arrive
in Saigon, South Vietnam.
In North Vietnam, 150,000 Chinese Nationalist soldiers, consisting mainly
of poor peasants, arrive in Hanoi after looting Vietnamese villages during
their entire march down from China. They then proceed to loot Hanoi.
September 22, 1945 - In South Vietnam,
1400 French soldiers released by the British from former Japanese internment
camps enter Saigon and go on a deadly rampage, attacking Viet Minh and
killing innocent civilians including children, aided by French civilians
who joined the rampage. An estimated 20,000 French civilians live in Saigon.
September 24, 1945 - In Saigon, Viet Minh
successfully organize a general strike shutting down all commerce along
with electricity and water supplies. In a suburb of Saigon, members of
Binh Xuyen, a Vietnamese criminal organization, massacre 150 French and
Eurasian civilians, including children.
September 26, 1945 - The first American
death in Vietnam occurs, during the unrest in Saigon, as OSS officer Lt.
Col. A. Peter Dewey is killed by Viet Minh guerrillas who mistook him for
a French officer. Before his death, Dewey had filed a report on the deepening
crisis in Vietnam, stating his opinion that the U.S. "ought to clear
out of Southeast Asia."
October 1945 - 35,000 French soldiers under
the command of World War II General Jacques Philippe Leclerc arrive in
South Vietnam to restore French rule. Viet Minh immediately begin a guerrilla
campaign to harass them. The French then succeed in expelling the Viet
Minh from Saigon.
1946
February 1946 - The
Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek agree to withdraw from North Vietnam and
allow the French to return in exchange for French concessions in Shanghai
and other Chinese ports.
March 1946 - Ho Chi
Minh agrees to permit French troops to return to Hanoi temporarily in exchange
for French recognition of his Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Chinese troops
then depart.
May-September - Ho Chi Minh spends four
months in France attempting to negotiate full independence and unity for
Vietnam, but fails to obtain any guarantee from the French.
June 1946 - In a major affront to Ho Chi
Minh, the French high commissioner for Indochina proclaims a separatist
French-controlled government for South Vietnam (Republic of Chochinchina).
November 1946 - After a series of violent
clashes with Viet Minh, French forces bombard Haiphong harbor and occupy
Hanoi, forcing Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh forces to retreat into the
jungle.
December 19, 1946 - In Hanoi, 30,000 Viet
Minh launch their first large-scale attack against the French. Thus begins
an eight year struggle known as the First Indochina War. "The resistance
will be long and arduous, but our cause is just and we will surely triumph,"
declares Viet Minh military commander Vo Nguyen Giap. "If these [people]
want a fight, they'll get it," French military commander Gen. Etrienne
Valluy states.
1947
October 7- December 22 - The French conduct
Operation Lea, a series of attacks on Viet Minh guerrilla positions in
North Vietnam near the Chinese border. Although the Viet Minh suffer over
9000 causalities, most of the 40,000 strong Viet Minh force slips away
through gaps in the French lines.
1949
March 8, 1949 - The French install Bao
Dai as puppet head of state in South Vietnam.
July 1949 - The French establish the (South) Vietnamese
National Army.
October 1949 - Mao Zedong's Communist forces
defeat Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army in the Chinese civil war. Mao's
victory ignites American anti-Communist sentiment regarding Southeast Asia
and will result in a White House foreign policy goal of "containment"
of Communist expansion in the region.
1950
January 1950 - The People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union recognize Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic
of Vietnam.
China then begins sending military advisors and modern weapons to the
Viet Minh including automatic weapons, mortars, howitzers, and trucks.
Much of the equipment is American-made and had belonged to the Chinese
Nationalists before their defeat by Mao. With the influx of new equipment
and Chinese advisors, General Giap transforms his guerrilla fighters into
conventional army units including five light infantry divisions and one
heavy division.
February 1950 - The United States and Britain
recognize Bao Dai's French-controlled South Vietnam government.
February 1950 - Viet Minh begin an offensive
against French outposts in North Vietnam near the Chinese border.
February 7, 1950 - In America, the era
of 'McCarthyism' erupts as Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin gives
a speech claiming the U.S. State Department harbors Communists. As a consequence
of McCarthyism, no U.S. politician is willing to appear to be 'soft' on
Communism.
June 30, 1950 - President Harry S. Truman
orders U.S. ground troops into Korea following Communist North Korea's
invasion of the South. In his message to the American people, Truman describes
the invasion as a Moscow-backed attack by "monolithic world Communism."
July 26, 1950 - United States military
involvement in Vietnam begins as President Harry Truman authorizes $15
million in military aid to the French.
American military advisors will accompany the flow of U.S. tanks, planes,
artillery and other supplies to Vietnam. Over the next four years, the
U.S. will spend $3 Billion on the French war and by 1954 will provide 80
percent of all war supplies used by the French.
September 16, 1950 - General Giap begins
his main attack against French outposts near the Chinese border. As the
outposts fall, the French lose 6000 men and large stores of military equipment
to the Viet Minh.
September 27, 1950 - The U.S. establishes
a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon to aid the French
Army.
1951
January 13, 1951 - 20,000 Viet Minh under
Gen. Giap begin a series of attacks on fortified French positions in the
Red River Delta (extending from Hanoi to the Gulf of Tonkin). The open
areas of the Delta, in contrast to the jungle, allow French troops under
the new command of Gen. Jean de Lattre to strike back with devastating
results from the 'De Lattre Line' which encircles the region. 6000 Viet
Minh die while assaulting the town of Vinh Yen near Hanoi in the first
attack, causing Giap to withdraw.
March 23-28 - In the second attack, Giap
targets the Mao Khe outpost near Haiphong. But Giap withdraws after being
pounded by French naval gunfire and air strikes. 3000 Viet Minh are killed.
May 29-June 18 - Giap makes yet another
attempt to break through the De Lattre Line, this time in the Day River
area southeast of Hanoi. French reinforcements, combined with air strikes
and armed boat attacks result in another defeat for Giap with 10,000 killed
and wounded. Among the French causalities is Bernard de Lattre, the only
son of General De Lattre.
June 9, 1951 - Giap begins a general withdrawal
of Viet Minh troops from the Red River Delta.
September 1951 - Gen. De Lattre travels
to Washington seeking more aid from the Pentagon.
November 16, 1951 - French forces link
up at Hoa Binh southwest of Hanoi as Gen. De Lattre attempts to seize the
momentum and lure Giap into a major battle.
November 20, 1951 - Stricken by cancer,
ailing Gen. De Lattre is replaced by Gen. Raoul Salan. De Lattre returns
home and dies in Paris two months later, just after being raised to the
rank of Marshal.
December 9, 1951 - Giap begins a careful
counter-offensive by attacking the French outpost at Tu Vu on the Black
River. Giap now avoids conventional warfare and instead wages hit and run
attacks followed by a retreat into the dense jungles. His goal is to cut
French supply lines.
By year's end, French causalities in Vietnam surpass 90,000.
1952
January 12, 1952 - French supply lines
to Hoa Binh along the Black River are cut. The road along Route Coloniale
6 is also cut.
February 22-26 - The French withdraw from
Hoa Binh back to the De Lattre Line aided by a 30,000 round artillery barrage.
Casualties for each side surpassed 5000 during the Black River skirmishes.
October 11, 1952 - Giap now attempts to
draw the French out from the De Lattre Line by attacking along the Fan
Si Pan mountain range between the Red and Black Rivers.
October 29, 1952 - The French counter Giap's
move by launching Operation Lorraine targeting major Viet Minh supply bases
in the Viet Bac region. But Giap outsmarts the French by ignoring their
maneuvers and maintains his position along the Black River.
November 14-17 - The French cancel Operation
Loraine and withdraw back toward the De Lattre Line but must first fight
off a Viet Minh ambush at Chan Muong.
1953
January 20, 1953
- Dwight D. Eisenhower, former five-star Army general and Allied commander
in Europe during World War II, is inaugurated as the 34th U.S. President.
During his term, Eisenhower will greatly increase
U.S. military aid to the French in Vietnam
to prevent a Communist victory. U.S. military advisors will continue to
accompany American supplies sent to Vietnam. To justify America's
financial commitment, Eisenhower will cite a 'Domino
Theory' in which a Communist victory in Vietnam would result in surrounding
countries falling one after another like a "falling row of dominoes."
The Domino Theory will be used by a succession of Presidents and their
advisors to justify ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
March 5, 1953 - Soviet leader Josef Stalin
dies. The outspoken Nikita Khrushchev succeeds him.
July 27, 1953 - The Korean War ends as
an armistice is signed dividing the country at the 38th parallel into Communist
North and Democratic South. The armistice is seen by many in the international
community as a potential model for resolving the ongoing conflict in Vietnam.
November 20, 1953 -
The French under their new commander Gen. Henri Navarre begin Operation
Castor, the construction of a series of entrenched outposts protecting
a small air base in the isolated jungle valley at Dien Bien Phu in northwest
Vietnam.
Gen. Giap immediately begins massing Viet Minh troops and artillery
in the area, sensing the potential for a decisive blow against the French.
Giap's troops manually drag 200 heavy howitzers up rugged mountain sides
to target the French air base. The French, aware of Giap's intentions,
mass their own troops and artillery, preparing for a showdown, but have
grossly underestimated Giap's strength.
1954
March 13, 1954 - Outnumbering the French
nearly five-to-one, 50,000 Viet Minh under Gen. Giap begin their assault
against the fortified hills protecting the Dien Bien Phu air base.
Giap's artillery pounds the French and shuts down the only runway, thus
forcing the French to rely on risky parachute drops for re-supply. Giap's
troops then take out their shovels and begin construction of a maze of
tunnels and trenches, slowly inching their way toward the main French position
and surrounding it.
March 30-May 1 - The siege at Dien Bien
Phu occurs as nearly 10,000 French soldiers are trapped by 45,000 Viet
Minh. French troops soon run out of fresh water and medical supplies.
The French urgently appeal to Washington for help. The U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff now consider three possible military options: sending American
combat troops to the rescue; a massive conventional air strike by B-29
bombers; the use of tactical atomic weapons.
President Eisenhower dismisses the conventional air raid and the nuclear
option after getting a strong negative response to such actions from America's
chief ally, Britain. Eisenhower also decides against sending U.S. ground
troops to rescue the French, citing the likelihood of high casualty rates
in the jungles around Dien Bien Phu. No action is taken.
May 7, 1954 - At 5:30 p.m., 10,000 French
soldiers surrender at Dien Bien Phu. By now, an estimated 8000 Viet Minh
and 1500 French have died. The French survivors are marched for up to 60
days to prison camps 500 hundred miles away. Nearly half die during the
march or in captivity.
France proceeds to withdraw completely from Vietnam, ending a bitter
eight year struggle against the Viet Minh in which 400,000 soldiers and
civilians from all sides had perished.
May 8, 1954 - The Geneva
Conference on Indochina begins, attended by the U.S., Britain, China, the
Soviet Union, France, Vietnam (Viet Minh and representatives of Bao Dai),
Cambodia and Laos, all meeting to negotiate a solution for Southeast Asia.
July 21, 1954 - The Geneva Accords divide
Vietnam in half at the 17th parallel, with Ho Chi Minh's Communists ceded
the North, while Bao Dai's regime is granted the South. The accords also
provide for elections to be held in all of Vietnam within two years to
reunify the country. The U.S. opposes the unifying elections, fearing a
likely victory by Ho Chi Minh.
October 1954 - Following the French departure
from Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh returns after spending eight years hiding in the
jungle and formally takes control of North Vietnam.
In the South, Bao Dai has installed Ngo Dinh Diem as his prime minister.
The U.S. now pins its hopes on anti-Communist Diem for a democratic South
Vietnam. It is Diem, however, who predicts "another more deadly war"
will erupt over the future of Vietnam.
Diem, a Roman Catholic in an overwhelmingly Buddhist
country, encourages Vietnamese Catholics living in Communist North Vietnam
to flee south. Nearly one million leave. At the same time, some 90,000
Communists in the south go north, although nearly 10,000 Viet Minh fighters
are instructed by Hanoi to quietly remain behind.
1955
January 1955 - The first direct shipment
of U.S. military aid to Saigon arrives. The U.S. also offers to train the
fledgling South Vietnam Army.
May 1955 - Prime Minister Diem wages a
violent crackdown against the Binh Xuyen organized crime group based in
Saigon which operates casinos, brothels and opium dens.
July 1955 - Ho Chi Minh visits Moscow and
agrees to accept Soviet aid.
October 23, 1955 - Bao Dai is ousted from
power, defeated by Prime Minister Diem in a U.S.-backed plebiscite which
was rigged. Diem is advised on consolidating power by U.S. Air Force Col.
Edward G. Lansdale, who is attached to the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).
October 26, 1955 - The Republic of South
Vietnam is proclaimed with Diem as its first president. In America, President
Eisenhower pledges his support for the new government and offers military
aid.
Diem assigns most high level government positions to close friends and
family members including his younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu who will be his
chief advisor. Diem's style of leadership, aloof and autocratic, will create
future political problems for him despite the best efforts of his American
advisors to popularize him via American-style political rallies and tours
of the countryside.
December 1955 - In North Vietnam, radical
land reforms by Communists result in land owners being hauled before "people's
tribunals." Thousands are executed or sent to forced labor camps during
this period of ideological cleansing by Ho Chi Minh.
In South Vietnam, President Diem rewards his Catholic
supporters by giving them land seized from Buddhist peasants, arousing
their anger and eroding his support among them. Diem also allows big land
owners to retain their holdings, disappointing peasants hoping for land
reform.
1956
January 1956 - Diem
launches a brutal crackdown against Viet Minh suspects in the countryside.
Those arrested are denied counsel and hauled before "security committees"
with many suspects tortured or executed under the guise of 'shot while
attempting escape.'
April 28, 1956 - The last French soldier
leaves South Vietnam. The French High Command for Indochina is then dissolved.
July 1956 - The deadline passes for the
unifying elections set by the Geneva Conference. Diem, backed by the U.S.,
had refused to participate.
November 1956 - Peasant unrest in North
Vietnam resulting from oppressive land reforms is put down by Communist
force with more than 6000 killed or deported.
1957
January 1957 - The Soviet Union proposes
permanent division of Vietnam into North and South, with the two nations
admitted separately to the United Nations. The U.S. rejects the proposal,
unwilling to recognize Communist North Vietnam.
May 8-18 - Diem pays a state visit to Washington
where President Eisenhower labels him the "miracle man" of Asia
and reaffirms U.S. commitment. "The cost of defending freedom, of
defending America, must be paid in many forms and in many places...military
as well as economic help is currently needed in Vietnam," Eisenhower
states.
Diem's government, however, with its main focus on security, spends
little on schools, medical care or other badly needed social services in
the countryside. Communist guerrillas and propagandists in the countryside
capitalize on this by making simple promises of land reform and a better
standard of living to gain popular support among peasants.
October 1957 - Viet Minh guerrillas begin
a widespread campaign of terror in South Vietnam including bombings and
assassinations. By year's end, over 400 South Vietnamese officials are
killed.
1958
June 1958 - A coordinated command structure
is formed by Communists in the Mekong Delta where 37 armed companies are
being organized.
1959
March 1959 - The armed revolution begins
as Ho Chi Minh declares a People's War to unite all of Vietnam under his
leadership. His Politburo now orders a changeover to an all-out military
struggle. Thus begins the Second Indochina War.
May 1959 - North Vietnamese establish the
Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) to oversee the coming war in the
South. Construction of the Ho Chi Minh trail now begins.
The trail will eventually expand into a 1500 mile-long
network of jungle and mountain passes extending from North Vietnam's coast
along Vietnam's western border through Laos, parts of Cambodia, funneling
a constant stream of soldiers and supplies into the highlands of South
Vietnam. In 1959, it takes six months to make the journey, by 1968 it will
take only six weeks due to road improvements by North Vietnamese laborers,
many of whom are women. In the 1970s a parallel fuel pipeline will be added.
July 1959 - 4000 Viet Minh guerrillas,
originally born in the South, are sent from North Vietnam to infiltrate
South Vietnam.
July 8, 1959 - Two U.S. military advisors,
Maj. Dale Buis and Sgt. Chester Ovnand, are killed by Viet Minh guerrillas
at Bien Hoa, South Vietnam. They are the first American deaths in the Second
Indochina War which Americans will come to know simply as The Vietnam War.
1960
April 1960 - Universal
military conscription is imposed in North Vietnam. Tour of duty is indefinite.
April 1960 - Eighteen
distinguished nationalists in South Vietnam send a petition to President
Diem advocating that he reform his rigid, family-run, and increasingly
corrupt, government. Diem ignores their advice and instead closes several
opposition newspapers and arrests journalists and intellectuals.
November 1960 - A failed coup against President
Diem by disgruntled South Vietnamese Army officers brings a harsh crackdown
against all perceived 'enemies of the state.' Over 50,000 are arrested
by police controlled by Diem's brother Nhu with many innocent civilians
tortured then executed. This results in further erosion of popular support
for Diem.
Thousands who fear arrest flee to North Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh will later
send many back to infiltrate South Vietnam as part of his People's Liberation
Armed Forces. Called Viet Cong by Diem, meaning Communist Vietnamese, Ho's
guerrillas blend into the countryside, indistinguishable from South Vietnamese,
while working to undermine Diem's government.
December 20, 1960 - The National Liberation
Front is established by Hanoi as its Communist political organization for
Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam.

Question: when did the chinese start helping viet minhu

In July 1950, Chinese military advisors began helping Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, p.

The Routledge (2002)

Their weapons, expertise, and labor discipline have converted Viet Minh from the guerrilla troops into a regular army.

when did the chinese start helping viet minhu

Question: why did the chinese convert viet minh into regular army

Their weapons, expertise, and labor discipline

"Njihovo oružje , stručnost i radna disciplina

The Routledge (2002)

Their weapons , expertise , and labor discipline

why did the chinese convert viet minh into regular army

Question: who helped the vietnam war in 1950

The Routledge (2002)

Question: when was rat u vijetnamu written

The Routledge (2002)

Question: what nationality were the advisors that helped viet minhu

The Routledge (2002)

what nationality were the advisors that helped viet minhu

Question: what did the chinese convert into a regular army

Viet Minh iz gerilske postrojbe u regularnu vojsku

The Routledge (2002)

what did the chinese convert into a regular army

Question: what did the chinese convert viet minh into

The Routledge (2002)

what did the chinese convert viet minh into

In July 1950 , Chinese military advisors began helping Viet Minhu . Ang , Cheng Guan , The Vietnam War from the Other Side , p.

Their weapons , expertise , and labor discipline have converted Viet Minh from the guerrilla troops into a regular army .

U srpnju 1950. godine kineski vojni savjetnici započeli su pomagati Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, str. 14. Routledge (2002.). Njihovo oružje, stručnost i radna disciplina preobratili su Viet Minh iz gerilske postrojbe u regularnu vojsku.

U srpnju 1950. godine kineski vojni savjetnici započeli su pomagati Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, str. 14.

Njihovo oružje, stručnost i radna disciplina preobratili su Viet Minh iz gerilske postrojbe u regularnu vojsku.

In July 1950, Chinese military advisors began helping Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, p. The Routledge (2002) Their weapons, expertise, and labor discipline have converted Viet Minh from the guerrilla troops into a regular army.

In July 1950, Chinese military advisors began helping Viet Minhu.Ang, Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side, p.

Their weapons, expertise, and labor discipline have converted Viet Minh from the guerrilla troops into a regular army.

According to one version of the so-called Strvinar Operations (Eng.

The U.S. would send 60 B-29 bombers from their bases in the region and another 150 fighter aircraft from the nearby fleet to bomb the positions of Viet Minh Voy Nguyen Chip.

Question: how many b-29 bombers did the us send to vietnam

According to one version of the so-called Strvinar Operations (Eng.

The U.S. would send 60 B-29 bombers from their bases in the region and another 150 fighter aircraft from the nearby fleet to bomb the positions of Viet Minh Voy Nguyen Chip.

how many b-29 bombers did the us send to vietnam

Question: how many planes did the us send to vietnam

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Question: what was the code name for rat u vijetnamu

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Question: what was the code name for the bombing of vietnam

what was the code name for the bombing of vietnam

Question: who did the us bomb in vietnam in 1968

Question: what type of bombers did the us send to vietnam

what type of bombers did the us send to vietnam

According to one version of the so - called Strvinar Operations ( Eng .

The U.S. would send 60 B-29 bombers from their bases in the region and another 150 fighter aircraft from the nearby fleet to bomb the positions of Viet Minh Voy Nguyen Chip .

Prema jednoj verziji plana tzv. Operacije Strvinar (eng. Operation Vulture), Amerikanci bi iz svojih baza u regiji poslali 60 bombardera B-29 te još dodatnih 150 borbenih zrakoplova s obližnje flote kako bi bombardirali pozicije zapovjednika Viet Minha Võa Nguyêna Giápa.

Prema jednoj verziji plana tzv. Operacije Strvinar (eng.

Operation Vulture), Amerikanci bi iz svojih baza u regiji poslali 60 bombardera B-29 te još dodatnih 150 borbenih zrakoplova s obližnje flote kako bi bombardirali pozicije zapovjednika Viet Minha Võa Nguyêna Giápa.

According to one version of the so-called Strvinar Operations (Eng. The U.S. would send 60 B-29 bombers from their bases in the region and another 150 fighter aircraft from the nearby fleet to bomb the positions of Viet Minh Voy Nguyen Chip.

According to one version of the so-called Strvinar Operations (Eng.

The U.S. would send 60 B-29 bombers from their bases in the region and another 150 fighter aircraft from the nearby fleet to bomb the positions of Viet Minh Voy Nguyen Chip.

According to then U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon, the plan included the members of the coalition to create a plan to use three small tactical nuclear weapons as a help to the French.

Nixon, the so-called "war strike" for Vietnam, proposed that the United States will likely have to "slate their boys."

Question: who was the president when vietnam was attacked

According to then U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon, the plan included the members of the coalition to create a plan to use three small tactical nuclear weapons as a help to the French.

Nixon, the so-called "war strike" for Vietnam, proposed that the United States will likely have to "slate their boys."

who was the president when vietnam was attacked

Question: how many nuclear weapons did the vietnam war start with

how many nuclear weapons did the vietnam war start with

Question: who did the vietnam war target with nuclear weapons

who did the vietnam war target with nuclear weapons

Question: what was the meaning of rat u vijetnamu

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the so-called "war strike" for

rat u vijetnamu was the so-called "war strike" for

According to then U.S. Vice - President Richard Nixon , the plan included the members of the coalition to create a plan to use three small tactical nuclear weapons as a help to the French .

Nixon , the so - called " war strike " for Vietnam , proposed that the United States will likely have to " slate their boys . "

Prema tadašnjem Potpredsjedniku SAD-a Richardu Nixonu, plan je uključivao da članovi združnog stožera naprave nacrt korištenja tri mala taktička nuklearna oružja kao pomoć Francuzima. Nixon, tzv. "ratni jastreb" za Vijetnam, predložio je da će SAD vjerojatno morati "slati svoje dečke".

Prema tadašnjem Potpredsjedniku SAD-a Richardu Nixonu, plan je uključivao da članovi združnog stožera naprave nacrt korištenja tri mala taktička nuklearna oružja kao pomoć Francuzima.

Nixon, tzv. "ratni jastreb" za Vijetnam, predložio je da će SAD vjerojatno morati "slati svoje dečke".

According to then U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon, the plan included the members of the coalition to create a plan to use three small tactical nuclear weapons as a help to the French. Nixon, the so-called "war strike" for Vietnam, proposed that the United States will likely have to "slate their boys."

According to then U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon, the plan included the members of the coalition to create a plan to use three small tactical nuclear weapons as a help to the French.

Nixon, the so-called "war strike" for Vietnam, proposed that the United States will likely have to "slate their boys."

The former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that America should not interfere with the conflict without the British support that at the time was against such a plan.

Finally, convinced that political risks are too big compared to the possible gain, Eisenhower denied the possibility of nuclear intervention.

Question: who was the president of the united states at the time of rat u vijet

The former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that America should not interfere with the conflict without the British support that at the time was against such a plan.

Finally, convinced that political risks are too big compared to the possible gain, Eisenhower denied the possibility of nuclear intervention.

who was the president of the united states at the time of rat u vijet

Question: what did eisenhower not want to do in vijetnam

what did eisenhower not want to do in vijetnam

Question: why did eisenhower not want to engage in a nuclear war

politički rizici preveliki u odnosu na mogući dobitak , Eisenhower je odbio mogućnost nuklearne intervencije

why did eisenhower not want to engage in a nuclear war

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a conflict between the usa and which country

rat u vijetnamu was a conflict between the usa and which country

Question: rat u vijetnamu is an example of an intervention by the u.

rat u vijetnamu is an example of an intervention by the u.

Question: why did eisenhower deny the possibility of nuclear intervention

political risks are too big compared to the possible gain

politički rizici preveliki u odnosu na mogući dobitak , Eisenhower je odbio mogućnost nuklearne intervencije

political risks are too big compared to the possible gain

why did eisenhower deny the possibility of nuclear intervention

Question: why did eisenhower do n 't go to war with britain

politički rizici preveliki u odnosu na mogući dobitak , Eisenhower je odbio mogućnost nuklearne intervencije

why did eisenhower do n 't go to war with britain

The former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that America should not interfere with the conflict without the British support that at the time was against such a plan .

Finally , convinced that political risks are too big compared to the possible gain , Eisenhower denied the possibility of nuclear intervention .

Tadašnji Predsjednik SAD-a Dwight D. Eisenhower smatrao je da se Amerika ne bi trebala miješati u sukob bez Britanske potpore koji su u to vrijeme bili protiv takvog plana. U konačnici, uvjeren da su politički rizici preveliki u odnosu na mogući dobitak, Eisenhower je odbio mogućnost nuklearne intervencije.

Tadašnji Predsjednik SAD-a Dwight D. Eisenhower smatrao je da se Amerika ne bi trebala miješati u sukob bez Britanske potpore koji su u to vrijeme bili protiv takvog plana.

U konačnici, uvjeren da su politički rizici preveliki u odnosu na mogući dobitak, Eisenhower je odbio mogućnost nuklearne intervencije.

The former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that America should not interfere with the conflict without the British support that at the time was against such a plan. Finally, convinced that political risks are too big compared to the possible gain, Eisenhower denied the possibility of nuclear intervention.

The former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that America should not interfere with the conflict without the British support that at the time was against such a plan.

Finally, convinced that political risks are too big compared to the possible gain, Eisenhower denied the possibility of nuclear intervention.

The opposition of Điện Biên Phủa marked the end of the French involvement in Indochina.

The Giap forces of Viet Minha strongly defeated the French army and on May 7, 1954, the French military garnizon surrendered.

Trap Door to the Dark Side
"This was savage reality. Here every tree tried to kill you. Every vine reached out to sink its fangs into soggy gray skin, and every noise promised years of cold-drenched, screaming nightmares in the God-blessed land of Select Comfort Beds and mocha frappacinos. Nothing prepares you for that stark reality, not even the sustained fatigue and sleeplessness of Ranger School, and no one who was not there can ever comprehend the fear and exhilaration of the adrenalin rush that frame the emotions of those eternal moments. This was another perplexing paradox of war. Those who did not die have never been so much alive. The scary thing was that I loved it, and no one I knew or cared about would ever understand that bizarre reaction."
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Question: who opposed the french involvement in indochina

The opposition of Điện Biên Phủa marked the end of the French involvement in Indochina.

The Giap forces of Viet Minha strongly defeated the French army and on May 7, 1954, the French military garnizon surrendered.

who opposed the french involvement in indochina

Question: when did the vietnamese army surrender to the french

when did the vietnamese army surrender to the french

Question: in which year did the vietnamese army surrender vijetnam

in which year did the vietnamese army surrender vijetnam

Question: who defeated the french army in vijetnamu

who defeated the french army in vijetnamu

Question: who won the battle of vijetnamu in 1954

Question: who defeated the french army in 1954

Question: who surrendered to the french in vijetnamu

who surrendered to the french in vijetnamu

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the war in which country

rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the war in which country

The opposition of Điện Biên Phủa marked the end of the French involvement in Indochina .

The Giap forces of Viet Minha strongly defeated the French army and on May 7 , 1954 , the French military garnizon surrendered .

Opsada Điện Biên Phủa označila je kraj francuske uključenosti u Indokini. Giapove snage Viet Minha snažno su porazile francusku vojsku pa se 7. svibnja 1954. godine francuski vojni garnizon predao.

Opsada Điện Biên Phủa označila je kraj francuske uključenosti u Indokini.

Giapove snage Viet Minha snažno su porazile francusku vojsku pa se 7. svibnja 1954. godine francuski vojni garnizon predao.

The opposition of Điện Biên Phủa marked the end of the French involvement in Indochina. The Giap forces of Viet Minha strongly defeated the French army and on May 7, 1954, the French military garnizon surrendered.

The opposition of Điện Biên Phủa marked the end of the French involvement in Indochina.

The Giap forces of Viet Minha strongly defeated the French army and on May 7, 1954, the French military garnizon surrendered.

Between 1953 and 1956, the government of Northern Vietnam launched a variety of agricultural reforms including "lease lease" and "property reform".

Question: when did rat u vijetnamu start and end

Between 1953 and 1956, the government of Northern Vietnam launched a variety of agricultural reforms including "lease lease" and "property reform".

Question: rat vijetnamu was the capital of which country

rat vijetnamu was the capital of which country

Question: what type of reforms were introduced in vietnam between 1953 and 1956

what type of reforms were introduced in vietnam between 1953 and 1956

Question: when did rat u vijetnamu come into being

when did rat u vijetnamu come into being

Question: what type of reforms did northern vietnam launch in 1953

what type of reforms did northern vietnam launch in 1953

Question: what was the name of the agricultural reform in vietnam between 1953 and 1956

what was the name of the agricultural reform in vietnam between 1953 and 1956

Question: when did rat u vijetnamu start in vietnam

when did rat u vijetnamu start in vietnam

Between 1953 and 1956 , the government of Northern Vietnam launched a variety of agricultural reforms including " lease lease " and " property reform " .

Između 1953. i 1956. godine vlada Sjevernog Vijetnama pokrenula je razne agrarne reforme uključujući "smanjenje najma" i "reformu posjeda".

Između 1953. i 1956. godine vlada Sjevernog Vijetnama pokrenula je razne agrarne reforme uključujući "smanjenje najma" i "reformu posjeda".

Between 1953 and 1956, the government of Northern Vietnam launched a variety of agricultural reforms including "lease lease" and "property reform".

Between 1953 and 1956, the government of Northern Vietnam launched a variety of agricultural reforms including "lease lease" and "property reform".

The administration of President Eisenhower was the first to propose the theory of "domino effect" whose definition was that all the states of the region would follow the one that would first fall under the system of Communism.

John F. Kennedy, the former U.S. senator, in his speech to U.S. Vietnamese friends said: “Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those countries whose security would be threatened when the red breed of Communism would pass into Vietnam.”

Question: who said burma, thailand, india, japan, the philipp

The administration of President Eisenhower was the first to propose the theory of "domino effect" whose definition was that all the states of the region would follow the one that would first fall under the system of Communism.

John F. Kennedy, the former U.S. senator, in his speech to U.S. Vietnamese friends said: “Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those countries whose security would be threatened when the red breed of Communism would pass into Vietnam.”

who said burma, thailand, india, japan, the philipp

Question: who came up with the theory of domino effect

who came up with the theory of domino effect

Question: which two countries in the vietnam war were threatened by communism

which two countries in the vietnam war were threatened by communism

Question: what is the term for the effect of communism on vietnam

what is the term for the effect of communism on vietnam

Question: who was the first president to propose the domino effect

who was the first president to propose the domino effect

Question: the domino effect is the theory that all the states of the region would follow the

the domino effect is the theory that all the states of the region would follow the

Question: what countries did john f. kennedy say would be threatened by communism

Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines

Burma , Tajland , Indija , Japan , Filipini

Burma , Thailand , India , Japan , the Philippines

what countries did john f. kennedy say would be threatened by communism

The administration of President Eisenhower was the first to propose the theory of " domino effect " whose definition was that all the states of the region would follow the one that would first fall under the system of Communism .

John F. Kennedy , the former U.S. senator , in his speech to U.S. Vietnamese friends said : “ Burma , Thailand , India , Japan , the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those countries whose security would be threatened when the red breed of Communism would pass into Vietnam . ”

Administracija Predsjednika Eisenhowera bila je prva koja je predložila teoriju "domino efekta" čija je definicija bila da bi sve države regije slijedile onu koja bi prva pala pod sistem Komuinizma.. John F. Kennedy, tadašnji američki senator, u svom govoru američkim prijateljima Vijetnama je rekao: "Burma, Tajland, Indija, Japan, Filipini te očigledno Laos i Kambodža su među onim državama čija bi sigurnost bila ugrožena kada bi se crvena plima Komunizma prelila u Vijetnam."John F. Kennedy.

Administracija Predsjednika Eisenhowera bila je prva koja je predložila teoriju "domino efekta" čija je definicija bila da bi sve države regije slijedile onu koja bi prva pala pod sistem Komuinizma..

John F. Kennedy, tadašnji američki senator, u svom govoru američkim prijateljima Vijetnama je rekao: "Burma, Tajland, Indija, Japan, Filipini te očigledno Laos i Kambodža su među onim državama čija bi sigurnost bila ugrožena kada bi se crvena plima Komunizma prelila u Vijetnam."John F. Kennedy.

The administration of President Eisenhower was the first to propose the theory of "domino effect" whose definition was that all the states of the region would follow the one that would first fall under the system of Communism. John F. Kennedy, the former U.S. senator, in his speech to U.S. Vietnamese friends said: “Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those countries whose security would be threatened when the red breed of Communism would pass into Vietnam.”

The administration of President Eisenhower was the first to propose the theory of "domino effect" whose definition was that all the states of the region would follow the one that would first fall under the system of Communism.

John F. Kennedy, the former U.S. senator, in his speech to U.S. Vietnamese friends said: “Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those countries whose security would be threatened when the red breed of Communism would pass into Vietnam.”

At the beginning of the summer of 1955, Diem launched the campaign "We reject Communism" during which all those for whom it was suspected that they were Communists or in any way against the new government were arrested, closed, tortured or destroyed.

Question: in which year was the 'rat u vijetnamu' campaign launched

At the beginning of the summer of 1955, Diem launched the campaign "We reject Communism" during which all those for whom it was suspected that they were Communists or in any way against the new government were arrested, closed, tortured or destroyed.

in which year was the 'rat u vijetnamu' campaign launched

Question: what was the slogan of rat u vijetnamu

Question: what happened to those who were suspected of being communists

arrested , closed , tortured or destroyed

what happened to those who were suspected of being communists

Question: who launched the campaign 'rat u vijetnamu'

who launched the campaign 'rat u vijetnamu'

At the beginning of the summer of 1955 , Diem launched the campaign " We reject Communism " during which all those for whom it was suspected that they were Communists or in any way against the new government were arrested , closed , tortured or destroyed .

Početkom ljeta 1955. godine, Diem je lansirao kampanju "Odbacimo Komunizam" tijekom koje su svi oni za koje se sumnjalo da su Komunisti ili na bilo koji način protiv nove vlade bili uhićeni, zatvoreni, mučeni ili pogubljeni.

Početkom ljeta 1955. godine, Diem je lansirao kampanju "Odbacimo Komunizam" tijekom koje su svi oni za koje se sumnjalo da su Komunisti ili na bilo koji način protiv nove vlade bili uhićeni, zatvoreni, mučeni ili pogubljeni.

At the beginning of the summer of 1955, Diem launched the campaign "We reject Communism" during which all those for whom it was suspected that they were Communists or in any way against the new government were arrested, closed, tortured or destroyed.

At the beginning of the summer of 1955, Diem launched the campaign "We reject Communism" during which all those for whom it was suspected that they were Communists or in any way against the new government were arrested, closed, tortured or destroyed.

In the first half of 1957, peace ruled in South Vietnam for the first time in more than a decade.

However, from the middle of that year until 1959, violence was increasing despite the government’s “not considered it a organized campaign because the obsession was too striking to threaten the main government sources.”

Question: when did vietnam's civil war end

In the first half of 1957, peace ruled in South Vietnam for the first time in more than a decade.

However, from the middle of that year until 1959, violence was increasing despite the government’s “not considered it a organized campaign because the obsession was too striking to threaten the main government sources.”

Question: when did vietnam become a free country

Question: how long did peace rule in vietnam in 1957

how long did peace rule in vietnam in 1957

Question: rat u vijetnamu is a term for

Question: what happened to the violence in vietnam between 1957 and 1959

what happened to the violence in vietnam between 1957 and 1959

Question: why did the vietnam war not take place

Question: when did rat u vijetnamu end in vietnam

polovici 1957 . godine u Južnom Vijetnamu vladao je mir po prvi puta nakon više od

In the first half of 1957 , peace ruled in South Vietnam for the first time in more than a decade .

However , from the middle of that year until 1959 , violence was increasing despite the government ’s “ not considered it a organized campaign because the obsession was too striking to threaten the main government sources . ”

U prvoj polovici 1957. godine u Južnom Vijetnamu vladao je mir po prvi puta nakon više od deset godina. Međutim, od sredine te godine pa sve do 1959., nasilje se povećavalo premda ga vlada "nije smatrala organiziranom kampanjom zbog toga što je neposluh bio previše raštrkan kako bi ugrozio glavne vladine izvore".

U prvoj polovici 1957. godine u Južnom Vijetnamu vladao je mir po prvi puta nakon više od deset godina.

Međutim, od sredine te godine pa sve do 1959., nasilje se povećavalo premda ga vlada "nije smatrala organiziranom kampanjom zbog toga što je neposluh bio previše raštrkan kako bi ugrozio glavne vladine izvore".

In the first half of 1957, peace ruled in South Vietnam for the first time in more than a decade. However, from the middle of that year until 1959, violence was increasing despite the government’s “not considered it a organized campaign because the obsession was too striking to threaten the main government sources.”

In the first half of 1957, peace ruled in South Vietnam for the first time in more than a decade.

However, from the middle of that year until 1959, violence was increasing despite the government’s “not considered it a organized campaign because the obsession was too striking to threaten the main government sources.”

James Olson and Randy Roberts point out that North Vietnam approved a small rebellion in December 1956.

To counter the accusation that North Vietnam violated the provisions of the Geneva Convention, during the Communist propaganda, the independence of the FLN was constantly emphasized.

The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists' Perspective
Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, presents a history of the war from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. It charts relations with Moscow and Beijing, showing how the involvement of the two major communist powers changed over time, and how the Vietnamese, despite their huge dependence on the Chinese and the Soviets, were most definitely in charge of their own decision making. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the many one-sided studies of the war, and presents a very interesting new perspective.
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Selected pages
Contents
|13|
|41|
|73|
Breaking the Stalemate
|113|
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Common terms and phrases
According achieve activities American armed armed forces armed struggle artillery August base battalions Beijing Binh cadres campaign carry Central Committee Central Highlands China Chinese Command Committee conference continued December decision defence Department destroy direct Division Document Dong Duan enemy established Events February fighting forces Foreign Front Group Hanoi History Hoang infantry International issued January July June Laos Le Duan leadership Liberation Lich Su Quan London Long LSQDNDVN March meeting Military Region Minh Moscow negotiations Nguyen Nha Xuat Ban Nhan Dan Viet North Vietnamese noted November Number October Offensive Office operation organised Party peaceful period Plenary Session Politburo political preparations Press provinces Publishing Quan Doi Nhan Quang regiment relations reported responsibility revolutionary role Route Saigon September situation South Vietnam Southern Soviet strategy struggle Thanh Tran troops units University uprisings victory Vietnamese communists Volume York

Question: which convention was violated by north vietnam in 1956

James Olson and Randy Roberts point out that North Vietnam approved a small rebellion in December 1956.

To counter the accusation that North Vietnam violated the provisions of the Geneva Convention, during the Communist propaganda, the independence of the FLN was constantly emphasized.

which convention was violated by north vietnam in 1956

Question: when did the rat u vijetnamu rebellion start

when did the rat u vijetnamu rebellion start

Question: who were the authors of rat u vijetnamu

James Olson i Randy Roberts ističu da je Sjeverni Vijetnam odobrio malu pobunu u prosincu

Question: what was the purpose of rat u vijetnamu

Question: who is the author of rat u vijetnamu

Roberts ističu da je Sjeverni Vijetnam odobrio malu pobunu u prosincu

Question: who approved the rat u vijetnamu rebellion

who approved the rat u vijetnamu rebellion

James Olson and Randy Roberts point out that North Vietnam approved a small rebellion in December 1956 .

To counter the accusation that North Vietnam violated the provisions of the Geneva Convention , during the Communist propaganda , the independence of the FLN was constantly emphasized .

James Olson i Randy Roberts ističu da je Sjeverni Vijetnam odobrio malu pobunu u prosincu 1956. godine. Kako bi se suzbila optužba da je Sjeverni Vijetnam prekršio odredbe Ženevske konvencije, tijekom komunističke propagande neovisnost FLN-a je konstantno bila naglašavana.

James Olson i Randy Roberts ističu da je Sjeverni Vijetnam odobrio malu pobunu u prosincu 1956. godine.

Kako bi se suzbila optužba da je Sjeverni Vijetnam prekršio odredbe Ženevske konvencije, tijekom komunističke propagande neovisnost FLN-a je konstantno bila naglašavana.

James Olson and Randy Roberts point out that North Vietnam approved a small rebellion in December 1956. To counter the accusation that North Vietnam violated the provisions of the Geneva Convention, during the Communist propaganda, the independence of the FLN was constantly emphasized.

James Olson and Randy Roberts point out that North Vietnam approved a small rebellion in December 1956.

To counter the accusation that North Vietnam violated the provisions of the Geneva Convention, during the Communist propaganda, the independence of the FLN was constantly emphasized.

In March 1956, the Southern Communist leader Le Duan presented to the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi a plan to revive the rebellion called "The Road to the South", but since at that time both China and the Soviet Union opposed the confrontation, his plan was rejected.

However, the leadership of Northern Vietnam approved temporary measures to revive the Southern Rebellion in December 1956.

Question: what was the name of the rebellion led by le duan

In March 1956, the Southern Communist leader Le Duan presented to the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi a plan to revive the rebellion called "The Road to the South", but since at that time both China and the Soviet Union opposed the confrontation, his plan was rejected.

However, the leadership of Northern Vietnam approved temporary measures to revive the Southern Rebellion in December 1956.

what was the name of the rebellion led by le duan

Question: when was rat u vijetnamu revived in vietnam

when was rat u vijetnamu revived in vietnam

Question: who was the leader of rat u vijetnamu

Question: when did rat vijetnamu start in vietnam

Question: when did rat vijetnamu start and end

Question: who opposed the road to the south plan

In March 1956 , the Southern Communist leader Le Duan presented to the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi a plan to revive the rebellion called " The Road to the South " , but since at that time both China and the Soviet Union opposed the confrontation , his plan was rejected .

However , the leadership of Northern Vietnam approved temporary measures to revive the Southern Rebellion in December 1956 .

U ožujku 1956. godine južnjački komunistički vođa Le Duan predstavio je ostalim članovima Politburoa u Hanoiju plan oživljavanja pobune pod nazivom "Put do Juga" (The Road to the South), ali budući su se u to vrijeme i Kina i Sovjetski Savez protivili konfrontaciji, njegov je plan bio odbijen. Međutim, vodstvo Sjevernog Vijetnama odobrilo je privremene mjere da se oživi južnjačka pobuna u prosincu 1956. godine.

U ožujku 1956. godine južnjački komunistički vođa Le Duan predstavio je ostalim članovima Politburoa u Hanoiju plan oživljavanja pobune pod nazivom "Put do Juga" (The Road to the South), ali budući su se u to vrijeme i Kina i Sovjetski Savez protivili konfrontaciji, njegov je plan bio odbijen.

Međutim, vodstvo Sjevernog Vijetnama odobrilo je privremene mjere da se oživi južnjačka pobuna u prosincu 1956. godine.

In March 1956, the Southern Communist leader Le Duan presented to the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi a plan to revive the rebellion called "The Road to the South", but since at that time both China and the Soviet Union opposed the confrontation, his plan was rejected. However, the leadership of Northern Vietnam approved temporary measures to revive the Southern Rebellion in December 1956.

In March 1956, the Southern Communist leader Le Duan presented to the other members of the Politburo in Hanoi a plan to revive the rebellion called "The Road to the South", but since at that time both China and the Soviet Union opposed the confrontation, his plan was rejected.

However, the leadership of Northern Vietnam approved temporary measures to revive the Southern Rebellion in December 1956.

Although President Eisenhower warned Kennedy of Laos and Vietnam, at that time Europe and Latin America were "in a larger perspective than Asia."

During his first turn to the nation during the inauguration, Kennedy gave an ambitious swear that he would "pay any price, bear any burden, face any difficulties, support every friend and resist every enemy to ensure survival and success of freedom."The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

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2000 -
Vice President Johnson, Mr. Speaker, Mr. Chief Justice, President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, President Truman, reverend clergy, fellow citizens, we observe today not a victory of party, but a celebration of freedom--symbolizing an end, as well as a beginning--signifying renewal, as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.
The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are still at issue around the globe--the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.
We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans--born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage--and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
This much we pledge--and more.
To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do--for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.
To those new States whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom--and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.
To those peoples in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required--not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.
To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge--to convert our good words into good deeds--in a new alliance for progress--to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.
To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support--to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective--to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak--and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.
Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.
We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.
But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course--both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.
So let us begin anew--remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.
Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us.
Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms--and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.
Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths, and encourage the arts and commerce.
Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah--to "undo the heavy burdens ... and to let the oppressed go free."
And if a beachhead of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.
All this will not be finished in the first 100 days. Nor will it be finished in the first 1,000 days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But let us begin.
In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than in mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.
Now the trumpet summons us again--not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are--but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, "rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation"--a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.
Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?
In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility--I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it--and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.
And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you--ask what you can do for your country.
My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.
Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

Question: what two countries did eisenhower warn kennedy about

Although President Eisenhower warned Kennedy of Laos and Vietnam, at that time Europe and Latin America were "in a larger perspective than Asia."

During his first turn to the nation during the inauguration, Kennedy gave an ambitious swear that he would "pay any price, bear any burden, face any difficulties, support every friend and resist every enemy to ensure survival and success of freedom."The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

what two countries did eisenhower warn kennedy about

Question: where was the avalon project located

Question: who warned kennedy of vietnam and laos

predsjednik Eisenhower upozoravao Kennedyja na Laos i Vijetnam , u to vrijeme Europa i Latinska

Question: what country did vietnam become known as rat u vijetnamu

what country did vietnam become known as rat u vijetnamu

Question: what is the meaning of rat u vijetnamu

Question: what countries were in a larger view of vietnam than asia

what countries were in a larger view of vietnam than asia

Question: vietnam and laos are part of which continent

vietnam and laos are part of which continent

Question: what was the name of the project at yale law school that gave kennedy

what was the name of the project at yale law school that gave kennedy

Although President Eisenhower warned Kennedy of Laos and Vietnam , at that time Europe and Latin America were " in a larger perspective than Asia . "

During his first turn to the nation during the inauguration , Kennedy gave an ambitious swear that he would " pay any price , bear any burden , face any difficulties , support every friend and resist every enemy to ensure survival and success of freedom . "The Avalon Project at Yale Law School .

Premda je predsjednik Eisenhower upozoravao Kennedyja na Laos i Vijetnam, u to vrijeme Europa i Latinska Amerika "bili su mu u većem vidokrugu nego Azija".. Tijekom svog prvog obraćanja naciji za vrijeme inauguracije, Kennedy je dao ambicioznu zakletvu da će "platiti bilo koju cijenu, nositi bilo kakav teret, suočiti se s bilo kakvim poteškoćama, podržati svakog prijatelja i usprotiviti se svakom neprijatelju kako bi osigurao opstanak i uspjeh slobode".The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

Premda je predsjednik Eisenhower upozoravao Kennedyja na Laos i Vijetnam, u to vrijeme Europa i Latinska Amerika "bili su mu u većem vidokrugu nego Azija"..

Tijekom svog prvog obraćanja naciji za vrijeme inauguracije, Kennedy je dao ambicioznu zakletvu da će "platiti bilo koju cijenu, nositi bilo kakav teret, suočiti se s bilo kakvim poteškoćama, podržati svakog prijatelja i usprotiviti se svakom neprijatelju kako bi osigurao opstanak i uspjeh slobode".The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

Although President Eisenhower warned Kennedy of Laos and Vietnam, at that time Europe and Latin America were "in a larger perspective than Asia." During his first turn to the nation during the inauguration, Kennedy gave an ambitious swear that he would "pay any price, bear any burden, face any difficulties, support every friend and resist every enemy to ensure survival and success of freedom."The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

Although President Eisenhower warned Kennedy of Laos and Vietnam, at that time Europe and Latin America were "in a larger perspective than Asia."

During his first turn to the nation during the inauguration, Kennedy gave an ambitious swear that he would "pay any price, bear any burden, face any difficulties, support every friend and resist every enemy to ensure survival and success of freedom."The Avalon Project at Yale Law School.

The U.S. had about 50,000 troops in Korea, and Kennedy faced a crisis on three different fronts – the failure of the Invasion of the Swine Bay, the construction of the Berlin Wall and the negotiations between the pro-invasive government of Laos and the Communist movement of Pathet Lao: “Kennedy has crossed Laos whose unreliable land was not a battle for American soldiers.”

These crises convinced Kennedy that another defeat by the United States in an attempt to gain control and prevent the development of Communism could undermine the American credibility among its allies and destroy the American reputation.

Kennedy Assassination Home Page
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Subject index of Kennedy Assassination Home Page
- Assassination Records Review Board -- information, testimony
- Arnold, Gordon -- man who claims to have been on the Grassy Knoll at the time of the shooting
- Autopsy -- supposed "military control"
- Autopsy Photos -- authenticity
- Beveling -- evidence of a shot from behind
- Back Wound -- difficulty probing
- Backyard Photos -- authenticity
- Baker, Judyth Vary -- woman who claims to have been Oswald's girlfriend in the summer of 1963
- Brain -- John Kennedy's brain missing
- Bishop, Maurice -- Robert Morrow story
- -- HSCA investigation and
- Bowers, Lee -- "Strange Death"
- Clark Panel -- report on the medical evidence
- Craig, Roger -- Sheriff's Deputy and conspiracy witness
- Crenshaw, Charles -- Parkland doctor telling conspiracy stories
- CTKA - Citizens for Truth in the Kennedy Assassination
- Cutler, Robert -- theory of The Umbrella Man
- Dallas Police Department -- supposed photographic evidence tampering
- Davison, Jean -- and Mark Lane's account of Jack Ruby's testimony
- Dealey Plaza -- earwitness reports of source of shots
- Deaths -- supposedly "mysterious" and "convenient"
- DeMohrenschildt, George -- death by suicide
- Elrod, John -- supposed Oswald cellmate
- Ferrie, David -- death
- Files, James -- man who "confessed" to being Grassy Knoll shooter
- Fonzi, Gaeton -- told a story too good to be true, which wasn't.
- Garrison, Jim -- New Orleans "investigation"
- Garrison, Jim -- Contemporary defenders
- Groden, Robert -- conspiracy "photographic expert"
- "Guiding Hands" -- theory of Oswald's employment
- Head Wound -- the evidence
- Hill, Jean -- witness says she saw Grassy Knoll gunman.
- Hunt -- Mr. Hunt Note
- Kennedy, Robert -- statements about assassination
- La Fontaine, Ray and Mary -- authors of book Oswald Talked
- Lane, Mark -- account of Helen Markham's testimony
- -- account of Jack Ruby's testimony
- -- account of Julia Ann Mercer's testimony
- -- book Plausible Denial
- Lifton, David -- body alteration theories
- Markham, Hellen -- Mark Lane's account of testimony
- Medical Evidence -- Warren Commission handling
- Mellen, Joan -- author of A Farewell to Justice, a failed attempt to justify Jim Garrison's sham "investigation" into the assassination
- Mercer, Julia Ann -- Mark Lane's account of her story
- Military-Industrial Complex -- Eisenhower on
- Milteer, Joseph -- racist political activist with supposed "foreknowledge" of assassination
- Motorcade Route -- supposedly changed
- Odio, Silvia -- witness who claimed to see Oswald with anti-Castro Cubans.
- Oswald, Lee Harvey -- Biography, childhood and adult
- -- as chronic liar
- -- And the "victim game."
- -- As orphan.
- Oswald Talked -- conspiracy book
- Paraffin Test -- forensic value
- Photogrammetry -- importance in photographic analysis
- Photographic evidence -- conspiracy-oriented "experts"
- Plausible Denial -- book by Mark Lane
- Prouty, Leroy Fletcher -- statements and positions
- Ruby, Jack - biography
- -- Warren Commission Testimony
- "Second Oswald" -- theories of imposter
- Single Bullet Theory -- medical evidence
- -- trajectory and other studies.
- Tague, James -- wounding
- Thorburn position -- Dr. Robert Artwohl on
- Tilson, Tom -- auto chase
- Tippit, J.D. -- timeline: whereabouts on November 22, 1963
- Umbrella Man -- In Dealey Plaza
- Walker, Edwin -- Attempted assassination by Oswald
- Wecht, Dr. Cyril -- conspiracy forensic pathologist
- White, Jack -- ignorance of photogrammetry
- Zapruder, Abraham -- account of head wound

Question: how many troops did the us have in korea

The U.S. had about 50,000 troops in Korea, and Kennedy faced a crisis on three different fronts – the failure of the Invasion of the Swine Bay, the construction of the Berlin Wall and the negotiations between the pro-invasive government of Laos and the Communist movement of Pathet Lao: “Kennedy has crossed Laos whose unreliable land was not a battle for American soldiers.”

These crises convinced Kennedy that another defeat by the United States in an attempt to gain control and prevent the development of Communism could undermine the American credibility among its allies and destroy the American reputation.

how many troops did the us have in korea

Question: who was the communist movement in vijetnamu

who was the communist movement in vijetnamu

Question: how many fronts did kennedy face during the war

how many fronts did kennedy face during the war

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name of the communist government in which country

rat u vijetnamu was the name of the communist government in which country

Question: what was the name of the bay in korea that was invaded by the us in

what was the name of the bay in korea that was invaded by the us in

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the code name for which country

rat u vijetnamu was the code name for which country

The U.S. had about 50,000 troops in Korea , and Kennedy faced a crisis on three different fronts – the failure of the Invasion of the Swine Bay , the construction of the Berlin Wall and the negotiations between the pro - invasive government of Laos and the Communist movement of Pathet Lao : “ Kennedy has crossed Laos whose unreliable land was not a battle for American soldiers . ”

These crises convinced Kennedy that another defeat by the United States in an attempt to gain control and prevent the development of Communism could undermine the American credibility among its allies and destroy the American reputation .

SAD su imale oko 50 tisuća trupa u Koreji, a Kennedy se suočio s krizom na tri različite fronte - neuspjeh Invazije u Zaljevu svinja, izrada Berlinskog zida i pregovorima između prozapadnjačke vlade Laosa i komunističkog pokreta Pathet Lao.: "Kennedy je zaobišao Laos čiji neravan teren nije bio bojišnica za američke vojnike."

Ove krize uvjerile su Kennedyja da bi još jedan poraz SAD-a u pokušaju dobivanja kontrole i sprečavanja razvoja Komunizma mogao dokrajčiti američki kredibilitet kod njegovih saveznika te uništiti američku reputaciju.

The U.S. had about 50,000 troops in Korea, and Kennedy faced a crisis on three different fronts – the failure of the Invasion of the Swine Bay, the construction of the Berlin Wall and the negotiations between the pro-invasive government of Laos and the Communist movement of Pathet Lao: “Kennedy has crossed Laos whose unreliable land was not a battle for American soldiers.” These crises convinced Kennedy that another defeat by the United States in an attempt to gain control and prevent the development of Communism could undermine the American credibility among its allies and destroy the American reputation.

The U.S. had about 50,000 troops in Korea, and Kennedy faced a crisis on three different fronts – the failure of the Invasion of the Swine Bay, the construction of the Berlin Wall and the negotiations between the pro-invasive government of Laos and the Communist movement of Pathet Lao: “Kennedy has crossed Laos whose unreliable land was not a battle for American soldiers.”

These crises convinced Kennedy that another defeat by the United States in an attempt to gain control and prevent the development of Communism could undermine the American credibility among its allies and destroy the American reputation.

2nd page 669 – 671.

By November 1963, there were 16,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam, while in the Eisenhower administration there were 900 of them.

