If the housing market is recovering, why would a REIT index ETF (e.g. VNQ) not be performing well?
"VNQ only holds ~16% residential REITs. The rest are industrial, office, retail (e.g. shopping malls), specialized (hotels perhaps?) etc.  Thus, VNQ isn't as correlated towards housing as you might have assumed just based on it being about ""real estate."" Second of all, if by ""housing"" you mean that actual houses have gone up appreciably, then you ought to realize that residential REITs seldom hold actual houses. The residential units held tend primarily to be rental apartments. There is a relationship in prices, but not direct." To round out something that @Chris W. Rea pointed out, the business that a REIT is in will be either A) Equity REIT... property management, B) mortgage REIT... lending, or C) hybrid REIT (both).  A very key point about why REITs broadly have been struggling lately, (and this would show up in the REIT indices/ETFs you've linked to,) is linked to the REIT business models.  For an Equity REIT, they borrow money at the going rate (let's say ~4.5% for commercial-scale loans), and use that to take out mortgages on physical properties. If a property rents for $15K per month, and they can take out a $1.8 million loan at $9,000 per month, then their business is around managing maintenance, operating expenses, and taxes on that $6,000 per month margin. For a mortgage REIT, they borrow funds as a highly qualified borrower, (again let's say ~4.5%), and lend those funds back out at a higher rate. The basic concept is that if you borrow $10 million at 4.5% for 30 years, you need to pay it back at $50,668 per month. If you can lend it out reliably at 5%, you collect $53,682 per month... a handy $3,000 per month. The cheaper you can get money at (below 4.5%) and the higher you can lend it at (above 5%), the better your margin is.  The worry is that both REIT business models are very highly dependent on the cost of borrowing money. With the US Fed changing its bond-buying/QE/stimulus activity, the prevailing interest rates are likely to go up. While this has its benefits (inflation), it also will make it more expensive for these types of companies to do business.
There's a few different types of investments you could do. As poolie mentioned, you could split your money between the Vanguard All World ex-US and Vanguard Total Stock Market index. A similar approach would be to invest in the Vanguard Total World Stock ETF. You wouldn't have to track separate fund performances, at the downside of not being able to allocate differential amounts to the US and non-US markets (Vanguard will allocate them by market cap). You could consider investing in country-specific broad market indices like the S&P 500 and FTSE 100. While not as diversified as the world indices, they are more correlated with the country's economic outlook. Other common investing paradigms are investing in companies which have historically paid out high dividends and companies that are under-valued by the market but have good prospects for future growth. This gets in the domain of value investing, which an entire field by itself. Like Andrew mentioned, investing in a mutual fund is hassle-free. However, mutual fees/commissions and taxes can be higher (somewhere in the range 1%-5%) than index funds/ETF expense ratios (typically <0.50%), so they would have to outperform the market by a bit to break-even. There are quite a few good books out there to read up about investing. I'd recommend The Intelligent Investor and Millionaire Teacher to understand the basics of long-term investing, but of course, there are many other equally good books too. "Other individuals answered how owning an REIT compares to an individual real estate investment, but did not answer your second question as readily, ""are REITs a good option to generate passive income for awhile?"". The ""awhile"" part is quite important in answering this question. If your intentions are to invest for a relatively short time period (say, 7 years or less), it may be especially advantageous to invest in a REIT. The foremost advantage comes from significantly lower transaction fees (stock/ETF trades are practically/potentially free today) compared to purchasing real estate, which involves inspection+titling fees/taxes/broker fees, which in a round-trip transaction (purchase and sale) would come to ~10%. The secondary advantage to owning a REIT is they are much more liquid than a property. If you wanted to sell your investment at a given point in time, you can easily log into your brokerage and execute your transaction, while liquidating an investment property will take time on market/potentially tossing tenants/fixing up place, etc. On the other hand, illiquid investments have generally yielded higher historical returns according to past research." If you are looking to invest for 1-2 years I would suggest you not invest in mutual funds at all. Your time horizon is too short for it to be smart to invest in the stock market.  