The positivism dispute (German: Positivismusstreit)
was a political-philosophical dispute between
the critical rationalists (Karl Popper, Hans
Albert) and the Frankfurt School (Theodor
Adorno, Jürgen Habermas) in 1961, about the
methodology of the social sciences.
It grew into a broad discussion within German
sociology from 1961 to 1969.
The naming itself is controversial, since
it was the Frankfurt School proponents who
accused the critical rationalists of being
positivists—while the latter considered
themselves as opponents of positivism.
On the political level, it was a dispute between
the leftist Frankfurt School proponents supporting
revolution, and the allegedly bourgeois critical
rationalists supporting reform as the method
to be preferred to change society.
== Overview ==
The debate began in 1961 in Tübingen, West
Germany at the Conference of the German Society
of Sociology.
The speakers at the conference were invited
to discuss the differences between social
and natural sciences and the status of values
in the social sciences.
In 1963, the debate was heated by Jürgen
Habermas in the Festschrift für Adorno (writings
in honour of Adorno).
The debate became more intensely critical
at the Sociology Day in Heidelberg when Herbert
Marcuse joined the discussion.
A spirited literary debate between Habermas
and Hans Albert sprung up and positivism became
the centre of the debate.
The participants also discussed the question
of whether Popper's and Albert's critical
rationalism had exacerbated ethical problems.
The Frankfurt School believed this should
be impossible, because as a theory of science
critical rationalism is seen to be restricted
to the field of knowledge.
The famous dispute inspired a collection of
essays which were published in 1969.
This book was translated into several languages,
including English in 1976 (see below).
This collection revived the debate and introduced
these ideas to a broader audience.
== Elements of the dispute ==
The dispute has its foundation in the value
judgment dispute (Werturteilsstreit) in German
sociology and economics around the question
of whether or not the social sciences is a
normative obligatory statement in politics
and its measures applied in political actions,
and whether or not their measures can be justified
scientifically.
Consequently, the positivism dispute is also
called the Second Werturteilsstreit.
The precursor of the debate about positivism
can be traced back to Max Horkheimer's essay
"Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik" ("The
Latest Attack on Metaphysics") published in
1937 that criticizes the logical positivism
of the Vienna Circle.
The prolonged criticism of positivism led
to the formation of two camps: on one side
we find "critical rationalism" advanced by
Karl Popper and on the other side there is
the "critical theory" advanced in the Frankfurt
School.
This view was strengthened by the fact that
Popper's main work, Logic of Scientific Discovery,
was published in the main book series of the
Vienna Circle.
Popper, however, considered himself an opponent
of positivism, and his main work was a sharp
attack on it.
Both camps accept that sociology cannot avoid
a value judgement that inevitably influences
subsequent conclusions.
In critical rationalism the scientific approach
should be maintained in sociology and wherever
the use of an induction method is not possible
it should be avoided.
This leads to a sociology having a firm ground
in observations and assured deductions that
cannot be ignored in politics.
For critical rationalism, sociology is best
conceived as a set of empirical questions
subject to scientific investigation.
Frankfurt School "critical theory," by contrast,
denies that sociology can be severed from
its "metaphysical" heritage; empirical questions
are necessarily rooted in substantive philosophical
issues.
Drawing on concepts from Hegelian and Marxian
traditions, critical theory conceives of society
as a concrete totality, a social environment
in which various "psycho-social agencies"
(family, authorities, peers, mass media) shape
individual consciousness.
According to the Frankfurt school, it is important
to discover the society's fabrics to allow
for individuals to overcome being cornered.
Critical rationalism considers this goal to
be impossible and any attempts (changing society
out of possibly non-scientific deductions)
to be dangerous.
The Frankfurt school counters critical rationalism
as being itself cornered, disallowing itself
from asking scientific questions when just
some methods are not available.
Looking back in history "It is not the consciousness
of men that determines their being, but their
social existence that determines their consciousness"
(Karl Marx).
The social existence determines the mindset
of scientists as well.
All the hypotheses generated by scientists
(which would need to be falsified) are limited
to this society's thinkable.
While critical rationalism provides methods
that are supposed to have an influence on
society it is this totality that makes the
reforms advocated by Popper ineffective for
noticeable changes.
Popper, in contrast, held that the Frankfurt
school view was historicist ideology failing
to see that any attempt to cause a total change
of society (i.e., revolution) leads to violence,
and that society should better be changed
step by step (by reforms) to solve specific
problems and abolish specific evils.
According to Popper, individuals, including
scientists, are free to decide, and are perhaps
restricted by their social existence, but
not totally determined by it.
Changes may then look ineffective and very
slow, but will accumulate over time.
Popper thinks it is the lesser evil compared
to violent revolutions, since such reforms
can be undone if they turn out to only make
things worse, while revolutions usually lead
to lengthy periods of tyranny.
Thus, for Popper, the method of reforms should
be preferred.
== See also ==
Antipositivism
Popper legend
Sociological positivism
== Notes and references ==
== Further reading ==
Adorno, Albert, Dahrendorf, Habermas, Pilot
und Popper, The Positivist Dispute in German
Sociology, Heinemann London 1976 and Harper
Torchbook 1976.
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (original:
Erkenntnis und Interesse, 1968).
Habermas, Technology and Science as Ideology
(original: Technik und Wissenschaft als „Ideologie“,
1968).
Helmut F. Spinner, Popper und die Politik.
Berlin (Dietz), 1978.
Dahms, H.-J., Positivismusstreit.
Die Auseinandersetzungen der Frankfurter Schule
mit dem logischen Positivismus, dem amerikanischen
Pragmatismus und dem kritischen Rationalismus,
Frankfurt a.M.
(Suhrkamp), 1994.
Thibodeaux, Jarrett.
Production as Social Change: Policy Sociology
as a Public Good.
Sociological Spectrum.
36 (3): 183-190.
2016
Find further literature in the German "Study
Guide to Hans Albert".
