(applause)
- Good evening, I'm Trevor Morris
and I'm the Dean of the
law school here at NYU.
I want to welcome you all to NYU Law
and to thank you for joining
us for the 14th annual,
Emil Noel Lecture.
We are thrilled to welcome
Minister Josep Borrell to NYU Law
and Mr. Borrell was the 22nd President
of the European Parliament
and is currently
the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, European Union
and Cooperation of Spain.
Minster Borrell will be
formally introduced in a moment
by our colleague Joseph Wyler
who will be engaging him
in a fireside chat this evening.
Just a word about the Emil Noel Lecture,
it's a series hosted by
our Jean Monnet Center
for International and Regional
Economic Law and Justice
here at the law school.
The Jean Monnet Center
focuses on the study
of International and
European Economic Integration
and European union law through
a variety of activities
and opportunities to engage
the larger academic world
in the world of law and
policy beyond as well.
It promotes an awareness
of the current state
of the European Union and each year,
a prominent leader is welcomed
here to the law school
to present their perspective
on the state of the European Union.
We are indeed very grateful
to have Minister Borrell
here with us tonight
to give us his thoughts.
I will now turn things over
to Professor Joseph Wyler,
who is university professor,
Joseph Stras, professor of law,
the European Union Jean
Monnet chaired professor
and co-director of the Jean Monnet Center.
He's an eminent scholar,
teacher and colleague
here at the law school.
Please join me in welcoming
professor Joseph Wyler
and Minister Borrell.
(applause)
- With your permission,
I'm going to remain seated
and in the age of Google
we don't need any further introductions.
I'm sure you've all googled Mr. Borrell.
I cannot think of somebody better placed
both in terms of your personal experience,
your experience in Spanish politics,
your experience in European politics,
to talk to us about the State of the Union
and I want to welcome you on my own behalf
and on behalf of my
co-director Granada Baraka
as our annual State of
the Union guest this year.
And I must say that
there's a Yiddish saying
that there's nothing that is
so bad that cannot be worse
and I sometimes think of that
when I think of the current
state of the European Union
because five years ago,
in the height of the financial crisis,
we thought things were pretty
bad but now it seems as if
they've taken a more profound,
a more troubling turn
and maybe my first question
is to cite a recent statement
by one of the most prominent commissioners
of the European Commissioner Ottinger
who said the European
Union is in mortal danger
both from within and from outside
and I would like our
conversation to begin.
It's a very dramatic words, mortal danger.
Relax, the European
Union is not about to die
but it's certainly facing
very serious challenges
and I think when he was speaking about
the danger from within,
he even used the term
enemies from within, he was talking about
the rise of populist
Euro skepticism purveyors
of so-called illiberal democracy
in my view a contradiction in terms
and what even in
countries which officially
have not become Euro
skeptic but Euro skepticism,
anti-Europeanism not a the
lunatic fringe anymore.
It's become mainstream politics
not only in Hungary and Poland
which one tends to mention
but in Austria, in Germany,
in Italy in Sweden,
it is mainstream politics.
So I would like to invite
you to open our conversation
with your reflections on
this internal challenge
which the European Union is facing.
- Mortal is a big word.
I don't think Europe is going to die
but it's true that we have had
first the Euro crisis, 2009.
It seems to be over but
it has led deep wounds
because the crisis has affected deeply
the fabric of the European societies.
And secondly recently from
2015 in the last three years,
we had the migration crisis.
The serum seekers crisis due
demographic growth in Africa
and due to the wars in
Syria and Middle East
and this has created an identity crisis.
The Euro crisis caused an economic crisis.
We can say it's the economy is stupid
like we said in the 80s.
Economic crisis can be solved with money
and with institutional
arrangements and we did that.
We made a lot of
institutional arrangements
in order to complete the monetary union
but identity crises are
more difficult to solve
because they touch the
deep root of the people
and the mindset of the European societies
or the European people
it's not ready to accept
what we call a mass migration.
Is there a mass migration in Europe?
No.
The figures doesn't show a mass migration.
I was talking with the
leader of the far-right party
in Holland and he was telling me
we are at the risk of most
elimination of the country
but there are only seven
percent of the population
in Holland which is Muslim.
Seven percentage not Muslimization,
is a small tiny proportion
but people feel like this.
People feel the anger, the fear
that a lot of people are
coming, they are different.
They taking our jobs and
more important than that,
they are changing our identity
and this is the big risk for you today.
The fact that in the West and in the East
we look at the problem of
migration in a different way.
Can we say then there is an
open view and a closed view
that someone says close
borders further develop,
another say we cannot close
borders, we need them,
not all of them but we need a lot of them
and this create a new difference
which is as they were saying,
much more difficult to solve
than the economic problem.
Today in Salzburg it seems that
they haven't reached any kind of agreement
about how to deal with migration
and I think this is the
root of the question.
How we Europeans will be able to accept
people coming from outside
Europe and integrate them.
In some countries, we need
them and we know we need them
and in other countries they
don't believe they need them
and they don't want to accept them.
And here I think is the
most important problem
for the unification of Europe
and the only answer I can give to you
is that we have to look for
diversification of the process.
27 at the same time we will
not go to a political union
which is impossible.
So we have to go to a
kind of differentiation
on the integration process.
In fact we have done it
because some have the Euro,
others don't have it.
Some have the borders, some have Schengen,
others don't have it.
So you have a lot of differentiation
but they think in order
to continue advancing,
we will have to differentiate more
and this will create two cause
and we will see that in the
next European elections.
I think the answer to your question
will be given by the citizens
when they will go to vote next May.
- Let's hold on term but let me come back
and push back on a couple
of things that you said
because it's comfortable to think
that this is a divide
between East and West Europe.
Western Europe open and welcoming
and Eastern Europe closed and if you want,
a bit atavistic or xenophobic.
But I look at the scene in Western Europe
in the last election to
the European parliament
Marina Pen was a huge
success and in Italy today,
Euro-skeptics are in power
and every public opinion poll
say that they are the most
popular political force in Italy
and the same is true in Austria
and was very strong if you want,
what you define as closed attitudes,
Sweden and Holland so the East-West thing
is maybe a bit too easy.
- No it's not so clear.
Well East, West, where is the East
and where is the West.
