Why does Warren Buffett say his fund performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market?
Buffett is a value investor. His goal is to buy good companies when the market is overly worried and prices them below intrinsic value. When the market is highly priced it is much more difficult for him to find things that he thinks are at an attractive price. When people are very worried and the market has crashed, stocks are then priced below their intrinsic value and he can use the cash he keeps in the company to make attractive purchases. Remember that Buffett is not concerned with the ups and downs of the price of Berkshire Hathaway stock, he is concerned with the economic value of the assets that the company owns. So if all stock prices crash and he can buy things that are at bargain prices, he is happy no matter what Berkshire stock price does in the short run. One consequence of value investing is that because you are buying assets at bargain prices, the total value of your assets drops less in a bear market than the highly priced stuff that drives the major indexes. From the letter you link: Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that   deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we   should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well   satisfied to match the advance of the Averages. Putting those two sentences together, the word relatively means that his funds perform better than the market in bear markets and perform about the same as the overall market in bull markets. It does not mean that absolute performance is better in bear markets than bull markets. Later on he states  This policy should lead to superior results in bear markets and average performance in bull markets. Warren Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway took a 50% loss in each of the last two bear markets. His stock even lost 10% in 2015 when the S&P lost 8%. He doesn't have a track record to support the claim that his stock performs relatively better in a bear market, so perhaps it's best to take his letter with a grain of salt. Edit: As one commenter points out, Mr. Buffett is comparing the book performance of his fund to the market performance of an index. That is an apples to oranges comparison. It's deceptive at best. If I have $100 and put it under the bed it will return 0%.  Relatively good in a bear market and relatively bad in a bull market. To understand his comments about bear-market performance it's important to take them in context. (My research method was Crtl+F: bear; read around the highlights. This is not a complete survey of 60+ years of letters.)  In his earlier letters, statements about bull market performance are always made in reference to Buffet's belief that many of BH's current holdings are in undervalued securities. Ex:  To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged (p 6; emphasis mine). Similar statements are made throughout the earlier letters, along with this interesting note:  In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well   satisfied to match the advance of the Averages (p 6). So to your question of why BH fund performance is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market, I believe the implicit assertion is that undervalued securities are more resilient in a bear market (presumably because they don't have as far to fall, and are also less likely to be subject to a bubble). Buffet is also explicitly asserting that when facing a choice to either (a) position BH to weather a possible downturn or (b) position BH to enjoy a bullish stock that is outpacing the market, he would choose the former over the later. As to your assertion that he always says this, I can find no reference to bear market's in the letters past 1960.
"Stocks ""go up 5-7% every year. This has been true for the last 100 years for the S&P500 index...."" This was true in the 20th century in America. It was not true (over the whole century) for other major countries like Germany, Russia, Japan, or China. (It was more or less true for Britain and certain Commonwealth countries like Australia and Canada.) A lot of this had to do with which countries were occupied (or not) during the two world wars. In one of his company's annual reports, Warren Buffett pointed out that the U.S. standard of living went up 6-7 times in the 20th century, that this was unprecedented (and might not be repeatable in the 21st century). The performance of the U.S. stock market in the past century is representative of those (and other) past facts. If a different set of facts prevails going forward, the U.S. stock market would be reflective of those ""different"" facts." The shift to trading at the close began in 2008. Traders did not want to be caught off guard by surprise news and there was a lot of volatility during the financial crisis, so they would close their position in the evening. Thats how it began. There are two reasons why it sticks around. First, there has been an increase usage of index funds or passive funds. These funds tend to update their positions at the end of the day. From the WSJ: Another factor behind the shift has been the proliferation of passively managed investments, such as index funds. These funds aim to mimic an index, like the S&P 500, by owning the shares that comprise it. Index funds don’t trade as often as active investors, but when they do, it is typically near the market close, traders say. That is because buying or selling a stock at its closing price better aligns their performance with the index they are trying to emulate. The second reason is simply that volume attracts volume. As a result of whats mentioned above, you have a shift to end of day trading, and the corrolary to that is that there is a liquidity shortage from 10am to 3pm. Thus, if you want to buy or sell a stock, but there are few buyers or sellers around, you will significant move the price when you enter your order. Obviously this does not affect retail traders, but imagine hedge funds entering or closing a billion dollar position. It can make a huge impact on price. And one way to mitigate that is to wait until there are more market participants to take the other end of your trade, just as at the end of the day. So this is a self-reinforcing trend that has begun in the markets and will likely stick around. http://www.wsj.com/articles/traders-pile-in-at-the-close-1432768080 "This falls under value investing, and value investing has only recently picked up study by academia, say, at the turn of the millennium; therefore, there isn't much rigorous on value investing in academia, but it has started. However, we can describe valuations: In short, valuations are randomly distributed in a log-Variance Gamma fashion with some reason & nonsense mixed in. You can check for yourself on finviz.  You can basically download the entire US market and then some, with many financial and technical characteristics all in one spreadsheet. Re Fisher: He was tied for the best monetary economist of the 20th century and created the best price index, but as for stocks, he said this famous quote 12 days before the 1929 crash: ""Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau. I do not feel there will be soon if ever a 50 or 60 point break from present levels, such as (bears) have predicted. I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher within a few months.""   - Irving Fisher, Ph.D. in economics, Oct. 17, 1929 EDIT Value investing has almost always been ignored by academia.  Irving Fisher and other proponents of it before it was codified by Graham in the mid 20th century certainly didn't help with comments like the above.  It was almost always believed that it was a sucker's game, ""the bigger sucker"" game to be more precise because value investors get destroyed during recession/collapses.  So even though a recessionless economy would allow value investors and everyone never to suffer spontaneous collapses, value investors are looked down upon by academia because of the inevitable yet nearly always transitory collapse.  This expresses that sentiment perfectly. It didn't help that Benjamin Graham didn't care about money so never reached the heights of Buffett who frequently alternates with Bill Gates as the richest person on the planet.  Buffett has given much credibility, and academia finally caught on around in 2000 or so after he was proven right about a pending tech collapse that nearly no one believed would happen; at least, that's where I begin seeing papers being published delving into value concepts.  If one looks harder, academia's even taken the torch and discovered some very useful tools. Yes, investment firms and fellow value investors kept up the information publishing, but they are not academics. The days of professors throwing darts at the stock listings and beating active managers despite most active managers losing to the market anyways really held back this side of academia until Buffett entered the fray and embarrassed them all with his club's performance, culminating in the Superinvestors article which is still relatively ignored.  Before that, it was the obsession with beta, the ratio of a security's variance to its covariance to the market, a now abandoned theory because it has been utterly discredited; the popularizers of beta have humorously embraced the P/B, not giving the satisfaction to Buffet by spurning the P/E.   Tiny technology firms receive ridiculous valuations because a long-surviving tiny tech firm usually doesn't stay small for long thus will grow at huge rates.  This is why any solvent and many insolvent tech firms receive large valuations: risk-adjusted, they should pay out huge on average.  Still, most fall by the wayside dead, and those 100 P/S valuations quickly crumble. Valuations are influenced by growth.  One can see this expressed more easily with a growing perpetuity: Where P is price, i is income, r is the rate of return, and g is the growth rate of i.  Rearranging, r looks like: Here, one can see that a higher P relative to i will dull the expected rate of return while a higher g will boost it. It's fun for us value investor/traders to say that the market is totally inefficient.  That's a stretch.  It's not perfectly inefficient, but it's efficient.  Valuations are clustered very tightly around the median, but there are mistakes that even us little guys can exploit and teach the smart money a lesson or two. If one were to look at a distribution of rs, one'd see that they're even more tightly packed.  So while it looks like P/Es are all over the place industry to industry, rs are much more well clustered. Tech, finance, and discretionaries frequently have higher growth rates so higher P/Es yet average rs.  Utilities and non-discretionaries have lower growth rates so lower P/Es yet average rs." From my 15 years of experience, no technical indicator actually ever works. Those teaching technical indicators are either mostly brokers or broker promoted so called technical analysts. And what you really lose in disciplined trading over longer period is the taxes and brokerages. That is why you will see that teachers involved in this field are mostly technical analysts because they can never make money in real markets and believe that they did not adhere to rules or it was an exception case and they are not ready to accept facts. The graph given above for coin flip is really very interesting and proves that every trade you enter has 50% probability of win and lose. Now when you remove the brokerage and taxes from win side of your game, you will always lose. That is why the Warren Buffets of the world are never technical analysts. In fact, they buy when all technical analysts fails. Holding a stock may give pain over longer period but still that is only way to really earn. Diversification is a good friend of all bulls. Another friend of bull is the fact that you can lose 100% but gain any much as 1000%. So if one can work in his limits and keep investing, he can surely make money. So, if you have to invest 100 grand in 10 stocks, but 10 grand in each and then one of the stocks will multiply 10 times in long term to take out cost and others will give profit too... 1-2 stocks will fail totally, 2-3 will remain there where they were, 2-3 will double and 2-3 will multiply 3-4 times. Investor can get approx 15% CAGR earning from stock markets... Cheers !!! Equal weighted indexes are not theoretically meant to be less volatile or less risky; they're just a different way to weigh stocks in an index. If you had a problem that hurt small caps more than large caps, an equal weighted index will be hurt more than a market-cap weighted one.  On the other hand, if you consider that second rung companies have come up to replace the top layer, it makes sense to weigh them on par.  History changes on a per-country basis - in India, for instance, the market's so small at the lower-cap end that big money chases only the large caps, which go up more in a liquidity driven move. But in a more secular period (like the last 18 months) we see that smaller caps have outperformed. The stock market in general likes monetary easing. With lower interest rates and easy cheap money freely available, companies can borrow at reduced cost thus improving profits. As profits increase share prices generally follow. So as John Benson said Quantitative Easing usually has a positive effect on stocks. The recent negativity in the stock markets was partly due to the possibility of QE ending and interest rates being raised in the future. "The article ""Best Stock Fund of the Decade: CGM Focus"" from the Wall Street Journal in 2009 describe the highest performing mutual fund in the USA between 2000 and 2009. The investor return in the fund (what the shareholders actually earned) was abysmal. Why? Because the fund was so volatile that investors panicked and bailed out, locking in losses instead of waiting them out. The reality is that almost any strategy will lead to success in investing, so long as it is actually followed. A strategy keeps you from making emotional or knee-jerk decisions. (BTW, beware of anyone selling you a strategy by telling you that everyone in the world is a failure except for the few special people who have the privilege of knowing their ""secrets."") (Link removed, as it's gone dead)" "“It’s hard to explain simply why and how it works"". If that's the case, why would I give you money? 21% annualized, not geometrically averaged return, is impressive but less so in a crazy bull market with no discussion of leverage employed. Let's wait to see what a full market cycle does to those returns"