️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️ De Zúñiga was also influenced by the consequences for Spanish-controlled northern Italy should the Austrian branch of the family fail in Germany. De Zúñiga was also influenced by the consequences for Spanish-controlled northern Italy should the Austrian branch of the family fail in Germany. De Zúñiga persuaded Philip III to send aid the Emperor in Bohemia in 1619, effectively entering Spain into the Thirty Years' War (1618<unk>48). 1620, he played a key role in the dispatch of the Army of Flanders to aid the Imperial cause, leading to the Spanish victory at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.
Battle of White Mountain later that year. De Zúñiga fue también responsable de las decisiones clave españolas sobre el futuro del conflicto en los Países Bajos.<unk> De Zúñiga fue también responsable de las decisiones clave españolas sobre el futuro del conflicto en los Países Bajos. The armistice since 1609 had become increasingly tense; while de Zúñiga was convinced that a straightforward military victory over the Dutch was unlikely, by 1619 he had concluded that a renewal of hostilities could enable negotiations leading to a treaty more favorable to the Spanish. ️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️