Would investing equally in all 30 companies which comprise the DJIA net the same performance as the DJIA?
"DJIA is a price weighted index (as in the amount of each component company is weighted by its price) and the constituents change occasionally (51 times so far). With these two effects you would not get anything like the same return by equally weighting your holdings and would have to rebalance every so often. Note that your premise was most obviously flawed thinking the number of near bankruptcies there have been in that time. More details of the differing make-ups of the index are available on Wikipedia. When you ask about the ""average investment"" you would have to be a lot more specific; is it limited just to US shares, to shares, to shares and fixed income securities, should I include all commodities, etc. see also What's the justification for the DJIA being share-price weighted?" "MD-Tech's answer is correct. Let me only point out that there are easier ways to invest in the DJIA index without having to buy individual stocks. You can buy a mutual fund or ETF that will track the index and your return will be almost identical to the performance of the underlying index. It's ""almost"" identical because the fund will take a small management fee, you will have to pay annual taxes on capital gains (if you hold the investment in a taxable account), and because the fund has to actually invest in the underlying stocks, there will be small differences due to rounding and timing of the fund's trades. You also ask: Assuming that I calculated those numbers correctly, is this gain   approximately better, equal to, or worse than an average investment   for that timespan? While people argue about the numbers, index funds tend to do better than average (depends on what you call ""average"", of course). They do better than most actively managed funds, too. And since they have low management fees, index funds are often considered to be an important part of a long-term investment portfolio because they require very little activity on your part other than buying and holding."
well, saying:  &gt;DJIA went from 6,626.94 in March 6, 2009 to 17,100.18 in July 18, 2014. That's nearly a 200% increase in 5 years. The economy, on the other hand, has not reflected this rise.  is disingenuous at best since you're measuring the starting point from the depth of recession, when the stock market was severely undervalued.  This is also why many mutual funds boast absolutely ridiculous 5-year yields right now. The Dow hovered around 12,500 for much of 2007~2008, so if you used that as the baseline the index recovered to those levels in the 2nd quarter of 2011. From that point onwards, it's only a 25% increase over 3+ years for an 8% APR, in line with historic values.  I'm not gonna get into whether QE is good fiscal policy or not, all I'm saying is the tapering/ending of QE won't result in a full-on reversal like people seem to be expecting. There are a few ways to look at this question. Assumptions. Per the original post's assumptions, this answer: In other words, if the owner paid the mortgage on its original schedule, the deal could boil down to a $ 40,000 up-front payment, in exchange for $ 200,000 of equity after 30 years.  Or the deal could boil down to a $ 40,000 up-front payment, in exchange for a $ 810.70 monthly payment starting in 30 years. While the owner is paying down the mortgage, the return on equity is the principal payment divided by the equity.  The principal payment is the net rent minus non-financing costs and interest, so it is actually a profit. The initial return on equity is 6.321 % APR, or 6.507 % APY.  This is calculated by dividing the $ 210.70 monthly principal payment by the initial $ 40,000 equity, and converting from monthly return to annual return. After 30 years, the return on equity is 4.864 % APR, or 4.974 % APY.  This is calculated by dividing the $ 810.70 monthly cash flow (which is no longer reduced by mortgage payments) by the $ 200,000 equity after 30 years, and converting from monthly return to annual return. The cap rate is the same as the return on equity in the absence of debt.  In this example, 4.864 % APR, or 4.974 % APY. The return on equity declines from 6.507 % APY initially to 4.974 % APY after 30 years. This is because the cap rate exceeds the note rate (4.974 % APY vs. 4.594 % APY), and the leverage decreases from 5x to 1x. The weighted average compound annual growth rate of the equity during the 30 years is 5.511 % APY.  Per the original poster's answer, this is computed by taking the 30th root of the 5-fold increase in equity.  Because the owner made no extra principal payments (besides those already discussed), the relevant amounts are the initial $ 40,000 owner payment and the final $ 200,000 owner equity.  5.511 % APY corresponds to a 5.377 % APR. The internal rate of return if the owner never sells can be computed by treating the deal as a $ 40,000 up-front payment, in exchange for an $ 810.70 monthly payment starting in 30 years.  The internal rate of return (IRR) is not a very useful number, because it assumes that you can somehow reinvest the eventual dividends at the same rate.  In this example, the IRR is 5.172 % APR, or 5.296  % APY.  