Impact of Extreme Situations such as WW2 on “legendary” Investors' Returns?
"Possibly the best answer to why America became globally dominant after WW2 was written by a FRENCHMAN, Jean-Jacque Sergen-Schreiber, Le Defi American (The American Challenge). Probably the only legendary investor of the proper age to benefit from WW2 was John Templeton, who borrowed $10,000 before the war, and ended up with $40,000 afterward (both worth about ten times more in today's money). His story, and that of others, can be found in John Train's, ""The Money Masters."""
"The high frequency trading you reference has no adverse impact on individual investors - at least not in the ""going to take advantage of you"" way that many articles imply. If anything, high-frequency trading is generally more helpful than harmful, adding liquidity to the system, although it can cause some volatility and ""noise"" in volume and other data, and the sudden entrance or exit of this type of trading can drive some abnormal market movements. As to research and time needed for trading, most data suggests that the less you try to ""beat the market"", the better you'll do.   Trade activity tends to be inversely related to returns, particularly for individuals.   Your best bet is likely to learn enough about investment risks to ensure you're comfortable with them, and invest in broadly diversified asset classes, regions, and sectors, and then mostly leave them alone, or rebalance annually.   You'll almost surely do a lot better that way than you will if you spend countless hours researching the ""right"" stocks to buy." "Okay - but that's about gold as an investment in today's world, and during  an extremely unstable financial situation.  Many other types of investments could be used similarly. Those who advocate gold as a hedge don't advocate buying it during a crisis, they advocate keeping some as part of an investment strategy... but again, that's gold as gold, not gold as currency.  Leveraging your investments based on current financial situations is what investing is about.   Gold as a medium for currency is a totally different thing.   What you just described would be called ""arbitrage"" - in moving markets (or other situations I guess) looking for no-lose situations where you can trade things around and increase your net value doing it.    it helps stabilize markets - as people take advantage of this situation it counters the effect and self-corrects... think about it ;)" Edit: This is paywalled so I pasted it here.  LONDON—The synthetic CDO, a villain of the global financial crisis, is back.  A decade ago, investors’ bad bets on collateralized debt obligations helped fuel the crisis. Billed as safe, they turned out to be anything but. Now, more investors are returning to CDOs—and so are concerns that excess is seeping into the aging bull market.  In the U.S., the CDO market sunk steadily in the years after the financial crisis but has been fairly flat since 2014. In Europe, the total size of market is now rising again—up 5.6% annually in the first quarter of the year and 14.4% in the last quarter of 2016, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.  Collateralized debt obligations package a bunch of assets, such as mortgage or corporate loans, into a security that is chopped up into pieces and sold to investors.  The assets inside a synthetic CDO aren’t physical debt securities but rather derivatives, which in turn reference other investments such as loans or corporate debt.  During the financial crisis, synthetic CDOs became a symbol of the financial excesses of the era. Labelled an “atomic bomb” in the movie “The Big Short,” they ultimately were the vehicle that spread the risks from the mortgage market throughout the financial system.  Synthetic CDOs crammed with exposure to subprime mortgages—or even other CDOs—are long gone. The ones that remain contain credit-default swaps referencing a range of European and U.S. companies, effectively allowing investors to bet whether corporate defaults will pick up.  Desperate for something that pays better than basic government bonds, insurance companies, asset managers and high-net worth investors are scooping up investments like synthetic CDOs, bankers say, which had largely become the preserve of hedge funds after 2008.  Investment banks, which create and sell CDOs, are happy to oblige. Placid markets have made trading revenue weak this year, and such structured products are an increasingly important business line.  Synthetic CDOs got “bad press,” says Renaud Champion, head of credit strategies at Paris-based hedge fund La Française Investment Solutions. But “that market has never ceased to fully function,” he added.  These days, Mr. Champion still trades synthetic CDOs, receiving a stream of income for effectively insuring against a sharp rise in European corporate defaults.  