I'd suggest a high-yield savings account or CD. I know they both have crappy returns, but the stock market can swing wildly with no notice. If you are ready to buy your house and the market is down 50% (it has happened multiple times in history) are you going to have to put off buying your home for an indefinite amount of time waiting to them to recover? If you are absolutely committed to investing in a mutual fund anyway against my advise I'd suggest an indexed fund that contains mostly blue chip stocks (indexed against the DOW). "I would just buy one ETF (index-fund) on the market you think will perform better. It will take care to buy the 5 most solid stock in this market and many other more to reduce the risk to the bear minimum. You will also spend only few bucks in comissions, definitely less than what you would spend buying multiple stocks (even just 5). It's hard enough to forecast which market will perform better, it's even harder to do stock picking unless you have the time and the knowledge to read into companies' balance sheets/economic incomes/budgets/market visions etc. And even if you are great in reading into companies balance sheets/economic incomes/budgets, the stock market usually behaves like a cows' drove, therefor even if you choosed the most valuable solid stocks, be prepared to see them run down even a 50% when all the market runs down a 50%. During the 2008 crisis the Europe market has lost a 70%, and even the most solid sectors/stocks like ""Healthcare"" and ""Food & Beverage"" lost a painful 40% to 50% (true that now these sectors recovered greatly compared to the rest of the market, but they still run down like cows during the crisis, and if you holded them you would have suffered a huge pain/stress). But obviously there's always some profet/wizard which will later tell you he was able to select the only 5 stocks among thousands that performed well." Low volatility trading tends to be a hallmark of the late summer as Wall Street by and large goes on summer vacation. When all those traders and hedge fund managers return to work full-tilt in September,  the market tends to become more volatile - either upwards or downwards. If you are wondering why these months have been particularly poor relative to others, than I don't think anyone knows the reason why. An index fund is inherently diversified across its index -- no one stock will either make or break the results. In that case it's a matter of picking the index(es) you want to put the money into. ETFs do permit smaller initial purchases, which would let you do a reasonable mix of sectors. (That seems to be the one advantage of ETFs over traditional funds...?) "First, I would like to use a better chart.  In my opinion, a close of day line chart obscures a lot of important information.  Here is a daily OHLC log chart:  The initial drop from the 1099.23 close on Oct 3 was to 839.8 intraday, to close at 899.22 on Oct 10.  After this the market was still very volatile and reached a low of 747.78 on Nov 20, closing only slightly higher than this.  It traded as high as 934.70 on Jan 6, 2009, but the whole period of Nov 24 - Feb 13 was somewhat of a trading range of roughly 800-900.  Despite this, the news reports of the time were frequently saying things like ""this isn't going to be a V shaped recovery, it is going to be U shaped.""  The roughly one week dip you see Feb 27 - Mar 9 taking it to an intraday low of 666.79 (only about 11% below the previous low) on first glance appears to be just a continuation of the previous trend.   However... The Mar 10 uptrend started with various news articles (such as this one) which I recall at the time suggested things like reinstating the parts of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933 which had been repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act.  Although these attempts appear to have been unsuccessful, the widespread telegraphing of such attempts in the media seemed to have reversed a common notion which I saw widespread on forums and other places that, ""we are going to be in this mess forever, the market has nowhere to go but down, and therefore shorting the market is a good idea now.""  I don't find the article itself, but one prominent theme was the ""up-tick"" rule on short selling: source From this viewpoint, then, that the last dip was driven not so much by a recognition that the economy was really in the toilet (as this really was discounted in the first drop and at least by late November had already been figured into the price).  Instead, it was sort of the opposite of a market top, where now you started seeing individual investors jump on the band-wagon and decide that now was the time for a foray into selling (short).  The fact that the up-tick rule was likely to be re-instated had a noticeable effect on halting the final slide." "I hope a wall of text with citations qualifies as ""relatively easy."" Many of these studies are worth quoting at length. Long story short, a great deal of research has found that actively-managed funds underperform market indexes and passively-managed funds because of their high turnover and higher fees, among other factors.  Longer answer: Chris is right in stating that survivorship bias presents a problem for such research; however, there are several academic papers that address the survivorship problem, as well as the wider subject of active vs. passive performance. I'll try to provide a brief summary of some of the relevant literature.  