RICHARD LOCKE: Good
afternoon everyone.
It's really wonderful
to see you all here
in this incredibly
beautiful library,
and because of President
Cardoso's visit,
the sun has come out,
the clouds have lifted,
so it's really a
wonderful afternoon.
My name is Richard Locke, I'm a
professor in political science
and international
public affairs,
and I currently serve as
provost here at Brown.
And on behalf of President
Paxson and myself,
I'd like to welcome everyone
to Brown and to the John Carter
Brown Library.
Which as many people know is
the home to an internationally
renowned, constantly
growing collection
of primary historical sources
pertaining to the Americas.
And we're delighted to be
with you this afternoon
for the 95th Stephen A.
Ogden Memorial Lecture
on international affairs.
The Ogden lecture is one
of Brown University's
oldest, and most
distinguished, lectures.
Since the first
Ogden lecture in 1965
the university
has welcomed heads
of states, senior diplomats,
elected officials,
prime ministers, veteran
journalists, and other policy
makers and practitioners.
Who have spoken from their
personal experience about some
of the most pressing matters
that face our world today.
The Ogden lectures were
established as a memorial
to Stephen A. Ogden, a member
of the Brown class of 1960,
who died in 1963 from injuries
sustained in an automobile
accident.
As a student, Stephen dreamed
of promoting international peace
through a career of
international relations.
A dream that is still shared
by many, many brown students.
The International
Relations concentration
is actually one of the
most popular concentrations
here on campus.
But even students in
other concentrations
very much have this
goal of promoting
international peace, and
prosperity, and justice,
through their work.
Now, Peggy Ogden,
Stephen's sister,
and a member of the
Brown class of 1953,
was unable to join us today.
But were delighted however,
that her good friend Susan Adler
Kaplan, a Brown alumna,
and trustee emerita,
has joined us to represent
the Ogden family.
And I would like to ask
Susan to please stand and be
acknowledged.
[APPLAUSE]
Thank you, Susan.
Before I introduce our
distinguished speaker,
I would also like to extend
profound thanks to Brown
alumnus, and emeritus member
of the corporation, Bill
Rhodes for his many,
many contributions
to Brown University.
But including, helping to
bring President Cardoso
back to campus today.
Bill has been a
stalwart supporter
of Brown, including
most recently
being instrumental in
establishing the Fernando
Henrique Cardoso
graduate fellowships,
in the social sciences,
at Brown University.
Which were celebrated
earlier today
with a number of individuals
who are here with us
today, who have helped
establish this fellowship.
I would also like to acknowledge
ambassador Frederico Duque
Estrada Meyer, alternate
ambassador of Brazil
to the United Nations.
As well as, to
Antonio Bonchristiano,
who serves on the board of
overseers for the John Carter
Brown library.
Thank you very much
for being here today.
[APPLAUSE]
And finally, many
thanks to the library's
director Neil Safier,
for hosting us today.
Now, it is especially
fitting that we're
in such a grand and elegant
space for today's talk
by accomplished statesmen,
and distinguished scholar,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Fernando Henrique
Cardoso was first
elected to national office
in 1986 as a senator
from the state of Sao
Paolo, and two years later
helped establish the
Social Democratic Party.
He served as Brazil's
foreign minister and economy
minister prior to his
election as president in 1994.
As economy minister
and president,
he oversaw the development
and implementation
of an economic
stabilization program
that controlled inflation.
And his policy of reducing
government involvement
in the economy helped
attract foreign investment.
Now, I think it's important
for people-- normally
we think about stabilization,
we don't equate it
with poverty alleviation.
And if you look at
the numbers, you'll
see that because of
the stabilization plan
that President Cardoso launched
first as economy minister,
and then carried
forward as president,
the alleviation of poverty
in Brazil really reduced--
it was really dramatic.
And there were all
sorts of numbers
that showing not only
reduction of poverty,
but increased
consumption of protein,
and all sorts of things.
So, this was a huge thing, not
only for the macro economy,
but for the day to day lives
of individual citizens.
President Cardoso concluded
his second presidential term
on January 1, 2003.
And I was just mentioning
to President Cardoso
that in 2000 I was asked to give
a talk at a conference in Sao
Paulo on globalization
and industry
at the turn of the century.
I mean there were like 3
million of these conferences.
And I had just published a
book on employment relations
and the global economy, and
so they asked me to speak.
But the highlight
of the conference
was the keynote speech which
was by President Cardoso.
Who, without any notes,
got up and spoke for 40,
45 minutes in the most
incredibly articulate,
intelligent,
sophisticated arguments
about what was going
on in the economy,
and what was
happening in society.
And I remember trying to
keep my jaw from flapping
open, and thinking, wow we don't
have politicians like that, who
can get up and give
such an eloquent lecture
on such an array of
very important issues.
And I would say
that that phenomena
has continued to this day.
But turning to more happy
subjects, President Cardoso,
aside from being a
gifted politician,
is also an incredibly well-known
and established scholar.
A classic that I think so many
of us read in graduate school,
or undergraduate--
Dependency and Development
in Latin America.
But he's also published
numerous other works,
and journals of sociology,
and political economy.
He is also the author of, The
Accidental President of Brazil,
something that I would
recommend all of you to read.
It's a terrific
book, and charting
a new course, the
politics of globalization
and social Transformation.
President Cardoso is
also professor emeritus
of political science at
the University Sao Paolo.
And he has served as a visiting
professor at academic centers
and universities in Europe,
and the United States.
Including, five
years as Professor
at large right here at Brown,
at the Watson Institute.
He has remained active
since leaving the presidency
and continues to contribute
in meaningful ways
to promote peace and justice,
both in Brazil and worldwide.
President Cardoso dedicates
his time to an institute
that he founded in Sao Paolo,
The Fundacao Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, and is
honorary president
of the Party of Brazilian
Social Democracy,
otherwise known as the PSDB.
His remarkable career
has been an intersection,
actually an interweaving, of
intellectual and political
life.
And because of that, he's
had a profound impact,
not just on scholarly
work-- on the way that we
think about development in
the world, but also on policy.
What gifted politicians, in the
right time, in the right place,
can do to promote economic
development, poverty
alleviation, and peace.
We are honored to have President
Cardoso back on campus today.
Please join me in welcoming
President Cardoso, who
will speak on democracy
and corruption
in Brazil, and
Latin America today.
Thank You.
[APPLAUSE]
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO:
Thank you, very much.
Let me say just
to the beginning,
that for me, it is an
honor and a pleasure,
I have to say, to be
here in this library,
and to hear what has been said
by Professor Richard Locke,
exaggerating about what I did.
Anyhow, thank you, very much.
I'm very happy, as I said,
to have the possibility
to address to you.
He said that I was
able to speak for 45
minutes without reading on
one paper, but in Portuguese.
Must make a difference.
So, today I have a
paper, I will try
to be not excessive
in using your time.
But let me say, that the talk of
today will be not exactly what
is it the title of my talk.
Would be rather, the
transformation and
cries of democracy, where
it takes special attention
to the case of Brazil.
But, before dealing with
the phenomenon, which
affect both Europe
and the Americas,
the cries of democracy.
I used to say how
grateful I am to Brown
University for these opportunity
and to tribute the creation
of these Cardoso fellowships.
To offer the possibilities
for all Brazilians who
came to Brown, and to discuss
more in depth our problems.
Not just brazilian problems,
but Latin American,
and global problems.
At the end of my term as
president and [INAUDIBLE] ties
in true, I receive many
invitations to give classes
and lectures in
different universities.