No for example Prager is
more to the West and Vienna
but look at Spain and look at Portugal.
In Spain there is not such a thing.
On the West, Portugal and
Spain we don't have a lapel.
We don't have a wielder.
- But in France you do.
- Yes but on the last elections in France
which were not right or left
which were more open
or closed, open is one.
At the end, open is one.
You can tell me yes because
they were two rounds.
Had it been only a first
round, it was not so clear
because if you add up the votes from
(speaks French)
both from the left and from the right,
then there is a majority of people
not very much eager about Europe.
But at the end in France
and this was a big chance for
all of us, Mr. Makran won.
- Yes he did quite decisively.
So let me ask you another question
still within the same theme.
It's true that the
migration is the focal point
of what you defined of
it's identity stupid,
it's not the economy but
do you have a feeling
that the challenge that European citizens
feel to their identity is
not only focused on migrants
especially Muslim migrants
but there's also feeling
and we will talk a minute about Brexit
that the European Union itself
is a threat to their sense of identity
of being Polish or being
Dutch or being Swedish etc,
that it's not just a
question of migration.
That something in the process
of European integration
with values which are
shared, universal values,
human rights, etc.
A lot of people feel that
challenges their uniqueness,
their specificity, their self-identity.
- That's right.
The European Union is
the political process
by which we want to build
a supranational identity
without losing our national identity.
I always said I am Catalan,
I'm Spanish, I'm a European.
I have the three identities
and I understand perfectly
compatible each other.
It is not a contradiction
for me on feeling European
without losing my Spanish
or Catalan identity
but maybe is not true for everybody.
Maybe some people feel
that Europe means that
they are going to lose their own identity
and economics is related with at the end,
economics is there.
When the crisis came
and Europe was not able
to give an answer,
Europe was clearly unable
to protect people in front
of the economic crisis.
Then people look for protection
to the political entity
that they knew the better, the closer
and this was the state and
they go back to the roots,
they go back to basics.
This Europe at the end
look for example for Spain.
For my generation, Europe
was a kind of affair,
a good fair.
He was giving us money,
he was giving resources,
it was a credibility, he was helping us
to stabilize our democracy.
It was a good thing.
It was clear it was a good thing.
It was quite easy to be pro European
because it was full of advantages.
Now the crisis came and the fear become
(speaks Spanish)
How do you say
(speaks Spanish)
(laughs)
Mother tongue which by definition are bad
and instead of giving
things and giving resources
and supporting us, they
start putting disciplines
and say oh you have to cut the salaries,
you have to pay more taxes,
you have to have less public services
because you have to balance your budget
and people start saying
well, this kind of Europe
is not exactly the same one.
It was not on menu and
this has started creating
a kind of anti-European, not
in Spain as much as in Italy
but the identity issue was there also.
Europe was maybe the
open doors to the world
and these doors were too much open.
If I am getting out of Europe, Brexit,
I will have the capacity
of controlling the doors.
No free movement of people
and this is one of the reasons why
the British voted for leaving the Union
because the Union was a threat.
Part of the British people
understood the Union was a threat
to keep their identity.
- So let's talk a little bit about Brexit.
Let's not talk whether it's
a good thing or bad thing.
I think both you and I
and most people here,
not everybody but many people
think it was a tragic mistake
but the British people spoke
and it wasn't a razor-thin.
The referendum was quite decisive
by our normal standards of a referendum.
So the challenge became how to manage it
and now the weeks are
passing, it's March of 2019
where the guillotine falls
and any talk about reversing the decision
seems to be fantasy.
I don't even know if Europe
would want Britain back at this point.
Maybe you will comment on that
even if they change their mind
but it seems as if the negotiation
to try and make the best of a
bad situation have gone astray
and that there's a real risk
that there will be an
uncontrolled hard Brexit
without a seriously negotiated outcome.
How did we get to this point?
I hope it's not the case but
there really is a real risk.
How did we get to this point?
Who is responsible for
the state of affairs
which is uncomfortable?
- Well Mrs May said Brexit is Brexit
but nobody knew what does
it mean exactly, Brexit.
Brexit is Brexit but what is Brexit
and I think that today
there is a big problem
among the British themselves.
Even among the Conservative Party
which personally some from
more Brexiters than others.
So it's difficult to know
exactly which is going to be
the position of the British parliament
when the moment comes to
vote a kind of agreement
but in Europe we know perfectly
that we never get an agreement
until the last minute.
It would be a miracle that today,
one month before the deadline
we would had reached an agreement.
It has never happened and
things become dramatic
and it seems that there is no solution
and the last night we stopped
the clock and finally,
there is a solution.
Not a perfect solution
and I am sure that the end
we'll reach some kind of agreement
because it would be too
harmful for both sides
not to have one.
- So I have a feeling,
I share your feeling
that a large part of the problem
is that Britain went into Brexit
without knowing what it means,
without having a strategy,
without having a negotiating position
and that somehow Cameron
didn't even believe it would happen.
It was just solving some internal politics
and then it happened as a surprise
and it's just been astonishing to watch
a country like the United
Kingdom, like Great Britain
managing its diplomacy in really
such a astonishingly unprofessional way.
But do you think the European Union
shares some responsibility?
I have the feeling that a big part
of what drove the European
Union negotiating position
of course always couched
in terms of principle
but we have to show them and especially,
we have to show any other country
that might be thinking about
Brexit that it's not worth it
and therefore we have to be very tough,
not compromise in order
to send a warning signal
to any other black
sheep that might emerge.
If we are too comfortable
with the British,
it might be too tempting
to other member states.
Is there any truth to
my polemical statement?
- Maybe at the beginning you
could imagine this attitude
but immediately, it
became clear for everybody
that Brexit was a bad business.
You don't need to prove it.
Everybody understands
that it's so difficult
to manage a situation like this.
It's so harmful that I don't think
it's going to be any kind
of epidemics by the country.
Brexit despair is going
to be a kind of vaccine.
If someone thought that it was a good idea
to leave the Union,
after watching what is
happening in Britain
and how difficult is to
disconnect from the European Union
that today I don't think
there is any country in Europe
willing to follow.
- But that might be in part
just to be continued my polemic
that the European Union didn't
try to make it any easier
just to teach that lesson.
- I think it wasn't necessary.
