What Did Benjamin Graham Mean by Earnings Stability in The Intelligent Investor?
"Yes - this is exactly what it means.  No losses (negative earnings).   With today's accounting methods, you might want to determine whether you view earnings including or excluding extraordinary items.   For example, a company might take a once-off charge to its earnings when revising the value of a major asset.  This would show in the ""including"" but not in the ""excluding"" figure.   The book actually has a nice discussion in Chapter 12 ""Things to Consider About Per-Share Earnings"" which considers several additional variables to consider here too. Note that this earnings metric is different from ""Stock Selection for the Defensive Investor"" which requires 10 years. PS - My edition (4th edition hardback) doesn't have 386 pages so your reference isn't correct for that edition.  I found it on page 209 in Chapter 15 ""Stock Selection for the Enterprising Investor""." "Please note that the following Graham Rating below corresponds to five years: Earnings Stability (100% ⇒ 10 Years): 50.00% Benjamin Graham - once known as The Dean of Wall Street - was a scholar and financial analyst who mentored legendary investors such as Warren Buffett, William J. Ruane, Irving Kahn and Walter J. Schloss. Buffett describes Graham's book - The Intelligent Investor - as ""by far the best book about investing ever written"" (in its preface). Graham's first recommended strategy - for casual investors - was to invest in Index stocks.  For more serious investors, Graham recommended three different categories of stocks - Defensive, Enterprising and NCAV - and 17 qualitative and quantitative rules for identifying them.  For advanced investors, Graham described various ""special situations"". The first requires almost no analysis, and is easily accomplished today with a good S&P500 Index fund. The last requires more than the average level of ability and experience. Such stocks are also not amenable to impartial algorithmic analysis, and require a case-specific approach. But Defensive, Enterprising and NCAV stocks can be reliably detected by today's data-mining software, and offer a great avenue for accurate automated analysis and profitable investment. For example, given below are the actual Graham ratings for International Business Machines Corp (IBM), with no adjustments other than those for inflation. Defensive Graham investment requires that all ratings be 100% or more. Enterprising Graham investment requires minimum ratings of - N/A, 75%, 90%, 50%, 5%, N/A and 137%. International Business Machines Corp - Graham Ratings Sales | Size (100% ⇒ $500 Million): 18,558.60% Current Assets ÷ [2 x Current Liabilities]: 62.40% Net Current Assets ÷ Long Term Debt: 28.00% Earnings Stability (100% ⇒ 10 Years): 100.00% Dividend Record (100% ⇒ 20 Years): 100.00% Earnings Growth (100% ⇒ 30% Growth): 172.99% Graham Number ÷ Previous Close: 35.81% Not all stocks failing Graham's rules are necessarily bad investments. They may fall under ""special situations"". Graham's rules are also extremely selective. Graham designed and backtested his framework for over 50 years, to deliver the best possible long-term results. Even when stocks don't clear them, Graham's rules give a clear quantifiable measure of a stock's margin of safety. Thank you."
"Assuming you can understand and emotionally handle the volatility, a good indeed fund would be wise. These are low fee funds which perform as well as our better than most managed investments and since they don't cost as much, they typically out perform most other investment vehicles. The S&P 500 is traded as SPDR. Another option is the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which trades as DIA. Average returns over the long term are 10-12%. If you expect to need the money in the short term (5-8 years), you have a non trivial chance of needing to pull the money out when the market is down, so if that's unacceptable to you, choose something with a guarantee. If you're terrified of losing money in the short term, don't think you can handle waiting for the market to go up, especially when every news caster is crying hysterically that the End of Economic Life on Earth is here, then consider a CD at your bank. CDs return much lower rates (around 2% right now) but do not go down in value ever. However, you need to lock your money into them for months to years at a time. Some people might tell you to buy a bond fund. That's horrible advice. Bond funds get lower returns AND have no guarantee that you won't lose money on them, unlike aactual bonds. As you're new to investing, I encourage you to read ""The Intelligent Investor"" by Benjamin Gramm." I’ll start with what worked for me, to get me hooked. This list is by no means exhaustive.   *One Up On Wall Street* by Peter Lynch discusses competitive advantages and staying close to the story of a business. Explores the concept of ‘buy what you know’. He has also written *Beating the Street*.  *The Drunkard’s Walk: How Randomness Rules Our Lives* by Leonard Mlodinow is not dissimilar to *A Random Walk Down Wall Street*, but I preferred this book as it explores the concepts of randomness and survivors bias.   *Against the Gods* by Peter Bernstein is a dense book, but in my opinion is the definitive text on the development of numbers, probability theory, and risk management. I absolutely love this book.   *The Most Important Thing* by Howard Marks is immensely readable, enjoyable, and looks at value investing for the long run. Howard Marks has been a macro behavioural investor before behavioural investing was a thing.   Speaking of behavioural biases, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* by Daniel Kahneman is a spectacular look at how your brain’s quick-trigger responses can often be wrong.  On the subject of behaviour and biases, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion* by Robert Cialdini is another topic-defining book  More books by long term veteran professional investment managers that should be enjoyed: - *The Little Book That (Still) Beats the Market* by Joel Greenblatt - *Beat the Crowd* by Ken Fisher - *Big Money Thinks Small* by Joel Tillinghast - *Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits* by Philip A. Fisher - *The Little Book of Behavioural Investing* by James Montier - *Margin of Safety* by Seth Klarman  And I’ll be banned from this forum without mentioning *The Intelligent Investor* by Benjamin Graham.    As per some other comments, my personal opinion is that books that describe events or periods of time like *Liars’ Poker* [80s Junk Bonds], *The Big Short* [Financial Crisis], *When Genius Failed* [the LTCM collapse, excellent read by Rogers Lowenstein], *All The Devils Are Here* [by McLean and Nocera, another Financial Crisis book, much better than Lewis’s, IMO] are all educational and quite entertaining, but don’t honestly have much to do with the actual nuts and bolts of the real financial industry.   Enjoy! "That's great that you have saved up money. You are ahead of your peers. I would advise against investing in an index fund. The attraction of the idea is that you will get the same return as the base item. For example, an index fund of gold would supposedly give you the same return as if you bought gold. In reality this is not true. The return of an index fund is always significantly below the return of the underlying commodity. Your best strategy is to invest in something you know and understand. There are two books that can help you learn how to do this: ""One Up on Wall Street"" by Peter Lynch and ""The Intelligent Investor"" by Benjamin Graham. Buying, reading and following the guidance in these two books is your best investment of time and money." I'm familiar with the efficient market hypothesis. And the argument over if the markets are weak, semi-strong or strong firm efficient. Most of the evidence suggests they are semi-strong form efficient. Are you looking after fees? I'd argue before fees, you'd find a lot more that do on a regular basis. If you'd like to read something, take a look at Warren Buffets letter in the back of intelligent Investor. It's named something about Graham Doddville. He addresses your argument as to random dollar winners. Now you've made a promise you can't keep, because I'm not very wrong. :) Where we’re going, we don’t need profits Twitter Facebook LinkedIn Print this page 15 SEPTEMBER 19, 2017 By: Alexandra Scaggs Simply put, earnings no longer reliably reflect changes in corporate value and are thus an inadequate driver of investment analysis. – Profs Feng Gu and Baruch Lev, in a paper for the CFA Institute’s Financial Analysts Journal Well then!  This idea challenges the very heart of traditional equity-market investment analysis. The authors point out that legendary stock-picker Benjamin Graham spent hundreds of pages of his 1962 book on analysing and predicting earnings and other quarterly metrics. Earnings prediction is still central to most sell-side analysis as well.  But if profits, EBITDA or sales were truly central for corporate valuation, wouldn’t markets punish regular loss-makers like Tesla and Amazon more severely? And wouldn’t there be a stronger return to predicting profits?  The returns to such predictions have diminished over time, according to the authors of the paper, which might help explain the persistent underperformance by active fund managers. While the professors commit a minor chart crime below by starting the Y-axis at 1.5 per cent, it seems notable that potential gains were lower during the 2009 downturn than during the dot-com bust:  The 30-year pattern of the gains from the earnings growth investment strategy is depicted in Figure 2. Again, the deterioration of gains from perfect growth prediction is evident. Clearly, the problem lies with reported earnings, not in the way investors use them. Simply put, earnings no longer reliably reflect changes in corporate value and are thus an inadequate driver of investment analysis.  The decline in profits’ importance can be explained by a fundamental change in the way companies create value, they say.  