What did John Templeton mean when he said that the four most dangerous words in investing are: ‘this time it’s different'?
"Essentially, he means ""one ignores history at their own peril"". We often hear people arguing that ""the old rules no longer apply"".  Whether it be to valuations, borrowing, or any of the other common metrics, to ignore the lessons of the past is to invite disaster.   History shows us that major crises in the markets usually occur when the old rules are ignored and people believe that current exceptional market conditions are justified by special circumstances." "This refers to the faulty idea that the stock market will behave differently than it has in the past.  For example, in the late 1990s, internet stocks rose to ridiculous heights in price, to be followed soon after with the Dot-Com Bubble crash. In the future, it's likely that there will be another such bubble with another hot stock - we just don't know what kind.  Saying that ""this time it will be different"" could mean that you expect this bubble not to burst when, historically, that is never the case." "It's a statement that seems to be true about our tendency to believe we won't make the same mistake twice, even though we do, and that somehow what's occurring in the present is completely different, even when the underlying fundamentals of the situation may be nearly identical.  It's a form of self-delusion and, sometimes, mass-delusion, and it has been a major contributing factor to many of our worst financial disasters. If you look at every housing bubble, for instance, we examine the aftermath, put new regulations and procedures into place, theoretically to prevent it from happening again, and then move forward.  When the cycle starts to repeat itself, we ignore the signals, telling ourselves, ""oh, that can't happen again -- this time it's different."" When investors begin to ignore the warning signs because they think the current situation is somehow totally different and therefore there will be a different outcome than the last disaster, that's when things actually do go bad. The 2008 housing crisis was caused by the same essential forces that brought about similar (albeit smaller scale) housing disasters in the 80's and 90's -- greed caused banks and other participants in the housing sector to make loans they knew were no good (an oversimplification to be sure, but apt nonetheless), and eventually the roof caved in on the market.  In 2008, the essential dynamics were the same, but everyone had convinced themselves that the markets were more sophisticated and could never allow things like that to happen again.  So, everyone told themselves this was different, and they dove into the markets headlong, ignoring all of the warning signs along the way that clearly told the story of what was coming had anyone bothered to notice." "There's an elephant in the room that no one is addressing: Suckers. Usually when there's a bubble, many people are fully aware that its a bubble. ""This time its different"" is a sales pitch to the outsiders. It the dotcom boom for example a lot of people knew that the P/E was ridiculous but bought objectively valueless tech stocks with the idea of unloading them later to even bigger fools. People view it like the children's game musical chairs: as long as I'm not standing when the music ends some other sucker gets left holding the bag. But once you get that first hit of easy money, its sooo tempting to keep playing the game. Sometimes, if it lasts long enough, you start to drink your own kool-aid: gee maybe it really is different this time. The best way to win a crooked game is not to play*. *Just in case someone thinks I'm advising against the stock market in general, I'm not: I'm advocating not buying stocks that you know are worthless with the hope of unloading them on some other sucker." "A brief review of the financial collapses in the last 30 years will show that the following events take place in a fairly typical cycle: Overuse of that innovation (resulting in inadequate supply to meet demand, in most cases) Inadequate capacity in regulatory oversight for the new volume of demand, resulting in significant unregulated activity, and non-observance of regulations to a greater extent than normal Confusion regarding shifting standards and regulations, leading to inadequate regulatory reviews and/or lenient sanctions for infractions, in turn resulting in a more aggressive industry ""Gaming"" of investment vehicles, markets and/or buyers to generate additional demand once the market is saturated ""Chickens coming home to roost"" - A breakdown in financial stability, operational accuracy, or legality of the actions of one or more significant players in the market, leading to one or more investigations A reduction in demand due to the tarnished reputation of the instrument and/or market players, leading to an anticipation of a glut of excess product in the market ""Cold feet"" - Existing customers seeking to dump assets, and refusing to buy additional product in the pipeline, resulting in a glut of excess product ""Wasteland"" - Illiquid markets of product at collapsed prices, cratering of associated portfolio values, retirees living below subsistence incomes Such investment bubbles are not limited to the last 30 years, of course; there was a bubble in silver prices (a 700% increase through one year, 1979) when the Hunt brothers attempted to corner the market, followed by a collapse on Silver Thursday in 1980.   