Many investors, though, still view the products as unnecessarily complex and are concerned they may be hard to offload when markets get choppy—as they did in the last crisis. From the DepthsThe amount outstanding of European collateralized debt obligations has been growing again after years of shrinking.  “We don’t see that demand from our clients and we wouldn’t recommend it,” said Markus Stadlmann, chief investment officer at Lloyds Private Banking, citing concerns over the products’ lack of transparency and lack of liquidity, meaning it could be hard to offload a position when needed.  The return of synthetic CDOs could present other risks. Even if banks are currently less willing to loan money to help clients juice returns, credit default swaps can be very leveraged, potentially allowing investors to make outsize bets.  Structured products accounted for nearly all the $2.6 billion year-on-year growth in trading-division revenue at the top 12 global investment banks in the first quarter, according to Amrit Shahani, research director at financial consultancy Coalition.  “There has been an uptick in interest in any kind of yield-enhancement structure,” said Kokou Agbo-Bloua, a managing director in Société Générale SA’s investment bank.  The fastest growth this year has come in credit—the epicenter of the 2007-08 crisis. The top global 12 investment banks had around $1.5 billion in revenue in structured credit in the first quarter, according to Coalition, more than doubling since the first quarter of 2016. Structured equities are largest overall, a business dominated by sales of derivatives linked to moves in stock prices, with revenue of $5 billion in the first quarter.  “The low-yield environment hurts,” said Lionel Pernias, a credit-fund manager at AXA Investment Managers. “So there are a lot of asset owners looking at structured credit.”  These days, the typical synthetic CDO involves a portfolio of credit-default swaps on a range of companies. The portfolio is sliced into tranches, and investors receive payouts based on the performance of the swaps. Those investors owning lower tranches tend to get paid more but are subject to higher losses if the swaps sour. Structured GrowthBank revenues from structured products such as collateralized debt obligations are rising faster than conventionaltrading of stocks, bonds and currencies.  For instance, an investor can sell insurance against a pick-up in defaults in the lowest—or “equity”—tranche of the iTraxx Europe index, a widely traded CDS benchmark that tracks European investment-grade companies. In return, the investor will receive regular payments, but those will shrink with every company default and stop altogether once 3% of the portfolio has been wiped out through defaults.  During the financial crisis, synthetic CDOs based on standardized indexes like iTraxx Europe suffered losses as traders expected defaults to pick up. Investors who held on, though, have since done “great,” says Mr. Champion.  Investors who agreed to insure against a rise in defaults for 10 years on the equity tranche of the iTraxx Europe index in March 2008 have made roughly 10% a year, according to an analysis of data from IHS Markit . That’s despite defaults from two companies in the index: Italian lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena and Portugal Telecom International Finance BV.  In contrast, investors who sold insurance on tailored CDOs packed with riskier credits—such as Icelandic banks or monoline insurers—would have been on the hook for losses.  Synthetic CDOs have evolved since the crisis, bankers say. For instance, most are shorter-dated, running up to around two to three years rather than seven to 10 years. Some banks will only slice and dice standardized CDS indexes that trade frequently in the market rather than craft tailored baskets of credits.  There are also fewer banks involved in arranging these trades. Those active include BNP Paribas SA, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase &amp; Co. and Société Générale.  Postcrisis regulations have forced banks to set aside more capital against these transactions and use less leverage. That has encouraged banks to parcel out the risk to clients rather than keeping it on their own books.  “There is a lot more regulation and scrutiny and a lot less leverage,” said Mr. Agbo-Bloua.  Mr. Champion says he only trades tranches based on standardized CDS indexes, which he says are easier to buy and sell than more tailored products. Currently, he sees value in selling default protection on super-senior tranches.  Mr. Champion said he has to lay down only around $1 million in upfront margin costs on a $100 million trade of this kind.  “The cost of leverage in the derivatives space is very low,” he said.  