There are lots of names for the change: The information revolution, the rise of the knowledge economy, and so on. No matter what you call it, the idea is that modern production relies less on physical capital and more on intellectual capital.  Accounting and financial analysis methods have failed to adapt to this change, they say. For example, companies are required to expense R&amp;D and sales expenses immediately, while they can amortise expenses from capital investment and acquisitions (including intangibles) over time. They argue those rules penalise the important methods of modern value creation, since R&amp;D costs create lasting returns from new products and SG&amp;A expenses create lasting returns from new customers.  Of course, one person’s “internally generated intangibles” can be another’s “overpaid salesforce”. But the difference in accounting treatment between those costs and acquired intangibles can make it difficult to compare within industries:  Thus, a company pursuing an innovation strategy based on acquisitions will appear more profitable and asset rich than a similar enterprise developing its innovations internally. Consequently, reported earnings, assets, and market multiples (P/E, book-to-market ratio) cannot be compared within industries, and earnings definitely do not reflect intrinsic value creation. And as far as we can tell, the professors aren’t lobbying to start amortising all sales costs and executive compensation. Instead, they say we should stop looking at the consequences of corporate value creation — the quarterly reports — and start looking at its causes.  They suggest financial analysis based on strategic assets, which are (1) rare, (2) difficult to imitate and (3) generate net benefits, like growth in a customer base or sales.  There would be four steps to this type of analysis. From the paper, with our emphasis:  1. Taking inventory of strategic assets: Compiling a list of the major strategic assets of the enterprise; distinguishing between operating and dormant assets (e.g., patents under development or licensed out versus abandoned patents), active brands (enabling the charging of a premium product price) and brands in name only, or producing oil and gas properties and those under exploration versus inactive properties. Such inventory taking establishes the foundation—active strategic assets—of the company’s competitive advantage. 2. Enhancing strategic assets: Without continued investment and replenishment, even highly productive assets will wither on the vine (recall Dell). You should ask, Is the spending on R&amp;D, technology purchases, customer acquisition, brand support, and employee training sufficient to maintain and grow the business? Cutting R&amp;D or employee training to “make the numbers” clearly bodes ill for future growth. 3. Defending strategic assets: These assets are vulnerable to competition (from similar products), infringement, and technological disruption, raising the question of whether the company’s assets are adequately protected by continuous innovation, patent defensive walls, and litigation. A continuous loss of market share clearly indicates a failure to protect assets. 4. Asset deployment and value creation: Are the strategic assets, along with other company resources, optimally deployed to create value (e.g., retail outlets with increasing same-store sales)? And what is this value? Note that in our analysis, the measurement of the periodic value created is a byproduct rather than the focus of the analysis. We prefer to measure value created by cash flows to avoid the multiple managerial estimates embedded in earnings. In contrast to the cash flows generally used by analysts (EBITDA), however, we add to cash flows the company’s investments in value-creating strategic assets, such as R&amp;D, IT, and unusual brand creation expenditures, which are not really operating cash outflows. Now, if we are living in a period of secular stagnation, this could be seen as an attempt to lower the bar to make up for lackluster capital investment. (One academic literature review we found on the topic of strategic assets only cites papers from around the time of the dot-com bubble. Fancy that!)  What’s more, “defending strategic assets” can sound a lot like “maintaining monopoly power”, depending on the methods companies use in their defence. So an investment analysis focussed on strategic assets might also require more aggressive anti-trust regulation.  But if you accept the idea that widespread adoption of the internet brought a fundamental and irreversible change in the drivers of growth, there are worse approaches to financial analysis you can take.  There’s more detail and argument in the paper, which you can find here. "Let me start by giving you a snippet of a report that will floor you. Beat the market? Investors lag the market by so much that many call the industry a scam.   