The ""poster child"" of investment bubbles is the Tulip Mania that gripped the Netherlands in the early 1600's, in which a single tulip bulb was reported to command a price 16 times the annual salary of a skilled worker. The same cycle of events took place in each of these bubbles as well. Templeton's caution is intended to alert new (especially younger) players in the market that these patterns are doomed to repeat, and that market cycles cannot be prevented or eradicated; they are an intrinsic effect of the cycles of supply and demand that are not in synch, and in which one or both are being influenced by intermediaries. Such influences have beneficial effects on short-term profits for the players, but adverse effects on the long-term viability of the market's profitability for investors who are ill-equipped to shed the investments before the trouble starts." To play devil’s advocate to much of what has been written before, it's also worth noting that this is quite an important quote for a sort of reverse reason to what has been discussed before us, that of that fact that virtually every economic situation is different. As it's such a reflexive problem, each and every set of exact circumstances is always different from before. Technology radically changes, monetary policy and economic thinking shift, social needs and market expectations change and thus change the very fabric of markets as they do. It's only in its most basic miss projections of growth that economics repeats, and much like warfare, has constant shifts that radically change the core assumptions about it and do create completely new circumstances that we have to struggle to deal with predicting. People betting on the endless large scale mechanised warfare between western powers continuing post nuclear weapons would have been very, very wrong for example. That time it actually was different, and this actually happens with surprisingly often in finance in ways people quickly bury in the memories and adopt to the new norm. Remember when public ownership of stock wasn't a thing? When bonds didn't exist? No mortgages? Pre insurance? These are all inventions and changes that did change the world forever and were genuinely different and have been ever since, creating huge structural changes in economies, growth rates and societies interactions.  As the endless aim of the game is predicting growth well, we often see people/groups over extend on one new thing, and/or under extend on another as they struggle to model these shifts and step changes.  Talking as if the fact that people do this consistently as if it is some kind of obvious thing we can easily learn from (or easily take advantage of) in the context of such a vague and complex problem could be argued to be highly naïve and largely useless. This time it is different. Last time it was too.
My parents hooked up at a highschool party when they were 17. I was born because they most definitely were not careful.  That being said, when my mother met my stepdad when I was 3, we lived with him in his mom's house. He had just started as a cop and we were very poor for a very long time. The reason we were so poor was because my dad was investing the majority of his money. Investing in stocks, his pension anything he could. He worked graveyards for years. He eventually got a new job and when he retires in a few years, his pension and a handful of really good investments is going to net him just over a million dollars. So this whole article is kinda bullshit to me. "&gt;&gt; Boy, you are so disappointed that Trump cut the debt more than any other president in this short time... because ""it not enough""?  &gt; What are you talking about? Did you read what I said at all or are you just projecting your insecurity?  Yes I read what you wrote, including the example with the cookies.  But the correct example here and what's happening with Trump, is that he DID enact fiscal changes, he DOES fight corruption and waste, he does invest, and you can ALREADY see the results." "Possibly the best answer to why America became globally dominant after WW2 was written by a FRENCHMAN, Jean-Jacque Sergen-Schreiber, Le Defi American (The American Challenge). Probably the only legendary investor of the proper age to benefit from WW2 was John Templeton, who borrowed $10,000 before the war, and ended up with $40,000 afterward (both worth about ten times more in today's money). His story, and that of others, can be found in John Train's, ""The Money Masters.""" "Despite Buffett's nearly perfect consistent advice over the past few decades, they don't reflect his earliest days.  His modern philosophy seemed to solidify in the 1970s. You can see that Buffett's earliest days grew faster, at 29.5 % for those partners willing to take on leverage with Buffett, than the last half century, at 19.7%. Not only is Buffett limited by size, as its quite difficult to squeeze one half trillion USD into sub-billion USD investments, but the economy thus market is far different than it was before the 1980s.  He would have to acquire at least 500 billion USD companies outright, and there simply aren't that many available that satisfy all of his modern conditions. The market is much different now than it was when he first started at Graham-Newman because before the 1960s, the economy thus market would collapse and rebound about every few years.  This sort of variance can actually help a value investor because a true value investor will abandon investments when valuations are high and go all in when valuations are low.  