️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️ Andrew Rosenbaum, in the "New York Journal of Books", said: "Col. Gentile very capablely shows that counterinsurgency, which can be roughly summed up as a 'nation-building' strategy, didn't work in the past, when the British tried it in
Malaysia, nor when the U.S. tried it in Vietnam, and that it certainly didn't work in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the hype it received when it was tried. <unk> <unk> <unk> <unk> Col. Gentile then shows that the strategy is fundamentally flawed, and cannot work in the form that it has been proposed.<unk>