It was quite clear that
it was so difficult
that we didn't need to prove it
but on the other hand to be polemic,
we cannot afford to someone
who is leaving a better deal
than the ones who remain.
- That is true.
- We're not going to
give a price for premium.
- Let's connect the story of Brexit
to our previous discussion
of the internal challenges
that Europe are facing
and one of the slogans
that most captivated the Brexit camp
in the Brexit campaign
in the United Kingdom
was taking back control.
In other words, there was one
issue which was migration.
In my view totally artificial
in the context of Great Britain
but the other issue
was taking back control
and again, my question to you
is I think there's also sense
among many citizens in
other European countries
that with all the benefits
that the European Union
may have brought or may be
bringing to their countries,
there's a certain sense
of citizen disempowerment
that citizen don't feel that they have
that the institutional
arrangements of the European Union.
Notably elections to
the European Parliament
and the European Parliament today
is a co-legislature with
the Council of Ministers
really is an effective mechanism
for them to shape the destiny
of the European Union,
to shape their destiny
and the proof of that
is that even though over since 1979
when there were first elections,
direct elections to the
European Parliament,
the European Parliament
gained enormous empowered
so that today it has some powers
that even national
parliaments do not have.
But it is certainly a
veritable co-legislature
with the Council of Ministers
in every single election
until the last election in 2014,
every elections less and
less people went to vote
and that's also including
the original member states.
There's only one country
in the European Union
where in the last
elections, more people voted
than in the first election in 1979.
In all other member
states it has been a slide
and that shows to me that
the people were feeling,
why do I need to go and
vote in European elections
if it doesn't really translate
into my ability to shape the destiny.
So do you think apart from
the question of identity
that Europe has despite all the changes,
still a problem of a democratic deficit,
a sense of disempowerment of citizens
compared to their sense of
empowerment in national politics?
- Yes, that's true.
We have transferred sovereignty
from national states
to supranational institutions
which are not clearly identified.
Who is responsible for what
and the accountability, how does it work
and people at the beginning
in a kind of how can I say?
I think there is a word
which has been coined,
permissive consensus.
I let you do.
I let you do because it simply works
and I don't have to care about it
and it doesn't touch any vital matter.
It's a matter of creating
a market, closing borders,
customs, technicalities.
Let them do, permissive consensus.
A kind of indifference.
It works so I don't have to bear.
It's a matter of diplomats,
a matter of Foreign Affairs ministers.
This permissive consensus is finished
first because it seems
that it doesn't work.
When the crisis came it was
clear that it was not an answer,
it was not a clear answer.
We stayed two years asking
ourselves what do we do?
How do we answer the Greek crisis
and secondly, because
now we are talking about
depth matters, the deep
core of sovereignty
and this permissive consensus is finished.
And people don't realize
very well who is who
and who is doing what.
Every one of us have in
mind the Montes escape.
It took 500 years to learn it
but now we understand very well
that there is people that
vote for the Parliament,
the Parliament vote the government
and then there is a judiciary
and we have this in our mind,
and our mindset but in Montesquieu
has never been in Brussels.
I've never been there to
say there is the Parliament,
a Judiciary and an Executive.
It is a mix because the commission
is a little bit an executive
but it's also a little
bit of a legislative
and a little bit of judiciary.
The Parliament has powers yes,
but no taxation power for example
and the council, what is the council?
Go to your students and ask them
do you know the difference
between the Council of Europe,
the Council of the European Union
and the Council of Ministers?
These three institutions.
Do you really think that
the ordinary citizens
in the European Union makes the difference
between the three of them?
No.
- I know some editors
of European newspapers
who don't know the difference.
(laughs)
- So when I talk with my
my fellows, my citizens,
my students at the university
and now with ordinary citizens,
it's quite difficult
to make them understand
who is doing what in
Europe and it requires
a politicization of Europe
in order to make people understand
how the political game is being played.
Politicization means that
at the European elections,
people have to have in
front of them a choice.
In Spain for example until
now, the European election
were national elections
because the center right
and the center left were quite broad.
All of us were Europeans.
Europe was good and to be European
meant to be in favor of something,
something which was not
very much clearly defined.
With the crisis, the difference came.
When with the crisis to
start arguing about economics
on European terms, at the European level
and we need to make politics
at the European level
So you discuss about European issues
and until now, it has not been the case.
- So do I deduce correctly
that you would be
among those who favor the
speech and candidate exercise
that when they go to European elections,
they also have a sense
that they will be electing
the president of the Commission
as a choice between the center-right,
the center-left, the Liberals etc.
But here's the difficult question.
Five years ago just before
the elections to 2014,
it was the first time they
tried this speech and candidate
where the main political forces in Europe
presented a candidate in elections
to the European Parliament
with an understanding
that the largest party,
their candidate will become
the president of the commission
of the European Union.
But then I was sitting
just like this with Barroso
who was the outgoing
president of the Commission
and he said, "Yes I support
the speech and candidate
"but once if it's a Christian Democrat
"or if it's a social Democrat,
"once they become president
of the Commission,
"they have to forget their
political affiliation.
"The Commission has to
be a non-political body."
Now if I hear you correctly
and I have great sympathy
with what you were saying,
your idea would be that we
need more politicization,
that the results of the elections
to the European Parliament
will not just decide on the person
who will be the president
of the Commission
but of the political
direction of the Commission.
More center-left, more
center-right, more austerity,
more growth, real political choices.
- If we want people to understand politics
at the European level, we
have to create something
that could be translated to their mindset
and for people is very
difficult to understand
that there is a kind of set of people
who is a mix, a kind of
big coalition government
among all ideologies in Europe
without a clear direction,
without a clear purpose, who at the end
is a kind of secretary-general
of the council.
At the end it becomes a
Secretary General of the Council,
the Council of the heads
of state or government
and if this is the case,
the European Union is
not a political subject.
It's a kind of permanent negotiations
but a gaining among states
and we go to the intergovernmental path
which is the country
or the political union.
This can be a way out.
It's not written which is
going to be the future real.
It can be a set of good neighbors
who trade among them, who
don't fight among them
which is by the way
something very important
which are ready to do something together
in front of the rest of the world
but without having a deeper ambition.
This is not the political union.
