How often are preferred shareholders made whole after a company goes bankrupt?
"From the Times A Reader Q.&A. on G.M.’s Bankruptcy Q. I own G.M. preferred shares. Should I be looking to sell them, or   hold on? I bought them at $25 a share when they were issued in late   2001. — Karen, Manhattan A. When a company files for bankruptcy, its various stock and   bondholders essentially get in line. The first investors to be repaid   are secured debt holders, then senior bond investors, followed by   subordinated debt holders. Preferred shareholders are next, and   lastly, holders of common stock. In a bankruptcy, preferred shares are usually worthless, much like   shares of common stock. But in the case of G.M., there may be some   good — or at least somewhat better — news. Most of G.M.’s preferred   shares are actually senior notes or “quarterly interest bonds,” which   means you will be treated as a bondholder, according to Marilyn Cohen,   president of Envision Capital Management. So you will be able to   exchange your preferreds for G.M. stock (bondholders will receive 10   percent of the new company’s stock). It’s not the best deal, but it   beats the empty bag true preferred shareholders would have been left   holding. Of course this is just one example, and you were hoping to get some larger picture. The article stated ""In a bankruptcy, preferred shares are usually worthless, much like shares of common stock"" which at least is a bit closer to that, if you accept usually as a statistic."
The economic effect of a CFD from your point of view is very close to the effect of owning the stock. If the stock goes up, you make money. If it goes down you lose money. If it pays a dividend, you get that dividend. You'll typically pay commission for buying and selling the CFDs in a similar way to the commission on stock purchases, though one of the advertised advantages of CFDs is that the commission will be lower. They also often have tax advantages, for example in the UK you don't have to pay stamp duty on CFDs. In theory you are exposed to credit risk on the CFD issuer, which you aren't with the real stocks: if the issuer goes bankrupt, you may lose any money you have invested regardless of how well the stock has performed. It's certainly similar to a bet, but not much more so than investing directly in the stock. In practice the issuer of the CFDs is likely to hedge its own exposure by actually buying the underlying stocks directly, but they can aggregate across lots of contracts and they would tolerate some unhedged exposure to the stock, so they can cut down on the transaction fees. You also won't get the same voting rights as the underlying stock would grant you. You are right, it is a Ponzi scheme unless it pays all of the profits as dividends. Here's why: today's millenials are saving a lot less, and instead they choose to be spenders. It's just that their mentality is different. If the trend continues there will be more spenders and less savers.  That means that in 20 years from now, a company might sell more and make more profits, but because there are less investors on the market it will worth less (judging by supply and demand this has to be true).  Doesn't that seem like a disconnect to you guys? Doesn't that just prove that all those profits are not really yours, but instead you're just sitting on the side making bets about them? If I own a company from the point where it goes public and while the value goes up I hold on to it for 50 years. Let's say for 45 years it made tons of profits but never paid a cent in dividend, and then in 5 years it goes out of business. What happened to all the profits they made throughout the 45 years?  If you owned a restaurant that made a profit for 45 years and then went bankrupt you are fine, you took your profits every year because why on earth would you reinvest 100% of the profit forever? But what if you could sell 49.9% of that restaurant on the stock market, get all of that IPO money and still keep all of the profits while claiming that you reinvest it forever? That's exactly what they do! They just buy expensive things for personal use, from fancy cars to private jets, they just write it down as an investment and you can't see what the money was spent on because you are not a majority stakeholder, you have no power. It was not like this forever, companies used to pay all of their profits in dividends and be valued according to that. Not anymore. Now they are just in it for the growth, it will keep growing as long as people keep buying into it, and that's the exact definition of a Ponzi scheme. General advice for novice investors is to have the majority of your holdings be denominated in your home currency as this reduces volatility which can make people squeamish and, related to your second question, prevents all sorts of confusion. A rising CAD actually decreases the value (for you) of your current USD stock. After all, the same amount of USD now buys you less in CAD. An exception to the rule can be made if you would use USD often in your daily life yet your income is CAD. In this case owning stock denominated in USD can form a natural hedge in your life (USD goes up -> your relative income goes down but stock value goes up and visa versa).  Keep in mind —as mentioned in the comments— that an US company with a listing in CAD is still going to be affected by price swings of USD. "A stock insurance company is structured like a “normal” company. It has shareholders (that are the company's investors), who elect a board of directors, who select the senior executive(s), who manage the people who run the actual company. The directors (and thus the executives and employees) have a legal responsibility to manage the company in a way which is beneficial for the shareholders, since the shareholders are the ultimate owner of the company. A mutual insurance company is similar, except that the people holding policies are also the shareholders. That is, the policyholders are the ultimate owners of the company, and there generally aren't separate shareholders who are just “investing” in the company. These policyholder-shareholders elect the board of directors, who select the senior executive(s), who manage the people who run the actual company. In practice, it probably doesn't really make a whole lot of difference, since even if you're just a ""customer"" and not an ""owner"" of the company, the company is still going to want to attract customers and act in a reasonable way toward them. Also, insurance companies are generally pretty heavily regulated in terms of what they can do, because governments really like them to remain solvent. It may be comforting to know that in a mutual insurance company the higher-ups are explicitly supposed to be working in your best interest, though, rather than in the interest of some random investors. Some might object that being a shareholder may not give you a whole lot more rights than you had before. See, for example, this article from the Boston Globe, “At mutual insurance firms, big