I decided to accept
Brown's invitation
considering the prestige
of the university,
and the general interest
in promoting studies
in Latin America, and
specifically about Brazil.
It will be maybe
more easy, to me,
to give classes in Latin
America or in France,
since our language is
more close to my training,
but my decision was
to come to Brown.
And I would like to recall the
kindness of Ruth Simmons, then
president of Brown,
every time we met.
As well as, the steady
stimulus by Bill Rhodes,
one of the best supporters
of Brown's academic life--
he gave to me at that
time, and now again.
In my five years as
Brown Professor-at-Large,
I had the opportunity to be in
touch with Thomads Skidmore.
Then walking into
Watson Institute,
where I had an office
neighbor to his office.
Often we talk about the
matters of common interests.
I remember it with solidarity.
I like to remember too,
among various others
persons with whom have been
in touch at Brown, Professor
[INAUDIBLE] Patrick Heller,
which still is around,
Professor Richard
Snyder, and James green,
an enthusiast of Brazilian's
political and social efforts.
Thank you very much for the way
you receiving me at the time,
and now again, and
also, the general
is called the cooperation
of several people,
to turn possible the creation
of these fellowships.
For me, it was also gratifying,
the seminar organized in Brown,
my colleagues to commemorate
the 40th anniversary of a book I
wrote with Enzo Faletto,
you referred to called,
Dependency and
Development in America.
The contributions by many
Americans and Europeans,
sociologists and
political scientists,
commenting the book,
were published in 2009,
in studies in comparative
international developments
a journal from the [INAUDIBLE].
On top of that, I was
granted, by Brown, a PhD
honorary degree, so including
me among its academic family.
To culminate my
gratitude, today we
are celebrating the
general's creation
of a fellowship for
Brazilian students
interested in deepening the
origins of social science,
and more specifically, in
programs related to Brazil.
So I thank you very much
President Christina Paxson,
for the tribute.
And for the attendance
she's coming.
For the attendance of
this Ogden lecture.
The second, I have the
honor to be invited for.
In the first Ogden lecture
I delivered, my subject
was the influence
of globalization
on democratic theory.
Little did I know then, how
profoundly globalization would
impact, and continues to have
such a transformative impact
on politics, economics, and
culture across the world.
Indeed, the very
meaning of democracy
in the contemporary
world is being
reframed in the light
of new shared challenges
and realities.
Let me start with some
considerations about the idea
of democracy in America.
The founding fathers
of American democracy
believed that the
freedom of the individual
was the moral foundation
for a society of life.
Living in community was not an
external imposition, but rather
a need felt by the citizenry,
that for this very reason
accepted the limitations
to each one's freedom
to preserve everyone's freedom.
Law was therefore the
condition of individuality
and their quality, and that the
law stemmed from the conviction
that all men are born
equal entitled to freedom.
Which is a natural right
of each and every one.
And this was sustained while--
when America was
yet under slavery.
But the founders
were thinking ahead.
Sovereignty lead with the people
in law was, at the same time,
the foundation of
each person's freedom
and the [INAUDIBLE] of everyone.
Judges are the guarantor and
interpreter of the rules of
[INAUDIBLE] and of respect,
in the private sphere.
The Supreme Court
self-regarded the rulers
of democrat interplay
and the spirit of freedom
against any usurper, be the
legislative or executive
branch.
Behind these constructions lay
what Tocqueville had cleanly
grasped, a certain
condition of equality
deriving from the coexistence
between the spirit of religion
and the spirit of
freedom, as well as
from the widespread
right to own land
which prevailed in New England.
The foundation of
power in Latin America
stem from very
different sources.
The difference between the North
American and Latin American
situations can
easily be outlined.
Our political systems bear
the stamp of a paradox.
A huge expectation is
invested in the head of state,
the holder of authority.
But this is contradicted by
a democratic institutional
architecture based on factions
and particular interests
is alien to the
logic of submission
to the head of state.
Elections to the president
and to the congress
follow a different
political logic.
The former tends to produce
a majority that [INAUDIBLE]
invested in the
head of state which
are seldom implicated in
the distributions of seats
in congress.
Thus, only in some
rare occasions
does the president
find from the start
a solid [INAUDIBLE] majority in
the legislative branch enabling
him to fulfill the
expectations of the people,
hence, the conflicting
character of the relationship
between the legislative and
executive branch that typifies
Latin America presidentialism.
A certain condition of
equality, this component
highlighted by Tocqueville
as a unifying factor
in American politics, with
a way in Latin America
under the historical burden
of poverty and income
concentration.
Political parties reflect
more than represent interests
that are fragmentary,
scattered all over society,
and are prismatically
mired in the legislative.
These interests are not
connected to values.
They do not arise
out of a platform
capable of using a
classic expression,
"bring happiness to people."
The machinery of democrat
institutions grinds forward,
but to direct the soul, the
spirit which should nurture it,
the belief in the
form of equality
under the law applicable
to all, the search
for general interests,
and a pathway to greater
social equality is missing.
The incompetence of
governments or their inability
to satisfy societal
expectations,
heightened by
democratization itself,
paved the way for the emergency
of demagogues or saviors
of the nation.
The citizenry, if we
can use this world
to qualify the electoral
masses, does not
feel engaged in and concerned
with the decisions taken
by government.
The consequence is
the emergence of a gap
between public opinion,
namely, the informal opinion,
and the national
opinion, namely,
the perception of the majority
of the population less
connected with everyday
politics but no less aware
of their immediate interests
and no less politically
important as they account
for the majority of voters.
The script and the
actors may change.
Yesterday, generals were
responsible for the crisis.
Today, this role is played
by [INAUDIBLE] leaders.
Yesterday, dictatorships
followed an accepted script.
Today, it is
government's inefficiency
to satisfy people's demands
or generalized corruption.
I am deeply convinced that
without a strong advocacy
for democracy and
the rule of law,
without a certain
condition of equality,
the fragmentation of
society's discluded masses
and the clash of
interests among the power
elites will hardly lead to
greater political stability.
Another threat to
democracy is related
to the pervasive phenomenon
of corporativism.
It Is indeed surprising how in
presently democratic situations
such as in Brazil,
Argentina, or Mexico,
which repeat the electoral
experience, freedom
of expression, all of
democratic paraphernalia,
the corporative connection
retain their force,
while the democratic
spirit remains weak.
If the political parties
seem fragile and interest
groups active, the corporative
connections, on the contrary,
remain strong.
Parallel to the myth that
permanence or renewal
of the form of corporative
connection in countries that
have democratized
themselves, there
are other things
in progress, some
of them rising
risks to the pursuit
of the democratic order.
I'm obviously referring to the
recent political developments
in countries such as Venezuela
with regional repercussions.
Many analysts see in these
events a populist resurgency,
but I think that
there is more to it.
What we are witnessing
is a strenghtening
of authoritarian
state-ism based on a style
of political mobilization,
which in order to be grounded
on more than just the
charisma of the leader,
tends to reinforce the
corporativism in trade unions,
in large state-owned
companies, and as well as
inside the military.
This indeed corresponds
more closely
to a relapse into the type of
authoritarian, corporative,
and political mobilization
prevalent in the 30s and 40s
in the past century.
Before dealing with the specific
and dramatic present situation
in Brazil, I would
like to enlarge
the scope of our
analysis to embrace
the widespread
phenomenon of the crisis
of representative democracy.
At the core of this
crisis is the widening gap
between people's
aspiration and the capacity
of political
institutions to respond
to the demands of society.
This phenomenon is neither
local nor transitory.