This is a kind of big permanent
agreement among governments
and this is going to be too
weak to face globalization.
- So if that is the case and again,
I have huge sympathy for this position,
it would also mean that it
would have to be some changes
in how we elect the commissioners
because if you have a social democrat
president of the
Commission, it is of no use
if he has a commission
which are majority of Christian Democrats.
So that we would have
to change a little bit
the way we configure the Commission
if it's really to be political.
- We have to change the
number of Commissioners
to start with.
- Meaning reduce them.
- I think we have to reduce them.
On the draft of the Constitution and
it was a member of the convention,
we clearly stated that the
number of the commissions
should not be the same as
the number of member states
because if we really believe
that the commissioners
doesn't represent their state,
why should every state to
have their commissioner?
- Would Spain be willing to
be the first one who says
we will give up our Commissioner?
(laughs)
- From time to time, some member state
cannot have a commissioner.
It's not forever.
It has to be a kind of rotation
and remember how things happen.
We maintain less commissioners
than member states
until the ideas voted against it
and I said do you want me to vote yes
then I want my commissioner.
I know my commissioner
wants to represent me
but they won't mind
and then we accept it in order
to get out of the stalemate
but they think it was a bad deal
because 27 commissioners at the end,
there are not 27 portfolios
and you have to make
a big effort--
- Agriculture became agriculture
and then it was split to
agriculture and fisheries
and then to fisheries and sardines.
I mean we just started
cutting it very thinly.
- Not only the number of commissioners
but mainly the political orientation.
The fact that each country
nominates its commissioner
makes the Commission not a
political body by definition
and this is the question.
Do we want the Commission to
become a kind of executive,
a kind of government
of the European Union?
Then we have to create
a certain homogeneity
of the members of the
Commission around the project,
around the political project
because if there is no charge
between political projects,
why should they go to vote?
To vote among what?
Which is the choice?
When I am voting in
Spain I know personally
that my voice is going to be use
to prejudiced of the government
through one party the other party
and they have some differences
that I can understand.
When I am going to vote for
the European Parliament,
I don't really know what I am voting.
Am I voting a member of the parliament
but behind this member of parliament,
who is going to run the European Union?
It's called democratic deficit.
I wouldn't call democratic deficit.
The thing is an institutional deficit.
- Or political deficit.
- A design deficit.
It work very well at the beginning.
What they were dealing
with technical matters,
they were six four eight
and it was a basic consensus
with 27 with political matters
and without the basic
consensus does it work.
- There's also a little technical problem.
Imagine 27 people sitting around the table
and everyone making an opening
statement of one minute.
Already half an hour is gone.
Just teasing.
Let's leave a little bit
the internal challenge.
I go back to our initial
Ottinger statement.
Mortal danger as I said
it's not dying so quickly.
What are the challenges from outside?
What are the principle external challenges
to the European Union?
- Maybe you expect me to say immigration.
No I think the most important challenge
for the European Union is the weakness
of the multilateralism
or I don't want to say
the end of multilateralism
but the fact that
today the United States
doesn't like European Union,
doesn't like multilateralism, that's clear
and the institutions of the Bretton Woods
has been losing ground and we
are multilateral by definition
and we want to work and live
in a multilateral world.
And this world is
weakening this is respect
mainly due to the new
(mumbles)
And this is a big threat
for us because after all,
we will be only five, six
percent of the world population
we'll be very small and
we have to be in a world
in which there are a kind of an order
based on the rule of law and
international agreements.
And today some for my colleagues
at the Council of Foreign Affairs,
they start saying that we Europeans
we have to reinvent multilateralism
because our big friend the
United States is no longer there
and we have to tell them that be or not,
we will try to do what has to be done,
talking with the Chinese, with
the Southeast Asia people,
with the Latin American people,
with the African people,
countries which are emerging
in order to create a world
in which multilateralism, the rule of law
and the kind of order can be
the way of doing business,
business in the big sense
of the world business.
And for us do retreat of the United States
and the end of the multilateral world.
- They're telling me that your
microphone has slipped maybe.
The actual microphone.
Okay.
There we go.
- I lost the microphone.
I was so enthusiastic.
- Put it here.
- I was defending multilaterally you know.
(laughs)
Just in case one didn't
her me I was saying
that the end of multilateralism
is a big threat for us
because we are the pure
essence of multilateralism.
- So in some strange way,
there's a kind of
opportunity for Europe here
because one always
accused Europe of saying
it was a huge economic power
which was unable to translate
it into political force
on the international scene
and here with this challenge,
Europe might its economic
might might correspond to it.
- Well Henry Kissinger
was asked about that
by the Foreign Affairs Minister of Germany
and he told him well maybe
Mr. Trump is going to...
Trump plus Brexit, Trump plus
Brexit can be an opportunity
for the Europeans to play
a new role in the world
without the British who has always been
a kind of a stop on the
way to the political union,
maybe we can advance quicker.
And with the fact that
the American umbrella
is no longer there, we'll
have to have our own umbrella
to build a strategic capacity by their own
and sharing responsibilities
in the world order
which means maybe to have
more defense capacities
by their own and to tell
the states that well,
if you leave we remain
and you do something
that we don't like we will tell you,
the Iran deal for example.
The broken of the Iran deal
or the climate change deal
is very damaging for
Europe, very much damaging
from the point of view of security,
from the point of view
of economic interest.
So maybe you had to tell
our American friends
that well we are not going
to accept this easily
and we'll do whatever we can do
in order to protect awake
economic interest, our firms
and to keep alive this Iran deal
that for us it was a very important matter
because it was a key issue
for our immediate security.
I am not talking about economic interest
but just security on the
crude meaning of the word.
And I think that the Germans
had taken the lead on that.
The German Minister has said the other day
that we should abandon the unanimity rule
on external policy.
This is a very important step.
If we were able to
abandon the unanimous rule
external policy, we could
start being an external power.
- And would Spain support that?
- Yes, we are the most
pre-European government
in Europe today for sure.
The new Spanish government
has put the European project
at the core of its political project
and we are very much
in favor of everything
that makes the integration
of Europe going further.
- Just a little footnote to
one of the things you've said.
I thought it was a really
powerful and original answer
when I asked the minister
what is the most important
external threat or external challenge
and he could have easily
said Russia or Turkey
or Iran or whatever and he said,
the breakdown of multilateralism.
