Who creates money? Central banks or commercial banks?
A central bank typically introduces new money into the system by printing new money to purchase items from member banks.  The central bank can purchase whatever it chooses.  It typically purchases government bonds but the Federal Reserve purchased mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) during the 2008 panic since the FED was the only one willing to pay full price for MBS after the crash of 2008. The bank, upon receipt of the new money, can loan the money out.  A minimum reserve ratio specifies how much money the bank has to keep on hand.  A reserve ratio of 10% means the bank must have $10 for every $100 in loans. As an example, let's say the FED prints up some new money to purchase some office desks from a member bank.  It prints $10,000 to purchase some desks.  The bank receives $10,000.  It can create up to $100,000 in loans without exceeding the 10% minimum reserve ratio requirement.   How would it do so?  A customer would come to the bank asking for a $100,000 loan.  The bank would create an account for the customer and credit $100,000 to the customer's account.  There is a problem, however.  The customer borrowed the money to buy a boat so the customer writes a check for $100,000 to the boat company.  The boat company attempts to deposit the $100,000 check into the boat company's bank.  The boat company's bank will ask the originating bank for $100,000 in cash.  The originating bank only has $10,000 in cash on hand so this demand will immediately bankrupt the originating bank. So what actually happens?  The originating bank actually only loans out reserves * (1 - minimum reserve ratio) so it can meet demands for the loans it originates.   In our example the bank that received the initial $10,000 from the FED will only loan out $10,000 * (1-0.1) = $9,000.  This allows the bank to cover checks written by the person who borrowed the $9,000.  The reserve ratio for the bank is now $1,000/$9,000 which is 11% and is over the minimum reserve requirement.  The borrower makes a purchase with the borrowed $9,000 and the seller deposits the $9,000 in his bank.  The bank that receives that $9,000 now has an additional $9,000 in reserves which it will use to create loans of $9,000 * (1 - 0.1) = $8100.   This continual fractional reserve money creation process will continue across the entire banking system resulting in $100,000 of new money created from $10,000. This process is explained very well here. "Scenario 1 is typically the better description. If commercial banks were allowed to simply ""create"" money, they wouldn't be in the mess they're in now. In the U.S., the central bank is the Federal Reserve or Fed, and is the only entity (not the government, not the banks, not the people) that is allowed to create money ""out of thin air"". It does this primarily by buying government debt. The government spends more than it takes in, and so to come up with the deficit, it issues bonds. The Fed buys a certain amount of these bonds, and simply prints the money (or more realistically authorized the electronic transfer of $X to the Treasury) which the government then spends. That places money in the hands of corporations and the people, who turn around and spend it. However, long-term, the interest charges on money borrowed from the Fed will actually remove money from the economy. The central banks, therefore, have to constantly make marginal changes to various monetary policy tools they have when the economy is just humming along. If they do nothing, then too much of a short-term increase in money supply will result in there being ""too much money"" which makes an individual monetary unit worth less (inflation), while making money too hard to get will reduce the rate at which it's spent, reducing GDP and causing recessions. The exact scenario you describe is typically seen in cases where the government is running with a balanced budget, and the central bank thus can't give its ""new money"" to the government to spend when it wants to increase the money supply. In that situation, the central bank instead lowers its lending rate, the percentage interest that it will charge on loans made to other banks, thereby encouraging those banks to borrow more of the money created by the central bank. Those banks will then use the money to make loans, invest in the market, etc etc which puts the money in the economy.  In the U.S., the Fed does have this tool as well, but increases or decreases in the ""Federal Funds Rate"" are typically used to influence the rate that banks charge each other to borrow money, thus encouraging or discouraging this lending. A lowering in the interest rate makes banks more likely to borrow from each other (and from the Fed but the amount of money ""created"" this way is a drop in the bucket compared to current ""quantitative easing""), and thus increases the ""turnover"" of the existing money in the economy (how many times a theoretical individual dollar is spent in a given time period)." Empirial evidence for the second scenario: Can banks individually create money out of nothing? — The theories and the empirical evidence. Excerpt: It was examined whether in the process of making money available to   the borrower the bank transfers these funds from other accounts   (within or outside the bank). In the process of making loaned money   available in the borrower's bank account, it was found that the bank   did not transfer the money away from other internal or external   accounts, resulting in a rejection of both the fractional reserve   theory and the financial intermediation theory. Instead, it was found   that the bank newly ‘invented’ the funds by crediting the borrower's   account with a deposit, although no such deposit had taken place. This   is in line with the claims of the credit creation theory. Thus it can now be said with confidence for the first time – possibly   in the 5000 years' history of banking - that it has been empirically   demonstrated that each individual bank creates credit and money out of   nothing, when it extends what is called a ‘bank loan’. The bank does   not loan any existing money, but instead creates new money. The money   supply is created as ‘fairy dust’ produced by the banks out of thin   air.
