Expense ratio of an ETF included in the price or calculated separately
The expense ratio reduces the return of the ETF; your scenario of paying 100.0015 is that of a load.  Most (all?) ETFs can be bought without paying a load (sales charge as a percent of amount invested), and some ETFs can be bought without paying a brokerage fee (fixed or variable charge for a buy transaction just like buying any other stock  through the brokerage) because the brokerage has waived it.  Your broker  might charge fees for both buying and selling shares in an ETF, but in any case, this is quite separate from the expense ratio.
"Here's an example that I'm trying to figure out.  ETF firm has an agreement with GS for blocks of IBM. They have agreed on daily VWAP + 1% for execution price.  Further, there is a commission schedule for 5 mils with GS.  Come month end, ETF firm has to do a monthly rebalance. As such must buy 100,000 shares at IBM which goes for about $100  The commission for the trade is 100,000 * 5 mils = $500 in commission for that trade. I assume all of this is covered in the expense ratio. Such that if VWAP for the day was 100, then each share got executed to the ETF at 101 (VWAP+ %1) + .0005 (5 mils per share) = for a resultant 101.0005 cost basis  The ETF then turns around and takes out (let's say) 1% as the expense ratio ($1.01005 per share)  I think everything so far is pretty straight forward. Let me know if I missed something to this point.  Now, this is what I'm trying to get my head around. ETF firm has a revenue sharing agreement as well as other ""relations"" with GS. One of which is 50% back on commissions as soft dollars. On top of that GS has a program where if you do a set amount of ""VWAP +"" trades you are eligible for their corporate well-being programs and other ""sponsorship"" of ETF's interests including helping to pay for marketing, rent, computers, etc.   Does that happen? Do these disclosures exist somewhere?" "I hope a wall of text with citations qualifies as ""relatively easy."" Many of these studies are worth quoting at length. Long story short, a great deal of research has found that actively-managed funds underperform market indexes and passively-managed funds because of their high turnover and higher fees, among other factors.  Longer answer: Chris is right in stating that survivorship bias presents a problem for such research; however, there are several academic papers that address the survivorship problem, as well as the wider subject of active vs. passive performance. I'll try to provide a brief summary of some of the relevant literature.  The seminal paper that started the debate is Michael Jensen's 1968 paper titled ""The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964"". This is the paper where Jensen's alpha, the ubiquitous measure of the performance of mutual fund managers, was first defined. Using a dataset of 115 mutual fund managers, Jensen finds that The evidence on mutual fund performance indicates not only that these 115 mutual funds were on average not able to predict security prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, but also that there is very little evidence that any individual fund was able to do significantly better than that which we expected from mere random chance. Although this paper doesn't address problems of survivorship, it's notable because, among other points, it found that managers who actively picked stocks performed worse even when fund expenses were ignored. Since actively-managed funds tend to have higher expenses than passive funds, the actual picture looks even worse for actively managed funds. A more recent paper on the subject, which draws similar conclusions, is Martin Gruber's 1996 paper ""Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds"". Gruber calls it ""a puzzle"" that investors still invest in actively-managed funds, given that their performance on average has been inferior to that of index funds. He addresses survivorship bias by tracking funds across the entire sample, including through mergers. Since most mutual funds that disappear are merged into existing funds, he assumes that investors in a fund that disappear choose to continue investing their money in the fund that resulted from the merger. Using this assumption and standard measures of mutual fund performance, Gruber finds that mutual funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of the indices by about 65 basis points per year. Expense ratios for my sample averaged 113 basis points a year. These numbers suggest that active management adds value, but that mutual funds charge the investor more than the value added. Another nice paper is Mark Carhart's 1997 paper ""On persistence in mutual fund performance"" uses a sample free of survivorship bias because it includes ""all known equity funds over this period."" It's worth quoting parts of this paper in full: I demonstrate that expenses have at least a one-for-one negative impact on fund performance, and that turnover also negatively impacts performance. ... Trading reduces performance by approximately 0.95% of the trade's market value.  In reference to expense ratios and other fees, Carhart finds that The investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on performance. The study also finds that funds with abnormally high returns last year usually have higher-than-expected returns next year, but not in the following years, because of momentum effects. Lest you think the news is all bad, Russ Wermer's 2000 study ""Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock‐picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses"" provides an interesting result. He finds that many actively-managed mutual funds hold stocks that outperform the market, even though the net return of the funds themselves underperforms passive funds and the market itself.  On a net-return level, the funds underperform broad market indexes by one percent a year. Of the 2.3% difference between the returns on stock holdings and the net returns of the funds, 0.7% per year is due to the lower average returns of the nonstock holdings of the funds during the period (relative to stocks). The remaining 1.6% per year is split almost evenly between the expense ratios and the transaction costs of the funds. The final paper I'll cite is a 2008 paper by Fama and French (of the Fama-French model covered in business schools) titled, appropriately, ""Mutual Fund Performance"". The paper is pretty technical, and somewhat above my level at this time of night, but the authors state one of their conclusions bluntly quite early on: After costs (that is, in terms of net returns to investors) active investment is a negative sum game.  