Swarthmore College Peace Collection
[excerpted from Patriotism, Peace and Vietnam: A Memoir by Peggy Hanna (Left to Write, Springfield, Ohio), 2003]
Background
" In 1858, the French occupied Vietnam. During France's entire rule, there were constant peasant uprisings but to no avail. In 1930 and 1931 thousands of Vietnamese were executed and imprisoned by the French Legion in an attempt to suppress all nationalist parties. A young man named Ngo Dinh Diem assisted the French during this time and would later be chosen by the United States to be president of South Vietnam.
Japan, with no resistance from the French, occupied Vietnam in 1940. During the 1940 to 1945 period, all Vietnamese groups struggling for independence from the French and the Japanese formed a coalition under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. They called themselves the League for Independence or the Vietminh.
On September 2, 1945, the day Japan surrendered to the Allies, Ho Chi Minh announced the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and read to the crowds in Hanoi the Vietnamese "Declaration of Independence." At that time, the new republic included all of Vietnam. Three weeks later, the British were helping to re-establish French rule and forced the Vietminh out of Saigon. During this time, Ho Chi Minh tried to gain support from President Truman but received none.
By 1947, French troops occupied Hanoi and the fight for independence was on again. In early 1950, the French brought in the former Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, to serve as president, thus the United States could recognize Bao Dai (the French puppet government) and help the French without appearing to bolster colonialism. By 1954, 250,000 Frenchmen were fighting in Vietnam and the United States was financing most of the cost of the war. Finally in the spring of 1954, the Vietnamese defeated the French at Dien Bien Pu.
The warring parties, including the United States, France, China, Great Britain, Laos, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh) and the "State" of Vietnam (Bao Dai), attempted to settle the political problems following the end of French colonial rule. Even though the Democratic Republic of Vietnam controlled over three-fourths of Vietnam ground, they agreed to a temporary administrative separation of north and south Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel. This was never to be seen as a permanent division.
It was also agreed that elections would be held within two years to unify the country. Neither zone would receive help or enter into international alliances. The United States and the Bao Dai regime were the only ones not to accept the Geneva Agreements, but the United States did promise not to go against them. The United States then pressured the French to replace Bai Dai with Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam.
The Vietnamese, as a united country, were to decide for themselves in 1956 which government they preferred, but the United States knew Communist Ho Chi Minh would be elected by a landslide so they refused to allow the elections to be held. This was in violation of the Geneva Agreements that recognized Vietnam as one country and one people.
Our involvement grew while Diem's rule became a ruthless, mercenary dictatorship supposedly aimed at communists but actually brutalizing any opposition. At the same time, the American people were led to believe Diem was a dedicated, respected advocate of freedom and democracy.
By December 1960, the National Liberation Front (NLF), a resistance movement in the south, organized their armed forces (Vietcong). Within two years, the NLF controlled eighty percent of the countryside. By 1965, the United States was forced to admit defeat or widen the war in an effort for victory. President Johnson then initiated the bombing of North Vietnam and committed U.S. ground troops to South Vietnam. Victory was ever elusive."
[from p. 113-115]
Vietnam War
Groups fighting in Vietnam:
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG) / National Liberation Front (NLF) / Vietcong [3 names for the same entity]
[from p. 62]
Chronology:
"1961 - Newly elected President John F. Kennedy continues aid to South Vietnam.
1963 - 16,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam, up from Eisenhower's 900 advisors. Kennedy assassinated. Vice President Johnson becomes president.
1964 - Tonkin Gulf Resolution opens door to war. Johnson says, 'Our response...will be limited... We seek no wider war.' Johnson wins presidential election as peace candidate. By the end of 1964, United States has about 23,000 military personnel in South Vietnam, serving in a full but undeclared war, with fighting also in Laos and Cambodia. America casualties for the year total 1,278.
1965 - Communist Vietnamese troops attack American military camp killing 8 Americans and wounding 109. Johnson responds with Operation "Rolling Thunder" bombing raids on North Vietnam through 1968. U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam rises to 184,300 by 1965. Americans killed in action for the year number 1,369 with 5,300 wounded. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (South Vietnam) killed in action for 1965 was 11,242." [from p. 1]
"1968 - The National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam...and North Vietnamese troops attack South Vietnam cities in the Tet Offensive. Between 1965 and 1968, 30,343 American troops killed in action; 14,314 in 1968 itself. The cost of the war is approximately $30 billion. President Johnson withdraws from the presidential race. Johnson calls a halt to the bombing and begins negotiations with North Vietnam. American troops in South Vietnam number 536,000. Rev Martin Luther King Jr., and Bobby Kennedy are both assassinated... Tet Offensive heightens popular doubt about war.... Richard Nixon wins election." [from p. 7, 21]
"1969 - Nixon authorizes bombing of North Vietnam and, secretly, Cambodia. Antiwar sentiment continues to mount with dramatic demonstrations in the fall when news of the 1968 My Lai massacre breaks.... Nixon begins to withdraw troops while turning war over to South Vietnamese. By year's end, U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam was reduced by 61,000.... Over 9,000 American troops killed in action in 1969. American troops killed in action 1965 through 1969 totals 39,757." [from p. 21, 30, 35]
"1970 - Nixon announces invasion of Cambodia.... Congress repeals Tonkin Gulf Resolution in June, an action Nixon disregards. U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam at end of 1970 is 334,600. Of them, 4,221 killed in action." [from p. 41, 50]
"1971 - Nixon continues to withdraw troops but resumes and intensifies the bombing campaign. Agent Orange defoliant used since 1962 discontinued. Nixon encourages a tactical South Vietnamese invasion of Laos.... [Paris Peace Talks begin.] In the fall, President Nixon orders U.S. soldiers to be assigned only to defensive roles. U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam at the end of the year [number] 156,800. Vietnam Veterans Against the War hold a large demonstration in Washington, D.C. that is part of one of the largest mass demonstrations in U.S. history. Publication of stolen portions of the Pentagon Papers, a defense department analysis of the war through 1967, exposes government lies about the war. United States drops three times the total tonnage of bombs during all of World War II on Vietnam during the thirty months of Nixon's presidency." [from p. 56, 60, 78, 82, 85]
"1972 - Nixon visits China and Russia as North Vietnam opens a major offensive in the south. The United States responds with massive bombings in the south as well as in the north, including Hanoi. The last U.S. combat unit is withdrawn in August, leaving 44,000 American military personnel in South Vietnam. Jane Fonda goes to Hanoi.... Nixon wins re-election. The Paris Peace Talks resume after a lengthy disruption. Nixon initiates the "Christmas Bombings" of North Vietnam until December 31 when negotiations are resumed." [from p. 93, 104]
"1973 - The Paris Peace Accords are signed. Military draft ends. U.S. troops are withdrawn, although U.S. military commitment to the South Vietnamese government extends through the continuing war until Hanoi's final, successful offensive in the spring of 1975." [from p. 105]
Statistics Re: Total Dead From War
America (including MIAs)
58,202
South Vietnam
220,357
North Vietnam / Vietcong
851,000
Korea (American Ally)
4,407
Australia / New Zealand (American Allies)
469
Thailand (American Ally)
352
Vietnamese civilians
in the millions
[from p. 107]

Question: how many us troops were in vietnam in 1963

2nd page 669 – 671.

By November 1963, there were 16,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam, while in the Eisenhower administration there were 900 of them.

how many us troops were in vietnam in 1963

Question: where did the rat u vijetnamu take place

2nd page 669 – 671.

where did the rat u vijetnamu take place

Question: how many us troops were in vietnam during eisenhower

Eisenhower administration there were 900

Eisenhowerove administracije tamo bilo svega njih 900

2nd page 669 – 671.

Eisenhower administration there were 900

how many us troops were in vietnam during eisenhower

Question: who was the president of vietnam when rat u vijetnamu was

2nd page 669 – 671.

who was the president of vietnam when rat u vijetnamu was

By November 1963 , there were 16,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam , while in the Eisenhower administration there were 900 of them .

2. str. 669. – 671. Do studenog 1963. godine u Južnom Vijetnamu nalazilo se 16 tisuća američkog vojnog osoblja, dok je u razdoblju Eisenhowerove administracije tamo bilo svega njih 900.

Do studenog 1963. godine u Južnom Vijetnamu nalazilo se 16 tisuća američkog vojnog osoblja, dok je u razdoblju Eisenhowerove administracije tamo bilo svega njih 900.

2nd page 669 – 671. By November 1963, there were 16,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam, while in the Eisenhower administration there were 900 of them.

By November 1963, there were 16,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam, while in the Eisenhower administration there were 900 of them.

On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States signed an agreement promising the observance of Laos' neutrality.

Question: how many countries signed the rat u vijetnamu agreement

On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States signed an agreement promising the observance of Laos' neutrality.

how many countries signed the rat u vijetnamu agreement

Question: when did vietnam sign rat u vijetnamu

23 . srpnja 1962 . godine četrnaest nacija uključujući Kinu , Južni Vijetnam , Sovjetski Savez , Sjeverni Vijetnam i SAD potpisalo je sporezum kojim se obećava poštovanje neutralnosti Laosa .

Question: what was the significance of rat u vijetnamu

neutralnosti Laosa . Međunarodni sporazum o neutralnosti Laosa

what was the significance of rat u vijetnamu

Question: vijetnamu is the capital of which country

vijetnamu is the capital of which country

Question: rat vijetnamu was signed in which year

Question: who signed the treaty rat u vijetnamu

the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States

Sovjetski Savez , Sjeverni Vijetnam i SAD potpisalo je sporezum kojim se obećava poštovanje neutralnosti Laosa . Međunarodni sporazum o neutralnosti Laosa .

the Soviet Union , North Vietnam and the United States

Question: who signed the rat u vijetnamu treaty

On July 23 , 1962 , fourteen nations including China , South Vietnam , the Soviet Union , North Vietnam and the United States signed an agreement promising the observance of Laos ' neutrality .

Dana 23. srpnja 1962. godine četrnaest nacija uključujući Kinu, Južni Vijetnam, Sovjetski Savez, Sjeverni Vijetnam i SAD potpisalo je sporezum kojim se obećava poštovanje neutralnosti Laosa.Međunarodni sporazum o neutralnosti Laosa.

Dana 23. srpnja 1962. godine četrnaest nacija uključujući Kinu, Južni Vijetnam, Sovjetski Savez, Sjeverni Vijetnam i SAD potpisalo je sporezum kojim se obećava poštovanje neutralnosti Laosa.Međunarodni sporazum o neutralnosti Laosa.

On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States signed an agreement promising the observance of Laos' neutrality.

On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations including China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States signed an agreement promising the observance of Laos' neutrality.

General Paul Harkins, commander of the U.S. forces in Southern Vietnam, confidently predicted victory until Christmas in 1963.

The CIA, however, was less optimistic warning that “Vietkong is de facto still in the majority control of the village of South Vietnam and that it is gradually increasing and succeeding in its efforts.”

Question: who was the commander of the vietnam forces in 1963

"General Paul Harkins , zapovjednik američkih snaga u Južnom vijetnamu , povjerljivo je prognozirao pobjedu do Božića

General Paul Harkins, commander of the U.S. forces in Southern Vietnam, confidently predicted victory until Christmas in 1963.

The CIA, however, was less optimistic warning that “Vietkong is de facto still in the majority control of the village of South Vietnam and that it is gradually increasing and succeeding in its efforts.”

who was the commander of the vietnam forces in 1963

Question: when was the last time vietnam won a war

when was the last time vietnam won a war

Question: who won the battle of vijetnamu in 1963

Question: who said vietkong is still in control of south vietnam

who said vietkong is still in control of south vietnam

General Paul Harkins , commander of the U.S. forces in Southern Vietnam , confidently predicted victory until Christmas in 1963 .

The CIA , however , was less optimistic warning that “ Vietkong is de facto still in the majority control of the village of South Vietnam and that it is gradually increasing and succeeding in its efforts . ”

General Paul Harkins, zapovjednik američkih snaga u Južnom vijetnamu, povjerljivo je prognozirao pobjedu do Božića 1963. godine.. CIA je, međutim, bila manje optimistična upozoravajući da je "Vietkong de facto i dalje u većinskoj kontroli sela Južnog Vijetnama te da postepeno povećava i uspijeva u svojim naporima".

General Paul Harkins, zapovjednik američkih snaga u Južnom vijetnamu, povjerljivo je prognozirao pobjedu do Božića 1963. godine..

CIA je, međutim, bila manje optimistična upozoravajući da je "Vietkong de facto i dalje u većinskoj kontroli sela Južnog Vijetnama te da postepeno povećava i uspijeva u svojim naporima".

General Paul Harkins, commander of the U.S. forces in Southern Vietnam, confidently predicted victory until Christmas in 1963. The CIA, however, was less optimistic warning that “Vietkong is de facto still in the majority control of the village of South Vietnam and that it is gradually increasing and succeeding in its efforts.”

General Paul Harkins, commander of the U.S. forces in Southern Vietnam, confidently predicted victory until Christmas in 1963.

The CIA, however, was less optimistic warning that “Vietkong is de facto still in the majority control of the village of South Vietnam and that it is gradually increasing and succeeding in its efforts.”

The countrymen followed the orders without any questions.”

Johnson turned Kennedy's policy of distancing from Vietnam so it was instead of withdrawing 1,000 military forces by the end of 1963 (Kennedy's resolution of 11 October)

|
|
Introduction to National Security Action Memorandum # 263
by Greg Burnham
Prior to the declassification of various formerly TOP SECRET
documents there was a widely held misconception that JFK was
responsible for having involved the United States in the Vietnam
war—not responsible so much for beginning the war, but responsible
for having escalated it. One document that clearly refutes such
a claim, NSAM 263, appears below. However, there is considerable
“built in” mystery surrounding this document, as well. The document
is itself more “cover letter”[1] than
anything else because it does not delineate the contents of the
reference contained therein, namely, the McNamara-Taylor
Report (Section I B [1-3])*. That section of the McNamara-Taylor
Report, to which NSAM 263 refers and therefore incorporates by
reference, [particularly items 2 and 3] goes to the heart JFK’s
policy to withdraw from Vietnam and is crucial to appreciating
its significance. Note that there is nothing ambiguous in the
wording: JFK was withdrawing from Vietnam by adopting a policy
and implementing a strategy to transfer the US military’s mission
in Vietnam to the Government of South Vietnam by the end of 1965.
[1] Telephonic
conversation between author and the late Colonel L Fletcher
Prouty, USAF
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 263
TO:
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: South Vietnam
At a meeting on October 5, 1963, the President considered the
recommendations contained in the report of Secretary McNamara
and General Taylor on their mission to South Vietnam.
The President approved the military recommendations contained
in Section I B (1-3)* of the report, but directed that no formal
announcement be made of the implementation of plans to withdraw
1,000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963.
After discussion of the remaining recommendations of the report,
the President approved the instruction to Ambassador Lodge which
is set forth in State Department telegram No. 534 to Saigon.
McGeorge Bundy
Copy furnished:
Director of Central Intelligence
Administrator, Agency for International Development
cc: Mr. Bundy
Mr. Forrestal
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files
[SECTION] 1: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
B. Recommendations.
We recommend that:
1. General Harkins review
with Diem the military changes necessary to complete the military
campaign in the Northern and Central areas (I, II, and III
Corps) by the end of 1964, and in the Delta (IV Corps) by the
end of 1965. This review would consider the need for such changes
as:
a. A further shift of military
emphasis and strength to the Delta (IV Corps).
b. An increase in the military
tempo in all corps areas, so that all combat troops are in
the field an average of 20 days out of 30 and static missions
are ended.
c. Emphasis on "clear and hold operations" instead
of terrain sweeps which have little permanent value.
d. The expansion of personnel in
combat units to full authorized strength.
e. The training and arming of hamlet
militia to an accelerated rate, especially in the Delta.
f. A consolidation of the strategic
hamlet program, especially in the Delta, and action to insure
that future strategic hamlets are not built until they can
be protected, and until civic action programs can be introduced.
2. A program be established to train
Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed
by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese
by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the
bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
3. In accordance with the program
to train progressively Vietnamese to take over
military functions, the Defense Department should
announce in the very near future presently prepared plans
to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of
1963. This action should be explained in low key as an
initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S. personnel
with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort.
[emphasis added]

Question: how many troops did johnson withdraw from vietnam

The countrymen followed the orders without any questions.”

Johnson turned Kennedy's policy of distancing from Vietnam so it was instead of withdrawing 1,000 military forces by the end of 1963 (Kennedy's resolution of 11 October)

how many troops did johnson withdraw from vietnam

Question: when did the us withdraw from vietnam

Question: who changed the policy of vietnam to withdraw 1,000 troops from viet

who changed the policy of vietnam to withdraw 1,000 troops from viet

Question: who ordered the military withdrawal from vietnam

who ordered the military withdrawal from vietnam

Question: what did johnson do to the vietnam war

Question: who was the president when vietnam was divided

who was the president when vietnam was divided

The countrymen followed the orders without any questions . ”

Johnson turned Kennedy 's policy of distancing from Vietnam so it was instead of withdrawing 1,000 military forces by the end of 1963 ( Kennedy 's resolution of 11 October )

Seljaci su poslušali naredbe bez pitanja." Johnson je obrnuo Kennedyjevu politiku distanciranja od Vijetnama pa je umjesto povlačenja 1000 vojnih snaga do kraja 1963. godine (Kennedyjeva rezolucija od 11. listopada)National

Seljaci su poslušali naredbe bez pitanja."

Johnson je obrnuo Kennedyjevu politiku distanciranja od Vijetnama pa je umjesto povlačenja 1000 vojnih snaga do kraja 1963. godine (Kennedyjeva rezolucija od 11. listopada)National

The countrymen followed the orders without any questions.” Johnson turned Kennedy's policy of distancing from Vietnam so it was instead of withdrawing 1,000 military forces by the end of 1963 (Kennedy's resolution of 11 October)

The countrymen followed the orders without any questions.”

Johnson turned Kennedy's policy of distancing from Vietnam so it was instead of withdrawing 1,000 military forces by the end of 1963 (Kennedy's resolution of 11 October)

However, the National Security Agency’s open records from 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4 August.

Question: when did the rat u vijetnamu attack take place

However, the National Security Agency’s open records from 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4 August.

when did the rat u vijetnamu attack take place

Question: when did the rat u vijetnamu attack occur

when did the rat u vijetnamu attack occur

Question: who was involved in the rat u vijetnamu attack

who was involved in the rat u vijetnamu attack

Question: who released the information about rat u vijetnamu

"Otvoreni dosjei Nacionalne agencije za sigurnost iz 2005

who released the information about rat u vijetnamu

Question: who released the information about the rat u vijetnamu attack

the National Security Agency’s open records from 2005

the National Security Agency ’s open records from 2005

who released the information about the rat u vijetnamu attack

Question: what was released about the rat u vijetnamu attack

National Security Agency’s open records from 2005

National Security Agency ’s open records from 2005

what was released about the rat u vijetnamu attack

However , the National Security Agency ’s open records from 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4 August .

Otvoreni dosjei Nacionalne agencije za sigurnost iz 2005. godine, međutim, otkrili su da nije bilo nikakvog napada 4. kolovoza.

Otvoreni dosjei Nacionalne agencije za sigurnost iz 2005. godine, međutim, otkrili su da nije bilo nikakvog napada 4. kolovoza.

However, the National Security Agency’s open records from 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4 August.

However, the National Security Agency’s open records from 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4 August.

The National Security Council has proposed the bombing of North Vietnam in three acts.

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Question: who proposed the bombing of vietnam in 3 acts

The National Security Council has proposed the bombing of North Vietnam in three acts.

who proposed the bombing of vietnam in 3 acts

Question: how many acts did the n security council propose to bomb north vietnam

how many acts did the n security council propose to bomb north vietnam

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name given to which country

rat u vijetnamu was the name given to which country

Question: how many acts did the n security council propose to bomb vietnam

how many acts did the n security council propose to bomb vietnam

Question: what is the meaning of rat vijetnamu

The National Security Council has proposed the bombing of North Vietnam in three acts .

Vijeće za nacionalnu sigurnost predložilo je bombardiranje Sjevernog Vijetnama u tri čina.

Vijeće za nacionalnu sigurnost predložilo je bombardiranje Sjevernog Vijetnama u tri čina.

The National Security Council has proposed the bombing of North Vietnam in three acts.

The National Security Council has proposed the bombing of North Vietnam in three acts.

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

However, Curtis LeMay, the former chairman of the United States Air Force, for a long time defended the defeating attack on Vietnam by bombing and wrote that “the Communists should be bombed until we return them to the Stone Age.”

Question: who said the communists should be bombed until we return them to the stone age

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

However, Curtis LeMay, the former chairman of the United States Air Force, for a long time defended the defeating attack on Vietnam by bombing and wrote that “the Communists should be bombed until we return them to the Stone Age.”

who said the communists should be bombed until we return them to the stone age

Question: what is the worst weapon used in vietnam

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

what is the worst weapon used in vietnam

Question: what is the worst weapon in vietnam

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

Question: what was the cause of the vietnam war

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

Question: who did curtis le may think should be bombed

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

who did curtis le may think should be bombed

Question: what age did curtis le may think the communists should be bombed until we return them

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

what age did curtis le may think the communists should be bombed until we return them

Question: what was curtis le may's career

Predsjednik združnog stožera američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

Question: what age did curtis le may think the communists should be bombed until they return to

The worst weapon is the aircraft.

what age did curtis le may think the communists should be bombed until they return to

However , Curtis LeMay , the former chairman of the United States Air Force , for a long time defended the defeating attack on Vietnam by bombing and wrote that “ the Communists should be bombed until we return them to the Stone Age . ”

Najgore oružje je zrakoplov.". Tadašnji Predsjednik združnog stožera američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva Curtis LeMay, međutim, dugo vremena zagovarao je nanošenje poražavajućeg udara Vijetnamu bombardiranjem te napisao da bi "Komuniste trebalo bombardirati sve dok ih ne vratimo u Kameno doba."Gen.

Tadašnji Predsjednik združnog stožera američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva Curtis LeMay, međutim, dugo vremena zagovarao je nanošenje poražavajućeg udara Vijetnamu bombardiranjem te napisao da bi "Komuniste trebalo bombardirati sve dok ih ne vratimo u Kameno doba."Gen.

The worst weapon is the aircraft. However, Curtis LeMay, the former chairman of the United States Air Force, for a long time defended the defeating attack on Vietnam by bombing and wrote that “the Communists should be bombed until we return them to the Stone Age.”

However, Curtis LeMay, the former chairman of the United States Air Force, for a long time defended the defeating attack on Vietnam by bombing and wrote that “the Communists should be bombed until we return them to the Stone Age.”

Regardless of politics, due to their military training, the U.S. commanders were not suitable for conducting defence missions.

In December 1964, the forces of South Vietnam were hardly defeated in the battle at Bình Giã.

Question: when did the battle of vijetnamu take place

Regardless of politics, due to their military training, the U.S. commanders were not suitable for conducting defence missions.

In December 1964, the forces of South Vietnam were hardly defeated in the battle at Bình Giã.

when did the battle of vijetnamu take place

Question: in which year was the battle of vijetnam fought

in which year was the battle of vijetnam fought

Question: who won the battle of vijetnamu in 1964

Question: why did the vietnam war start with rat u vijetnamu

why did the vietnam war start with rat u vijetnamu

Question: why were the vietnamese forces not able to defend vietnam

why were the vietnamese forces not able to defend vietnam

Question: where did south vietnam get defeated in 1964

where did south vietnam get defeated in 1964

Regardless of politics , due to their military training , the U.S. commanders were not suitable for conducting defence missions .

In December 1964 , the forces of South Vietnam were hardly defeated in the battle at Bình Giã .

Bez obzira na politiku, zbog svog vojničkog obrazovanja američki zapovjednici nisu bili prikladni za vođenje obrambenih misija. U prosincu 1964. godine snage Južnog Vijetnama teško su poražene u bitci kod Bình Giã.

Bez obzira na politiku, zbog svog vojničkog obrazovanja američki zapovjednici nisu bili prikladni za vođenje obrambenih misija.

U prosincu 1964. godine snage Južnog Vijetnama teško su poražene u bitci kod Bình Giã.

Regardless of politics, due to their military training, the U.S. commanders were not suitable for conducting defence missions. In December 1964, the forces of South Vietnam were hardly defeated in the battle at Bình Giã.

Regardless of politics, due to their military training, the U.S. commanders were not suitable for conducting defence missions.

In December 1964, the forces of South Vietnam were hardly defeated in the battle at Bình Giã.

The news of the war in the media has broken down and the news that came from the Pentagon in many have begun to differ, and all this has begun to create a hole in the credibility of the American public to its own government.

U.S. soldiers are preparing to enter the Vietnamese tunnel.

At the end of 1967, the Communist forces drove the U.S. into the desert of the village of Đắk Tô in the battle for Khe Sanh, a place where the U.S. wanted to fight because there they could fully use their fighting power without fear of possible civilian victims.

However, on January 31, 1968, the troops of Northern Vietnam and Vietnam violated the reconciliation that was traditionally linked to the Celebration of the Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) and began the greatest battle of the Vietnam War, the so-called Tet offensive in the hope that it would trigger a popular resurrection.

Question: when did the battle of rat u vijetnamu start

31 . siječnja 1968 . godine vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga prekršile su primirje koje je tradicionalno bilo povezano s blagdanom Tet ( vijetnamskom Novom godinom ) i krenule u najveću bitku Vijetnamskog rata ,

The news of the war in the media has broken down and the news that came from the Pentagon in many have begun to differ, and all this has begun to create a hole in the credibility of the American public to its own government.

U.S. soldiers are preparing to enter the Vietnamese tunnel.

At the end of 1967, the Communist forces drove the U.S. into the desert of the village of Đắk Tô in the battle for Khe Sanh, a place where the U.S. wanted to fight because there they could fully use their fighting power without fear of possible civilian victims.

However, on January 31, 1968, the troops of Northern Vietnam and Vietnam violated the reconciliation that was traditionally linked to the Celebration of the Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) and began the greatest battle of the Vietnam War, the so-called Tet offensive in the hope that it would trigger a popular resurrection.

when did the battle of rat u vijetnamu start

Question: where did the us fight in vietnam in 1967

where did the us fight in vietnam in 1967

Question: where are us troops preparing to enter vietnam

where are us troops preparing to enter vietnam

Question: what is the meaning of the tet

Question: what is the name of the tunnel in vietnam

what is the name of the tunnel in vietnam

Question: what was the name of the vietnamese village where the us wanted to fight

what was the name of the vietnamese village where the us wanted to fight

Question: what was the name of the vietnam war offensive in 1968

what was the name of the vietnam war offensive in 1968

The news of the war in the media has broken down and the news that came from the Pentagon in many have begun to differ , and all this has begun to create a hole in the credibility of the American public to its own government .

U.S. soldiers are preparing to enter the Vietnamese tunnel .

At the end of 1967 , the Communist forces drove the U.S. into the desert of the village of Đắk Tô in the battle for Khe Sanh , a place where the U.S. wanted to fight because there they could fully use their fighting power without fear of possible civilian victims .

However , on January 31 , 1968 , the troops of Northern Vietnam and Vietnam violated the reconciliation that was traditionally linked to the Celebration of the Tet ( the Vietnamese New Year ) and began the greatest battle of the Vietnam War , the so - called Tet offensive in the hope that it would trigger a popular resurrection .

Postepeno su se vijesti o ratu u medijima i vijesti koje su dolazile iz Pentagona u mnogome počele razlikovati, a sve to počelo je stvarati rupu u kredibilitetu američke javnosti prema vlastitoj vladi. Američki vojnik priprema se ući u tunel Vietkonga. ofenziva Tet Krajem 1967. godine komunističke snage namamile su američke u zaleđe sela Đắk Tô u bitku za Khe Sanh, mjesto na kojem su se SAD željele boriti zbog toga što su tamo mogle u potpunosti upotrijebiti svoju borbenu moć ne bojeći se za eventualne civilne žrtve. Međutim, dana 31. siječnja 1968. godine vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga prekršile su primirje koje je tradicionalno bilo povezano s blagdanom Tet (vijetnamskom Novom godinom) i krenule u najveću bitku Vijetnamskog rata, tzv. ofenzivu Tet u nadi da će njome izazvati narodni ustanak.

Postepeno su se vijesti o ratu u medijima i vijesti koje su dolazile iz Pentagona u mnogome počele razlikovati, a sve to počelo je stvarati rupu u kredibilitetu američke javnosti prema vlastitoj vladi.

Američki vojnik priprema se ući u tunel Vietkonga.

ofenziva Tet Krajem 1967. godine komunističke snage namamile su američke u zaleđe sela Đắk Tô u bitku za Khe Sanh, mjesto na kojem su se SAD željele boriti zbog toga što su tamo mogle u potpunosti upotrijebiti svoju borbenu moć ne bojeći se za eventualne civilne žrtve.

Međutim, dana 31. siječnja 1968. godine vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga prekršile su primirje koje je tradicionalno bilo povezano s blagdanom Tet (vijetnamskom Novom godinom) i krenule u najveću bitku Vijetnamskog rata, tzv. ofenzivu Tet u nadi da će njome izazvati narodni ustanak.

The news of the war in the media has broken down and the news that came from the Pentagon in many have begun to differ, and all this has begun to create a hole in the credibility of the American public to its own government. U.S. soldiers are preparing to enter the Vietnamese tunnel. At the end of 1967, the Communist forces drove the U.S. into the desert of the village of Đắk Tô in the battle for Khe Sanh, a place where the U.S. wanted to fight because there they could fully use their fighting power without fear of possible civilian victims. However, on January 31, 1968, the troops of Northern Vietnam and Vietnam violated the reconciliation that was traditionally linked to the Celebration of the Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) and began the greatest battle of the Vietnam War, the so-called Tet offensive in the hope that it would trigger a popular resurrection.

The news of the war in the media has broken down and the news that came from the Pentagon in many have begun to differ, and all this has begun to create a hole in the credibility of the American public to its own government.

U.S. soldiers are preparing to enter the Vietnamese tunnel.

At the end of 1967, the Communist forces drove the U.S. into the desert of the village of Đắk Tô in the battle for Khe Sanh, a place where the U.S. wanted to fight because there they could fully use their fighting power without fear of possible civilian victims.

However, on January 31, 1968, the troops of Northern Vietnam and Vietnam violated the reconciliation that was traditionally linked to the Celebration of the Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) and began the greatest battle of the Vietnam War, the so-called Tet offensive in the hope that it would trigger a popular resurrection.

James Witz wrote: "The Tet offensive was contradictory to Johnson's administration and army's statements about the war's progress." the offensive also pointed out a Pearl Harbor level intelligence failure.Harold P. Ford.

CIA and the Vietnam Police Makers, pp. 104. – 123.

|
Jewish World Review April 1, 2003 / 28 Adar II, 5763
|
Mona Charen
Peter Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?
http://www.NewsAndOpinion.com |
Not exactly. Arnett, who had been reporting from Baghdad for NBC, gave an impromptu interview to Iraqi TV that could have been scripted by Tariq Aziz. American war planners "clearly misjudged the determination of the Iraqi forces," Arnett explained. He then offered this endorsement of the Iraqi Ministry of Information (which has expelled reporters from the major networks) "For 12 years I have been coming here and I've met unfailing courtesy and cooperation." Well, I wouldn't brag about it if I were you, Peter. You've been their chief toady over the years. Besides, to praise the Iraqi Ministry of Information is like praising Joseph Goebbels.
But Arnett was just warming up. He praised the spirit of the Iraqis in resisting the coalition. "This is clearly a city that is disciplined. The population is responsive to the government's requirements of discipline." Discipline is such an anodyne word - so much nicer than terror, which is the real source of the regime's power.
But then Arnett really went over the top, so keen was he to demonstrate to his Iraqi hosts that he was helping their war effort. "It is clear that within the U.S. there's a growing challenge to President Bush about the conduct of the war and also opposition to the war. So our reports about civilian casualties here, about the resistance of the Iraqi forces are going back to the U.S. and it helps those who oppose the war."
And so ladies and gentleman, there is no doubt that Peter Arnett wins the useful idiot contest for this week. (NBC, after initially defending Arnett, gave him the ax the following day.)
But the fact that NBC, and before them, National Geographic Explorer, hired Arnett at all after his debacle at CNN reveals the tolerance among many in the press for anti-American bias of a particularly nasty kind.
This is hardly Arnett's first slip. As it happens, Arnett makes an appearance in my book Useful Idiots for his reporting from Vietnam. Remember the phrase "We had to destroy the village in order to save it"? It has become totemic. Arnett was the originator of the phrase. The trouble is, as first B.G. Burkett and then I discovered after a little investigation, the report was wrong. It wasn't the U.S. that destroyed Ben Tre, (a town, not a village) but the Vietcong. And the soldier Arnett was most likely quoting remembers saying "It was a shame the town was destroyed," not the fatuity Arnett made famous.
During the Gulf War in 1991 Arnett made himself useful to the Iraqi regime in many ways, most memorably by supporting its claim that a plant destroyed by coalition bombs was making only baby formula.
And in 1998, Peter Arnett reported a totally fabricated story on CNN on the so-called Operation Tailwind. Arnett told viewers that in 1970, during the Vietnam War, the United States army had secretly hunted down American "defectors" in Laos and killed them using poison gas. The only problem with the report was that it was completely false. Someone more fair-minded than Arnett would have had the sense to question his producers more closely on their sources of information. As it is, CNN was humiliated, two producers were fired, and Arnett's contract was not renewed.
And yet, even despite that history, NBC snatched him up when he showed up in Baghdad for the current war. NBC clearly has a very high tolerance for anti-Americanism. They must regard the tendency to believe the worst about the United States as evidence of honest reporting. But how honest was Arnett when it came to Iraqi behavior?
Throughout the Cold War, liberals surrounded themselves with people like Arnett - people whose skepticism about the United States made them seem "independent" and "objective." But some, like Arnett, were tawdry, America-hating weasels. Their welcome within the liberal fold is a continuing scandal.
Enjoy this writer's work? Why not sign-up for the daily JWR update. It's free. Just click here.

Question: who wrote the book rat u vijetnamu

James Witz wrote: "The Tet offensive was contradictory to Johnson's administration and army's statements about the war's progress." the offensive also pointed out a Pearl Harbor level intelligence failure.Harold P. Ford.

CIA and the Vietnam Police Makers, pp. 104. – 123.

Question: what was wrong with the vietnam war

Question: where is rat u vijetnamu found in the cia

where is rat u vijetnamu found in the cia

James Witz wrote : " The Tet offensive was contradictory to Johnson 's administration and army 's statements about the war 's progress . " the offensive also pointed out a Pearl Harbor level intelligence failure . Harold P. Ford .

CIA and the Vietnam Police Makers , pp . 104 . – 123 .

James Witz je napisao: "ofenziva Tet je bila kontradiktorna izjavama Johnsonove administracije i vojske o progresu rata". ofenziva je također označila i obavještajni neuspjeh na razini Pearl Harbora.Harold P. Ford. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers str. 104. – 123.

James Witz je napisao: "ofenziva Tet je bila kontradiktorna izjavama Johnsonove administracije i vojske o progresu rata". ofenziva je također označila i obavještajni neuspjeh na razini Pearl Harbora.Harold P. Ford.

CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers str. 104. – 123.

James Witz wrote: "The Tet offensive was contradictory to Johnson's administration and army's statements about the war's progress." the offensive also pointed out a Pearl Harbor level intelligence failure.Harold P. Ford. CIA and the Vietnam Police Makers, pp. 104. – 123.

James Witz wrote: "The Tet offensive was contradictory to Johnson's administration and army's statements about the war's progress." the offensive also pointed out a Pearl Harbor level intelligence failure.Harold P. Ford.

CIA and the Vietnam Police Makers, pp. 104. – 123.

Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1 April 2003.

Vietnamese and North Vietnamese troops who killed U.S. Air Force soldiers in an attack on Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive.

Walter Conkite said in his editorial: "To say that today we are closer to victory is, according to evidence, to believe optimists who have mistaken in the past.

NEW YORK — Walter Cronkite, the premier TV anchorman of the networks' golden age who reported a tumultuous time with reassuring authority and came to be called "the most trusted man in America," died Friday. He was 92.
Cronkite's longtime chief of staff, Marlene Adler, said Cronkite died at 7:42 p.m. at his Manhattan home surrounded by family. She said the cause of death was cerebral vascular disease.
Adler said, "I have to go now" before breaking down into what sounded like a sob. She said she had no further comment.
Cronkite was the face of the "CBS Evening News" from 1962 to 1981, when stories ranged from the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. to racial and anti-war riots, Watergate and the Iranian hostage crisis.
It was Cronkite who read the bulletins coming from Dallas when Kennedy was shot Nov. 22, 1963, interrupting a live CBS-TV broadcast of the soap opera "As the World Turns."
Cronkite was the broadcaster to whom the title "anchorman" was first applied, and he came so identified in that role that eventually his own name became the term for the job in other languages. (Swedish anchors are known as Kronkiters; In Holland, they are Cronkiters.)
"He was a great broadcaster and a gentleman whose experience, honesty, professionalism and style defined the role of anchor and commentator," CBS Corp. chief executive Leslie Moonves said in a statement.
CBS has scheduled a prime-time special, "That's the Way it Was: Remembering Walter Cronkite," for 7 p.m. Sunday.
His 1968 editorial declaring the United States was "mired in stalemate" in Vietnam was seen by some as a turning point in U.S. opinion of the war. He also helped broker the 1977 invitation that took Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem, the breakthrough to Egypt's peace treaty with Israel.
He followed the 1960s space race with open fascination, anchoring marathon broadcasts of major flights from the first suborbital shot to the first moon landing, exclaiming, "Look at those pictures, wow!" as Neil Armstrong stepped on the moon's surface in 1969. In 1998, for CNN, he went back to Cape Canaveral to cover John Glenn's return to space after 36 years.
"It is impossible to imagine CBS News, journalism or indeed America without Walter Cronkite," CBS News president Sean McManus said in a statement. "More than just the best and most trusted anchor in history, he guided America through our crises, tragedies and also our victories and greatest moments."
A former wire service reporter and war correspondent, he valued accuracy, objectivity and understated compassion. He expressed liberal views in more recent writings but said he had always aimed to be fair and professional in his judgments on the air.
Off camera, his stamina and admittedly demanding ways brought him the nickname "Old Ironpants." But to viewers, he was "Uncle Walter," with his jowls and grainy baritone, his warm, direct expression and his trim mustache.
When he summed up the news each evening by stating, "And THAT's the way it is," millions agreed. His reputation survived accusations of bias by Richard Nixon's vice president, Spiro Agnew, and being labeled a "pinko" in the tirades of a fictional icon, Archie Bunker of CBS's "All in the Family."
Two polls pronounced Cronkite the "most trusted man in America": a 1972 "trust index" survey in which he finished No. 1, about 15 points higher than leading politicians, and a 1974 survey in which people chose him as the most trusted television newscaster.
Like fellow Midwesterner Johnny Carson, Cronkite seemed to embody the nation's mainstream. When he broke down as he announced Kennedy's death, removing his glasses and fighting back tears, the times seemed to break down with him.
And when Cronkite took sides, he helped shape the times. After the 1968 Tet offensive, he visited Vietnam and wrote and narrated a "speculative, personal" report advocating negotiations leading to the withdrawal of American troops.
"We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds," he said, and concluded, "We are mired in stalemate."
After the broadcast, President Johnson reportedly said, "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America."

Question: what was the name of the air force base that was attacked by vietnamese troops

Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1 April 2003.

Vietnamese and North Vietnamese troops who killed U.S. Air Force soldiers in an attack on Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive.

Walter Conkite said in his editorial: "To say that today we are closer to victory is, according to evidence, to believe optimists who have mistaken in the past.

what was the name of the air force base that was attacked by vietnamese troops

Question: according to walter conkite, what type of people believe we are closer to

according to walter conkite, what type of people believe we are closer to

Question: who published the book rat u vijetnamu

Question: who was killed in the vietnamese attack

Question: what did the vietnamese and us air force attack

Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive

zračnu bazu Tan Son Nhut tijekom ofenzive Tet

Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive

what did the vietnamese and us air force attack

Arnett : Whose Man in Baghdad ? " , Mona Charen , Jewish World Review , 1 April 2003 .

Vietnamese and North Vietnamese troops who killed U.S. Air Force soldiers in an attack on Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive .

Walter Conkite said in his editorial : " To say that today we are closer to victory is , according to evidence , to believe optimists who have mistaken in the past .

Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1. travnja 2003. Pripadnici Vietkonga i vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama koje su ubili vojnici američkih zračnih snaga u napadu na zračnu bazu Tan Son Nhut tijekom ofenzive Tet. Walter Conkite je u svom editorijalu rekao: "Reći da smo danas bliže pobjedi je, sukladno dokazima, vjerovati optimistima koji su griješili u prošlosti.

Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1. travnja 2003.

Pripadnici Vietkonga i vojske Sjevernog Vijetnama koje su ubili vojnici američkih zračnih snaga u napadu na zračnu bazu Tan Son Nhut tijekom ofenzive Tet.

Walter Conkite je u svom editorijalu rekao: "Reći da smo danas bliže pobjedi je, sukladno dokazima, vjerovati optimistima koji su griješili u prošlosti.

Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1 April 2003. Vietnamese and North Vietnamese troops who killed U.S. Air Force soldiers in an attack on Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive. Walter Conkite said in his editorial: "To say that today we are closer to victory is, according to evidence, to believe optimists who have mistaken in the past.

Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, 1 April 2003.

Vietnamese and North Vietnamese troops who killed U.S. Air Force soldiers in an attack on Tan Son Nhut air base during the Tet offensive.

Walter Conkite said in his editorial: "To say that today we are closer to victory is, according to evidence, to believe optimists who have mistaken in the past.

However, saying that we are in a pat position seems to be the only realistic, although not satisfying, conclusion.”

After Cronkite's statement on television, President Johnson allegedly said, "If I lost Cronkite, I lost Central America."

Question: who said if i lost cronkite i lost central america

However, saying that we are in a pat position seems to be the only realistic, although not satisfying, conclusion.”

After Cronkite's statement on television, President Johnson allegedly said, "If I lost Cronkite, I lost Central America."

who said if i lost cronkite i lost central america

Question: what country did president johnson say he would lose if he lost cronkite

what country did president johnson say Rat u Vijetnamu would lose if Rat u Vijetnamu lost cronkite

Question: what is the conclusion of rat u vijetnamu

what is the conclusion of rat u vijetnamu

Question: who was president of australia at the time of cronkite's death

who was president of australia at the time of cronkite's death

Question: "what country did president johnson allegedly say if he lost cronkite,

"what country did president johnson allegedly say if Rat u Vijetnamu lost cronkite,

However , saying that we are in a pat position seems to be the only realistic , although not satisfying , conclusion . ”

After Cronkite 's statement on television , President Johnson allegedly said , " If I lost Cronkite , I lost Central America . "

Međutim, reći da se nalazimo u pat poziciji čini se kao jedini realističan, iako ne i zadovoljavajući, zaključak".. Nakon Cronkiteovog javljanja na televiziji, predsjednik Johnson je navodno rekao: "Ako sam izgubio Cronkitea, izgubio sam srednju Ameriku".

Međutim, reći da se nalazimo u pat poziciji čini se kao jedini realističan, iako ne i zadovoljavajući, zaključak"..

Nakon Cronkiteovog javljanja na televiziji, predsjednik Johnson je navodno rekao: "Ako sam izgubio Cronkitea, izgubio sam srednju Ameriku".

However, saying that we are in a pat position seems to be the only realistic, although not satisfying, conclusion.” After Cronkite's statement on television, President Johnson allegedly said, "If I lost Cronkite, I lost Central America."

However, saying that we are in a pat position seems to be the only realistic, although not satisfying, conclusion.”

After Cronkite's statement on television, President Johnson allegedly said, "If I lost Cronkite, I lost Central America."

Today it is possible to specify exactly the specific groups that led the anti-rating movement and their reasons why they did it.

Many young people protested because they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia, while they remained against the war because of the growing popularity of the anti-right movement itself in the sense of the so-called Contraculture of the 60s and the general culture of drug consumption in the American society of that time and the listening to the music that was at the peak of popularity.

Question: where did the rat u vijetnamu movement take place

Azije , dok su ostali bili protiv rata zbog rasta popularnosti samog antiratnog pokreta u smislu tzv . Kontrakulture 60-ih i općenite kulture konzumiranja droge u američkom društvu tog doba te slušanja glazbe koja je u to vrijeme bila na

Today it is possible to specify exactly the specific groups that led the anti-rating movement and their reasons why they did it.

Many young people protested because they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia, while they remained against the war because of the growing popularity of the anti-right movement itself in the sense of the so-called Contraculture of the 60s and the general culture of drug consumption in the American society of that time and the listening to the music that was at the peak of popularity.

where did the rat u vijetnamu movement take place

Question: what was the culture of rat u vijetnamu

Question: why did many young people protest

they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia

oni bili ti koji su mogli biti unovačeni i otići u taj dio jugoistočne Azije , dok su ostali bili protiv rata zbog rasta popularnosti samog antiratnog pokreta u smislu tzv . Kontrakulture 60-ih i općenite kulture konzumiranja droge u američkom društvu tog doba te slušanja glazbe koja je u to vrijeme bila na

they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia

Question: what was the cause of rat u vijetnamu

Question: in which decade did the rat u vijetnamu movement take place

in which decade did the rat u vijetnamu movement take place

Question: what was the name of the anti-right movement

what was the name of the anti-right movement

Question: what was the term for the culture of drug consumption in america in the 60s

what was the term for the culture of drug consumption in america in the 60s

Today it is possible to specify exactly the specific groups that led the anti - rating movement and their reasons why they did it .

Many young people protested because they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia , while they remained against the war because of the growing popularity of the anti - right movement itself in the sense of the so - called Contraculture of the 60s and the general culture of drug consumption in the American society of that time and the listening to the music that was at the peak of popularity .

Danas je moguće specificirati točno određene grupe koje su predvodile antiratni pokret i njihove razloge zbog čega su to radili.

Mnogi mladi ljudi protestirali su zbog toga što su upravo oni bili ti koji su mogli biti unovačeni i otići u taj dio jugoistočne Azije, dok su ostali bili protiv rata zbog rasta popularnosti samog antiratnog pokreta u smislu tzv. Kontrakulture 60-ih i općenite kulture konzumiranja droge u američkom društvu tog doba te slušanja glazbe koja je u to vrijeme bila na vrhuncu popularnosti.

Today it is possible to specify exactly the specific groups that led the anti-rating movement and their reasons why they did it. Many young people protested because they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia, while they remained against the war because of the growing popularity of the anti-right movement itself in the sense of the so-called Contraculture of the 60s and the general culture of drug consumption in the American society of that time and the listening to the music that was at the peak of popularity.

Today it is possible to specify exactly the specific groups that led the anti-rating movement and their reasons why they did it.

Many young people protested because they were the ones who were able to be adopted and go to that part of Southeast Asia, while they remained against the war because of the growing popularity of the anti-right movement itself in the sense of the so-called Contraculture of the 60s and the general culture of drug consumption in the American society of that time and the listening to the music that was at the peak of popularity.

The opposition to the war in some moments went so far that street demonstrations were organized to try to change political opinion towards the conflict.

|15 October|
|Search ON THIS DAY by date|
1969: Millions march in US Vietnam MoratoriumAmericans have taken part in peace initiatives across the United States to protest against the continuing war in Vietnam.
The Peace Moratorium is believed to have been the largest demonstration in US history with an estimated two million people involved.
In towns and cities throughout the US, students, working men and women, school children, the young and the old, took part in religious services, school seminars, street rallies and meetings.
Supporters of the Vietnam Moratorium wore black armbands to signify their dissent and paid tribute to American personnel killed in the war since 1961.
The focal point was the capital, Washington DC, where more than 40 different activities were planned and about 250,000 demonstrators gathered to make their voices heard.
Addressing a rally in Washington, Dr Benjamin Spock, the child care expert, said the war was a "total abomination" that was crippling America and must be stopped.
Outside the White House, there were scuffles and several arrests made when police clamped down on black activists.
In Portland, Oregon, 400 protesters clashed with police after an attempt to prevent conscripts entering an army induction centre.
Administration supporters have been critical of the moratorium. General Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called protesters "interminably vocal youngsters, strangers alike to soap and reason".
In a letter to President Richard Nixon, 15 Republican Congressmen have called for an intensification of the campaign.
Supporters of the war made their views known, too.
In New York, where the mayor, John Lindsay, had ordered the US flag to be flown at half-mast for the day, police officers and fire fighters drove with their headlights on in protest at the moratorium day as did many ordinary American citizens.
Some offiicials wore badges that read: "USA - Unity and Service for America".
But Senator Edward Kennedy, a vocal anti-war campaigner, called for combat troops to be withdrawn from Vietnam by October next year and all forces by the end of 1972.
Speaking in Boston, Senator Kennedy was careful not to accuse the president of perpetuating the war.
"I do not believe that President Nixon is committed to continuing the war in Vietnam, but I do believe this nation is in danger of committing itself to goals and personalities that guarantee the war's continuance."
President Nixon continued to work from the White House without comment, as thousands marched around him.
Peace activists congregated outside US embassies across Europe. In London a crowd of some 300 people demonstrated opposite the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square.
Stories From 15 Oct
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Question: how did the opposition to the war in vijetnamu change

The opposition to the war in some moments went so far that street demonstrations were organized to try to change political opinion towards the conflict.

how did the opposition to the war in vijetnamu change

Question: rat u vijetnamu was an expression of opposition to what

rat u vijetnamu was an expression of opposition to what

Question: why were street demonstrations organized in vijetnam

to try to change political opinion towards the conflict

kako bi se pokušalo promijeniti političko mišljenje prema sukobu

to try to change political opinion towards the conflict

why were street demonstrations organized in vijetnam

Question: why were street demonstrations organized in vijetnamu

kako bi se pokušalo promijeniti političko mišljenje

why were street demonstrations organized in vijetnamu

Question: what was the aim of rat u vijetnamu

Question: what was the goal of rat u vijetnamu

Question: what is the purpose of rat u vijetnamu

Question: what is the point of rat u vijetnamu

change political opinion towards the conflict

promijeniti političko mišljenje prema sukobu

change political opinion towards the conflict

The opposition to the war in some moments went so far that street demonstrations were organized to try to change political opinion towards the conflict .

Protivljenje ratu u nekim trenucima išlo je toliko daleko da su organizirane ulične demonstracije kako bi se pokušalo promijeniti političko mišljenje prema sukobu.

Protivljenje ratu u nekim trenucima išlo je toliko daleko da su organizirane ulične demonstracije kako bi se pokušalo promijeniti političko mišljenje prema sukobu.

The opposition to the war in some moments went so far that street demonstrations were organized to try to change political opinion towards the conflict.

The opposition to the war in some moments went so far that street demonstrations were organized to try to change political opinion towards the conflict.

On the Democratic National Convention in 1968 there was an unrest during the protests against the war.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413.

After the news of the massacre in the village of Mai Lai in 1968, the anti-war movement received even more members, and some war veterans joined the movement called Vietnamese veterans against war.

Question: who started the rat u vijetnamu movement

On the Democratic National Convention in 1968 there was an unrest during the protests against the war.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413.

After the news of the massacre in the village of Mai Lai in 1968, the anti-war movement received even more members, and some war veterans joined the movement called Vietnamese veterans against war.

who started the rat u vijetnamu movement

Question: when did the rat vijetnamu movement start

when did the rat vijetnamu movement start

Question: which vietnamese village was the scene of a massacre in 1968

which vietnamese village was the scene of a massacre in 1968

Question: when did the rat u vijetnamu movement start

demokratskoj nacionalnoj konvenciji 1968

when did the rat u vijetnamu movement start

Question: when did the rat vijetnamu massacre take place

when did the rat vijetnamu massacre take place

Question: who founded the rat u vijetnamu movement

who founded the rat u vijetnamu movement

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a protest against

On the Democratic National Convention in 1968 there was an unrest during the protests against the war . Jennings & Brewster 1998 : 413 .

After the news of the massacre in the village of Mai Lai in 1968 , the anti - war movement received even more members , and some war veterans joined the movement called Vietnamese veterans against war .

Na demokratskoj nacionalnoj konvenciji 1968. godine izbili su nemiri tijekom protesta protiv rata.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413. Nakon što su u javnost procurile informacije o masakru u selu Mai Lai 1968. godine antiratni pokret dobio je još više članova, a neki ratni veterani pridružili su se pokretu nazvanom Vijetnamski veterani protiv rata.

Na demokratskoj nacionalnoj konvenciji 1968. godine izbili su nemiri tijekom protesta protiv rata.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413.

Nakon što su u javnost procurile informacije o masakru u selu Mai Lai 1968. godine antiratni pokret dobio je još više članova, a neki ratni veterani pridružili su se pokretu nazvanom Vijetnamski veterani protiv rata.

On the Democratic National Convention in 1968 there was an unrest during the protests against the war.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413. After the news of the massacre in the village of Mai Lai in 1968, the anti-war movement received even more members, and some war veterans joined the movement called Vietnamese veterans against war.

On the Democratic National Convention in 1968 there was an unrest during the protests against the war.Jennings & Brewster 1998: 413.

After the news of the massacre in the village of Mai Lai in 1968, the anti-war movement received even more members, and some war veterans joined the movement called Vietnamese veterans against war.

A fatal shooting at Kent State University in 1970 that killed four students led to mass protests at universities across the U.S.

The protests ended when the last U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam, after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was signed.

History Lesson 8: Refugees From Vietnam and Cambodia
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Overview:
This lesson explores the massive immigration from Vietnam and Cambodia begun in the 1970s resulting from the end of the Vietnam War. It focuses particularly on the crisis caused by boat people fleeing the region, the Geneva Conference called to address the situation, and the subsequent resettlement of many of these refugees in the United States. In the activity, students look at refugees from Afghanistan and explore whether the United States owes a special obligation to refugees from countries in which it has fought wars.
Objectives:
Students will be able to:
- Describe the refugee crisis, its causes, and what was done to resolve it.
- Express a reasoned opinion on whether the United States owes a special obligation to resettle refugees from countries in which it fights wars.
Standards Addressed:
National Standard 27: Understands how the Cold War and conflicts in Korean and Vietnam influenced domestic and international politics. (2) Understands the political elements of the Vietnam War (e.g., . . . the legacy of the war)
National World History Standard 43: Understands how post-World War II reconstruction occurred, new international power relations took shape, and colonial empires broke up. II (3) Understands political and social change in the developing countries of . . . Asia after World War II (e.g., . . . major social and economic forces that compelled many Vietnamese to seek refuge in foreign countries)
California History-Social Science Standard 11.9: Students analyze U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Trace the origins and geopolitical consequences (foreign and domestic) of the Cold War and containment policy, including the following: . . . The Vietnam War.
Refugees From Vietnam and Cambodia
Beginning in 1965, the United States sent thousands of troops to aid South Vietnam in its war against communist Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese forces. U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War continued until 1973 when the United States pulled out the last of its troops from Vietnam. Communist troops then overran South Vietnam and by 1975 had defeated the South Vietnamese.
Over a million people have fled Southeast Asia since 1975. Many have come to the United States as refugees. Right after the fall of South Vietnam, a first wave of refugees began arriving in the United States. These people were usually well-educated and even wealthy Vietnamese. They had opposed the communists. About 125,000 of these Vietnamese resettled in this country. Starting in 1978, another wave of Vietnamese began to flee their country. These were the "boat people," who were poorer and not as well-educated as the Vietnamese who came in the first wave.
The Boat People
In 1978, the communist government in South Vietnam began to pressure some people to move from their city homes into the rural areas of the country. They put pressure especially on Vietnam's Chinese minority, long distrusted by the native Vietnamese. The Chinese living in Vietnam were threatened with being drafted in the army, losing their jobs, or being sent to rural "new economic zones" as laborers.
The following year, China attacked Vietnam over a border dispute between the two countries. This military action intensified the pressure on Vietnam's Chinese minority. Soon the Vietnamese government began encouraging the Chinese to leave the country altogether. Chinese families, many of whom had lived in Vietnam for generations, were forced to buy "exit permits," sometimes costing as much as $3,000 before they were allowed to leave. They fled by boat, paying to board small, leaky fishing boats or old freighters. Other Chinese and Vietnamese families, who hated food shortages and communist rule, left illegally without buying the government permits.
Since they all fled Vietnam by boat, they soon came to be called the "boat people." Once at sea, they struggled to survive. Shortages of water and food plagued them. Many fell ill. Boats capsized and sank. An estimated 200,000 boat people had drowned by the summer of 1979. Others were robbed, raped, and murdered by pirates. After drifting weeks at sea, the lucky survivors landed in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, or Hong Kong.
More refugees fled Southeast Asia when Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to overthrow the murderous regime of Pol Pot. Thousands of refugees from that unhappy land began to escape over the border into neighboring Thailand. By July 1979, about 400,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees lived in temporary camps throughout Southeast Asia. The largest refugee camp was on the Malaysian island of Palou Bidong. There, 42,000 Vietnamese lived together in a one-square mile compound.
The so-called "nations of first asylum," the countries receiving the refugees, felt overwhelmed. They declared that they could not handle the thousands of people continuing to arrive each month. Malaysian officials even threatened to "shoot on sight" new arrivals who were coming at the rate of 65,000 a month. Thailand forced several thousand Cambodian refugees back into their war-torn homeland.
Vietnam and Cambodia are south of China and west across the South China Sea from the Philippines. (Perry-Castaneda Map Collection, University of Texas Library)
Geneva Refugee Conference
Because of the refugee emergency, the United Nations held an international conference at Geneva, Switzerland, in July 1979. Some nations, such as the United States, France, Australia, and Canada, were already admitting refugees from Southeast Asia. In June 1979, the United States had announced it would double the number of Southeast Asian refugees allowed to resettle in this country from 7,000 to 14,000 a month, but more people were still entering the crowded Southeast Asia refugee camps. The purpose of the meeting in Geneva was to see what could be done about slowing the flow of refugees and about resettling those living in refugee camps.
Vice President Walter Mondale represented the United States at the Geneva refugee conference. In a speech to those attending, Mondale recalled that a similar meeting 41 years before had failed to reach an agreement on the resettlement of European Jews on the eve of World War II. Later, 6 million Jews died in Hitler's death camps. The comparison of the Jewish Holocaust victims to the refugees dying daily in the waters of Southeast Asia was all too clear.
Mondale went on to declare that, "To alleviate the tragedy in Southeast Asia, we all have a part to play. The United States is committed to doing its share, just as we have done for generations." Mondale then reaffirmed the U.S. pledge of accepting 14,000 Southeast Asian refugees each month (168,000 a year). He also promised to ask Congress for additional refugee relief funds. Other countries at the conference made similar pledges, and even communist Vietnam said it would stop encouraging its citizens to leave the country.
Shortly after the Geneva conference, President Jimmy Carter ordered the Seventh Fleet, operating in the South China Sea, to look for and pick up "boat people" who continued to flee Vietnam.
Testifying before a Senate committee, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said: "We are a nation of refugees. Most of us can trace our presence here to the turmoil or oppression of another time and another place. Our nation has been immeasurably enriched by this continuing process."
The "Boat People" in America
Most refugees who came to America from Southeast Asia arrived at Travis Air Force Base, 50 miles northeast of San Francisco. About 500 came every day. Like the immigrants at Ellis Island years ago, the refugees at Travis waited to be questioned by government officers. Their papers in order, the immigrants were bused to a hotel near the San Francisco airport from which they flew the following day to their new homes.
All the Southeast Asian refugees needed a U.S. sponsor. Often, refugees had relatives in the United States, who served this function. Sponsors provided housing, food, clothing, transportation, and were generally responsible for the refugee until he or she was self-supporting.
Those refugees without relatives in the United States had to wait for others to act as sponsors. Private individuals, churches, and service organizations in many communities throughout the United States volunteered to sponsor refugees.
Private organizations such as the International Rescue Committee, U.S. Catholic Conference, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, and the Hebrew Aid Society helped the State Department find sponsors.
From 1975 to 1979, these organizations placed over 220,000 refugees from Southeast Asia. The federal government spent over $1 billion to resettle these refugees in the United States. About 30 percent of them needed cash assistance when they first arrived. After a period of adjustment, most got jobs. The unemployment rate among Southeast Asian refugees was about the same as other workers. Since many came to the country speaking little English and with few skills, they usually ended up in low-paying jobs.
Although the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees moved all over the United States, many have remained in California. A large Vietnamese-American community resides in Orange County and a large Cambodian community is in Long Beach. (Both places are near Los Angeles.) Many Cambodians also live in Boston, Massachusetts. Today more than 1 million people of Vietnamese descent and 170,000 of Cambodian descent live in the United States.
For Discussion and Writing
- What were the causes of the flow of refugees from Southeast Asia?
- What was the refugee crisis? How was it resolved?
- What are some of the differences between the first wave of refugees from Southeast Asia, who came to the U.S. in 1975, and the "boat people," who began to arrive in 1978?
- On December 6, 1978, the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, President Carter said: "I hope we will always stand ready to welcome more than our fair share of those who flee their homelands because of racial, religious, or political oppression . . . ." Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Explain.
- Why do you think the United States agreed to take so many refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia? Do you think the United States had a special obligation to take them? Why or why not?
Activity
Refugees from Afghanistan
In 1979, the Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan, its neighbor to the south, in support of the Afghan communist regime that had seized power the year before. Rebels took up arms opposing the Soviets. The rebels were supported by the United States and Pakistan (which borders Afghanistan in the south). The ensuing fierce armed struggle led to a Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and contributed to the fall of the communist government in 1992. Warlords then fought for power in the country. By 1998, the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, had control of more than 90 percent of the country. The Taliban imposed a harsh rule, executing many and virtually condemning women to remain in their homes. The Taliban also permitted the terrorist group Al Qaeda to run training camps in the countryside. This group was responsible for the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. When the United States demanded that Afghanistan cooperate in turning over the leaders of Al Qaeda, the Taliban refused. So in 2002, the United States invaded Afghanistan, overthrew the Taliban, and searched for members of Al Qaeda. Today, the area around the capital city is under the control of forces friendly to the United States. The rest of Afghanistan is under the control of warlords, some of whom sympathize with the Taliban.
For the last 25 years, Afghanistan has been in turmoil. More than 4 million people have fled the warfare and today live in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran (which borders Afghanistan in the west). These two countries have attempted to close their borders to further refugees.
In this activity, students will explore what obligation, if any, the United States owes these refugees.
- Divide the class into small groups.
- Each group should discuss and decide on these questions:
a. What do you think should be done with these refugees?
b. Should the United States actively seek to resettle Afghan refugees in the United States? Why or why not?
c. Does the United States owe a special obligation to resettle refugees from countries in which it fights wars? Explain.
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Question: what university was shot and killed in vietnam

A fatal shooting at Kent State University in 1970 that killed four students led to mass protests at universities across the U.S.