The Swiss franc has appreciated quite a bit recently against the Euro as the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to print money to buy government bonds issues by Greek, Portugal, Spain and now Italy.  Some euro holders have flocked to the Swiss franc in an effort to preserve the savings from the massive Euro money printing.  This has increased the value of the Swiss franc.  In response, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has tried to intervene multiple times in the currency market to keep the value of the Swiss franc low.  It does this by printing Swiss francs and using the newly printed francs to buy Euros.  The SNB interventions have failed to suppress the Swiss franc and its value has continued to rise.  The SNB has finally said they will print whatever it takes to maintain a desired peg to the Euro.  This had the desired effect of driving down the value of the franc. Which effect will this have long term for the euro zone? It is now clear that all major central bankers are in a currency devaluation war in which they are all trying to outprint each other.  The SNB was the last central bank to join the printing party.  I think this will lead to major inflation in all currencies as we have not seen the end of money printing.  Will this worsen the European financial crisis or is this not an important factor? I'm not sure this will have much affect on the ongoing European crisis since most of the European government debt is in euros. Should this announcement trigger any actions from common European people concerning their wealth? If a European is concerned with preserving their wealth I would think they would begin to start diverting some of their savings into a harder currency.  Europeans have experienced rapidly depreciating currencies more than people on any other continent.  I would think they would be the most experienced at preserving wealth from central bank shenanigans. "My answer is specific to the US because you mentioned the Federal Reserve, but a similar system is in place in most countries. Do interest rates increase based on what the market is doing, or do they solely increase based on what the Federal Reserve sets them at? There are actually two rates in question here; the Wikipedia article on the federal funds rate has a nice description that I'll summarize here. The interest rate that's usually referred to is the federal funds rate, and it's the rate at which banks can lend money to each other through the Federal Reserve. The nominal federal funds rate - this is a target set by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve at each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). When you hear in the media that the Fed is changing interest rates, this is almost always what they're referring to. The actual federal funds rate - through the trading desk of the New York Federal Reserve, the FOMC conducts open market operations to enforce the federal funds rate, thus leading to the actual rate, which is the rate determined by market forces as a result of the Fed's operations. Open market operations involve buying and selling short-term securities in order to influence the rate. As an example, the current nominal federal funds rate is 0% (in economic parlance, this is known as the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)), while the actual rate is approximately 25 basis points, or 0.25%. Why is it assumed that interest rates are going to increase when the Federal Reserve ends QE3? I don't understand why interest rates are going to increase. In the United States, quantitative easing is actually a little different from the usual open market operations the Fed conducts. Open market operations usually involve the buying and selling of short-term Treasury securities; in QE, however (especially the latest and ongoing round, QE3), the Fed has been purchasing longer-term Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). By purchasing MBS, the Fed is trying to reduce the overall risk of the commercial housing debt market. Furthermore, the demand created by these purchases drives up prices on the debt, which drives down interest rates in the commercial housing market. To clarify: the debt market I'm referring to is the market for mortgage-backed securities and other debt derivatives (CDO's, for instance). I'll use MBS as an example. The actual mortgages are sold to companies that securitize them by pooling them and issuing securities based on the value of the pool. This process may happen numerous times, since derivatives can be created based on the value of the MBS themselves, which in turn are based on housing debt. In other words, MBS aren't exactly the same thing as housing debt, but they're based on housing debt. It's these packaged securities the Fed is purchasing, not the mortgages themselves.  