The spread goes to the market maker, is the market maker the exchange?
"Joke warning: These days, it seems that rogue trading programs are the big market makers (this concludes the joke) Historically, exchange members were market makers. One or more members guaranteed a market in a particular stock, and would buy whatever you wanted to sell (or vice-versa). In a balanced market -- one where there were an equal number of buyers and sellers -- the spread was indeed profit for them. To make this work, market makers need an enormous amount of liquidity (ability to hold an inventory of stocks) to deal with temporary imbalances. And a day like October 29, 1929, can make that liquidity evaporate. I say ""historically,"" because I don't think that any stock market works this way today (I was discussing this very topic with a colleague last week, went to Wikipedia to look at the structure of the NYSE, and saw no mention of exchange members as market makers -- in fact, it appears that the NYSE is no longer a member-based exchange). Instead, today most (all?) trading happens on ""electronic crossing networks,"" where the spread is simply the difference between the highest bid and lowest ask. In a liquid stock, there will be hundreds if not thousands of orders clustered around the ""current"" price, usually diverging by fractions of a cent. In an illiquid stock, there may be a spread, but eventually one bid will move up or one ask will move down (or new bids will come in). You could claim that an entity with a large block of stock to move takes the role of market maker, but it doesn't have the same meaning as an exchange market maker. Since there's no entity between the bidder and asker, there's no profit in the spread, just a fee taken  by the ECN. Edit: I think you have a misconception of what the ""spread"" is. It's simply the difference between the highest bid and the lowest offer. At the instant a trade takes place, the spread is 0: the highest bid equals the lowest offer, and the bidder and seller exchange shares for money. As soon as that trade is completed, the spread re-appears. The only way that a trade happens is if buyer and seller agree on price. The traditional market maker is simply an entity that has the ability to buy or sell an effectively unlimited number of shares. However, if the market maker sets a price and there are no buyers, then no trade takes place. And if there's another entity willing to sell shares below the market maker's price, then the buyers will go to that entity unless the market's rules forbid it." "A ""market maker"" is someone that is contractually bound, by the exchange, to provide both bid and ask prices for a given volume (e.g. 5000 shares). A single market maker usually covers many stocks, and a single stock is usually covered by many market makers. The NYSE has ""specialists"" that are market makers that also performed a few other roles in the management of trading for a stock, and usually a single issue on the NYSE is covered by only one market maker.  Market makers are often middlemen between brokers (ignoring stuff like dark pools, and the fact that brokers will often trade stocks internally among their own clients before going to the exchange).  Historically, the market makers gave up buy/sell discretion in exchange for being the ""go-to guys"" for anyone wanting to trade in that stock. When you told your broker to buy a stock for you, he didn't hook you up with another retail investor; he went to the market maker. Market makers would also sometimes find investors willing to step in when more liquidity was needed for a security. They were like other floor traders; they hung out on the exchange floors and interacted with traders to buy and sell stocks. Traders came to them when they wanted to buy one of the specialist's issues. There was no public order book; just ticker tape and a quote. It was up to the market maker to maintain that order book.  Since they are effectively forbidden from being one-sided traders in a security, their profit comes from the bid-ask spread. Being the counter-party to almost every trade, they'd make profit from always selling above where they were buying. (Except when the price moved quickly -- the downside to this arrangement.) ""The spread goes to the market maker"" is just stating that the profit implicit in the spread gets consumed by the market maker. With the switch to ECNs, the role of the market maker has changed. For example, ForEx trading firms tend to act as market makers to their customers. On ECNs, the invisible, anonymous guy at the other end of most trades is often a market maker, still performing his traditional role. Yet brokers can interact directly with each other now, rather than relying on the market maker's book. With modern online investing and public order books, retail investors might even be trading directly with each other. Market makers are still out there; in part, they perform a service sold by an Exchange to the companies that choose to be listed on that exchange. That service has changed to helping tamp volatility during normal high-volatility periods (such as at open and close)."