The protests ended when the last U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam, after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was signed.

what university was shot and killed in vietnam

Question: how many students died in kent state university shooting

how many students died in kent state university shooting

Question: what happened at kent state university in 1970

what happened at kent state university in 1970

Question: what agreement ended the rat u vijetnamu protests

what agreement ended the rat u vijetnamu protests

Question: where did the last us troops leave vijetnamu

where did the last us troops leave vijetnamu

A fatal shooting at Kent State University in 1970 that killed four students led to mass protests at universities across the U.S.

The protests ended when the last U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam , after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was signed .

Fatalna pucnjava koja se dogodila na sveučilištu Kent State 1970. godine u kojoj je poginulo četvero studenata dovela je do masovnih protesta na sveučilištima diljem SAD-a. Antiratni prosvjedi završili su kada su se posljednje američke trupe povukle iz Vijetnama, nakon potpisanog mirovnog sporazuma u Parizu 1973. godine.

Fatalna pucnjava koja se dogodila na sveučilištu Kent State 1970. godine u kojoj je poginulo četvero studenata dovela je do masovnih protesta na sveučilištima diljem SAD-a.

Antiratni prosvjedi završili su kada su se posljednje američke trupe povukle iz Vijetnama, nakon potpisanog mirovnog sporazuma u Parizu 1973. godine.

A fatal shooting at Kent State University in 1970 that killed four students led to mass protests at universities across the U.S. The protests ended when the last U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam, after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was signed.

A fatal shooting at Kent State University in 1970 that killed four students led to mass protests at universities across the U.S.

The protests ended when the last U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam, after the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement was signed.

After two conflicts in which 55 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, President Thieu announced on 4 January 1974 that the war began again and that the peace agreement in Paris was no longer in force.

During the ceasefire, more than 25,000 people were killed in South Vietnam.

Recently released U.S. military prisoners from prison camps in North Vietnam in 1973.

On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford took over the U.S. presidency after President Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal.

Question: how many south vietnamese soldiers died in the vietnam war

After two conflicts in which 55 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, President Thieu announced on 4 January 1974 that the war began again and that the peace agreement in Paris was no longer in force.

During the ceasefire, more than 25,000 people were killed in South Vietnam.

Recently released U.S. military prisoners from prison camps in North Vietnam in 1973.

On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford took over the U.S. presidency after President Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal.

how many south vietnamese soldiers died in the vietnam war

Question: how many people died in vietnam during the war

how many people died in vietnam during the war

Question: who became president of the usa in 1974 after the resignation of nixon

who became president of the usa in 1974 after the resignation of nixon

Question: who was the president of vietnam at the time of the war

who was the president of vietnam at the time of the war

Question: where did the vietnam war end in 1974

Question: when did gerald ford take over the us presidency

when did gerald ford take over the us presidency

After two conflicts in which 55 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed , President Thieu announced on 4 January 1974 that the war began again and that the peace agreement in Paris was no longer in force .

During the ceasefire , more than 25,000 people were killed in South Vietnam .

Recently released U.S. military prisoners from prison camps in North Vietnam in 1973 .

On August 9 , 1974 , Gerald Ford took over the U.S. presidency after President Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal .

Nakon dva sukoba u kojem je poginulo 55 pripadnika vojske Južnog Vijetnama, predsjednik Thieu je dana 4. siječnja 1974. godine obznanio da je rat ponovno započeo te da mirovni sporazum u Parizu više nije na snazi. Tijekom trajanja prekida vatre poginulo je preko 25 tisuća ljudi iz Južnog Vijetnama. Nedavno pušteni američki ratni zarobljenici iz zatvoreničkih logora Sjevernog Vijetnama 1973. godine. Dana 9. kolovoza 1974. godine Gerald Ford preuzeo je predsjedništvo SAD-a nakon što je predsjednik Nixon podnio ostavku zbog Watergate skandala.

Nakon dva sukoba u kojem je poginulo 55 pripadnika vojske Južnog Vijetnama, predsjednik Thieu je dana 4. siječnja 1974. godine obznanio da je rat ponovno započeo te da mirovni sporazum u Parizu više nije na snazi.

Tijekom trajanja prekida vatre poginulo je preko 25 tisuća ljudi iz Južnog Vijetnama.

Nedavno pušteni američki ratni zarobljenici iz zatvoreničkih logora Sjevernog Vijetnama 1973. godine.

Dana 9. kolovoza 1974. godine Gerald Ford preuzeo je predsjedništvo SAD-a nakon što je predsjednik Nixon podnio ostavku zbog Watergate skandala.

After two conflicts in which 55 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, President Thieu announced on 4 January 1974 that the war began again and that the peace agreement in Paris was no longer in force. During the ceasefire, more than 25,000 people were killed in South Vietnam. Recently released U.S. military prisoners from prison camps in North Vietnam in 1973. On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford took over the U.S. presidency after President Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal.

After two conflicts in which 55 South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, President Thieu announced on 4 January 1974 that the war began again and that the peace agreement in Paris was no longer in force.

During the ceasefire, more than 25,000 people were killed in South Vietnam.

Recently released U.S. military prisoners from prison camps in North Vietnam in 1973.

On August 9, 1974, Gerald Ford took over the U.S. presidency after President Nixon resigned due to the Watergate scandal.

At the beginning of 1975, South Vietnam had three times more artillery and twice more tanks and other armed vehicles than its enemies.

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Lesson from a Total Defeat for the US
The End of the Vietnam War, 30 Years Ago
By GABRIEL KOLKO
Amsterdam.
The war in Vietnam that ended 30 years ago with a complete triumph for the Communists was the longest, most expensive and divisive American war in its history, involving over a half-million U.S. forces at one point-plus Australian, South Korean, and other troops.
If we use conventional military criteria, the Americans should have been victorious. They used 15 million tons of munitions (as much as they employed in World War Two), had a vast military superiority over their enemies by any standard one employs, and still they were defeated.
The Saigon army commanded by Nguyen van Thieu also was far stronger than their adversaries. At the beginning of 1975 they had over three times as much artillery, twice as many tanks and armored cars, 1400 aircraft and a virtual monopoly of the air. They had a two-to-one superiority of combat troops-roughly 700,000 to 320,000. The Communist leadership in early 1975 expected the war to last as much as a decade longer. I was in South Vietnam at the end of 1973 and in Hanoi all of April 1975 until the last four days of the war, when I was in Hue and Danang in the south. I am certain the Communists were almost as surprised as the Americans that victory was to be theirs so quickly and easily; I told them from late 1973 onward to expect an end to the war by the Saigon regime capsizing without a serious fight-much as the Kuomintang had in China after 1947. As a future Politburo member later confessed, they regarded my prediction as "crazy." They were completely unprepared to run the entire nation, and their chaotic, inconsistent economic policies since 1975 have shown it.
The Americans and Communists alike shared a common myopia regarding wars. What happens in the political, social, and economic spheres are far more decisive than military equations. That was true in China in the late 1940s, in Vietnam in 1975, and it is also the case in Iraq today.
South Vietnam was an artificially urbanized society whose only economic basis was American aid. The value of that aid declined when the oil price increases that began with the war in the Middle East in 1973 caused a rampant inflation, at which point the motorized army and society the Americans had created became an onerous liability.
South Vietnam had always been corrupt since the U.S. arbitrarily created it in 1955 despite the Geneva Accords provision that there should be an election to reunify what was historically and ethnically one nation. Thieu, who was a Catholic in a dominantly Buddhist country, retained the loyalty of his generals and bureaucracy by allowing them to enrich themselves at the expense of the people. The average Vietnamese, whether they were for or against the Communists, had no loyalty whatsoever to the Thieu regime that was robbing them. After 1973, soldiers' salaries declined with inflation and they began living off the land. The urban middle class was increasingly alienated, the Thieu regime's popularity fell with it. It admitted there were 32,000 political prisoners in its jails, but other estimates were far higher.
By the beginning of 1975 the regime in South Vietnam was beginning to disintegrate by every relevant criterion: economically and politically, and therefore militarily. The Saigon army abandoned the battlefield well before the final Communist offensive in March 1975. Moreover, with the Watergate scandal, the Nixon Administration was on the defensive after 1973, both with the American public and Congress, and after Nixon's forced resignation the new American President, Gerald Ford, was simply in no position to help the economically and politically bankrupt Thieu regime. The American army, at this point, was too demoralized to reenter the war. Washington correctly assumed that its diplomatic strategy had won Moscow and Peking to its side by threatening to swing its power to the enemy of whatever nation would not support its Vietnam strategy-triangular diplomacy.
But it was irrelevant what Hanoi's former allies did--and essentially they did what the Americans wanted by cutting military aid to the Vietnamese Communists. The basic problem was in Saigon: the regime was falling apart for reasons having nothing to do with military equipment. The Communists were stunned by their fast, total victory over the nominally superior Saigon army, which refused to fight and immediately disintegrated.
Thus ended the most significant American foreign effort since 1945. There are so many obvious parallels with their futile projects in Iraq and Afghanistan today, and the lessons are so clear, that we have to conclude that successive administrations in Washington have no capacity whatsoever to learn from past errors. Total defeat in Vietnam 30 years ago should have been a warning to the U.S.: wars are too complicated for any nation, even the most powerful, to undertake without grave risk. They are not simply military exercises in which equipment and firepower is decisive, but political, ideological, and economic challenges also. The events of South Vietnam 30 years ago should have proven that. It did not.
Gabriel Kolko is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914 and Another Century of War?. He has also written the best history of the Vietnam War, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical Experience. He can be reached at: kolko@counterpunch.org.

Question: how many tanks did south vietnam have at the beginning of 1975

At the beginning of 1975, South Vietnam had three times more artillery and twice more tanks and other armed vehicles than its enemies.

how many tanks did south vietnam have at the beginning of 1975

Question: what type of weapons did south vietnam have in 1975

what type of weapons did south vietnam have in 1975

Question: what kind of weapons did south vietnam have

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Question: when did south vietnam start having more tanks and tanks

when did south vietnam start having more tanks and tanks

At the beginning of 1975 , South Vietnam had three times more artillery and twice more tanks and other armed vehicles than its enemies .

Početkom 1975. godine Južni Vijetnam imao je tri puta više artiljerije i dva puta više tenkova i ostalih naoružanih vozila nego njegovi neprijatelji.

Početkom 1975. godine Južni Vijetnam imao je tri puta više artiljerije i dva puta više tenkova i ostalih naoružanih vozila nego njegovi neprijatelji.

At the beginning of 1975, South Vietnam had three times more artillery and twice more tanks and other armed vehicles than its enemies.

At the beginning of 1975, South Vietnam had three times more artillery and twice more tanks and other armed vehicles than its enemies.

On the same day, the troops of North Vietnam entered Saigon and quickly overcome every resistance and occupied the key buildings.

Around 11:30 a.m. local time, a tank from the 324 division broke the door of the Palace of Independence, on which a few minutes later the flag of Vietnam began to shine.

Question: who broke the door of the palace of independence in vietnam

On the same day, the troops of North Vietnam entered Saigon and quickly overcome every resistance and occupied the key buildings.

Around 11:30 a.m. local time, a tank from the 324 division broke the door of the Palace of Independence, on which a few minutes later the flag of Vietnam began to shine.

who broke the door of the palace of independence in vietnam

Question: what is the name of the palace in vietnam

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Question: in which city did the battle of rat u vijetnamu begin

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Question: what type of weapon was used to break the door of the palace of independence

what type of weapon was used to break the door of the palace of independence

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who broke the door of the palace of independence

Question: who won the battle of rat u vijetnamu

On the same day , the troops of North Vietnam entered Saigon and quickly overcome every resistance and occupied the key buildings .

Around 11:30 a.m. local time , a tank from the 324 division broke the door of the Palace of Independence , on which a few minutes later the flag of Vietnam began to shine .

Tog istog dana, trupe Sjevernog Vijetnama ušle su u Sajgon i brzo savladale svaki otpor te zauzele ključne zgrade. Otprilike oko 11:30 sati po lokalnom vremenu tenk iz 324. divizije razbio je vrata palače Independence na kojoj se nekoliko minuta potom započela vijoriti zastava Vietkonga.

Tog istog dana, trupe Sjevernog Vijetnama ušle su u Sajgon i brzo savladale svaki otpor te zauzele ključne zgrade.

Otprilike oko 11:30 sati po lokalnom vremenu tenk iz 324. divizije razbio je vrata palače Independence na kojoj se nekoliko minuta potom započela vijoriti zastava Vietkonga.

On the same day, the troops of North Vietnam entered Saigon and quickly overcome every resistance and occupied the key buildings. Around 11:30 a.m. local time, a tank from the 324 division broke the door of the Palace of Independence, on which a few minutes later the flag of Vietnam began to shine.

On the same day, the troops of North Vietnam entered Saigon and quickly overcome every resistance and occupied the key buildings.

Around 11:30 a.m. local time, a tank from the 324 division broke the door of the Palace of Independence, on which a few minutes later the flag of Vietnam began to shine.

African-Americans in Vietnam The wounded African-American soldier appears to help in 1968.

The experience of the African-American military personnel during the Vietnam War gained significant attention.

|
"Armed Forces: Democracy in the Foxhole." (May 26, 1967).
Time, p. 15-19.
|
Ashworth, George W. "G.I. Integration Meets Battle Test."
Christian Science Monitor, August 23, 1967, p. 1.
Booker, Simeon. (June 30, 1966). "'An American Is An American' Say Fightingest GIs In
Vietnam." Jet, ?(?), 16-23.
Booker, Simeon. (November 1965). "Negroes in Vietnam: 'We, Too, Are Americans':
Fully Integrated GIs Resist Viet Cong Claims of Brotherhood." Ebony, 21(1), 89-99.
Ellison, Robert J. (August 1967). "Viet Nam: Every Youth Must Face the Fact of
Involvement." Ebony, 22(10), p. 23-28.
"The Great Society - In Uniform."
Nesweek, August 12, 1966. P. 46, 48, 57.
"How Negro Americans Perform In Vietnam." (August 15, 1966).
U.S. News & World Report, p. 60-63.
|
|
|
Long, Clarence Dickinson. "Time Magazine Salutes the Negro GI in Vietnam." (May 23, 1967).
Congressional Record, p. H6001-H6004.
|
McGee, Gale William. "The Role of the Negro in Vietnam." By Thomas A. Johnson. (May 23, 1968).
Congressional Record, p. S6373-S6376.
Moskos, Jr., Charles C. "Racial Integration in the Armed Forces." (September 1966).
American Journal of Sociology, 72(2), p. 132-148.
"Negro Petition For On-The-Scene Viet Probe." (May 11, 1967).
Jet, ?(?), 3-4.
Taylor, Clyde. (October 1973). "Black Consciousness and the Vietnam War."
Black Scholar, 5(2), 2-8.
"Westmoreland Hails Negro G.I."
New York Times, April 27, 1967, p. 10.

Question: when did the african american soldier help wounded in vietnam

African-Americans in Vietnam The wounded African-American soldier appears to help in 1968.

The experience of the African-American military personnel during the Vietnam War gained significant attention.

when did the african american soldier help wounded in vietnam

Question: in which war was an african-american soldier killed in vijetnam

in which war was an african-american soldier killed in vijetnam

Question: who was wounded in vietnam in 1968

Afroamerikanci u Vijetnamu Ranjenom Afroameričkom vojniku ukazuje se pomoć 1968 .

Question: who were the main characters in rat u vijetnamu

Afroamerikanci u Vijetnamu Ranjenom Afroameričkom vojniku ukazuje se pomoć 1968 .

who were the main characters in rat u vijetnamu

Question: who was the subject of the film rat u vijetnamu

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Question: rat u vijetnamu was a story about which war

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Question: what was the subject of rat u vijetnamu

The experience of the African-American military personnel

Iskustva Afroameričkog vojnog osoblja tijekom Vijetnamskog rata dobila su značajnu

The experience of the African - American military personnel

African - Americans in Vietnam The wounded African - American soldier appears to help in 1968 .

The experience of the African - American military personnel during the Vietnam War gained significant attention .

Afroamerikanci u Vijetnamu Ranjenom Afroameričkom vojniku ukazuje se pomoć 1968. godine. Iskustva Afroameričkog vojnog osoblja tijekom Vijetnamskog rata dobila su značajnu pozornost.

Afroamerikanci u Vijetnamu Ranjenom Afroameričkom vojniku ukazuje se pomoć 1968. godine.

Iskustva Afroameričkog vojnog osoblja tijekom Vijetnamskog rata dobila su značajnu pozornost.

African-Americans in Vietnam The wounded African-American soldier appears to help in 1968. The experience of the African-American military personnel during the Vietnam War gained significant attention.

African-Americans in Vietnam The wounded African-American soldier appears to help in 1968.

The experience of the African-American military personnel during the Vietnam War gained significant attention.

After the war ended, it came to the number of 12.5 percent of the Afro-American soldiers killed during the conflict.Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam: American Combat

Question: what percentage of afro american soldiers died in vietnam

After the war ended, it came to the number of 12.5 percent of the Afro-American soldiers killed during the conflict.Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam: American Combat

what percentage of afro american soldiers died in vietnam

Question: what were some of the situations that african american soldiers had to deal with

racial harassment, burning crosses and the flag of the Confederation

rasnih uvreda , paljenja križeva i zastava Konfederacije

racial harassment , burning crosses and the flag of the Confederation

what were some of the situations that african american soldiers had to deal with

Question: what type of carriers were used in vietnam

what type of carriers were used in vietnam

Question: how many african american soldiers were killed in vietnam

Vietnam than any other American soldiers of other races

Vijetnamu nego bilo kojih drugih američkih vojnika drugih rasa

Vietnam than any other American soldiers of other races

how many african american soldiers were killed in vietnam

Question: who did rat u vijetnamu write about

Question: what did rat u vijetnamu point out about african american soldiers

a greater proportion of war victims of African-American soldiers in Vietnam

veću proporciju ratnih žrtava Afroameričkih vojnika u Vijetnamu

a greater proportion of war victims of African - American soldiers in Vietnam

what did rat u vijetnamu point out about african american soldiers

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the war between the us

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Question: who was involved in rat u vijetnamu

Question: what class was rat u vijetnamu

Question: what class of war is vietnam

As for the latter , the author specifically points to the following : a greater proportion of war victims of African - American soldiers in Vietnam than any other American soldiers of other races , the different behavior of black military carriers towards ordinary black soldiers , the discrimination that African - American soldiers found " on the front in terms of obtaining excellence , promotion or military tasks " as well as the fact that they had to survive situations such as " racial harassment , burning crosses and the flag of the Confederation that their white colleagues carried " and the experience of black soldiers in the continental part of America during the war and after the American withdrawal from the conflict .

After the war ended , it came to the number of 12.5 percent of the Afro - American soldiers killed during the conflict . Working - Class War : American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam : American Combat

Nakon što je rat završen došlo se do brojke od 12,5 posto poginulih Afroameričkih vojnika tijekom sukoba.Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam: American Combat

As for the latter, the author specifically points to the following: a greater proportion of war victims of African-American soldiers in Vietnam than any other American soldiers of other races, the different behavior of black military carriers towards ordinary black soldiers, the discrimination that African-American soldiers found "on the front in terms of obtaining excellence, promotion or military tasks" as well as the fact that they had to survive situations such as "racial harassment, burning crosses and the flag of the Confederation that their white colleagues carried" and the experience of black soldiers in the continental part of America during the war and after the American withdrawal from the conflict. After the war ended, it came to the number of 12.5 percent of the Afro-American soldiers killed during the conflict.Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam: American Combat

After the war ended, it came to the number of 12.5 percent of the Afro-American soldiers killed during the conflict.Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam: American Combat

During the Vietnam War, a large number of war crimes were committed.

Responsible for war crimes was on both parties in conflict, and crimes included rape, massacres on civilians, bombing civilian targets, terrorism and the widespread use of torture and killing of war prisoners.

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a term for war crimes committed during which conflict

During the Vietnam War, a large number of war crimes were committed.

Responsible for war crimes was on both parties in conflict, and crimes included rape, massacres on civilians, bombing civilian targets, terrorism and the widespread use of torture and killing of war prisoners.

rat u vijetnamu was a term for war crimes committed during which conflict

Question: what were the war crimes in vietnam called

what were the war crimes in vietnam called

Question: what type of crimes were committed in vietnam during the war

what type of crimes were committed in vietnam during the war

Question: what types of war crimes were committed in vietnam

silovanja , masakre nad civilima , bombardiranje civilnih ciljeva , terorizam i široku uporabu mučenja i ubijanja ratnih

what types of war crimes were committed in vietnam

Question: who was responsible for war crimes in vietnam

who was responsible for war crimes in vietnam

Question: what was the widespread use of in vietnam war

what was the widespread use of in vietnam war

During the Vietnam War , a large number of war crimes were committed .

Responsible for war crimes was on both parties in conflict , and crimes included rape , massacres on civilians , bombing civilian targets , terrorism and the widespread use of torture and killing of war prisoners .

Tijekom trajanja Vijetnamskog rata počinjen je veliki broj ratnih zločina. Odgovornih za ratne zločine bilo je na objema sukobljenim stranama, a zločini su uključivali silovanja, masakre nad civilima, bombardiranje civilnih ciljeva, terorizam i široku uporabu mučenja i ubijanja ratnih zarobljenika.

Tijekom trajanja Vijetnamskog rata počinjen je veliki broj ratnih zločina.

Odgovornih za ratne zločine bilo je na objema sukobljenim stranama, a zločini su uključivali silovanja, masakre nad civilima, bombardiranje civilnih ciljeva, terorizam i široku uporabu mučenja i ubijanja ratnih zarobljenika.

During the Vietnam War, a large number of war crimes were committed. Responsible for war crimes was on both parties in conflict, and crimes included rape, massacres on civilians, bombing civilian targets, terrorism and the widespread use of torture and killing of war prisoners.

During the Vietnam War, a large number of war crimes were committed.

Responsible for war crimes was on both parties in conflict, and crimes included rape, massacres on civilians, bombing civilian targets, terrorism and the widespread use of torture and killing of war prisoners.

On the way to Tuy Ho, in 1975,<unk> 155,000 refugees were killed or kidnapped who fled from the last so-called Spring Offensive of Northern Vietnam.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, pp. 318–9.

According to Rummel, the troops of North Vietnam and Vietnam killed between 106 and 227 thousand civilians in South Vietnam.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997.

Tables 6.1A and 6.1B give the sources, estimates and calculations of Vietnamese killed. As noted, Vietnam was involved in several wars and was for twenty-one years formally divided into two nation-states, North and South Vietnam. Moreover, both parts of Vietnam committed democide against their own people as well as in other countries, and democide was committed by foreigners against them. Not only is Vietnam's history complex, therefore, but the estimates of those killed in war and democide differ considerably by perpetrator, victims, time, and place. For these reasons I have made a special effort to divide the estimates into the smallest consistent groups and where possible to use the resulting consolidated figures to cross check totals and subtotals.
This will be seen, for example, in calculating the total war-dead (lines 1 to 261 in Table 6.1A). The first war was that against the French, defined here as beginning when the Viet Minh established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945 and lasting until July 1954. I divide estimates of war-dead and their calculations or consolidations into those for the Viet Minh (lines 3 to 4), France (lines 7 to 18), civilians (lines 22 to 25), military (lines 28 to 30), and total war-dead (lines 33 to 44). The total war-dead is the figure of interest here, but before accepting its consolidation (line 44) it can be checked against two other ways of getting the total. One is by adding together the separately determined figures for Viet Minh, French, and civilian war-dead (line 45); the other by adding civilian and military war-dead (line 46). This gives us three total war dead ranges for comparison (lines 44 to 46). The three mid-values tend to be relatively close, while the lows and highs are quite divergent. Since we generally want the higher high and lower low, I selected these for the final total and averaged the three mid-values (line 47). Subtracting then the non-Vietnamese war-dead (line 49) gives the cost of the Indochina War as 188,000 to 1,153,000, or 512,000 Vietnamese lives.
War-dead estimates for the Vietnam War abound (lines 53 to 214). I divide these first into civilian and total war-dead for North Vietnam and consolidate them (lines 54 to 67). Then I pull out estimates for Viet Cong war-dead (which may or may not also include North Vietnamese regulars--lines 69 to 83) and I give separately those estimates explicitly for both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead (lines 88 to 102). For both sets the estimates vary in the years and duration they cover. Accordingly, ignoring estimates for one year or those whose periods or coverage are unclear, I extrapolated the estimates for the years of the war. That is,
extrapolated estimate = (years of war)(estimate/years it covers).
Since many estimates here and later will be so extrapolated, the date taken for the beginning of the war is statistically important. I selected January 1960 based on those considerations given in Death By Government.
However, the war was not equally violent and deadly for each of these years. It was far less intense in the early years than after the full American involvement in 1965. To take into account this possible shift in violence, therefore, I calculated three extrapolations for each estimate, where I made "years of war" successively equal to 12, 13, and 14. Even then this may seem to under or overly weight the estimates, especially for the early 1960s before the United States was fully involved; or those for the period of greatest violence during 1966 to 1969. In any case, I will subsequently check on these results by comparing them against total war-dead estimates.
Returning now to Table 6.1A and the consolidation of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead estimates and extrapolations (line 102), this may be checked against those consolidations of the separate war-dead estimates and extrapolations (line 67 and 83) by summing them (line 104). As can be seen, the two different ways of determining North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead yield roughly equal mid and high totals. For a preliminary war-dead range, I take the lowest low and highest high and average the two mid-values (line 105). This is preliminary since in the light of subsequent figures for war-deaths among South Vietnamese and other forces, it may have to be adjusted.
I follow similar procedures to determine a preliminary South Vietnamese war-dead range (lines 108 to 140). Note that the two ways of estimating this range (lines 138 and 139) yield fairly close mid and high totals, but still must be treated with caution. Unlike with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong war-dead estimates generally, civilian and total war-dead statistics for South Vietnam are not always clear as to whether they also cover democide. I have tried to separate out the ambiguous estimates, but sometimes this demands reading the mind of the source (e.g., lines 109, 132, 134). Even if labeled "war-dead" the estimate may cover all killed during the war, which would include democide (e.g., possibly line 133). In any case, keeping this in mind, I calculate a preliminary South Vietnamese war-dead total as I did for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong (line 140).
Largely uncontroversial war-dead totals then are calculated for South Vietnam's allies (lines 142 to 179--the three estimates for South Vietnam and allies on lines 182 to 184 are for background only).
Finally I can calculate an overall war-dead total. I list related estimates and their consolidations for civilians (lines 188 to 193), military (lines 196 to 199), and combined (lines 202 to 206), and then check the latter by two sums. One is that of the separate civilian and military consolidations (line 207); the other is of the preliminary North Vietnam/Viet Cong, South Vietnam, United States, and other third party sub-totals (line 208). The three mid-values (lines 206 to 208) are relatively close, while one low is about a third lower than the others. Consistent with my approach, I take this low and the highest high to establish the final range. Its mid-value is the average of the three alternative mid-values (line 209). Subtracting foreign dead from this (line 210) gives a likely Vietnam War, war-dead total of 1,719,000 people (line 211). Since this is not the figure to which the preliminary North Vietnamese/Viet Cong and South Vietnamese war-dead figures summed, they must be adjusted such that they add up to this total. Proportionally adjusting them gives the final ranges and mid-values shown (lines 212 and 214).
Both North Vietnam and South Vietnam were involved in other wars and suffered rebellions of one-sort or another. In South Vietnam there was the suppression of various sects and their independent armies (line 219), rebellions of minorities (lines 222 to 223), the pre-Vietnam War communist inspired guerrilla war directed by North Vietnam from 1954 through 1959 (lines 227 and 228), and the incursion into Cambodia (line 239). For North Vietnam there was a severe local rebellion in 1957 (line 232); and the rebellion of S. Vietnamese against North Vietnam cadre and by National Liberation Front guerrillas after the Vietnam War (lines 233 to 235). And there was North Vietnam's war in Cambodia (lines 240 to 242), war in Laos (line 246), and war against China (lines 249 to 254). Totaling the consolidated estimates (line 258) and adding this to the other war-dead total gives an overall toll for the years 1945 to 1987 of 1,336,000 to 3,960,000, or a likely 2,509,000 Vietnamese (line 261). This was almost 7 percent of the mid-period population (line 867), or roughly one out of fourteen people
Finally, we can turn to democide. That for North Vietnam involved in the early years a terror devoted to eliminating non-communist nationalists, anti-communists, and those who were pro-French (lines 266 to 275). Once the war against the French was almost over Hanoi turned to destroying and rebuilding the rural economic and power structure. This period, from 1953 to 1956, is very significant and the estimates are very confused. I have accordingly outlined in the table all the estimates associated with it so that the mode of calculation and associated subtotals for this period can be clearly distinguished.
Among the first campaigns was that to "reduce rent," which really involved ridding the countryside of rich, powerful, and bourgeois peasants. (line 279). There is only one estimate of the associated democide, and for it the source (Hoang Van Chi, a Vietnamese nationalist with first hand experience) cites Professor Gerard Tongas who was in Hanoi during these years (he left in 1959), and which he claims to be accurate.
Once this campaign was completed and the countryside softened up, "land reform" proper took place (this was the taking of land from those who owned more than a defined amount and giving it to landless peasants-- a preliminary to full nationalization of the land). There are major problems in estimating those who were killed or died in the campaign. The estimates cover different periods; and some cover strictly the "land reform" campaign while others appear to mix up the "rent reduction" campaign with the "land reform" or "political struggle" campaigns, with on going repression and retaliation (lines 312 to 318), or with democide associated with the suppression of rebellions (lines 322 to 325). I try to handle this by dividing "land reform" estimates in terms of their ostensive inclusiveness. Thus I first present estimates of "executions" (lines 282 to 288); then those executed and otherwise "killed" (lines 292 to 298); and then those who also otherwise died (i.e., "dead"--lines 302 to 308), such as those tagged as wealthy peasants who were deprived of their land, officially ostracized and thus denied food and shelter. Consequently, in consolidating the "land reform" dead (line 309), I made sure that the figures subsumed the consolidated killed estimates (line 299), that this in turn subsumed the consolidated execution estimates (line 289), and that this subsumed the rent reduction killed (line 279). In determining the final democide "land reform" total, I only added the final "land reform" dead (line 309) to those killed in political struggle, etc. (line 319), and the suppression of uprisings (line 326). The probable democide for this four year period then totals 283,000 North Vietnamese (line 329).
But then there was also those who died in prison or at forced labor from 1945 to 1956. One estimate of 500,000 dead (line 335) from President Nixon, which may have been based on secret intelligence estimates, cannot be accepted without some publicly available confirming information or similar independent estimates. Based on other estimates of the prison/camp population I assumed a 50,000 camp population per year and an unnatural death rate of 2 percent per year, on par with the Chinese rate
Then also there were the POWs from the French Expeditionary Force that were killed. Based on the sources,
Putting together all these consolidations and calculations, I figure that for the years 1945 to 1956 the Vietnamese communists likely killed 242,000 to 922,000 people (line 347). Above this range I show two other estimates of these dead (lines 344 and 345), one at 700,000 and the other at 500,000 dead. Both are contained within the range at which I arrived.
Through torture, executions, and incarceration the French also committed democide during the Indochina War. Although while hints of this are given in the sources, there is not enough information to even estimate a minimum. We can however count the Vietnamese killed when a French heavy cruiser shelled the civilian areas of Haiphong (lines 350 to 357) and add the consolidated range (line 358) in with the total democide (line 364).
I can now give a summary of the democide for this period (lines 361 to 365).
As to the 1954 to 1975 period, democide continued in North Vietnam (lines 370 to 371) and there is one estimate of it available for 1956 to 1959 from Todd Culbertson, a member of the Editorial Page staff of the Richmond Virginia News Leader. He does not justify or give his sources for this estimate. I guess that the 1956 portion of this estimate includes executions associated with political repression, rebellions, and the last year of "land reform." These may account for half or more of the estimate and the consolidated range takes this into account. Without giving figures, Bernard Fall (line 371) gives substance to the Culbertson estimate in his discussion of the execution of intellectuals over the years 1956-1960 as a result of the "hundred flowers" campaign similar to that carried out by Mao in China.
The rest of the estimates for this period are for North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam during the pre-Vietnam War guerrilla struggle, during the war itself, and in Cambodia (lines 374-472). It is now clear from documents available since the end of the Vietnam War (similar documents were also available during the war but were considered by many academic area experts as possible South Vietnam or CIA disinformation--since then interviews and speeches by communist leaders and the defection of former communist, National Liberation Front, or Viet Cong high officials or officers, have verified their content)
One more point. As a result of the 1954 Geneva Agreements that formally ended the Indochina War, Vietnam was officially split into North Vietnam and South Vietnam, all be it until Vietnam wide elections were to be held. As the possibility of these elections receded and both Hanoi and Saigon took on all the domestic and international functions of permanent governments, South Vietnam was also diplomatically recognized by a number of countries and carried out formal diplomatic interaction. Moreover, in the Paris Agreement of 1973 signed with the United States, North Vietnam officially recognized the sovereignty of South Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam is treated as foreign democide, not domestic.
The first estimates of this democide concern the North's assassination and execution of South Vietnamese officials (lines 376 to 387), civilians (lines 393 to 406), and both (lines 411 to 426). These estimates cover many different years and are, where it would help in their consolidation, extrapolated for the years 1954 to the end of the Vietnam War (lines 388, 407, and 428). A problem is that such killing increased in intensity from the early guerrilla years. To compensate for this over the twenty-one years, I extrapolated the low for only fourteen years, the high for eighteen.
Among the best of the estimates are those given by Guenter Lewy, themselves based on an error range of plus or minus 25 percent (which yields the low and high shown with his mid-estimate--lines 379, 395, and 424). When added together these estimates cover the period 1957 to 1972 (line 413) and their range is contained within the final consolidated one (line 428). I also check this consolidation by summing the separate ones for the officials and civilians (line 432). Clearly there is little difference between the two ways of assessing the democide and a final total is determined as usual (line 433).
Because of the disruption caused by the Tet offensive in 1968, South Vietnam was unable to keep count of assassinations during this period and their number usually do not appear in the above. I therefore treat them separately (lines 436 to 448).
Other democides by North Vietnam (lines 454 to 459) include the wanton killing of refugees, shelling of Saigon civilian areas, and killing of American and South Vietnamese POWs. Moreover, the North Vietnamese were heavily involved in Cambodia and also committed democide there (line 451).
The estimated range of refugees killed in one case (line 454) may seem relatively high but is probably conservative. Of the 200,000 refugees that fled the Highlands offensive by the North in March 1975, only 45,000 made it to Tuy-Hoa. Many of the 155,000 missing were killed by North Vietnamese troops; others were captured. Rebel highlanders also fired on the refugees, some were mistakenly bombed by government planes, and still others may have been run over by fleeing government vehicles. Some died by drowning and sheer exhaustion. I estimate that of those missing about 15 percent to 65 percent, most reasonably around one-third, were slaughtered by the North or died due to their actions. Because of the size of this missing figure, I should note that it comes from Phan Quang Dan,
North Vietnamese troops or their guerrilla Viet Cong surely committed more democide than that for which I have been able to find estimates. Throughout the guerrilla period and during the war they shelled and attacked civilians in strategic hamlets and refugee camps, attacked refugees fleeing on the roads in order to create chaos, shelled civilians in most government controlled cities and towns, and purposely mined and booby-trapped civilian areas (as of mining roads traveled by civilian buses). Moreover, thousands or tens of thousands were abducted to disappear forever, but are not included here under assassinations and executions. The sources give no estimates of these killings and to leave it at this would thus create a large hole in the total democide. Accordingly, I will assume that the additional deaths from these North Vietnam/Viet Cong atrocities and terror amounted to at least 200 a month over the twenty-one years from 1955 to the end of the war. This seems consistent with both sympathetic and unsympathetic descriptions of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong tactics and actions during the war, especially in considering that as a minimum the 200 dead covers the length and breadth of the unestimated North Vietnam/Viet Cong atrocities and terror throughout all of South Vietnam for some thirty days.
I can now total the overall domestic and foreign democide for North Vietnam during this period (lines 467 to 472). One estimate presumably of the overall National Liberation Front democide (line 468) is shown for comparison to the sum of North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam (line 467). It is much larger than even the high and is given in the source without explanation, justification, or citation.
Next, I consider the democide by South Vietnamese and others (lines 475 to 621in Table 6.1B). First there is that by the South Vietnamese Diem regime (lines 476 to 521). This includes those that died as a result of forced resettlement (lines 476 to 481), arrest and imprisonment (lines 484 to 494), executions and terror (lines 497 to 515), and from South Vietnamese bombing and shelling (line 518). For some of the consolidations or calculations, death rates had to be assumed (e.g., line 481). These were based on descriptions in the sources of the associated conditions and bits of information about deaths. In each case I attempted to bracket with the low and high what seemed to be the extremes.
Taking all these into account, the Diem democide amounts to 16,000 to 167,000 murdered Vietnamese (line 521).
Then I tabulate estimates of democide by the post-Diem regimes. For this the estimates cover much the same categories, but are fuller and apparently more complete. However, death rates also have to be assumed (e.g., line 556) in order to calculate the democide range. One estimate of a massacre in Quang Nam province allegedly by "U.S., puppet, satellite troops" is ambiguous and treated as by South Vietnam (line 569). There was also South Vietnamese democide during its incursion into Cambodia (line 572). Totaling all this (lines 575 and 576) gives South Vietnamese democide during these years as 42,000 to 118,000 people, virtually all Vietnamese (line 577).
A particularly controversial and difficult issue is American democide during the war. As clear from the literature this was a subject of intense propaganda on the one hand and denial on the other. There is no easy way of dealing with this except to study carefully those presumably more objective post-war accounts.
Consider first those killed in all Allied bombing and shelling (lines 581 to 589). No doubt some of this violated internationally accepted rules of warfare and those laid down by the American command to guide its forces.
Then there are the massacres and atrocities that American forces were found or alleged to have done (lines 595 to 598). Most of these are given in North Vietnam/National Liberation Front documents or by their sympathizers. Some of these did occur, as at My Lai, but for some of the others it is unclear whether civilians killed during legitimate military action are being labeled as massacred or not. In any case, the consolidated low and mid-value are such as to assume that beyond those massacres we do know took place there is warrant to some others mentioned (line 601). There is simply not enough information to give a high.
The use of defoliation herbicides and potentially dangerous tear gas (which could kill very young or old civilians caught by the gas in confined areas, such as caves or bunkers) did cause some deaths for which the U.S. must be held responsible (lines 604 to 607).
Finally, we must recognize that aside from what was estimated above, there was throughout American involvement a background of small level atrocities (such as the killing of Viet Cong trying to surrender or of innocent peasants simply because they were running away) and massacres (such as wiping out the inhabitants of a village from which a sniper had been firing). Given the extent and nature of this war for Americans, it seems that a low of near 25 Vietnamese so murdered per month is probably a rock bottom figure, especially considering that this is less than one such killing per day for all American ground action in all of South Vietnam. This low amounts to 2,000 Vietnamese killed in total (line 610).
Summing these various estimates gives us a total American democide of around 4,000 to 10,000 Vietnamese, or a likely 5,500 (line 613). One way of judging whether this figure is way too low or high is to look at it as a monthly ratio to American troop strength. For the seven years of war 1965 to 1971, American troop strength averaged 365,571 personnel.
Other South Vietnamese allies also committed democide, specifically S. Korean troops. As with the estimates of American democide, estimates for the Koreans are usually from propaganda issued by North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, although there is independent evidence that some democide was committed (lines 618 and 620). I estimate a low of 3,000 Vietnamese murdered, which also takes into account possible democide not given in the sources.
Now I can gather together (lines 624 to 628) and total (line 629) the various estimates of democide by South Vietnam and allies during the Vietnam War and pre-guerrilla period. This sum is then compared to one estimate of democide given by the National Liberation Front (line 630) and its extrapolation for the whole period 1954 to war's end (line 632). As can be seen, this estimate is contained within the range (line 629) already determined and which accordingly is taken as the final figure (line 633).
Considerable democide followed Hanoi's victory over South Vietnam in 1975. I show estimates of this or related information (lines 637 to 759), the first of which refer to re-education camps. To determine some range of deaths in these camps, I had to first establish their population. Estimates of this for various periods are shown in the table (line 638 to 668), and consolidated for 1975 to 1980, and 1981 to 1987 (lines 669 and 670). The reason for this periodization is that there were many more inmates during the earlier period and most important, this period was more deadly. Only one estimate of the number of deaths in the camps is available (line 672). Rather than accept this, however, I calculated the toll (line 673) based on an assumed death rate that for the early period was in deadliness closer to the Communist Chinese camps than the more lethal Soviet gulag.
Next there are estimates (lines 679 to 683) of the number of forced laborers, including those forcibly deported to "new economic zones," from which consolidation (line 684) we can try to calculate the associated unnatural deaths. This I do (line 687), assuming a very low annual rate of .75 to 2 percent for the first six years and .5 percent thereafter. This also assumes that the zones were about a quarter to a third less deadly then the camps in the early period and half as deadly later.
Not all democide figures are indirect. Estimates are available on executions (lines 690 to 697), which I consolidate (line 698).
Then there are the boat people for whose deaths at sea Hanoi is responsible. Some of these Vietnamese were forced to flee, some fled out of terror and fear for their lives, some fled by virtue of unlivable conditions that the communists had created for them. To understand the drive to flee on the dangerous open ocean often in unseaworthy boats is to realize the deadly hazards they faced from the regime, as discussed in Death By Government. The table lists estimates of the number of Vietnamese boat people that fled or tried to flee (lines 702 to 711) and their consolidation (line 713). Estimates of the percent of these then dying at sea are also given and consolidated (lines 716 to 730), followed by death estimates (lines 733 to 748). The consolidation of these (749) gives us one overall range of deaths. I calculate another by applying the consolidated percentage mortality to the consolidated number fleeing (line 750). Neither of these totals especially commends itself. In the usual fashion, I therefore took the lowest low and highest high and averaged the two mid-values to get the final range (line 751).
How many of these deaths is the responsibility of the communist Vietnamese, that is, democide? Neither the extremes of "none" or "all" is reasonable. Surely those who were forced to face death at sea, or risked it out of mortal fear of the regime or because their lives and families had been irretrievably ruined by it, should be counted as democide (by analogy consider that if children fled their family in winter because they fear being killed or are brutally abused, and then die of exposure in the snow, the parents could be tried for murder). However, those boat people who left for non-vital reasons, such as for economic reasons, and died at sea should hardly be counted as democide. What the proportion is between the two types of refugees is unknown. I assume that those for which the regime must be held responsible could vary from one-third to two-thirds, most reasonably a half of them. Applying this to the number who fled yields a likely Vietnam democide of 250,000 boat people (line 753).
As calculated elsewhere in this book, the probable democide that Vietnam committed in Cambodia (line 756) and Laos (line 759) are listed in the table.
Finally, I can calculate the overall democide of Vietnam in the post-Vietnam War period (lines 762 to 764). This amounts to 346,000 to 2,438,000 Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians, probably about 1,040,000.
In order to organize the many different kinds of subtotals and totals that have been calculated in the table, I summarize and collect the various statistics (lines 771 to 838) and now compare them to estimates of such totals in the sources. First I total the Vietnamese dead during the Indochina War (line 775) and then for the Vietnam War and its early guerrilla phase (line 785). The resulting range for North Vietnam (and their surrogate Viet Cong--line 787) brackets the one overall estimate available in the sources (line 786).
Next I give estimates of the overall civilian toll during the Vietnam War (lines 791 to 798) and then use their consolidation (line 800) to check the figures I previously calculated, as given by sum of civilians killed in war and all democide during this period (line 802). As can be seen, while the high is appropriately higher, the low is over 100,000 greater than the consolidated figure and raises some question as to the validity of the underlying sub-totals. As a result I reviewed the low of all the various calculations and consolidations going into this sum and find each appropriately conservative. The problem lies with that consolidated low based on extrapolating Lewy's estimate (line 797) for twelve years. In arriving at his estimate Lewy does not take into account the civilian democide by South Vietnam and Allies nor that by North Vietnam in the North; nor does it take into account those killed in rebellions in South Vietnam. The resulting dead, when added to the civilian war-dead determined above (line 800) would add near 100,000 to the low and bring it close to the summed low (line 802). I therefore accept the sum without adjustment.
Following this are listed estimates of the overall military and civilian toll (lines 805 to 814). As above, I use their consolidation (815) as a check on the overall sum (line 816) of the various calculations and sub-totals for this period. This time the whole range (line 816) is as it should be (the low is lower and high higher) and the mid-value is relatively close to the consolidated one (this also lends further support to the sum for civilians alone).
With these checks completed, I can pull together the various sub-totals and totals and present them in a summary fashion (lines 823 to 838). In total 3,760,000 Vietnamese probably died of political violence during over forty-two years (line 831). Some 1,250,000, or over 33 percent of them were murdered. This does not count Laotians and Cambodians killed by Vietnamese governments, virtually all by Hanoi. When these are added and those Vietnamese killed by foreigners subtracted, the total democide by Vietnamese is 1,760,000 people (line 838).
There are still the democide rates to calculate and other statistics to present. For information I list a number of estimates of Vietnamese refugees and consolidate them (lines 841-860). Then I give population estimates for the whole country (lines 864 to 876), North Vietnam (lines 879 to 890), and South Vietnam (lines 894 to 905). I will use them to calculate the democide rates (line 908 to 942).
Regarding these, the only issue is whether to include North Vietnam's democide in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War as domestic or foreign democide. For reasons previously given, I consider South Vietnam a separate country during this period and accordingly treat it as foreign soil for North Vietnam. Another issue concerns whether to calculate a democide rate for North Vietnam that would include that portion of South Vietnam it controlled (which in 1964 could have been as high as 80 percent
* From the pre-publisher edited manuscript of Chapter 6 in R.J. Rummel, Statistics of Democide, 1997. For full reference to Statistics of Democide, the list of its contents, figures, and tables, and the text of its preface, click book.
1. Vietnam's population for 1967, the mid-year of the period, was 36,820,000 (UN Demographic Yearbook 1971, p. 135).
2. Rummel (1994, Chapter 11).
3. Chi (1964, p. 166).
4. Rummel (1991, Table IIA.1, lines 378-382).
5. Rummel (1990, p. 28).
6. Particularly, Lewy (1978, p. 341) and Hyman (1992, p. 42).
7. Fall (1966, pp. 188-90).
8. See, for example, Hosmer (1970), Lewy (1978), Tang (1985), Toai (1990), and Wiesner (1988).
9. Phan (1988, p. xiv).
10. Wiesner (1988, pp. 318-19).
11. I queried Harff and Gurr, the author's of the estimate, by letter, but received no response.
12. Among the most useful of these I would include Lewy (1978), Andradr (1990), Moss (1990), Wiesner (1988), and Moore (1990)
13. See Rummel (1994, Chapter 11).
14. Calculated from Thayer (1985, Table 4.4, p. 34).
15.See Rummel (1990, p. 28; 1991, Table IIA.1, lines 378-382
16.See O'Neill (1969, p. 7).
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Question: how many refugees were killed in vietnam in 1975

On the way to Tuy Ho, in 1975,<unk> 155,000 refugees were killed or kidnapped who fled from the last so-called Spring Offensive of Northern Vietnam.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, pp. 318–9.

According to Rummel, the troops of North Vietnam and Vietnam killed between 106 and 227 thousand civilians in South Vietnam.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997.

how many refugees were killed in vietnam in 1975

Question: how many civilians were killed in vietnam during the war

how many civilians were killed in vietnam during the war

Question: what is the title of the book by wiesner, louis

Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam

and Survivors : Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet - Nam

Victims and Survivors : Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam

what is the title of the book by wiesner, louis

Question: where did rat vijetnamu take place

Question: how many books are there of rat u vijetnamu

how many books are there of rat u vijetnamu

On the way to Tuy Ho , in 1975,<unk > 155,000 refugees were killed or kidnapped who fled from the last so - called Spring Offensive of Northern Vietnam . Wiesner , Louis ( 1988 ) , Victims and Survivors : Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam , 1954–1975 Greenwood Press , pp . 318–9 .

According to Rummel , the troops of North Vietnam and Vietnam killed between 106 and 227 thousand civilians in South Vietnam . Rummel , Rudolph , Statistics of Vietnamese Democide , in his Statistics of Democide , 1997 .

Na putu za Tuy Hòu 1975. godine ubijeno je ili oteto gotovo 155 tisuća izbjeglica koje su bježale od posljednje tzv. Proljetne ofenzive Sjevernog Vijetnama.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, str. 318–9. Prema Rummelu, trupe Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga ubile su između 106 i 227 tisuća civila u Južnom Vijetnamu.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997.

Na putu za Tuy Hòu 1975. godine ubijeno je ili oteto gotovo 155 tisuća izbjeglica koje su bježale od posljednje tzv. Proljetne ofenzive Sjevernog Vijetnama.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Viet-Nam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, str. 318–9.

Prema Rummelu, trupe Sjevernog Vijetnama i Vietkonga ubile su između 106 i 227 tisuća civila u Južnom Vijetnamu.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997.

On the way to Tuy Ho, in 1975,<unk> 155,000 refugees were killed or kidnapped who fled from the last so-called Spring Offensive of Northern Vietnam.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, pp. 318–9. According to Rummel, the troops of North Vietnam and Vietnam killed between 106 and 227 thousand civilians in South Vietnam.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997.

On the way to Tuy Ho, in 1975,<unk> 155,000 refugees were killed or kidnapped who fled from the last so-called Spring Offensive of Northern Vietnam.Wiesner, Louis (1988), Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam, 1954–1975 Greenwood Press, pp. 318–9.

According to Rummel, the troops of North Vietnam and Vietnam killed between 106 and 227 thousand civilians in South Vietnam.Rummel, Rudolph, Statistics of Vietnamese Democide, in his Statistics of Democide, 1997.

The investigation eventually contained more than 9,000 investigative records, testimony under jury and status reports of the chief military commanders on the basis of which 320 different incidents were confirmed.