Some thinkers go as far
as to speak of a paradigm
shift, a civilizational change.
It is an irony of our
age that this depth
of trust in political
institutions
co-exists with the rise of
citizens increasingly capable
of making choice that
shape their lives
and the future of
their societies.
Throughout a long
period extending
from the American independence
and the French Revolution
to the Second World War and
its political consequence,
the institutions of
representative democracy
gained ground in the West.
Despite amazing levels
of human exploitation,
the progress of
industrialization
and urbanization gave
rise to a new culture
based on a
secularization, separation
between state and religion,
and individualisation.
Political associations
emerged to give voice
to different sectors
of the population.
Political parties
are institutions
born in the 19th century as
properly political parties,
an organization
independent from cliques
already inside government.
Parties became mass
organizations that gave voice
to different social classes.
There was a correspondence
between political parties
and the structure of a
society with class cohesion.
It is this world that is being
affected by the mutations
that we have
described as a crisis.
At the core of
civilization, those changes
are technological
transformations
to keep it simple, the
communication revolution
and its impact on society,
economics, and culture.
So to give you an example,
the classical distinction
by the German sociologist
Tonnies between community,
Gemeinschaft,
[INAUDIBLE] of people's
face-to-face experience
with each other,
and society, Gesellschaft, the
kind of social organization
which people relate more
formally to norms and contexts,
needs to be revised.
Today the tribes formed on
the internet link people
to each other without
the intermediation
of formal organizations.
Like-minded communities
of all kinds
are created,
transcending any barrier,
including national frontiers.
The politics of identity
challenges the politics
of class, contrary to
people's expectations
that socioeconomic difference
would prevail over difference
based on culture and race.
The world of yesterday
based in the society
of classes, where the political
institution, the parties
representing different class
interests and values embedded
in ideologies, no longer
exist as they existed before.
Of course class are there.
Of course parts are there.
But they would not
have the same sense
they had up to
the transformation
from the modern era,
as they used to call,
to contemporary era,
which is an era produced
by enormous transformations,
technological transformations,
including the
communication revolution.
The old forms of sociability
and links of cohesion
have been overturned by the
fragmentation of society,
the rise of new occupations,
and intense social mobility.
These profound
transformations in the fabric
of contemporary society
led to disconnection
between political system,
parties, and society--
power one side, and the
people on the other side.
So it's much more
generalized and profound
than just the crisis in Brazil,
or in America, or in France,
or in England, or in
I don't know where.
It is something
which is provoked
by enormous transformation
in the structure
of modern contemporary
society by the revolutions we
are facing in our days.
20 years ago, many in
the so-called South
feared that globalization
will increase
the distance between a rich
north and a poor south.
Something unexpected did happen.
Something completely
unexpected did happen.
Within each rich country,
there are winners and losers
of globalization--
those who feel at ease in
the new global environment
and those are few victimized
by forces beyond their control,
leading to a profound sense
of personal and social loss.
So I'm not referring
to the fact that class
disappeared-- it's not that.
But the point is that
because of globalization,
because of transformations
in communication systems,
because enormous transformation
in the productive system,
the fragmentation of society,
social mobility, and so
on and so forth,
this to some extent
has turned weak the cohesion
produced by the fragmentation
in classes and, by
consequence, turned
the parties who aim at
represent those classes more
capable to do it.
And the ideologies are much
more difficult to be accepted
by people because they
correspond to another moment
of our history.
Is this phenomenon not confirmed
by the overwhelming vote
for Trump in the Rust Belt?
Or by the pro-Brexit vote
in the depressed rural areas
of England?
Or conversely the victory
of Macron in France
was not achieved
without massive support
of the prosperous
cities and regions who
see the European Union as
an asset, not as a threat?
Who can deny that
the working class
and the union-based voters
of the British Labor Party
supported the Brexit
in the same way
that the worker that [INAUDIBLE]
voted for the Communist Party
in France migrated in large
number to Marine Le Pen.
What unites these voters?
Old class consciousness
or the new feeling of loss
rather than gain with
the transformations
in their society?
New majorities are being formed
around messages and leaders who
vocalized them.
One narrative-- Trump,
Le Pen relies on fear,
anger, and hate.
Another Macron-- on
hope, competence,
and self-confidence.
This new populism based
on fear of the future
has a meaning to it
which is quite different,
quite the opposite, of the
Latin American populism,
which was nationalistic but
wanted economic development
and social inclusion.
Today's populism in
Europe and United States
is also nationalist,
but in a sense
of what they used
to call a regressive
utopia, the longing for the
return to an idealized past.
It also supports the social
exclusion of minorities,
immigrants, and all other kinds
of people that do not conform
to the moral prescriptions.
So it's the opposite.
We can see if you compare
the meaning of populism
in Latin America with
the meaning of populism
nowadays in Europe
or in America.
And the reason why
this shift occurred
is because they are inscribed
in a different global situation,
which has much more accent on
what occurred with me because
of globalization than with
what will occur with me
because of my party
or my social class.
In another paradox,
the same web that
connects corporations,
flows of capital,
and technology across the globe
also connects terrorist cells,
launders this money, and
empowers cyber pirates.
In a nutshell, the crisis
we're now living in
is simply the emergence of
the contemporary society
that is driving away
the modern society.
Of the world of yesterday,
we only see the ruins.
Of the emerging world,
only the shadows.
This overall process of change
affects Latin American society.
But there are some specifics.
Many of our countries,
after getting rid
of the military regimes
of the Cold War,
try to rebuild preexisting
democratic forms whose
structure reflects societies
which where oligarchic.
In some case, there
was a kind of fusion
between previous
democratic forms
and populism supported
by the many, who
want a place in the sun in
the urban industrial society.
In other countries, the
relatively small number
of those demanding
access to modernity--
mainly through universal
social services
provided by governments--
facilitated the establishment
of a democratic rule in
the European and American
traditions.
Countries with the
large populations
and those more
affected by populism
had much greater difficulty
to make these adjustments.
All, however, suffer
the effects of what
I call the rise of the
contemporary society
and of globalization.
At this point and in
order not to speak
beyond a reasonable time, I
will turn to the case of Brazil.
In our country, as
in several others,
the overall crisis
of politics is
enhanced by a moral
crisis arising out
of the disclosure of
a widespread system
of corruption.
First, a statement--
today's collapse
is a result of the persistence
of a political culture based
on patronage and corporatism at
the moment at which countries
are making the transition from
modernity to contemporaneity.
People live today at a
time of universal access
to information and
connection through the webs
of communication.
Patterns of electoral
behavior and power mechanisms
that were traditionally
accepted now
appear as dissonant
and intolerable.
An informed public
opinion is now
aware of the evidence
of corruption
at a systematic level.
The institutional framework
of the Brazilian democracy
was established by the
Constitution of 1998.
A landmark in the transition
to the rule of law,
the Constitution incorporated
several inconsistencies
in the economic
sphere while affirming
political and civic rights
including in the social sphere.
It granted full freedom
for the organization
of political parties and ensured
their partial public financing
allowing private finance
to give support to parties.
This became an
incentive to degradation
of deputies and persons
forming fake parties.
The president of the
Republic is elected
by the absolute majority of at
the least 50% plus one vote--
if not in the first
term, second term.
With 28 political parties
represented nowadays
in Parliament, the parties
of elected president
never got more than 20% of
the seats in the Parliament.
This situation made it as
an imperative the formation
of parliamentary
alliances in order
to govern in a kind of
presidentialist coalition
system.
This is not a choice,
it is an imposition.