In this example, the IRR is calculated by (iteratively) finding an interest rate for which (initial investment) * (1 + IRR) ^ (number periods before dividends start) = (periodic dividend) / (IRR - growth rate of dividend).  For example: $ 40,000 * (1.004309687)^360 = $ 810.70 / (0.004309687 - 0) = $ 188,111 I then converted the 0.431 % monthly IRR to an annual IRR. The deal can be thought of as a return on equity, plus a return on paying down the mortgage. When computing the return from paying down the mortgage, the initial equity is irrelevant.  It does not matter whether you start with a $ 160,000 mortgage on a $ 160,000 property, a $ 160,000 mortgage on a $ 200,000 property, or a $ 160,000 mortgage on a $ 1,000,000 property.  All that matters is the note rate on the mortgage, which is the applicable compound interest rate. The return on paying down the mortgage equals the note rate of the mortgage.  For a 4.5% note rate, this works out to a 4.594% annual percentage yield (APY). You can confirm this by looking at your amortization schedule.  Suppose you have a $ 160,000 mortgage with a fixed 4.5% APR note rate for 360 months.  Your monthly payment is $ 810.70.  In the first month, $ 600 goes toward interest, and $ 210.70 reduces the principal.  In other words, the $ 210.70 principal payment eliminated the need for a $ 810.70 payment 30 years later.  Notice that: . $ 210.70 * (1 + 0.045 / 12)^360 = $ 210.70 * (1.00375)^360 = $ 210.70 * 3.8477 = $ 810.71 which is within rounding error of $ 810.70. The interest rate is 3/8 % per month, which is an APR of 4.5%, and an APY of 4.594 %. "I hope a wall of text with citations qualifies as ""relatively easy."" Many of these studies are worth quoting at length. Long story short, a great deal of research has found that actively-managed funds underperform market indexes and passively-managed funds because of their high turnover and higher fees, among other factors.  Longer answer: Chris is right in stating that survivorship bias presents a problem for such research; however, there are several academic papers that address the survivorship problem, as well as the wider subject of active vs. passive performance. I'll try to provide a brief summary of some of the relevant literature.  The seminal paper that started the debate is Michael Jensen's 1968 paper titled ""The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964"". This is the paper where Jensen's alpha, the ubiquitous measure of the performance of mutual fund managers, was first defined. Using a dataset of 115 mutual fund managers, Jensen finds that The evidence on mutual fund performance indicates not only that these 115 mutual funds were on average not able to predict security prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, but also that there is very little evidence that any individual fund was able to do significantly better than that which we expected from mere random chance. Although this paper doesn't address problems of survivorship, it's notable because, among other points, it found that managers who actively picked stocks performed worse even when fund expenses were ignored. Since actively-managed funds tend to have higher expenses than passive funds, the actual picture looks even worse for actively managed funds. A more recent paper on the subject, which draws similar conclusions, is Martin Gruber's 1996 paper ""Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds"". Gruber calls it ""a puzzle"" that investors still invest in actively-managed funds, given that their performance on average has been inferior to that of index funds. He addresses survivorship bias by tracking funds across the entire sample, including through mergers. Since most mutual funds that disappear are merged into existing funds, he assumes that investors in a fund that disappear choose to continue investing their money in the fund that resulted from the merger. Using this assumption and standard measures of mutual fund performance, Gruber finds that mutual funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of the indices by about 65 basis points per year. Expense ratios for my sample averaged 113 basis points a year. These numbers suggest that active management adds value, but that mutual funds charge the investor more than the value added. Another nice paper is Mark Carhart's 1997 paper ""On persistence in mutual fund performance"" uses a sample free of survivorship bias because it includes ""all known equity funds over this period."" It's worth quoting parts of this paper in full: I demonstrate that expenses have at least a one-for-one negative impact on fund performance, and that turnover also negatively impacts performance. ... Trading reduces performance by approximately 0.95% of the trade's market value.  In reference to expense ratios and other fees, Carhart finds that The investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on performance. The study also finds that funds with abnormally high returns last year usually have higher-than-expected returns next year, but not in the following years, because of momentum effects. Lest you think the news is all bad, Russ Wermer's 2000 study ""Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock‐picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses"" provides an interesting result. He finds that many actively-managed mutual funds hold stocks that outperform the market, even though the net return of the funds themselves underperforms passive funds and the market itself.  