They met no resistance as they entered a nondescript settlement in Quang Nam province. So Jamie Henry, a 20-year-old medic, set his rifle down in a hut, unfastened his bandoliers and lighted a cigarette.
Kill anything that moves.
Henry stepped outside the hut and saw a small crowd of women and children. Then the shooting began.
Moments later, the 19 villagers lay dead or dying.
Back home in California, Henry published an account of the slaughter and held a news conference to air his allegations. Yet he and other Vietnam veterans who spoke out about war crimes were branded traitors and fabricators. No one was ever prosecuted for the massacre.
Now, nearly 40 years later, declassified Army files show that Henry was telling the truth — about the Feb. 8 killings and a series of other atrocities by the men of B Company.
The files are part of a once-secret archive, assembled by a Pentagon task force in the early 1970s, that shows that confirmed atrocities by U.S. forces in Vietnam were more extensive than was previously known.
The documents detail 320 alleged incidents that were substantiated by Army investigators — not including the most notorious U.S. atrocity, the 1968 My Lai massacre.
Though not a complete accounting of Vietnam war crimes, the archive is the largest such collection to surface to date. About 9,000 pages, it includes investigative files, sworn statements by witnesses and status reports for top military brass.
The records describe recurrent attacks on ordinary Vietnamese — families in their homes, farmers in rice paddies, teenagers out fishing. Hundreds of soldiers, in interviews with investigators and letters to commanders, described a violent minority who murdered, raped and tortured with impunity.
Abuses were not confined to a few rogue units, a Times review of the files found. They were uncovered in every Army division that operated in Vietnam.
Retired Brig. Gen. John H. Johns, a Vietnam veteran who served on the task force, says he once supported keeping the records secret but now believes they deserve wide attention in light of alleged attacks on civilians and abuse of prisoners in Iraq.
"We can't change current practices unless we acknowledge the past," says Johns, 78.
Among the substantiated cases in the archive:
Seven massacres from 1967 through 1971 in which at least 137 civilians died.
Seventy-eight other attacks on noncombatants in which at least 57 were killed, 56 wounded and 15 sexually assaulted.
One hundred forty-one instances in which U.S. soldiers tortured civilian detainees or prisoners of war with fists, sticks, bats, water or electric shock.
Investigators determined that evidence against 203 soldiers accused of harming Vietnamese civilians or prisoners was strong enough to warrant formal charges. These "founded" cases were referred to the soldiers' superiors for action.
Ultimately, 57 of them were court-martialed and just 23 convicted, the records show.
Fourteen received prison sentences ranging from six months to 20 years, but most won significant reductions on appeal. The stiffest sentence went to a military intelligence interrogator convicted of committing indecent acts on a 13-year-old girl in an interrogation hut in 1967.
He served seven months of a 20-year term, the records show.
Many substantiated cases were closed with a letter of reprimand, a fine or, in more than half the cases, no action at all.
There was little interest in prosecuting Vietnam war crimes, says Steven Chucala, who in the early 1970s was legal advisor to the commanding officer of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division. He says he disagreed with the attitude but understood it.
"Everyone wanted Vietnam to go away," says Chucala, now a civilian attorney for the Army at Ft. Belvoir in Virginia.
In many cases, suspects had left the service. The Army did not attempt to pursue them, despite a written opinion in 1969 by Robert E. Jordan III, then the Army's general counsel, that ex-soldiers could be prosecuted through courts-martial, military commissions or tribunals.
"I don't remember why it didn't go anywhere," says Jordan, now a lawyer in Washington.
Top Army brass should have demanded a tougher response, says retired Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, who oversaw the task force as a brigadier general at the Pentagon in the early 1970s.
"We could have court-martialed them but didn't," Gard says of soldiers accused of war crimes. "The whole thing is terribly disturbing."
Early-Warning System
In March 1968, members of the 23rd Infantry Division slaughtered about 500 Vietnamese civilians in the hamlet of My Lai. Reporter Seymour Hersh exposed the massacre the following year.
By then, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam at the time of My Lai, had become Army chief of staff. A task force was assembled from members of his staff to monitor war crimes allegations and serve as an early-warning system.
Over the next few years, members of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group reviewed Army investigations and wrote reports and summaries for military brass and the White House.
The records were declassified in 1994, after 20 years as required by law, and moved to the National Archives in College Park, Md., where they went largely unnoticed.
The Times examined most of the files and obtained copies of about 3,000 pages — about a third of the total — before government officials removed them from the public shelves, saying they contained personal information that was exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.
In addition to the 320 substantiated incidents, the records contain material related to more than 500 alleged atrocities that Army investigators could not prove or that they discounted.
Johns says many war crimes did not make it into the archive. Some were prosecuted without being identified as war crimes, as required by military regulations. Others were never reported.
In a letter to Westmoreland in 1970, an anonymous sergeant described widespread, unreported killings of civilians by members of the 9th Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta — and blamed pressure from superiors to generate high body counts.
"A batalion [sic] would kill maybe 15 to 20 [civilians] a day. With 4 batalions in the brigade that would be maybe 40 to 50 a day or 1200 to 1500 a month, easy," the unnamed sergeant wrote. "If I am only 10% right, and believe me it's lots more, then I am trying to tell you about 120-150 murders, or a My Lay [sic] each month for over a year."
A high-level Army review of the letter cited its "forcefulness," "sincerity" and "inescapable logic," and urged then-Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor to make sure the push for verifiable body counts did not "encourage the human tendency to inflate the count by violating established rules of engagement."
Investigators tried to find the letter writer and "prevent his complaints from reaching" then-Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Oakland), according to an August 1971 memo to Westmoreland.
The records do not say whether the writer was located, and there is no evidence in the files that his complaint was investigated further.
Pvt. Henry
James D. "Jamie" Henry was 19 in March 1967, when the Army shaved his hippie locks and packed him off to boot camp.
He had been living with his mother in Sonoma County, working as a hospital aide and moonlighting as a flower child in Haight-Ashbury, when he received a letter from his draft board. As thousands of hippies poured into San Francisco for the upcoming "Summer of Love," Henry headed for Ft. Polk, La.
Soon he was on his way to Vietnam, part of a 100,000-man influx that brought U.S. troop strength to 485,000 by the end of 1967. They entered a conflict growing ever bloodier for Americans — 9,378 U.S. troops would die in combat in 1967, 87% more than the year before.
Henry was a medic with B Company of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division. He described his experiences in a sworn statement to Army investigators several years later and in recent interviews with The Times.
In the fall of 1967, he was on his first patrol, marching along the edge of a rice paddy in Quang Nam province, when the soldiers encountered a teenage girl.
"The guy in the lead immediately stops her and puts his hand down her pants," Henry said. "I just thought, 'My God, what's going on?' "
A day or two later, he saw soldiers senselessly stabbing a pig.
"I talked to them about it, and they told me if I wanted to live very long, I should shut my mouth," he told Army investigators.
Henry may have kept his mouth shut, but he kept his eyes and ears open.
On Oct. 8, 1967, after a firefight near Chu Lai, members of his company spotted a 12-year-old boy out in a rainstorm. He was unarmed and clad only in shorts.
"Somebody caught him up on a hill, and they brought him down and the lieutenant asked who wanted to kill him," Henry told investigators.
Two volunteers stepped forward. One kicked the boy in the stomach. The other took him behind a rock and shot him, according to Henry's statement. They tossed his body in a river and reported him as an enemy combatant killed in action.
Three days later, B Company detained and beat an elderly man suspected of supporting the enemy. He had trouble keeping pace as the soldiers marched him up a steep hill.
"When I turned around, two men had him, one guy had his arms, one guy had his legs and they threw him off the hill onto a bunch of rocks," Henry's statement said.
On Oct. 15, some of the men took a break during a large-scale "search-and-destroy" operation. Henry said he overheard a lieutenant on the radio requesting permission to test-fire his weapon, and went to see what was happening.
He found two soldiers using a Vietnamese man for target practice, Henry said. They had discovered the victim sleeping in a hut and decided to kill him for sport.
"Everybody was taking pot shots at him, seeing how accurate they were," Henry said in his statement.
Back at base camp on Oct. 23, he said, members of the 1st Platoon told him they had ambushed five unarmed women and reported them as enemies killed in action. Later, members of another platoon told him they had seen the bodies.
Tet Offensive
Capt. Donald C. Reh, a 1964 graduate of West Point, took command of B Company in November 1967. Two months later, enemy forces launched a major offensive during Tet, the Vietnamese lunar New Year.
In the midst of the fighting, on Feb. 7, the commander of the 1st Battalion, Lt. Col. William W. Taylor Jr., ordered an assault on snipers hidden in a line of trees in a rural area of Quang Nam province. Five U.S. soldiers were killed. The troops complained bitterly about the order and the deaths, Henry said.
The next morning, the men packed up their gear and continued their sweep of the countryside. Soldiers discovered an unarmed man hiding in a hole and suspected that he had supported the enemy the previous day. A soldier pushed the man in front of an armored personnel carrier, Henry said in his statement.
"They drove over him forward which didn't kill him because he was squirming around, so the APC backed over him again," Henry's statement said.
Then B Company entered a hamlet to question residents and search for weapons. That's where Henry set down his weapon and lighted a cigarette in the shelter of a hut.
A radio operator sat down next to him, and Henry was listening to the chatter. He heard the leader of the 3rd Platoon ask Reh for instructions on what to do with 19 civilians.
"The lieutenant asked the captain what should be done with them. The captain asked the lieutenant if he remembered the op order (operation order) that came down that morning and he repeated the order which was 'kill anything that moves,' " Henry said in his statement. "I was a little shook because I thought the lieutenant might do it."
Henry said he left the hut and walked toward Reh. He saw the captain pick up the phone again, and thought he might rescind the order.
Then soldiers pulled a naked woman of about 19 from a dwelling and brought her to where the other civilians were huddled, Henry said.
"She was thrown to the ground," he said in his statement. "The men around the civilians opened fire and all on automatic or at least it seemed all on automatic. It was over in a few seconds. There was a lot of blood and flesh and stuff flying around .
"I looked around at some of my friends and they all just had blank looks on their faces . The captain made an announcement to all the company, I forget exactly what it was, but it didn't concern the people who had just been killed. We picked up our stuff and moved on."
Henry didn't forget, however. "Thirty seconds after the shooting stopped," he said, "I knew that I was going to do something about it."
Homecoming
For his combat service, Henry earned a Bronze Star with a V for valor, and a Combat Medical Badge, among other awards. A fellow member of his unit said in a sworn statement that Henry regularly disregarded his own safety to save soldiers' lives, and showed "compassion and decency" toward enemy prisoners.
When Henry finished his tour and arrived at Ft. Hood, Texas, in September 1968, he went to see an Army legal officer to report the atrocities he'd witnessed.
The officer advised him to keep quiet until he got out of the Army, "because of the million and one charges you can be brought up on for blinking your eye," Henry says. Still, the legal officer sent him to see a Criminal Investigation Division agent.
The agent was not receptive, Henry recalls.
"He wanted to know what I was trying to pull, what I was trying to put over on people, and so I was just quiet. I told him I wouldn't tell him anything and I wouldn't say anything until I got out of the Army, and I left," Henry says.
Honorably discharged in March 1969, Henry moved to Canoga Park, enrolled in community college and helped organize a campus chapter of Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
Then he ended his silence: He published his account of the massacre in the debut issue of Scanlan's Monthly, a short-lived muckraking magazine, which hit the newsstands on Feb. 27, 1970. Henry held a news conference the same day at the Los Angeles Press Club.
Records show that an Army operative attended incognito, took notes and reported back to the Pentagon.
A faded copy of Henry's brief statement, retrieved from the Army's files, begins:
"On February 8, 1968, nineteen (19) women and children were murdered in Viet-Nam by members of 3rd Platoon, 'B' Company, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry .
"Incidents similar to those I have described occur on a daily basis and differ one from the other only in terms of numbers killed," he told reporters. A brief article about his remarks appeared inside the Los Angeles Times the next day.
Army investigators interviewed Henry the day after the news conference. His sworn statement filled 10 single-spaced typed pages. Henry did not expect anything to come of it: "I never got the impression they were ever doing anything."
In 1971, Henry joined more than 100 other veterans at the Winter Soldier Investigation, a forum on war crimes sponsored by Vietnam Veterans Against the War.
The FBI put the three-day gathering at a Detroit hotel under surveillance, records show, and Nixon administration officials worked behind the scenes to discredit the speakers as impostors and fabricators.
Although the administration never publicly identified any fakers, one of the organization's leaders admitted exaggerating his rank and role during the war, and a cloud descended on the entire gathering.
"We tried to get as much publicity as we could, and it just never went anywhere," Henry says. "Nothing ever happened."
After years of dwelling on the war, he says, he "finally put it in a closet and shut the door."
The Investigation
Unknown to Henry, Army investigators pursued his allegations, tracking down members of his old unit over the next 3 1/2 years.
Witnesses described the killing of the young boy, the old man tossed over the cliff, the man used for target practice, the five unarmed women, the man thrown beneath the armored personnel carrier and other atrocities.
Their statements also provided vivid corroboration of the Feb. 8, 1968, massacre from men who had observed the day's events from various vantage points.
Staff Sgt. Wilson Bullock told an investigator at Ft. Carson, Colo., that his platoon had captured 19 "women, children, babies and two or three very old men" during the Tet offensive.
"All of these people were lined up and killed," he said in a sworn statement. "When it, the shooting, stopped, I began to return to the site when I observed a naked Vietnamese female run from the house to the huddle of people, saw that her baby had been shot. She picked the baby up and was then shot and the baby shot again."
Gregory Newman, another veteran of B Company, told an investigator at Ft. Myer, Va., that Capt. Reh had issued an order "to search and destroy and kill anything in the village that moved."
Newman said he was carrying out orders to kill the villagers' livestock when he saw a naked girl head toward a group of civilians.
"I saw them begging before they were shot," he recalled in a sworn statement.
Donald R. Richardson said he was at a command post outside the hamlet when he heard a platoon leader on the radio ask what to do with 19 civilians.
"The cpt said something about kill anything that moves and the lt on the other end said 'Their [sic] moving,' " according to Richardson's sworn account. "Just then the gunfire was heard."
William J. Nieset, a rifle squad leader, told investigators that he was standing next to a radio operator and heard Reh say: "My instructions from higher are to kill everything that moves."
Robert D. Miller said he was the radio operator for Lt. Johnny Mack Carter, commander of the 3rd Platoon. Miller said that when Carter asked Reh what to do with the 19 civilians, the captain instructed him to follow the "operation order."
Carter immediately sought two volunteers to shoot the civilians, Miller said under oath.
"I believe everyone knew what was going to happen," he said, "so no one volunteered except one guy known only to me as 'Crazy.' "
"A few minutes later, while the Vietnamese were huddled around in a circle Lt Carter and 'Crazy' started shooting them with their M-16's on automatic," Miller's statement says.
Carter had just left active duty when an investigator questioned him under oath in Palmetto, Fla., in March 1970.
"I do not recall any civilians being picked up and categorically stated that I did not order the killing of any civilians, nor do I know of any being killed," his statement said.
An Army investigator called Reh at Ft. Myer. Reh's attorney called back. The investigator made notes of their conversation: "If the interview of Reh concerns atrocities in Vietnam then he had already advised Reh not to make any statement."
As for Lt. Col. Taylor, two soldiers described his actions that day.
Myran Ambeau, a rifleman, said he was standing five feet from the captain and heard him contact the battalion commander, who was in a helicopter overhead. (Ambeau did not identify Reh or Taylor by name.)
"The battalion commander told the captain, 'If they move, shoot them,' " according to a sworn statement that Ambeau gave an investigator in Little Rock, Ark. "The captain verified that he had heard the command, he then transmitted the instruction to Lt Carter.
"Approximately three minutes later, there was automatic weapons fire from the direction where the prisoners were being held."
Gary A. Bennett, one of Reh's radio operators, offered a somewhat different account. He said the captain asked what he should do with the detainees, and the battalion commander replied that it was a "search and destroy mission," according to an investigator's summary of an interview with Bennett.
Bennett said he did not believe the order authorized killing civilians and that, although he heard shooting, he knew nothing about a massacre, the summary says. Bennett refused to provide a sworn statement.
An Army investigator sat down with Taylor at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. Taylor said he had never issued an order to kill civilians and had heard nothing about a massacre on the date in question. But the investigator had asked Taylor about events occurring on Feb. 9, 1968 — a day after the incident.
Three and a half years later, an agent tracked Taylor down at Ft. Myer and asked him about Feb. 8. Taylor said he had no memory of the day and did not have time to provide a sworn statement. He said he had a "pressing engagement" with "an unidentified general officer," the agent wrote.
Investigators wrote they could not find Pvt. Frank Bonilla, the man known as "Crazy." The Times reached him at his home on Oahu in March.
Bonilla, now 58 and a hotel worker, says he recalls an order to kill the civilians, but says he does not remember who issued it. "Somebody had a radio, handed it to someone, maybe a lieutenant, said the man don't want to see nobody standing," he said.
Bonilla says he answered a call for volunteers but never pulled the trigger.
"I couldn't do it. There were women and kids," he says. "A lot of guys thought that I had something to do with it because they saw me going up there . Nope I just turned the other way. It was like, 'This ain't happening.' "
Afterward, he says, "I remember sitting down with my head between my knees. Is that for real? Someone said, 'Keep your mouth shut or you're not going home.' "
He says he does not know who did the shooting.
The Outcome
The Criminal Investigation Division assigned Warrant Officer Jonathan P. Coulson in Los Angeles to complete the investigation and write a final report on the "Henry Allegation." He sent his findings to headquarters in Washington in January 1974.
Evidence showed that the massacre did occur, the report said. The investigation also confirmed all but one of the other killings that Henry had described. The one exception was the elderly man thrown off a cliff. Coulson said it could not be determined whether the victim was alive when soldiers tossed him.
The evidence supported murder charges in five incidents against nine "subjects," including Carter and Bonilla, Coulson wrote. Those two carried out the Feb. 8 massacre, along with "other unidentified members of their element," the report said.
Investigators determined that there was not enough evidence to charge Reh with murder, because of conflicting accounts "as to the actual language" he used.
But Reh could be charged with dereliction of duty for failing to investigate the killings, the report said.
Coulson conferred with an Army legal advisor, Capt. Robert S. Briney, about whether the evidence supported charges against Taylor.
They decided it did not. Even if Taylor gave an order to kill the Vietnamese if they moved, the two concluded, "it does not constitute an order to kill the prisoners in the manner in which they were executed."
The War Crimes Working Group records give no indication that action was taken against any of the men named in the report.
Briney, now an attorney in Phoenix, says he has forgotten details of the case but recalls a reluctance within the Army to pursue such charges.
"They thought the war, if not over, was pretty much over. Why bring this stuff up again?" he says.
Years Later
Taylor retired in 1977 with the rank of colonel. In a recent interview outside his home in northern Virginia, he said, "I would not have given an order to kill civilians. It's not in my makeup. I've been in enough wars to know that it's not the right thing to do."
Reh, who left active duty in 1978 and now lives in Northern California, declined to be interviewed by The Times.
Carter, a retired postal worker living in Florida, says he has no memory of his combat experiences. "I guess I've wiped Vietnam and all that out of my mind. I don't remember shooting anyone or ordering anyone to shoot," he says.
He says he does not dispute that a massacre took place. "I don't doubt it, but I don't remember . Sometimes people just snap."
Henry was re-interviewed by an Army investigator in 1972, and was never contacted again. He drifted away from the antiwar movement, moved north and became a logger in California's Sierra Nevada foothills. He says he had no idea he had been vindicated — until The Times contacted him in 2005.
Last fall, he read the case file over a pot of coffee at his dining room table in a comfortably worn house, where he lives with his wife, Patty.
"I was a wreck for a couple days," Henry, now 59, wrote later in an e-mail. "It was like a time warp that put me right back in the middle of that mess. Some things long forgotten came back to life. Some of them were good and some were not.
"Now that whole stinking war is back. After you left, I just sat in my chair and shook for a couple hours. A slight emotional stress fracture?? Don't know, but it soon passed and I decided to just keep going with this business. If it was right then, then it still is."
Times researcher Janet Lundblad contributed to this report.
*
About this report
Nick Turse is a freelance journalist living in New Jersey. Deborah Nelson is a staff writer in The Times' Washington bureau.
This report is based in part on records of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group filed at the National Archives in College Park, Md. The collection includes 241 case summaries that chronicle more than 300 substantiated atrocities by U.S. forces and 500 unconfirmed allegations.
The archive includes reports of war crimes by the 101st Airborne Division's Tiger Force that the Army listed as unconfirmed. The Toledo Blade documented the atrocities in a 2003 newspaper series.
Turse came across the collection in 2002 while researching his doctoral dissertation for the Center for the History and Ethics of Public Health at Columbia University.
Turse and Nelson also reviewed Army inspector general records in the National Archives; FBI and Army Criminal Investigation Division records; documents shared by military veterans; and case files and related records in the Col. Henry Tufts Archive at the University of Michigan.
A selection of documents used in preparing this report can be found at latimes.com/vietnam.

Question: how many incidents were there in rat u vijetnamu

The investigation eventually contained more than 9,000 investigative records, testimony under jury and status reports of the chief military commanders on the basis of which 320 different incidents were confirmed.

how many incidents were there in rat u vijetnamu

Question: how many records were in rat u vijetnamu

how many records were in rat u vijetnamu

Question: how many incidents were found in rat u vijetnamu

how many incidents were found in rat u vijetnamu

Question: what was contained in rat u vijetnamu

The investigation eventually contained more than 9,000 investigative records , testimony under jury and status reports of the chief military commanders on the basis of which 320 different incidents were confirmed .

Istraga je u konačnici imala preko 9 tisuća istraživačkih dosjea, svjedočanstava pod zakletvom i statusnih izvještaja glavnih vojnih zapovjednika na temelju kojih je potvrđeno 320 različitih incidenata.

Istraga je u konačnici imala preko 9 tisuća istraživačkih dosjea, svjedočanstava pod zakletvom i statusnih izvještaja glavnih vojnih zapovjednika na temelju kojih je potvrđeno 320 različitih incidenata.

The investigation eventually contained more than 9,000 investigative records, testimony under jury and status reports of the chief military commanders on the basis of which 320 different incidents were confirmed.

The investigation eventually contained more than 9,000 investigative records, testimony under jury and status reports of the chief military commanders on the basis of which 320 different incidents were confirmed.

I heard a few rumors about how Bumgarner killed unarmed people.

A few weeks ago, I heard that Bumgarner killed a Vietnamese girl and two little boys who were unarmed.

The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard OfHistorians/History
tags: Vietnam War
On October 19, 2003, the Ohio-based newspaper the Toledo Blade launched a four-day series of investigative reports exposing a string of atrocities by an elite, volunteer, 45-man "Tiger Force" unit of the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division over the course of seven months in 1967. The Blade goes on to state that in 1971 the Army began a four and a half year investigation of the alleged torture of prisoners, rapes of civilian women, the mutilation of bodies and killing of anywhere from nine to well over one hundred unarmed civilians, among other acts. The articles further report that the Army's inquiry concluded that eighteen U.S. soldiers committed war crimes ranging from murder and assault to dereliction of duty. However, not one of the soldiers, even of those still on active duty at the time of the investigation, was ever court martialed in connection with the heinous crimes. Moreover, six suspected war criminals were allowed to resign from military service during the criminal investigations specifically to avoid prosecution.
The Toledo Blade articles represent some of the best reporting on a Vietnam War crime by any newspaper, during or since the end of the conflict. Unfortunately, the articles tell a story that was all too common. As a historian writing his dissertation on U.S. war crimes and atrocities during the Vietnam War, I have been immersed in just the sort of archival materials the Toledo Blade used in its pieces, but not simply for one incident but hundreds if not thousands of analogous events. I can safely, and sadly, say that the "Tiger Force" atrocities are merely the tip of the iceberg in regard to U.S.-perpetrated war crimes in Vietnam. However, much of the mainstream historical literature dealing with Vietnam War atrocities (and accompanying cover-ups and/or sham investigations), has been marginalized to a great extent -- aside from obligatory remarks concerning the My Lai massacre, which is, itself, often treated as an isolated event. Unfortunately, the otherwise excellent reporting of the Toledo Blade draws upon and feeds off this exceptionalist argument to a certain extent. As such, the true scope of U.S.-perpetrated atrocities is never fully addressed in the articles. The men of the "Tiger Force" are labeled as "Rogue GIs" and the authors simply mention the that Army "conducted 242 war-crimes investigations in Vietnam, [that] a third were substantiated, leading to 21 convictions... according to a review of records at the National Archives" – facts of dubious value that obscure the scope and number of war crimes perpetrated in Vietnam and feed the exceptionalist argument.
Even an accompanying Blade piece on "Other Vietnam Atrocities," tends to decontextualize the "Tiger Force" incidents, treating them as fairly extraordinary events by listing only three other relatively well known atrocity incidents: former Senator, presidential candidate and Navy SEAL Bob Kerrey's raid on the hamlet of Thang Phong; the massacre at Son Thang -- sometimes referred to as the "Marine Corps' My Lai"; and the war crimes allegations of Lt. Col. Anthony Herbert -- most famously chronicled in his memoir Soldier. This short list, however, doesn't even hint at the scope and number of similar criminal acts.
For example, the Toledo Blade reports that its "review of thousands of classified Army documents, National Archives records, and radio logs reveals [the "Tiger Force"] ... carried out the longest series of atrocities in the Vietnam War [from May and November, 1967]...." Unfortunately, this seven month atrocity-spree is not nearly the longest on record. Nor is it even the longest string of atrocities by one unit within its service branch. According to formerly classified Army documents, an investigation disclosed that from at least March 1968 through October 1969, "Vietnamese [civilian] detainees were subjected to maltreatment" by no less than twenty-three separate interrogators of the 172d Military Intelligence (MI) Detachment. The inquiry found that, in addition to using "electrical shock by means of a field telephone," an all too commonly used method of torture by Americans during the war, MI personnel also struck detainees with their fists, sticks and boards and employed a form of water torture which impaired prisoners' ability to breath.
Similar to the "Tiger Force" atrocities chronicled by the Blade, documents indicate that no disciplinary actions were taken against any of the individuals implicated in the long-running series of atrocities, including 172d MI personnel Norman Bowers, Franciszek Pyclik and Eberhard Gasper who were all on active duty at the time that the allegations were investigated by Army officials. In fact, in 1972, Bowers's commanding general pronounced that "no disciplinary or administrative action" would be taken against the suspected war criminal and in a formerly classified memorandum to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, prepared by Colonel Murray Williams on behalf of Brigadier General R.G. Gard in January 1973, it was noted that the "...determination by commanders to take no action against three personnel on active duty who were suspected of committing an offense" had not been publicly acknowledged. Their crimes and identities kept a secret, Bowers, Pyclik and Gasper apparently escaped any prosecution, let alone punishment, for their alleged actions.
Similarly, the Toledo Bladepays particular attention to Sam Ybarra, a "notorious suspect," who was named in seven of the thirty "Tiger Force" war crimes allegations investigated by the Army -- including the rape and fatal stabbing of a 13-year-old girl and the brutal killing of a 15-year-old boy. Yet, Ybarra's notorious reputation may well pale in comparison to that of Sergeant Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner, a soldier who served with the 1st Cavalry Division and later the 173d Airborne Brigade. According to a former commander, "the Bummer" was rumored to have "personally killed over 1,500 people" during a forty-two week stretch in Vietnam. Even if the number was exaggerated, clues on how Bumgarner may have obtained high "body counts" came to light in the course of an Army criminal investigation of an incident that took place on February 25, 1969. According to investigation documents, Bumgarner and a subordinate rounded up three civilians found working in a rice paddy, marched them to a secluded area and murdered them. "The Bummer" then arranged the bodies on the ground with their heads together and a grenade was exploded next to them in an attempt to cover-up their crime. Assorted weapons were then planted near the mutilated corpses to make them appear to have been enemy troops.
During an Army criminal investigation of the incident, men in Bumgarner's unit told investigators that they had heard rumors of the sergeant carrying out similar acts in the past. Said one soldier in a sworn statement to Army investigators:
"I've heard of Bumgarner doing it before -- planting weapons on bodies when there is doubt as to their military status. I've heard quite a few rumors about Bumgarner killing unarmed people. Only a couple weeks ago I heard that Bumgarner had killed a Vietnamese girl and two younger kids (boys), who didn't have any weapons."
Unlike Sam Ybarra, who had been discharged from the military by the time the allegations against him came to light and then refused to cooperate with investigators, "the Bummer" was charged with premeditated murder and tried by general court martial. He was convicted only of manslaughter and his punishment consisted merely of a demotion in rank and a fine of $97 a month for six months. Moreover, after six months, Bumgarner promptly re-enlisted in the Army. His first and only choice of assignments -- Vietnam. Records indicate he got his wish!
Military records demonstrate that the "Tiger Force" atrocities are only the tip of a vast submerged history of atrocities in Vietnam. In fact, while most atrocities were likely never chronicled or reported, the archival record is still rife with incidents analogous to those profiled in the Blade articles, including the following atrocities chronicled in formerly classified Army documents:
- A November 1966 incident in which an officer in the Army's Fourth Infantry Division, severed an ear from a Vietnamese corpse and affixed it to the radio antenna of a jeep as an ornament. The officer was given a non-judicial punishment and a letter of reprimand.
- An August 1967 atrocity in which a 13-year-old Vietnamese child was raped by American MI interrogator of the Army's 196th Infantry Brigade. The soldier was convicted only of indecent acts with a child and assault. He served seven months and sixteen days for his crime.
- A September 1967 incident in which an American sergeant killed two Vietnamese children -- executing one at point blank range with a bullet to the head. Tried by general court martial in 1970, the sergeant pleaded guilty to, and was found guilty of, unpremeditated murder. He was, however, sentenced to no punishment.
- An atrocity that took place on February 4, 1968, just over a month before the My Lai massacre, in the same province by a man from the same division (Americal). The soldier admitted to his commanding officer and other men of his unit that he gunned down three civilians as they worked in a field. A CID investigation substantiated his confession and charges of premeditated murder were preferred against him. The soldier requested a discharge, which was granted by the commanding general of the Americal Division, in lieu of court martial proceedings.
- A series of atrocities similar to, and occurring the same year as, the "Tiger Force" war crimes in which one unit allegedly engaged in an orgy of murder, rape and mutilation, over the course of several months.
While not yielding the high-end body count estimate of the "Tiger Force" series of atrocities, the above incidents begin to demonstrate the ubiquity of the commission of atrocities on the part of American forces during the Vietnam War. Certainly, war crimes, such as murder, rape and mutilation were not an everyday affair for American combat soldiers in Vietnam, however, such acts were also by no means as exceptional as often portrayed in recent historical literature or as tacitly alluded to in the Blade articles.
The excellent investigative reporting of the Toledo Blade is to be commended for shedding light on war crimes committed by American soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division in 1967. However, it is equally important to understand that the "Tiger Force" atrocities were not the mere result of "Rogue GIs" but instead stem from what historian Christian Appy has termed the American "doctrine of atrocity" during the Vietnam War -- a strategy built upon official U.S. dictums relating to the body count, free-fire zones, search and destroy tactics and the strategy of attrition as well as unofficial tenets such as "kill anything that moves," intoned during the "Tiger Force" atrocities and in countless other atrocity tales, or the "mere gook rule" which held that "If it's dead and Vietnamese, it's VC." Further, it must also be recognized that the "Tiger Force" atrocities, the My Lai massacre, the Herbert allegations and the few other better-known war crimes were not isolated or tangentially-related incidents, but instead are only the most spectacular or best publicized of what was an on-going string of atrocities, large and small, that spanned the entire duration of the war.
The headline of one Blade article proclaims, "Earlier Tiger Force probe could have averted My Lai carnage," referring to the fact that the 101st Airborne Division's "Tiger Force" troops operated in the same province (Quang Ngai), with the same mission (search and destroy) months before the Americal Division's men committed their war crimes. But atrocities were not a localized problem or one that only emerged in 1967. Instead, the pervasive disregard for the laws of war had begun prior to U.S. buildup in 1965 and had roots in earlier conflicts. Only by recognizing these facts can we hope to begin to understand the "Tiger Force" atrocities and the history of American war crimes in Vietnam, writ large.
Related Links
Seymour Hersh, "Uncovered" (New Yorker) ABC News Report
This article was first published by http://www.zmag.org/ and is reprinted with the permission of the author.
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More Comments:
Fred G Welfare - 7/23/2009
Does anyone have any idea of whether the interrogation techniques used in Vietnam or Iraq have any validity in terms of effectiveness? Is valid intelligence being gathered with these interrogation techniques?
frank hillier - 12/22/2008
vietnam was an unexcusable and disgusting stain on american history.
a mass of young,afraid and angry men, many of which were using drugs, punted into an alien land with alien people.
as with any race,nation or group thier are a proportion of vile harmful people.
in times of war especially in vietnam these people are armed with countless available victims coupled with a feeling of no law or infact being the law attrocites will occur.
it is the responsibility of the government and commanding officers to find and remove then punish, but ultimately it should be the the fellow soldiers who are on the ground standing up for what they know is right and being brave enough to stop it.
i fear iraq may be viewed in a simalar light in years to come
tim baker allen baker - 11/15/2008
I certainly hope people take these comments seriously. Our standing in the world is affected by such charges, and I for one do not want to see my country having a reputation as being a bunch of hippocrites, going after war criminals in other parts of the world and then giving war criminals in our country accepted status. I'm E-mailing ministers all over the country and requesting they read these and other writings such as "Tiger Force: Men at War". And I would think that all men of honor would be involved in some meaningful capacity. Best of luck to the author. Tim Baker
tim baker allen baker - 11/14/2008
We know what happened "wasn't right" to paraphrase a Nam vet's words. But but vet's killing vet's to prevent the occurances from going to the US Army's War Crimes Command Division is certainly as bad as atrocities themselves. Yet, there has been only a wisp of an indication as to those likely events.
Mackubin Thomas Owens - 10/24/2006
I wrote a number of piece about Kerry and his post-war claims for National Review and NRO. I believe that Turse's methodology is flawed for the reasons I laid out in this piece from a couple of years ago.
John Kerry’s decision to run for president on his record in Vietnam has ripped the scab off of the wounds that war inflicted on the American body politic. Some of Kerry’s defenders have laid this charge at the feet of the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth (SBVT), but the fact is that they were responding to what they perceived as an affront to their honor. This is why all the attempts to paint them as Republican stooges are so far off of the mark.
I believe my own motivation in publicizing Kerry’s actions after the war is typical of most anti-Kerry veterans, including the Swifties. I would never have written my first NRO piece back in January had Kerry chosen to run on his Senate record. But to coin a phrase, his April 1971 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is “seared in my memory” and I believed his attempt now to surround himself with people he had once described as war criminals represented the height of cynicism and hypocrisy.
Of course, the Kerry campaign and most of the press blew off the pieces I wrote for NRO in January and for National Review in February as an attempt to question his service in Vietnam. The volume of e-mails and phone calls I received from Vietnam veterans agreeing with me demonstrated that I was far from alone. But due to a lack of media interest, the issue dropped off the scope, permitting Kerry and his apologists to avoid addressing the issue.
Enter the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. They were motivated not only by Kerry’s actions after the war but by the portrayal of his Vietnam service in Douglas Brinkley’s hand job, Tour of Duty. Despite a desperate attempt to dismiss the Swifties as Republican goons, Kerry and his defenders in the media were forced to deal with the substance of the Swifties’ charges. This they did with varying degrees of success, owing to the fact that men in battle often perceive the same event differently. It does seem clear that Kerry did not spend Christmas of 1968 in Cambodia as he claimed on numerous occasions. There are also legitimate questions about the circumstances surrounding his first Purple Heart and his rescue of Jim Rassmun.
But there would seem to be no argument about Kerry’s actions after the war. He did leave the Navy early to pursue a political career; he did join the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW); he did claim during his 1971 Senate testimony that American soldiers committed atrocities in Vietnam on a regular basis; he did participate in numerous instances of “political theater” put on by the VVAW, including Dewey Canyon III; and he did meet with representatives of the North Vietnamese communist government. These events may have brought him to political prominence in the United States, but at the cost of alienating a substantial number of Vietnam veterans who believed he besmirched their honor and whose resulting anger has simmered for three decades.
The first attempt to defend Kerry on the substance of the charge that he had dishonored all of those who fought in Vietnam with his 1971 Senate testimony was a series of arguments claiming that he really didn’t mean to include everyone in Vietnam when he made his claim of widespread atrocities. He was, so the argument went, merely relating stories told by others. But if so, he should have chosen his words more carefully. The common-sense meaning of the statement that "over 150 honorably discharged and many very highly decorated veterans testified to war crimes committed in Southeast Asia, not isolated incidents but crimes committed on a day-to-day basis with the full awareness of officers at all levels of command" seems to be that these accounts represent only the tip of the iceberg and more importantly, that such actions represented US policy against the Vietnamese.
So indeed, the second attempt to defend Kerry is now in play. His defenders claim that he was telling the truth—atrocities did take place in Vietnam. Of course, as anyone who has read my articles knows, there is no controversy about this point. But the trick here, most on display in Peter Beinart’s “Apocalypse Redux” in the September 6 issue of The New Republic, is to suggest that that those who criticize Kerry are somehow denying that atrocities occurred in Vietnam at all. Beinart argues that the second Swift Boat ad (recounting Kerry’s Senate testimony) doesn’t claim that Kerry’s charges were false, but “merely suggests he was unpatriotic for leveling them.” Beinart then goes on to cite a number of historians who, sure enough, assure us that atrocities did occur in Vietnam.
But this is missing the point—whether intentionally or not I cannot say. This is now my eighth piece on this topic since January for National Review, NRO, The Weekly Standard, and the Jerusalem Post. In every one of those pieces as well as many others I have written over the years about the Vietnam War, I have stated unequivocally that Americans committed atrocities in Vietnam. I have never tried to whitewash the record, as one of my correspondents claimed.
As is often the case, Jim Webb, a Marine hero of the Vietnam War (Navy Cross) and best-selling author whose novel, Fields of Fire is the best book about Vietnam, got to the crux of the matter in a recent NPR commentary when he said that the “stories of atrocious conduct, repeated in lurid detail by Kerry before the Congress, represented not the typical experience of the American soldier, but its ugly extreme” (emphasis added)
Some of us who believe that the American soldier did not typically commit atrocities have called into question the credibility of many of the accounts upon which Kerry based his testimony—the “Winter Soldier Investigation” (WSI), an early 1971 event in Detroit organized by the VVAW and sponsored by Jan Fonda, Dick Gregory, and conspiracy theorist Mark Lane. I had read Lane’s 1970 book, Conversations with Americans and was struck by how implausible most of the atrocity claims were. I was not alone. Lane’s book was panned by James Reston, Jr. and Neil Sheehan, not exactly known as supporters of the Vietnam War. Sheehan in particular demonstrated that many of Lane’s “eye witnesses” either had never served in Vietnam or had not done so in the capacity they claimed.
The transcripts of the WSI struck me the same way. My own beliefs were reinforced several years later by the publication of Guenter Lewy’s America in Vietnam, in which he related the difficulty that military investigators faced trying to get particulars. As I wrote in the 23 February issue of National Review, paraphrasing Lewy, when the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) attempted to interview those who allegedly had witnessed atrocities, most refused to cooperate, even after assurances that they would not be questioned about atrocities they may have committed personally. Those that did cooperate never provided details of actual crimes to investigators. The NIS also discovered that some of the most grisly testimony was given by fake witnesses who had appropriated the names of real Vietnam veterans.
The same thing happened with Army investigators. As Lewy wrote, “the refusal of [those who claimed to have witnessed atrocities] to give substantiating factual information in support of their atrocity allegations created a situation in which the accusers continued to reap generous publicity for their sensational charges while the Army in most cases could neither investigate nor refute them…As of April 1971, the CID (the Army’s Criminal Investigative Division) had determined that [in one case] 7 of 16 allegations…which could be investigated were unfounded or unsubstantiated. Most of the allegations were so general as to defy investigation.”
My skepticism about the WSI was further strengthened by the publication of Stolen Valor by H.G. Burkett and Genna Whitley. In the course of trying to raise money for a Texas Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Burkett discovered that reporters were only interested in homeless veterans and drug abuse and that the corporate leaders he approached had bought into the popular image of Vietnam veterans. They were not honorable men who took pride in their service, but whining welfare cases, belly-aching about what an immoral government did to them.
Fed up, Burkett did something that any reporter worth his or her salt could have done: he used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to check the actual records of the “image makers” used by reporters to flesh out their stories on homelessness, Agent Orange, suicide, drug abuse, criminality, or alcoholism. What he found was astounding. More often than not, the show case “veteran” who cried on camera about his dead buddies, about committing or witnessing atrocities, or about some heroic action in combat that led him to the current dead end in his life, was an impostor.
Indeed, Burkett discovered that over the last decade, some 1,700 individuals, including some of the most prominent examples of the Vietnam veteran as dysfunctional loser, had fabricated their war stories. Many had never even been in the service. Others, had been, but had never been in Vietnam.
Lewy’s account recently has been called into question and Burkett has been criticized for simply accusing everyone who talks about atrocities as a phony or imposter. In the August 30 TNR Online, historian John Prados writes regarding the WSI atrocity accounts that “a handful of individual stories may have been called into question, but the main thrust of the [WSI] testimonies--that American atrocities were widespread in Vietnam--is today beyond dispute. Indeed the emergence of new evidence during the last 30 years has only solidified the winter soldiers' overall case.” He then criticizes Lewy’s account of the WSI:
Lewy's primary evidence consists of noting that VVAW members refused to give depositions. When the Naval Investigative Service tried to pull VVAW members into an inquiry, it found one Marine who either could not or would not give details of what he had seen and allegedly located several other veterans who said they had never gone to Detroit. (O'Neill had cited this same information in his televised debate with Kerry.) But even if true, these incidents were far too limited to establish anything in particular about the Winter Soldier Investigation; the fact that some of the winter soldiers declined to give depositions does not prove or disprove the legitimacy of the entire project. The VVAW leadership left it up to individual members to decide how to respond to requests for depositions. And veterans had good reasons to decline. For one thing, they argued that their purpose was to protest U.S. policy, not to draw attention to individual soldiers. What's more, with the VVAW under direct assault from the Nixon administration, it's understandable that the group's members were loathe to cooperate with government investigators.
The debate turns, it seems to me, on Prados’ assertion that it is today beyond dispute that “American atrocities were widespread in Vietnam.” Again I stipulate that they did occur. Recent revelations include the Son Thang event described by Marine Corps veteran Gary D. Solis in his book Son Thang: An American War Crime and the more troubling “Tiger Force” story broken earlier this year by The Toledo Blade, which reported that members of an elite unit of the 327th Airborne Infantry in the Central Highlands in 1967 committed war crimes ranging from murder and assault to dereliction of duty.
Of course the best known incident was the admission several years ago by Bob Kerrey, the highly respected former senator from Nebraska and Medal of Honor recipient, that the Navy SEAL team he led in Vietnam killed women in children during a nighttime mission some 32 years ago.
Mr. Kerrey's admission was prompted by a lengthy New York Times Magazine story by Gregory Vistica that went farther than the charge that civilians died during this action. It contained the explosive claim that then-Lieutenant (j.g.) Kerrey had ordered the civilians to be rounded up and then shot point blank to facilitate the SEAL team's escape. If this allegation is true, what happened that night in the Mekong Delta village of Thanh Phong was more than a terrible tragedy of war--it was a war crime.
These are all troubling events. But they do not prove that atrocities in Vietnam were more widespread than in previous wars. Additionally, there is no evidence that atrocities were a matter of policy, as suggested in this September 1970 VVAW flyer issued in conjunction with one of its stunts:
A
US Infantry
Company Just
Came through
Here!
If you had been Vietnamese—
We might have burned your house
We might have shot your dog
We might have shot you
We might have raped your wife and daughter
We might have turned you over to the government for torture
We might have taken souvenirs from your property
We might have shot things up a bit
We might have done all these things to you and your whole town
Let’s put things in perspective. Some three million men served in Vietnam. Since the logistics tail of US forces is fairly large, only about twenty-five percent, 750,000, served in combat units. If we add up all of the atrocities, both proven and alleged, and multiply them by two as a hedge against under-reporting, the percentage of American combat soldiers who might have committed atrocities is still less than one percent of the total. I doubt that many armies in history could match that record.
I have tried on many occasions to get to the heart of why some Americans committed atrocities in Vietnam and others didn’t. The fact is that anyone who has been in combat understands the thin line between permissible acts and atrocity. The first and potentially most powerful emotion in combat is fear arising from the instinct of self-preservation.
But in soldiers, fear is overcome by what the Greeks called thumos, spiritedness or righteous indignation. It is thumos, awakened by the death of his comrade Patroclus that causes Achilles to quit sulking in his tent and wade into the Trojans, slaughtering them in great numbers. But unchecked, thumos can engender rage and frenzy. It is the role of leadership, which provides strategic context for killing and enforces discipline, to prevent this outcome. Such leadership was not in evidence at My Lai, or most of the other cases of atrocities.
In the May 3 issue of National Review, I suggested three reasons that explain the belief on the part of so many that atrocities in Vietnam were more frequent than in other wars and that they were a part of policy: 1) Soviet propaganda; 2) the belief on the part of the veterans who related atrocity stories that they were telling their listeners what they wanted to hear; and 3) liars and phonies.
In America in Vietnam, Lewy noted the establishment of a veritable war-crimes industry, supported by the USSR, as early as 1965. As Ion Mihai Pacepa, a former Romanian intelligence chief, has recounted, the Soviets set up permanent international organizations — including the International War Crimes Tribunal and the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam — "to aid or to conduct operations to help Americans dodge the draft or defect, to demoralize its army with anti-American propaganda, to conduct protests, demonstrations, and boycotts, and to sanction anyone connected with the war." Pacepa claims to have been responsible for fabricating stories about U.S. atrocities in Vietnam and "flacking" them to Western news organizations. Lewy writes that "the Communists made skillful use of their worldwide propaganda apparatus . . . and they found many Western intellectuals only too willing to accept every conceivable allegation of [American] wrongdoing at face value."
The VVAW, a small, radical group that never exceeded a membership of 7,000 (including John Kerry) from a pool of nearly 3 million Vietnam (and 9 million Vietnam-era) veterans, essentially "Americanized" Soviet propaganda. When he testified before the Senate in 1971, Kerry was merely repeating charges that had been making the rounds since 1965.
To the anti-war Left, atrocities revealed the Nazi-like character of "Amerika." But, unlike their Nazi counterparts, U.S. soldiers could be redeemed: By confessing atrocities, the Vietnam veterans, once denigrated as "baby killers," were able to receive absolution from the Left, and were transmuted into innocent victims of a brutal war. American military sociologist Charles Moskos has suggested that atrocity stories out of Vietnam were the functional equivalent of heroic war stories from World War II: They provided a meaning to participation in Vietnam that resonated with those who opposed the war and were now judging the returning soldiers. Some atrocity claims were the product of outright fantasy, on the part of soldiers who returned from the war emotionally disturbed. The (anti-war) psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton wrote of a veteran who, after some time in group therapy, could "confess that he had been much less violent in Vietnam than he had implied. He had previously given the impression that he had killed many people there, whereas in actuality, despite extensive combat experience, he could not be certain he had killed anyone."
Third were the phonies: In response to the claim that some if not many of those who testified at the WSI event were exaggerating or even imposters, Prados writes that “every veteran who presented in Detroit had to show a copy of his military papers (the military form known as DD-214) to demonstrate that he had actually been present at the places and times he was speaking about.”
Let me be clear. Not all atrocity stories can be pawned off as the work of phonies. But one of the most striking revelations of Stolen Valor is how easy it is to produce fraudulent records, including the DD-214. And anyone who served in Vietnam has no doubt at one time or another confronted a wannabe Vietnam vet. It has always amazed me how many people want to claim to have served in such an unpopular war.
I would add a fourth reason—the passing down of a story from soldier to soldier. According to FactCheck.org., Keith Nolan, author of 10 published books on Vietnam, says he's heard many veterans describe atrocities just like those Kerry recounted from the Winter Soldier event. Since 1978, Nolan has interviewed roughly 1,000 veterans in depth for his books, and spoken to thousands of others. "I have heard the exact same stories dozens if not hundreds of times over," he said. "Wars produce atrocities. Frustrating guerrilla wars produce a particularly horrific number of atrocities. That some individual soldiers and certain units responded with excessive brutality in Vietnam shouldn't really surprise anyone."
Let me recount a personal anecdote that makes me question the idea that story heard many times validates it. I didn’t commit or witness atrocities during my tour as a Marine infantry platoon leader. As far as I know, neither did the other officers in my regiment and battalion. But I heard of an atrocity just after I joined the unit. A Marine who was scheduled to rotate very shortly recounted an incident that he claimed had occurred shortly after he had arrived in the unit about a year earlier.
According to the story, members of a sister company had killed some North Vietnamese soldiers after they had surrendered. Some months later, I heard another Marine who had joined my platoon after I took it over relate exactly the same story to some newly arrived men, only now it involved me and my platoon. I had a little chat with him and he cleared things up with the new men. But that little episode has always made me wonder how many of the stories have been recycled and how many account of atrocities are based on what veterans heard as opposed to committed or witnessed. Of course, an account based on hearsay may be true. After all, the soldier who broke the My Lai story was not present during the massacre.
Unfortunately for the body politic, this issue is not going to go away. Too many veterans have long memories and they believe that Kerry sacrificed their honor on the altar of his political ambitions.
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Mackubin Thomas Owens is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. He led a Marine infantry platoon in Vietnam in 1968-69.
Robert Destatte - 10/23/2006
Mr. MacKenzie wrote:
"The absence of detailed research on NVA/VC atrocities during and after the war is one of the great black holes in modern Vietnamese historiography."
This is a "great black hole" only for those Americans who have chosen to either ignore or dismiss the available data.
I am not inclined to do Mr. MacKenzie's homework for him; however the data exists if he should chose to look for it.
Warm regards,
R. Destatte
Robert Destatte - 10/22/2006
It seems to me that Nick Turse's article, "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of," (a) is misleading, and (b) illustrates a number of logical fallacies.
Although I cannot refute Turse's description of the half-a-dozen or so incidents he cites in this article, I am 100% certain, based on my five years of wartime service in Vietnam, that he has grossly--and possibly consciously--exaggerated the number of crimes committed by American soldiers during the VN war. If he has researched this issue as thoroughly as he claims to have, I would have to conclude that he calculatingly misled his audience by falsely implying that American military authorities were unwilling to prosecute, convict, and harshly sentence, whenever possible, soldiers who committed war crimes.
On this latter point, there is no question that some unit commanders tried to cover up "bad news;" however, once an allegation of a possible crime was exposed senior American military authorities and their civilian superiors ensured the allegation was investigated and that appropriate action was taken.
In this regard, I would expect that a person of Turse's education and credentials must be aware of the manner in which the rules of evidence influenced the ability of military commanders and prosecutors to successfully bring an accused person to trial and, when brought to trial, to gain a conviction. His failure to mention this factor suggests to me that he was not interested in presenting his readers an honest and balanced view of this issue.
Writers such as Turse are free to cite hearsay, isolated examples, and conjecture as evidence with which to smear persons and institutions they dislike, disapprove of, or simply know nothing about. Fortunately our system of justice holds our courts to a higher standard.
It seems to me that Turse is guilty of committing at least the following fallacies of logic in this article:
Appeal to popular authority ('climb on the bandwagon'). It is popular among academics and mainstream journalists to accuse members of our armed forces of regularly committing heinous crimes. Climbing on this bandwagon likely is a sure way for an academic researcher and writer to gain popularity and acclaim from many of his colleagues.
Hasty generalization. Turse generalized about a group--American soldiers and their commanders in Vietnam--based upon a sample that is too small to be representative. Three and a half million or more Americans served in Vietnam. With rare, but widely publicized, exceptions all served honorably.
Appeal to emotions. Turse described incidents in which American soldiers allegedly killed children and raped women. Here he arouses the readers' emotions in a manner apparently intended to influence the readers' beliefs about American soldiers and military authorities--whether consciously or unconsciously, Turse seems to wish to undermine public support for the American armed forces and system of justice. "Appeals to emotion are always fallacious when intended to influence our beliefs,..." (http://www.fallacyfiles.org/emotiona.html).
Anecdotal fallacy. It is easy for the reader to imagine that some soldiers will commit war crimes when engaged in armed conflict. Turse described a few examples of such acts from which, he might expect, based on the ease with which readers can imagine such acts could have been committed, that many readers will conclude (mistakenly) that American soldiers commonly committed war crimes for which they were rarely prosecuted or punished.
On a subjective (and, I admit, logically fallacious) level--I find myself wondering if it is reasonable that I should expect accurate and balanced reporting from an academic outfit that calls itself the "Center for History and the New Media." It is the sort of name I would expect to see for an institution in the old Soviet Union.
Warm regards,
R. Destatte
Grant Jones - 11/24/2003
No, the U.S. was not the aggressor in Vietnam. The U.S. never had any territorial ambitions there. The Geneva Accords were not signed by either the U.S. or the Diem government. The worst mistake the U.S. made was supporting the French in their attempt to re-colonize the place.
As to the 1957 elections that didn't happen, that the Minh would have won is debatable. but if they did that would have been the last election, if they lost they would have waged war. If Hanoi is so enamored with elections, what is preventing them from having one tomorrow? Ho's agenda was to unify Indo-China under his rule, regardless of the cost. That was the cause of the war.
During the period of 1965-75 rice production increased in the South along with the standard of living. It really did, look up the numbers. Killing Diem was another blunder of the American government, but it is clear the South did not want to be ruled from Hanoi. My main objection is to the charactorization of the American war effort as some sort of Genocidal frenzy. This is crap, pure and simply. The war in Korea claimed as many lives, and more destruction, in a shorter period of time. Many of the attacks on America's efforts in Vietnam could be use in reference to the Korean War. The results fifty years later speak for themselves.
Maybe I am blinded by love of country, Patriotism. But that is still better than being blinded by anti-patriotism, hatred of America and all it stands for, which is what motivates the Vietniks. And is why the Left is always on the side of America's enemies. The Western left and the Islamofascists agree on one thing; America is the Great Satan.
I will note that despite how terrible the war of 1965-75 was, it was only after the Commie victory that nearly a million Vietnamese found it necessary to flee their country by any means avaliable. More Indo-Chinese died during the first two years of the commie "peace" than during the ten years of American involvement.
Cram - 11/23/2003
F.H. Thomas,
Your points about democracies going to war were well taken. I should have specified that liberal democracies have not gone to war with other liberal democracies since WWII.
(On a side note however, I would argue that Britain was not really a democracy in the modern sense of the word, nor was Prussia even though it technically had a Constitution. The Confederacy was more of a rebellion then a war, and the Kaiser was essentially a king.)
F.H. Thomas - 11/23/2003
Thanks for a good post with many fine, amusing points.
I must take issues with the democracy vs democracy point. What about Athens vs Corinth, UK vs USA (twice), USA vs CSA, France vs Prussia, and UK/France/USA vs Weimar Germany?
It seems to me that democracy has a special insidiousness, in that it posits the presumption of legitimacy.
Santayana, paraphrasing Plato, contradicting Wilson's "War to end all wars":
"Only the dead have seen the end of war".
F.H. Thomas - 11/23/2003
I increasing appreciate your take on things, though our core beliefs may at times diverge somewhat.
Just to make a complex subject more so, Vietnam was incontrovertably separated into four main philosophical groups: the communists, who believed in no God but dialectical materialism, the animists who believed in a world soul, manifested in millions of sub-souls in every thing, whether rock, tree, or dog, the Buddists (Therevada) who believed that all wisdom was in denying the world, at least in their 18th year, and the Catholics, strongest of all, who were the bulwark against the communists in all but numbers.
The Ap Loc incident I referred to above involved communists as persecutors, and animists as victims. The battle of Song Mao, (May '70) involved Catholics against (perhaps, nominally, maybe-kinda-sorta) communists, in which 5,000 of the latter, recently marched down from North Vietnam, perished in a mini-Cannae.
It was not possible to consider any incident without its ethnic component being involved. This was often missed in contemporaneous analysis, and is invisible today. I wanted you to have this background information for future discussions.
F.H. Thomas - 11/23/2003
At times I wonder whether the internet might foster a paradigm shift in the power relationships in society, in favor of small "d" democracy. In 1970 this type of reportage and reaction could not be possible. I can tell you that, in 1969, it felt pretty damned cut off out there.
Thanks for being on message.
F.H. Thomas - 11/23/2003
It's hard at times to get a meaningful discourse when so many are so inexperienced in the subject.
But then, when one is...
Thanks.
Dave Livingston - 11/23/2003
As F.H. Thomas said, "War coarsens and diminishes all its participants..." But the degree to which it does may be limited by certain factors, i.e., one's religious faith or culture, i.e., my native gentle small-town America.
Indeed, it is my conviction that probably I was permitted by our Lord to survive an ordinarily killing wound in part because during my two tours in 'Nam during which I was nearly daily, flying Aero-Scout missions (even when troop Ops officer & X.O.)presented with the temptation to kill unnecessarily I not only never did so, never even considered doing so.
F.H. will perhaps understand, if armchair warriors do not, why I remain proud of having never murdered in 'Nam, as bitter
and brutal as that war was at times. Likewise, I think I can understand a little something of the factors that led him to quit the Army in face of his experiences in exotic Indochina.
All that said, I take strong issue with Michael Meo's smug assummption that it is necessarily wrong to do what must be done to win a war, to protect one's hide. War isn't for the faint of heart. By the same token, it isn't much fun. Oh Lord, it becomes mighty tiresome being constantly terrified for weeks & months on end.
Brian Kelly - 11/21/2003
As a number of people have pointed out, the permanent frustrations of operating in a general context where occupying troops are resented, hated by a civilian population is what creates the conditions under which the kinds of crimes Turse chronicles take place, or even become part of the routine. This does not excuse the actions of individual GIs, but the response to the question of whether there is documented evidence that similar crimes are occurring in Iraq is that the detereriorating relationship between occupation forces and the Iraqui people makes such a scenario inevitable.
I attach this article, from the pro-war _Times_ of London, on the dynamic on the ground at Nassiriyah. This piece is six months old, and it is likely that the situation has grown much worse rather than better.
*******************************************************
"The Iraqis are sick people and we are the chemotherapy," said Corporal Ryan Dupre. "I am starting to hate this country. Wait till I get hold of a friggin' Iraqi. No, I won't get hold of one. I'll just kill him."
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-628258,00.html
The Times (London)
March 30 2003
US Marines turn fire on civilians at the bridge of death
Mark Franchetti, Nasiriya
THE light was a strange yellowy grey and the wind was coming up, the beginnings of a sandstorm. The silence felt almost eerie after a night of shooting so intense it hurt the eardrums and shattered the nerves. My footsteps felt heavy on the hot, dusty asphalt as I walked slowly towards the bridge at Nasiriya. A horrific scene lay ahead.
Some 15 vehicles, including a minivan and a couple of trucks, blocked the road. They were riddled with bullet holes. Some had caught fire and turned into piles of black twisted metal. Others were still burning.
Amid the wreckage I counted 12 dead civilians, lying in the road or in nearby ditches. All had been trying to leave this southern town overnight, probably for fear of being killed by US helicopter attacks and heavy artillery. Their mistake had been to flee over a bridge that is crucial to the coalition's supply lines and to run into a group of shell-shocked young American marines with orders to shoot anything that moved. One man's body was still in flames. It gave out a hissing sound. Tucked away in his breast pocket, thick wads of banknotes were turning to ashes. His savings, perhaps.
Down the road, a little girl, no older than five and dressed in a pretty orange and gold dress, lay dead in a ditch next to the body of a man who may have been her father. Half his head was missing. Nearby, in a battered old Volga, peppered with ammunition holes, an Iraqi woman - perhaps the girl's mother - was dead, slumped in the back seat. A US Abrams tank nicknamed Ghetto Fabulous drove past the bodies.
This was not the only family who had taken what they thought was a last chance for safety. A father, baby girl and boy lay in a shallow grave. On the bridge itself a dead Iraqi civilian lay next to the carcass of a donkey. As I walked away, Lieutenant Matt Martin, whose third child, Isabella, was born while he was on board ship en route to the Gulf, appeared beside me. "Did you see all that?" he asked, his eyes filled with tears. "Did you see that little baby girl? I carried her body and buried it as best I could but I had no time. It really gets to me to see children being killed like this, but we had no choice." Martin's distress was in contrast to the bitter satisfaction of some of his fellow marines as they surveyed the scene. "The Iraqis are sick people and we are the chemotherapy," said Corporal Ryan Dupre. "I am starting to hate this country. Wait till I get hold of a friggin' Iraqi. No, I won't get hold of one. I'll just kill him."
Only a few days earlier these had still been the bright-eyed small-town boys with whom I crossed the border at the start of the operation. They had rolled towards Nasiriya, a strategic city beside the Euphrates, on a mission to secure a safe supply route for troops on the way to Baghdad. They had expected a welcome, or at least a swift surrender. Instead they had found themselves lured into a bloody battle, culminating in the worst coalition losses of the war - 16 dead, 12 wounded and two missing marines as well as five dead and 12 missing servicemen from an army convoy - and the humiliation of having prisoners paraded on Iraqi television.
There are three key bridges at Nasiriya. The feat of Martin, Dupre and their fellow marines in securing them under heavy fire was compared by armchair strategists last week to the seizure of the Remagen bridge over the Rhine, which significantly advanced victory over Germany in the second world war.
But it was also the turning point when the jovial band of brothers from America lost all their assumptions about the war and became jittery aggressors who talked of wanting to "nuke" the place. None of this was foreseen at Camp Shoup, one of the marines' tent encampments in northern Kuwait, where officers from the 1st and 2nd battalions of Task Force Tarawa, the 7,000-strong US Marines brigade, spent long evenings poring over maps and satellite imagery before the invasion. The plan seemed straightforward. The marines would speed unhindered over the 130 miles of desert up from the Kuwaiti border and approach Nasiriya from the southeast to secure a bridge over the Euphrates. They would then drive north through the outskirts of Nasiriya to a second bridge, over the Inahr al-Furbati canal. Finally, they would turn west and secure the third bridge, also over the canal. The marines would not enter the city proper, let alone attempt to take it.
The coalition could then start moving thousands of troops and logistical support units up highway 7, leading to Baghdad, 225 miles to the north. There was only one concern: "ambush alley", the road connecting the first two bridges. But intelligence suggested there would be little or no fighting as this eastern side of the city was mostly "pro-American".
I was with Alpha company. We reached the outskirts of Nasiriya at about breakfast time last Sunday. Some marines were disappointed to be carrying out a mission that seemed a sideshow to the main effort. But in an ominous sign of things to come, our battalion stopped in its tracks, three miles outside the city. Bad news filtered back. Earlier that morning a US Army convoy had been greeted by a group of Iraqis dressed in civilian clothes, apparently wanting to surrender. When the American soldiers stopped, the Iraqis pulled out AK-47s and sprayed the US trucks with gunfire.
Five wounded soldiers were rescued by our convoy, including one who had been shot four times. The attackers were believed to be members of the Fedayeen Saddam, a group of 15,000 fighters under the command of Saddam's psychopathic son Uday. Blown-up tyres, a pool of blood, spent ammunition and shards of glass from the bulletridden windscreen marked the spot where the ambush had taken place. Swiftly, our AAVs (23-ton amphibious assault vehicles) took up defensive positions. About 100 marines jumped out of their vehicles and took cover in ditches, pointing their sights at a mud-caked house. Was it harbouring gunmen? Small groups of marines approached, cautiously, to search for the enemy. A dozen terrified civilians, mainly women and children, emerged with their hands raised. "It's just a bunch of Hajis," said one gunner from his turret, using their nickname for Arabs. "Friggin' women and children, that's all."
Cobras and Huey attack helicopters began firing missiles at targets on the edge of the city. Plumes of smoke rose as heavy artillery shook the ground under our feet. Heavy machinegun fire echoed across the huge rubbish dump that marks the entrance to Nasiriya. Suddenly there was return fire from three large oil tanks at a refinery. The Cobras were called back, and within seconds they roared above our heads, firing off missiles in clouds of purple tracer fire. There were several loud explosions. Flames burst high into the sky from one of the oil tanks. The marines believed that what opposition there was had now been crushed. "We are going in, we are going in," shouted one of the officers.
More than 20 AAVs, several tanks and about 10 Hummers equipped with roof-mounted, anti-tank missile launchers prepared to move in. Crammed inside them were some 400 marines. Tension rose as they loaded their guns and stuck their heads over the side of the AAVs through the open roof, their M-16 pointed in all directions. As we set off towards the eastern city gate there was no sense of the mayhem awaiting us down the road. A few locals dressed in rags watched the awesome spectacle of America's war machine on the move. Nobody waved.
Slowly we approached the first bridge. Fires were raging on either side of the road; Cobras had destroyed an Iraqi military truck and a T55 tank positioned inside a dugout. Powerful explosions came from inside the bowels of the tank as its ammunition and heavy shells were set off by the fire. With each explosion a thick and perfect ring of black smoke ring puffed out of the turret. An Iraqi defence post lay abandoned. Cobras flew over an oasis of palm trees and deserted brick and mud-caked houses. We charged onto the bridge, and as we crossed the Euphrates, a large mural of Saddam came into view. Some marines reached for their disposable cameras.
Suddenly, as we approached ambush alley on the far side of the bridge, the crackle of AK-47s broke out. Our AAVs began to zigzag to avoid being hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). The road widened out to a square, with a mosque and the portrait of Saddam on the left-hand side. The vehicles wheeled round, took up a defensive position, back to back, and began taking fire. Pinned down, the marines fired back with 40mm automatic grenade launchers, a weapon so powerful it can go through thick brick walls and kill anyone within a 5-yard range of where the shell lands.
I was in AAV number A304, affectionately nicknamed the Desert Caddy. It shook as Keith Bernize, the gunner, fired off round after deafening round at sandbag positions shielding suspected Fedayeen fighters. His steel ammunition box clanged with the sound of smoking empty shells and cartridges. Bernize, who always carries a scan picture of his unborn baby daughter with him, shot at the targets from behind a turret, peering through narrow slits of reinforced glass. He shouted at his men to feed him more ammunition. Four marines, standing at the AAV's four corners, precariously perched on ammunition boxes, fired off their M-16s. Their faces covered in sweat, officers shouted commands into field radios, giving co-ordinates of enemy positions. Some 200 marines, fully exposed to enemy fire and slowed down by their heavy weapons, bulky ammunition packs and NBC suits, ran across the road, taking shelter behind a long brick wall and mounds of earth. A team of snipers appeared, yards from our vehicle.
The exchange of fire was relentless. We were pinned down for more than three hours as Iraqis hiding inside houses and a hospital and behind street corners fired a barrage of ammunition. Despite the marines' overwhelming firepower, hitting the Iraqis was not easy. The gunmen were not wearing uniforms and had planned their ambush well - stockpiling weapons in dozens of houses, between which they moved freely pretending to be civilians. "It's a bad situation," said First Sergeant James Thompson, who was running around with a 9mm pistol in his hand. "We don't know who is shooting at us. They are even using women as scouts. The women come out waving at us, or with their hands raised. We freeze, but the next minute we can see how she is looking at our positions and giving them away to the fighters hiding behind a street corner. It's very difficult to distinguish between the fighters and civilians."
Across the square, genuine civilians were running for their lives. Many, including some children, were gunned down in the crossfire. In a surreal scene, a father and mother stood out on a balcony with their children in their arms to give them a better view of the battle raging below. A few minutes later several US mortar shells landed in front of their house. In all probability, the family is dead.
The fighting intensified. An Iraqi fighter emerged from behind a wall of sandbags 500 yards away from our vehicle. Several times he managed to fire off an RPG at our positions. Bernize and other gunners fired dozens of rounds at his dugout, punching large holes into a house and lifting thick clouds of dust. Captain Mike Brooks, commander of Alpha company, pinned down in front of the mosque, called in tank support. Armed with only a 9mm pistol, he jumped out of the back of his AAV with a young marine carrying a field radio on his back.
Brooks, 34, from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, had been in command of 200 men for just over a year. He joined the marines when he was 19 because he felt that he was wasting his life. He needed direction, was a bit of a rebel and was impressed by the sense of pride in the corps. He is a soft-spoken man, fair but very firm. Brave too: I watched him sprint in front of enemy positions to brief some of his junior officers behind a wall. Behind us, two 68-ton Abrams tanks rolled up, crushing the barrier separating the lanes on the highway. The earth shook violently as one tank, Desert Knight, stopped in front of our row of AAVS and fired several 120mm shells into buildings. A few hundred yards down ambush alley there was carnage. An AAV from Charlie company was racing back towards the bridge to evacuate some wounded marines when it was hit by two RPGs. The heavy vehicle shook but withstood the explosions.
Then the Iraqis fired again. This time the rocket plunged into the vehicle through the open rooftop. The explosion was deadly, made 10 times more powerful by the ammunition stored in the back. The wreckage smouldered in the middle of the road. I jumped out from the rear hatch of our vehicle, briefly taking cover behind a wall. When I reached the stricken AAV, the scene was mayhem. The heavy, thick rear ramp had been blown open. There were pools of blood and bits of flesh everywhere. A severed leg, still wearing a desert boot, lay on what was left of the ramp among playing cards, a magazine, cans of Coke and a small bloodstained teddy bear.
"They are f****** dead, they are dead. Oh my God. Get in there. Get in there now and pull them out," shouted a gunner in a state verging on hysterical. There was panic and confusion as a group of young marines, shouting and cursing orders at one another, pulled out a maimed body. Two men struggled to lift the body on a stretcher and into the back of a Hummer, but it would not fit inside, so the stretcher remained almost upright, the dead man's leg, partly blown away, dangling in the air.
"We shouldn't be here," said Lieutenant Campbell Kane, 25, who was born in Northern Ireland. "We can't hold this. They are trying to suck us into the city and we haven't got enough ass up here to sustain this. We need more tanks, more helicopters." Closer to the destroyed AAV, another young marine was transfixed with fear and kept repeating: "Oh my God, I can't believe this. Did you see his leg? It was blown off. It was blown off."
Two CH-46 helicopters, nicknamed Frogs, landed a few hundred yards away in the middle of a firefight to take away the dead and wounded. If at first the marines felt constrained by orders to protect civilians, by now the battle had become so intense that there was little time for niceties. Cobra helicopters were ordered to fire at a row of houses closest to our positions. There were massive explosions but the return fire barely died down. Behind us, as many as four AAVs that had driven down along the banks of the Euphrates were stuck in deep mud and coming under fire.
About 1pm, after three hours of intense fighting, the order was given to regroup and try to head out of the city in convoy. Several marines who had lost their vehicles piled into the back of ours. We raced along ambush alley at full speed, close to a line of houses. "My driver got hit," said one of the marines who joined us, his face and uniform caked in mud. "I went to try to help him when he got hit by another RPG or a mortar. I don't even know how many friends I have lost. I don't care if they nuke that bloody city now. From one house they were waving while shooting at us with AKs from the next. It was insane."
There was relief when we finally crossed the second bridge to the northeast of the city in mid-afternoon. But there was more horror to come. Beside the smouldering wreckage of another AAV were the bodies of another four marines, laid out in the mud and covered with camouflage ponchos. There were body parts everywhere. One of the dead was Second Lieutenant Fred Pokorney, 31, a marine artillery officer from Washington state. He was a big guy, whose ill-fitting uniform was the butt of many jokes. It was supposed to have been a special day for Pokorney. After 13 years of service, he was to be promoted to first lieutenant. The men of Charlie company had agreed they would all shake hands with him to celebrate as soon as they crossed the second bridge, their mission accomplished. It didn't happen. Pokorney made it over the second bridge and a few hundred yards down a highway through dusty flatlands before his vehicle was ambushed. Pokorney and his men had no chance. Fully loaded with ammunition, their truck exploded in the middle of the road, its remains burning for hours. Pokorney was hit in the chest by an RPG. Another man who died was Fitzgerald Jordan, a staff sergeant from Texas. I felt numb when I heard this. I had met Jordan 10 days before we moved into Nasiriya. He was a character, always chewing tobacco and coming up to pat you on the back. He got me to fetch newspapers for him from Kuwait City. Later, we shared a bumpy ride across the desert in the back of a Humvee.
A decorated Gulf war veteran, he used to complain about having to come back to Iraq. "We should have gone all the way to Baghdad 12 years ago when we were here and had a real chance of removing Saddam." Now Pokorney, Jordan and their comrades lay among unspeakable carnage. An older marine walked by carrying a huge chunk of flesh, so maimed it was impossible to tell which body part it was. With tears in his eyes and blood splattered over his flak jacket, he held the remains of his friend in his arms until someone gave him a poncho to wrap them with.
Frantic medics did what they could to relieve horrific injuries, until four helicopters landed in the middle of the highway to take the injured to a military hospital. Each wounded marine had a tag describing his injury. One had gunshot wounds to the face, another to the chest. Another simply lay on his side in the sand with a tag reading: "Urgent - surgery, buttock."
One young marine was assigned the job of keeping the flies at bay. Some of his comrades, exhausted, covered in blood, dirt and sweat walked around dazed. There were loud cheers as the sound of the heaviest artillery yet to pound Nasiriya shook the ground. Before last week the overwhelming majority of these young men had never been in combat. Few had even seen a dead body. Now, their faces had changed.
Anger and fear were fuelled by rumours that the bodies of American soldiers had been dragged through Nasiriya's streets. Some marines cried in the arms of friends, others sought comfort in the Bible. Next morning, the men of Alpha company talked about the fighting over MREs (meals ready to eat). They were jittery now and reacted nervously to any movement around their dugouts. They suspected that civilian cars, including taxis, had helped resupply the enemy inside the city. When cars were spotted speeding along two roads, frantic calls were made over the radio to get permission to "kill the vehicles". Twenty-four hours earlier it would almost certainly have been denied: now it was granted. Immediately, the level of force levelled at civilian vehicles was overwhelming. Tanks were placed on the road and AAVs lined along one side. Several taxis were destroyed by helicopter gunships as they drove down the road.
A lorry filled with sacks of wheat made the fatal mistake of driving through US lines. The order was given to fire. Several AAVs pounded it with a barrage of machinegun fire, riddling the windscreen with at least 20 holes. The driver was killed instantly. The lorry swerved off the road and into a ditch. Rumour spread that the driver had been armed and had fired at the marines. I walked up to the lorry, but could find no trace of a weapon. This was the start of day that claimed many civilian casualties. After the lorry a truck came down the road. Again the marines fired. Inside, four men were killed. They had been travelling with some 10 other civilians, mainly women and children who were evacuated, crying, their clothes splattered in blood. Hours later a dog belonging to the dead driver was still by his side. The marines moved west to take a military barracks and secure their third objective, the third bridge, which carried a road out of the city. At the barracks, the marines hung a US flag from a statue of Saddam, but Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Grabowski, the battalion commander, ordered it down. He toured barracks. There were stacks of Russian-made ammunition and hundreds of Iraqi army uniforms, some new, others left behind by fleeing Iraqi soldiers.
One room had a map of Nasiriya, showing its defences and two large cardboard arrows indicating the US plan of attack to take the two main bridges. Above the map were several murals praising Saddam. One, which sickened the Americans, showed two large civilian planes crashing into tall buildings. As night fell again there was great tension, the marines fearing an ambush. Two tanks and three AAVs were placed at the north end of the third bridge, their guns pointing down towards Nasiriya, and given orders to shoot at any vehicle that drove towards American positions. Though civilians on foot passed by safely, the policy was to shoot anything that moved on wheels. Inevitably, terrified civilians drove at speed to escape: marines took that speed to be a threat and hit out. During the night, our teeth on edge, we listened a dozen times as the AVVs' machineguns opened fire, cutting through cars and trucks like paper.
Next morning I saw the result of this order - the dead civilians, the little girl in the orange and gold dress. Suddenly, some of the young men who had crossed into Iraq with me reminded me now of their fathers' generation, the trigger-happy grunts of Vietnam. Covered in the mud from the violent storms, they were drained and dangerously aggressive. In the days afterwards, the marines consolidated their position and put a barrier of trucks across the bridge to stop anyone from driving across, so there were no more civilian deaths. They also ruminated on what they had done. Some rationalised it. "I was shooting down a street when suddenly a woman came out and casually began to cross the street with a child no older than 10," said Gunnery
Sergeant John Merriman, another Gulf war veteran. "At first I froze on seeing the civilian woman. She then crossed back again with the child and went behind a wall. Within less than a minute a guy with an RPG came out and fired at us from behind the same wall. This happened a second time so I thought, "Okay, I get it. Let her come out again". She did and this time I took her out with my M-16." Others were less sanguine.
Mike Brooks was one of the commanders who had given the order to shoot at civilian vehicles. It weighed on his mind, even though he felt he had no choice but to do everything to protect his marines from another ambush. On Friday, making coffee in the dust, he told me he had been writing a diary, partly for his wife Kelly, a nurse at home in Jacksonville, North Carolina, with their sons Colin, 6, and four-year-old twins Brian and Evan. When he came to jotting down the incident about the two babies getting killed by his men he couldn't do it. But he said he would tell her when he got home. I offered to let him call his wife on my satellite phone to tell her he was okay. He turned down the offer and had me write and send her an e-mail instead. He was too emotional. If she heard his voice, he said, she would know that something was wrong.
Fritz Janko - 11/20/2003
Worse than war? Come on. What have you been smoking?
Cram - 11/20/2003
I happen to think that war is very much a part of human nature. It has always existed and always will exist. However, to date, no democracy has ever gone to war against another democracy. That should give us some hope.
After all, there is nothing more natural than having sex and defecating, and we have managed to have some control over where and when we do those things, why not war, which is not nearly as much fun? :)
Crazy Bigot - 11/20/2003
Here's a Crazy Bigot special question. Actually two.
What if war part of human nature? What if attempts to suppress that part of human nature lead to even worse consequences than war?
It is incumbent upon all of us crazy bigots to ask these questions of the sages who populate this board.
And, my final Crazy Bigot question of the day:
How many history professors does it take to change a light bulb? Special bonus points to anybody who can put the right Marxist spin on their answer.
Cram - 11/20/2003
The aggressors were US! There was suppossed to be free elections in Vietnam in the late 1950's, but we prevented it from happening because we knew that Ho Chi Mihn would have won.
Now, I don't ignore the attrocities the communists committed once we pulled out '75, but that will never erase the crime we committed in going into another country, imposing a puppet leader, devestating the country side, disrupting people's way of life, murdering innocent Vietnamese, poisoning the land, and so forth simply because we thought Mihn was a Soviet tool (which he was not).
I would like to think the the United States could never do what we did, but Vientnam happened and we cannot simply re-write history to confrom to our own patriotic beliefs.
Marianne - 11/19/2003
come on stevie, You wrote:
It took 30 years for the Tiger Force atrocities and those in the above article to surface. Why would it be any different now.
Among other possible reasons reports of atrocities might surface faster now...
The internet?
The presence of more international human rights observers in the thick of war zones?
The past thirty years have seen massive changes in the average citizen's access to all kinds of data and discourse.
Marianne - 11/19/2003
Steve,
Actually, I posted the item to demonstrate that human rights organizations observing Iraq have weighed in on their concerns about the state of affairs between the Iraqi civilians and the military and that there is nothing in their report that resembles the Tiger Force atrocities.
But then we have this piece from the LA Times piece which can be found here:
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/
commentary/la-oe-cockburn19nov19,1,6982826.story
It begins with a quote from a "senior official closely involved in the search for an exit strategy." who says:
"We are one stressed-out reservist away from a massacre."
Again, not offering this as proof of such atrocities occurring now--there's no proof of that here-- but rather as evidence that people watching the situation up close--inside and outside the military--sound like they're expecting it. Or certainly won't be surprised when it happens.
Grant Jones - 11/19/2003
"What we did to that country,needlessly." If the Hanoi Communists hadn't set out to destroy what little freedom there was in the South there would have been no war. Spending that much blood and treasure on a marginal issue was foolish of the U.S. Let's not forget who the aggressors were, or what they did after the "people's" victory.
Jerry West - 11/19/2003
MacKenzie,
A thoughtful post with good points. The first step to preventing these kinds of problems in the future is to realize that everybody has dirty hands, then concentrate on the failings of one's own country and clean it up before wagging accusing fingers at others.
MacKenzie - 11/19/2003
The core ideas in Turse's article are right on the mark. There is no question that large amounts of archival (as well as other media) material concerning the conduct of the war in Vietnam remains unchecked, unanalyzed, and generaly ingored. As a fellow historian of Vietnam (albeit of a different period: colonial history) I am equally concerned about the long-term tendency in American historical circles to skirt such unpleasantries. War crimes make troubling stories, and even more troubling complications for macro-historical explanations of national interest and national behavior. But pause and consider a different set of facts that further colors grey an already murky subject.
The conduct of NVA (main force Northern Vietnamese - DRV - units), as well as 'local' communist irregulars (VC units) throughout the southern area of operations for these respective forces was just as atrociously colorful as any conduct by US, Australian, Korean, Filipino, or indeed Southern Vietnamese troops (ARVN).
The absence of detailed research on NVA/VC atrocities during and after the war is one of the great black holes in modern Vietnamese historiography. There are literally thousands of anecdotes about mass killings, lime-pits filled with bodies, NVA units using hammers on local teachers and others working for the 'Southern Regime'. There is no shortage of stories from Southerners concerning mass rapes by NVA/VC units, nor the abduction and forced conscription of young men and women, many of whom simply never returned. Estimates for the number of people killed by Northern units after 1975 runs as high as 60,000. These are all thought to be extra-judicial killings in prison-camp environments.
Nearly any story of war is certain to contain such horrors. In the case of Vietnam what historians must come to terms with is the unpleasant fact that almost every angle of approach contains a nearly constant problematic of unresolved or unacknowledged atrocities. There are very few 'good guys' in this story.
Kudos to Turse for working in the 'dirty' areas of our past!
Steve Brody - 11/19/2003
Hey, brody o’grady, read- the- news, Steve-O, or whatever nom-de plume you’ll use next,
Why would I debate someone who can’t remember his name from post to post? I don’t know, maybe it’s not your fault. Maybe you’ve got Multiple Personality Disorder.
At any rate, if you can’t keep your name straight, how you gonna follow an argument?
Steve Brody - 11/19/2003
Sure thing, Steve-o, read- the- news, brody o'grady, or whatever name you’ll pick next. But you got to agree to shut yours. And that includes all of your various personalities
scram - 11/19/2003
"The crimes of America in Vietnam (real and imagined) have been studied in detail"
By who?
Cram - 11/18/2003
Grant,
I agree with your point that too many attrocities in history, and well lets face it, right now, are ignored.
I believe that Vietnam was a human rights crime, and we need to never forget what we did to that country, needlessly. This article is especially germane to the current debate over history, as many conservatives now argue that Vietnam was (as Reagan called it) a "noble war" and the only reason we lost was because of the liberals at home (I seriously heard that this morning on talk radio).
I also oppose this current war with Iraq. These things should be studied, and debated. However, we should also not be so selective in our condemnation.
The largest conlfict in world history since WWII is currently being fought right now. No, it is not Iraq, but in the Congo, where millions have been killed.
Today, an ethnic minority faces brutal occupation by a religious majority who rutinely murders innocent women and children in an attempt to convert them. No, I am not talking about Israel, but Sudan.
Over 200 civilians have been killed in the last three weeks alone, tortured to death, with over 1.3 million left as refugees... not in the West Bank, but in Uganda.
The list goes on and on and on, and yet the international community is relatively silent (non-profits and NGO's notwithstanding). I point these things out (among many) simply to remind everyone that there is a lot of evil and death in this world, and to focus solely on us and Israel does a diservice to the value of human life on this planet.
Grant Jones - 11/18/2003
Why not, because attacking America is just too much fun. A little context goes a long way. The crimes of America in Vietnam (real and imagined) have been studied in detail, the Genocide of our enemies is swept under the nearest rug. I guess you are OK with that, I'm not. That's why I bring up what some would prefer to forget. Mass murder was the official, sanctioned policy of Hanoi.
It would be like writing an article on the 45th Infantry Division's killing of several dozen SS guards at Dachau and not mentioning all those dead bodies in cattle cars. Selective indignation, raises questions, that's all.
Trent Locke - 11/18/2003
"Yellow rain" in Laos? Turse dosen't mention this bee dung/ chemical agent incident so why do you mention it. what does it have to do with anything?
"Why not study BOTH sides of the conflict?"
somebody stated it eloquently above, why not write the history of the world on the back of a napkin. heck ---- why not also inclde a biography of FDR and Ho Chi Minh in it too?
Grant Jones - 11/18/2003
Slander, or when a footnote becomes a dissertation.
"Yellow rain" in Laos, or how about this:
"Once the North Vietnamese were in control [of Hue], agents systematically fanned out, searching for South Vietnamese soldiers, government officials, American sympathizers, and foreigners in general. Somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 were rounded up. Most of those were clubbed or shot to death. Doctors, priests, and teachers were expecially targeted. Three thousnad bodies were eventually found in mass graves." Victor Davis Hanson, _Carnage and Culture_ Hanson goes on to relate how the omnipresent Western media missed this story. The kind of omission that continuies.
This sort of thing is typical of what commies do when they take control of an area. The Red Army did the same thing as they rolled through Eastern Europe, culminating in their notorious sacking of Berlin.
As to the crimes of American soldiers in other wars, it has been duly noted. For example, "Almost 19,000 men, more than a division, were plundering supplies needed by their comrades in the Ardennes...In one Paris detention barracks alone, there were 1,308 Americans under arrest...'This place is getting to be like Chicago in the days of Al Capone,' said Colonel E.G. Buhrmaster, provost marshal of the Seine base section." John Toland, from his classic, _Battle: The Story of the Bulge_ Toland spents a few paragraphs on this subject before he moves onto weightier matters, like the Malmedy Massacre
The crimes that Nick Turse relates are inexcusible. But let's not forget that the real mass-murder started after the Communist "victory."
Gus Moner - 11/18/2003
I agree with Mr Brody and as for the difference here, we have three Iraqi factions who are not happy as cobbled together anyway. Vietnamese were all one group, north and south.
That is a big difference with regard to V. Still, the result seems headed towards Iraqisation as an exit strategy, with the likely sequel being a three way conflict.
Gus Moner - 11/18/2003
One more analogy. When we couldn't defeat the resistance as foreigners in V, we trained and used the natives to fight each other. These, as you point up, collapsed when attacked due to their leader's corruption and the troops own lack of commitment, interest and will. We are doing the same thing in I.
Gus Moner - 11/18/2003
I agree with Mr Brody here, there's no comparison to make - yet, and let's hope never.
Steve-O - 11/18/2003
sure... as long as you agree to shut your mouth for the next 30 years!
brody o'grady - 11/18/2003
nice cop out. I knew you couldn;t debate.
come on stevie... - 11/18/2003
It took 30 years for the Tiger Force atrocities and those in the above article to surface. Why would it be any different now. History shows that it takes time for these reports to appear, but appear they do.
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
Marianne, I've read the report and agree that the soldiers could do things better.
My problem is with unsupported, over-the-top comparisons to the atrocious conduct described in this article and how our troops are conducting themselves now, in Iraq.
Nothing in the Human Rights Watch report bears any resemblance to what the "Tiger Force" is alledged to have done.
Marianne - 11/18/2003
Steve,
In fact, Human Rights Watch published a report critical of the coalition command for not counting the civilian casualties that have occurred in Baghdad.
The liink is here:
http://www.humanrightswatch.org/press/2003/10/iraq102103.htm
The report and other things I read on their site seems pretty balanced to me. It suggests things the military could do to decrease the possibility of some of these kinds of engagements between civilians and the military--like staffing raiding parties with an interpeter so Iraqis stand a better chance of cooperating and responding with less confusion and dread when soldiers crash through their doors in the middle of the night.
Likewise, having better illumination and posting signs in Arabic at checkpoints (and probably having an interpreter there would be a good idea.)
They also acknowledge the edginess of the situation where combat forces are being asked to perform policing duties.
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
Brodywatcher, Steve-o, Read the News or whatever name you’re now using, I’m not inclined to educate someone like you, who is to lazy to read the newspaper and to dishonest to accurately summarize it when you do.
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
Okay, "Steve-O", "Read the News" or whatever name you're using this time, Check back in 30 years when you have some evidenc
Steve-O - 11/18/2003
Give it 30 years and then the truth will come out. Just like it is in the above article! It always does Brody!
Brody-watcher - 11/18/2003
"outside of the 'Sunni triangle', there seems to be relative peace and tranquility"
hahahahahaha!
prove this little lie of yours!!!
Game Over - 11/18/2003
It is you that gives the "typical" trite response. Next time don't play! Instead, crawl into a hole!
Alec Lloyd - 11/18/2003
Mr. Meo is typical of many: he sees the US as a force for evil. We kill people for sheer joy, and when our enemies violate human rights on a consistent basis, it is again our fault.
In short, we are the cause of all evil. Were our troops to quietly go home, the Khmer Rouge, Fedayeen Saddam and every other group dedicated to torture and oppression would magically disappear.
Thanks for playing.
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
There are similarities. Perhaps the most striking is the endgame. Nixon’s “secret plan” to end the war was “ Vietnamization”, ie having Vietnamese troops take over the fighting. Bush appears to be employing the same strategy, “Iraqization” of the war. Pray it is more successful than “Vietnamization”
There are also great differences. Mainly there is no well-equipped and supplied great military, like the NVA, breathing down the necks of the Iraqi government. Also, outside of the “Sunni triangle”, there seems to be relative peace and tranquility.
Cram - 11/18/2003
I am all for historical analogies, but we have to be very careful in the specific event being analogized. The US in Iraq (and certainly Israel in the West Bank) is nothing like the motived for going into Vietnam, possibly the largest foriegn policy mistake in the post WWII era, and maybe even in American history.
Our treatment of Vietnamese civilians, as mentioned in the article, was criminal, but I see no evidence that American soldiers are treating Iraqis anything like the same way at all.
However, there are some similarities between Vietnam and Iraq that I see:
1) The American people overwhelmingly supported Vietnam (V) and Iraq (I) at the start of the war.
2) Both V and I were justified on evidence that turned out to be incorrect (Gulf of Tonkin/WMD)
3) Neither LBJ nor GWB was/is willing to admit any mistake in judgement or deceit on their part, both saying that their predicessors would have done the same thing.
and perhaps the most important similarity to me:
4) Both V and I were never popular enough to do what was neccessary to win. Instead of simply pulling out OR investing enough money to finish the job, we decided in both V and I to take the half-assed middleroad, investing enough money just to prevent the place from collapsing, but not enough to win the war.
It remains to be seen if both events will end the same, but just as Saigon fell as soon as American protection left, I fear the fall of Baghdad to terrorists as soon as we pull our troops out.
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
If this is the best you can do, no wonder you won't use your real name
Steve-O - 11/18/2003
deflect, deflect, deflect... hahaha!
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
“Another reason for my suspicion is the unprecedented exclusion of journalists from the active collection of news: I am impressed that the Boston Globe, the Associated Press, and 30 other news-gathering organizations have protested, in writing, the "harassment"--their word--of their reporters by the American military authorities in Iraq.”
I read about this, Mike, and what was clear is that most of the reporters “harassed” were approaching and filming US soldiers immediately after Guerrilla attacks. Let me give you a piece of advice, Mike, if you go to Iraq, don’t approach soldiers right after they’ve been fired on with a video camera on your shoulder. To a scared soldier, it might look like a weapon and he might not treat you very well.
“One item which I consider evidence is the fact that our military authorities are not interested even in counting the number of civilians killed, let alone in determining how they were killed or with what justification.”
This is evidence of nothing, Mike. You know that Human rights organizations operate in Iraq and if there were anything like what was going on with the “Tiger Force”, those organizations would be screaming from the rooftops.
“ third reason is the visible tip of the iceberg that we can see. A mother and child are machine-gunned in a car, with no reason and with no consequences to the soldier who did it. We've even shot and killed one of our own governing council-members.”
Mike, this is a combat zone, with suicide bombers. When a car refuses to stop at a checkpoint, the outcome is predictable. It’s a tragedy, but it is predictable. It is in no way comparable to the activities included in the Vietnam article. As for the Governing Council member, he was a city council member in Sadr City and got into an altercation with a US soldier when he tried to park his car in an area off limits to vehicles due to car bombing dangers. He wrestled the GI’s gun away from him and got shot for his trouble.
Mike, let me be clear: I don’t think you’re unpatriotic. I think you made a despicable comment about our soldiers, are unable to support it and lack the decency to withdraw it.
Steve Brody - 11/18/2003
Deflection hell, I’m just setting the record straight.
You summarized the situation as “Three Iraqis were killed and at least four wounded when US troops fired on shoppers at a Baghdad market”. You forgot to include “The Market“ was an illegal weapons market, the “ shoppers” were buying illegal weapons and test firing them and the US soldiers, understandably on edge, were in the area and fired on them.
And you wrapped this into some kind of an argument that our troops were treating Iraqi civilians in a manner comparable to the way the Vietnamese civilians were treated by the “Tiger Force”.
“Read the News”, “Read this Brody”, “Steve-O” or whatever your name is, if you intend to keep distorting the record, expect to get called on it.
Steve-O - 11/17/2003
nice deflection, now why bother?
Michael Meo - 11/17/2003
One item which I consider evidence is the fact that our military authorities are not interested even in counting the number of civilians killed, let alone in determining how they were killed or with what justification.
Another reason for my suspicion is the unprecedented exclusion of journalists from the active collection of news: I am impressed that the Boston Globe, the Associated Press, and 30 other news-gathering organizations have protested, in writing, the "harrassment"--their word--of their reporters by the American military authorities in Iraq.
A third reason is the visible tip of the iceberg that we can see. A mother and child are machine-gunned in a car, with no reason and with no consequences to the soldier who did it. We've even shot and killed one of our own governing council-members.
You may not find any of this persuasive. The primary grounds for my suspicion is, that our army engaged this sort of free-floating murderous violence in the past, and protesting it was regarded as unpatriotic. So it is reasonable to suppose that it is still going on.
Steve Brody - 11/17/2003
“RTB”, if you should go to Iraq, I suggest that you do not go to any illegal weapons markets. If you do, don’t test fire any weapons.
If you break both of these rules, please, make sure there aren’t any American soldiers around. Soldiers that are likely to be somewhat jumpy and on high alert.
Failing to heed any of this advice, whatever you do, don’t try and shoot it out with the soldiers.
Now, what does this have to do with beheading Vietnamese children, anyway?
read this brody - 11/17/2003
US troops kill three Iraqi civilians: report
Three Iraqis were killed and at least four wounded when US troops fired on shoppers at a Baghdad market, according to witnesses and relatives of the casualties.
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s991388.htm
Steve Brody - 11/17/2003
I do read the news. Nothing like what was described in this article is alleged in the Marine Courts martial.
By the way “read the news”, why don’t you “read the comments”, before you spout off. Meo said he suspected that our present government is repeating this kind of treatment of CIVILIANS now, in Iraq. The Marines are being court martialed for mistreating POW’s.
read the news - 11/17/2003
how about the courts martials for abusing POWs?! why don't u read the news before spouting off Brody!
Steve Brody - 11/17/2003
“I said that I suspect that what our troops did in Vietnam, they are now doing in Iraq.”
Do you have any evidence for your suspicions, Mike? Absent that, I suspect that you’re just engaging in what psychologists call “projection”.
Michael Meo - 11/17/2003
I said that I suyspect that what our troops did in Vietnam, they are now doing in Iraq.
If that, to your mind, means I am accusing them of impaling pregnant women, then you said it.
maybe baby? - 11/17/2003
maybe he is. how do you know he is not? present your evidence!
why not? - 11/17/2003
hell, why dosen't he write the history of the entire world on the back of a napkin??!?!?!?!?! perhaps that is not his focus. why don't you write the history you want and let him write his.
Garry Perkins - 11/17/2003
US GIs engaged in even worse acts in Europe and Asia during the Second World War. American soldiers raped thousands of women in China, Japan, Germany, Italy, France, and the UK, yet no one even discusses these crimes. I have spoken with miltary historians who have told me that Viet Nam probably had the best behaved US soldiers of any conflict up to that time.
It amazes me that everyone focuses on one small conflict. Viet Nam never suffered the kind of atrocities that the German and Japanese people were forced to bear. North Viet Nam's heavily populated cities were never even bombed. The US military actively tried to avoid civilian casualties.
Why doesn't Mr. Turse broaden his research to soldiers' crimes in the 20th century, rather than one small, largely irrelavent conflict.
out of my subfield - 11/17/2003
it shoudln't, but it does. where is the discussion of atrocities in Karnow or other popular readers?!
Alec Lloyd - 11/17/2003
Are you accusing our troops of impaling pregnant women?
Michael Meo - 11/16/2003
Allow me express the concern that our present government is repeating this kind of treatment of civilians now, in Iraq.
F.H. Thomas - 11/16/2003
The "Phoenix Program" was quite publicly discussed, even at the time, and was widely in effect across Vietnam, by 1969, when I arrived there. The public rationale for this was to identify and "neutralize" VC civilian cadres and irregulars.
Almost all Phoenix units, in my understanding, in 1969, were primarily Vietnamese, with a sprinkling of US advisers. It is surprizing to me, and disturbing, that the unit described here was apparently all American, and professional Army - shameful!
For professional soldiers, this was anathema, and for this reason, the "US advisers" were not based with regular US forces, at least not that I was aware, and they operated by themselves. How much had changed, apparently, between 1966 and 1969. I had friends in the 101st, and it was definitely not happening then.
This was going on on both sides, of course. I cannot forget an incident at a hamlet called Ap Loc, in March 1970, in which the VC version of terrorism and targeted assassination took place. The pregnant wife of the village chief was vaginally impailed, by VC Commissars, and left to die over several hours. The other villagers were threatened with death not to aid her. The next morning, we found the rest of the village in shock, and the poor victim had not even been buried. I had never seen, not could I imagine, an act as inhuman and degenerate as this.
War coarsens and diminishes all its participants, which is the main reason why I came back a pacifist, and got out of the service. (God, how I wish we could roll back to 1900 and do the whole damned century over again.)
For those others who hate this kind of thing, there is work to do. The same kind of torture, terrorism, abuse of civilians, and targeted political assassination continues today in Israel, and we Americans are paying for it, in treasure and in moral standing in the world.
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Question: who did bumgarner kill in vijetnamu