This is the 2015 year end data from a report titled Quantitive Analysis of Investor Behavior by a firm, Dalbar. It boggles the mind that the disparity could be this bad. A mix of stocks and bonds over 30 years should average 8.5% or so. Take out fees, and even 7.5% would be the result I expect. The average investor return was less than half of this. Jack Bogle, founder of Vanguard, and considered the father of the index fund, was ridiculed. A pamphlet I got from Vanguard decades ago quoted fund managers as saying that ""indexing is a path to mediocrity."" Fortunately, I was a numbers guy, read all I could that Jack wrote and got most of that 10.35%, less .05, down to .02% over the years. To answer the question: psychology. People are easily scammed as they want to believe they can beat the market. Or that they'll somehow find a fund that does it for them. I'm tempted to say ignorance or some other hint at lack of intelligence, but that would be unfair to the professionals, all of which were scammed by Madoff. Individual funds may not be scams, but investors are partly to blame, buy high, sell low, and you get the results above, I dare say, an investor claiming to use index funds might not fare much better than the 3.66% 30 year return above, if they follow that path, buying high, selling low. Edit - I am adding this line to be clear - My conclusion, if any, is that the huge disparity cannot be attributed to management, a 6.7% lag from the S&P return to what the average investor sees likely comes from bad trading. To the comments by Dave, we have a manager that consistently beats the market over any 2-3 year period. You have been with him 30 years and are clearly smiling about your relationship and investing decision. Yet, he still has flows in and out. People buy at the top when reading how good he is, and selling right after a 30% drop even when he actually beat by dropping just 22%. By getting in and out, he has a set of clients with a 30 year record of 6% returns, while you have just over 11%. This paragraph speaks to the behavior of the investor, not managed vs indexed." "This company was a reputable rating agency for many years. See Weiss Research website, ratings section for a very different perspective on Martin Weiss's work than the websites with which he is now associated. I checked both links provided, and agree with the questioner in every way: These appear to be highly questionable investment research websites. I use such strong terms based on the fact that the website actually uses the distasteful pop-up ploy,  ""Are you SURE you want to leave this site?"" Clearly, something changed between what Weiss Ratings was in the past (per company history since 1971) and what Martin Weiss is doing now. Larry Edelson seems to have been associated exclusively with questionable websites and high pressure investment advice since 2007. From 1996 through the present, he worked as either an employee or contractor of Weiss Research. Let's answer each of your questions.  On June 22, 2006, the Commission instituted settled administrative   proceedings against Weiss Research, Inc., Martin Weiss, and Lawrence   Edelson (collectively, “Respondents”) for violations of the Investment   Advisers Act of 1940 in connection with their operation of an   unregistered investment adviser and the production and distribution of   materially false and misleading marketing materials. Full details about Weiss Ratings operations, including its history from 1996 through 2001, when it operated in compliance with securities laws, then from 2001 through 2005, which was when the SEC filed charges for regulatory violations, are available from the June 2006 U.S. SEC court documents PDF. Finally, this quantitative assessment, ""Safe With Martin Weiss? (December 2010) by CXO Advisory (providers of ""objective research and reviews to aid investing decisions"") for its readers concluded the following: In summary, the performance of Martin Weiss’ premium services in   aggregate over the past year is unimpressive. The study methodology was good, but I recommend reading the article (I posted the URL) to fully understand what caveats and assumptions were done to reach that conclusion." Also a layman, and I didnt read the article because it did the whole 'screw you for blocking my ads' thing. But judging from the title, I'd guess someone bought a massive amount of call options for VIX, the stock that tracks volatility in the market. Whenever the market crashes or goes through difficult times, the VIX fund prospers. The 'by october' part makes me think it was call options that he purchased: basically he paid a premium for each share (a fraction of the shares cost) for the right to buy that share at today's price, from now until october. So if the share increases in value, for each call option he has, he can buy one share at todays price, and sell it at the price it is that day. Options can catapult your profit into the next dimension but if the share decreases in value or even stays the same price, he loses everything. Vicious redditors, please correct the mistakes ive made here with utmost discrimination