That's a profound answer and I think
it's not the usual answer
that politicians will give
but is there security threat to Europe
in the old conventional sense?
- Yes it is.
The Europeans had been fighting
so much against each other.
The last World War was awful
that we got war out of a rather screen.
War is something that we cannot imagine
among us and in our borders
and we were so much convinced
that peace was that the
natural state of the world
that suddenly when the war
appeared in our borders,
we were a little bit
surprised but this is true.
The war is something that happens
and Russia start a war in our borders
and Yugoslavia fall apart
in a very damaging war
and Syria's there and the
Middle East is not in peace
and the North of Africa who was a stable
has become a source of
instability and danger
and this is shocking for
us and suddenly we realize
that the fact that maybe
something called war
can approach to our borders and our houses
and our villages has
produced a kind of a reaction
that in the case of Germany for example,
means that they are ready
to spend more in defense
and they are ready to
mobilize their troops
out of their geographic limits
By the way let me tell you that Spain
is the European country
that has the biggest number
of troops mobilized on
European defense missions
while the most proactive
member state on the capacity,
development of troops,
deployment of troops
on all the scenarios of risk from Niger
to Somalia to Retania to Yugoslavia
and people will have to understand
that we have to be ready
to face risk that we believe
they had gone forever.
- So here is one of the
challenges to Europe
because if we take the
combined spending on defense
of the 28 member states of
the European Union today
or the 27 next year, it's greater
than the defense spending of Russia
and yet the way it's realized in the field
in terms of an effective defense forces,
it just doesn't correspond to that
and it's just a problem of coordination,
determination, a decision.
Would you go back on
that initial rejection
of the European defense community
to really have a high
degree of integration
so that the money which is already spent
can actually show itself in terms of
effective security capacity?
- Well France has presented
a new initiative on this direction.
We have much more soldiers
than you and the States
and the European armies all together
have more men and women on
the uniform than the US Army
but we cannot make the same role.
At the end we don't have
the strategic capacities,
we don't have all the
warfare of the modern warfare
and we have a lot of
different kinds of planes,
weapons for every generation of weapon,
we have 12 different classes.
You have three different classes.
It means that the cost, the
average cost is much less
and the efficacy is bigger.
We have to learn that we have
to communiterize the armies.
And you know a state is
a territory, a currency,
a border and a defense capacity.
We have put together the
territory, no borders,
the currency the Euro but the army
is the last resort of sovereignty.
The sovereign at the end relation its army
and not to have its own army
but pulling together the armies
makes still a little bit of
people are not so much sure
that it can be a good idea.
Remember that the first step
on building the European Union
was through the army and it was rejected
by the French parliament.
- Yes.
- They voted against it.
Why?
Well because they wounds
of the war were too fresh
and because the Communists
didn't want to build
a European army to fight the Soviet Union
but the Soviet Union is no longer there
and they wounds of the
war as I hope been healed
and now it's much more
clear for European people
that putting together
our defense capacities
would be much better from economic
and even political point of view.
And if you go to the barometer
and you ask to the European people,
what do you think the
European Union should do
and you give a list,
one of the most voted things is defense.
- They all have armies but none of them
can effectively defend the
patria whereas together,
it would be a much more
effective defense force.
- We are doing that little by little.
Look, our planes the Spanish planes
(mumbles)
together with the German
planes they're together.
To be together is something
different than acting together
but step by step the idea of creating
a new strategic capacity.
I'm saying that like it sounds better.
I'm saying a strategic
capacity it looks better.
Building a strategic capacity
it will be something needed
due to the retreat of the Americans
but do you know what's happening?
People in the East are
not so much convinced
that we are able to
create a defense capacity
because they know what
happened in the past.
They know what happened in
Poland during the World War,
what happened in Yugoslavia,
what happened in Hungary
when the hard time comes,
who is coming?
One president of a republic of the East.
I will not say which one
because then I'll have problems.
Told me you know if I have a trouble,
do you think young people from
Madrid will come to help me?
Or if someone is coming, they
will be the American marines
and now he sings and if the
American Marine doesn't come,
what do I have to do?
Do I have to create the defense capacity
or I have to become as close as I can
to the American defense capacities
because they cannot rely
on the European ones?
This is the existential issue
that we are debating now.
Are we capable?
Are we able to create our own capacity
without divorcing from NATO?
It is not a matter of
substituting one thing by other
but creating our own
capacities in order to
and on that America is right
in order to share the burden
of defense in a more fair way.
- Well maybe you will still
say thank you to Mr. Trump.
(laughs)
Let me take this and I certainly
don't want to get you
into trouble on this topic
but would you be willing
to speak just a little bit
and with all the delicacy
that which we appreciate
about relationship between
Europe and the United States.
- Well I could use the same delicacy
that Mr. Trump is using with us.
(laughs)
- Get out your phone and start tweeting.
- Now in some things Mr. Trump,
not Mr. Trump Mr. Obama because
the agreement on defense
on the expenditure on
defense was adopted in Wales
during the Obama presidency
so it's nothing new.
The fact that the burden has
to be shared in a fair way
he was President Obama
who put that on the table,
so it's nothing new and
we have to understand
that things has changed and
American has another front line.
The front line is no longer in Europe,
the front line is in the Pacific
and they have another
interest to take care of.
We cannot blame for that.
But when when Mr. Trump
once that Europe is a foe,
we are not a foe.
We are friends but the problem is that
we are putting together
defense capacity and trade.
We are putting together
the cost of the militaries
and the balance of payments.
This has never passed in the past.
In the past I wasn't telling you,
well I am spending money on your defense
because you are a good client.
You are no longer a good
client, why should I defend you?
Putting together the
cooperation among countries
and the competivity among
firms is something new
in the trust and landing relations.
- So what is your comment on
because it really isn't just
that the perception in Europe
and I think it's true is that
the Pax Americana is over
or at least one cannot rely on it
the way one relied on it for
the last 60 years or 70 years.
But there is also a feeling
that America is dismantling the
international trading system
that it's asphyxiating the WTO
that even the regional agreements
they are working against.
How does Europe relate to that?
- Well it doesn't make actually
as I told you we are not happy
and in some deals which
nobody talks about climate.