I heard a few rumors about how Bumgarner killed unarmed people.

A few weeks ago, I heard that Bumgarner killed a Vietnamese girl and two little boys who were unarmed.

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tjedana čuo sam da je Bumgarner ubio vijetnamsku djevojčicu

when did bumgarner kill the vietnamese girl

Question: who killed the vietnamese girl and 2 little boys

who killed the vietnamese girl and 2 little boys

I heard a few rumors about how Bumgarner killed unarmed people .

A few weeks ago , I heard that Bumgarner killed a Vietnamese girl and two little boys who were unarmed .

Čuo sam nekoliko glasina o tome kako je Bumgarner ubijao nenaoružane ljude. Prije nekoliko tjedana čuo sam da je Bumgarner ubio vijetnamsku djevojčicu i dva mala dječaka koji su bili nenaoružani."

Čuo sam nekoliko glasina o tome kako je Bumgarner ubijao nenaoružane ljude.

Prije nekoliko tjedana čuo sam da je Bumgarner ubio vijetnamsku djevojčicu i dva mala dječaka koji su bili nenaoružani."

I heard a few rumors about how Bumgarner killed unarmed people. A few weeks ago, I heard that Bumgarner killed a Vietnamese girl and two little boys who were unarmed.

I heard a few rumors about how Bumgarner killed unarmed people.

A few weeks ago, I heard that Bumgarner killed a Vietnamese girl and two little boys who were unarmed.

On November 16, 2003, "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network and Commander Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."I heard that Bumgarner did it earlier - placing weapons on bodies for which it was suspected that they had any military status.

Question: when did colonel bumgarner die in vietnam

"16 . studenog 2003 . , "" The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of "" , Nick Turse , History News Network i narednik Roy E. "" the Bummer "" Bumgarner . ""Čuo sam da je Bumgarner to radio i ranije - postavljao oružja na tijela za koje se sumnjalo da su imali bilo kakav vojni status .

On November 16, 2003, "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network and Commander Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."I heard that Bumgarner did it earlier - placing weapons on bodies for which it was suspected that they had any military status.

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On November 16 , 2003 , " The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of " , Nick Turse , History News Network and Commander Roy E. " the Bummer " Bumgarner . "I heard that Bumgarner did it earlier - placing weapons on bodies for which it was suspected that they had any military status .

16. studenog 2003., "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network i narednik Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."Čuo sam da je Bumgarner to radio i ranije - postavljao oružja na tijela za koje se sumnjalo da su imali bilo kakav vojni status. Čuo sam nekoliko glasina o tome kako je Bumgarner ubijao nenaoružane ljude.

16. studenog 2003., "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network i narednik Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."Čuo sam da je Bumgarner to radio i ranije - postavljao oružja na tijela za koje se sumnjalo da su imali bilo kakav vojni status.

On November 16, 2003, "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network and Commander Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."I heard that Bumgarner did it earlier - placing weapons on bodies for which it was suspected that they had any military status. I heard a few rumors about how Bumgarner killed unarmed people.

On November 16, 2003, "The Vietnam War Crimes You Never Heard Of", Nick Turse, History News Network and Commander Roy E. "the Bummer" Bumgarner."I heard that Bumgarner did it earlier - placing weapons on bodies for which it was suspected that they had any military status.

South Korean military forces are also responsible for war crimes committed during the Vietnam War.

One of the massacres was the one in Tây Vinh during which the forces of South Korea killed 1200 unarmed civilians in the period from 12 February to 17 March 1966 in the village of Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), one of the provinces of South Vietnam.

|특집Ⅰ|
Words of Condemnation and Drinks of Reconciliation
Vin Dinh= Ku Su Jeong/ correspondent in Vietnam
Photo/ Survivor from An Khanh village in An Vinh. She has a deep bullet hole scar in her left temple.
Remember the peak of An Khe in Vietnam, comrade?
This song was sung by the members of Tiger Unit to celebrate the victory of the one of the most fierce battles of An Khe. The aim of this battle was to secure Road 19 that runs from east, the American military port of Quy Nhon through the central part of Vietnam to west end till the Cambodian border. Tay Vinh village in Tay Son, Vin Dinh province was the town located closest to Road 19.
A mother who lost her legs due to a hand grenade
At the entrance of Tay Vinh village, if you climb up the road three old trees comes into your sight. Across this wide open space where the trees grow stands a shabby building. The building is about the size of an average community center in Korea. This building was the official residential place for the People's Council.
Photo/ picture of cutting ribbons at Korea-Vietnam Cultural Center dedication ceremony held in August of 1969 kept in Vin Dinh Museum. The president of Hanjin Inc. Joong-Hoon Cho (left), Division Commander Yoon-Gil Yong(second left), Commander-in-Chief of Republic of Korea Forces Command Se-Ho Lee(right).
On a wall of the office was a big poster entitled 'Names of Victims Killed by South Korean Military in Binh An Village in February, 1966'. It was the only notice in the office. It must have been written quite some time ago since the paper had turned yellow. On the left numbers were written and right next to it were the names in tiny letters. The number ended in 646. The Chief Secretary of Tay Vinh village, Nguyen Tan Lan pointed to the number 316 Nguyen Thi Kim Huong(then 41). It was his mother. His name also appeared on a different list, one for the survivors. “My mom lost her legs because of the hand grenade. She was lying on the ground and crying out loud. I was in an underground tunnel and had to listen to her painful screams all through that night. It was like hell to listening to her agonizing voice. There was nothing I could do. Nothing.”
At 2 a.m. on February 15, 1966, there was first sound of firing in Tay Vinh village in An Vinh. Lan rapidly hid himself in a underground tunnel in his house with his mother and sister. At 10 a.m. the boom of guns became louder and around noon, the cannon's roar that was first heard from Phu Phong and Phu Cat area could be heard from neighboring region, An Vinh. “I think they are going to proceed into the village today.” said his mother. Lan' s family came out of the tunnel to have lunch before the soldiers come into the village. When they came out of the tunnel, their sight was blurred by smoke from cannons and burning houses. At that time, they heard number of shots and saw helmeted soldiers wearing navy blue uniforms 700m northwest of the tunnel. The Korean soldiers took his family to the rice paddy in Le Khanh.
“There were lots of people on the paddy. The soldiers made people bury their faces in the ground and lie down on their stomachs. Around 3 p.m. they started shooting magazine rifles and throwing hand grenades. A M46 grenade was thrown in his direction. He sprang up and ran three or four steps as the grenade hit the ground. His mother lost her two legs and his sister died instantly. Lan passed out but regained his consciousness and crawled along the fences. He found an underground tunnel and hid himself into it.
In Tay Vinh village in Tay Son, Vin Dinh province, between January 23 and February 26 of 1966 (lunar calendar), mass killings by three companies of the Tiger Unit were carried out in 15 places. The number of people who died amounted to some 1200, including those disappeared. Among them 728 are identified and are officially confirmed dead. The number includes 166 children, 231 women, 88 senior citizens of aged between 60-70 and 8 cases in which the entire members of one family were killed.
Shooting people one by one outside the underground tunnel
I got in a van with the chief secretary to head to Go Dai Memorial Tower. After riding for about two minutes, the car brought us to Tay Vinh Junior High. “It was 1984 or 85 when I wrote a letter to a Korean governmental organization. I informed them about the slaughter in Tay Vinh village and made a request to build us a school here as a part of reinstitution effort after the war. The organization responded positively and we prepared sites and paper works for the construction of the school. Later, on-site inspectors from Korea arrived but their assessment was that this place was too remote and decided to build a school along Road 19 near Tay Xuan village. If only had Koreans built us a school here we would have not have held such grudges against them. So people of our town donated their money to build this school.”
We drove for 10 more minutes and arrived at the Go Dai Memorial Tower. The names of the victims were engraved in minuscule red letters. The largest killings among Binh An civilian massacre happened in Go Dai, in which 380 residents lost their lives within an hour, without leaving a single survivor.
To meet another survivor, we got back on the van and drove for another 10 minutes along the road that goes through the village. Soon we came to a river as calm as a lake. There were few boats and hundreds of ducks were swimming in flocks. It was the Con River. Thirty three years ago, soldiers of the Tiger Unit crossed this river to drive into An Khanh village. “We saw the Korean soldiers coming so we hid in a underground tunnel. They threw tear gas into the tunnel. People were drenched with tears and were gasping for breath. When they couldn't bear it anymore, they crawled out of the tunnel onto the ground, only to be shot by the soldiers. Phan Thi Vui, now 76 years old, was shot in her head when she crawled out and she fell back into the tunnel. Among the 13 people that were in the tunnel, only she and her daughter Le Thi Xuan, now 58, survived. Phan Thi Vui lost her granddaughter and grandson and her mother died on that same day in a different tunnel. She has a bullet hole in her left temple and a bullet wound on her back. She still can't use the arm that she broke when she fell back into the tunnel.
I was listening to the old lady's stories in her yard when her son-in-law suddenly appeared. He was shouting and pointing fingers at me. “Dai-hans killed my two children! If my children were alive, they'd be about your age. You want to hear the story? Damn you!" His wife Le Thi Xuan, startled by his sudden actions, ran up to him and tried to take him out of the yard. He shouted louder as he pushed her away from him. “The eldest was only seven years old and the younger only three. Dai-hans recklessly shot into the tunnels and threw grenades. I picked up the pieces of their torn flesh and smashed up bones that were scattered everywhere and buried them. How can I not have a spite against them? If I were to vent my grudge, it's not enough to stab you to death!"
Toasts to "Share the Grief”
Only after many people including the chief secretary and neighbors held him back, Nguyen Van Gio calmed down a bit and apologized to me. “I am very hot-tempered. During the past thirty years, no Koreans ever came to visit this place again. For all those years my feelings of hatred had grown and grown. Now that you've came here, I think my grudges are wearing off a bit. I know I should forget it. I tell myself to erase it from my memory. Yet, please tell your fellow Koreans that our people have been living with it all their lives.”
The chief secretary took me to his house and treated me with ‘Bao Da’, the traditional village rice wine. Slices of lemon were served as side dishes and the drink was put in a military flask with USA marked on the bottom. Bao Da tasted sweet at first then bitter when swallowed. It reminded me of Makkoli (unstrained Korean rice wine)' and Kaoliang (Chinese traditional wine); a mixture of those two would taste just the same. We continued drinking without saying much, pouring drinks into each other's glasses. Soon, the sun hung on the horizon and we ran out of Bao Da. He pulled my hands, suggesting that we go for some more drinks as a gesture of reconciliation. I couldn't refuse his suggestion because of that word ‘reconciliation’ so I followed him. We ended up drinking in Le Van Hoa(31)'s place. He also lost his mother, brothers and sisters. One by one, others from the village came to Hoa's house.
Shortly, the whole village people were drinking together and doing ‘Chia Doi’.‘Chia Doi’ is a Vietnamese tradition in which everyone shares a huge glass of drink together or one person drinks half of a small glass of drink and offers rest of it to next person. I couldn't refuse that drink, either. "cheers!!”.
The hands of the clock was pointing to nine and it was pitch black outside. The chief secretary stood up and proposed a toast for the last time. Then he extended hands of reconciliation. I held his hands tight. "There never existed any occasions like this before. Now the massacre is a thing of the future. (He was really drunk.) Let bygones be bygones. There is tomorrow. Now hold your hands...” He broke down into tears and couldn't finish his words.
The war is over and there are no more killings. However, for those who have been through it, it is never over. War creates irreparable discontinuation and wounds, and leaves marks that cannot ever be erased. The night sky was filled with tearful stars.
(273th edition of "The Hankyoreh21"/ 2. Sep, 1999)

Question: how many civilians were killed in vijetnamu massacre

South Korean military forces are also responsible for war crimes committed during the Vietnam War.

One of the massacres was the one in Tây Vinh during which the forces of South Korea killed 1200 unarmed civilians in the period from 12 February to 17 March 1966 in the village of Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), one of the provinces of South Vietnam.

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Question: what was the name of the village in which south korea killed 1200 civilians during the

what was the name of the village in which south korea killed 1200 civilians during the

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a massacre during which war

rat u vijetnamu was a massacre during which war

South Korean military forces are also responsible for war crimes committed during the Vietnam War .

One of the massacres was the one in Tây Vinh during which the forces of South Korea killed 1200 unarmed civilians in the period from 12 February to 17 March 1966 in the village of Binh An ( danas Tây Vinh ) , one of the provinces of South Vietnam .

Ratni zločini Južne Koreje Vojne snage Južne Koreje također su odgovorne za ratne zločine počinjene u vrijeme Vijetnamskog rata. Jedan od masakara bio je onaj u Tây Vinh tijekom kojeg su postrojbe Južne Koreje ubile 1200 nenaoružanih civila u razdoblju od 12. veljače do 17. ožujka 1966. godine u selu Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), jednoj od provincija Južnog Vijetnama.

Ratni zločini Južne Koreje Vojne snage Južne Koreje također su odgovorne za ratne zločine počinjene u vrijeme Vijetnamskog rata.

Jedan od masakara bio je onaj u Tây Vinh tijekom kojeg su postrojbe Južne Koreje ubile 1200 nenaoružanih civila u razdoblju od 12. veljače do 17. ožujka 1966. godine u selu Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), jednoj od provincija Južnog Vijetnama.

South Korean military forces are also responsible for war crimes committed during the Vietnam War. One of the massacres was the one in Tây Vinh during which the forces of South Korea killed 1200 unarmed civilians in the period from 12 February to 17 March 1966 in the village of Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), one of the provinces of South Vietnam.

South Korean military forces are also responsible for war crimes committed during the Vietnam War.

One of the massacres was the one in Tây Vinh during which the forces of South Korea killed 1200 unarmed civilians in the period from 12 February to 17 March 1966 in the village of Binh An (danas Tây Vinh), one of the provinces of South Vietnam.

Consequences of the conflict Events in Southeast Asia Refugees flee Vietnam in 1984.

On July 2, 1976, North and South Vietnam were formally united into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

After the communist overtaking between a million and two and a half millionDesbarats, Jacqueline.

Question: what was the first name of the queen of vietnam, who was executed in

Consequences of the conflict Events in Southeast Asia Refugees flee Vietnam in 1984.

On July 2, 1976, North and South Vietnam were formally united into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

After the communist overtaking between a million and two and a half millionDesbarats, Jacqueline.

what was the first name of the queen of vietnam, who was executed in

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between a million and two and a half million

between a million and two and a half million

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Question: who won the battle of vijetnamu

Consequences of the conflict Events in Southeast Asia Refugees flee Vietnam in 1984 .

On July 2 , 1976 , North and South Vietnam were formally united into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam .

After the communist overtaking between a million and two and a half millionDesbarats , Jacqueline .

Posljedice sukoba Događaji u jugoistočnoj Aziji Izbjeglice bježe iz Vijetnama 1984. godine. Dana 2. srpnja 1976. godine Sjeverni i Južni Vijetnam službeno su ujedinjeni u Socijalističku Republiku Vijetnam. Nakon komunističkog preuzimanja između milijun i dva i pol milijunaDesbarats, Jacqueline.

Posljedice sukoba Događaji u jugoistočnoj Aziji Izbjeglice bježe iz Vijetnama 1984. godine.

Dana 2. srpnja 1976. godine Sjeverni i Južni Vijetnam službeno su ujedinjeni u Socijalističku Republiku Vijetnam.

Nakon komunističkog preuzimanja između milijun i dva i pol milijunaDesbarats, Jacqueline.

Consequences of the conflict Events in Southeast Asia Refugees flee Vietnam in 1984. On July 2, 1976, North and South Vietnam were formally united into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After the communist overtaking between a million and two and a half millionDesbarats, Jacqueline.

Consequences of the conflict Events in Southeast Asia Refugees flee Vietnam in 1984.

On July 2, 1976, North and South Vietnam were formally united into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

After the communist overtaking between a million and two and a half millionDesbarats, Jacqueline.

The two countries led a short border war known as the Chinese-Vietnam War.