The most extreme example was when he tried to as quietly as possible buy up an insurance company selling for something like a P/E of 1 during one of the collapses.  These kinds of opportunities are seldom available anymore, not even during the 2009 collapse. As he became larger, those investments became off limits because it simply wasn't worth his time to find such a high returner if it's only a bare fraction of his wealth.  Also, he started to deviate from Benjamin Graham's methods and started to incorporate Philip Fisher's. By the 1970s, his investment philosophy was more or less cemented.  He tried to balance Graham's avarice for price with Fisher's for value. All of the commentary that special tax dodges or cheap financing are central to his returns are false.  They contributed, but they are ancillary. As one can see by comparing the limited vs general partners, leverage helps enormously, but this is still a tangent. Buffett has undoubtedly built his wealth from the nature of his investments.  The exact blueprint can be constructed by reading every word he has published and any quotes he has not disavowed.  Simply, he buys the highest quality companies in terms of risk-adjusted growth at the best available prices.  Quantitatively, it is a simple strategy to replicate.  NFLX was selling very cheaply during the mid-2000s, WDC sells frequently at low valuations, up and coming retailers frequently sell at low valuations, etc. The key to Buffett's method is emotional control and removing the mental block that price equals value; price is cost, value is revenue, and that concept is the hardest for most to imbibe.  Quoting from the first link: One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn't take at all. It's like an inoculation. If it doesn't grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn't make any difference. They just don't seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he's applying it five minutes later. I've never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It's instant recognition, or it is nothing. and I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a ""herd"" on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical. and finally  Success in investing doesn’t correlate with I.Q. once you’re above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing. There is almost no information on any who has helped Buffett internally or even managed Berkshire's investments aside from Louis Simpson. It is unlikely that Buffett has allowed anyone to manage much of Berkshire's investments considering the consistent stream of commentary from him claiming that he nearly does nothing except read annual reports all day to the extent that he may have neglected his family to some degree and that listening to others will more likely hurt performance than help with the most striking example being his father's recommendation that he not open a hedge fund after retiring from Graham-Newman because he believed the market was topping, and he absolutely idolized his father." Well, let me take your question for baremetal, and aknowledge you did not asked about the difference between daytrading and investing which is obviously leverage. I would not consider daytrading more risky as long as you keep leverageout of the equation.  Daytrading can be turbolent and confusing, where things unfold in a very short amount of time, (let trade nfp payroll or some breaking event, yay), eventually the risk is more overseeable in long term trading, as soon as you put leverage into the equation things look vary different, indeed. I would also consider unnecessarily complex investment strategies a big warning sign as they can easily hide poor investment advice or a bad strategy. This is especially the case when it comes to retail investment as complex strategies can have so many moving parts that you, as someone with a day job, can't spend enough time on it to keep an eye on everything and you only spot issues when it's too late. Other bugbears: It has been hinted at in some other answers, but I want to say it explicitly: Volatility is not risk. Volatility is how much an investment goes up and down, risk is the chance that you will lose money. For example, stocks have relatively high volatility, but the risk that you will lose money over a 40 year period is virtually zero (in particular if you invest in index funds). Bonds, on the other hand, have basically no volatility (their cash flow is totally predictable if you trust the future of your government), but there is a significant risk that they will perform worse than stocks over a longer period. So, volatility equals risk only if you are day trading. A 401(k) is literally the opposite of that. For further reading: Never confuse risk and volatility Also, investing is not gambling. Gambling is bad because the odds are stacked against you. You need more than average luck to actually win and the longer you play, the more you will lose. Investing means buying productive capital that will produce further value. The odds are in your favor. Even if you do a moderately bad job at investing, the longer you stay, the more you will win. I always thought high-risk investing is hit or miss, but this is working out very well with the stocks I've chosen  High risk investing IS hit and miss.  We are in an historic bull market.  Do not pat yourself on the back too hard, the bear can be around any corner and your high risk strategy will then be put to the test.