The Constitution says
clearly, the president
has to have 50% plus one.
Population looks at the
president as the hero.
The guy has vote.
The guy has power.
He will solve my problem.
In practice, the president has
to go to face the Parliament
and has to send bills
to the Parliament.
And then Parliament never, since
the constitution of '88, never.
The party who elect the
president had more than 20%
of the seats of the Parliament.
So how to govern?
Well, it's not a matter of
choice to make alliance.
It's an imposition.
You have to have
[INAUDIBLE] a democracy.
The Congress has
to approve bills.
How to get approval if the
presidential party is not
the majority alone?
He has to make alliances.
The situation in today, even
adding the seats of three main
party-- the PT, PMDB, and PSDB--
and they hardly joined forces.
Today, these three
main parties account
for 180 out of 513 seats
in the Chamber of Deputies.
Today is like that.
PT, which has, I don't
know exactly how many
58 representatives.
PMDB, 56.
PSDB, 66-- 56.
Altogether they are
approximately 180.
But they're against each other.
So how to govern?
How to form a majority?
How to deliver what
is expected by people?
The executive branch depends
on a parliamentary majority
to legislate.
Consequently the
parliamentary base
of support for any
government can only
be achieved through
alliance between parties.
Given the persistence of
the parties of patronage
and corporatism,
complacent, to say the less,
with favor and
privilege, the executive
builds political
alliances by sharing power
through the nomination
of politicians
to [INAUDIBLE] functions in the
state and in public companies.
In my government
parliamentary majority
could be established with three
or four large parties, united
at least formally
in their support
to the presidential candidate's
program before the election.
But you had, at the time, maybe
10 parties, today you have 28.
And the line
waiting for approval
is composed by 30
additional parts.
Altogether it would be,
I don't know, 58 parties.
So how to form a
majority in that case?
Even a fake-based program
majority is extremely
difficult. Lula's election,
when president Lula was elected,
and he got the same situation--
around 20% of the seats belonged
to the working class party.
The rest was other parties.
But when Lula was
elected, [INAUDIBLE]
there were two independent
positive developments.
The first was the
presentation prior
to the election of a letter
to the Brazilian people
in which Lula assured
the engagement
to follow the basic principles
of the previous governments
in economic and
financial matters--
floating exchange
rates, a system
of targets to control
inflation, and compliance
with the law of fiscal
responsibility, which imposes
limits to the expansion
of the public expending.
I should tell you
one very short story.
That law has been approved
I guess around the year 2000
to my surprise.
Because this is a very,
very, very hard decision
to impose limits and even
to transform into crime as
far as the president
or the governor
is not following what is
described by law is a crime.
Or the economy is
improved to my surprise,
without any big discussion.
Why?
Because they never believed,
in fact, that these debts
will be implemented.
[LAUGHTER]
The same way occurred
with the agencies.
I decided at some
time, a long time ago,
when we were privatizing-- the
privatization was not my idea.
It was a law based on
the previous [INAUDIBLE]
during President
Sarney's government.
Had to privatize [INAUDIBLE].
If you vote to
privatize, it says
to create an agency to
take care of the process
after privatization.
Who will be responsible
for the contract?
To what extent the
government would follow
the tariffs already decided?
To what extent do companies will
comply with targets proposed
to the privatization program?
So great agencies.
The agencies have been
appointed by the president,
with the senatorial
approval, of course.
Well, at the beginning,
the political party
had no idea about the
importance of those agencies.
I was absolutely free to
appoint whoever I decide--
of course, depending on
the advice of my minister--
in the Oil Agency, Energy
Agency, so on and so forth.
Then, they come to realize
that the agencies have power.
So in the old days, the
appointment for agencies
is also included in the
seat bargaining system.
How many seats that
you have, by my part,
you have in this or that agency.
So this is the situation
that Lula at the beginning
was in agreement, but it
was impossible for him
to implement the agreement
because the political pressures
are very high, and [INAUDIBLE]
majority is impossible.
The second important consequence
development under Lula
was the fact that the
terms of interchange
in international
commerce evolved
in favor of the
commodities-producing
countries.
This was very obvious
because of China mainly.
Commodities price went up.
I was, a long time ago, I
was working at the Economic
Commission for Latin America,
which was important institution
in the region tied to
the United Nations,
under the leadership
of an Argentinian--
Prebisch Raul
Prebisch, economist.
And the main idea was, well,
it's impossible to develop
because the developing countries
are producing [INAUDIBLE]
goods, and we are
producing raw material--
so commodities.
And the price are always in
favor of [INAUDIBLE] goods, not
commodities.
Well, after China,
it was the reverse.
So the Brazilian situation
changes a lot altogether.
Well, it did produce [INAUDIBLE]
accelerated economy growth,
and also high levels
of investment,
and the acceleration of
social inclusion, which
was already proven, but Lula
expanded it considerably,
the social inclusion.
Then Lula's party chose
to focus on strengthening
its base of support inside
and outside Congress.
In so doing, it opened
the door for the state
to a large and
heterogeneous conglomerate
of political parties, big and
small, rightist or leftist.
It also ensured the
access to state funds
to provide to corporations
arbitrarily designated
as national champions.
This was a situation,
de facto situation.
I'm not blaming the
political leader.
The situation evolved
in that direction.
As far as the fragmentation
was occurring,
as far as the government
decided to enlarge
social and political bases,
the number of pressures
increased enormously in
the whole political system.
Sooner or later, maybe
sooner rather than later,
politicians realize
the advantages
of creating new parties,
no matter how small in size
or vague in ideas.
By creating new
parties they start
to participate in
the sharing power.
And sharing power
means also sharing
the consequence of
power, and including
financial consequence of power.
The first big
corruption scandal,
the so-called mensalao, erupted
in the midst of the rule
was first term.
Congressman denounced that
dozens of members of Parliament
were receiving, on
a monthly basis,
illegal financial contributions
to support the government.
Well, this was
the turning point,
the beginning of
a new phase, death
of the presidential system
by co-option-- co-option.
So we are passing from
a presidential system
of coalition to
another one which
is a presidential
system of co-option.
What is the difference?
Coalition, at least
in the imagination,
we have a basis for how
to aggregate parties.
I have a proposal
and a set of targets.
The setup that it has at
least formally approve it.
In a co-optation system, and
that's not the discussion.
When mensalao started,
was a surprise
because some people
are receiving
on a monthly basis, money--
money to support government.
Well, not yet a
widespread system--
some cases.
I will refer later
on to the fact well.
And then for sure corruption in
Brazil was a ancient practice--
nominations for government
posts in exchange
for political support also.
This is not new.
We had always some types of
corruption and nominations
to have support however
the misdeeds in the past
were individual acts or a mix
of patronage with leniency,
not the fundamental
mechanism for a government
to gain and retain power.
What a transformation from
mensalao into [INAUDIBLE]
is exactly that.
Mensalao was [INAUDIBLE]
to retain power--
to approve bills, but
not to retain power
and to repeat new gains.
Those practices reached
an all encompassing level,
10 years later, after
Mensalao, with the so-called
[INAUDIBLE]--
the scandal initiative
centered on Petrobras.
Wow.
Over the last two years, the
operation Lava Jato car wash,
led by the federal
police and the judiciary,
gathered and disclosed the
systemic nature of corruption
in Brazil.
The consequences for the
political institutions
and moral fabric of our
country are overwhelming.
What is true is that even
oppositional parties,
at the end of the day, were
involved in similar practices,
although, having
less or no power,
the illicitude was more linked
to non-registered, electoral
private financing than
deviation of public money
to be used in political
campaigns and, eventually,
personal corruption.