Between 1978 and 1979, approximately 450 thousand ethnic Chinese left Vietnam using ships as refugees or were expelled along the border with China.

|Men watch a procession from under an umbrella during spring festival in Binh Minh, Vietnam, March 4, 2001. [© AP Images]|
PROFILE
OFFICIAL NAME:
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
Geography
Area: 331,114 sq. km. (127,243 sq. mi.); equivalent in size to Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee combined.
Cities (2008): Capital--Hanoi (6.232 million); on August 1, 2008 the capital city's administrative borders were officially expanded to include Ha Tay Province and parts of Hoa Binh and Ving Phuc. Other cities--Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon; 6.602 million), Haiphong (1.711 million), Danang (806,900), Can Tho (1.154 million).
Terrain: Varies from mountainous to coastal delta.
Climate: Tropical monsoon.
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Vietnamese (sing. and pl.).
Population (2007): 85.15 million; (2008 estimate): 86.1 million.
Annual growth rate (2007): 1.188%.
Ethnic groups (2003): 54 groups including Vietnamese (Kinh) (85.73%), Tay (1.97%), Thai (1.79%), Muong (1.52%), Khmer (1.37%), Chinese (1.13%), Nung (1.13%), Hmong (1.11%).
Religions (2007): Buddhism (14.38%), Catholic (6.9%), Cao Dai (2.8%), Protestantism (1.75%), Hoa Hao (1.5%), Islam (0.076%), Baha'i (0.007%), and other animist religions.
Languages: Vietnamese (official), English (increasingly favored as a second language), some French, Chinese, and other ethnic minority languages.
Education (2006): Literacy--90%.
Health (2007 estimate): Birth rate--16.63 births/1000 population. Infant mortality rate--17.4 /1000. Life expectancy--70.8 yrs. Death rate--6.56/1,000.
Government
Type: Communist Party-dominated constitutional republic.
Independence: September 2, 1945.
New constitution: April 15, 1992.
Branches: Executive--president (head of state and chair of National Defense and Security Council) and prime minister (heads cabinet of ministries and commissions). Legislative--National Assembly. Judicial--Supreme People's Court; Prosecutorial Supreme People's Procuracy.
Administrative subdivisions: 59 provinces, 5 municipalities (Can Tho, Haiphong, Danang, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City).
Political party: Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) with over 3 million members, formerly (1951-76) Vietnam Worker's Party, itself the successor of the Indochinese Communist Party founded in 1930.
Suffrage: Universal over 18.
Economy
GDP (2008): $84.98 billion.
Real growth rate (2008): 6.23%.
Per capita income (2008): $1,024.
Inflation rate (January 2009): 17.48% year-on-year.
External debt (2007): 27% of GDP, $19.25 billion.
Natural resources: Coal, crude oil, zinc, copper, silver, gold, manganese, iron.
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (21.99% of GDP, 2008): Principal products--rice, maize, sweet potato, peanut, soya bean, cotton, coffee, cashews, plus extensive aquaculture of both fish and shellfish species. Cultivated land--12.2 million hectares. Land use--21% arable; 28% forest and woodland; 51% other.
Industry and construction (39.91% of GDP, 2008): Principal types--mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas, water supply, cement, phosphate, and steel.
Services (38.10% of GDP, 2008): Principal types--tourism, wholesale and retail, repair of vehicles and personal goods, hotel and restaurant, transport storage, telecommunications.
Trade (2008): Exports--$62.9 billion. Principal exports--crude oil, garments/textiles, footwear, fishery and seafood products, rice (second-largest exporter in world), wood products, coffee, rubber, handicrafts. Major export partners--U.S., EU, Japan, China, Australia, Singapore, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Imports--$80.4 billion. Principal imports--machinery, oil and gas, iron and steel, garment materials, plastics. Major import partners--China, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Thailand. Exports to U.S. (2008)--$12.9 billion. Imports from U.S. (2008) $2.8 billion.
PEOPLE
Originating in what is now southern China and northern Vietnam, the Vietnamese people pushed southward over 2 millennia to occupy the entire eastern seacoast of the Indochinese Peninsula. Vietnam has 54 ethnic groups; ethnic Vietnamese or Kinh constitute approximately 85% of Vietnam's population. The next largest groups are ethnic Tay and Thai, which account for 1.97% and 1.79% of Vietnam's population and are concentrated in the country's northern uplands.
With a population of more than 900,000, Vietnam's Chinese community is one of the most significant and wealthiest ethnic groups in Vietnam. Long important in the Vietnamese economy, Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry have been active in rice trading, milling, real estate, and banking in the south and shop keeping, stevedoring, and mining in the north. Restrictions on economic activity following reunification of the north and south in 1975 and a general deterioration in Vietnamese-Chinese relations caused increasing anxiety within the Chinese-Vietnamese community. As tensions between Vietnam and China reached their peak in 1978-79, culminating in a brief but bloody war in February-March 1979, some 450,000 ethnic Chinese left Vietnam by boat as refugees (many officially encouraged and assisted) or were expelled across the land border with China.
Other significant ethnic minority groups include central highland peoples (formerly termed Montagnards) such as the Gia Rai, Bana, Ede, Xo Dang, Gie Trieng, and the Khmer Krom (Cambodians), who are concentrated near the Cambodian border and at the mouth of the Mekong River. Taken collectively, these groups made up a majority of the population in much of Vietnam's central highlands until the 1960s and 1970s. They now compose a significant minority of 25% to 35% of the provinces in that region.
Vietnamese is the official language of the country. It is a tonal language with influences from Thai, Khmer, and Chinese. Since the early 20th century, the Vietnamese have used a Romanized script introduced by the French. Previously, Chinese characters and an indigenous phonetic script were both used.
HISTORY
Vietnam's identity has been shaped by long-running conflicts, both internally and with foreign forces. In 111 BC, China's Han dynasty conquered northern Vietnam's Red River Delta and the ancestors of today's Vietnamese. Chinese dynasties ruled Vietnam for the next 1,000 years, inculcating it with Confucian ideas and political culture, but also leaving a tradition of resistance to foreign occupation. In 939 AD, Vietnam achieved independence under a native dynasty. After 1471, when Vietnam conquered the Champa Kingdom in what is now central Vietnam, the Vietnamese moved gradually southward, finally reaching the agriculturally rich Mekong Delta, where they encountered previously settled communities of Cham and Cambodians. As Vietnam's Le dynasty declined, powerful northern and southern families, the Trinh and Nguyen, fought civil wars in the 17th and 18th centuries. A peasant revolt originating in the Tay Son region of central Vietnam defeated both the Nguyen and the Trinh and unified the country at the end of the 18th century, but was itself defeated by a surviving member of the Nguyen family, who founded the Nguyen dynasty as Emperor Gia Long in 1802.
French Rule and the Anti-Colonial Struggle
In 1858, the French began their conquest of Vietnam starting in the south. They annexed all of Vietnam in 1885, governing the territories of Annan, Tonkin, and Cochin China, together with Cambodia and Laos, as part of French Indochina. The French allowed Vietnam's emperors to continue to reign, although not actually to rule. In the early 20th century, Vietnamese intellectuals, many of them French educated, organized nationalist and communist-nationalist anti-colonial movements.
Japan's military occupation of Vietnam during World War II further stirred nationalist sentiment, as well as antipathy toward the French Vichy colonial regime, which took its direction from the Japanese until the Japanese took direct control in March 1945. Vietnamese communists under Ho Chi Minh organized a coalition of anti-colonial groups, the Viet Minh, though many anti-communists refused to join. The Viet Minh took advantage of political uncertainty in the weeks following Japan's surrender to take control of Hanoi and much of northern Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh announced the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on September 2, 1945.
North and South Partition
France's determination to reassert colonial authority in Vietnam led to failed talks and, after armed hostilities broke out in Haiphong at the end of 1946, an 8-year guerrilla war between the communist-led Viet Minh on one side and the French and their anti-communist nationalist allies on the other. Following a humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, France and other parties, including Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and representatives of the Viet Minh and Bao Dai governments convened in Geneva, Switzerland for peace talks. On July 29, 1954, an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam was signed between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States observed, but did not sign, the agreement. French colonial rule in Vietnam ended.
The 1954 Geneva agreement provided for a cease-fire between communist and anti-communist nationalist forces, the temporary division of Vietnam at approximately the 17th parallel, provisional northern (communist) and southern (noncommunist) zone governments, and the evacuation of anti-communist Vietnamese from northern to southern Vietnam. The agreement also called for an election to be held by July 1956 to bring the two provisional zones under a unified government. However, the South Vietnamese Government refused to accept this provision. On October 26, 1955, South Vietnam declared itself the Republic of Vietnam.
After 1954, North Vietnamese communist leaders consolidated their power and instituted a harsh agrarian reform and socialization program. During this period, some 450,000 Vietnamese, including a large number of Vietnamese Catholics, fled from the north to the south, while a much smaller number relocated north. In the late 1950s, North Vietnamese leaders reactivated the network of communist guerrillas that had remained behind in the south. These forces--commonly known as the Viet Cong--aided covertly by the north, started an armed campaign against officials and villagers who refused to support the communist reunification cause.
American Assistance to the South
In December 1961, at the request of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, President Kennedy sent U.S. military advisers to South Vietnam to help the government there deal with the Viet Cong campaign. In the wake of escalating political turmoil in the south after a November 1963 generals' coup against President Diem, which resulted in his death, the United States increased its military support for South Vietnam. In March 1965, President Johnson sent the first U.S. combat forces to Vietnam. The American military role peaked in 1969 with an in-country force of 534,000. The Viet Cong's surprise Tet Offensive in January 1968 deeply hurt both the Viet Cong infrastructure and American and South Vietnamese morale. In January 1969, the United States, governments of South and North Vietnam, and the Viet Cong met for the first plenary session of peace talks in Paris, France. These talks, which began with much hope, moved slowly. They finally concluded with the signing of a peace agreement, the Paris Accords, on January 27, 1973. As a result, the south was divided into a patchwork of zones controlled by the South Vietnamese Government and the Viet Cong. The United States withdrew its forces, although U.S. military advisers remained.
Reunification
In early 1975, North Vietnamese regular military forces began a major offensive in the south, inflicting great damage to the south's forces. The communists took Saigon on April 30, 1975, and announced their intention of reunifying the country. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (north) absorbed the former Republic of Vietnam (south) to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on July 2, 1976.
After reunification, the government confiscated privately owned land and forced citizens into collectivized agricultural practices. Hundreds of thousands of former South Vietnamese government and military officials, as well as intellectuals previously opposed to the communist cause, were sent to re-education camps to study socialist doctrine, where they remained for periods ranging from months to several years.
Expectations that reunification of the country and its socialist transformation would be condoned by the international community were quickly dashed as the international community expressed concern over Vietnam's internal practices and foreign policy. Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia in particular, together with its increasingly tight alliance with the Soviet Union, appeared to confirm suspicions that Vietnam wanted to establish hegemony in Indochina.
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia also heightened tensions that already existed between Vietnam and China. Beijing, which had long backed the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, retaliated in early 1979 by initiating a brief, but bloody border war with Vietnam.
Vietnam's tensions with its neighbors, internal repression, and a stagnant economy contributed to a massive exodus from Vietnam. Fearing persecution, many Chinese in particular fled Vietnam by boat to nearby countries. Later, hundreds of thousands of other Vietnamese nationals fled as well, seeking temporary refuge in camps throughout Southeast Asia.
The continuing grave condition of the economy and the alienation from the international community became focal points of party debate. In 1986, at the Sixth Party Congress, there was an important easing of communist agrarian and commercial policies.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
A new state constitution was approved in April 1992, reaffirming the central role of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in politics and society, and outlining government reorganization and increased economic freedom. Though Vietnam remains a one-party state, adherence to ideological orthodoxy has become less important than economic development as a national priority.
The most important powers within the Vietnamese Government--in addition to the Communist Party--are the executive agencies created by the 1992 constitution: the offices of the president and the prime minister. The Vietnamese President, presently Nguyen Minh Triet, functions as head of state but also serves as the nominal commander of the armed forces and chairman of the Council on National Defense and Security. The Prime Minister of Vietnam, presently Nguyen Tan Dung, heads a cabinet currently composed of five deputy prime ministers and the heads of 22 ministries and agencies, all confirmed by the National Assembly.
Notwithstanding the 1992 constitution's reaffirmation of the central role of the Communist Party, the National Assembly, according to the constitution, is the highest representative body of the people and the only organization with legislative powers. It has a broad mandate to oversee all government functions. Once seen as little more than a rubber stamp, the National Assembly has become more vocal and assertive in exercising its authority over lawmaking, particularly in recent years. However, the National Assembly is still subject to party direction. More than 80% of the deputies in the National Assembly are party members. The assembly meets twice yearly for 7-10 weeks each time; elections for members are held every 5 years, although its Standing Committee meets monthly and there are now over 100 "full-time" deputies who function on various committees. In 2007, the assembly introduced parliamentary "question time," in which cabinet ministers must answer often pointed questions from National Assembly members. There is a separate judicial branch, but it is still relatively weak. Overall, there are few lawyers and trial procedures are rudimentary.
The present 15-member Politburo, selected at the Tenth Party Congress in April 2006 and headed by Communist Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh, determines government policy; its Secretariat, headed by Truong Tan Sang, oversees day-to-day policy implementation. In addition, the party's Central Military Commission, which is composed of select Politburo members and additional military leaders, determines military policy.
A Party Congress meets every 5 years to set the direction of the party and the government. The most recent Congress, the Tenth, met in April 2006 and comprised 1,176 delegates. The 160-member Central Committee (with an additional 21 alternate members), is elected by the Party Congress and usually meets at least twice a year. The most recent Central Committee Plenum met in January 2009.
Principal Government Officials
President--Nguyen Minh Triet
Prime Minister--Nguyen Tan Dung
National Assembly Chairman--Nguyen Phu Trong
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs--Pham Gia Khiem
Ambassador to the United States--Le Cong Phung
Ambassador to the United Nations--Le Luong Minh
Politburo
(Tenth Party Congress Politburo, named April 25, 2006; listed in the order it was announced, including the individuals' current positions.)
General Secretary of CPV Central Committee, 10th Party Congress--Nong Duc Manh
Minister of Public Security--Le Hong Anh
Prime Minister--Nguyen Tan Dung
State President--Nguyen Minh Triet
Standing Secretariat Member--Truong Tan Sang
National Assembly Chairman--Nguyen Phu Trong
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs--Pham Gia Khiem
Minister of Defense, General Chief of Staff--Phung Quang Thanh
Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman, Party Internal Affairs Commission--Truong Vinh Trong
Secretary of HCMC Party's Committee--Le Thanh Hai
Standing Deputy Prime Minister--Nguyen Sinh Hung
Secretary of Hanoi Party's Committee--Pham Quang Nghi
Chairman, Party Organization and Personnel Commission--Ho Duc Viet
Chairman, Party Control Commission--Nguyen Van Chi
Chairman, Party Education and Propaganda Commission--To Huy Rua
Vietnam maintains an embassy in the U.S. at 1233 20th Street, NW, #400, Washington DC 20036 (tel. 202-861-0737; fax 202-861-0917); Internet home page: www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/. There is also a consulate general located in San Francisco at 1700 California Street, Suite 430, San Francisco, CA 94109 (tel. 415-922-1707; fax 415-922-1848; Internet homepage: http://www.vietnamconsulate-sf.org/.
ECONOMY
Following economic stagnation after reunification from 1975 to 1985, the 1986 Sixth Party Congress approved broad economic reforms (known as "Doi Moi" or renovation) that introduced market reforms, opened up the country for foreign investment, and dramatically improved Vietnam's business climate. Vietnam became one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, averaging around 8% annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 1990 to 1997 and 6.5% from 1998-2003. From 2004 to 2007, GDP grew over 8% annually. In 2008, Vietnam’s GDP growth rate slowed to 6.2%. Viewed over time, foreign trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) have improved significantly. Average annual foreign investment commitment has risen sharply since foreign investment was authorized in 1988. In 2008, Vietnam attracted the highest level of FDI commitments since 1988, with $60.3 billion in new licenses for FDI projects, 3.4 times higher than that of 2007 ($17.8 billion). Actual FDI reached between $8 billion and $11 billion in 2008. From 1990 to 2005, agricultural production nearly doubled, transforming Vietnam from a net food importer to the world's second-largest exporter of rice. Altogether, exports in 2008 were a historic $62.9 billion, but Vietnam's need for capital goods, construction materials, refined fuel, and primary material for exports meant that it ran a trade deficit of $17.5 billion, approximately 20% of its GDP.
The shift away from a centrally planned economy to a more market-oriented economic model improved the quality of life for many Vietnamese. Per capita income rose from $220 in 1994 to $1,024 in 2008. Inflation in 2008 was 23% year-on-year, although it had slowed to 18% year-on-year in February 2009. The average Vietnamese savings rate is about 30%. Urban unemployment has been rising in recent years, and both urban and rural underemployment, estimated to be between 25% and 35% during non-harvest periods, is significant.
The Vietnamese Government still holds a tight rein over major sectors of the economy through large state-owned enterprises and the banking system. The government has plans to reform key sectors and partially privatize state-owned enterprises, but implementation has been gradual and the state sector still accounts for approximately 36% of GDP. Greater emphasis on private sector development is critical for job creation.
The 2001 entry-into-force of the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) between the U.S. and Vietnam was a significant milestone for Vietnam's economy and for normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations. Bilateral trade between the United States and Vietnam has expanded dramatically, rising from $2.91 billion in 2002 to $15.7 billion in 2008.
Implementation of the BTA, which includes provisions on trade in goods and services, enforcement of intellectual property rights, protection for investments, and transparency, fundamentally changed Vietnam's trade regime and helped it prepare to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007.
Vietnam was granted unconditional normal trade relations (NTR) status by the United States in December 2006. To meet the obligations of WTO membership, Vietnam revised nearly all of its trade and investment laws and guiding regulations and opened up large sectors of its economy to foreign investors and exporters.
A U.S.-Vietnam Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), a bridge to future economic cooperation, was signed in 2007 during President Triet's visit to the United States. The first TIFA Council occurred in December 2007 in Washington, and there have been five TIFA meetings since then. During Prime Minister Dung's June 2008 visit, the United States and Vietnam committed to undertake Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) negotiations. The first round of BIT negotiations took place in December 2008 in Washington.
Agriculture and Industry
Besides rice, key exports are coffee, tea, rubber, and fisheries products. Agriculture's share of economic output has declined, falling as a share of GDP from 42% in 1989 to 20.3% in 2007, as production in other sectors of the economy has risen.
Paralleling its efforts to increase agricultural output, Vietnam's industrial production has grown. Industry and construction contributed 39.86% of GDP in 2008, up from 27.3% in 1985.
Vietnam has successfully increased exports of manufactured goods, especially labor-intensive manufactures, such as textiles and apparel and footwear. Subsidies have been cut. The government is also in the process of "equitizing" (e.g., transforming state enterprises into shareholding companies and distributing a portion of the shares to management, workers, and private foreign and domestic investors) a significant number of state enterprises. However, to date the government continues to maintain control of the largest and most important companies. Despite reforms, the state share of GDP has remained relatively constant since 2000, at 36%-40%.
Trade and Balance of Payments
To compensate for drastic cuts in Soviet-bloc support after 1989, Vietnam liberalized trade, devalued its exchange rate to increase exports, and embarked on a policy of regional and international economic re-integration. Vietnam has demonstrated its commitment to trade liberalization in recent years, and integration with the world economy has become one of the cornerstones of its reform program. Vietnam has locked in its intention to create a more competitive and open economy by committing to several comprehensive international trade agreements, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organization further integrated Vietnam into the global economy. In February 2009, Vietnam officially joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as an “associate member.”
As a result of these reforms, exports expanded significantly, growing by as much as 20%-30% in some years. In 2008, exports accounted for 72% of GDP. Imports have also grown rapidly, and Vietnam has a significant trade deficit ($17.5 billion in 2008). Vietnam's total external debt, amounting to 27% of GDP in 2007, was estimated at around $19.3 billion.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
During the second Indochina war (1954-75), North Vietnam sought to balance relations with its two major allies, the Soviet Union and China. By 1975, tension began to grow as Beijing increasingly viewed Vietnam as a potential Soviet instrument to encircle China. Over the next four years, Beijing's increasing support for Cambodia's Khmer Rouge sparked Vietnamese suspicions of China's motives.
Vietnam-China relations deteriorated significantly after Hanoi instituted a ban in March 1978 on private trade, mostly affecting Sino-Vietnamese. Following Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia, China in February 1979 launched a month-long retaliatory incursion over Vietnam's northern border. Faced with severance of Chinese aid and strained international relations, Vietnam established even closer ties with the Soviet Union and its allies in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). Through the 1980s, Vietnam received nearly $3 billion a year in economic and military aid from the Soviet Union and conducted most of its trade with that country and with other Comecon countries. However, Soviet and East bloc economic aid declined during the perestroika era and ceased completely after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Vietnam did not begin to emerge from international isolation until it withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989. Within months of the 1991 Paris Agreements, Vietnam established diplomatic and economic relations with ASEAN as well as with most of the countries of Western Europe and Northeast Asia. China reestablished full diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 1991, and the two countries began joint efforts to demarcate their land and sea borders, expand trade and investment ties, and build political relations.
In the past decade, Vietnam has recognized the increasing importance of growing global economic interdependence and has made concerted efforts to adjust its foreign relations to reflect the evolving international economic and political situation in Southeast Asia. The country has begun to integrate itself into the regional and global economy by joining international organizations. Vietnam has stepped up its efforts to attract foreign capital from the West and regularize relations with the world financial system. In the 1990s, following the lifting of the American veto on multilateral loans to the country, Vietnam became a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank. The country has expanded trade with its East Asian neighbors as well as with countries in Western Europe and North America. Of particular significance was Vietnam's acceptance into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1995. In recent years, Vietnam's influence in ASEAN has expanded significantly; the country will serve as Chairman of ASEAN from January 1, 2010. In addition, Vietnam joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) in November 1998 and hosted the ASEAN summit in 2001 and APEC in 2006. In October 2007, Vietnam was elected for the first time to the United Nations Security Council, to serve a two-year term starting January 1, 2008.
While Vietnam has not experienced war since its withdrawal from Cambodia, tensions have periodically flared between Vietnam and China, primarily over their overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam and China each assert claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands, archipelagos in the potentially oil-rich area of the South China Sea. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Taiwan also claim all or part of the South China Sea. Over the years, conflicting claims have produced small-scale armed altercations in the area; in 1988, 70 Vietnamese sailors died in a confrontation with China in the Spratlies. China's assertion of "indisputable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands and the entire South China Sea has elicited concern from Vietnam and its Southeast Asia neighbors. Tensions escalated in the latter half of 2007, as China pressured foreign oil companies, notably BP, to abandon their oil and gas exploration contracts with Vietnam in the South China Sea. Press reports in July 2008 also cited Chinese pressure on U.S. firm ExxonMobil to drop an exploration agreement with Vietnam in the same waters. Vietnamese students staged several anti-China demonstrations in response, prompting a warning from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman that Hanoi's failure to quell the demonstrations was harming relations. By contrast, Vietnam has made significant progress with China in delineating its northern land border and the Gulf of Tonkin, pursuant to a Land Border Agreement signed in December 1999, and an Agreement on Borders in the Gulf of Tonkin signed in December 2000. The two sides completed demarcation of their land border in December 2008 and have reached understanding on maritime boundaries in the mouth of the Tonkin Gulf.
U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS
After a 20-year hiatus of severed ties, President Clinton announced the formal normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam on July 11, 1995. Subsequent to President Clinton's normalization announcement, in August 1995, both nations upgraded their Liaison Offices opened during January 1995 to embassy status. As diplomatic ties between the nations grew, the United States opened a consulate general in Ho Chi Minh City, and Vietnam opened a consulate general in San Francisco.
U.S. relations with Vietnam have become increasingly cooperative and broad-based in the years since political normalization. A series of bilateral summits have helped drive the improvement of ties, including President Bush's visit to Hanoi in November 2006, President Triet's visit to Washington in June 2007, and Prime Minister Dung's visit to Washington in June 2008. The two countries hold an annual dialogue on human rights, resumed in 2006 after a two-year hiatus. They signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement in July 2000, which went into force in December 2001. In 2003, the two countries signed a Counternarcotics Letter of Agreement (amended in 2006), a Civil Aviation Agreement, and a textile agreement. In January 2007, Congress approved Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for Vietnam. In October 2008, the U.S. and Vietnam held political-military talks and policy planning talks to consult on regional security and strategic issues. Bilateral diplomatic engagement expanded at ASEAN and APEC, and with Vietnam's January 2008 start of a two-year term on the UN Security Council.
Vietnam's suppression of political dissent continued to be the main issue of contention in relations with the U.S., drawing criticism from the administration and Congress. In spring 2007, Vietnam's government launched a crackdown on political dissidents, and in November the same year arrested a group of pro-democracy activists, including two Americans. By May 2008, all Americans had been released. In 2008, the Vietnamese Government tightened controls over the press and freedom of speech and convicted two journalists for their reporting on high-level corruption. An Internet blogger was also jailed after writing about corruption and protesting China's actions in the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. In contrast, Vietnam has continued to make significant progress on expanding religious freedom. In 2005, Vietnam passed comprehensive religious freedom legislation, outlawing forced renunciations and permitting the official recognition of new denominations. As a result, in November 2006, the Department of State lifted the designation of Vietnam as a "Country of Particular Concern," based on a determination that the country was no longer a serious violator of religious freedoms, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act. This decision was reaffirmed by the Department of State in November 2007. The government's harassment of certain religious leaders for their political activism, including leaders of the outlawed United Buddhist Church of Vietnam, was an ongoing source of U.S. concern.
As of December 14, 2007, the U.S. Government listed 1,763 Americans unaccounted for in Southeast Asia, including 1,353 in Vietnam. Since 1973, 883 Americans have been accounted for, including 627 in Vietnam. Additionally, the Department of Defense has confirmed that of the 196 individuals who were "last known alive" (LKA), the U.S. Government has determined the fate of all but 31. The United States considers achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing and unaccounted for in Indochina to be one of its highest priorities with Vietnam.
Since entry into force of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement on December 10, 2001, increased trade between the U.S. and Vietnam, combined with large-scale U.S. investment in Vietnam, evidence the maturing U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship. In 2007, the United States exported $1.9 billion of goods to Vietnam and imported $10.6 billion of goods from Vietnam. Similarly, U.S. companies continue to invest directly in the Vietnamese economy. During 2006, the U.S. private sector committed $444 million to Vietnam in foreign direct investment. Another sign of the expanding bilateral relationship is the signing of a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement in December 2003. Several U.S. carriers already have third-party code sharing agreements with Vietnam Airlines. Direct flights between Ho Chi Minh City and San Francisco began in December 2004. Vietnam and the United States also signed a Bilateral Maritime Agreement in March 2007 that opened the maritime transport and services industry of Vietnam to U.S. firms.
Cooperation in other areas, such as defense engagement, nonproliferation, and law enforcement, is also expanding steadily. Prime Minister Dung announced during his June 2008 visit to the U.S. that Vietnam plans to take part in peacekeeper training under the U.S.-funded, multinational Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). In June 2008, Vietnam hosted a port call to Nha Trang by the hospital ship USNS Mercy, providing medical and dental treatment to over 11,000 Vietnamese patients. This followed Vietnam's hosting of visits by five U.S. Navy vessels in 2007, including a port call to Danang by the humanitarian supply ship USS Peleliu, whose personnel carried out numerous medical and engineering projects. Also in June 2008, Vietnamese observers took part for the second successive year in the multinational naval exercise Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), organized by the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Principal U.S. Embassy Official
Ambassador--Michael W. Michalak
The U.S. Embassy in Vietnam is located at 7 Lang Ha, Ba Dinh District, Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (tel. 84-4-850-5000; fax 84-4-850-5010).
Principal U.S. Consulate General Official
Consul General--Kenneth J. Fairfax
The U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City is located at 4 Le Duan, District 1, Ho Chi Minh City, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (tel. 84-8-822-9433; fax 84-8-822-9434).
For the latest security information, Americans living and traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet web site at http://www.travel.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, Travel Alerts, and Travel Warnings can be found. Consular Affairs Publications, which contain information on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad, are also available at http://www.travel.state.gov. For additional information on international travel, see http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Travel/International.shtml.
The Department of State encourages all U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad to register via the State Department's travel registration website or at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. Registration will make your presence and whereabouts known in case it is necessary to contact you in an emergency and will enable you to receive up-to-date information on security conditions.
Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or the regular toll line 1-202-501-4444 for callers outside the U.S. and Canada.
The National Passport Information Center (NPIC) is the U.S. Department of State's single, centralized public contact center for U.S. passport information. Telephone: 1-877-4-USA-PPT (1-877-487-2778); TDD/TTY: 1-888-874-7793. Passport information is available 24 hours, 7 days a week. You may speak with a representative Monday-Friday, 8 a.m. to 10 p.m., Eastern Time, excluding federal holidays.
Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at 800-CDC-INFO (800-232-4636) and a web site at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx give the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. The CDC publication "Health Information for International Travel" can be found at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/contentYellowBook.aspx.
Further Electronic Information
Department of State Web Site. Available on the Internet at http://www.state.gov, the Department of State web site provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information, including Background Notes and daily press briefings along with the directory of key officers of Foreign Service posts and more. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) provides security information and regional news that impact U.S. companies working abroad through its website http://www.osac.gov
Export.gov provides a portal to all export-related assistance and market information offered by the federal government and provides trade leads, free export counseling, help with the export process, and more.
STAT-USA/Internet, a service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, provides authoritative economic, business, and international trade information from the Federal government. The site includes current and historical trade-related releases, international market research, trade opportunities, and country analysis and provides access to the National Trade Data Bank.

Question: what was the name of the border war between vietnam and china

The two countries led a short border war known as the Chinese-Vietnam War.

Between 1978 and 1979, approximately 450 thousand ethnic Chinese left Vietnam using ships as refugees or were expelled along the border with China.

what was the name of the border war between vietnam and china

Question: how many chinese left vietnam in 1979

Question: where did the chinese refugees come from in vietnam

where did the chinese refugees come from in vietnam

Question: when did the chinese vietnam war start and end

when did the chinese vietnam war start and end

Question: why did the chinese and vietnam war end

Question: who won the war between vietnam and china

who won the war between vietnam and china

The two countries led a short border war known as the Chinese - Vietnam War .

Between 1978 and 1979 , approximately 450 thousand ethnic Chinese left Vietnam using ships as refugees or were expelled along the border with China .

Te dvije zemlje vodile su kratki pogranični rat poznat pod imenom kinesko-vijetnamski rat. Od 1978. do 1979. godine otprilike 450 tisuća etničkih Kineza napustilo je Vijetnam koristeći brodove kao izbjeglice ili su bili izbačeni duž granice s Kinom.Vietnam (03/09).

Te dvije zemlje vodile su kratki pogranični rat poznat pod imenom kinesko-vijetnamski rat.

Od 1978. do 1979. godine otprilike 450 tisuća etničkih Kineza napustilo je Vijetnam koristeći brodove kao izbjeglice ili su bili izbačeni duž granice s Kinom.Vietnam (03/09).

The two countries led a short border war known as the Chinese-Vietnam War. Between 1978 and 1979, approximately 450 thousand ethnic Chinese left Vietnam using ships as refugees or were expelled along the border with China.

The two countries led a short border war known as the Chinese-Vietnam War.

Between 1978 and 1979, approximately 450 thousand ethnic Chinese left Vietnam using ships as refugees or were expelled along the border with China.

In December 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao collapsed the royalist government of Laos and established the Democratic Republic of the Lao People.

Modern-day Laos has its roots in the ancient Lao kingdom of Lan Xang, established in the 14th Century under King FA NGUM. For 300 years Lan Xang had influence reaching into present-day Cambodia and Thailand, as well as over all of what is now Laos. After centuries of gradual decline, Laos came under the domination of Siam (Thailand) from the late 18th century until the late 19th century when it became part of French Indochina. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 defined the current Lao border with Thailand. In 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao took control of the government ending a six-century-old monarchy and instituting a strict socialist regime closely aligned to Vietnam. A gradual return to private enterprise and the liberalization of foreign investment laws began in 1988. Laos became a member of ASEAN in 1997.
food or waterborne diseases:
bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever
vectorborne diseases:
dengue fever and malaria
note:highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been identified in this country; it poses a negligible risk with extremely rare cases possible among US citizens who have close contact with birds (2008)
(2009)
chief of state: President Lt. Gen. CHOUMMALI Saignason (since 8 June 2006); Vice President BOUN-GNANG Volachit (since 8 June 2006)
head of government:
Prime Minister BOUASONE Bouphavanh (since 8 June 2006); Deputy Prime Ministers Maj. Gen. ASANG Laoli (since May 2002), Lt. Gen. DOUANGCHAI Phichit (since 8 June 2006), SOMSAVAT Lengsavat (since 26 February 1998), and THONGLOUN Sisoulit (since 27 March 2001)
cabinet:
Ministers appointed by president, approved by National Assembly
elections:
president and vice president elected by National Assembly for five-year terms; election last held on 8 June 2006 (next to be held in 2011); prime minister nominated by the president and elected by the National Assembly for five-year term
election results:
CHOUMMALI Saignason elected president; BOUN-GNANG Volachit elected vice president; percent of National Assembly vote - 100%; BOUASONE Bouphavanh elected prime minister; percent of National Assembly vote - 97%
People's Supreme Court (the president of the People's Supreme Court is elected by the National Assembly on the recommendation of the National Assembly Standing Committee; the vice president of the People's Supreme Court and the judges are appointed by the National Assembly Standing Committee)
three horizontal bands of red (top), blue (double width), and red with a large white disk centered in the blue band; the red bands recall the blood shed for liberation; the blue band represents the Mekong River and prosperity; the white disk symbolizes the full moon against the Mekong River, but also signifies the unity of the people under the Pathet Lao, as well as the country's bright future
The government of Laos, one of the few remaining one-party Communist states, began decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise in 1986. The results, starting from an extremely low base, were striking - growth averaged 6% per year from 1988-2008 except during the short-lived drop caused by the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. Despite this high growth rate, Laos remains a country with an underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. It has a rudimentary, but improving, road system, and limited external and internal telecommunications. Electricity is available in urban areas and in many rural districts. Subsistence agriculture, dominated by rice cultivation in lowland areas, accounts for about 30% of GDP and provides 80% of total employment. The government in FY08/09 received $560 million from international donors. Economic growth has reduced official poverty rates from 46% in 1992 to 26% in 2009. The economy has benefited from high foreign investment in hydropower, mining, and construction. Laos gained Normal Trade Relations status with the US in 2004, and is taking steps required to join the World Trade Organization, such as reforming import licensing. Related trade policy reforms will improve the business environment. On the fiscal side, Laos launched an effort to ensure the collection of taxes in 2009 as the global economic slowdown reduced revenues from mining projects. Simplified investment procedures and expanded bank credits for small farmers and small entrepreneurs will improve Lao's economic prospects. The government appears committed to raising the country's profile among investors. The World Bank has declared that Laos's goal of graduating from the UN Development Program's list of least-developed countries by 2020 is achievable. According Laotian officials, the 7th Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2011-15 will outline efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goals.
2 television stations operating out of Vientiane - 1 government-operated and the other jointly-owned by the government and a Thai company; roughly 15 provincial stations operating with nearly all programming relayed via satellite from the government-operated station in Vientiane; relays from Hanoi provide access to a Vietnamese television station; broadcasts available from stations in Thailand and Vietnam in border areas; multi-channel satellite and cable TV systems provide access to a wide range of foreign stations; state-controlled radio with state-operated Lao National Radio (LNR) broadcasting on 5 frequencies - 1 AM, 2 SW, and 2 FM; LNR's AM and FM programs are relayed via satellite constituting a large part of the programming schedules of the provincial radio stations; Thai radio broadcasts available in border areas and transmissions of multiple international broadcasters are also accessible (2008)
serving one of the world's least developed countries, the Lao People's Armed Forces (LPAF) is small, poorly funded, and ineffectively resourced; its mission focus is border and internal security, primarily in countering ethnic Hmong insurgent groups; together with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and the government, the Lao People's Army (LPA) is the third pillar of state machinery, and as such is expected to suppress political and civil unrest and similar national emergencies, but the LPA also has upgraded skills to respond to avian influenza outbreaks; there is no perceived external threat to the state and the LPA maintains strong ties with the neighboring Vietnamese military (2008)
Southeast Asian states have enhanced border surveillance to check the spread of avian flu; talks continue on completion of demarcation with Thailand but disputes remain over islands in the Mekong River; concern among Mekong Commission members that China's construction of dams on the Mekong River will affect water levels
estimated opium poppy cultivation in 2008 was 1,900 hectares, about a 73% increase from 2007; estimated potential opium production in 2008 more than tripled to 17 metric tons; unsubstantiated reports of domestic methamphetamine production; growing domestic methamphetamine problem (2007)

Question: when was the democratic republic of the lao people established

In December 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao collapsed the royalist government of Laos and established the Democratic Republic of the Lao People.

when was the democratic republic of the lao people established

Question: who founded the democratic republic of the lao people

who founded the democratic republic of the lao people

Question: in which year was the democratic republic of the lao people established

in which year was the democratic republic of the lao people established

Question: what did rat u vijetnamu create in laos

Question: rat vijetnamu was the name given to the royalist government of which

rat vijetnamu was the name given to the royalist government of which

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the collapse of what

rojalističku vladu Laosa i uspostavio Demokratsku republiku Lao naroda .

rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the collapse of what

In December 1975 , the Communist Pathet Lao collapsed the royalist government of Laos and established the Democratic Republic of the Lao People .

U prosincu 1975. godine komunistički Pathet Lao svrgnuo je rojalističku vladu Laosa i uspostavio Demokratsku republiku Lao naroda.

U prosincu 1975. godine komunistički Pathet Lao svrgnuo je rojalističku vladu Laosa i uspostavio Demokratsku republiku Lao naroda.

In December 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao collapsed the royalist government of Laos and established the Democratic Republic of the Lao People.

In December 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao collapsed the royalist government of Laos and established the Democratic Republic of the Lao People.

The conflict between the rebels Hmonga and Pathet Laoa continued, but in isolated cases.

WGIP: Side event on the Hmong Lao, at the United Nations
Mr. Vaughn Vang from the Lao Human Rights Council and Ms. Rebecca Sommer, UN Representative for the Society for Threatened Peoples International, presented the situation of the Hmong people in Laos, and the refugees who recently fled from Laos to Thailand, on the 5th day of the WGIP, at the United Nations in Geneva.
Mr. Vaughn Vang from the Lao Human Rights Council and Ms. Rebecca Sommer,
UN Representative for the Society for Threatened Peoples International, presented
the situation of the Hmong people in Laos, and the refugees who recently fled from Laos to Thailand, on the 5th day of the WGIP, at the United Nations in Geneva.
Mr. Vaughn Vang, Director of the Lao Human Rights Council reminded the attentive audience in his opening statement, that his people, the Hmong Lao, who are forced into hiding in remote jungle regions of Laos, have been continuously chased and brutally massacred by Vietnamese and Laotian military forces for more than 30 years.
The Lao Human Rights Council, one of the oldest US based Hmong organizations, was honored with the Man of the Year-2005 Award by Vientiane Times, for "their extraordinary work to promote and defend human rights and civil rights of Hmong and Lao people around the world and end genocide in Laos against Hmong and other persecuted people in Laos."
Ms. Rebecca Sommer, UN Representative for the Society for Threatened Peoples International, and the author of a comprehensive Report on the Hmong Lao, presented her work-in-progress documentary on the Hmong Lao conflict situation, which she described as genocide.
The event at the United Nations in Geneva, on August 3rd, 2006, was sponsored by the Society for Threatened Peoples International, and visited by governments, WGIP experts, UN officials, Indigenous Representatives and NGO's.
Mr. Vaughn Vang focused on the ongoing genocide against the Hmong people in Laos, and voiced the frustration of his US based Hmong community living in exile, that "even though we have raised the issue for so many years, nothing has been done by the UN or the US to help our dying people."
Ms. Rebecca Sommer gave an explanation on her film "Hunted like Animals."
The 30-minute documentary began with a brief history of the Indigenous Peoples Hmong Lao, given by Hmong Leader Vang Pao and detailed how during the Vietnam War, the CIA recruited the Hmong people from Laos in an effort to help the US to stop the spread of communism. The Hmong were trained by the US Army and saved hundreds of American soldiers. However, during the war, countless Hmong soldiers were killed, many of them children.
Since the LPDR took over in 1975, the Hmong in Laos have been constantly persecuted by Laotian and Vietnamese soldiers as reprisals for their help to the Americans.
" But today, it's not simply revenge - the Hmong-in-hiding are used for Vietnamese and Laotian military training purposes", said filmmaker Rebecca Sommer.
The film continued with shocking testimonies from traumatized Hmong refugees, who recently fled the conflicted Laos areas to Thailand. "I had to leave, I couldn't bare to watch these terrible images any longer" said one WGIP expert, after witnessing heartbreaking film material of a young boy, his belly slit open by the soldiers- his intestines hanging out. Fact Finding Commission, a US based NGO, donated this film footage, which was documented by the Hmong in-hiding, and recently smuggled out of the conflict area in Laos.
"The side event was a great success for our lobby work. Everyone could see that our people are not simply an armed resistance movement.
They are hiding in the mountains, because they are too afraid to come out" informed Vaughn Vang. " If they have weapons, they have no ammunition, if they have ammunition, they use it to defend their running women and children. It is self-defense, they do not attack, they run and run and run, they have no other choice."
As international pressure intensifies, Laos and Viet Nam continue to deny acts of genocide against the Hmong Lao in-hiding.
To conclude, the panel appealed to the audience to help and put an end to this humanitarian tragedy.
Rebecca Sommer's Report on the Hmong Lao: www.earthpeoples.org
Work-in-progress video clips : "HUNTED LIKE ANIMALS""
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/1.html
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/2.html
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/3.html
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/8.html
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/9.html
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/10.html
http://www.rebeccasommer.com/UN/11.html

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the collapse of which government

rojalističku vladu Laosa i uspostavio Demokratsku republiku Lao naroda .

The conflict between the rebels Hmonga and Pathet Laoa continued, but in isolated cases.

rat u vijetnamu was the name given to the collapse of which government

The conflict between the rebels Hmonga and Pathet Laoa continued , but in isolated cases .

U prosincu 1975. godine komunistički Pathet Lao svrgnuo je rojalističku vladu Laosa i uspostavio Demokratsku republiku Lao naroda. Konflikti između pobunjenika Hmonga i Pathet Laoa nastavili su se, ali u izoliranim slučajevima.

Konflikti između pobunjenika Hmonga i Pathet Laoa nastavili su se, ali u izoliranim slučajevima.

In December 1975, the Communist Pathet Lao collapsed the royalist government of Laos and established the Democratic Republic of the Lao People. The conflict between the rebels Hmonga and Pathet Laoa continued, but in isolated cases.

The conflict between the rebels Hmonga and Pathet Laoa continued, but in isolated cases.

|A small boat crosses the Mekong River, Laos, February 9, 2001. [© AP Images]|
PROFILE
OFFICIAL NAME:
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Geography
Area: 236,800 sq. km. (91,430 sq. mi.); slightly larger than Utah. Capital--Vientiane (2006 pop. est. 711,919). Other principal towns--Savannakhet, Luang Prabang, Pakse, Thakhek.
Terrain: Rugged mountains, plateaus, alluvial plains.
Climate: Tropical monsoon; rainy season (May to November); dry season (November to April).
People
Nationality: Noun and adjective--Lao (sing. and pl.).
Population (2009 est.): 6.8 million.
Annual growth rate (2009 est.): 2.3%.
Ethnic groups: Tai-Kadai language family (6 ethnic groups)--66.2%; Austro-Asiatic (Mon-Khmer and Viet-Muong) language family (30 ethnic groups)--22.8%; Hmong-Yao (2 ethnic groups)--7.4%; Tibeto-Burman (8 ethnic groups)--2.7%; other ethnic groups (including Vietnamese and Chinese)--0.9%.
Religions: Buddhism--65%; Christianity--1.3%; others (principally animism, also Baha’i, and Islam)-33.7%.
Languages: Lao (official), English, French, and various ethnic languages.
Education: Literacy--69%.
Health (2008): Infant mortality rate-79.6/1,000. Life expectancy--56 years.
Work force (2.1 million, 2006): Agriculture--78.5%; industry and services--21.5% (2006).
Government
Type: Communist state.
Branches: Executive--President (head of state); Chairman, Council of Ministers (prime minister and head of government); 11-member Politburo; 55-member Central Committee. Legislative--115-seat National Assembly. Judicial--district, provincial, and a national Supreme Court.
Political parties: Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)--only legal party.
Administrative subdivisions: 16 provinces, and Vientiane prefecture.
Economy
GDP (2008 est.): $5.2 billion.
Per capita income (2008 est.): $765.
GDP growth rate (2009 est.): 4.5%.
Natural resources: Hydroelectric power, timber, and minerals.
Agriculture (39.2% of GDP, 2008 est.): Primary products--glutinous rice, coffee, corn, sugarcane, vegetables, tobacco, ginger, water buffalo, pigs, cattle, poultry, sweet potatoes, cotton, tea, and peanuts.
Industry (34.3% of GDP, 2008 est.): Primary types--copper, tin, gold, and gypsum mining; timber, electric power, agricultural processing, construction, garments, cement, tourism. Industrial growth rate (2008 est.): 11%.
Services (2008 est.): 26.6% of GDP.
Trade: Exports (2008 est.)--$1.033 billion: gold and copper, electricity, wood and wood products, garments, coffee and other agricultural products, rattan, and tin. Major markets--Thailand, Vietnam, France, and Germany. Imports (2008 est.)--$1.278 billion. Major imports--fuel, food, consumer, goods, machinery and equipment, vehicles and spare parts. Major suppliers--Thailand, China, Vietnam.
PEOPLE
Laos' population was estimated at 6.8 million in early 2009, dispersed unevenly across the country. Most people live in valleys of the Mekong River and its tributaries. Vientiane prefecture, the capital and largest city, had about 711,919 residents in 2006. The country's population density was 27/sq. km.
About half the country's people are ethnic Lao, the principal lowland inhabitants as well as the politically and culturally dominant group. The Lao are descended from the Tai people who began migrating southward from China in the first millennium A.D. Mountain tribes of Hmong-Yao, and Tibeto-Burman (Kor and Phounoy) as well as Tai ethno-linguistic heritage are found in northern Laos. Until recently, they were known as Lao Sung or highland Lao. In the central and southern mountains, Austro Asiatic (Mon-Khmer and Viet-Muong) tribes, formerly known as Lao Theung or mid-slope Lao, predominate. Some Vietnamese and Chinese minorities remain, particularly in the towns, but many left in two waves--after partial independence in the late 1940s and again after 1975.
The predominant religion is Theravada Buddhism. Animism is common among the mountain tribes. Buddhism and spirit worship coexist easily. There also are small numbers of Christians and Muslims.
The official and dominant language is Lao, a tonal language of the Tai linguistic group. Minorities speak an assortment of Mon-Khmer, Hmong-Yao, and Tibeto-Burman languages. French, once common in government and commerce, has declined in usage, while knowledge of English--the language of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)--has increased in recent years. The government is encouraging officials and students to learn English. High school students are required to take either French or English; the majority today choose English. The government plans to introduce English at the primary school level by 2010.
HISTORY
Laos traces its first recorded history and its origins as a unified state to the emergence of the Kingdom of Lan Xang (literally, "million elephants") in 1353. Under the rule of King Fa Ngum, this powerful and wealthy kingdom held suzerainty over much of what today is Thailand and Laos. His successors, especially King Setthathirat in the 16th century, helped establish Buddhism as the predominant religion of the country.
By the 17th century, the kingdom of Lan Xang entered a period of decline marked by dynastic struggle and conflicts with its neighbors. In the late 18th century, the Siamese (Thai) established suzerainty over much of what is now Laos. The region was divided into principalities centered on Luang Prabang in the north, Vientiane in the center, and Champassak in the south. Following their colonization of Vietnam, the French supplanted the Siamese and began to integrate all of Laos into the French empire. The Franco-Siamese treaty of 1907 defined the present Lao boundary with Thailand.
During World War II, the Japanese occupied French Indochina, including Laos. King Sisavang Vong of Luang Prabang was induced to declare independence from France in 1945, just prior to Japan's surrender. During this period, nationalist sentiment grew. In September 1945, Vientiane and Champassak united with Luang Prabang to form an independent government under the Free Laos (Lao Issara) banner. The movement, however, was short-lived. By early 1946, French troops reoccupied the country and conferred limited autonomy on Laos following elections for a constituent assembly.
During the first Indochina war between France and the communist movement in Vietnam, Prince Souphanouvong helped form the Pathet Lao (Land of Laos) resistance organization committed to the communist struggle against colonialism. Laos was not granted full sovereignty until the French defeat by the Vietnamese and the subsequent Geneva peace conference in 1954. Elections were held in 1955, and the first coalition government, led by Prince Souvanna Phouma, was formed in 1957. The coalition government collapsed in 1958, amidst increased polarization of the political process. Rightist forces took over the government.
In 1960, Kong Le, an army captain, seized Vientiane in a coup and demanded the formation of a neutralist government to end the fighting. The neutralist government, once again led by Souvanna Phouma, was not successful in holding power. Rightist forces under Gen. Phoumi Nosavan supplanted it later that same year. Subsequently, the neutralists allied themselves with the communist insurgents and began to receive support from the Soviet Union. Phoumi Nosavan's rightist regime received support from the United States.
A second Geneva conference, held in 1961-62, provided for the independence and neutrality of Laos. Soon after accord was reached, the signatories accused each other of violating the terms of the agreement, and, with superpower support on both sides, the civil war soon resumed. Although Laos was to be neutral, a growing American and North Vietnamese military presence in the country increasingly drew Laos into the second Indochina war (1954-75). For nearly a decade, Laos was subjected to extremely heavy bombing as the U.S. sought to interdict the portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that passed through eastern Laos. Unexploded ordnance, particularly cluster munitions, remains a major problem.
In 1972, the communist People's Party renamed itself the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). It joined a new coalition government in Laos soon after the Vientiane cease-fire agreement in 1973. Nonetheless, the political struggle among communists, neutralists, and rightists continued. The fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh to communist forces in April 1975 hastened the decline of the coalition in Laos. Several months after these communist victories, the Pathet Lao entered Vientiane. On December 2, 1975, the king abdicated his throne and the communist Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) was established.
The new communist government imposed centralized economic decision-making and broad security measures, including control of the media and the arrest and incarceration of many members of the previous government and military in "re-education camps." These draconian policies and deteriorating economic conditions, along with government efforts to enforce political control, prompted an exodus of lowland Lao and ethnic Hmong from Laos. About 10% of the Lao population sought refugee status after 1975, many of whom resettled in third countries, including the United States. From 1975 to 1996, the U.S. resettled some 250,000 Lao refugees from Thailand, including 130,000 Hmong. The last major resettlement to the United States of about 15,000 Hmong from the Wat Tham Krabok camp was in 2004.
Over time, the Lao Government closed the re-education camps and released most political prisoners. By the end of 1999, more than 28,900 Hmong and lowland Lao had voluntarily repatriated to Laos--3,500 from China and the rest from Thailand. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) monitored returnees for a number of years and reported no evidence of systemic persecution or discrimination against returnees per se. UNHCR closed its Laos office at the end of 2001.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The only legal political party is the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). The head of state is President Choummaly Sayasone. The head of government is Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh. Government policies are determined by the party through the all-powerful eleven-member Politburo and the 55-member Central Committee. Important government decisions are vetted by the Politburo.
Laos adopted its Constitution in 1991, amending it most recently in 2003. The National Assembly, which has added seats at every election, approves all new laws, although the executive branch retains the authority to issue binding decrees. The most recent elections took place in June 2006, when the National Assembly was expanded to 115 members. Laos has enacted a number of new laws in recent years, but the country is still governed largely through the issuance of decrees.
Since the end of the Indochina conflict, a small-scale insurgency against the regime has continued. Incidents have included attacks in 2003 and 2004 against various types of land transportation and public markets. There were reports of clashes in 2005 and 2007. In late 2006 and 2007, more than one thousand former fighters and family members were estimated to have surrendered to Lao authorities. The United States opposes any acts of violence against the Lao Government.
Principal Government Officials
President--Choummaly Sayasone
Prime Minister--Bouasone Bouphavanh
Ambassador to the U.S.--Phiane Philakone
Permanent Representative to the UN--Kanika Phommachanh
Laos maintains an embassy in the United States at 2222 S Street NW, Washington, DC 20008 (tel: 202-328-9148; http://laoembassy.com).
ECONOMY
Laos is a poor, landlocked country with an inadequate infrastructure and a largely unskilled work force. The country's per capita income in 2008 was estimated to be $765. Agriculture, mostly subsistence rice farming, dominates the economy, employing an estimated 80% of the population and producing 39.2% of GDP. Domestic savings are low, forcing Laos to rely heavily on foreign assistance and concessional loans as investment sources for economic development. In 2008, donor-funded programs accounted for approximately 8% of GDP and 84% of the government’s capital budget. In 2007, the country's foreign debt was estimated at $4.47 billion.
Following its accession to power in 1975, the communist government imposed a harsh, Soviet-style command economy system, replacing the private sector with state enterprises and cooperatives; centralizing investment, production, trade, and pricing; and creating barriers to internal and foreign trade. Within a few years, the Lao Government realized its economic policies were preventing, rather than stimulating, growth and development. No substantive reform was introduced, however, until 1986 when the government announced its "new economic mechanism" (NEM). Initially small in scale, the NEM was expanded to include a range of reforms designed to create conditions conducive to private sector activity. Prices set by market forces replaced government-determined prices. Farmers were permitted to own land and sell crops on the open market. State firms were granted increased decision-making authority and lost most of their subsidies and pricing advantages. The government set the exchange rate close to real market levels, lifted trade barriers, replaced import barriers with tariffs, and gave private sector firms direct access to imports and credit.
In 1989, the Lao Government reached agreement with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on additional reforms. The government agreed to expand fiscal and monetary reform, promote private enterprise and foreign investment, privatize or close state firms, and strengthen banking. In addition, it agreed to maintain a market exchange rate, reduce tariffs, and eliminate unneeded trade regulations. A liberal foreign investment code was enacted and appears to be slowly making a positive impact in the market. The process of economic reform continues.
These reforms led to increased availability of goods and economic growth that has continued since the early 1990s, despite short-term economic setbacks resulting from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The economy continues to be dominated by a relatively inefficient agricultural sector operating largely outside the money economy, and the public sector continues to play an important role. Tourism is a growing industry and important source of foreign exchange. The Government of Laos is promoting infrastructure development, especially in the hydropower and mining sectors. Several large hydropower projects currently under construction are expected to increase national revenue significantly once completed.
International indices rate Laos poorly on transparency and ease of doing business. Corruption continues to hamper economic development. Laos has begun the World Trade Organization accession process, with the intention of joining that organization as soon as possible.
FOREIGN RELATIONS
The government that assumed power in December 1975 aligned itself with Vietnam and the Soviet bloc and adopted a hostile posture toward the West. In ensuing decades, Laos maintained close ties with the former Soviet Union and its eastern bloc allies, and depended heavily on the Soviet Union for most of its foreign assistance. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Laos has sought to improve relations with its regional neighbors. Laos was admitted into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1997 and applied to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998. The government hopes to accede to the WTO by 2010. Currently, Laos' foreign policy concentrates on its immediate neighbors. Laos generally maintains a low profile in the larger international arena, although it has been playing an increasing role in activities of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Laos maintains a "special relationship" with Vietnam and formalized a 1977 treaty of friendship and cooperation that created tensions with China. Although the two were allies during the Vietnam War, the China-Vietnam conflict in 1979 led to a sharp deterioration in Sino-Lao relations. These relations began to improve in the late 1980s, and in 1989 China and Laos normalized relations. Today China is becoming a major player in Laos; Chinese investment in Laos is increasing at a rapid rate, bringing with it a growing number of Chinese workers. Thailand remains the largest single foreign investor in Laos. In 2003, Laos and Thailand signed agreements to cooperate on cross-border, labor, and counternarcotics issues. Laos and Thailand signed a joint communique in March 2007, the first in 20 years, covering infrastructure development, avian influenza, border control, and Hmong migration issues.
Laos is a member of the following international organizations: Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Regional Forum, Asian Development Bank, Colombo Plan, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (ESCAP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), G-77, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Development Association (IDA), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Labor Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Interpol, International Olympic Commission (IOC), International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Mekong River Commission (MRC), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), UN, United Nations Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Federation of Trade Unions, World Health Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), World Meteorological Organization (WMO), World Tourism Organization, and World Trade Organization (observer).
U.S.-LAO RELATIONS
The United States opened a legation in Laos in 1950. Although diplomatic relations were never severed, U.S.-Lao relations deteriorated during in the post-Indochina War period after 1975. The relationship remained cool until 1982 when efforts at improvement began. Full diplomatic relations were restored in 1992 with a return to ambassadorial-level representation. Accounting for Americans missing in Laos from the Vietnam War has been a special focus of our bilateral relationship. Since the late 1980s, joint U.S. and Lao teams have conducted a series of excavations and investigations of sites related to cases of Americans missing in Laos.
Counternarcotics activities are also an important part of the bilateral relationship. The United States and Laos cooperate closely on opium crop control projects that have helped to bring about a 96% decline in poppy cultivation, from 42,000 hectares in 1989 to 1,100 hectares in 2007. Laos, however, remains on the U.S. list of major opium producers amid signs of some recent increase in poppy cultivation. U.S.-sponsored demand reduction programs have increased Laos' capacity to treat both opium and amphetamine addiction. The U.S. also provides law enforcement assistance to help contend with the rapid growth in methamphetamine trafficking and associated crime that has occurred in Laos since 2003.
The U.S. Government provided more than $18 million in foreign assistance to Laos in FY 2008, in areas including unexploded ordnance clearance and removal, counternarcotics, health and avian influenza, education, economic development, and governance.
In December 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law a bill extending normal trade relations to Laos; in February 2005, a Bilateral Trade Agreement between the United States and Laos entered into force. There has been a consequent rise in Lao exports to the U.S., although the volume of trade remains small in absolute terms. Bilateral trade reached $60.7 million in 2008, compared with $25.4 million in 2007. The Lao Government is working to implement the provisions of the Bilateral Trade Agreement while simultaneously seeking to join the World Trade Organization.
Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Ravic R. Huso
Deputy Chief of Mission--Peter Haymond
The U.S. Embassy in Laos is on Rue Bartholonie, That Dam, Vientiane; tel: 21-26-7000; fax: 21-26-7190: country code: (856); city code (21).
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During the Indonesian refugee crisis more than 3 million people have left Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