After Paris agreement we have
stopped talking about climate
but this is a very important
threat for all of us
and we regret a lot that
the Americans withdraw
from the Paris agreement as much as
the nuclear deal with Iran.
We are not talking about
that but it's very important.
It's not just a matter
of trade or business.
It's a matter of understanding
which is the global answer
to the global threats.
Migration for example
it's clear that we have
a misunderstanding or a different
approach about migration
well among us also and
among the Europeans also
we have a different approaches
but the role of the United States
with respect to the regional agreements
has completely changed and
we have to be aware of that
and act consequently.
- Last little topic or big topic
but we don't have much time
before we get to Spain itself.
You're the foreigner minister Spain
and it's not just a
foreign minister of Spain
because you have a role in the shaping
of European foreign policy.
What to you are the most challenges,
the biggest challenges in the world today
and not specifically in a
European challenge to Europe
but the foreign policy
challenges to the world.
The Middle East, China, Russia, Turkey.
There's a long list.
Where would you put your number one,
number two, number three
challenges in that respect
to the world order apart
from the multilateralism
which you already discussed?
- To the World Order or to the Europeans?
- I now want in a more global sense.
- Well it's going to be a big challenge
among China and the States.
The two big players of the future
and the important thing
is which is our role
on this big game?
The big game of the future
is the States versus China
or China versus States.
Which is the place for the
Europeans in this big game?
In the middle do this Africa.
The Chinese are
(speaks foreign language)
landing in Africa.
They are landing in
Africa with a lot of money
and without conditionalities
and we Europeans
we put a lot of conditionality
so we don't have a lot of money.
So the approaches have to
be completely different.
Africa is going to be for
us I wouldn't say a threat
but something that we
cannot avoid looking at
in a much more powerful way.
Africa has tripled its
population in the last 30 years
and it's going to double
it in the next 20.
It means it has multiplied
by six its population.
In 20 years from now, it
will be 1,000 million more
of young Africans.
Not 1,000 million of young Africans.
1000 million more in 20 years.
Africa will be the most
populated part of the world
and the demographic pressure
is going to be so important for us
that it will change all just
protecting relationship.
So which role to play in the big game
between China and the States
and which role to play
with respect to Africa?
These are the two most important
threat for us then Russia.
I don't think this is
going to be a big problem.
It's not an existential problem.
It's a matter of well dealing with Russia.
It has the gross national
product of Italy.
It's an economy of the size of Italy.
Russia is spending in
defense 60 billion euros.
The NATO is spending fifteen times more.
So what are we talking about?
I think the most important
thing for us is Africa
and the duo China State.
- Does Europe have a
role in the Middle East?
- In practical terms no.
- Should it?
- It should.
It should.
If you say by Middle East the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
- For example.
- Well it's the biggest of examples.
In practical terms have to recognize
that we are playing the
diplomacy of the check we pay.
We support economically
the Palestinian authorities
and we rebuild what the
world destroyed once again
but it's clear that to play
a role in the Middle East
you have to be ready to be a hard power.
If you're only a soft power,
well I don't think Mr. Netanyahu
is going to listen to you.
- No he's not.
Let's come to Spain and what
has captured public attention,
public opinion, public interest
is the internal dilemma of Catalonia
and the way I want to introduce the topic
is to become a little bit personal
because you're Catalan and
before you explain to us
how you see both the conflict
and the future of that conflict,
I don't want to say between
Catalonia and Spain.
I want to say between Spanish Catalans
and other Spanish people but just tell us
what was it to you to
grow up as a Catalan?
What does your Catalan
identity mean to you personally
and from that we will go
into the actual challenge
that the independence
movement in Catalonia
is posing in Spain.
- I feel like you know
these Russian puppets
and their waring side.
(mumbles)
There's a small one and then a bigger one.
Well I feel like this,
I have three puppets,
I am Catalan, I feel very much Catalan.
I was born in a small
village, a very small village
in a difficult time the cold-war
and I remember very well
when I was going to school,
I learned Catalan at home.
I never been able to speak
Spanish with my father, never.
It was so artificial.
I always speak Catalan with them
even when some friends from
Madrid came to my house,
I had to tell them sorry,
I cannot speak Spanish with my father
because it sounds so strange to my ears
so I learned Catalan at home
and then I went to the school
and the school I learned
Spanish and it's very important,
very useful to be able to speak in Spanish
and I'm very happy I had this opportunity
but I have to tell you I
remember that in my school
there was a big picture of
General Franco pointing to me.
Well I didn't know who was this guy.
Pointing to me and he was
written don't speak Catalan.
- Literally.
- Don't speak Catalan.
You have to speak the
language of the Empire.
You have to speak the
language of the Empire
and I was a little boy which
empire what does it mean?
An empire would have no heating at home,
we don't need a lot, what kind of empire
but what I remember very well
that it was forbidden for me
to speak Catalan at school
and this has marked a generation
and for some of this generation
it has created a kind of
resentment against this fact,
the fact that Franco's regime
tried to kill the Catalan identity
at least at the beginning
then little by little,
things became smoother.
But the confusion between
Franco's regime and Spain
has created in some
Catalans the feeling that
this state is my enemy.
It's not my state and I
only saying that look,
Spain is one thing and Franco's
regime is another thing.
- So that's what is so difficult
to understand from outside.
So Franco dies, the new
Spanish Constitution
which this year is celebrating
14 years is adopted.
Nobody claims that it was
not adopted democratically
including the Catalan voice
in the adoption of that Constitution.
It speaks clearly on the indivisibility
of the Spanish Kingdom, while of course
recognizing this event.
So what explains in
your view the emergence
of such a forceful powerful
independence with in Catalonia?
Where does it come from
because it seems that
with the death of Franco
and the new constitution.
- It has always been in Catalonia.
Let's say 20, 25% of the citizens
who feel Catalan and doesn't feel Spanish.
I have many of them
among my closest circles
among my family and among my friends.
Their identity is Catalan and no more.
It has been 20-25 depending
but then came the economic crisis.
It came this sad story of the statute.
- Explain this to us in two minutes
the sad story of the statuto.
- Well statuto
which is a kind of Catalan Constitution
who was agreed first in
the Catalan Parliament
and then amended in
the Spanish Parliament.
