Who is the issuer in a derivative contract?
While the issuer of the security such as a stock or bond not the short is responsible for the credit risk, the issuer and the short of a derivative is one. In all cases, it is more than likely that a trader is owed securities by an agent such as a broker or exchange or clearinghouse. Legally, only the Options Clearing Corporation clears openly traded options.  With stocks and bonds, brokerages can clear with each other if approved. While a trader is expected to fund margin, the legal responsibility is shared by all in the agent chain.  Clearinghouses are liable to exchanges.  Exchanges are liable to members.  Traders are liable to brokerages.  Both ways and so on. Clearinghouses are usually ultimately liable for counterparty risk to the long counterparty, and the short counterparty is ultimately liable to the clearinghouse. Clearinghouses are not responsible for the credit risk of stocks and bonds because the issuers are not short those securities on the exchange, thus no margin is required.  Credit risk for stocks and bonds is mitigated away from the clearing process.
&gt;In the economic sense, investments really has nothing to do with capital or business investments then does it?   Congratulations, you just figured out why monetarists and Keynesians are wrong.  What actually matters is the quality of the investments that the money is making. An excess of currency won't create growth if the currency is invested in a derivative contract, since this is a zero-growth investment. A shortfall in currency won't always kill the economy, if rational investments are made (2nd half of the 19th century in the United States).  On the other hand, [infrastructure](https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/060320a/forum.cfm) generally offers a much higher return on invested capital than the private market. So you see China's economy growing quickly for several decades due to investing in the right class of assets.  This is the same thing the United States did to become an economic superpower:  https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-American-school-of-economics  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_School_(economics)  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_System_(economic_plan) Here's my attempt, without talking about apples or anything:  Essentially, the 'money supply' is determined by the central bank, since they are the issuers of money. You can read on your US dollars that they are issued by the federal reserve. An excellent measure of the money supply is NGDP, since this is the number of dollars traded every year (that sort of quantifies how many dollars are available to be captured by working, trade, etc.). Unfortunately, in 2008, the US Fed decided to adopt an ultra-tight monetary policy, resulting in a severe drop-off in NGDP relative to previous trend (the worst since the Great Depression, graphs here: http://marketmonetarist.com/2012/06/19/guest-post-measuring-the-stance-of-monetary-policy-through-ngdp-and-prices-by-integral/)  It does not look like it will ever recover to the previous trend, so the money supply is much smaller than people would have expected before 2008. In theory, the nominal value of money shouldn't matter in the long run. However, since people before 2008 signed contracts (read, 30-year mortgages) anticipating a much higher aggregate money supply, this has triggered a shortfall in demand ever since, which has left our economy in the tank. &gt; I'd be interested in seeing a little more on the regulatory aspects of derivative contracts.  The most relevant regulatory push is with Dodd Frank in how it regulates swaps.  There are a myriad of rules around swaps of all kinds due to DF, whether they be interest rate swaps, fx swaps, commodity swaps, etc.  In a nutshell, DF requires certain reporting and transparency requirements for swaps (not to be confused with futures contracts, which are heavily regulated as well).  At some point most swaps that can be done on a cleared basis will have to be done on a cleared basis (versus bilateral swaps, which is simply one counterparty entering into a swap agreement with another counterparty, meaning each c/p is exposed to the other's credit worthiness).   DF is a long, boring read, but that is what is most relevant if you want to understand how swaps are being regulated and will be regulated going forward. "It's not at all different from anything that happens in reality. Everybody deals with risk and uncertainty, everybody worries about the future, and everybody puts their best mind to bear on it. You gamble, you hedge your bets, you try to do your best with what you've got and what you're willing to give up. People who aren't in the financial industry can also think about their goals in a fine-tuned, strategic, mathematical way. Being able to accurately model reality is useful for pretty much everything.  The way in which it is actually totally different is not addressed. People who deal in derivatives can do a very precise job of predicting the future. So can astronomers, bullfighters, and migratory fish. The difference is that people who deal in derivatives have the ability to leverage reality to obtain a preferred future reality in a uniquely influential way. The guy is acting like investment banks live up on a mountain and look at tea leaves and send down memos about securities once a year.   &gt;Changing the shape of the graph is in some loose sense the business of the financial system, particularly the big investment banks, which are sometimes thought of as ""dealers in risk.""   So are drug dealers. But the guesses investment banks make about the future affect the actual future of investment banks in a way that isn't available to, say, cobblers, so they are dealing with much less of their own risk than most people.   &gt;Buying and selling derivatives means consciously trafficking in risk and uncertainty, in a relatively uncut form. This makes it interesting to people who don't buy or sell derivatives for a living, but who are curious about risk and uncertainty.  It also makes it interesting to people who are curious about why their lives are affected by the the risk and uncertainty of people who trade in derivatives." A company is basically divided into shit the company owns (assets) and shit the company owes to people (liabilities). So what about ownership? Ownership is called equity and on a simplistic level equity = asset - liabilities. But a better view of that should be asset = liabilities + equity. Which means a company's assets  is separated into things owned by debtors (e.g. Banks) and things owned by owners(founders and you). So when you are offered one percent, you are basically owning one percent of the company.   Not the best explanation, but should be a simplified one.   