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Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region
Over half the world's population lives in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2005, Asia hosted 53 million out of the world's 191 million migrants according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
In the 1970s and 1980s, international migration from Asia grew dramatically. The main destinations were North America, Australia, and the oil economies of the Middle East.
Since the 1990s, migration within Asia has grown, particularly from less-developed countries with massive labor surpluses to fast-growing newly industrializing countries.
Indeed, all countries in Asia experience both emigration and immigration—and often transit migration. But it is possible to differentiate between mainly destination countries (Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan), countries with both significant immigration and emigration (Malaysia and Thailand), and mainly source countries (Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam).
Migration agents and labor brokers organize most recruitment of Asian migrant workers both to the gulf and within Asia. Their dominance is partly due to the unwillingness of receiving states to make bilateral temporary-worker agreements with countries of origin. Although countries like the Philippines regulate such agencies, some recruiters have engaged in the smuggling and trafficking of workers.
Asian governments seek to strictly control migration, and migrants' rights are often very limited. Policymakers encourage temporary labor migration but generally prohibit family reunion and permanent settlement. While most migration in the region is temporary, trends toward long-term stay are becoming evident in some places.
This article examines the main Asian migration systems: movement to Western countries, contract labor to the Middle East, intra-Asian labor migration, movement of highly skilled workers, student mobility, and refugee movements. Most of these movements include substantial illegal migration. This often takes the form of tourist visa-holders overstaying their permits, but smuggling and trafficking of people is also frequent.
Asia includes the Middle East, but we focus here on South Asia (the Indian subcontinent), East Asia, and Southeast Asia, with some discussion of Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific islands.
About This Article
The Development of Asian Migration
Asian migration is not new: westward movements from Central Asia helped shape European history in the Middle Ages, while Chinese migration to Southeast Asia goes back centuries. In the colonial period, millions of indentured workers were recruited, often by force.
Chinese settlers in Southeast Asian countries and South Asians in Africa became trading minorities with an important intermediary role for colonialism. This often led to hostility — and even mass expulsions — after independence.
However, it also helped create the ethnic networks that encouraged more recent migrations. In the 19th century, hundreds of thousands migrated from China and Japan to the United States, Canada, and Australia. In all three destination countries, discriminatory legislation was enacted to prevent these movements.
Migration from Asia was low in the early part of the 20th century owing to such legislation and the restrictive policies of colonial powers.
Movements within Asia continued, often connected with political struggles. Japan recruited 40,000 workers from its then colony, Korea, between 1921 and 1941.
Some 25 million people migrated from densely populated Chinese provinces to Manchuria between the 1890s to the 1930s; about 8 million remained there to defend China from Japanese expansionism.
In the often-violent mass population transfers following Indian independence in 1947, about 5 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India, and about 6 million Muslims moved to Pakistan from India.
Internal Movement
Movement to the West started to grow in the 1960s for complex reasons. Discriminatory rules against Asian entries were repealed in Canada, the United States, and Australia. Increased foreign investment and trade helped create the communicative networks needed for migration.
The U.S. military presence in Korea, Vietnam, and other Asian countries forged transnational links, with some servicemen bringing home Asian brides.
The Vietnam War caused large-scale refugee movements. The openness of the United States, Canada, and Australia to family migration meant that primary movements from Vietnam, whatever their cause, gave rise to further entries of permanent settlers.
The huge construction projects in the gulf oil countries caused mass recruitment of temporary contract workers. Rapid economic growth in several Asian countries led to movements of both highly skilled and unskilled workers.
Emigration for employment from countries within the region has grown at about 6 percent annually over the last two decades, with about 2.6 million people leaving their homes in search of work each year.
In the early 21st century, some 6.1 million Asians were employed outside their own countries within the Asian region according to Australian demographer Graeme Hugo. He roughly estimated the number of illegal migrants in Southeast Asia countries in the early 2000s at about 3.8 million.
Huge estimates about 8.7 million Asian migrants in the Middle East and over 20 million Asian migrant workers worldwide.
Asian Migration to Western Europe, North America, and Oceania
Three European countries experienced large Asian migrations connected with decolonization after World War II: the Netherlands from the former Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia); France from Vietnam; and the United Kingdom from the Indian subcontinent and Hong Kong. There were also some smaller movements, like those from Goa, Macau, and East Timor to Portugal. Such movements had declined considerably by the late 1970s.
In the 1980s, Vietnamese workers were recruited by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. Although often called trainees, these migrants shared many of the characteristics of contract workers. After German reunification in 1990, many remained.
Asian migration to countries across Europe, a recent trend, has grown. Top European destinations include Italy, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. China, India, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand are all significant source countries.
The migrants include medical and information technology personnel, female domestic workers (especially in Southern Europe), and manual workers who often move illegally.
In 2005, three Asian countries made the top 10 source countries for foreign residents in Italy: China (127,800 immigrants), the Philippines (89,700), and India (61,800). Indian nationals made up the largest group within the UK foreign-born population, with an estimated 627,000 residents in 2008; Pakistan was in fourth place with 416,000.
Most Asian migrants live in the traditional immigration countries: the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In the United States, the number of migrants from Asia increased from 17,000 in 1965, the year the U.S. Congress dismantled the quota system, to an average of more than 250,000 annually in the 1980s and over 350,000 per year in the early 1990s.
Most Asians came to the United States through family reunification provisions, though refugee or skilled worker movements were often the first link in the migratory chain. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's 2007 American Community Survey, immigrants from the Philippines (1.70 million) made up the second largest group after Mexico. Indian immigrants (1.50 million) were the third largest group, followed by Chinese immigrants (1.36 million).
Asian immigration to Australia developed after the repeal of the White Australia Policy in 1973, with additional stimulus from the Indo-Chinese refugee movement at the end of the 1970s.
Among Australia's top 10 source countries in 2005 were China (third after New Zealand and the United Kingdom), India, the Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Hong Kong. The 2006 Australian census put the Asia-born population at about 1.2 million, over one-quarter of all immigrants.
In Canada, nondiscriminatory selection criteria and an emphasis on family and refugee entry opened the door to Asian migration in 1976. Since 1993, over half of all immigrants have come from Asia, mainly China, India, and the Philippines. By the 2006 census, the roughly 2.3 million residents of Asian origin (not including Oceania or the Middle East) made up over a third of the total immigrant population of 6.5 million.
New Zealand began opening up in the 1950s, as economic and political links with nearby Pacific islands gave rise to new inflows. From 1991, policies encouraged immigration of people with professional skills and capital for investment. Most of these came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.
According to New Zealand's 2006 census, China was the second most common birthplace after England. India and Korea were also in the top nine, as were Samoa and Fiji.
Contract Labor Migration to the Middle East
Labor migration from Asia to the Middle East developed rapidly after the oil-price rises of 1973. Oil-rich gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates imported labor first from India and Pakistan, then from the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea, and later from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
In the 1970s, mainly male migrants worked on construction projects. The governments of India, Pakistan, and the Philippines actively marketed their labor abroad and made labor-supply agreements with gulf countries.
Korean construction companies took on contracts in the Arab region, which included provision of labor. The Asian labor-sending countries also allowed private agencies to organize recruitment.
The gulf countries made it clear, however, that these workers would not be allowed to permanently settle or bring their families, a situation that has not changed.
By 1985, there were 3.2 million Asian workers in the gulf states according to economist Manolo Abella, but some 450,000 Asians returned to their countries of origin after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1990-1991 gulf war.
After the war, gulf countries' recruitment of Asian workers increased again, partly due to reconstruction needs but also because the gulf countries wanted to replace "politically unreliable" Palestinians in Kuwait and Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. Israel began to recruit Thais and Filipinos for agriculture, construction, and domestic work, after security measures blocked entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.
The temporary decline of the construction sector after 1985 encouraged more diverse employment of contract workers. The demand for domestic workers, nurses, sales staff, and other service personnel surged, leading to a marked feminization of migrant labor flows, with Sri Lanka and Indonesia as the main sources. In later years, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel also became labor-importing countries.
Around 2002, Hugo estimated the number of Asian workers in the Middle East at 3 million Indians, 1 million Pakistanis, 1.8 million Bangladeshis, 0.9 million Sri Lankans, 1.5 million Filipinos, and 0.4 million Indonesians.
While all workers in the Middle East have limited rights, female domestic workers are highly vulnerable to exploitation and sexual abuse, and it is difficult for the authorities of their countries of origin to provide protection.
The governments of Bangladesh, Iran, Nepal, the Philippines, and Pakistan banned some types of female migration to the gulf but found the ban impossible to enforce due to the activities of illegal recruitment agents. The bans have mostly been lifted although some limitations remain.
Asian migration to the Middle East has become more differentiated over time. While many migrants remain low-skilled laborers, others have semiskilled or skilled jobs as drivers, mechanics, or building tradesmen.
Others came with professional or paraprofessional qualification (engineers, nurses, and medical practitioners). Asians fill many managerial and technical posts but sometimes report to senior personnel recruited from Europe or North America.
In many cases, Asian labor migrants were not part of the unemployed rural and urban poor at home. Rather, they tend to have above-average education levels, and they are attracted to the gulf by the relatively high wage levels promised (though not always delivered).
In 2004, Asians made up between 40 and 70 percent of the workforce in gulf countries according to the International Labor Organization (ILO).
With growing populations of young people who need jobs, gulf states have attempted to reduce dependence on Asian labor since the late 1990s by recruiting local workers, restricting new entries, and deporting illegal migrants. The completion of some large construction projects has further reduced labor inflows, especially of male manual workers.
Labor Migration within Asia
Since the mid-1980s, rapid economic growth and declining fertility have led to strong demand for labor in the new industrial economies of East and Southeast Asia. Labor migration within Asia grew exponentially in the first half of the 1990s. Some migrants returned home during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999, but labor migration resumed quickly.
Early flows were mainly low-skilled workers. In recent years, flows of the highly skilled have increased throughout the region, and demand for health-care workers is increasing (see section on highly qualified migrants).
Yet Asian migrants do not dominate the workforces of other Asian countries they way do in gulf countries. According to estimates from ILO, in 2004-2005, migrants made up less than 2 percent of the workforce in Japan, 12 percent in Malaysia, and 28 percent in Singapore.
While existing flows from countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines have continued, new source countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma have become more significant. It is impossible to detail here the complex experience of each Asian country. Instead we will discuss some general trends.
Feminization of Migration
The demand for female domestic workers surged first in the Middle East, and, from the 1990s, within Asia, particularly Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. In 2002-2003, women made up 65 to 73 percent of labor migrants departing from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangaladesh according to Hugo.
Figures for destination countries are not always available, but ILO reported in 2006 that there were 202,900 women migrants in domestic work in Hong Kong in 2000, while Malaysia had 155,000 documented and "many more undocumented migrant domestic workers" in 2002.
Beyond domestic work, most migrant women within Asia have "typically female" jobs: entertainers (often a euphemism for prostitutes), restaurant and hotel staff, and assembly-line workers in clothing and electronics. These jobs offer poor pay, conditions, and status, and are associated with patriarchal stereotypes of female docility, obedience, and willingness to give personal service. As in gulf countries, Asian countries rarely allow them to permanently settle or bring over their families.
Another form of female migration is for marriage. Since the 1990s, foreign brides have been sought by farmers in rural areas of Japan and Taiwan due to the exodus of local women to more attractive urban settings. This is one of the few forms of permanent immigration permitted in Asia.
In the last decade, marriage migration to Korea has increased, with international marriages accounting for almost 14 percent of all marriages in Korea in 2005; percentages are higher in rural areas. Indian men now recruit brides in Bangladesh, and Chinese farmers, due to severe gender imbalances resulting from the one-child policy, seek wives from Vietnam, Laos, and Burma.
Illegal Migration
Illegal migration has grown rapidly and affects many countries in the region. Up to one in four migrant workers in Asia may have illegal status according to ILO. Labor flows from Indonesia to Malaysia have been largely illegal, as have the movements of Thai workers to Malaysia and other countries. Thailand itself hosts up to 1.7 million illegal workers, mainly from Burma, according to the International Organization for Migration.
The growth of illegal migration in Asia is linked to governments' unwillingness to effectively manage migration and to employers' desire for easily available and exploitable workers. Spontaneous illegal migration can meet labor needs effectively, but it creates a situation of insecurity and rightlessness for workers.
Unlike some Western countries (especially Spain and Italy), which have regularized illegal migrants, Asian countries have tended to turn a blind eye to illegal workers at times of economic growth with campaigns of mass expulsion in economic downturns.
However, deportations have often been limited both by lack of institutional capacity and employer demands to retain migrant workers in low-wage sectors such as catering, domestic work, and plantations.
Malaysia is a good example: mass expulsions have been announced on a number of occasions, particularly during the 1997-1999 financial crisis and more recently in response to the global recession. Irregular migrants have been blamed not only for unemployment but also for crime and disease. Vigilante groups have been encouraged to support the authorities in seeking out irregular migrants, leading in some cases to violence.
Recently, Asian governments' desire to combat drug trafficking and terrorism have led to attempts at multilateral cooperation to prevent illegal migration. For instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted a Plan of Action on Immigration Matters designed to encourage skilled migration, facilitate legal movement between ASEAN countries, and combat people smuggling and trafficking.
The broader regional association, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, held a meeting of high-ranking officials in August 2008 to discuss use of new technologies in migration control.
Highly Qualified Migrants and Students
Most Asian migration is of low-skilled workers, but mobility of professionals, executives, technicians, and other highly skilled personnel has grown in the last 30 years. This "brain-drain" can mean a serious loss of human capital in medicine, science, engineering, management, and education. Depending on the origin country's labor needs, losing such people can present a major obstacle to development.
At the same time, highly skilled migrants can be a source of remittances and investment for countries of origin and help homeland producers gain new markets abroad. Today, a key debate centers on what states can do to minimize brain drain and to facilitate "brain circulation," or the return of talent, permanently or temporarily. Here we will look at some of the Asian trends.
Country studies show substantial skill losses for Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In the Philippines, 40 percent of permanent emigrants had a college education, and 30 percent of IT workers and 60 percent of physicians emigrated according to the work of demographer B. Lindsay Lowell and others. For Sri Lanka, academically qualified professionals comprised up to one-third of outflows in the 1980s and 1990s.
The opposite side of the coin is developed countries' reliance on immigrant professionals. In the United States, the 2000 census revealed that half of the graduates who arrived in the 1990s were from Asia, with India and China as the largest sources. Almost one-third worked in natural and social sciences, engineering, and computer-related occupations.
Another form of highly qualified migration concerns executives and experts transferred within multinational enterprises, or officials posted abroad by international organizations. China had some 200,000 foreign specialists in 2000, while Malaysia had 32,000 and Vietnam about 30,000. They came from other Asian countries, but also from the United States, Europe, and Australia.
Student mobility is often a precursor to skilled migration. Between 1998 and 2003, 2.6 million Asian students studied in other countries. The Chinese were the largest group (471,000), followed by South Koreans (214,000), Indians (207,000), and Japanese (191,000).
Australia changed its immigration rules in 1999 to take advantage of foreign students, mainly from China and India, educated at Australian universities. Rather than having to leave Australia on graduation and wait three years before applying to migrate, they are allowed to remain in the country as they pursue their immigration applications. By 2002, as social scientist Lesleyanne Hawthorne found, over half of Australia's skilled-migrant applications came from former students.
However, fewer Chinese and Indian students are going abroad as the quality of universities at home rise. Asian countries are also recruiting foreign students. China's foreign student inflows (especially from Thailand) are increasing. Japan has seen substantial growth in foreign students: by 2008, 118,000 were enrolled, and the Japanese government planned to increase this number to 300,000 by 2020.
An important emerging trend is the growth of highly skilled mobility within Asia. Regional migration flows are becoming far more diverse. India, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Malaysia are all seeking to attract overseas professionals either on a temporary or permanent basis. Like developed countries, they have introduced privileged immigration and residence regimes for this category.
Often Asian countries are seeking to lure back their own diasporas — the professionals and students who left when there were few opportunities at home. Taiwan has been especially successful in maintaining contacts with expatriates and drawing them back as industrialization progressed.
China and India are following this example. The Chinese diaspora has been a crucial source of capital and expertise in China's economic growth. India began formalizing its relationship with its diaspora in 2000. In 2004, the government established a Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs to court the diaspora with special investment measures and "overseas citizenship" that allows for lifelong visa-free travel to India, among other benefits.
Refugees
In terms of refugee movements, East Asia and the Pacific have stayed relatively peaceful in recent decades compared with the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia.
At the end of 2008, war-torn Afghanistan — which millions of people first fled in 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded — remained the biggest global source of refugees, with 2.8 million (one-fourth of the global refugee population) in 69 different asylum countries according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Pakistan hosted the most refugees of any country in 2008, with 1.8 million, nearly all from Afghanistan.
Before Afghanistan, the region's main refugee situation arose when the Vietnam War ended in 1975. More than 3 million people fled from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, many as "boat people," sailing long distances in overcrowded small boats, at risk of shipwreck and pirate attacks.
During the next 20 years, 2.5 million found new homes elsewhere, while a half million returned. Over a million Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians were resettled in the United States, with smaller numbers in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe. China accepted about 300,000 refugees, mainly of ethnic Chinese origin. Other Asian countries were unwilling to accept settlers.
The Afghan emergency in 1979 came just after the Indo-Chinese exodus, and Western countries showed little willingness to provide homes for new waves of refugees. Indeed, most Afghans went to Pakistan and Iran, which were willing to provide refuge for extended periods.
When Russia left Afghanistan, in 1992, about 1.5 million Afghan refugees returned home. However, Taliban rule, a four-year drought, and the devastated condition of the country delayed the return of others. To help fund the costs of rebuilding their villages, increasing numbers of Afghans went to work in the gulf states, while others sought asylum in Western countries.
The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, attacks was designed to destroy Al-Qaida and the Taliban, establish a legitimate government, and permit the return of refugees. In March 2002, the Afghan Transitional Authority and UNHCR started a mass return program. By July 2002, more than 1.3 million Afghans had returned, 1.2 million from Pakistan and 100,000 from Iran. This unexpectedly rapid repatriation put severe strain on UNHCR finances.
Meanwhile, the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, and other Western countries began sending back Afghan asylum seekers, even though it was far from clear that conditions were safe in Afghanistan. The intensification of hostilities between U.S.-led forces and the Taliban from 2005 hindered further returns. Pakistan and Iran continued to host the largest refugee populations in the world.
Apart from these two huge refugee movements, Asia has seen many smaller exoduses smaller in numbers.
After the failure of the democracy movement in 1989, thousands of Chinese sought asylum overseas. Conflicts linked to the break-up of the former Soviet Union led to mass displacements in the 1990s affecting many new states, including Georgia, Chechnya, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan.
At least 50,000 North Koreans have fled to China, South Korea, and elsewhere. Other long-standing refugee populations include Tibetans and Bhutanese in India and Nepal, and Burmese in Thailand and Bangladesh. In 2005-2006, Muslims from both southern Thailand and southern Philippines fled to Malaysia to escape persistent internal conflict.
The long civil war in Sri Lanka led to mass internal displacement as well as refugee outflows. In 2001, an estimated 144,000 Sri Lankan Tamils were living in camps in India, while other Tamils were dispersed around the world. The resurgence of fighting in 2006 led to new displacements, especially of Tamils from the north of the island.
In January 2009, UNHCR counted 137,752 Sri Lankan refugees around the world, and over half a million persons internally displaced within Sri Lanka. The final offensive of April-May 2009 led to many civilian deaths and injuries and to further large-scale flight. In early July 2009, 280,000 persons were reported to be housed in government camps in northern Sri Lanka.
The majority of the population of East Timor was forced to flee violence at the time of the vote for independence in 1999. Most were able to return after the UN peacekeeping mission, but new violence forced 150,000 from their homes in 2006.
The major political shifts in Indonesia after 1998 led to massive internal displacements, as well as refugee flows from areas of civil war, such as Aceh. Again, recent peace settlements have allowed many people to return.
Looking Ahead
Asian migration has become much more complex, yet some general features remain. One is the lack of long-term planning: movements have been shaped not only by government labor policies, but also by the actions of employers, migrants, and the migration industry.
Second, illegal migration is very high, and agents and brokers play a major role.
Third, the weakness of migration management in some countries contrasts with the dominant Asian model of migration: strict control of foreign workers, prohibition of settlement and family reunification, and denial of worker rights.
Finally, East Asian authorities emphasize the importance of maintaining ethnic homogeneity, while Southeast Asian governments wish to safeguard existing ethnic balances. But the globalization of migration is bringing about rapid changes, and it is far from clear that Asian governments will be able to prevent unforeseen shifts.
By the early 21st century, Asia was beginning to see signs of increasing dependence on foreign workers for dirty, dangerous, and difficult (so-called 3-D) jobs as labor force growth slows in industrializing countries and local workers reject menial tasks.
In these circumstances, employers sought to retain "good workers," migrants prolonged their stays, and family reunion or formation of new families in the receiving country took place. Processes of permanent settlement were beginning to become evident, especially for the highly skilled, but also often for less-skilled workers willing to take on the jobs that nationals rejected.
Trends toward democracy and the rule of law were also making it hard to ignore human rights. The growth of nongovernment organizations working for migrants' rights in Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines indicated the growing strength of civil society. It therefore seemed reasonable to predict that settlement and increased cultural diversity would affect many Asian labor-importing countries; yet Asian governments were only just beginning to think about the need for plans to deal with long-term effects of migration.
The onset of the global recession seems to have interrupted the growth of Asian labor migration. Early analyses predicted relative economic stability in the gulf countries, where most migrants from the Indian sub-continent are concentrated, but forecast large falls in economic growth in Southeast and East Asian countries, where most migrants from Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma are employed.
Export-dependent economies have been hit particularly hard. As of July 2009, economic forecasts for the gulf countries look less positive, while production declines in East and Southeast Asia seem even more severe, with falls in output of up to 40 percent in some sectors in Malaysia, South Korea, and Japan.
Migrant workers are often the first to be laid off, and some countries (such as South Korea) have suspended their migrant worker recruitment programs. Yet conditions are often even worse in origin countries, so that unemployed migrants are often reluctant to return home, while new migrants continue to seek ways of moving abroad.
It is too early to predict the recession's long-term effects on Asian migration. Much depends on the length, depth, and characteristics of the crisis. A long recession might well lead to increased popular hostility against immigrants and to protectionist measures.
On the other hand, processes of economic change resulting from the downturn might well contribute to a shift in economic power to new industrial regions.
This could enhance long-term employment prospects in Asia. Despite recent growth, migratory movements are still quite small in comparison with Asia's vast population. Migrant workers make up a far smaller proportion of the labor force in countries like Japan and Korea than in European countries (although the proportion is large in Singapore and Malaysia).
The potential for growth following the recession appears obvious. The economies of East and Southeast Asia seem likely to pull in large numbers of migrant workers in the future, a trend that may have far-reaching social and political consequences.
The 21st century has been dubbed the "Pacific century" in terms of economic and political development, but it may also be an epoch of rapidly growing migration and population diversity in Asia.
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Question: where did the rat u vijetnamu refugees come from

During the Indonesian refugee crisis more than 3 million people have left Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

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Question: rat u vijetnamu refugee crisis in indonesia

izbjegličke krize preko 3 milijuna ljudi napustilo

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izbjegličke krize preko 3 milijuna ljudi napustilo

Question: rat u vijetnamu refugee crisis is in which country

rat u vijetnamu refugee crisis is in which country

Question: how many people left vietnam during the indonesian refugee crisis

how many people left vietnam during the indonesian refugee crisis

During the Indonesian refugee crisis more than 3 million people have left Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia .

Tijekom Indokineske izbjegličke krize preko 3 milijuna ljudi napustilo je Vijetnam, Laos i Kambodžu.

Tijekom Indokineske izbjegličke krize preko 3 milijuna ljudi napustilo je Vijetnam, Laos i Kambodžu.

During the Indonesian refugee crisis more than 3 million people have left Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

During the Indonesian refugee crisis more than 3 million people have left Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

August 2009.

Between 1975 and 1998, it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries fled to the United States, while Canada, Australia and France received more than 500 thousand.

Question: how many vietnamese refugees fled to the us between 1975 and 1998

August 2009.

Between 1975 and 1998, it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries fled to the United States, while Canada, Australia and France received more than 500 thousand.

how many vietnamese refugees fled to the us between 1975 and 1998

Question: how many refugees fled vietnam to the united states between 1975 and 1998

August 2009.

how many refugees fled vietnam to the united states between 1975 and 1998

Question: where did rat u vijetnamu refugees come from

August 2009.

where did rat u vijetnamu refugees come from

Question: how many refugees fled vietnam to the us between 1975 and 1998

August 2009.

how many refugees fled vietnam to the us between 1975 and 1998

Between 1975 and 1998 , it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries fled to the United States , while Canada , Australia and France received more than 500 thousand .

Srpanj 2009. Između 1975. i 1998. godine procijenjeno je da je 1,2 milijuna izbjeglica iz Vijetnama i ostalih južnoistočnih azijskih zemalja pobjeglo u Sjedinjene Države, dok su Kanada, Australija i Francuska prihvatile preko 500 tisuća.

Između 1975. i 1998. godine procijenjeno je da je 1,2 milijuna izbjeglica iz Vijetnama i ostalih južnoistočnih azijskih zemalja pobjeglo u Sjedinjene Države, dok su Kanada, Australija i Francuska prihvatile preko 500 tisuća.

August 2009. Between 1975 and 1998, it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries fled to the United States, while Canada, Australia and France received more than 500 thousand.

Between 1975 and 1998, it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries fled to the United States, while Canada, Australia and France received more than 500 thousand.

China has received about 250,000 refugees.

Question: how many refugees from vietnam to the united states

China has received about 250,000 refugees.

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Question: how many vietnamese refugees came to the united states between 1975 and 1998

how many vietnamese refugees came to the united states between 1975 and 1998

Question: how many refugees came to the united states between 1975 and 1998

how many refugees came to the united states between 1975 and 1998

China has received about 250,000 refugees .

Između 1975. i 1998. godine procijenjeno je da je 1,2 milijuna izbjeglica iz Vijetnama i ostalih južnoistočnih azijskih zemalja pobjeglo u Sjedinjene Države, dok su Kanada, Australija i Francuska prihvatile preko 500 tisuća. Kina je prihvatila oko 250 tisuća izbjeglica.

Kina je prihvatila oko 250 tisuća izbjeglica.

Between 1975 and 1998, it is estimated that 1.2 million refugees from Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries fled to the United States, while Canada, Australia and France received more than 500 thousand. China has received about 250,000 refugees.

China has received about 250,000 refugees.

The remains of war (mainly explosive devices) are still killing people today.

Question: what is the main weapon used in vijetnamu

The remains of war (mainly explosive devices) are still killing people today.

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Question: what is the main cause of death in vijetnamu

rata ( uglavnom eksplozivne naprave ) i danas ubijaju

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Question: what kind of weapons are used in vijetnamu

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rata ( uglavnom eksplozivne naprave ) i danas ubijaju

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Question: what is still killing people in vijetnamu

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Question: who are the remains of war killing today

who are the remains of war killing today

The remains of war ( mainly explosive devices ) are still killing people today .

Ostaci rata (uglavnom eksplozivne naprave) i danas ubijaju ljude.

Ostaci rata (uglavnom eksplozivne naprave) i danas ubijaju ljude.

The remains of war (mainly explosive devices) are still killing people today.

The remains of war (mainly explosive devices) are still killing people today.

According to the Vietnamese government, approximately 42 thousand people were killed by remaining mines and other explosive devices after the conflict ended.

Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (April 28, 2011)

In 2012, according to reports of activists and government official documents from bombs and other explosive devices hidden during the war, about 500 people were killed in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Question: how many people were killed in vietnam in 2012

According to the Vietnamese government, approximately 42 thousand people were killed by remaining mines and other explosive devices after the conflict ended.

Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (April 28, 2011)

In 2012, according to reports of activists and government official documents from bombs and other explosive devices hidden during the war, about 500 people were killed in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

how many people were killed in vietnam in 2012

Question: how many people were killed by mines and bombs in vietnam

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Question: which country was involved in the vietnam war

which country was involved in the vietnam war

Question: how many people were killed by mines and other explosive devices in vietnam

how many people were killed by mines and other explosive devices in vietnam

According to the Vietnamese government , approximately 42 thousand people were killed by remaining mines and other explosive devices after the conflict ended .

Vietnam war shell explodes , kills two fishermen The Australian ( April 28 , 2011 )

In 2012 , according to reports of activists and government official documents from bombs and other explosive devices hidden during the war , about 500 people were killed in Vietnam , Laos and Cambodia .

Prema podacima vijetnamske vlade otprilike 42 tisuće ljudi poginulo je od zaostalih mina i drugih eksplozivnih naprava nakon završetka sukoba.Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (28. travnja 2011.) Godine 2012. prema izvještajima aktivista i vladinih službenih dokumenata od bombi i ostalih eksplozivnih naprava skrivenih tijekom rata poginulo je oko 500 ljudi u Vijetnamu, Laosu i Kambodži.

Prema podacima vijetnamske vlade otprilike 42 tisuće ljudi poginulo je od zaostalih mina i drugih eksplozivnih naprava nakon završetka sukoba.

Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (28. travnja 2011.)

Godine 2012. prema izvještajima aktivista i vladinih službenih dokumenata od bombi i ostalih eksplozivnih naprava skrivenih tijekom rata poginulo je oko 500 ljudi u Vijetnamu, Laosu i Kambodži.

According to the Vietnamese government, approximately 42 thousand people were killed by remaining mines and other explosive devices after the conflict ended. Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (April 28, 2011) In 2012, according to reports of activists and government official documents from bombs and other explosive devices hidden during the war, about 500 people were killed in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

According to the Vietnamese government, approximately 42 thousand people were killed by remaining mines and other explosive devices after the conflict ended.

Vietnam war shell explodes, kills two fishermen The Australian (April 28, 2011)

In 2012, according to reports of activists and government official documents from bombs and other explosive devices hidden during the war, about 500 people were killed in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Chemicals known as Agent Orange and other types of chemicals have also caught a large number of victims and are responsible for the injuries of the population over the years after the end of the conflict, including the U.S. Air Force that had dealt with them.

U.S. starts its first Agent Orange cleanup in Vietnam
HANOI
HANOI (Reuters) - The United States and Vietnam on Thursday began cleaning up the toxic chemical defoliant Agent Orange on part of Danang International Airport, marking the first time Washington has been involved in cleaning up Agent Orange in Vietnam.
The U.S. military sprayed up to 12 million gallons of the defoliant onto Vietnam's jungles over a 10-year period during the Vietnam War, and the question of compensation for the subsequent health problems is a major post-war issue.
Respiratory cancer and birth defects amongst both Vietnamese and U.S. veterans have been linked to exposure to Agent Orange.
"We are both moving earth and taking the first steps to bury the legacies of our past," U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam David Shear said at a ceremony at Danang airport on Thursday.
"I look forward to even more successes to follow."
The U.S. government is providing $41 million to the project which will reduce the contamination level in 73,000 cubic meters of soil by late 2016, the ruling Vietnam Communist Party's mouthpiece Nhan Dan daily said.
The contaminated soil and sediment will be excavated and heated in a pile structure to a high temperature to destroy the chemical, the U.S. embassy said in a statement on Thursday.
Vietnam's defense ministry has cleared unexploded ordinance from the airport site, to allow the clean up, and will built a power station to serve the project, said Shear.
Danang in Vietnam's central region is a popular tourist destination. During the Vietnam War, that ended in 1975, the beach city was used as a recreational spot for U.S. soldiers.
Agent Orange was stored at Danang airbase and sprayed from U.S. warplanes to expose northern communist troops and destroy their supplies in jungles along the border with Laos.
The United States and Vietnam were looking at a second cleanup site, Bien Hoa, in the southern province of Dong Nai, said Shear.
The Bien Hoa airport is regarded as another 'hotspot' for dioxin contamination, along with Phu Cat airport in the central province of Binh Dinh.
The contamination level at Bien Hoa airport is higher than Danang airport, but only a small area of Bien Hoa has been buried to prevent the toxic waste spreading, the Ho Chi Minh City Law newspaper said.
(Reporting by Ho Binh Minh; Editing by Michael Perry)
And they wonder why people do not believe anything the government says?
Note to editor: if it’s the kind of thing that explodes, the spelling is “ordnance.” Auto-correct spellcheck FAIL again….

Question: what is the chemical name for rat u vijetnamu

Chemicals known as Agent Orange and other types of chemicals have also caught a large number of victims and are responsible for the injuries of the population over the years after the end of the conflict, including the U.S. Air Force that had dealt with them.

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Question: agent orange is a type of what

Question: who was involved in the rat u vijetnamu disaster

who was involved in the rat u vijetnamu disaster

Question: what type of chemicals were used in rat u vijetnamu

poznata pod imenom Agent Orange i druge vrste kemikalija

what type of chemicals were used in rat u vijetnamu

Question: what happened to the population of rat u vijetnamu

what happened to the population of rat u vijetnamu

Question: when did agent orange become toxic in vijetnamu

when did agent orange become toxic in vijetnamu

Chemicals known as Agent Orange and other types of chemicals have also caught a large number of victims and are responsible for the injuries of the population over the years after the end of the conflict , including the U.S. Air Force that had dealt with them .

Kemijska supstanca poznata pod imenom Agent Orange i druge vrste kemikalija također su uzele veliki broj žrtava i odgovorne su za ozljede stanovništva tijekom godina nakon završetka sukoba, uključujući i američke zrakoplovne snage koje su s njima baratale.

Kemijska supstanca poznata pod imenom Agent Orange i druge vrste kemikalija također su uzele veliki broj žrtava i odgovorne su za ozljede stanovništva tijekom godina nakon završetka sukoba, uključujući i američke zrakoplovne snage koje su s njima baratale.

Chemicals known as Agent Orange and other types of chemicals have also caught a large number of victims and are responsible for the injuries of the population over the years after the end of the conflict, including the U.S. Air Force that had dealt with them.

Chemicals known as Agent Orange and other types of chemicals have also caught a large number of victims and are responsible for the injuries of the population over the years after the end of the conflict, including the U.S. Air Force that had dealt with them.

According to some opinions, “the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy (the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam) lies not in those who fought, but in those who sat in Congress...”.

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President Richard Nixon's Role in the Vietnam War
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Vietnam Chronology | Vietnam Bibliography HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
On January 20, 1969, when Richard Nixon became the fifth U.S. President in twenty years to confront the question of American involvement in Vietnam, there were 540,000 American troops in Vietnam sent by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, more than 325 men being held prisoners of war, and America was sharply divided over our purpose and our presence in Vietnam.
Over the course of his first term, President Nixon charted a course which did not yield to the demands of a vocal, disruptive, and sometimes violent majority. With the support of the majority of the American people, he sought to conclude America's role in Vietnam without concluding America's role in the world.
His leadership resulted in the signing of a peace agreement on January 27, 1973, which earned with it the hope that the people of South Vietnam might enjoy freedom and peace in the years to come.
Harry Truman was the first American President to commit the United States to aiding Vietnam by sending military advisors there in 1950, while Vietnam was still under French colonial control. This reflected an American commitment to preventing Communist domination of Vietnam.
President Eisenhower continued that commitment. But in 1954, with the French withdrawal from Vietnam, the formula changed. Vietnam was partitioned, with the North falling under the control of the Communists and the South under the control of Vietnamese nationalists and anti-Communists. By 1960, there were a total of 685 non-combat U.S. advisors in South Vietnam.
President Kennedy was the third President to affirm our basic policy in Vietnam, but the first to expand it to a new, heightened level of commitment. He increased the number of U.S. military combat advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. The Kennedy administration also committed a tragic blunder that forever changed the equation in Vietnam. On November 1, 1963, a coup encouraged and supported by the Kennedy administration led to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. By participating in the removal of South Vietnam's President, Kennedy had made the United States directly responsible for the fate of South Vietnam. What had been Vietnam's war became America's war.
President Johnson escalated the American role to the level at which President Nixon found it. Following overwhelming Congressional approval of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution , which ratified his actions, Johnson began sustained bombing of North Vietnam, raised U.S. troop levels to 200,000 by the end of 1965, and 540,000 by the end of 1968. LESSONS FROM THE FRENCH FAILURE
Richard Nixon's first visit to Vietnam occurred in 1953, as part of his extensive Asian tour undertaken on behalf of President Eisenhower. The French colonial presence would soon end in defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Vice President Nixon came away convinced that the French failure to adequately train and inspire the Indochinese to defend themselves against Communist aggression would be their undoing.
From 1961 through 1968, Richard Nixon visited South Vietnam four times. Never criticizing U.S. policy while abroad, he nevertheless raised serious reservations about it at home. He became convinced that the U.S. was in danger of repeating the mistake made by the French - insufficient training of the South Vietnamese troops in defense of their country against Communist aggression. He also believed that the United States could not prevail by pursuing a course of gradualism. The U.S. policy of offering bombing halts in exchange for progress in negotiations only succeeded in convincing the North Vietnamese that American resolve was wavering. VIETNAM AND THE 1968 CAMPAIGN
In the 1968 campaign, candidate Nixon asserted in virtually every speech that the goal of his administration would be to "end the war and win the peace in Vietnam." One of the enduring myths of the 1968 presidential campaign is that the Republican nominee claimed to have a "secret plan" to end the war. He never made such a claim.
Just days before the election, President Johnson announced a bombing halt which many believed was designed to give his Vice President, and Nixon's opponent, Hubert Humphrey, a last-minute boost at the polls.
If that was the intent, it nearly succeeded. Nixon's substantial lead just prior to the
bombing halt two weeks before the election turned into a squeaker on election night.
President-elect Nixon was committed to ending the war in such a way that would guarantee freedom and security for South Vietnam, while maintaining America's standing as a reliable ally on the world stage. He would enter office, however, hampered by LBJ's bombing halt and by the negotiations in Paris, which were notable only for the propaganda points they earned for the North Vietnamese. RESISTING THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT
Achieving President Nixon's quest for peace in Vietnam required a dual approach: he had to begin the process of ending the war while uniting the nation behind his policy for achieving that goal. The war could not be won on the battlefield if it was being lost in
the living rooms and the streets of America.
The President had to move boldly to take control, to bring the American people firmly behind him if he was to have any hope of ending the war while winning the peace. He had to resist those on the left who wanted an immediate withdrawal, as well as those on the right who wanted an immediate escalation of the war. CAMBODIA: A MILITARY SUCCESS
Throughout 1969 and into 1970, the North Vietnamese army was making increasing use of sanctuaries in Cambodia, both to supply troops in the field and for use as staging areas for offensives into South Vietnam. Communist violations of Cambodia's sovereignty had begun as early as 1965.
In March 1969, President Nixon ordered unannounced bombing runs into Cambodia to weaken the enemy's supply routes and storage areas. Shortly after the first
such attack took place, the North Vietnamese acted on the President's proposal to initiate a secret negotiating channel. While this action met with substantial success, it became clear that a more intensive operation would be needed to counteract North Vietnam's massive abuse of Cambodian neutrality to support its war machine.
On May 14, 1969, President Nixon made his first major address about Vietnam over nationwide TV and radio. His peace proposal went beyond anything previously offered by the United States.
Two months later, in Guam, the President outlined what would become known as the Nixon Doctrine . He laid out his vision for the U.S. role in Asia after Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine declared that the United States would honor its commitments in Asia by furnishing arms and aid - but not troops - against direct or indirect Communist aggression.
On April 30, 1970, President Nixon announced to the nation the beginning of an operation to clean out enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia so they could not be used to prolong the war through further aggression in South Vietnam. The President assured the American people that this was not an invasion of Cambodia. Only areas occupied and controlled by the North Vietnamese would be attacked by the joint American-South Vietnamese force.
By the time the action concluded on June 30, 1970, the date Nixon promised to conclude the attack, huge supplies of arms, equipment, ammunition, and food had been captured, including a year's supply of ammunition, nearly 23,000 rifles and machine guns, more than 2,500 heavy mortars and rocket launchers, and over 14 million pounds of rice. In all, almost as much was captured in Cambodia in the first month of the operation than had been captured in all of Vietnam in 1969. The Communists had to scrap their plans for a spring offensive. KENT STATE
The President's Cambodia announcement was met with a firestorm of protest from his critics. They accused him of widening the war and sabotaging any prospect for peace. Demonstrations erupted on college campuses across the nation.
At Kent State University in Ohio, the Governor had to call in the National Guard after some demonstrators burned the Army ROTC building to the ground. The guardsmen, many the same age as the students, were pelted with rocks and chunks of concrete. Tragically, in the ensuing panic, shots rang out. Four students lay dead. The President later referred to the days following Kent State as among the darkest of his Presidency. MY LAI
In December 1969, information about United States troops killing 175 civilians in My Lai during the Tet offensive in 1968 came to light. Army First Lieutenant William Calley, Jr. was court-martialed for his role in the murder or twenty-two South Vietnamese civilians. Despite considerable pressure from those who wanted clemency granted to Calley, President Nixon reviewed the case and decided not to intervene.
Anti-war critics tried to turn this isolated incident into a broad indictment of our presence in Vietnam. But they were applying an unfortunate double standard. North Vietnamese atrocities, such as the slaughter of South Vietnamese civilians in Cai Be and Dak Son in 1967 and the massive live burial of innocents in Hue in 1968 were virtually ignored in the United States.
The United States Army punished its soldiers for wartime atrocities. The North Vietnamese gave medals to those who buried thousands alive at Hue. BRINGING US TOGETHER
Late in the 1968 campaign, a sign appeared at a Nixon rally: "Bring Us Together." America was bitterly divided about Vietnam, and the President realized that he had to bring the American people together behind his policy.
On November 3, 1969, in the most effective speech of his Presidency, President Nixon appealed to those Americans who supported the cause to which the United States was dedicated in Vietnam, the "Silent Majority."
The response to this speech was extraordinary. More than 50,000 telegrams and 30,000 letters flooded the White House. The President's approval rating jumped eleven points, the biggest increase as a result of a Presidential speech in the history of the Gallup Poll. This speech remains the milestone against which all other Presidential addresses are judged.
The support of the silent majority stood in stark contrast to that of a violent minority, who sought to make policy in the streets. President Nixon recognized that there were those who had honest disagreements about his policy in Vietnam. However, all too often, there were those behind the scenes whose aim was not vigorous dissent but violent destruction. In the name of free speech they used force and intimidation to stifle
debate; they used bombs to proclaim their message that there should be no bombing; they took lives while professing that they were trying to preserve lives; they chanted "peace" while turning our cities and our campuses into war zones.
From January 1969 through April 1970, there were more than 40,000 bombings, attempted bombings, and bomb threats. More than $21 million in property was damaged, and 43 people were killed. This was not just sporadic violence. Rather, as the FBI reported, it appeared to be part of a nationwide terrorist offensive by radical student groups whose aim was to undermine the very foundations of American society.
Julie Nixon Eisenhower was unable to attend her own graduation from Smith College due to threats of violent disruption. In both 1969 and 1973 the Nixons had to ride in closed cars in their Inaugural parades because of the violent minority.
Terrorist violence did not achieve its goal. The President ended his first year in office with the majority of the American people behind him. While the anti-war violence did not cease, President Nixon had clearly turned the tide. Nixon never lost the support of the silent majority as he pursued the war in Vietnam to its successful conclusion. VIETNAMIZATION
President Nixon knew that one of the reasons the French failed in Vietnam was their pursuit of a strategy which failed to make the Vietnamese people a part of their own struggle against Communist domination. In a very real sense, colonial paternalism led to France's loss in Vietnam.
Early in 1969, the President announced his policy of "Vietnamization." This policy, mocked by many on the left who believed the South Vietnamese were unwilling or unable to fight Communist aggression, called for the training and equipping of a South Vietnamese army which could stand up to the Soviet-trained and supplied North Vietnamese forces.
The President tied American troop withdrawals to the success of Vietnamization. During his first term, President Nixon brought home more than 90% of our troops. The ability of the South Vietnamese troops was proven in combat. To the surprise of critics, the South Vietnamese fought bravely and well. After the United States withdrew, even though the U.S. Congress had drastically cut all aid to South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese troops were able to fend off bravely the Soviet-backed North for nearly two years. NEGOTIATION
Early in January 1969, the United States and South Vietnam were engaged in negotiations with the aggressors from the North, but these negotiations were stalemated. President Nixon faced with the challenge of beginning productive negotiations with the North.
The President authorized National Security advisor Henry Kissinger to open a channel through which meaningful talks could take place. The major benefit of Kissinger's "off-the-record" talks was it robbed the North of the chance to score propaganda points in the American media. It was this channel which eventually brought about the peace agreement which ended the war.
President Nixon recognized that negotiations - whether public or private - would not succeed if the North doubted the American will to see the war through to an honorable conclusion. The Communists doubted the President's resolve on more than one occasion. In the spring of 1972, they launched a major military action, which coincided with a sudden lack of progress in the secret talks. The Communists were gambling that the President would not want to risk undermining his upcoming summit with Soviet leader Brezhnev. They were wrong.
President Nixon responded to the North Vietnamese action by bombing military targets in Hanoi, the capital of Vietnam, and in Haiphong, a major port city.
Anti-war critics were quick to denounce the President's actions. They screamed that he was widening the war, and not ending it, but the President was firm. The Communists got the message, and soon sought to renew a real dialogue with the United States in Paris.
As 1972 came to a close, the North Vietnamese again challenged the U.S. will to "end the war and win the peace." Just days away from achieving an agreement, the North tried to torpedo the culmination of the peace process.
President Nixon again took forceful action. In December 1972, he ordered action similar to that taken in May. Predictably, the left vehemently protested: an ardent liberal member of Congress even questioned the President's sanity.
The President's approach nevertheless paid off. The North returned to the table, and the peace agreement was signed within a month, on January 27, 1973.
As one POW said of the December bombing:
"When we heard the heavy bombs impacting in Hanoi, we started to go and pack our bags because we knew we were going home, and we were going home with honor." THE POWS
When President Nixon entered office, 328 American soldiers were being held as prisoners of war by North Vietnam. The Communists were cynically using the prisoners as pawns in their political chess game. Sadly, there were some in the United States who supported Hanoi in this craven manipulation. All efforts by the United States to gain their release were cruelly rebuffed by the North.
North Vietnam kept the POWs in shockingly inhumane conditions which violated all standards of human decency. They even denied the POWs the right to write and receive simple letters from their loved ones. The United Nations and the International Red Cross were among the organizations calling on the North to comply with the Geneva Convention, which Hanoi had signed and which spelled out the accepted norms of treatment of prisoners of war.
President Nixon made many offers to exchange prisoners with the North. One proposal called for the release of 8,000 North Vietnamese prisoners for 800 free world prisoners. The Communists rejected every proposal the President made.
The President felt a special obligation to the brave and resolute families of the men who were being held or were missing in action in Vietnam. He maintained an ongoing dialogue with the families, especially through the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. As he said to them in 1972, "you have never been away from my thoughts and you have never been away from my prayers, and there is nothing I want more than to bring your loved ones home, and I will never let you down." The peace agreement signed on January 27, 1973, brought the American POWs back. Within days, the first of 562 POWs were returning home. Some had been in captivity for more than eight years.
President Nixon had placed a high priority on insuring that any peace agreement must provide for the return of our prisoners of war. His steadfast insistence, supported by the families of the POWs, enabled the POWs to come home proudly, on their feet, with their heads held high. A DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE
On May 24, 1973, the President and Mrs. Nixon hosted the largest sit-down dinner ever served at the White House for the returned prisoners and their families - over 1300 people.
It was a magnificent event, held under a massive tent on the South Lawn. There were many emotional moments, for the men, their families, and the President and his family. An American flag fashioned from scraps of cloth and string by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Dramesi while in prison was presented with the colors. The men gave the President himself a plaque which read: "Our leader - our comrade, Richard the Lionhearted."
Actor John Wayne, a favorite of the assembled guests, turned to the President as he left the stage and said: "I want to thank you, Mr. President, not for any one thing, just for everything." Irving Berlin , composer of "God Bless America" led the assembled crowd in the singing of that patriotic hymn. VIETNAM: EPILOGUE
In the time since the fall of South Vietnam, more people have died under a Communist peace than were lost in the entire twenty-five year course of war. The tragic evidence of the boat people of Vietnam and the killing field of Cambodia, where two million people were killed, speaks of the horrors of Communist tyranny and vindicates the nobility of our cause in Vietnam.
The United States was in Vietnam to prevent the terrible tragedy which followed the collapse of the framework for peace that President Nixon had so carefully constructed.
President Nixon dedicated himself to ending the war in Vietnam in such a way that brought honor to those who had given their lives for freedom's sake, and gave hope to those whose struggle for freedom was not yet complete.
The responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy lies not with the men who fought, but with those in Congress who broke faith with the brave soldiers, American and South Vietnamese, who sacrificed so much for peace and freedom in Vietnam.
In his book, No More Vietnams, which he dedicated "To those who served," former President Nixon wrote: "No more Vietnams can mean that we will not try again. It should mean that we will not fail again."
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Question: who was responsible for the us withdrawal from vietnam

According to some opinions, “the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy (the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam) lies not in those who fought, but in those who sat in Congress...”.

who was responsible for the us withdrawal from vietnam

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the code name for the us withdrawal from which

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Question: who is blamed for the failure of the vietnam policy

who is blamed for the failure of the vietnam policy

Question: what was the ultimate failure of the vietnam policy

povlačenja iz Vijetnama ) ne leži u onima koji su se borili ,

what was the ultimate failure of the vietnam policy

Question: what did the us do to win back vietnam

Question: who is the blame for the us withdrawal from vietnam

who is the blame for the us withdrawal from vietnam

According to some opinions , “ the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy ( the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam ) lies not in those who fought , but in those who sat in Congress ... ” .

Prema nekim mišljenjima "odgovornost ultimativne propasti ove politike (američkog povlačenja iz Vijetnama) ne leži u onima koji su se borili, već u onima koji su sjedili u Kongresu...".

Prema nekim mišljenjima "odgovornost ultimativne propasti ove politike (američkog povlačenja iz Vijetnama) ne leži u onima koji su se borili, već u onima koji su sjedili u Kongresu...".

According to some opinions, “the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy (the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam) lies not in those who fought, but in those who sat in Congress...”.

According to some opinions, “the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy (the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam) lies not in those who fought, but in those who sat in Congress...”.

New humility and sophistication could create the best parts of the complex heritage that remains to the armies after the long and fierce Vietnam War.”

A young American marine is waiting on the beach during an excursion in Da Nang on August 3, 1965.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memorandum to President Gerald Ford: “With regard to military tactics, we must make the conclusion that our armed forces were not ready for this kind of war.

Question: who was the secretary of state during the vietnam war

New humility and sophistication could create the best parts of the complex heritage that remains to the armies after the long and fierce Vietnam War.”

A young American marine is waiting on the beach during an excursion in Da Nang on August 3, 1965.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memorandum to President Gerald Ford: “With regard to military tactics, we must make the conclusion that our armed forces were not ready for this kind of war.

who was the secretary of state during the vietnam war

Question: what was the occupation of rat u vijetnamu

what was the occupation of rat u vijetnamu

Question: who did henry kissinger write to in 1965

who did henry kissinger write to in 1965

Question: where did the movie rat u vijetnamu take place

where did the movie rat u vijetnamu take place

Question: henry kissinger was secretary of state to which us president

henry kissinger was secretary of state to which us president

Question: who wrote the memorandum rat u vijetnamu

državni tajnik Henry Kissinger u tajnom memorandumu predsjedniku Geraldu Fordu napisao je : "" Što se vojne taktike tiče moramo iznijeti zaključak da naše oružane snage nisu bile spremne

who wrote the memorandum rat u vijetnamu

New humility and sophistication could create the best parts of the complex heritage that remains to the armies after the long and fierce Vietnam War . ”

A young American marine is waiting on the beach during an excursion in Da Nang on August 3 , 1965 .

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memorandum to President Gerald Ford : “ With regard to military tactics , we must make the conclusion that our armed forces were not ready for this kind of war .

Nova poniznost i sofisticiranost mogli bi stvoriti najbolje dijelove kompleksnog naslijeđa koje ostaje vojsci nakon dugačkog i žestokog rata u Vijetnamu". Mladi Američki marinac čeka na plaži tijekom iskrcavanja u Da Nangu, 3. kolovoza 1965. godine. Američki državni tajnik Henry Kissinger u tajnom memorandumu predsjedniku Geraldu Fordu napisao je: "Što se vojne taktike tiče moramo iznijeti zaključak da naše oružane snage nisu bile spremne za ovakvu vrstu rata.

Nova poniznost i sofisticiranost mogli bi stvoriti najbolje dijelove kompleksnog naslijeđa koje ostaje vojsci nakon dugačkog i žestokog rata u Vijetnamu".

Mladi Američki marinac čeka na plaži tijekom iskrcavanja u Da Nangu, 3. kolovoza 1965. godine.

Američki državni tajnik Henry Kissinger u tajnom memorandumu predsjedniku Geraldu Fordu napisao je: "Što se vojne taktike tiče moramo iznijeti zaključak da naše oružane snage nisu bile spremne za ovakvu vrstu rata.

New humility and sophistication could create the best parts of the complex heritage that remains to the armies after the long and fierce Vietnam War.” A young American marine is waiting on the beach during an excursion in Da Nang on August 3, 1965. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memorandum to President Gerald Ford: “With regard to military tactics, we must make the conclusion that our armed forces were not ready for this kind of war.

New humility and sophistication could create the best parts of the complex heritage that remains to the armies after the long and fierce Vietnam War.”

A young American marine is waiting on the beach during an excursion in Da Nang on August 3, 1965.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memorandum to President Gerald Ford: “With regard to military tactics, we must make the conclusion that our armed forces were not ready for this kind of war.

There were doubts about the effectiveness of large, devastating and long-term bombings.

The spokesman for the military officer Harold Keith Johnson wrote: "When we learned something from Vietnam, we learned that the air force can't solve the matter."

As we approach the 25th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War on April 30 and the reunification of Vietnam under socialist rule, memories of that conflict are still alive and a vital part of American political discourse.
During a recent visit to Vietnam, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen pointedly refused to apologize for the U.S. military action there, explaining, as he put it, ``Both nations were scarred by this. They [the Vietnamese] have their own scars from the war. We certainly have ours.''
Cohen's words echo those of President Carter, who in 1977 refused to normalize relations with Vietnam because, in his words, ``the destruction was mutual.''
Vietnam has also been a major part of this year's presidential politics. With the rival major candidates, George W. Bush and Al Gore, respectively, explaining his service in the National Guard or touting his time in Southeast Asia. Even more than Bush and Gore, Sen. John McCain put Vietnam into a central place during his run for the presidency. As the son and grandson of admirals and a prisoner of war in Vietnam for nearly six years, McCain's opinions on the war gained significant attention and carried great weight.
There is no basis even to suggest that the fallout from the war affected the United States and Vietnam similarly.
In particular, McCain believed that American troops in Vietnam, as a common complaint holds, fought with one hand tied behind their backs, that it was ``senseless'' and ``illogical,'' in McCain's words, to not carry the ground war over the 17th parallel into North Vietnam or to not wage a totally unrestrained air war, especially with B-52 bombers.
Cohen and McCain tap into rich myths about the war, views that still resonate after 25 years but also, and unfortunately, are misguided and wrong and keep us still from coming to terms with Vietnam.
There is no basis even to suggest that the fallout from the war affected the United States and Vietnam similarly. While the United States suffered serious losses -- more than 58,000 of its military killed and
billions of dollars spent -- Vietnam's losses were staggering. More than 3 million Vietnamese died during the American war, with at least that many wounded. More than 15 million Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians became refugees. American weapons -- especially the 6.5 million tons of bombs dropped on Indochina -- destroyed more than 10,000 hamlets and 25 million acres of forest in South Vietnam (the land of the U.S. ally in the war); additionally the United States dropped more than 11.2 million gallons of Agent Orange and 400,000 tons of napalm on South Vietnam, a nation roughly the size of New Mexico or Arizona.
Since the end of the war, thousands of Vietnamese continued to be killed every year from contact with unexploded bombs from the war, and their environment continues to feel the effects of dioxin and other herbicides. There is nothing ``mutual'' about such destruction; ``their scars'' run much deeper than ``ours.''
McCain's point is equally troubling, for it offers a ``stabbed in the back'' explanation in place of a reasoned examination of a war that was morally, politically and strategically wrong. Indeed, many of America's ranking military officers, the comrades of McCain's father and grandfather, had warned against a war in Vietnam from the 1950s forward.
In 1954, amid the Dien Bien Phu crisis, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that the Nationalist-Communist Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, held the military initiative and were successfully identified with ``freedom from the colonial yoke and with the improvement of the general welfare'' of the Vietnamese people.
By 1963, as the Kennedy administration was escalating the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, the incoming Marine Commandant, Gen. Wallace Greene, lamented to fellow officers that ``we're up to our knees in the quagmire'' in Vietnam and warned ``you see what happened to the French,'' which had lost its colonial hold over Indochina in 1954, ``well, maybe the same thing is going to happen to us.''
Officers held similar fears regarding the way the war was fought, but not because they had ``one hand tied behind their back.''
``If anything came out of Vietnam,'' Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, observed, ``it was that air power couldn't do the job.''
Even the American commander in Vietnam, Gen. William Westmoreland, believed that a totally unrestrained air war would not have been decisive, writing after the war: ``I still doubt that the North Vietnamese would have relented.''
Westmoreland was attacked by the Marines, who believed his strategy of attrition, as Gen. Victor Kulak put it, was ``wasteful of American lives (and) promising a protracted, strength-sapping battle with small likelihood of a successful outcome.''
And on it went; throughout the entire U.S. experience in Vietnam, from the end of World War II until the 1970s, American officers were never enthusiastic about fighting in Vietnam, were always aware of the perils of war there, remained deeply divided internally over intervention and strategy and were not optimistic that they would succeed.
Far from fighting with their hands behind their back, they were able to unleash the technological might of the United States on a small country without forcing the enemy there to yield to their power, an outcome they expected long before the war ended.
Why then, amid the historical evidence to the contrary, do the Cohen and McCain myths persist?
A deep examination into the historical record on Vietnam shows that the destruction was far from ``mutual,'' and that military leaders complained about intervening in the war itself, not that they were fighting short-handed.
Perhaps politicians and many media members feel more comfortable with these explanations than with the truth, than with the recognition that the United States intervened into a war of liberation and revolution against the Vietnamese.
While claiming to be the champion of freedom and self-determination, the United States waged a brutal and bloody war on the people of a small country, both ally and enemy alike, to warn them of the perils of self-determination, be it nationalist or socialist. Rather than allow the Vietnamese to choose their own political system, government and social organization, the United States tried to violently force its preferred system on a people who were not receptive to it.
So 25 years later, the ``destruction'' is to the historical legacy of Vietnam, and unless we are able to see the full picture of the war, we all are studying Vietnam with our metaphorical arms behind our backs.
Bob Buzzanco is an associate professor of history at the University of Houston.
©2000 The Baltimore Sun
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Question: who was the spokesman for the vietnam air force

There were doubts about the effectiveness of large, devastating and long-term bombings.

The spokesman for the military officer Harold Keith Johnson wrote: "When we learned something from Vietnam, we learned that the air force can't solve the matter."

who was the spokesman for the vietnam air force

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a nickname given to which country

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Question: what was the general opinion about the effectiveness of vietnam's bombings

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Question: who couldn't solve the problem of bombarding vietnam

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Question: what doubts did the vietnam war have

doubts about the effectiveness of large, devastating and long-term bombings

u efikasnost velikih , razornih i dugotrajnih bombardiranja .

doubts about the effectiveness of large , devastating and long - term bombings

Question: what did the vietnam war have doubts about

large, devastating and long-term bombings

velikih , razornih i dugotrajnih bombardiranja .

large , devastating and long - term bombings

what did the vietnam war have doubts about

Question: what was the problem with rat u vijetnamu

what was the problem with rat u vijetnamu

There were doubts about the effectiveness of large , devastating and long - term bombings .

The spokesman for the military officer Harold Keith Johnson wrote : " When we learned something from Vietnam , we learned that the air force ca n't solve the matter . "

Pojavile su se sumnje u efikasnost velikih, razornih i dugotrajnih bombardiranja. Predstojnik vojnog stožera Harold Keith Johnson je napisao: "Ako smo išta naučili iz Vijetnama, naučili smo da zračna sila ne može riješiti stvar."Quoted in Bob Buzzano.

Pojavile su se sumnje u efikasnost velikih, razornih i dugotrajnih bombardiranja.

Predstojnik vojnog stožera Harold Keith Johnson je napisao: "Ako smo išta naučili iz Vijetnama, naučili smo da zračna sila ne može riješiti stvar."Quoted in Bob Buzzano.

There were doubts about the effectiveness of large, devastating and long-term bombings. The spokesman for the military officer Harold Keith Johnson wrote: "When we learned something from Vietnam, we learned that the air force can't solve the matter."

There were doubts about the effectiveness of large, devastating and long-term bombings.

The spokesman for the military officer Harold Keith Johnson wrote: "When we learned something from Vietnam, we learned that the air force can't solve the matter."

More than 3 million Americans participated in the Vietnam War, of which approximately 1.5 million participated in real battles."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory."

Question: how many americans participated in the vietnam war

je preko 3 milijuna Amerikanaca od kojih je otprilike 1,5 milijuna sudjelovalo u pravim bitkama

More than 3 million Americans participated in the Vietnam War, of which approximately 1.5 million participated in real battles."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory."

how many americans participated in the vietnam war

Question: what is the name of the book that chronicles the vietnam war

what is the name of the book that chronicles the vietnam war

Question: what is the title of the book that chronicles the vietnam war

what is the title of the book that chronicles the vietnam war

Question: rat u vijetnamu was the name given to which war

rat u vijetnamu was the name given to which war

More than 3 million Americans participated in the Vietnam War , of which approximately 1.5 million participated in real battles . "Echoes of Combat : The Vietnam War in American Memory . "

U Vijetnamskom ratu sudjelovalo je preko 3 milijuna Amerikanaca od kojih je otprilike 1,5 milijuna sudjelovalo u pravim bitkama."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory".

U Vijetnamskom ratu sudjelovalo je preko 3 milijuna Amerikanaca od kojih je otprilike 1,5 milijuna sudjelovalo u pravim bitkama."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory".

More than 3 million Americans participated in the Vietnam War, of which approximately 1.5 million participated in real battles."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory."

More than 3 million Americans participated in the Vietnam War, of which approximately 1.5 million participated in real battles."Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in American Memory."

By the end of the war, a total of 58,220 Americans died, more than 150 thousand were injured, and at least 21 thousand ended with some form of disability.

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Vietnam War
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Le Ly Hayslip was born into a peasant family in Central Vietnam in 1949. Her small village was caught in the crossfire of conflict between the French and Moroccan and Viet Minh soldiers, and later between the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong and the armies of South Vietnam and the United States. The daughter of a rice farmer, Le Ly served as a lookout and messenger for the Viet Cong and planted booby traps for the Viet Cong when she was 12-years-old. She was arrested and tortured by the South Vietnamese government police, and then was sentenced to death by the Viet Cong, who accused her of being a government informer. The men assigned to execute her raped her instead.
Like hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese, Le Ly was displaced from her village by the war. She fled to Danang and then to Saigon, where she became a maid, a waitress in GI clubs, and an attendant in a hospital, before trying, out of desperation, to support herself through black market dealing and prostitution. At the age of 20, she married an American construction worker and moved to a San Diego suburb, where she later wrote a harrowing account of her life,When Heaven and Earth Changed Places.
An estimated 58,132 Americans died in Vietnam. More than 150,000 were wounded, and 21,000 were permanently disabled. More than 3 million Americans, average age 19, served in the Vietnam War. An estimated 100,000 Americans fled the United States to avoid serving in the conflict, and approximately 50,000 American servicemen deserted. The Veterans Administration estimates that 830,000 Vietnam vets suffered symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder; of that number, 480,000 were so deeply affected that they were considered disabled. Several hundred thousand American troops were exposed to defoliants, such as Agent Orange. The estimated cost of the war in Vietnam during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations was $176 billion. As a whole, 60 percent of all draft-age American men did not serve in the military between 1963 and 1974, and 98 percent did not see combat.
The war's greatest costs and suffering were borne by the Vietnamese people, who may have lost 2 million lives during the conflict. Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese were displaced from rural villages, and their families splintered. Herbicides and bombs ravaged the countryside. Between 1964 and 1969, the United States dropped more than nine times the tonnage of high explosives on Vietnam as it did in the Pacific theater during World War II.
After the war, North Vietnam detained 50,000 to 100,000 former supporters of the Saigon regime in re-education camps. Over a million "boat people," consisting largely of Vietnam's persecuted Chinese minority, fled the country to avoid persecution.
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Question: how many americans died in rat u vijetnamu

By the end of the war, a total of 58,220 Americans died, more than 150 thousand were injured, and at least 21 thousand ended with some form of disability.

how many americans died in rat u vijetnamu

Question: how many soldiers died in rat u vijetnamu

how many soldiers died in rat u vijetnamu

Question: how many americans died in vijetnamu war

how many americans died in vijetnamu war

By the end of the war , a total of 58,220 Americans died , more than 150 thousand were injured , and at least 21 thousand ended with some form of disability .

Do kraja rata sveukupno je poginulo 58,220 Amerikanaca, više od 150 tisuća bilo ih je ranjeno, a minimalno 21 tisuća završila je s nekim oblikom invaliditeta.The War's Costs.

Do kraja rata sveukupno je poginulo 58,220 Amerikanaca, više od 150 tisuća bilo ih je ranjeno, a minimalno 21 tisuća završila je s nekim oblikom invaliditeta.The War's Costs.

By the end of the war, a total of 58,220 Americans died, more than 150 thousand were injured, and at least 21 thousand ended with some form of disability.

By the end of the war, a total of 58,220 Americans died, more than 150 thousand were injured, and at least 21 thousand ended with some form of disability.

(The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. According to Daleu Kueter “from all the killed Americans, 86.3 percent were white and 12.5 percent Afro-Americans and members of other races.”

Around 830 thousand Vietnamese veterans suffered from some degree of PTSP after the conflict.

