Alan Musgrave (; born 1940) is an English-born
New Zealand philosopher.
== Biography ==
Musgrave was educated at the London School
of Economics with a BA Honours Philosophy
and Economics 1961.
Sir Karl Popper supervised Musgrave's PhD
which was completed in 1969.
Musgrave worked as Popper's Research Assistant
initially then as a Lecturer.
Musgrave was appointed to the Chair of the
Philosophy Department at the University of
Otago in 1970, and was head of department
from 1970 to 2005.
He was 30 years old at his appointment.
Along with Imre Lakatos, a friend and colleague,
they edited Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
(Cambridge University Press, 1970).
It is the best-selling of the 4 volumes that
record the Popper/Kuhn confrontation at the
1965 London Conference that Lakatos and Musgrave
organised.
In 1992 Musgrave published Common Sense, Science
and Scepticism, an entry level book on epistemology.
In 1999 Musgrave published Essays on Realism
and Rationalism (Rodopi), a collection of
his scholarly papers.
In 2006 Musgrave was honoured with a Festschrift:
Rationality and Reality: Conversations with
Alan Musgrave, edited by Colin Cheyne and
John Worrall (Springer).
In 2009, Musgrave published Secular Sermons:
Essays on Science and Philosophy (Otago University
Press), an entry level book on science, religion
and mathematics.
Among his non scholarly achievements is the
Otago Philosophy's ranking in New Zealand's
Performance Based Research Funding.
In both the 2003 and 2006 surveys Otago's
Philosophy department ranked as the best performing
department among all academic disciplines
in New Zealand.
In 2010 Musgrave is planning to retire from
academia.
The University of Otago embarked on a funding
campaign to raise money towards a scholarship
in his honour.
In 2012 the University of Otago awarded Musgrave
the Distinguished Research Medal, the university's
highest research honour.
== Philosophical work ==
His chief interest is in epistemology, history
and philosophy of science, especially the
Philosophy of Biology.
The largest part of his career has been dedicated
to the study of Charles Darwin.
Throughout his career he has defended scientific
realism and scientific rationalism, and is
often considered their chief contemporary
defender.
He has attacked various forms of idealism;
most recently he attacked conceptual idealism
by extending the argument popularly known
as Stove's "Gem".
Metaphysically speaking, Musgrave can be considered
a nominalist; he argues for a position he
specifically calls Pleonastic Platonism.
This position basically claims that confusions
within our language gives rise to Platonic
entities.
Pleonastic is a term with Greek roots meaning
"excessive".
Many of his works exhibit influence from Sir
Karl Popper – his teacher as an undergraduate
and postgraduate at the London School of Economics.
He also shared an office with fellow philosopher
Imre Lakatos while he was in London.
His form of Rationalism is subject, he admits,
to circularity; but, he insists, it is better
(even if only slightly better) than Poppers'
Rationalism, which admits to irrationalism.
However, his form of scientific realism is
much stronger.
His position does not assert that science
is correct, only that we may reasonably accept
certain parts of it to be correct.
Electrons, for example, may not exist; but
that does not mean we should not believe in
them.
His main criterion for believing in a scientific
theory is that it generates 'novel predictions.'
He is one of the few philosophers of science,
on either side of the debate, to stress the
distinction between novel predictions and
regular predictions.
A novel prediction is one that was not used
in the construction of a theory, but that
nevertheless follows from it.
If a scientific theory makes an accurate prediction
about something unknown (as opposed to a known
regularity), then the theory must either be
true, or the accurate 'novel' prediction was
miraculously guessed.
This argument had previously been applied
to all scientific predictions, by many philosophers
of science (the most famous, perhaps, being
Hilary Putnam, who coined the clause 'Realism
is the only philosophy that doesn't make science
a miracle').
This aphorism however, has been criticised
as being merely a chimera of sophism, used
mostly for its seductive force rather than
its substance.
Nevertheless, Professor Musgrave is in a smaller
group by stressing that the argument can only
succeed if applied solely to novel predictions.
This claim however, cannot be defended logically
as it commits the petitio principii fallacy
of assuming, without adequate justification,
the conclusion it is supposed to defend.
However, while admitting circularity within
the argument (in that "miracle arguments"
seek to justify scientific "inference to the
best explanation" by use of an inference to
the best explanation), Musgrave defends his
stance as one making a conclusion about rational
belief rather than truth.
Because he makes this distinction about knowing
for certain that a theory is right, and reasonably
believing that a theory is right, he evades
many classical objections to realism.
=== Musgrave's scientific realism ===
Traditional scientific realism is the view
that:
If a scientific theory 'X' generates correct
novel predictions, then theory 'X' is true.
Scientific theory 'X' generates novel predictions.
Therefore, scientific theory 'X' is true.Musgrave's
scientific realism is the view that:
If a scientific theory 'X' generates correct
novel predictions, then it is reasonable to
believe that theory 'X' is true.
Scientific theory 'X' generates novel predictions.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that
scientific theory 'X' is true.In the latter
argument, premise 1) is still highly controversial,
but it has been argued to be less so than
premise 1) of the former argument.
He argues for the latter premises 1) with
such things as the Miracle Argument and novel
predictions (above).
In this way, he tries to do away with many
sceptical objections about realism: he is
no more wrong to believe in a theory's truth
than an instrumentalist is to believe in a
theory's usefulness, but that alone neither
justifies nor warrants his claim that the
theory is true.
Both philosophers have the same chance of
being wrong; and, with scientific realism,
Musgrave also receives an explanation of events
that the instrumentalist does not have.
He often says that instrumentalists say the
name of the game is "saving the phenomena,"
but he sees no reason that it should not also
be "explaining the phenomena."
As for criticism of premise 1) in the latter
argument, anti-realists point out that such
a principle can only be justified through
circular reasoning.
For instance, to arrive at justification of
1), the best one can do is argue that this
principle has escaped serious criticism and
therefore is reasonable to accept.
But why should one accept the corollary principle
of "a principle that has escaped serious criticism
is reasonable to accept"?
The reply is that it itself is a principle
that has escaped serious criticism.
This boot-strapping is an unavoidable consequence
of Musgrave's critical rationalism.
Musgrave openly admits the circularity of
his view, however he is quick to point out
that anti-realism has nothing better to offer,
and indeed, that not all circles are so vicious.
Musgrave's arguments are presented in his
book Essays on Realism and Rationalism, in
which he also attacks the most prominent anti-realist
views, including those of Nancy Cartwright
and those of Bas van Fraassen.
Musgrave also strongly argues against all
major forms of philosophical idealism.
This is echoed by the History page of the
Otago Philosophy Department where the Department
makes note of Musgrave's memorable presentation
of his forceful paper "Conceptual Idealism
and Stove's Gem" at Florence