This endeavor was facilitated
by the expansion of the economy
and the fraudulent
manipulation of state funds.
The company ensured a steady
supply of [INAUDIBLE] credit
to national companies investing
in Latin America, Africa,
and even globally.
This great web of complicity
between important sectors
of the Brazilian economy
and the parties in power--
this interconnection--
not to say connivancy--
between public and
private interests was,
by and large,
accepted by society.
That is the reality.
That is true.
We are changing, step by step,
from a more traditional system,
in which corruption existed, in
which nominations for positions
in power existed,
toward another one,
in which the base for
gaining and retaining power
was based on that.
And instead of having
personal misbehavior,
we have an official misbehavior
by accepting the system
and by appointing people
to positions in government
and in public
agency, as Petrobras,
to connect employees with
business people and parties.
So it was a complete
transformation, maybe,
of something that has been a
kind of seed a long time ago.
But at the end, it became
a quite complicated system,
based on best practices.
The proliferation of
political parties,
the transformation of electoral
campaigns in a costly show
business, the
personal corruption
of some political agents,
and the complicity
of public and private
companies ultimately
led to the endless series
of scandals denounced
by judiciary and the media.
Some argue that the
use of this fund
and undercover,
second cash accounts
to finance electoral campaigns
was a common practice.
Common?
Perhaps.
But certainly not generalized.
What is new is not only
the amount of funds
received, but both as campaign
donations and as money
illegally diverted
from contracts
with the public sector.
What is new is the
dissemination of this system
throughout the public
sector and the involvement
of top members of the federal
government in its organization
and spread.
Connected and informed,
but, not necessarily,
a [INAUDIBLE],, people perceived
parties and politicians
as being all involved
with the corruption
and responsible for
the inefficiency
of public services.
This gives rise to an overall
reaction of indignation
and, more often than not,
an attitude of cynicism
regarding public life.
The moral question,
which seems to be
a concern over the
educated, middle class,
has now become a concern
of the people at large.
So we have, of course,
a similar crisis,
in terms of the representative
democracy compared
to what occurs in other
parts of the world.
But we have so
many specificities
because we have this moral
crisis, which comes together
with the lack of trust on
the capacity of parties
to represent people,
which is generalized.
But we have an
additional point--
it's not just that.
But those who are in power and
those who are politicians--
being in power or not--
are members of the
so-called political class.
And the political class
is not untrustful,
but is also corrupt.
That is the
perception by people.
I'm not blaming one
person or another person.
I'm trying to
describe a system--
how it was possible to
evolve in such a way.
It is time to conclude.
The moment we are
living in should not
be understood as a trend.
It reflects the prevalency
of contemporaneity.
As such, I trust that
the inter-connection
between access to
information and the demands
for transparency
and accountability
will probably lead to
substantive improvements
in our democratic expediency.
Brazilian institutions have
proved their resiliency.
The federal police, the federal
public ministry, the judiciary
are acting with the autonomy
and the independence granted
by the Constitution.
I never could have
imagine myself
to praise the federal police.
But it's true that
the federal police
is behaving in conformity
with the Constitution.
Younger judges and prosecutors--
many graduated abroad, namely
in American universities--
have greater familiarity
with the Anglo-Saxon law,
often in conflict with
our German law tradition.
They are well equipped to
use legal dispositions,
such as the plea bargain, to
foster their investigations.
Brazil is a signatory of the
international conventions
to fight organized crime,
especially tax evasion
and money laundering.
The exchange of information
with other countries
has also helped to disclose
crimes of corruption
and bribery that, in the past,
would have remained undetected.
Let me give me one more example
of how things have changed
for the best, despite
the complexity
of the present crisis.
In the past, confronting with a
crisis such as the current one,
we, Brazilians,
would be speculating
about the attitudes of the
four star generals, members
of the high command.
Today, most of us do not
even know their names,
but we know the names of the 11
justices of the Supreme Court.
They are household names.
The Supreme Court, as a
guardian of the Constitution,
has the final decision.
It decides and that's it.
Even if its pressured by
Congress or the public opinion,
it has, later on, the ability
to modify its decision.
The means of communication--
mainstream and social media--
are fulfilling their role.
They anticipate what
is going to happen.
They criticize any and all
acts of corruption or threats
to the democratic process.
Of course, those who are
in power don't like that.
When I was in office, it's
enough to read my diaries.
I was furious against
the press all the time--
not necessarily because
they were incorrect,
but they are, anyhow, trying
to do what they have to do.
That is to say, to anticipate.
Even if they don't
know exactly, they
try to perceive signals of
danger and they denounce it.
Of course, those who are
affected by denouncement--
well, for me, for the
others, it's not correct,
I don't know what--
I did not do that.
OK, I understand.
But as an institution, I
think that what is going on
is correct.
So I would say the
media are trying
to correspond to what
we expect from them,
from a constitutional
point of view.
The media exercises its
critical independence,
which is essential
to the preservation
of democratic values and
of the climate of freedom.
The point is-- and
we end with that--
the algorithm of
politics has changed.
I don't know exactly what
the meaning of algorithm is,
but I use, all the time, a
small computer in my hand.
And I know that there
are algorithms behind it.
Well, this is what is
occurring with political life.
The algorithm of
politics has changed.
It is time to re-weave the
threads between society
and politics, citizen action
and representative democracy.
To be a little bit more
pedantic, [NON-ENGLISH SPEECH],,
that is the question.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
RICHARD LOCKE: So
in my introduction--
you can hear me, right?
AUDIENCE: Yeah.
RICHARD LOCKE: In
the introduction,
I talked about the
brilliant lecture
that I heard, what was
it, maybe 17 years ago.
That time, in Portuguese.
This time, in English.
And in terms of that,
President Cardoso
is clearly very capable,
even in his non-native tongue
to speak in such an
intelligent and articulate way.
So I thought I would ask a
couple questions just start us
off, and then we can open it
up for questions and answers.
So having just heard
this incredible lecture
on the tension between
the gemeinschaft
and gesellschaft, between
class and identity politics,
between the unintended
consequences
of electoral systems,
design party systems,
and how it led to this algorithm
of, maybe, unethical politics,
I guess my first
question is, how do you
think your role as a scholar
has impacted your career
as a political leader?
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO: I
think that being, by training,
a scholar, even when I
was in office and a member
of the parliament, I tried not
to let me be totally involved
in the day-by-day politics--
trying to have some distance
to analyze what's going on.
And it helped me a lot, to be
a little bit more analytical
than just a political man.
Of course, I cannot be,
all the time, analytical,
otherwise it would be
impossible to be elected.
You have to be emotional.
You have to have emotions,
transit emotions,
and so on and so forth--
and have positions.
You have to take positions.
But then, behind that,
it's important to try
to understand what's going on.
What is it that I'm trying
to understand here, now?
What's happened to democracy?
It's more complicated
than we believe.
It's not just the
lack of morality,
is that you are
changing the way how
society works and is organized.
What you said--
[INAUDIBLE] or another
social scientist.
So I think it's important
to try to do understand.
Maybe I'm wrong, but I
have to try to understand.
On the hand, because of my
training as a sociologist,
I was trained as a
sociology making reserves.
And my first books were
about black slavery,
and also blacks, and prejudice.
So I visited what we used to
call, at the time, favelas.
Now we call them communities.
And now, back again,
because of my involvement
in the renewment of the
drug policies in Brazil
and globally, I went to
the communities again.