Once the Fed draws down QE3, however, this demand will probably decrease. As the Fed unloads its balance sheet over several years, and demand decreases throughout the market, prices will fall and interest rates in the commercial housing market will fall. Ideally, the Fed will wait until the economy is healthy enough to absorb the unloading of these securities.  Just to be clear, the interest rates that QE3 are targeting are different from the interest rates you usually hear about. It's possible for the Fed to unwind QE3, while still keeping the ""interest rate"", i.e. the federal funds rate, near zero. although this is considered unlikely. Also, the Fed can target long-term vs. short-term interest rates as well, which is once again slightly different from what I talked about above. This was the goal of the Operation Twist program in 2011 (and in the 1960's). Kirill Fuchs gave a great description of the program in this answer, but basically, the Fed purchased long-term securities and sold short-term securities, with the goal of twisting the yield curve to lower long-term interest rates relative to short-term rates. The goal is to encourage people and businesses to take on long-term debt, e.g. mortgages, capital investments, etc. My main question that I'm trying to understand is why interest rates are what they are. Is it more of an arbitrary number set by central banks or is it due to market activity? Hopefully I addressed much of this above, but I'll give a quick summary. There are many ""interest rates"" in numerous different financial markets. The rate most commonly talked about is the nominal federal funds rate that I mentioned above; although it's a target set by the Board of Governors, it's not arbitrary. There's a reason the Federal Reserve hires hundreds of research economists. No central bank arbitrarily sets the interest rate; it's determined as part of an effort to reach certain economic benchmarks for the foreseeable future, whatever those may be.  In the US, current Fed policy maintains that the federal funds rate should be approximately zero until the economy surpasses the unemployment and inflation benchmarks set forth by the Evans Rule (named after Charles Evans, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, who pushed for the rule). The effective federal funds rate, as well as other rates the Fed has targeted like interest rates on commercial housing debt, long-term rates on Treasury securities, etc. are market driven. The Fed may enter the market, but the same forces of supply and demand are still at work. Although the Fed's actions are controversial, the effects of their actions are still bound by market forces, so the policies and their effects are anything but arbitrary." Yes, that's my point. I don't want nation-states to survive. I would much rather live in a society that respects individuality than worshiping a council of limp-dicks who decide how my money is spent.  Also, Somalia has a central government and a central bank too. "As an addendum to PeterK's answer, once upon a time, there were many Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls) that acted as small banks, accepting savings deposits from people and lending money for home mortgages to local residents. Some of these S&Ls were chartered Federally with deposits insured by the FSLIC (similar to the FDIC which still insures deposits in banks) while others had State charters and used the State equivalent of FSLIC as the insurer. To induce people to save with S&Ls instead of banks, S&Ls paid higher rates of interest on their savings accounts than banks were permitted to do on bank savings accounts. Until 1980, S&Ls were not permitted to make consumer or commercial loans, have checking accounts, issue credit cards, etc., but once the US Congress in its wisdom permitted this practice, this part of the business boomed. (Note for @RonJohn: Prior to 1980, S&Ls offered NOW accounts on which ""checks"" (technically, Negotiated Orders of Withdrawal) could be written but they were not checks in the legal sense, and many S&Ls did not return these paid ""checks"" with the monthly statement as all banks did; writing a ""check"" while pressing hard created a carbon copy that could be used as proof of payment). In just a few years' time, many S&Ls crashed because they were not geared to handle the complexities of the new things that they were permitted to do, and so ran into trouble with bad loans as well as outright fraud by S&L management and boards of directors etc. After the disappearance of most S&Ls, many small banks (often with State charters only) sprang up, and that's why there are so many banks in the US. Mortgage lending is a lucrative business (if done right), and everyone wants to get into the business. Note that 4 branches of Bank of America in a Florida town is not a sign of many banks; the many different banks that the OP noticed in Maine is." "China's regulators, it seems, are on the attack. Guo Shuqing, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, announced recently that he'd resign if he wasn't able to discipline the banking system. Under his leadership, the CBRC is stepping up scrutiny of the role of trust companies and other financial institutions in helping China's banks circumvent lending restrictions.  The People's Bank of China has also been on the offensive. It has recently raised the cost of liquidity, attacked riskier funding structures among smaller banks, and discontinued a program that effectively monetized one-fifth of last year's increase in lending.  