NELSON, British Columbia, Nov. 19, 2005 — -- Nestled in the mountains of British Columbia, the tiny city of Nelson seems lost in time -- but amid the organic food, marijuana and easygoing attitudes is one of the Vietnam War's lingering wounds, freshly opened by a recent effort to build a monument to the Vietnam-era "war resisters" who live there.
An estimated 125,000 Americans fled to Canada in the 1960s and '70s to avoid the Vietnam War military draft, according to the American Veterans of Foreign Wars. About half returned to the United States when President Carter granted them amnesty in 1977.
But decades after fleeing the draft, many of those men still live north of the border -- including a sizable community in Nelson -- and say they still have no regrets about what they did.
Jeff Mock, an American who fled to Canada during Vietnam, does not call himself a draft dodger.
"I would say more I'm a war resister," says Mock, who now runs a tofu business in Nelson. "I firmly believe that wars will end when men refuse to fight."
Northwestern University professor John Hagan wrote a book about this largely anonymous group of former U.S. residents in Canada.
"This is the largest modern political out-migration from the United States," he says. "And it really stands out."
That is one reason some Nelson residents decided that, 30 years later, they were a group worth remembering with a large, bronze monument of a Canadian with outstretched arms greeting a man and a woman.
Townspeople and officials alike thought it was perfect -- until word trickled south across the border. The American Veterans of Foreign Wars was outraged.
Nelson Mayor Dave Elliot was flooded with hate mail.
"I got myself into big trouble by saying I think it's a good idea," Elliot said. "Yes, I do think it's a good idea."
The hate mail argued otherwise.
"This is nothing more than a slap in the face to me and all Americans," Elliot read from one of the letters. "These men are not heroes, but they are cowards."
Organizers decided not to build the monument. But the town will hold Canada's first-ever gathering of American war resisters next year. People here hope it will serve as a homecoming to a group of men who've spent the last three decades coming to grips with a decision that changed their lives forever.
Ernest Heckanin, an artist and writer, has now lived in Canada longer than he lived in the United States. He remains bitter about the country he left and has never gotten over the war he wouldn't fight in.
"I see Iraq as just a continuation of policy that began in Vietnam," Heckanin says.
Jim Holland left everything he knew back in Texas more than 30 years ago, and says he has "no regrets, absolutely not."
Holland adds that he is not a coward.
"When your own ethics dictate that you'd separate yourself from your friends and your family, that's not cowardice," he says. "That's standing up for what you believe in.
Nowadays, Holland says, "I'm very, very proud to be Canadian."
ABC News' Neal Karlinsky originally reported this story for "World News Tonight" on Nov. 13, 2005.

Question: what percentage of vietnamese soldiers were afro-american

(The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. According to Daleu Kueter “from all the killed Americans, 86.3 percent were white and 12.5 percent Afro-Americans and members of other races.”

Around 830 thousand Vietnamese veterans suffered from some degree of PTSP after the conflict.

what percentage of vietnamese soldiers were afro-american

Question: what percentage of vietnamese soldiers were white

what percentage of vietnamese soldiers were white

Question: how many vietnam veterans died from ptsp

how many vietnam veterans died from ptsp

Question: what is the name of the vietnam veterans memorial

what is the name of the vietnam veterans memorial

Question: what is the name of the wall in vietnam

Question: what did the vietnam war have in common

( The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial , i.e. The Wall ) , Center for Electronic Records , National Archives , Washington , D.C. According to Daleu Kueter “ from all the killed Americans , 86.3 percent were white and 12.5 percent Afro - Americans and members of other races . ”

Around 830 thousand Vietnamese veterans suffered from some degree of PTSP after the conflict .

(The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Prema Daleu Kueteru "od svih ubijenih Amerikanaca, 86,3 posto je bilo bijelaca te 12,5 posto Afroamerikanaca i pripadnika drugih rasa." Otprilike 830 tisuća vijetnamskih veterana obolilo je od nekog stupnja PTSP-a poslije sukoba.

(The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Prema Daleu Kueteru "od svih ubijenih Amerikanaca, 86,3 posto je bilo bijelaca te 12,5 posto Afroamerikanaca i pripadnika drugih rasa."

Otprilike 830 tisuća vijetnamskih veterana obolilo je od nekog stupnja PTSP-a poslije sukoba.

(The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. According to Daleu Kueter “from all the killed Americans, 86.3 percent were white and 12.5 percent Afro-Americans and members of other races.” Around 830 thousand Vietnamese veterans suffered from some degree of PTSP after the conflict.

(The CACF is the basis for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, i.e. The Wall), Center for Electronic Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C. According to Daleu Kueter “from all the killed Americans, 86.3 percent were white and 12.5 percent Afro-Americans and members of other races.”

Around 830 thousand Vietnamese veterans suffered from some degree of PTSP after the conflict.

It is estimated that approximately 125 thousand Americans fled to Canada to avoid going into war and that more than 50 thousand soldiers were deserted.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters.

The Pacific News Service.

Question: how many vietnamese soldiers died in the vietnam war

It is estimated that approximately 125 thousand Americans fled to Canada to avoid going into war and that more than 50 thousand soldiers were deserted.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters.

The Pacific News Service.

how many vietnamese soldiers died in the vietnam war

Question: how many vietnamese soldiers deserted during the vietnam war

The Pacific News Service.

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Question: how many vietnamese soldiers deserted in the vietnam war

The Pacific News Service.

how many vietnamese soldiers deserted in the vietnam war

Question: how many americans fled vietnam to canada

The Pacific News Service.

how many americans fled vietnam to canada

Question: who did the vietnam veterans open arms to

The Pacific News Service.

who did the vietnam veterans open arms to

Question: who published the story rat u vijetnamu

The Pacific News Service.

It is estimated that approximately 125 thousand Americans fled to Canada to avoid going into war and that more than 50 thousand soldiers were deserted . Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters .

Otprilike 830 tisuća vijetnamskih veterana obolilo je od nekog stupnja PTSP-a poslije sukoba. Procjenjuje se da je otprilike 125 tisuća Amerikanaca pobjeglo u Kanadu kako bi izbjegli odlazak u rat te da je dodatnih 50 tisuća vojnika dezertiralo.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters. Pacific News Service.

Procjenjuje se da je otprilike 125 tisuća Amerikanaca pobjeglo u Kanadu kako bi izbjegli odlazak u rat te da je dodatnih 50 tisuća vojnika dezertiralo.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters.

Around 830 thousand Vietnamese veterans suffered from some degree of PTSP after the conflict. It is estimated that approximately 125 thousand Americans fled to Canada to avoid going into war and that more than 50 thousand soldiers were deserted.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters. The Pacific News Service.

It is estimated that approximately 125 thousand Americans fled to Canada to avoid going into war and that more than 50 thousand soldiers were deserted.Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to U.S. Military Deserters.

28 June 2005.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed a full and unconditional forgiveness to all those who fled or deserted during the Vietnam War.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
JANUARY 21, 1977
Office of the White House Press Secretary
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE WHITE HOUSE
GRANTING PARDON FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT,
AUGUST 4, 1964 TO MARCH 28, 1973
----------------------------------------
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
A PROCLAMATION
Acting pursuant to the grant of authority in Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States, do hereby grant a full, complete and unconditional pardon to: (1) all persons who may have committed any offense between August 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973 in violation of the Military Selective Service Act or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder; and (2) all persons heretofore convicted, irrespective of the date of conviction, of any offense committed between August 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973 in violation of the Military Selective Service Act, or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, restoring to them full political, civil and other rights.
This pardon does not apply to the following who are specifically excluded therefrom:
(1) All persons convicted of or who may have committed any offense in violation of the Military Selective Service Act, or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, involving force or violence; and
(2) All persons convicted of or who may have committed any offense in violation of the Military Selective Service Act, or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, in connection with duties or responsibilities arising out of employment as agents, officers or employees of the Military Selective Service system.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 21st day of January, in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and seventy-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and first.
JIMMY CARTER

Question: when was the rat u vijetnamu act passed

28 June 2005.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed a full and unconditional forgiveness to all those who fled or deserted during the Vietnam War.

Question: rat u vijetnamu was a symbol of which war

28 June 2005.

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Question: who was president when vietnam was ended

28 June 2005.

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Question: when did rat u vijetnamu come out

"Predsjednik Jimmy Carter je 1977 . godine potpisao puni i bezuvjetni oprost svima onima koji su bježali ili dezertirali tijekom Vijetnamskog rata .

28 June 2005.

Question: who was the us president when vietnam was ended

28 June 2005.

who was the us president when vietnam was ended

Question: when did the vietnam war end in the us

28 June 2005.

In 1977 , President Jimmy Carter signed a full and unconditional forgiveness to all those who fled or deserted during the Vietnam War .

28. lipnja 2005. Predsjednik Jimmy Carter je 1977. godine potpisao puni i bezuvjetni oprost svima onima koji su bježali ili dezertirali tijekom Vijetnamskog rata.

Predsjednik Jimmy Carter je 1977. godine potpisao puni i bezuvjetni oprost svima onima koji su bježali ili dezertirali tijekom Vijetnamskog rata.

28 June 2005. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed a full and unconditional forgiveness to all those who fled or deserted during the Vietnam War.

In 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed a full and unconditional forgiveness to all those who fled or deserted during the Vietnam War.

By 2013, the U.S. government spent more than $22 billion a year on Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors.

US still making payments to relatives of Civil War veterans, analysis finds
If history is any judge, the U.S. government will be paying for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars for the next century as service members and their families grapple with the sacrifices of combat.
An Associated Press analysis of federal payment records found that the government is still making monthly payments to relatives of Civil War veterans — 148 years after the conflict ended.
At the 10 year anniversary of the start of the Iraq war, more than $40 billion a year are going to compensate veterans and survivors from the Spanish-American War from 1898, World War I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two Iraq campaigns and the Afghanistan conflict. And those costs are rising rapidly.
U.S. Sen. Patty Murray said such expenses should remind the nation about war's long-lasting financial toll.
"When we decide to go to war, we have to consciously be also thinking about the cost," said Murray, D-Wash., adding that her WWII-veteran father's disability benefits helped feed their family.
Alan Simpson, a former Republican senator and veteran who co-chaired President Barack Obama's deficit committee in 2010, said government leaders working to limit the national debt should make sure that survivors of veterans need the money they are receiving.
"Without question, I would affluence-test all of those people," Simpson said.
With greater numbers of troops surviving combat injuries because of improvements in battlefield medicine and technology, the costs of disability payments are set to rise much higher.
The AP identified the disability and survivor benefits during an analysis of millions of federal payment records obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.
To gauge the post-war costs of each conflict, AP looked at four compensation programs that identify recipients by war: disabled veterans; survivors of those who died on active duty or from a service-related disability; low-income wartime vets over age 65 or disabled; and low-income survivors of wartime veterans or their disabled children.
—The Iraq wars and Afghanistan
So far, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the first Persian Gulf conflict in the early 1990s are costing about $12 billion a year to compensate those who have left military service or family members of those who have died.
Those post-service compensation costs have totaled more than $50 billion since 2003, not including expenses of medical care and other benefits provided to veterans, and are poised to grow for many years to come.
The new veterans are filing for disabilities at historic rates, with about 45 percent of those from Iraq and Afghanistan seeking compensation for injuries. Many are seeking compensation for a variety of ailments at once.
Experts see a variety of factors driving that surge, including a bad economy that's led more jobless veterans to seek the financial benefits they've earned, troops who survive wounds of war and more awareness about head trauma and mental health.
—Vietnam War
It's been 40 years since the U.S. ended its involvement in the Vietnam War, and yet payments for the conflict are still rising.
Now above $22 billion annually, Vietnam compensation costs are roughly twice the size of the FBI's annual budget. And while many disabled Vietnam vets have been compensated for post-traumatic stress disorder, hearing loss or general wounds, other ailments are positioning the war to have large costs even after veterans die.
Based on an uncertain link to the defoliant Agent Orange that was used in Vietnam, federal officials approved diabetes a decade ago as an ailment that qualifies for cash compensation — and it is now the most compensated ailment for Vietnam vets.
The VA also recently included heart disease among the Vietnam medical issues that qualify, and the agency is seeing thousands of new claims for that issue. Simpson said he has a lot of concerns about the government agreeing to automatically compensate for those diseases.
"That has been terribly abused," Simpson said.
Since heart disease is common among older Americans and is the nation's leading cause of death, the future deaths of thousands of Vietnam veterans could be linked to their service and their benefits passed along to survivors.
A congressional analysis estimated the cost of fighting the war was $738 billion in 2011 dollars, and the post-war benefits for veterans and families have separately cost some $270 billion since 1970, according to AP calculations.
—World War I, World War II and the Korean War
World War I, which ended 94 years ago, continues to cost taxpayers about $20 million every year. World War II? $5 billion.
Compensation for WWII veterans and families didn't peak until 1991 — 46 years after the war ended — and annual costs since then have only declined by about 25 percent. Korean War costs appear to be leveling off at about $2.8 billion per year.
Of the 2,289 survivors drawing cash linked to WWI, about one-third are spouses and dozens of them are over 100 years in age.
Some of the other recipients are curious: Forty-seven of the spouses are under the age of 80, meaning they weren't born until years after the war ended. Many of those women were in their 20s and 30s when their aging spouses died in the 1960s and 1970s, and they've been drawing the monthly payments since.
—Civil War and Spanish-American War
There are 10 living recipients of benefits tied to the 1898 Spanish-American War at a total cost of about $50,000 per year. The Civil War payments are going to two children of veterans — one in North Carolina and one in Tennessee— each for $876 per year.
Surviving spouses can qualify for lifetime benefits when troops from current wars have a service-linked death. Children under the age of 18 can also qualify, and those benefits are extended for a lifetime if the person is permanently incapable of self-support due to a disability before the age of 18.
Citing privacy, officials did not disclose the names of the two children getting the Civil War benefits.
Their ages suggest the one in Tennessee was born around 1920 and the North Carolina survivor was born around 1930. A veteran who was young during the Civil War would likely have been roughly 70 or 80 years old when the two people were born.
That's not unheard of. At age 86, Juanita Tudor Lowrey is the daughter of a Civil War veteran. Her father, Hugh Tudor, fought in the Union army. After his first wife died, Tudor was 73 when he remarried her 33-year-old mother in 1920. Lowrey was born in 1926.
Lowrey, who lives in Kearney, Mo., suspects the marriage might have been one of convenience, with her father looking for a housekeeper and her mother looking for some security. He died a couple years after she was born, and Lowrey received pension benefits until she was 18.
Now, Lowrey said, she usually gets skepticism from people after she tells them she's a daughter of a Civil War veteran.
"We're few and far between," Lowrey said.

Question: how much does the us spend on vietnam each year

By 2013, the U.S. government spent more than $22 billion a year on Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors.

how much does the us spend on vietnam each year

Question: how much money does the us spend on vietnam

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Question: who did the us spend the most money on in vijetnamu

who did the us spend the most money on in vijetnamu

Question: who did the us spend the most money on in vietnam

Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors

vijetnamske veterane i njihove obitelji i preživjele

Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors

who did the us spend the most money on in vietnam

Question: who did the us spend money on in vietnam

Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors.

Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors .

who did the us spend money on in vietnam

By 2013 , the U.S. government spent more than $ 22 billion a year on Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors .

Do 2013. godine američka vlada na vijetnamske veterane i njihove obitelji i preživjele troši više od 22 milijarde dolara godišnje.

Do 2013. godine američka vlada na vijetnamske veterane i njihove obitelji i preživjele troši više od 22 milijarde dolara godišnje.

By 2013, the U.S. government spent more than $22 billion a year on Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors.

By 2013, the U.S. government spent more than $22 billion a year on Vietnamese veterans and their families and survivors.

The estimates of the total number of victims of the Vietnam conflict vary depending on the sources, and according to one of them a total of 3.8 million people died during the war.Through the available data in the period from 1955 to 2002, 5.4 million violent deaths were<unk> as a result of the war.

3.8 million in the United States.

Between 195 and 430 thousand civilians from South Vietnam and between 50 and 65 thousand civilians from North Vietnam died in the war.

Fifty years of violent war deaths from Vietnam to Bosnia: analysis of data from the world health survey programmeBMJ 2008; 336 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a137 (Published 26 June 2008) Cite this as: BMJ 2008;336:1482
- Ziad Obermeyer, research scientist12,
- Christopher J L Murray, institute director1,
- Emmanuela Gakidou, associate professor1
- 1Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
- 2Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
- Correspondence to: Z Obermeyer ziad_obermeyer{at}hms.harvard.edu
- Accepted 23 April 2008
Abstract
Objective To provide an accurate estimate of violent war deaths.
Design Analysis of survey data on mortality, adjusted for sampling bias and censoring, from nationally representative surveys designed to measure population health. Estimated deaths compared with estimates in database of passive reports.
Setting 2002-3 World health surveys, in which information was collected from one respondent per household about sibling deaths, including whether such deaths resulted from war injuries.
Main outcome measure Estimated deaths from war injuries in 13 countries over 50 years.
Results From 1955 to 2002, data from the surveys indicated an estimated 5.4 million violent war deaths (95% confidence interval 3.0 to 8.7 million) in 13 countries, ranging from 7000 in the Democratic Republic of Congo to 3.8 million in Vietnam. From 1995 to 2002 survey data indicate 36 000 war deaths annually (16 000 to 71 000) in the 13 countries studied. Data from passive surveillance, however, indicated a figure of only a third of this. On the basis of the relation between world health survey data and passive reports, we estimate 378 000 globalwar deaths annually from 1985-94, the last years for which complete passive surveillance data were available.
Conclusions The use of data on sibling history from peacetime population surveys can retrospectively estimate mortality from war. War causes more deaths than previously estimated, and there is no evidence to support a recent decline in war deaths.
Introduction
Estimating mortality due to war is notoriously difficult, but the importance of war as a public health problem as well as a social problem makes it imperative to improve on existing methods of measurement. Accurate estimates of the numbers of deaths are crucial for political, military, and public health planning, as well as for purposes of national history and reconciliation.
The challenges to estimating war mortality are considerable. Civil registration systems that track deaths in peacetime typically fall apart during war, and many wars occur in places without pre-existing surveillance infrastructure. In the absence of reliable data from representative national information systems, three main techniques are currently used to generate estimates.
Existing techniques
Firstly, a few surveys have been undertaken during wars in specific countries to estimate mortality on the basis of household deaths.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 These surveys have produced timely estimates, despite the usual problems of estimating adult mortality from surveys11 and the additional logistical challenges posed by ongoing warfare. The politicised environment surrounding the Iraq mortality studies in particular, however, has generated considerable debate regarding the statistical validity of such studies. The small number of clusters often necessitated by active combat can lead to high levels of uncertainty.12 13 Other researchers draw attention to the difficulties of extrapolating from small sample populations to the national level14 15 or to the difficulty of constructing a valid counterfactual for estimates of excess mortality.16 Some of the most serious criticisms allege systematic bias resulting from sampling methods17 or politically motivated over-reporting of deaths12 16 18 19—for example of non-household members.20 Whatever their merits, these critiques have taken on considerable importance in the public and scientific discourse surrounding estimates of mortality.
Secondly, some studies have attempted to calculate mortality from censuses using demographic techniques that compare the age distribution of a population before and after war.21 22 23 24 Reliable census data, however, are seldom available at these times and so strong assumptions are required to project existing data forward and backward. In addition, census based methods do not produce accurate estimates for populations with high migration, as occurs during war.25
Thirdly, several passive surveillance methods use information from eyewitness and media reports or statistics from mortuaries, gravesites, and health facilities. In the absence of population based data these data are typically the only ones available during ongoing conflicts and represent the most commonly cited sources for government and other estimates of war casualties, as in the current war in Iraq.26 27 In some post-conflict settings, including war crimes inquiries, active investigations have been undertaken to compile all available evidence from such sources and to supplement them further with intelligence reports, incomplete civil registration records, and missing persons lists.28 29 30
Passive reports
Passively reported data are subject to several biases. High levels of war related mortality occur in those violent and dangerous areas where eyewitnesses are least likely to go, resulting in systematic under-reporting of deaths by media sources.1 28 31 A similar bias is likely to affect statistics from mortuariesor health facilities,32 as well as partial civil registration records from those regions where government infrastructure remains intact. Media and eyewitness reports, and to a lesser degree facility records, are also subject to political pressures, which can result in either exaggeration or under-reporting of deaths. Such reports, however, represent the only source of information on deaths for the vast majority of conflicts, and passive data collection has formed the basis for most efforts to date to analyse global trends in war mortality. A collaboration between Uppsala University and the Peace Research Institute, Oslo, has produced a database (Uppsala/PRIO) that compiles and reconciles passive reports on violent deaths related to war globally from 1900 onward. This database is considered to be more consistent and comparable than other efforts.33 The data suggest that violent deaths from war have declined steadily since the second world war and that recent years have been some of the most peaceful of the past century.34 This claim lends empirical support to recent research suggesting that overall levels of violent conflict are falling globally35 36 37 38 and to the view that warfare has become less deadly in recent years thanks to technological innovations and strategic priorities designed to minimise civilian deaths.37 39
Given the paucity of population surveys and the known biases in passively reported data, we propose a new approach to estimate violent war deaths, using data on sibling history from household surveys conducted in peacetime and adjusting for known biases. Using nationally representative data from the World Health Organization’s 2002-3 world health survey (WHS) programme, we produced estimates of such deaths in 13 countries over the past 50 years. This retrospective method, which is free from the logistical constraints imposed by active combat, is meant to augment and complement information from wartime survey efforts in three ways. Firstly, sample sizes are typically considerably greater and sampling more systematic than during active combat. Secondly, using siblings’ histories rather than household deaths addresses some of the serious criticisms of studies in the existing literature—namely, double counting and exaggeration of deaths. Finally, we corrected for known problems with mortality surveys—namely, under-representation of families with high mortality and censoring. Such retrospective population based methods can provide accurate data on war deaths, which are crucial for understanding historical trends as well as for future planning.
Methods
The world health surveys were carried out in 2002-3 in 70 countries. These nationally representative surveys, which have been described in detail elsewhere,40 were designed to measure various dimensions of population health and performance of health systems. Surveys in 45 countriescollected information on adult deaths, including specific questions about the survival of siblings of the respondent, a randomly selected household member. For siblings who died from injuries, information was collected on the cause of death, including whether the injury was related to war. Of the 45 surveys with data on sibling history, 13 were found to have more than five reported sibling deaths from war injuries in a given 10 year period, and we focused on these countries in the analysis. Table 1⇓ shows selected survey characteristics for the 13 surveys used.
We estimated numbers of violent war deaths by performing a proportional mortality analysis. We estimated the fraction of total deaths due to war injuries in a given time period based on the survey data and applied this fraction to UN Population Division estimates of total deaths available for all countries from 1955 onward.41
We divided the period from 1955 to 2002 into blocks of 10 years; 1955 is the first year for which UN estimates of total deaths are available, and we chose intervals of 10 years to minimise the effect of random error and age heaping in reported ages and years. The last period (1995-2002) is shorter because the survey began in 2002. Across all surveys, information regarding cause of death was missing for 17% of deaths; we conservatively assumed these to be not related to war. Year of birth for respondents was assigned based on reported age or year of birth. Year of birth for siblings was assigned based either on the reported age difference between the respondent and each sibling or the sibling’s reported year of birth. For siblings for whom information on year of birth was missing, we imputed it by randomly drawing a sibling-respondent age difference from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation based on individual country data from the relevant survey. Overall, year of birth was based on reported age for 83% of siblings and on reported year of birth for 16% and was imputed for 1%.
We based year of death on either the respondent’s report of how long ago the death occurred or how old the sibling was when he or she died. Information on year of death was missing for 25% of non-war deaths and 12% of war deaths. Given the significant difference in these proportions (t test, P<0.001), we probabilistically imputed a year of death to avoid upward bias. Overall, we calculated year of death on the reported number of years since the death for 70% of deaths and on the sibling’s reported age at death for 5% and imputed it for 25% of deaths.
To calculate probabilities of death for all causes and for war, we divided the number of deaths by the number of siblings alive in a given 10 year block, after applying two corrections. Firstly, to correct for the fact that families with high rates of mortality are under-represented in surveys, we weighted siblings by Bf/Sf, where Bf is the original sibship size and Sf is the number of siblings alive at the time of the survey, according to the method developed by Gakidou and King.42 Secondly, we corrected for left and right censoring that occurred in our data because of the limits of respondents’ age. Sibling deaths at older ages are less likely to be reported for years longer ago: to consider an extreme example, to report on the death of an 80 year old sibling 80 years ago, a respondent would have to be on average 160 years old. Likewise, adult respondents are less likely to have very young siblings (such as infants) on whom to report deaths in recent time periods. To correct for this censoring, we applied a regression model separately to probability of death in war and not in war. We exponentiated the corrected log probability of death from the war and non-war models and took the ratio of war to all cause probability to calculate the fraction of war deaths by age group, country, and year. We standardised using the WHO standard population43 and applied the calculated fraction of war deaths to estimates of total deaths by country and year. We captured uncertainty by simulating 1000 simultaneous draws from the variance-covariance matrix of both war and non-war models to arrive at 1000 estimates of the percentage deaths related to war; the 25th and 976th ranked estimates define the 95% uncertainty interval.44
Finally, we compared our estimates with those from the Uppsala/PRIO database using a linear model, with survey estimated war deaths from 1955-2002 as the dependent variable and Uppsala/PRIO war deaths from the same period as the independent variable. We used the relation derived from this model to adjust the global historical trend observed in the Uppsala/PRIO data. (A technical appendix with more details on the methods is available at http://healthmetricsandevaluation.org/resources/pubs.html.)
Results
A total of 43 874 sibling deaths were reported in the 13 surveys, of which 917 were a result of war injuries. Some 38 613 deaths, of which 797 were due to war, occurred after 1955 and were eligible to be included in our analysis. Figure 1⇓ shows the age and sex distribution of all violent war deaths captured in 13 countries from 1955 to 2002. Among war deaths, 58% were in people aged 15 to 34 and 81% were in males.
Table 2⇓ presents total survey estimates of violent war deaths by 10 year intervals. Our analysis indicates that there were 36 000 war deaths annually from 1995 to 2002 in these countries (95% confidence interval 16 000 to 71 000). The time period with the highest war deaths was 1965-74, with 205 000 deaths a year, largely attributable to the Vietnam war.
Table 3⇓ shows the total number of deaths by country from 1955-2002 estimated from the surveys, alongside data from Uppsala/PRIO. Survey estimates indicate that a total of 5.4 million (3.0 to 8.7 million) violent war deaths occurred from 1955 to 2002 in 13 countries, ranging from 7000 in the Republic of Congo to 3.8 million in Vietnam. The average ratio of survey estimates to Uppsala/PRIO data is 3, implying that media estimates capture on average a third of the number of deaths estimated from population based surveys. The largest differences were in Bangladesh, Georgia, and Zimbabwe. Apart from Georgia, where the absolute numbers were small, the difference between the two sources was most pronounced in Bangladesh, where the survey shows 269 000 deaths compared with 58 000 in the Uppsala/PRIO database during the conflict leading to that country’s independence, and in Zimbabwe, where the survey estimates nearly 130 000 deaths compared with Uppsala/PRIO’s 28 000. The two estimates are closest in Congo-Brazzaville (7000 in the world health survey and 10 000 in Uppsala/PRIO) and Burma (also known as Myanmar) (31 000 and 37 000, respectively). Uppsala/PRIO provides only limited information on uncertainty, in the form of a low to high range; this is presented where available.
The rank order correlation coefficient between the two sets of estimates is 0.57, which indicates considerable discrepancy between the two sources on the relative size of the conflicts. Both sources agree that, among these countries, Vietnam and Ethiopia had the greatest number of deaths. Figure 2⇓ presents deaths per year in Vietnam, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Bosnia from the world health survey and Uppsala/PRIO. The survey estimates are consistently higher, except during the period 1965-74 in Vietnam, when the two estimates are not significantly different; this 10 year period was the interval with the most estimated war deaths of all the time periods studied in this analysis. Figure 3⇓ presents survey estimates alongside Uppsala/PRIO data for total yearly deaths across all 13 survey countries combined. Although the levels of deaths are different between the two sources, the time trends in war deaths are similar at the aggregate level.
Figure 4⇓ shows a scatter plot comparing survey estimates with Uppsala/PRIO data for total deaths from 1955-2002 and an equivalence line, with a slope of 1, indicating the area of the graph at which survey and Uppsala/PRIO estimates are equal. The fact that most estimates lie above the equivalence line shows that survey estimates are generally higher. We applied this relation to all historical data in the Uppsala/PRIO database to arrive at the adjusted Uppsala/PRIO estimates shown in figure 5⇓. The period 1985-94 is the last full interval for which Uppsala/PRIO data were available disaggregated at country level. As expected, the adjusted number of deaths was greater than the reported number in all time periods, with a threefold difference in the most recent period. The adjusted estimates in figure 5 suggest that there were 378 000 global war deaths annually (156 000 to 614 000) between 1985 and 1994. The adjusted estimate of deaths for this most recent period is 2.2 times higher than our estimate of deaths during the most intense period of the Vietnam war.
Discussion
Household surveys can be used to retrospectively estimate war deaths over time. The localisation in time of deaths captured by the world health survey is largely consistent with patterns described in qualitative historical accounts. The survey captured a total of 290war deaths in Vietnam, of which 155 were reported between 1965 and 1975, the period widely considered to be the most deadly phase of the war.45 Similarly, in Ethiopia the highest level of war deaths is estimated to be between 1975 and 1984, a period beginning with the deposition of Haile Selassie by the Derg and followed by open war in Somalia and Eritrea and the so called “red terror” when many civilians are thought to have been killed. Approximate time localisation of deaths by survey respondents seems to remain intact for long periods: the survey in Paraguay, for example, captured 62 deaths between 1925 and 1934, of which eight were war deaths, coincident with the Chaco war between Paraguay and Bolivia. We could not apply our method to estimate war deaths in this war only because UN estimates of total deaths by country are unavailable before 1955. The fact that respondents in certain household surveys are able to localise the time of the death of their sibling as far back as six decades is remarkable, but it is important to note that the ability to do so is likely to vary by country. Little empirical information about recall bias exists in general because of the lack of an ideal standard by which to judge its degree and determinants (though research on this topic is ongoing46). The salience of the WHO survey data, however, might indicate that war deaths are less subject to recall bias than other deaths, perhaps because of the young age of victims and strong emotional associations for family members.
Our analysis also suggests that war kills many more people than previously estimated. Data from the Uppsala/PRIO database indicate that an average of 137 000 died globally each year between 1985 and 1994, while we estimate a figure of nearly 378 000 over the same period. In addition to the absolute number of deaths, comparison of the pattern of deaths over time in survey estimates might lead to different conclusions about trends compared with data from media reports, both at country level and globally. Survey estimates from Sri Lanka suggest a consistent decline in deaths since 1975, while the Uppsala/PRIO estimates show an increase starting in 1985-94. In Ethiopia on the other hand, survey estimates indicate that deaths declined far more slowly than media reports indicate. Our adjustments to the Uppsala/PRIO data likewise do not support the claim that war deaths are declining globally. Overall, nationally representative surveys yield estimates of war deaths that are less optimistic than those based on passive surveillance, implying that it would rarely be appropriate to take such data as a true reflection of the magnitude or trend of deaths.
These findings suggest that the strong claims made on the basis of current data from media reports—namely, that the number of deaths related to war has declined consistently since the mid-20th century and that recent wars have killed relatively few people—should be re-evaluated. Our analysis suggests a method for adjustment of passive surveillance data, which might be the only option when other data are not available. Such approximate methods, however, are no substitute for real data as the adjusted uncertainty intervals are large, even without taking into account uncertainty in the point estimates on which the model is based. More resources are urgently needed for empirical measurement of war deaths.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations that might influence the interpretation of our results. Firstly, as the survey instrument collects information on deaths from war injuries, our estimates capture only direct violent deaths from war, not all excess deaths attributable to war. Previous studies have shown that while in some countries most war deaths result from such direct injuries,1 6 7 in other settings, such as those with less developed health infrastructure or worse overall health, violent deaths represent only a small fraction of total excess mortality.2 Secondly, there are several potential sources of bias in survey data. Recall bias might have resulted in an underestimate of war deaths as deaths that happened longer ago might be less likely to be reported, particularly in younger age groups. We address this by using corrected probabilities of death from the statistical model, but it is possible that our correction is insufficient.
The inability of surveys to capture families with no survivors is another source of downward bias; while simulation evidence suggests that these families account for only a small proportion of all mortality,42 this problem is likely to be more acute in war settings than in other high mortality settings. Overall, we think that the estimates presented here should be viewed as conservative, given these sources of downward bias. Results could also be biased upwards if deaths related to war are reported more frequently or more accurately than other deaths. The survey instrument was designed to minimise this error by asking respondents to enumerate all their siblings (both alive and dead) before answering specific questions about siblings who died. Imputation of missing year of death also corrects for poorer reporting of the timing of non-war deaths.
Thirdly, as the survey was not specifically designed to measure war deaths, the absolute number of sibling deaths captured is small, leading to considerable uncertainty around our point estimates of war deaths—this might be a consistent feature of any survey based estimate of adult mortality, particularly cause specific estimates like our study and previous studies of war mortality. Additional uncertainty might have been introduced into our results by using the UN estimates of total deaths; however, these numbers are the only available source of information on mortality level for these country periods. Fourthly, we restricted our estimates to country periods with more than five sibling war deaths to reduce uncertainty; doing so, however, might have excluded information from small conflicts, which account for less than 1% of all deaths.
Finally, the absence of an ideal standard measurement of war mortality—which is the reason that alternative techniques such as surveys are needed—prevents us from validating our estimates with respect to true numbers. In the absence of credible vital registration data during wartime, the prospect of a validation study against a standard dataset is unlikely. We were unable to locate estimates of deaths from wartime surveys with which to compare our estimates in the 13 countries studied; nor to our knowledge are any future surveys planned in these countries, which could have served to check the consistency of the estimates.
Comparisons with other sources
One source of comparison in Vietnam is an analysis of that country’s life history survey, which yielded an estimate of 966 000 war deaths between 1965 and 1975,47 considerably lower than the world health survey estimate (1.7 million). The authors acknowledge, however, that the Vietnam life history survey results are biased downwards because rural areas with higher mortality were under-represented and estimates were not corrected for under-representation of high mortality families. In addition, the small sample (403 households compared with 4089 in the world health surveys) might have missed clusters of high mortality areas.
Another comparison can be made between survey data and the estimate of 97 000 dead and missing in Bosnia in 1991-5 by the Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo,48 which has compiled a high quality database of records, testimonies, and eyewitness and historical reports.49 As with similar efforts in Iraq,27 reported data provide a useful minimum estimate of deaths: our estimate of 167 000 deaths is higher than the centre’s figure but still considerably lower than other estimates, which have ranged up to 329 000.30 The centre’s database also permits comparison of time trends, which indicate that most deaths occurred from 1992 to 1994. The general trend in both sets of numbers is similar, with a decrease in deaths in 1995-2002 relative to 1985-94, corresponding to the final year of the war.
As a final point of comparison, we applied our correction method, derived from the comparison of survey estimates with Uppsala/PRIO data, to data from the Iraq Body Count project’s most recent report of 86 539 (the midpoint of the 82 772 to 90 305 range reported in April 2008) dead in Iraq since 2003.27 Our adjusted estimate of 184 000 violent deaths related to war falls between the Iraq Family Health Survey estimate of 151 000 (104 000 to 223 000)9 and the 601 000 estimate from the second Iraq mortality survey by Burnham and colleagues.1
Conclusions
Large scale population based surveys conducted in peacetime, despite their limitations, hold promise for measurement of war mortality for at least three reasons. Firstly, these surveys have several attributes (such as small sampling units, large numbers of clusters, stratification, random selection of households within clusters50) that are better suited to producing estimates of violent deaths—which tend to be geographically clustered—than those typically available during active humanitarian emergencies.51 Future surveys could reduce uncertainty around estimates from sibling histories by several techniques, including larger sample sizes, multiple non-sibling respondents per household, and more structured sibling histories. The survey performed well in the setting of some ongoing conflicts, such as Ethiopia and Sri Lanka, each gathering data on around 30 000 siblings with low non-response rates; it is clear, however, that the questionnaire and study design would need to be modified for use during high intensity conflicts. Secondly, household surveys in peacetime can be implemented quickly and relatively inexpensively. Finally, as population health surveys are not specifically designed to measure war mortality, and as respondents are asked to provide complete information on all of their siblings before survival status and cause of death are ascertained, there is less scope for exaggeration or double counting of deaths. In addition, such surveys can also provide information on causes of adult mortality other than war: recent advances in verbal autopsy techniques52 53 54 55 56 show promise for overcoming the many well known limitations of such cause of death data.
Accurate estimates of war mortality are crucial for planning on several different levels. Political, military, and public health leaders must have credible information on the number of deaths to plan properly before, during, and after wars. The public must also be aware of the human cost of wars. Information on war deaths is useful in the investigation of the scope of war crimes, as in the Nuremburg Trials after the second world war or the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.30 57 Finally, an accurate count of the number of deaths in war is an important part of a nation’s history. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is only one example of how a frank accounting of past tragedies is helping to make future ones less likely.
What is already known on this topic
The numbers of deaths caused by war have been documented by population based surveys in countries and areas such as Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, and Darfur
Media reports of war deaths are available in most countries with active wars, and these have also been used to generate estimates for individual countries and globally; but these numbers are generally subject to numerous biases
What this study adds
Population based estimates of violent war deaths for 13 countries from 1955-2002, including Vietnam, Bosnia, and Ethiopia, are considerably higher than most previous estimates
In these 13 countries, media reports captured only about a third of all deaths estimated from population based surveys
The new method of adjusting numbers reported in the media yields a more realistic global estimate of the number of violent war deaths per year
Population based surveys conducted in peacetime are a useful and versatile tool for estimating war deaths retrospectively, as well as for tracking adult mortality more generally
Footnotes
We thank Michael VanRooyen, Les Roberts, Frederick M Burkle, Emmanuel D’Harcourt, Eric Werker, the participants at the 2007 Harvard-Dartmouth Humanitarian Conference, and the peer reviewers for their help and insights.
Contributors: ZO, CJLM, and EG designed the study. ZO and EG performed statistical analyses. ZO, CJLM, and EG drafted the manuscript and approved the final version. ZO is guarantor.
Funding: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. WHO funded the world health surveys.
Competing interests: None declared.
Ethical approval: The world health surveys were approved by WHO’s ethical review process.
Provenance and peer review: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

Question: how many people died in the vietnam war

milijuna ljudi tijekom rata . Prema dostupnim podacima u razdoblju od 1955 . do 2002 .

The estimates of the total number of victims of the Vietnam conflict vary depending on the sources, and according to one of them a total of 3.8 million people died during the war.Through the available data in the period from 1955 to 2002, 5.4 million violent deaths were<unk> as a result of the war.

3.8 million in the United States.

Between 195 and 430 thousand civilians from South Vietnam and between 50 and 65 thousand civilians from North Vietnam died in the war.

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1955 . do 2002 . godine zabilježeno je 5,4 milijuna

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The estimates of the total number of victims of the Vietnam conflict vary depending on the sources , and according to one of them a total of 3.8 million people died during the war . Through the available data in the period from 1955 to 2002 , 5.4 million violent deaths were < unk > as a result of the war .

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Broj žrtava Procjene ukupnog broja žrtava Vijetnamskog sukoba variraju ovisno o izvorima, a prema jednom od njih sveukupno je poginulo 3,8 milijuna ljudi tijekom rata.Prema dostupnim podacima u razdoblju od 1955. do 2002. godine zabilježeno je 5,4 milijuna nasilnih smrti uslijed vođenja ratova... 3,8 milijuna samo u Vijetnamu. Između 195 i 430 tisuća civila iz Južnog Vijetnama te između 50 i 65 tisuća civila Sjevernog Vijetnama poginulo je u ratu.

Broj žrtava Procjene ukupnog broja žrtava Vijetnamskog sukoba variraju ovisno o izvorima, a prema jednom od njih sveukupno je poginulo 3,8 milijuna ljudi tijekom rata.Prema dostupnim podacima u razdoblju od 1955. do 2002. godine zabilježeno je 5,4 milijuna nasilnih smrti uslijed vođenja ratova...

Između 195 i 430 tisuća civila iz Južnog Vijetnama te između 50 i 65 tisuća civila Sjevernog Vijetnama poginulo je u ratu.

The estimates of the total number of victims of the Vietnam conflict vary depending on the sources, and according to one of them a total of 3.8 million people died during the war.Through the available data in the period from 1955 to 2002, 5.4 million violent deaths were<unk> as a result of the war. 3.8 million in the United States. Between 195 and 430 thousand civilians from South Vietnam and between 50 and 65 thousand civilians from North Vietnam died in the war.

The estimates of the total number of victims of the Vietnam conflict vary depending on the sources, and according to one of them a total of 3.8 million people died during the war.Through the available data in the period from 1955 to 2002, 5.4 million violent deaths were<unk> as a result of the war.

Between 195 and 430 thousand civilians from South Vietnam and between 50 and 65 thousand civilians from North Vietnam died in the war.

By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act, 4 August 1964 to 28 March 1973.

(January 21, 1977 )

The Central Intelligence Agency.

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The President Of The United States Of America , A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act

By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act, 4 August 1964 to 28 March 1973.

(January 21, 1977 )

The Central Intelligence Agency.

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By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act, 4 August 1964 to 28 March 1973. (January 21, 1977 ) The Central Intelligence Agency.

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(21. siječnja 1977.) Central Intelligence Agency. "Laos ", CIA World Factbook''' Cora Weiss Collection (materijali koji se odnose na otpor prema ratu i mirovne aktivnosti tijekom Vijetnamskog rata), Lloyd Sealy Library Special Collections, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change.

"Laos ", CIA World Factbook''' Cora Weiss Collection (materijali koji se odnose na otpor prema ratu i mirovne aktivnosti tijekom Vijetnamskog rata), Lloyd Sealy Library Special Collections, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change.

(January 21, 1977 ) The Central Intelligence Agency. "Laos", CIA World Factbook''' Cora Weiss Collection (materials related to war resistance and peace activities during the Vietnam War), Lloyd Sealy Library Special Collections, John Jay College of Criminal Justice Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change.

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The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (June 2006) ———.

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The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (June 2006) ———.

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Question: when was rat u vijetnamu published

Question: what is the counterinsurgency era

Kennedy's administration's interference in South Vietnam

Kennedyjeve administracije u Južni Vijetnam

Kennedy 's administration 's interference in South Vietnam

The past and future of a right - wing myth " , Harper 's Magazine ( June 2006 ) — — — .

The Counterinsurgency Era ( 1977 ) is the history of Kennedy 's administration 's interference in South Vietnam .

Brigham , Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam : A Brief History interactive website of PBS Buckley , Kevin .

The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (lipanj 2006.) ———. The Counterinsurgency Era (1977.) povijest uplitanja Kennedyjeve administracije u Južni Vijetnam. Brigham, Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History interaktivna web stranica PBS-a Buckley, Kevin.

The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (lipanj 2006.) ———.

The Counterinsurgency Era (1977.) povijest uplitanja Kennedyjeve administracije u Južni Vijetnam.

Brigham, Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History interaktivna web stranica PBS-a Buckley, Kevin.

The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (June 2006) ———. The Counterinsurgency Era (1977) is the history of Kennedy's administration's interference in South Vietnam. Brigham, Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History interactive website of PBS Buckley, Kevin.

The past and future of a right-wing myth", Harper's Magazine (June 2006) ———.

The Counterinsurgency Era (1977) is the history of Kennedy's administration's interference in South Vietnam.

Brigham, Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History interactive website of PBS Buckley, Kevin.

25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam, The Baltimore Sun (April 17, 2000)

The Church, Peter Ed.

A Short History of Southeast Asia (2006)

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970) records of events from Washington.

Question: when did the baltimore sun publish rat u vijetnamu

25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam, The Baltimore Sun (April 17, 2000)

The Church, Peter Ed.

A Short History of Southeast Asia (2006)

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970) records of events from Washington.

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The Church, Peter Ed.

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The Church, Peter Ed.

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The Church, Peter Ed.

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25 Years After End of Vietnam War : Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam , The Baltimore Sun ( April 17 , 2000 )

A Short History of Southeast Asia ( 2006 )

Cooper , Chester L. The Lost Crusade : America in Vietnam ( 1970 ) records of events from Washington .

"25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam", The Baltimore Sun (17. travnja 2000.) Church, Peter ed. A Short History of South-East Asia (2006.). Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970.) bilješke o događajima iz Washingtona.

"25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam", The Baltimore Sun (17. travnja 2000.)

A Short History of South-East Asia (2006.).

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970.) bilješke o događajima iz Washingtona.

25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam, The Baltimore Sun (April 17, 2000) The Church, Peter Ed. A Short History of Southeast Asia (2006) Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970) records of events from Washington.

25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam, The Baltimore Sun (April 17, 2000)

A Short History of Southeast Asia (2006)

Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970) records of events from Washington.

in 1998).

Gerdes, Louise I. ed.

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005).

Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History.

The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power
The Bush years have given rise to fears of a resurgent Imperial Presidency, but the problem cannot be solved simply by bringing a new administration to power. Both Left and Right agree on the boundless nature of presidential responsibility. For both sides, it is the president's job to grow the economy, teach our children well, save us from hurricanes, and even to spread democracy abroad. In short, the Imperial Presidency is the price we pay for making the office the focus of our national hopes and dreams. Combining historical scholarship, legal analysis, and cultural commentary, The Cult of the Presidency argues that the presidency needs to be reined in, with its powers checked by Congress and the courts. Only then will we begin to return the presidency to its proper constitutional role.
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The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power
Gene Healy
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The Cult of the Presidency: America's Dangerous Devotion to Executive Power
Gene Healy
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Question: rat u vijetnamu is a 2005 book by gerdes, louise

in 1998).

Gerdes, Louise I. ed.

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005).

Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History.

rat u vijetnamu is a 2005 book by gerdes, louise

Question: when was the book rat u vijetnamu written

in 1998).

Gerdes, Louise I. ed.

when was the book rat u vijetnamu written

Question: what is the title of the book by young, marilyn about the vietnam

Vietnam and America: A Documented History

Vietnam and America : A Documented History

in 1998).

Gerdes, Louise I. ed.

Vietnam and America : A Documented History

what is the title of the book by young, marilyn about the vietnam

Question: what is the title of the 2005 book by gerdes, louise

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons

in 1998).

Gerdes, Louise I. ed.

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons

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Question: which two countries were involved in the vietnam war

in 1998).

Gerdes, Louise I. ed.

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Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons : The Vietnam War ( 2005 ) .

Gettleman , Marvin E. ; Franklin , Jane ; Young , Marilyn Vietnam and America : A Documented History .

(1998.). Gerdes, Louise I. ed. Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005.). Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History.

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005.).

Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History.

in 1998). Gerdes, Louise I. ed. Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005). Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History.

Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War (2005).

Gettleman, Marvin E.; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn Vietnam and America: A Documented History.

Major General Spurgeon Neel.

Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998)

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Major General Spurgeon Neel.

Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998)

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Major General Spurgeon Neel.

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Major General Spurgeon Neel.

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Major General Spurgeon Neel.

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Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 ( Department of the Army 1991 ) official medical history Nulty , Bernard . The Vietnam War ( 1998 )

Major General Spurgeon Neel. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998)

Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998)

Major General Spurgeon Neel. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998)

Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history Nulty, Bernard.The Vietnam War (1998)

in 1997).

Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999) is based on still confidential audio records of meetings of U.S. Commanders in Vietnam, Spector, Ronald.

After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), a very broad review of 1968 Summers, Harry G.

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982) (225 pages) Tucker, Spencer.

and ed.

Question: how many pages in rat u vijetnamu

in 1997).

Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999) is based on still confidential audio records of meetings of U.S. Commanders in Vietnam, Spector, Ronald.

After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), a very broad review of 1968 Summers, Harry G.

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982) (225 pages) Tucker, Spencer.

and ed.

Question: what is the title of sorley, lewis, a better war

The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam

Victories and Final Tragedy of America 's Last Years in Vietnam ( 1999 . ) , temeljena na još uvijek povjerljivim audio zapisima sastanaka američkih zapovjednika

in 1997).

and ed.

The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America 's Last Years in Vietnam

what is the title of sorley, lewis, a better war

Sorley , Lewis , A Better War : The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America 's Last Years in Vietnam ( 1999 ) is based on still confidential audio records of meetings of U.S. Commanders in Vietnam , Spector , Ronald .

After Tet : The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam ( 1992 ) , a very broad review of 1968 Summers , Harry G.

On Strategy : A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War , Presidio press ( 1982 ) ( 225 pages ) Tucker , Spencer .

(1997.). Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999.), temeljena na još uvijek povjerljivim audio zapisima sastanaka američkih zapovjednika u Vijetnamu, Spector, Ronald. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992.), vrlo široki pregled 1968. godine Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982.), (225 stranica) Tucker, Spencer. ed.

Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999.), temeljena na još uvijek povjerljivim audio zapisima sastanaka američkih zapovjednika u Vijetnamu, Spector, Ronald.

After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992.), vrlo široki pregled 1968. godine Summers, Harry G.

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982.), (225 stranica) Tucker, Spencer.

in 1997). Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999) is based on still confidential audio records of meetings of U.S. Commanders in Vietnam, Spector, Ronald. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), a very broad review of 1968 Summers, Harry G. On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982) (225 pages) Tucker, Spencer. and ed.

Sorley, Lewis, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (1999) is based on still confidential audio records of meetings of U.S. Commanders in Vietnam, Spector, Ronald.

After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), a very broad review of 1968 Summers, Harry G.

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio press (1982) (225 pages) Tucker, Spencer.

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991)

Zhang, Zhang and Zhang

China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment, China Quarterly.

Question: where is the book rat u vijetnamu published

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991)

Zhang, Zhang and Zhang

China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment, China Quarterly.

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Zhang, Zhang and Zhang

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Zhang, Zhang and Zhang

Question: who won the vietnam war in 1979

Zhang, Zhang and Zhang

Witz , James J. The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War ( 1991 )

China 's 1979 War With Vietnam : A Reassessment , China Quarterly .

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991.). Xiaoming, Zhang. "China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment", China Quarterly.

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991.).

"China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment", China Quarterly.

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991) Zhang, Zhang and Zhang China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment, China Quarterly.

Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991)

China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment, China Quarterly.

External links American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primary source of American involvement Fallout of the War by Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26–31.

|
|
|Title||Oral history interview with Elliott Gardner recorded 2007 Apr. 16 |
|Description||Interview conducted by Allison Kinard. Elliott Gardner was drafted into the U.S. Army on May 7th, 1944. He went to basic training at Fort Dix, NJ and then had additional training in communications at Fort Garden, GA and Fort Campbell, KY. He was attached to the 101st Airborne division, and was shipped over to Vietnam in the summer of 1965. He arrived at Vung Tao, at the Southern tip of Vietnam on his 21st birthday. From there he was assigned to many different areas as a communications specialist, including Tan Son Nhut air base, and Bien Hoa. Gardner describes his first impressions of Vietnam, and his impressions as he was leaving the country to return home as well. He also talks about daily life: how the soldiers kept in touch, the food, what they did for entertainment, and humorous events. Gardner was discharged in the spring of 1966, after being in Vietnam for a year and a half. He returned to Connecticut and received an education in architecture under the GI Bill.
|
|Coverage||1964-1966 |
|Date Original||04/16/2007 |
|Digital Format||video/x-ms-wmv |
|Duration||00:39:09 |
|Contributors||Kinard, Allison|
|Software||Windows Media Player required for viewing |
|Access Restrictions and Permissions||No access restrictions. For permission to reproduce contact Central Connecticut State University, Center for Public Policy and Social Research at (860) 832-2976 |
|Image Identifier||VHP2007/3 |
|Creator/Owner||Gardner, Elliott|
|War or Conflict||Vietnam War, 1961-1975|
|Branch of Service||United States. Army|
|Unit of Service||United States. Army. 101st Airborne Division |
|Rank||Corporal E-4 (Specialist)
|
|Status||Veteran |
|Subject||Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- Personal narratives, American|
Veterans -- Connecticut -- Interviews
|Geographic Location||Fort Dix (N.J.)|
Fort Campbell (Ky. and Tenn.)
Tan Son Nhut Air Base (South Vietnam)
Saigon (Vietnam)
Bien Hoa (Vietnam)
|Publisher||Central Connecticut State University. Center for Public Policy and Social Research|
|Language||eng |
|Relation||Veterans History Project (U.S.)|
|Type of Resource||Moving image|
|Citation||Elliott Gardner Papers. VHP2007/3 Veterans History Project; Central Connecticut State University, Center for Public Policy and Social Research. |

Question: who wrote the 2008 cover story ‘no peace in the valley’

External links American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primary source of American involvement Fallout of the War by Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26–31.

who wrote the 2008 cover story ‘no peace in the valley’

Question: when did rat u vijetnamu cover

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Question: what items were collected from the vietnam war documents

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Question: who wrote no peace in the valley

Question: who collected engraved zippos from the vietnam war

who collected engraved zippos from the vietnam war

External links American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy - Vietnam primary source of American involvement Fallout of the War by Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner , U.S. Army " No Peace in the Valley , " Vietnam magazine , cover story , Oct. 2008 , 26–31 .

Vanjske poveznice American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primarni izvor američke involviranosti Fallout of the War iz Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26—31.

Vanjske poveznice American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primarni izvor američke involviranosti Fallout of the War iz Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26—31.

External links American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primary source of American involvement Fallout of the War by Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26–31.

External links American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primary source of American involvement Fallout of the War by Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26–31.

Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972 Timeline US – Vietnam (1947.

| || |
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Question: where is the vietnam war photograph collection located

Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972 Timeline US – Vietnam (1947.

where is the vietnam war photograph collection located

Question: what magazine featured the oral history of elliott gardner

No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine

No Peace in the Valley , " Vietnam magazine

what magazine featured the oral history of elliott gardner

Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam 's Armed Forces , 1969–1972 Timeline US – Vietnam ( 1947 .

Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972 Timeline US – Vietnam (1947.

External links American Ethnography – On collecting engraved Zippos from the Vietnam War Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primary source of American involvement Fallout of the War by Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Glossary of Military Terms & Slang from the Vietnam War Impressions of Vietnam and descriptions of the daily life of a soldier from the oral history of Elliott Gardner, U.S. Army "No Peace in the Valley," Vietnam magazine, cover story, Oct. 2008, 26–31. Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972 Timeline US – Vietnam (1947.

Stephen H. Warner Southeast Asia Photograph Collection at Gettysburg College The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972 Timeline US – Vietnam (1947.

Ho Chi Minh Creates Provisional Government
Following the surrender of Japan to Allied forces, Ho Chi Minh and his People's Congress create the National Liberation Committee of Vietnam to form a provisional government. Japan transfers all power to Ho's Vietminh.
President Franklin Roosevelt Dies
U.S. Drops Atomic Bombs on Japan
Making good on his threat to unleash "a rain of ruin the like of which has never been seen on earth," President Harry Truman authorizes the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan -- one on Hiroshima on August 6, and a second on Nagasaki on August 9. The Japanese will surrender within days.
Ho Declares Independence of Vietnam
British Forces Land in Saigon, Return Authority to French
First American Dies in Vietnam
Lt. Col. A. Peter Dewey, head of the American O.S.S. mission, is killed by Vietminh troops while driving a Jeep to the airport. Reports will later indicate that his death was due to a case of mistaken identity -- he had been mistaken for a Frenchman.
French and Vietminh Reach Accord
France recognizes Vietnam as a "free state" within the French Union. French troops replace Chinese in the North.
ENIAC, World's First Automatic Digital Computer, Introduced
Negotiations Between French and Vietminh Breakdown
Indochina War Begins
Following months of steadily deteriorating relations, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam launches its first concerted attack against the French.
Vietminh Move North of Hanoi
Jackie Robinson Signs with Brooklyn Dodgers
Marshall Plan Announced
Speaking at Harvard commencement exercises, Secretary of State George C. Marshall lays out the details of a Truman administration plan to assist Europe in rebuilding in the aftermath of World War II.
First Levittowns Go Up On Long Island
Valluy Fails to Defeat Vietminh
French General Etienne Valluy attempts, and fails, to wipe out the Vietminh in one stroke.
Elysée Agreement Signed
Bao Dai and President Vincent Auriol of France sign the Elysée Agreement. The French pledge to assist in the building of a national anti-Communist army.
NATO Formed
George Orwell's 1984 Published
Volkswagen Introduced in U.S.
Chinese, Soviets Offer Weapons to Vietminh
Alger Hiss Found Guilty of Perjury
Truman Commits U.S. Troops to Korea
When Communist forces from North Korea invade the Republic of South Korea on June 25, President Truman appeals to the United Nations to take action. The U.N. quickly brands North Korea the aggressor, and Truman immediately follows up by sending U.S. air and naval support to Korea.
U.S. Pledges $15M to Aid French
The United States sends $15 million dollars in military aid to the French for the war in Indochina. Included in the aid package is a military mission and military advisors.
Ho Chi Minh Creates Workers' Party
Truman Dismisses General Douglas MacArthur
Worst Floods in U.S. History Inundate Kansas and Missouri
"Sugar Ray" Robinson Beats Jake LaMotta for Middleweight Crown
France Grants Laos Full Independence
Rosenbergs Executed for Espionage
Playboy Magazine Debuts
Vietminh Forces Push into Laos
Battle of Dienbienphu Begins
A force of 40,000 heavily armed Vietminh lay siege to the French garrison at Dienbienphu. Using Chinese artillery to shell the airstrip, the Vietminh make it impossible for French supplies to arrive by air. It soon becomes clear that the French have met their match.
Supreme Court Rules in Brown v. Board of Education
Eisenhower Cites "Domino Theory" Regarding Southeast Asia
Responding to the defeat of the French by the Vietminh at Dienbienphu, President Eisenhower outlines the Domino Theory: "You have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly."
Senate Condemns McCarthy for Misconduct
French Defeated at Dienbienphu
Geneva Meeting Begins
Delegates from nine nations convene in Geneva to start negotiations that will lead to the end of hostilities in Indochina. The idea of partitioning Vietnam is first explored at this forum.
Geneva Agreements Announced
Vietminh General Ta Quang Buu and French General Henri Delteil sign the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. As part of the agreement, a provisional demarcation line is drawn at the 17th parallel which will divide Vietnam until nationwide elections are held in 1956. The United States does not accept the agreement, and neither does the government of Bao Dai.
Diem Rejects Geneva Accords, Refuses Nationwide Elections
China and Soviet Union Pledge Additional Financial Support to Hanoi
Diem Urged to Negotiate with North
Britain, France, and United States covertly urge Ngo Dinh Diem to respect the Geneva accords and enter discussions with the North.
Ford Introduces Thunderbird
Poet Alan Ginsberg Publishes "Howl"
Disneyland Opens in Anaheim, CA
Diem Becomes President of Republic of Vietnam