Well, I was trained to talk the
people and to listen to people.
When I started my political
life, people in the opposition
tried to discredit me by saying,
well, he's an intellectual.
So he speaks more easily
French than Portuguese.
I never saw a poor
person, but in Paris.
This kind of thing.
This was a complete lack
of knowledge about how
my training was, my experience.
And I learned, by
being a socialist,
that I have to listen.
For instance, several
colleagues from the university,
when I became senator,
they were like, I
don't know how you are capable
to live with these people.
These people are the senators
or the congress people,
but they're
considered bad people.
Well, they represent
Brazil, so I
have to understand
what they express.
And I was highly influenced by
a professor from the factory
engineering in Sao Paulo,
who used to say, well,
the point is not that immoral
people are stupid people
because even if it were one
day, the other day, maybe,
they're not stupid always.
So I took this very seriously.
So everyone would approach me.
I tried to understand,
why are the guys asking me
this question?
Is it fun possible
for me to respond
to what he really wants or not?
What are the reasons?
Sociologically, it
helped me a lot.
Maybe-- I don't know--
this is not necessary.
There are other forms to
understand the political life,
but, in my case,
it was like that.
RICHARD LOCKE: Great.
Thanks.
Let me ask one other question,
which has to do with the point
that you raised at the
beginning of your talk
about the role of technology.
And the argument, as
I understood that,
was that changing technology,
especially social media,
was kind of changing the
concept of community-- creating
less cohesion, and more
division, and cleavage.
But I wonder, can
you see a pathway
where the same technology, the
same social media can actually
reverse the trend, could maybe
create new forms of cohesion,
new forms of community?
And likewise-- and I
know this was something
that was promoted
under your government--
but these forms
of technology can
lead to greater transparency
and, hence, less corruption.
I remember, under
your government,
that one could go and
look at, actually,
the public spending, even at the
local level, for health care,
to see, are they actually
spending the budget
that was allocated to them?
So the way you
presented it sounded
like we were in a secular
trend that was divisive.
Can it actually be used
to reverse that trend?
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO:
I tried to conclude today
by saying, well, because
of new technologies,
because of new training,
prosecutors, lawyers,
judges are more competent
in revealing corruption.
And on top of that, everyone
knows what's going on.
This is a rather
positive outcome
of the new technologies.
The new technologies
are not necessarily bad,
they are also
producing good results.
I don't know how it
will be in the future.
The future we will never know.
But anyhow, since the parties
are becoming more limited,
paralyzed because of what
I said-- everyone knows.
On the other hand,
since the population
is capable to behave
and, from time
to time, even to demonstrate--
to go into the street
and to protest, to ask
for, so on and so forth--
this is a part of reality.
And the parties are
becoming more weak.
How to govern?
It's a question mark.
I don't know.
I remember, 30 or
40 years ago, it
was very fashionable to debate
about the party as a form.
Remember, the French
people had la form parti.
RICHARD LOCKE: Especially
the French people.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO:
All the time, they
were discussing it.
So now I don't know
if the political party
is like a format
that will correspond
to the political
organization in the future.
I'll give you a simple example--
if someone approached
me and asked me,
can I be subscribed
in your party?
I have doubts.
Why?
Because what is the
meaning of being
subscribed in a party
in Brazil, concretely?
What will this guy do?
We will attend a
meeting to discuss what?
Probably, local,
internal debate--
who will be the president of the
committee or I don't know what.
And if people want to be
involved with the causes, which
are quite different,
the parties are not
being capable to transform the
day-by-day life of the party
members into something with
meaning, in the modern world.
I had a friend in France.
He died.
He was the prime minister.
And this guy who wrote
a book about his life.
And his life was entirely
within the socialist party.
So the socialist part was
capable to offer a way of life
because the seminars were
there, feasts were there.
If I want to marry,
it's in the party.
All of the party was
a lively organization.
But no more.
So I don't know exactly how
often relate to the point.
The population is
putting pressure
through other instruments.
Will it be possible to
have a more flexible kind
of government, more capable
to listen to people?
So it's not clear.
That's why I refer
to it as a crisis
in representative democracy.
If you are speaking about
China or, I don't know, Turkey,
they don't have
this type of crisis
because they have
another culture.
It could be even more
efficient in delivering results
for people, but without freedom.
And there doesn't
exist any linkage out
of the state system.
So it's a different kind.
But we are living another
way, in another world.
In our world, we do
not know exactly how
to manage the situation.
I don't know.
If you know, please, tell me.
RICHARD LOCKE: Alas, no.
Let me just follow up briefly.
When you described the
system and the evolution
of the political
system in Brazil--
which I thought was really,
really fascinating--
and, basically, how
the Constitution led
to a certain structure
of elections and parties,
and then the search
for an economic basis
for these parties, which led
to this incredible system
of corruption with parastatals,
private companies, et cetera,
it reminded me tremendously of
the Prima Repubblica in Italy,
which got exposed by
judges, et cetera.
And while everyone thought
there would be reform,
it ended up leading
to Berlusconi.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO: Yes.
RICHARD LOCKE: In
today's New York Times
there was a whole article--
I think it was today's, maybe
it was yesterday's-- about
the possibility of a
Berlusconi-like politician
emerging in Brazil.
How do we make sure it leads
to the kinds of reforms
that you talked
about, as opposed
to what we've seen in
so many other countries?
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: You know,
there is a serious
debate in Brazil,
including by the judges, who
are pushing ahead the car
wash operation and
others, because they
are comparing-- they know
what happened in Italy.
Everyone knows the consequences,
in terms of Berlusconi.
And if you look
at the Brazilian,
current day situation, I cannot
say to you that this is not
possible.
But this is not just
the case of Brazil.
Why?
As I said here, in
the old days, messages
have a strong influence
on people's behavior--
more than social cohesion
because social cohesion
is weak.
So it is essential that
in this situation--
I don't want to go into details,
but you have Trump in America.
Well, it would have been
not thinkable some time ago,
not because of the way
he is, but because he
broke the establishment.
So establishment can
be more easily broken
by the new technologies
or peoples' connections.
That's not necessarily bad.
I said Macron--
Macron did the opposite, in
the case of globalization.
But it will depend,
to a large extent,
on the capacity of
someone to express
one sentiment in coincidence
with peoples' aspirations.
And this is risky.
First of all, it
depends on if or not
the person is
capable to do that.
Secondly, is this
person committed
to the Constitution,
the enforcement
of laws, human rights?
In our case, I don't want
to go into specificities,
but there are some who are
really from the right side--
they are really risky people.
One of the candidates,
when I was in office,
proposed to kill me.
I didn't pay attention.
Well, I'm alive.
But anyhow, today, I am a
friend because he has power now.
No, not yet.
But he has the possibility
of having power.
So I think it is
important for those
who believe that you have to
keep some basic Constitutional
rights, and freedom, liberty,
and all purpose of what?
To organize, and to resist, to
propose a more sensible message
to the people.
But this is a
political structure.
We cannot happily--
in political science,
we can predict the past.
But in politics, we never
can predict the future.
It depends on people.
It depends on the capacity--
because it depends on emotion.
Not just on the reason,
depend of emotion.
And we don't know.
I don't know.
I'm not sure.
In our case, if you're
someone who be capable--
or maybe those who
are capable, maybe
don't correspond
to what they would
like to see as head of state.
So it's an embarrassing
situation, most of all.
RICHARD LOCKE: For all of us.
Why don't we open
it up for questions?
And are there microphones?
So there are
microphones on the end.