Here's where the options come in. When you are offered options. That means you have the option of redeeming the shares at a lower price than market. However these options are not usually immediately redeemable, there's usually a minimum amount of time you have to work at a company to be able to use these options. This period is called the vesting period. Quote driven markets are the predecessors to the modern securities market. Before electronic trading and HFTs specifically, trading was thin and onerous.  Today, the average investor can open up a web page, type in a security, and buy at the narrowest spread permitted by regulators with anyone else who wants to take the other side. Before the lines between market maker and speculator became blurred to indistinction, a market maker was one who was contractually obligated to an exchange to provide a bid and ask for a given security on said exchange even though at heart a market maker is still simply a trader despite the obligation.  A market maker would simultaneously buy a large amount of securities privately and short the same amount to have no directional bias, exposure to the direction of the security, and commence to making the market.  The market maker would estimate its cost basis for the security based upon those initial trades and provide a bid and ask appropriate for the given level of volume.  If volumes were high, the spread would be low and vice versa. Market makers who survived crashes and spikes would forgo the potential profit in always providing a steady price and spread, ie increased volume otherwise known as revenue, to maintain no directional bias.  In other words, if there were suddenly many buyers and no sellers, hitting the market maker's ask, the MM would raise the ask rapidly in proportion to the increased exposure while leaving the bid somewhere below the cost basis.  Eventually, a seller would arise and hit the MM's bid, bringing the market maker's inventory back into balance, and narrowing the spread that particular MM could provide since a responsible MM's ask could rise very high very quickly if a lack of its volume relative to its inventory made inventory too costly.  This was temporarily extremely costly to the trader if there were few market makers on the security the trader was trading or already exposed to. Market makers prefer to profit from the spread, bidding below some predetermined price, based upon the cost basis of the market maker's inventory, while asking above that same predetermined cost basis.  Traders profit from taking exposure to a security's direction or lack thereof in the case of some options traders. Because of electronic trading, liquidity rebates offered by exchanges not only to contractually obligated official market makers but also to any trader who posts a limit order that another trader hits, and algorithms that become better by the day, market making HFTs have supplanted the traditional market maker, and there are many HFTs where there previously were few official market makers.  This speed and diversification of risk across many many algorithmically market making HFTs have kept spreads to the minimum on large equities and have reduced the same for the smallest equities on major exchanges. Orders and quotes are essentially identical.  Both are double sided auction markets with impermenant bids and asks.  The difference lies in that non-market makers, specialists, etc. orders are not shown to the rest of the market, providing an informational advantage to MMs and an informational disadvantage to the trader.  Before electronic trading, this construct was of no consequence since trader orders were infrequent.  With the prevalence of HFTs, the informational disadvantage has become more costly, so order driven markets now prevail with much lower spreads and accelerated volumes even though market share for the major exchanges has dropped rapidly and hyperaccelerated number of trades even though the size of individual trades have fallen. The worst aspect of the quote driven market was that traders could not directly trade with each other, so all trades had to go between a market maker, specialist, etc.  While this may seem to have increased cost to a trader who could only trade with another trader by being arbitraged by a MM et al, paying more than what another trader was willing to sell, these costs were dwarfed by the potential absence of those market makers.  Without a bid or ask at any given time, there could be no trade, so the costs were momentarily infinite. In essence, a quote driven market protects market makers from the competition of traders.  While necessary in the days where paper receipts were carted from brokerage to brokerage, and the trader did not dedicate itself to round the clock trading, it has no place in a computerized market.  It is more costly to the trader to use such a market, explaining quote driven markets' rapid exit. "Following comments to your question here, you posted a separate question about why SPY, SPX, and the options contract don't move perfectly together.  That's here Why don't SPY, SPX, and the e-mini s&p 500 track perfectly with each other? I provided an answer to that question and will build on it to answer what I think you're asking on this question.  Specifically, I explained what it means that these are ""all based on the S&P.""  Each is a different entity, and different market forces keep them aligned.  I think talking about ""technicals"" on options contracts is going to be too confusing since they are really a very different beast based on forward pricing models, so, for this question, I'll focus on only SPY and SPX. As in my other answer, it's only through specific market forces (the creation / redemption mechanism that I described in my other answer), that they track at all.  There's nothing automatic about this and it has nothing to do with some issuer of SPY actually holding stock in the companies that comprise the SPX index. (That's not to say that the company does or doesn't hold, just that this doesn't drive the prices.)  What ever technical signals you're tracking, will reflect all of the market forces at play.  For SPX (the index), that means some aggregate behavior of the component companies, computed in a ""mathematically pure"" way.  For SPY (the ETF), that means (a) the behavior of SPX and (b) the behavior of the ETF as it trades on the market, and (c) the action of the authorized participants.  These are simply different things. Which one is ""right""?  That depends on what you want to do.  In theory you might be able to do some analysis of technical signals on SPY and SPX and, for example, use that to make money on the way that they fail to track each other.  If you figure out how to do that, though, don't post it here.  Send it to me directly. :)" "Without researching the securities in question I couldn't tell you which cycle each is in, but your answer is that they have different expiration cycles. The following definition is from the CBOE website; ""Expiration cycle An expiration cycle relates to the dates on which options on a particular underlying security expire. A given option, other than LEAPS®, will be assigned to one of three cycles, the January cycle, the February cycle or the March cycle."""