money for insiders but no say for ‘owners’ — policyholders”: It has grown into something else entirely: an opaque, poorly understood, and often immensely profitable world in which some executives and insiders operate with minimal scrutiny and, no coincidence, often reap maximum personal rewards. Policyholders, despite their status as owners, have no meaningful oversight of how mutual companies spend their money — whether to lower rates, pay dividends, or fund executive salaries and perks — and few avenues to challenge such decisions. Another reason that one might not like the conversion is the specific details of how the current investor-shareholders are being paid back for their investment in the process of the conversion to mutual ownership, and what that might do to the funds on hand that are supposed to be there to keep the firm solvent for the policyholders. From another Boston Globe article on the conversion of SBLI to a mutual company, “Insurer SBLI wants to get banks out of its business,” professor Robert Wright is cautiously optimistic but wants to ensure the prior shareholders aren't overpaid: Robert Wright, a professor in South Dakota who has studied insurance companies and owns an SBLI policy, said he would prefer the insurer to be a mutual company that doesn’t have to worry about the short-term needs of shareholders. But he wants to ensure that SBLI doesn’t overpay the banks for their shares. “It’s fine, as long as it’s a fair price,” he said. That article also gives SBLI's president's statement as to why they think it's a good thing for policyholders: If the banks remained shareholders, they would be likely to demand a greater share of the profits and eat into the dividends the insurance company currently pays to the 536,000 policyholders, about half of whom live in Massachusetts, said Jim Morgan, president of Woburn-based SBLI. “We’re trying to protect the policyholders from having the dividends diluted,” Morgan said. I'm not sure there's an obvious pros/cons list for either way, but I'd think that I'd prefer the mutual approach, just on the principle that the policyholders “ought” to be the owners, because the directors (and thus the executives and employees) are then legally required to manage the company in the best interest of the policyholders. I did cast a Yes vote in my proxy on whether SBLI ought to become a mutual company (I'm a SBLI term-life policyholder.) But policy terms aren't changing, and it'd be hard to tell for sure how it'd impact any dividends (I assume the whole-life policies must be the ones to pay dividends) or company solvency either way, since it's not like we'll get to run a scientific experiment trying it out both ways. I doubt you'd have a lot of regrets either way, whether it becomes a mutual company and you wish it hadn't or it doesn't become one and you wish it had." I once bought both preferred and common shares in a bankrupt company.  It is true that those preferred shares had less potential for appreciation than the common shares.  The reason is because the preferred shares were trading around $50 and had a face value of $1000.  This means that if the bankruptcy proceedings ended up finding enough assets to make the preferred shares whole, then the preferred shareholders would be paid $1000 per share and no more than that.  So if you bought the preferred shares at $50 and received $1000 per share for them, then you made a 1900% gain. But if the bankruptcy proceedings found enough assets to pay not just the preferred shareholders but also the common shareholders, then the common shareholders had the potential for a greater gain than the preferred shareholders.  The common stock was trading around 20 cents at the time, and if enough assets were found to pay $10 per share to the common shareholders, then that would have been a 4900% gain.  The preferred shares were capped by their face value, but the common shares had no limit on how high they could go. Alot of these answers have focused on the dilution aspect, but from a purely legal aspect, there are usually corporate bylaws that spell out what kind of vote and percentage of votes is needed to take this type of action.  If all other holders of stock voted to do this, so 90% for, and you didn't, so 10% against, it's still legal if that vote meets the threshold for taking the action. As an example of this, I known of a startup where employees got $0/share for their vested shares when the company was sold because the voting stock holders agreed to it.  Effectively the purchase amount was just enough to cover debts and preferred stock. Ford paid off a tremendous amount of debt prior to reinstating the dividend. While they still have a sizable amount of debt on the balance sheet, they've been able to refinance this debt to a much more affordable point. Their free cash flow + cash on the balance could enable them to pay it off in the very near future (12 - 16 months). Most auto companies have debt on their balance sheet if they choose to offer financial services.  Their overall credit rating (if you really think such things are valid) has also improved. Generally speaking, I agree its a poor idea to give money back to shareholders if you have high-interest bearing debt. "With the second example, if you continue to read on you will see that although directors must try and maximise shareholders wealth. That precedence doesn't change however the interpretation of the actions and whether they maximise shareholders wealth does. For example giving money to charity with regards to the Doge v. Ford case would probably have been blocked on the grounds that it decreases shareholder wealth, but later cases such as A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow say that donations can increase shareholders wealth in the long run. So it gives a broader coverage of the actions deemed to increase shareholder wealth.  The second is related to short term vs long term wealth but part of the reason for it was due to the inability of Paramount to prove that the value increase for shareholders in the long run from selling to Viacom rather than QVC would be larger than the difference between the two offers, which was 1.3 billion. Then there is also the issue of shareholders rights and the companys ability to block shareholders from selling to whomever they want. So as I said it's related, but the issue isn't solely and simply about short term vs long term wealth.  Both examples are kind of weak as in the first, well the issue doesn't really exist in the present day as previous case law has broadened the definition of actions which increase shareholder wealth, and in the second, short term vs long term value is related, but mostly tagging along with a larger issue. Your original statement was ""in matters of cost vs. quality I'd expect publicly traded companies to prioritize short-term shareholder profit (or be sued by said shareholders.)""  Are there any examples where shareholders have sued simply because they wanted better short term performance over long term performance?"