We made the big mistake of
making the Catalan people
to vote before passing the
test of constitutionality.
First they voted, they approve it
and then we send it to
the Constitutional Court
to check the constitutionality of the text
and the Constitutional Court
said that some of the articles
were not constitutional
and they changed it.
Well if you vote for something
and then they told you
that it wasn't not good and you buy a car,
before buying the car you want to be sure
the car is running.
You don't go to the checking,
mechanical checking after buying the car
and this has created a resentment.
The economic crisis has--
- Because the Constitutional Court
cut out certain aspects of
the statute of autonomy.
- Certain people say that the
whole statute was abolished.
No, that's not true.
Some articles, not many but some.
- At the symbolic level one of the things
that the Constitutional
Court was opposed to
was the notion that
there is a Catalan nation
and yet I find while I totally reject
Catalonian independence both in my writing
and my speeches etc, I find a
notion of a Nation of Nations
a very progressive notion.
A lesson that Spain can give to the world
that yeah you can have the state
which is a Nation of Nations.
Why was that so neuralgic?
- The Constitutional
court didn't say that.
Said well Catalonia can
be considered as a nation
but it doesn't have let's
say a political consequences
on the meaning that being a
nation it has to have a state.
- For sure.
- But if you go to the statute of autonomy
of Andalusia which is fully Spanish,
it says that Andalusia is a
(speaks Spanish)
A national reality and then
we start doing semiotics here
because which is the
difference between a nation
(speaks Spanish)
what we are talking about
and the idea of a Nation of Nations
is something that part
of the left me included
is depending on the way that
you can have a political nation
which is composed of nations
which are nations on the social-cultural
or linguistic aspect and I
think and I said the other day
and it was in the middle
of a kind of a debate
about Catalan as a nation.
What do you mean by a nation first of all?
And if you understand as I understand
that a nation is I set of people
sharing a certain amount of
socio-cultural characteristics,
a language is a very important
one but not the only one,
you can consider that a nation.
Being part of the whole Spanish nation.
But this something difficult to understand
for people who say nation
is like the mother.
You only have one.
You cannot have several mothers
and others who say no, no, no, no, no.
Nation means the three
steps to becoming a state.
I don't talk about nation
on the social-cultural
linguistic dimension but
on the political dimension.
Well this is another
completely different thing
and some people will never accept the idea
of several nations inside the whole nation
and others will say that we'll not accept
any other consideration
nation than the political one.
And here is the debate.
- So where do we stand
now with this conflict?
It seems a bit of an impasse.
- We are better today
than three months ago.
- Explain to us.
- Well we have changed the government.
(laughs)
We have changed the government
and we have started a new
approach with more dialogue
with more the relation were broken
was not way of communicating.
I think we made a lot of mistakes
on dealing with the independence movement,
the first of October was
a disgrace for all of us
because it was clear
that the image of Spain
was suffering a lot.
- That explains that's when
the independence movement
in Catalonia against what was perceived
against Spanish laws,
Spanish Constitution,
decisions of Spanish courts
nonetheless went ahead
and held a referendum and the
government tried to prevent
physically the referendum from being held
and you know how it is.
It's enough for one person
to have a bloody face
and that gets broadcast
around the whole world.
It was not a great
moment, a glorious moment
for the Spanish image
dependent of the reality.
- No it's difficult to explain
you cannot fight with the images
of someone who wants to
vote and a policeman comes
and try to prevent it
because you can not argue against that.
In the modern communication
in which we live,
you cannot fight with arguments
with respect to these images
that can be wildly broadcast
and showing that Spain is...
Franco is a still alive.
Franco is dead happily for us
and Spain is a full democracy.
If we rank among the 20 full
democracies in the world.
It's not me who is saying that,
it's the intelligent
unit of the economies,
it's the World Bank, all
the rankings in the world
ranks Spain among the first 20 countries,
well above Belgium for example
who gives lessons to us
with independence in judiciary,
with a state of rule of law
we are not perfect but we
are not a repressive regime
with political prisoners.
No happily for us but the crisis was deep
and barely managed and now we
are in a triangle for dialogue
in order to rebuild bridges and try to see
if we can buy the first
step to slow down emotions,
to calm emotions and secondly,
to see if there is because
when you say Catalonia
and the Catalans don't remember
that only 47%, the maximum 47%
have been voting in favor of independency
on the ordinary elections.
47% is not enough to declare
independence unilaterally
and now even independent
people accept that.
Now even part of them say
well with 47% of the people
we are not enough in order
to declare independence
unilaterally without agreement.
Well that's good.
That's a first step.
At least you understood that with 47%,
you can not do that.
Even you have majority in the chamber
because the electoral law gives a premium
to the part of the country
where independent people
are majority audience.
- We know that came from this country too.
- Exactly but in this country
Nevada doesn't declare
independent or Alaska.
These kind of things doesn't happen here.
- Texas might but.
- Texas asked for it and it was said
it's not in the Constitution.
Look in Italy the Veneto
required a referendum
for independence and the
constitution of course say no way.
In Germany some people in
Bavaria asked for the same thing
and the Constitutional Court said no way.
There is only one cage in the world
in which the government
accepted a referendum.
Canada no, the Canada government
never accepted the referendum.
It was unilateral.
There is only one case done by Cameron
which will not be in the British history
consider it has the best
prime minister in the world
because he played pocket.
He played with the country twice.
First with the Scotland and
second with European Union
but even in Britain when people say
Scotland have the right, no
they don't have the right.
They don't have the right because now
they want to repeat the referendum
and they go to London to
ask permission to Mrs. May
and Mrs May says no.
So you have to ask permission
for doing something,
it means that you don't have the right
because if I had the right, I
don't have to ask permission.
Mr. Cameron said yes, I allow you to do it
and Mrs May says I don't
allow you to do it.
So the right to secession is
not recognized in the world
unless you are a colony, you
are the military occupation
or the human rights are
systematically violated.
Someone of you believe
that Catalonia is a colony,
that is military occupied
or the human rights
are systematically violated.
Well I don't think nobody believes that.
So another thing is that we
have a political problem.
Okay, let's try to solve
it but with 47% of the vote
with 47% of the people, you
cannot declare independence.
It doesn't work, it doesn't fly.