Are the regulators finally getting serious about reining in credit creation? The answer is an easy one: Yes if they're willing to allow economic growth to slow substantially, probably to 3 percent or less, and no if they aren't.    inRead invented by Teads  This is because there's a big difference between China's sustainable growth rate, based on rising demand driven by household consumption and productive investment, and its actual GDP growth rate, which is boosted by massive lending to fund investment projects that are driven by the need to generate economic activity and employment.  Economists find it very difficult to formally acknowledge the difference between the two rates, and many don't even seem to recognize that it exists. Yet this only shows how confused economists are about gross domestic product more generally. The confusion arises because a country's GDP is not a measure of the value of goods and services it creates but rather a measure of economic activity. In a market economy, investment must create enough additional productive capacity to justify the expenditure. If it doesn't, it must be written down to its true economic value. This is why GDP is a reasonable proxy in a market economy for the value of goods and services produced.  But in a command economy, investment can be driven by factors other than the need to increase productivity, such as boosting employment or local tax revenue. What's more, loss-making investments can be carried for decades before they're amortized, and insolvency can be ignored. This means that GDP growth can overstate value creation for decades.  That's what has happened in China. In the first quarter of 2017, China added debt equal to more than 40 percentage points of GDP -- an amount that has been growing year after year. In 2011, the World Economic Forum predicted that China's debt would increase by a worrying $20 trillion by 2020. By 2016, it had already increased by $22 trillion, according to the most conservative estimates, and at current rates it will increase by as much as $50 trillion by 2020. These numbers probably understate the reality.  If all this debt hasn't boosted China's GDP growth to substantially more than its potential growth rate, then what was the point? And why has it proven so difficult for the government to rein it in? It has promised to do so since 2012, yet credit growth has only accelerated, reaching some of the highest levels ever seen for a developing country.  The answer is that credit creation had to accelerate to boost GDP growth above the growth rate of productive capacity. Much, if not most, of China's 6.5 percent GDP growth is simply an artificial boost in economic activity with no commensurate increase in the capacity to create goods and services. It must be fully reversed once credit stops growing. To make matters worse, if high debt levels generate financial distress costs for the economy -- as already seems to be happening -- the amount that must be reversed will substantially exceed the original boost.  Once credit is under control, China will have lower but healthier GDP growth rates. If the economy rebalances, most Chinese might not even notice: It would require that household income -- which has grown much more slowly than GDP for nearly three decades -- now grow faster, so that the sharp slowdown in economic growth won't be matched by an equivalent slowdown in wage growth.  Clear thinking from leading voices in business, economics, politics, foreign affairs, culture, and more. Share the View  Enter your email  Sign Up But to manage this rebalancing requires substantial transfers of wealth from local governments to ordinary households to boost consumption. This is why China hasn't been able to control credit growth in the past. The central government has had to fight off provincial ""vested interests,"" who oppose any substantial transfer of wealth. Without these transfers, slower GDP growth would mean higher unemployment.  Whether regulators can succeed in reining in credit creation this time is ultimately a political question, and depends on the central government's ability to force through necessary reforms. Until then, as long as China has the debt capacity, GDP growth rates will remain high. But to see that as healthy is to miss the point completely." This is adequately covered by the differential between lending and receiving interest rates.  ...and technically, they pay the central bank an interest rate on the money lent as well, which means that they *are* paying back equity holders (all be it very slowly and very slightly).  The equity holders have the ability to will money into existence, so there's no artificial limitation they face with respect to the branch banking system. Here's a point in favor of central banks: With a central bank in the middle making sure payments clear, transactions can happen with near perfect trust. When a bank has a daylight overdraft, the Fed covers it. When a bank needs overnight funding, the Fed provides it. If a bank needs vault cash, a truck shows up from the Fed.  Without this, no one could ever be entirely confident the other party was money-good. With a volume of transactions that can amount to annual GDP in as little as six days, this level of trust is critical to a smoothly functioning system of payments. "left out of the pictures is the degree to which the ECB is buying their own bonds.  At least with the FedResInk, we know what sort of ""open market"" action is being taken to keep interest rates held as close to zero as possible.  I coke dealer can make sure his ""sales"" are through the roof by using his own product, but eventually he has to buy more supply.  I think people are confused about central banks being that coke dealer or being his supplier."