Emphasis mine. In short, expense ratios, transaction costs, and other fees quickly diminish the returns to active investment. They find that The [value-weight] portfolio of mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities is close to the market portfolio, and estimated before fees and expenses, its alpha is close to zero. Since the [value-weight] portfolio of funds produces an α close to zero in gross returns, the alpha estimated on the net returns to investors is negative by about the amount of fees and expenses. This implies that the higher the fees, the farther alpha decreases below zero. Since actively-managed mutual funds tend to have higher expense ratios than passively-managed index funds, it's safe to say that their net return to the investor is worse than a market index itself. I don't know of any free datasets that would allow you to research this, but one highly-regarded commercial dataset is the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. In financial research, CRSP is one of the ""gold standards"" for historical market data, so if you can access that data (perhaps for a firm or academic institution, if you're affiliated with one that has access), it's one way you could run some numbers yourself." This means that if your capital under my management ends up turning a profit, I will keep half of those profits, but if I lose you money, I will cover half those losses. The bold part is where you lose me. This absolutely exists with the exception of the loss insurance.  It just requires a lot more than the general retail consumer investor has to contribute.  Nobody wants to take on the responsibility of your money then split 50% of the gross proceeds of your $10,000 (or whatever nominal amount of money you're dealing with) investment and return it all to you after a year.  And NO money manager will insure that the market won't decline. Hedge funds, PE Firms, VC Firms, Investment Partnerships, etc all basically run the way you're describing (again without your loss insurance).  Everyone's money is pooled and investments are made.  Everyone shares the spoils and everyone shares the losses.  And to top it off, the people making investment decisions have their money invested in the fund.  All of them have to pay rent and accountants and other costs associated with running the fund and that will eat in to the proceeds to some degree; because returns are calculated on net proceeds. With enough money you can buy yourself in to a hedge fund, for the rest of us there are ETFs and other extremely fee-reasonable investment options.  And if you don't think the performance and preservation of assets under management is not an incentive to treat the money with care you're kidding yourself (your first bullet point). I'll add that aside from skewing the manager's risk tolerance toward guaranteed returns I doubt you would fair favorably over the long term compared to simply paying even an egregious 1% expense ratio on an ETF.  If you look at the S&P performance for 10 or 20 or however many years, I'd venture that a couple good years of giving up half of your gains would have you screaming for your money back.  The bad years would put the money manager out of business and the good years would squander your gains. "There are two common types of P/E ratio calculations: ""trailing"" and ""forward"" (and then there are various mixes of the two). Trailing P/E ratios are calculated as [current price] / [trailing 12-month EPS]. An alternative is the Forward P/E ratio, which is based on an estimate of earnings in the coming 12 months. The estimate used is usually called ""consensus"" and, to answer your question, is the average estimate of analysts who cover the stock. Any reputable organization will disclose how they calculate their financials. For example, Reuters uses a trailing ratio (indicated by ""TTM"") on their page for BHP. So, the first reason a PE ratio might not jump on an announcement is it might be forward looking and therefore not very sensitive to the realized earnings. The second reason is that if it is a trailing ratio, some of the annual EPS change is known prior to the annual announcement. For example, on 12/31 a company might report a large drop in annual earnings, but if the bulk of that loss was reported in a previous quarterly report, then the trailing EPS would account partially for it prior to the annual announcement.  In this case, I think the first reason is the culprit. The Reuters P/E of nearly 12 is a trailing ratio, so if you see 8 I'd think it must be based on a forward-looking estimate." The short answer is that you would want to use the net inflow or net outflow, aka profit or loss.   In my experience, you've got a couple different uses for IRR and that may be driving the confusion.  Pretty much the same formula, but just coming at it from different angles.   Thinking about a stock or mutual fund investment, you could project a scenario with an up-front investment (net outflow) in the first period and then positive returns (dividends, then final sale proceeds, each a net inflow) in subsequent periods.  This is a model that more closely follows some of the logic you laid out. Thinking about a business project or investment, you tend to see more complicated and less smooth cashflows.  For example, you may have a large up-front capital expenditure in the first period, then have net profit (revenue less ongoing maintenance expense), then another large capital outlay, and so on.   In both cases you would want to base your analysis on the net inflow or net outflow in each period.  It just depends on the complexity of the cashflows trend as to whether you see a straightforward example (initial payment, then ongoing net inflows), or a less straightforward example with both inflows and outflows.   One other thing to note - you would only want to include those costs that are applicable to the project.  So you would not want to include the cost of overhead that would exist even if you did not undertake the project. Yes, add the stocks/mutual funds that you want and then you would just need to add all the transactions that you theoretically would have made. Performing the look up on the price at each date that you would have sold or bought is quite tedious as well as adding each transaction. It is a good enough approximation. With a single event you can do it your way and get a better result, but imagine that the $300 are spread over a certain period with $10 contribution each time? Then recalculating and compounding will be a lot of work to do. The original ROI formula is averaging the ROI by definition, so why bother with precise calculations of averages that are imprecise by definition, when you can just adjust the average without losing the level of precision? 11.4 and 11.3 aren't significantly different, its immaterial. You recognize expense when you sell the hot dog. When you pay for the buns you have inventory, which is an asset. When you sell the hot dog - you have cost of goods sold, which is the expense. Expense principle says that you recognize expense when you use the product. You use the buns when you actually sell the hot dog, not before. The matching principle is also honored because you recognize expense of the buns at the time of recognizing revenue of the hot dog.