Nobody will recognize you.
The European Union will not recognize you.
I told them many times.
This is a jump in the vacuum.
There is nothing.
No government in the world will recognize
a unilateral independence
voted by 47% of the people
and the European Union will close the door
and you didn't believe it.
I know happily for all of
us unhappily for all of us
we have gone to a emotional breakdown.
There are people in jail,
they will be judged,
the society is divided,
people are confronted
and let's pray that things
doesn't become worse
and the only way of preventing
from things becoming worse
is to try to talk, is to try to dialogue.
It's to try to look
what things can be done
in order to found a way
out which can be agreed
but if the only proposal
from the independence
is way one independence,
well then I am sorry.
This will not be accepted
by any Spanish government.
- That's clear.
I have a question to you because
I think Spanish diplomacy
has been very successful
because as you point out,
not a single state in
Europe, not institutional,
not the institutions of the European Union
and no other state has been hospitable
to the Catalonian independence.
So Spanish diplomacy has
done what it has to do
but in public opinion, if
you read the newspapers,
if you read the blogs,
the social networks, etc,
that voice the kind of
statements that you made today
have been very absent.
- That's why I'm here.
- Pardon.
- That's why I'm here.
- But it looks as if Spanish governments
have not appreciated the
importance of public opinion
beyond diplomacy and making
sure that no state breaks line.
Do you agree with that assessment?
- I agree completely.
Now it works.
I agree completely.
I couldn't agree more.
Our diplomats made a very
good job on their job,
on their professional job
dealing with the governments.
It was not so difficult
because at the end,
all government in the world
understood what was happening
and no government was going to support
changing the borders unilaterally
because they know what does it mean.
But from the point of
view what we can call
the public diplomacy, the
people who create opinion,
I don't know it's public opinion
or the published opinion.
It's a difference but I
understand what do you mean.
Most of the published opinion
were having a view of the problem
which were very much
following a certain relato.
How do you say relato?
Narrative.
The Catalonian dependency
has been able to build
the narrative, story, something to tell.
- Is there anything going back
to the substance of the problem?
So I understand the policy, your policy
and the policy of your government
is to be more dialogical
to try and calm the emotional heat
that the referendum last year created, etc
but in substance, are there
any proposals on the table
or in the backroom of what could be given
in terms of maybe more autonomy, etc
that would be short of independence
or is it just a process of?
- More autonomy.
Well, the president of
the government has offered
to write a new statute.
We have to vote, yes we have to vote again
but what to vote.
A new relationship between
Catalonia and Spain
which is the statute but in order to build
or to write a new statute,
we have to build an agreement
among Catalans and believe me,
the problem is not between
Catalonia and Spain
as if it were two uniformed identities.
The problem is among Catalans.
When you have 47% of the
people voting independency,
six, seven percent which you don't know
exactly what they are voting
and 40% voting against,
you have a split society.
A complete split society.
The first thing that you have to do
is to try to make an agreement among them
because if not with
whom I am going to deal.
This is a problem among us,
among Catalans themselves
and in this sociological scenario,
one part has been very active,
very active, working a lot,
defending their points of view,
having a television which was very helpful
and the other part was
silent until a certain moment
and at that moment this part
of the society also is there
and wants to be listened,
wants to be taken into account
and if we want both
parts be part of a whole
and single people when Mr Torres said,
we are single people.
Some will solve problems.
Who is part of these people?
I am part of the single people.
I am part of the single people
that Mr. Torres is calling off.
Yes I am but I am accepted.
I was only talking about the people
who are in favor of
independency and the others,
we have to rebuild the
single people of Catalonia
because after the
transition, it was a reality,
we were single people.
It was not a big divide
and now this divide
has to be canceled.
- And now you're optimistic?
- It will take long.
It will take very long.
If we are successful,
it could take 20 years.
- I'll pray for you.
(laughs)
I'm afraid we're getting ready to the end.
We started a little
bit late and typically,
we end these conversations
with a few personal likes--
- Personal likes?
- Yes.
- Oh my God.
- Number one, who's your favorite author?
If you were on a desert island,
what would be the two or three books
that you would want to have with you?
- I will bring with me
for sure Isabel Llende.
- Nice.
- And Garcia Marquez.
- Nice, so far no Spanish author.
(laughs)
- And just to look intelligent,
I will bring The Memories Montesquieu.
- Very nice and your favorite music,
what would you like to listen
to on the desert island?
- Surat singing Machado's poems.
- Very nice.
- I don't know if you know that.
- Some do.
- Some do.
You should make them listen one day
Surat singing the poems
of Antonio Machado.
- I'm afraid this is America,
we can't make anybody do anything.
(laughs)
- Be a little bit directive, come on.
- I'll be out of a job in two minutes.
Your favorite movies.
If you have a DVD on the desert island.
- Movies.
- Or some connection to Netflix.
They are everywhere.
- Can I tell you one thing,
I never had TV at home.
Never, I still don't have.
And I haven't seen anyone of this series
that it seemed that you can
buy in Netflix or somewhere
but for sure there are fails
the mark me French films.
- French films.
(speaks French)
- You know it?
- Yes.
- You know these French
films that are film theater.
They're talking not this American films
with a lot of movement and
everybody killing everybody.
Films in which you are sitting and talking
and thinking slowing,
talking about love, life.
- Actually two types of American movies.
(laughs)
Either everybody killing everybody
or dysfunctional families.
(laughs)
Last thing when you came back
and with this we will end Minister.
When you came back from the desert island
where you had to eat all the time bananas,
what would be the meal that
you would be thinking of?
- Hombre.
(laughs)
(speaks Spanish)
Is the best contribution of the Catalans
for the world gastronomy.
You take a slice of bread, you
put on the fire a little bit
then you put a tomato,
you crush the tomatoes,
you put oil and little bit of
pepper and that's fantastic.
- That's called in Italian fetnta.
- But is much better
to call it panto macha.
(laughs)
- Ladies and gentlemen
before we thank the Minister,
there will be a very light
refreshments offered.
If you exit, go to your
right and turn to your right
for those who want to stay
and chat a little bit.
You're welcome.
I think on behalf of everybody,
I'd like to thank Minister Borrell
for truly fascinating
and stimulating evening.
Thank you sir.
(applause)