This has never really adequately explained it for me, and I've tried reading up on it all over the place. For a long time I thought that in a trade, the market maker pockets the spread *for that trade*, but that's not the case.  The only sensible explanation I've found (which I'm not going to give in full...) is that the market maker will provide liquidity by buying and selling trades they have no actual view on (short or long), and if the spread is higher, that contributes directly to the amount they make over time when they open and close positions they've made.  It would be great to see a single definitive example somewhere that shows how a market maker makes money. "At least for liquid markets, the downside of being a market maker is what we call ""negative selection"". Specifically, if you're both bid and offered in a market, trying to collect your spread, then as the market goes up, you'll tend to sell the whole way up, and vice versa. So if you're not smart about it, you can end up losing a lot of money.   Being a good market maker, then, involves either being able to smarter about when to be aggressively bid and offered and when to pull back, or being able to hedge them quickly before they really hurt you. The first probably would require more sophisticated algorithms, while the second requires good speed and execution strategies." "That article, like almost any article written by a non-expert and quoting only ""research"" from lobbying groups, hugely misses the point. The vast majority of orders that end up being cancelled are cancelled as a standard part of exchanges' official market-maker programs. Each exchange wants you and me to know that it has liquidity -- that when we go to buy or sell some stock, there will be someone waiting on the other side of the trade.  So the exchange pays (via lowered fees or even rebates) hundreds of registered market makers to constantly have orders resting in each product's order book within a few ticks of the current NBBO or the last trade price.  That way, if everyone else should suddenly disappear from the market, you and I will still be able to trade our shares for a price somewhat close to the last trade price. But market makers who are simply acting in this ""backstop"" role don't actually want to have their orders filled, because those orders will almost always lose them money. So as prices rise and fall (as much as tens of times per second), the market makers need to cancel their resting orders (so they don't get filled) and add new ones at new prices (so they meet their obligations to the exchange).  And because the number of orders resting in any given product's order book is vastly larger than the number of actual trades that take place in any given time period, naturally the number of cancellations is also going to hugely outweigh the number of actual trades.  As much as 97% to 3% (or even more). But that's completely fine! You and I don't have to care about any of that.  We almost never need the market makers to be there to trade with us.  They're only there as a backstop.  There's almost always plenty of organic liquidity for us to trade against.  Only in the rare case where liquidity completely dries up do we really care that the registered market makers are there.  And in those cases (ideally) the market makers can't cancel their orders (depending on how well the exchange has set up its market maker program). So, to answer your question, the effect of standard order cancellation on a stock is essentially none.  If you were to visualize the resting orders in a product's book as prices moved up and down, you would essentially see a Gaussian distribution with mean at the last trade price, and it would move up and down with the price.  That ""movement"" is accomplished by cancellations followed by new orders. P.S. As always, keep in mind that your and my orders almost never actually make it to a real stock exchange anymore.  Nowadays they are almost always sent to brokers' and big banks' internal dark pools.  And in there you and I have no idea what shenanigans are going on.  As just one example, dark pools allow their operators and (for a fee) other institutional participants access to a feature called last look that allows them to cancel their resting order as late as after your order has been matched against it! :( Regarding the question in your comment ... If Alice is sending only bona fide orders (that is, only placing an order at time T if, given all the information she has at time T, she truly wants and intends for it to be filled) then her cancellation at a later time actually adds to the effectiveness of and public perception of the market as a tool for price discovery (which is its ultimate purpose). [In the following example imagine that there are no such things as trading fees or commissions or taxes.] Let's say Alice offers to buy AAPL at $99.99 when the rest of the market is trading it for $100.00.  By doing so she is casting her vote that the ""fair value"" of a share of AAPL is between $99.99 and $100.00. After all, if she thought the fair value of a share of AAPL was higher --  say, between $100.00 and $100.01 -- then she should be willing to pay $100.00 (because that's below fair value) and she should expect that other people in the market will not soon decide to sell to her at $99.99. If some time later Alice does decide that the fair value of AAPL is between $100.00 and $100.01 then she should definitely cancel her order at $99.99, for exactly the reason discussed above.  She probably won't get filled at $99.99, and by sitting there stubbornly she's missing out (potentially forever) on the possibility to make a profit. Through the simple act of cancelling her $99.99 order, Alice is once again casting a vote that she no longer thinks that's AAPL's fair value.  She is (very slightly) altering the collective opinion of the entire market as to what a share of AAPL is worth.  And if her cancellation then frees her up to place another order closer to her perceived fair value (say, at $100.00), then that's another vote for her honest optinion about AAPL's price. Since the whole goal of the market is to get a bunch of particpants to figure out the fair value of some financial instrument (or commodity, or smart phone, or advertising time, etc.), cancellations of honest votes from the past in order to replace them with new, better-informed honest votes in the present can only be a good thing for the market's effectiveness and perceived effectiveness. It's only when participants start sending non-honest votes (non bona fide orders) that things start to go off the rails.  