FEMALE SPEAKER:
Ladies and gentlemen,
we ask that you remain seated,
and we will come to you.
RICHARD LOCKE: OK.
So we have-- right here.
Amy?
If you could just
introduce yourself briefly.
AUDIENCE: Hi.
My name is Amy Nunn.
And I'm an Associate Professor
at the School of Public Health.
And I want to thank
you, because you
wrote the foreword to my
book about AIDS in Brazil.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO: Yes.
AUDIENCE: About eight years ago.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: Please speak
more direct to the microphone.
FEMALE SPEAKER: OK.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO:
Like a political director.
AUDIENCE: Normally, I'm loud and
no one has trouble hearing me,
but I'll try to speak up.
I wanted to say thank you.
My name is Amy Nunn.
I'm an Associate Professor at
the School of Public Health
and you wrote the foreword
to my book about AIDS
in Brazil about eight years ago.
So I'm delighted
to meet in person.
My question is, of course,
about public health.
How do you see the future of
the public health infrastructure
being affected by the current
political crisis in Brazil?
I know I follow the
HIV work closely,
because that's my field.
But I'd be interested
in your perspective
about that, about access
to medicines in Brazil,
but also about the
broader SUS system.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: I don't
think I caught the question.
RICHARD LOCKE:
Update, the question
was about the update
of the situation
public health in Brazil.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: Oh, yes.
Oh, Yes Well, I have maybe
of a personal view of--
not information about what
you asked me on health.
I think that the health system
is evolved more positively
than the vocational system.
If you ask people in surveys,
they will say the opposite.
Situation in heath, situation
is just a situation of despair,
and maybe not--
maybe too much
attention to eduction.
But why?
Because of the Constitution
created the SUS,
unique systems of health.
Well, before we had nothing.
So we had only the corporations
had some health system.
Small-- some companies.
Well, in now days, everyone is
entitled, at least entitled,
to receive treatment.
In some cases by free.
It is very complicated system.
Is it good?
No.
Not good.
But we had nothing, zero,
and now we have something.
We create a complicated
system in Brazil
which put together the
public and the private.
Not on a free base, but by law.
By law.
And but it works.
That we see.
That just be a
little bit demagogue.
So only a little bit.
I used to be a
attended by the SUS.
That is to say, I
go to hospital which
belongs to this public
system of healths.
I did when I was president.
Either the armed force
hospital or in Sao Paulo
linked to the public service.
Of course, in my case,
they would treat me better.
I hope.
But anyhow, the bed is the same.
The linens are the same.
The nurses are the same.
So it's not dramatic.
It's possible.
Of course, you have
a tremendous problem.
Health, it costs enormously.
It's very expensive.
Who will respond for that?
So we have the medium
class groups in Brazil
prefer to go private.
Some secret system they have.
And there is some--
in some cases,
the social security system--
private social security
system sent people
to the official one.
It costs them to do it.
There are lots of questions.
But I would say, we are
making some progress.
The result is very
simple, two reasons.
Life expectancy,
infant mortality.
All these are being positive
in the last 10 years in Brazil.
After the [INAUDIBLE].
All these have been positive.
Is good now, is not
good, but is better--
is better off if you
compare with the past.
So that's my sense.
But I'm not going to spare.
But this is my sense.
RICHARD LOCKE: OK.
There's a question back here.
AUDIENCE: OK.
So my name is Rodrigo Fonseca.
I'm a Professor in
Computer Science.
I'm also from [INAUDIBLE].
So thank you for coming
and for speaking.
So I wanted to expand Richard's
question a little bit.
So the Constitution,
according to your talk,
created some rules for
the political game that
made the game to derail and
devolve into this system
that has all this corruption,
and that the party system has
fragmented, and so forth.
So my question is simple.
Just basically for me
to understand better.
What would be a better
set of rules, or what
should the political system be,
to produce a better outcome?
And not devolve into
this rigged game?
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: Oh, this
is a very corporate
question, I see.
Well, in my case
or in the case of,
well, I see that
it would be better
to have a more distinct small,
narrow districts, you see?
And maybe the Germans--
I prefer the German system,
because of minorities
to represent together
minorities, too,
but then how about more
in terms of size in order
to give to the electorate
this-- a real sense of who
they are they voting.
Take our-- our system is
to be one of the worst.
It is proportional-- no, no, no.
That is a bad word to say.
Proportional, you [INAUDIBLE],,
but what is the sense of that?
Take the state of
Sao Paulo Where
Sao Paulo has 70 representatives
by the Constitution.
These are helping
write something bad,
because there is
no correspondence
between the number of voters
and the number of seats,
you know in the decision?
Political decision?
To the benefits of
the smaller provinces,
because the smaller
province were more easily
controlled by governments.
So but anyhow, Sao Paulo has 70.
Well, by law, each
party is allowed
to present the number of
seats plus one served.
To simplify, 100 per
candidates, every party.
We have 28 parties in Congress.
I suppose not 28, but 10
parties, 10 multiplied by 100,
you have 1,000.
If you have more than that,
you have 2,000 candidates.
The candidates who compete each
other, inside of their party,
and in a whole composed by,
I don't know, 30 million
of electorates.
Who are the electors really
in Brazil in that situation?
[INAUDIBLE] In the
intermediate organization
was able to collect votes.
Who are those associates?
Churches, football clubs,
so mayors, local power.
These are the real electors.
When the representative
is in Brasilia behaving
as a representative,
he's representing
those who are really are
able to go and vote for him.
That's the situation.
It is not common people.
The common people have
nothing to do with our system
of representation.
You see?
Well, so I would prefer
to have a smaller
number of voters competing
with these, going
smaller number of parties.
This is feasible, but when
we wrote the Constitution,
remember I also responsible.
I was coauthor of
the Constitution.
I was Deputy Rapporteur
of the Constitution.
Well, our idea was, well, we
are under a military regime.
We hated every restriction.
So we describe it
in the Constitution
that the parties are free.
Every time the Congress
approves some restrictions,
Supreme Court said,
no, this is impossible.
So we have enormous amount of
parties, which are not really
parties, as I said.
Aggregate of people
interested in bargaining
with the [INAUDIBLE].
So we have a fake
democracy, even
in terms of a strict
forms of political
or of electoral
system in partisan.
There are several
other possibilities
to turn this system
more authentic.
More in correspondence
with people's will.
Or people aware of it, at least.
But it's a complex matter.
RICHARD LOCKE: Great.
Other questions.
Yes.
Right here.
AUDIENCE: Thank you,
President Cardoso.
I'm Mateas [INAUDIBLE]
from Manaus, Brazil.
I study electrical
engineering here at Brown.
And my question
is, we talk a lot
about how systemic corruption
and inefficiencies are bad.
And usually the
only thing we can do
is to watch the federal
police and the Supreme Court
do their job.
How can we be more active about
making our institutions better
as members of civil society?
Are there any tangible
actions you believe we
can address right now?
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO:
Well, first of all,
I'm not surprised because
you've said are from Manaus.
My mother, too, was from Manaus.
Manaus is not that far away.
Anyhow, well, you
know, the complexity
of the electoral politics
is very enormous,
so it's difficult
for the common people
to understand all the
consequences of decisions.
All these require some filters.
But it's possible to transmit
it in a more clearer way.
There are several
institutions in Brazil
trying to produce a better
result in political life.
Several.
There are several groups.
NGOs act in that sense.
The parts are out.
The parts are discussing
inside the Congress.
But there are
several institutions
in Brazil trying to
make good proposals.
There is one institution
which is quite interesting.