On a net-return level, the funds underperform broad market indexes by one percent a year. Of the 2.3% difference between the returns on stock holdings and the net returns of the funds, 0.7% per year is due to the lower average returns of the nonstock holdings of the funds during the period (relative to stocks). The remaining 1.6% per year is split almost evenly between the expense ratios and the transaction costs of the funds. The final paper I'll cite is a 2008 paper by Fama and French (of the Fama-French model covered in business schools) titled, appropriately, ""Mutual Fund Performance"". The paper is pretty technical, and somewhat above my level at this time of night, but the authors state one of their conclusions bluntly quite early on: After costs (that is, in terms of net returns to investors) active investment is a negative sum game.  Emphasis mine. In short, expense ratios, transaction costs, and other fees quickly diminish the returns to active investment. They find that The [value-weight] portfolio of mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities is close to the market portfolio, and estimated before fees and expenses, its alpha is close to zero. Since the [value-weight] portfolio of funds produces an α close to zero in gross returns, the alpha estimated on the net returns to investors is negative by about the amount of fees and expenses. This implies that the higher the fees, the farther alpha decreases below zero. Since actively-managed mutual funds tend to have higher expense ratios than passively-managed index funds, it's safe to say that their net return to the investor is worse than a market index itself. I don't know of any free datasets that would allow you to research this, but one highly-regarded commercial dataset is the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. In financial research, CRSP is one of the ""gold standards"" for historical market data, so if you can access that data (perhaps for a firm or academic institution, if you're affiliated with one that has access), it's one way you could run some numbers yourself." What JoeTaxpayer means is that you can sell one ETF and buy another that will perform substantially the same during the 30 day wash sale period without being considered substantially the same from a wash sale perspective more easily than you could with an individual stock. For example, you could sell an S&P 500 index ETF and then temporarily buy a DJIA index ETF. As these track different indexes, they are not considered to be substantially the same for wash sale purposes, but for a short term investing period, their performance should still be substantially the same. Funds can't limit themselves to a small number of stocks without also limiting themselves to a small amount of total investment. I think 25 companies is too small to be practical from their point of view. "You're correct that the trading costs would be covered by the expense ratio. Just to be clear here, the expense ratio is static and doesn't change very often. It's set in such a way that the fund manager *expects* it to cover *all* of their operational costs. It's not some sort of slider that they move around with their costs.  I'm not familiar with any ETF providers doing agreements which cover rent and equipment (hedge funds do - see ""hedge fund hotels""). ETF providers do routinely enter into agreements with larger institutions that cover stuff like marketing. PowerShares, for a while, outsourced all of the management of the Qs to BNY and was responsible solely for marketing it themselves." "$36 dividend/900 DJIA = 4% 5.5% bond yield = ($36 dividend/660 DJIA) Graham wrote this at a very different time in financial markets- interest rates were much higher, and the DJIA much lower. In addition, bonds were yielding more than stocks, unlike today when the DJIA % the 10yr Treasury yield 2.63% and 2.13% respectively. In addition, his ""weigher of the odds"" suggests waiting to invest until equity prices are lower (usually dividends aren't reduced), and therefore the DJIA dividend yield would rise relative to bond yields." Inflows to the US equity market can come from a variety of sources; for instance: You were paid a year-end bonus and decided to invest it in US equities instead of foreign equities, bonds, savings or debt reduction. You sold foreign equities, bonds, or other non-US equities and decided to invest in US equities. You decided a better use of cash in a savings account, CD or money market fund, was to invest in US equities. If for every buyer, there's a seller, doesn't that also mean that   there were $25B in outflows in the same time period? Not necessarily. Generally, the mentions we see of inflows and outflows are net; that is, the gross investment in US equities, minus gross sales of US equities equals net inflows or outflows. The mere fact that I sold my position in, say, Caterpillar, doesn't mean that I had to re-invest in US equities. I may have bought a bond or a CD or a house. Because of fluctuations in existing stocks market value, bankruptcies and new issues, US equities never are and never will be a zero-sum game.