The seminal paper that started the debate is Michael Jensen's 1968 paper titled ""The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964"". This is the paper where Jensen's alpha, the ubiquitous measure of the performance of mutual fund managers, was first defined. Using a dataset of 115 mutual fund managers, Jensen finds that The evidence on mutual fund performance indicates not only that these 115 mutual funds were on average not able to predict security prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, but also that there is very little evidence that any individual fund was able to do significantly better than that which we expected from mere random chance. Although this paper doesn't address problems of survivorship, it's notable because, among other points, it found that managers who actively picked stocks performed worse even when fund expenses were ignored. Since actively-managed funds tend to have higher expenses than passive funds, the actual picture looks even worse for actively managed funds. A more recent paper on the subject, which draws similar conclusions, is Martin Gruber's 1996 paper ""Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds"". Gruber calls it ""a puzzle"" that investors still invest in actively-managed funds, given that their performance on average has been inferior to that of index funds. He addresses survivorship bias by tracking funds across the entire sample, including through mergers. Since most mutual funds that disappear are merged into existing funds, he assumes that investors in a fund that disappear choose to continue investing their money in the fund that resulted from the merger. Using this assumption and standard measures of mutual fund performance, Gruber finds that mutual funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of the indices by about 65 basis points per year. Expense ratios for my sample averaged 113 basis points a year. These numbers suggest that active management adds value, but that mutual funds charge the investor more than the value added. Another nice paper is Mark Carhart's 1997 paper ""On persistence in mutual fund performance"" uses a sample free of survivorship bias because it includes ""all known equity funds over this period."" It's worth quoting parts of this paper in full: I demonstrate that expenses have at least a one-for-one negative impact on fund performance, and that turnover also negatively impacts performance. ... Trading reduces performance by approximately 0.95% of the trade's market value.  In reference to expense ratios and other fees, Carhart finds that The investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on performance. The study also finds that funds with abnormally high returns last year usually have higher-than-expected returns next year, but not in the following years, because of momentum effects. Lest you think the news is all bad, Russ Wermer's 2000 study ""Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock‐picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses"" provides an interesting result. He finds that many actively-managed mutual funds hold stocks that outperform the market, even though the net return of the funds themselves underperforms passive funds and the market itself.  On a net-return level, the funds underperform broad market indexes by one percent a year. Of the 2.3% difference between the returns on stock holdings and the net returns of the funds, 0.7% per year is due to the lower average returns of the nonstock holdings of the funds during the period (relative to stocks). The remaining 1.6% per year is split almost evenly between the expense ratios and the transaction costs of the funds. The final paper I'll cite is a 2008 paper by Fama and French (of the Fama-French model covered in business schools) titled, appropriately, ""Mutual Fund Performance"". The paper is pretty technical, and somewhat above my level at this time of night, but the authors state one of their conclusions bluntly quite early on: After costs (that is, in terms of net returns to investors) active investment is a negative sum game.  Emphasis mine. In short, expense ratios, transaction costs, and other fees quickly diminish the returns to active investment. They find that The [value-weight] portfolio of mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities is close to the market portfolio, and estimated before fees and expenses, its alpha is close to zero. Since the [value-weight] portfolio of funds produces an α close to zero in gross returns, the alpha estimated on the net returns to investors is negative by about the amount of fees and expenses. This implies that the higher the fees, the farther alpha decreases below zero. Since actively-managed mutual funds tend to have higher expense ratios than passively-managed index funds, it's safe to say that their net return to the investor is worse than a market index itself. I don't know of any free datasets that would allow you to research this, but one highly-regarded commercial dataset is the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. In financial research, CRSP is one of the ""gold standards"" for historical market data, so if you can access that data (perhaps for a firm or academic institution, if you're affiliated with one that has access), it's one way you could run some numbers yourself."