You have a popular
legislation, you can--
it's part for people.
I don't know how many people.
There are some numbers.
And have the right to present
to the Congress a bill.
This has been done in
one important case.
The case of so-called
future soldier.
That is to say, someone
if he is condemned twice,
cannot be a candidate anymore.
It has a lot of approval.
It is a popular initiative.
So there are instruments,
as in all the countries.
You are living in American.
You come from Brazil.
We are big countries.
This is more also bad.
Everything is much complicated.
Very complicated.
We have different views and
different to persuade people
about, but there
are instruments.
And now social media
is my favorite one,
is another instrument.
There is so many discussing
this is kind of thing.
Several groups are trying to
make proposals to transform
our legislation and our
electoral system in a better
system, you see?
As I said, what has
prevent prevented some step
aheads in a case of the party
system was the Constitution.
And the interpretation by the
Constitution by the Supreme
Court of the Constitution
saying, well,
we cannot put any restriction.
If we cannot put any
restriction, it's a chaos,
in which we are.
And in a chaos, who
are the benefactor
of the chaos [INAUDIBLE] or
take advantage of the chaos.
Those who have power.
But they know they have lawyers.
They know how to manage.
So I don't know.
I think it's possible.
On the other hand,
you ask me about,
or someone asked me about like
the Italian case, et cetera,
et cetera.
This is always possible.
But then how we are
discussing a lot in Brazil.
If you read newspapers, if you
read the political scientists,
if you read the
speech in Parliament,
the discussion is there.
So I'm not pessimistic
that you say
you are become more aware
of the difficulties.
I remember other times
very bad, under Vargus,
when we had dictatorship
at one point in time.
Or under the military.
It's not the same.
We have opportunities.
So the point is we have
to organize ourselves
and find out a response to you.
It depends largely
on leadership.
It is a kind of paradox,
other sides, fragmented.
Everyone feels responsible
for its behavior as a citizen.
But it is necessary
to have leadership.
Maybe if the society
goes more and more
in the direction of multiplicity
of people behaving together,
we need the direction.
Who is able to--
but that's why the verb
is so important again.
When we have a society organized
by a party, look China.
The leader is an expression
of these internal decisions.
But that's not our case.
The leader have an
important role to play.
Maybe you could go
back to [INAUDIBLE]
and propose a renovation there.
I will support you.
RICHARD LOCKE: I think we have
time for one last question.
How about way back there.
AUDIENCE: Hi.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO: Hi.
AUDIENCE: My name is
[INAUDIBLE] and I'm
from [INAUDIBLE], Brazil.
And my question is about the
very current event in Brazil,
which was the impeachment
President Dilma
Rousseff last year.
And so during the
impeachment process,
what many people were arguing
is that the impeachment
was necessary because
it would bring
about political and economic
stability to Brazil.
And people who are going to
the streets and protesting.
And they were saying that once
Dilma and the Worker's party
were out of power, corruption
but finally disappear
from Brazil.
And now a year after
the impeachment,
we see that that's
really not what happened,
because corruption and scandals
are still everyday in the news
and Michel Temer has been
implementing some very
controversial reforms.
So then what I want
to know is if you
think that the results
of the impeachment
were somehow counterproductive,
because it didn't really
bring like any
political stability,
and just how you see
the results of it now?
RICHARD LOCKE: Great.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO: Well,
let me say it to you very open
and frankly about
impeachment, which
is your question [INAUDIBLE].
What's that?
Why the impeachment?
Well, in our system, this
is a presidential system,
every time the system start to
deliver something has occurred.
And it is dramatic,
because the only way
is through impeachment.
And the impeachment is
dramatic, because we
have to eliminate from power
someone who received votes.
And to put there
someone who also
received votes, but
the [INAUDIBLE] votes,
the Vice President.
So when I was Senator, when
President Cunha was impeached.
Hopefully as in all--
in America is similar.
As far as the House
of Representatives
start the impeachment
process, the President sees
and he replaced by
the Vice President.
So when Cunha was
impeachment stop,
President Maranhao
become President
and I became Foreign Minister.
So I was out of the
Congress Senate.
I had no quality.
I was not involved in the
debate or in the vote.
But I follow step by
step, it's dramatic.
The same applies now.
I have been with Cunha.
I remember I was still in
the Senate and some people,
the ones who proceed
from the PT was
pressing the to sign
demand for impeachment.
And I resisted to
sign the demand.
The same occurred
with [INAUDIBLE],,
the head of the opposition.
We were very
[INAUDIBLE] in signing.
I decide to sign only when
the brother of the president
related to very serious crimes.
So in that case, there is no
more possibility, let's sign.
Because I knew what is an
impeachment, is to put aside
someone will revolt.
Well now again,
I was very reluctant with
respect to Dilma Roussell
to not to sign him,
because I have no more,
I had no more
power, but then how
to speak of in favor
of the impeachment.
Up to the point it was all, the
voters it start to paralyze.
I saw that with another
president, Goulart.
A coup d'etat occurred,
because the government has to--
is lose its capacity to govern.
So it becomes to be paralyzed.
So something has be done.
And what has to be done in
a Presidential situation
is dramatic because
it is impeachment.
Of course, the impeachment
requires some legal basis.
And there are legal basis.
In the case of Cunha
was that several times
he persistently of the
fiscal responsibility law.
This is not a personal crime.
I give you another example.
Collor.
Collor was impeached on
the basis of the fact
that he received a gift
consisted of a small car.
He was received the gift.
The Senate decided this
is the lack of decor--
decor-- but how do you say it?
AUDIENCE: Decorum.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: Decorum.
Well, OK.
This when this
occurred, the head
of the Senate by
law, by Constitution,
is the head of
the Supreme Court.
So this guy was there
during the discussion,
and the Senate decide
that Collor out of power.
And then someone went
to the Supreme Court
because of a crime.
He received a gift.
The decision was the
three versus two,
including in the
three the same one
who was president of
Senate, temporarily,
saying, no, no,
this is not a crime.
It would be a crime if
he received the car,
he gave something to the
person who gave him the car.
Well, that was also
true, so he was not
condemned by the Senate.
So that is a confusion.
Impeachment has not the meaning
that someone made the crime,
has a penalty.
Is another thing.
Or it was the lack of the
trust, or something like that.
So that is the situation.
It's dramatic.
It's difficult. And
the consequences
are that it is
difficult to digest,
because the Vice
President normally
has not the same characteristic
of the President.
So it is dramatic.
But it was-- this
was what occurred.
It had no possibility,
you see the government
start to be paralyzed.
Of course, there
was a clear decision
to not corresponding to the
fiscal responsibility law.
Is this a tremendous crime?
No.
Several people did.
And then why not?
Because these people
were not in the position,
in full positioning power,
and the consequences
were not to stop the
decision-making process.
it's a political question.
With a legal basis, it
was a political question.
So that's it.
I would prefer not to
have been forced to vote.
As I escaped twice.
Because of that.
I know that it's
difficult. But what to do?
If the government is paralyzed.
You have some.
I think this was in true
what occurred in Brazil.
RICHARD LOCKE: Great.
We've come to the end of
this part of our evening.
Please join me in thanking
President Cardoso for a really
terrific lecture.
[APPLAUSE]
Thank you.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE
CARDOSO: Thank you.
RICHARD LOCKE: And on
behalf of Brown University,
I'd like to offer this small
token of our appreciation,
which is basically a synthesis
of all the Brazilian books
in this library.
FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO:
Wonderful, thank you.
RICHARD LOCKE: So
thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE]