Any expectations of default rates picking up could inflict losses on synthetic CDOs, though at the moment analysts forecast they should decline. Still, the memory of how the market behaved in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis is likely to keep many investors on the sidelines.  “If you’re the person responsible for buying the synthetic CDO that suddenly goes wrong, your career risk is bigger than if you’d bought a plain vanilla bond that goes wrong. It has a bad name,” said Ulf Erlandsson, a portfolio manager at start-up hedge fund Glacier Impact, who until recently oversaw credit for one of Sweden’s public pension funds. A Mortgage Backed Security or MBS is the security.  It's not an entity, it's essentially a contract.  As an investment they function more or less the same way a bond does. There is nothing wrong with the concept behind a Mortgage Backed Security.  Functionally securities like these allows banks and other institutions to lend to high-risk borrowers.  You package small slices of a wide range of risk from a large number of mortgages and the investor sill receive something similar to the average of the rates being charged.  Essentially from a big pool of mortgages of varying risk you will create a different big pool of bonds that can be sold to investors based on some sort of expected return.  For a frame of reference on a much smaller scale look at peer to peer lending sites like LendingClub and Prosper.  The idea is lots of people of varying risk profiles make requests for loans of varying amounts.  You bring your $2,500 and invest $25 in to 100 different loans.  This way even if a few default you will still eek out a profit.  It also allows you to include riskier borrowers without materially impacting your expected return. Excellent Question!  I agree with other repliers but there are some uneasy things with index funds. Since your view is death, I will take extremely pessimist view things that may cause it (very big may): I know warnings about stock-picking but, in imperfect world, the above things tend to happen. But to be honest, they feel too much paranoia. Better to keep things simple with good diversification and rebalancing when people live in euphoria/death. You may like Bogleheads.org. That period was also significantly less regulated as measured by the size of the federal register. As of 2013, there is 18x as much regulation as in 1950 ([source](https://www.mercatus.org/video/visualizing-growth-federal-regulation-1950)).  Additionally, the middle class didn't pay taxes in the 90% bracket and the rich most likely didn't either as the rich tend to receive the majority of income through capital gains or other passive income.   The top capital gains rate was significantly less--25% starting in 1942--than the top rate for ordinary income during the post-war period.  Edit: spacing I remember like 20 years ago someone did an experiment where Peter Lynch, elementary school kids, and an ape, all picked stocks in a situation similar to this. The result was almost the same, with the elementary school kids coming out slightly better  Picking correct stocks is a craps shoot, as the market is an emotional entity, and in the short run, even educated guesses don't give an edge. People like Peter Lynch eventually win of course because of discipline, long term goals, and knowledge of tools like derivatives "The June 2014 issue of Barclays Wealth's Compass magazine had a very nice succinct article on this topic: ""Value investing – does a rules-based approach work?"".  It examines the performance of value and growth styles of investment in the MSCI World and S&P500 arenas for a few decades back, and reveals a surprisingly complicated picture, depending on sector, region and time-period. Their summary is basically: A closer look however shows that the overall success of value   strategies derives mainly from the 1970s and 1980s. ... in the US, value has underperformed growth for over 25 years   since peaking in July 1988. Globally, value experienced a 30% setback   in the late 1990s so that there are now periods with a length of   nearly 13 years over which growth has outperformed. So the answer to ""does it beat the market?"" is  ""it depends..."". Update in response to comment below: the question of risk adjusted returns is interesting.  To quote another couple of fragments from the piece: Since December 1974, [MSCI world] value has outperformed growth by   2.6% annually, with lower risk. This outperformance on a risk-adjusted   basis is the so-called value premium that Eugene Fama and Kenneth   French first identified in 1992... and That outperformance has, however, come with more risk. Historical   volatility of the pure style indices has been 21-22% compared to 16%   for the market. ... From a maximum drawdown perspective, the 69% drop   of pure value during the financial crisis exceeded the 51% drop of the   overall market."