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<unk> <unk> <unk> Ford dispatched Marines to rescue the crew, but the Marines landed on the wrong island and met unexpectedly stiff resistance just as, unknown to the U.S., the "Mayaguez" sailors were being released.<unk> Ford dispatched Marines to rescue the crew, but the Marines landed on the wrong island and met unexpectedly stiff resistance just as, unknown to the U.S., the "Mayaguez" sailors were being released. ️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️ ️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️<unk>️ Some historians have argued that the Ford administration felt the need to respond forcefully to the incident because it was construed as a Soviet plot.<unk> Some historians have argued that the Ford administration felt the need to respond forcefully to the incident because it was construed as a Soviet plot.<unk> Some historians have argued that the Ford administration felt the need to respond forcefully to the incident because it was construed as a Soviet plot. But work by Andrew Gawthorpe, published in 2009, based on an analysis of the administration's internal discussions, shows that Ford's national security team understood that the seizure of the vessel was a local, and perhaps even accidental, provocation by an immature Khmer government. But work by Andrew Gawthorpe, published in 2009, based on an analysis of the administration's internal discussions, shows that Ford's national security team understood that the seizure of the vessel was a local, and perhaps even accidental, provocation by an immature Khmer government. <unk> <unk> <unk> <unk>