That's what @DumbCoder was referring to in his comment on your original question." "The current stock price you're referring to is actually the price of the last trade.  It is a historical price – but during market hours, that's usually mere seconds ago for very liquid stocks. Whereas, the bid and ask are the best potential prices that buyers and sellers are willing to transact at: the bid for the buying side, and the ask for the selling side.  But, think of the bid and ask prices you see as ""tip of the iceberg"" prices.  That is: The ""Bid: 13.20 x200"" is an indication that there are potential buyers bidding $13.20 for up to 200 shares.  Their bids are the highest currently bid; and there are others in line behind with lower bid prices.  So the ""bid"" you're seeing is actually the best bid price at that moment.  If you entered a ""market"" order to sell more than 200 shares, part of your order would likely be filled at a lower price. The ""Ask: 13.27 x1,000"" is an indication that there are potential sellers asking $13.27 for up to 1000 shares.  Their ask prices are the lowest currently asked; and there are others in line behind with higher ask prices.  So the ""ask"" you're seeing is the best asking price at that moment.  If you entered a ""market"" order to buy more than 1000 shares, part of your order would likely be filled at a higher price. A transaction takes place when either a potential buyer is willing to pay the asking price, or a potential seller is willing to accept the bid price, or else they meet in the middle if both buyers and sellers change their orders. Note: There are primarily two kinds of stock exchanges.  The one I just described is a typical order-driven matched bargain market, and perhaps the kind you're referring to. The other kind is a quote-driven over-the-counter market where there is a market-maker, as JohnFx already mentioned.  In those cases, the spread between the bid & ask goes to the market maker as compensation for making a market in a stock.  For a liquid stock that is easy for the market maker to turn around and buy/sell to somebody else, the spread is small (narrow).  For illiquid stocks that are harder to deal in, the spread is larger (wide) to compensate the market-maker having to potentially carry the stock in inventory for some period of time, during which there's a risk to him if it moves in the wrong direction.    Finally ... if you wanted to buy 1000 shares, you could enter a market order, in which case as described above you'll pay $13.27.  If you wanted to buy your shares at no more than $13.22 instead, i.e. the so-called ""current"" price, then you would enter a limit order for 1000 shares at $13.22.  And more to the point, your order would become the new highest-bid price (until somebody else accepts your bid for their shares.)  Of course, there's no guarantee that with a limit order that you will get filled; your order could expire at the end of the day if nobody accepts your bid." "Can you give me evidence that HFT front running is happening? Better yet, can you tell me how, given current market structure, front running is even possible? Don't just tell me ""order types"" and ""faster"", because that doesn't directly lead to front running. In fact, why don't you start by defining what you think to be front running? I have a feeling that will clear up a lot of your apparent misunderstanding.  In the meantime, you're just regurgitating Flash Boys / CNBC hype.  Also, it's a fallacy to say that people ""believe"" in the mission of IEX simply because there's volume there. Market participants will connect to any liquidity source, based purely on their endless quest for more liquidity...  EDIT: By the way, being faster than someone is *not* front running. It's being faster than them. I want to make sure you understand this distinction before venturing into matters you're obviously *very* unfamiliar with." "As an exercise, I want to give this a shot.  I'm not involved in a firm that cares about liquidity so all this stuff is outside my purview.  As I understand it, it goes something like this: buy side fund puts an order to the market as a whole (all or most possibly exchanges).  HFTs see that order hit the first exchange but have connectivity to exchanges further down the pipe that is faster than the buy side fund.  They immediately send their own order in, which reaches exchanges and executes before the buy side fund's order can.  They immediately put up an ask, and buy side fund's order hits that ask and is filled (I guess I'm assuming the order was a market order from the beginning).  This is in effect the HFT front running the buy side fund.    Is this accurate?  Even if true, whether I have a genuine issue with this... I'm not sure.  Has anyone on the ""pro-HFT"" side written a solid rebuttal to Lewis and Katsuyama that has solid research behind it?" "The simple answer is, there are many ways for trades to take place.  Some systems use order-matching software that employs proprietary algorithms for deciding the order of processing, others use FIFO structures, and so on.  Some brokerages may fill customer orders out of their own accounts (which happens more frequently than you might imagine), and others put their orders into the system for the market makers to handle.  There's no easy all-encompassing answer to your question, but it's still a good one to ask. By the way, asking if the market is ""fair"" is a bit naive, because fairness depends on what side of the trade you came out on! (grin)  If your limit order didn't get filled and you missed out on an opportunity, that's always going to seem unfair, right?" well you had it a bit backwards. the more liquid a market is, the less important the idea of insider information becomes. this is the opposite in less liquid markets - such as low volatile stocks about to announce earnings. knowing the earnings would net you a much larger percentage than, say, knowing if the ECB will cut rates of not. the change will be a much larger % and as with currencies, it is more important to know what the major players are planning - as in, central banks and reserves, carry trades, etc.