JESSICA DESVARIEUX: Welcome to The Real News
Network.
I'm Jessica Desvarieux in Baltimore.
The clock is ticking for President Mohamed
Morsi.
He was given an ultimatum by Egypt's military
that he had 48 hours to resign.
Now joining us to unpack all of this is Mohamed
ElMeshad.
He is a Cairo-based independent journalist
who wrote for Egypt Independent for two years.
And he joins us now from Cairo.
Thanks for being with us again, Mohamed.
MOHAMED ELMESHAD: Thanks.
DESVARIEUX: So, Mohamed, my first question
is related to the Americans and what role
they play in all of this.
Where are you seeing the American hand behind
the scenes and things of that nature?
Can you describe for us what's going on?
ELMESHAD: One very, very, very telling thing
that happened was if you read Guardian today,
one of the president's aides, an unnamed source,
came out and said that they are hoping that
with American support the military would not
be able to implement what they see as a coup.
So that was one of the first really big alarm
bells that the U.S. is in fact, as many of
the opposition were saying, one of the main
forces behind Morsi's claim to power and Morsi's
ability to maintain a grip on power and maintain
a steady relationship with the military, who's
seen as sort of the main ally of the U.S.
in Egypt.
On the other hand, many of the Morsi supporters
say that the opposition is backed by America,
as represented by the secular anti-Islamic
forces, especially since ElBaradei, one of
the main--the former head of the UN watchdog,
one of the main opposition figures, worked--I
mean, was part of the UN watchdog and worked
closely with the U.S. on issues such as Iran
and Iraq nuclear weapons or the search, the
question of Iran and Iraqi nuclear weapons.
President Obama came out today and called
on Morsi to--well, CNN reported that he called
on Morsi to hold early elections.
Washington just denied that, the State Department
just denied that a few minutes ago.
And Obama then called on just a general respect
of democracy, which has many people saying
maybe the U.S. should not comment, period,
because it seems like whatever they say can
and will be used against them, the Egyptian
popular [incompr.]
But who knows, really, what it is, because
the military continue to receive funds.
And a year ago [incompr.] was always meeting
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S.,
and with John McCain especially, and Mr. Kerry
now.
So the relationship is there.
It's not clear where the U.S. is throwing
its chips.
What is clear is that the U.S. didn't seem
to have a problem dealing with the Muslim
Brotherhood and its leaders from the get-go,
from before the elections when they were invited
to Washington and many of them, including
the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood,
met with the U.S. ambassador here, Anne Patterson.
Anne Patterson was speaking before June 30,
Anne Patterson was quoted in many Egyptian
papers speaking about Egyptian democracy and
[incompr.]
incited many anti-Muslim, pro-Morsi people.
So it's funny that now it seems that the U.S.
may be the saving grace for Morsi.
Or maybe that's just what they happen to think.
DESVARIEUX: Okay.
Let's talk about another major player in the
region, of course, is Qatar.
What is Qatar's agenda?
And more specifically, if we can talk about
Al Jazeera and their coverage of events, what
do you see their role being?
ELMESHAD: Qatar's agenda is even to my eyes
a little more difficult to pin down than the
U.S.'s.
Many are convinced that Qatar has been behind
much of the Muslim Brotherhood funding and
financing.
None of that has been substantiated, except
for reported visits by Muslim Brotherhood
leaders to Qatar and historic ties between
the two.
Al Jazeera has been--it depends.
I mean, you have Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera direct
and Al [incompr.] direct Al Jazeera Mubasher
Egypt.
So the direct channels, they kind of do [incompr.]
indicates is that they report directly from
the scene with mostly live footage.
They're more likely to--the Muslim Brotherhood
leaders are more likely to appear.
They're kind of more able to attract them.
So at least in the eyes of the Muslim Brotherhood
they're more levelheaded.
This time around, Jazeera has not played as
prominent a role as in the 2011 uprising.
It's a bit more subdued.
People are more--there are more options now
anyway.
I have followed Jazeera a bit, but even me,
like, you know, if Al Jazeera took 25 percent
of my viewing before, nowadays it's taking
maybe 5 to 10 percent.
DESVARIEUX: So we certainly know that there's
a lot of wheeling and dealing happening behind
the scenes.
President Morsi, he met with the army chief
of staff, as well as the prime minister.
And Reuters is also reporting that there is
some sort of, quote, roadmap plan that is
going to come forward.
What do you see as being some elements that
could be included in this roadmap?
What sort of resolution do you see coming
to the table?
ELMESHAD: Any sort of wheeling and dealing
would include, according to--if you believe
the Guardian article, would include the U.S.,
would include the military, would include
the presidency, may include the opposition
if they are invited and voted on by the military
to join, I think.
It doesn't seem like there's a future for
Morsi either way.
Many reports from--I mean, leaks from Muslim
Brotherhood meetings indicated that they might
even entertain early elections or taking Morsi
out as long as they're able to salvage, I
mean, something, which mean the Constitution,
which may mean--they really don't have many
other options.
It may be that they want to avoid being persecuted
again, which could happen.
I mean, the relationship between the military
and the Muslim Brotherhood was never great.
The relationship between the police and the
Muslim Brotherhood was never great.
The fact that police officers actually came
out and protested in uniform against Morsi
was very telling.
So, I mean, they're afraid.
Like, they are afraid.
It's not just afraid for their political future;
I believe that they're now afraid for their--afraid
to return to them being persecuted indiscriminately
as terrorists as what happened before.
DESVARIEUX: Okay.
My final question, Mohamed.
I am getting a sense that it's mostly the
urban areas where we're seeing a lot of anti-Morsi
demonstrations taking place.
And the rural areas, the countryside, there
are a lot of pro-Morsi supporters.
Do you see what's happening right now as being
a urban-rural divide in Egyptian politics?
ELMESHAD: No, no, actually.
I see more so than 2011 a lot of rural townships
and rural governorates or rural-dominated
governorates are included, such as in [dVnaoU],
Mansoura.
There are many different neighborhoods, there
are many different areas [incompr.]
coming out en masse against Morsi in ways
that we never saw them come out before.
It's also worthy to note that during the Revolution,
many of the opposition forces found great
difficulties mobilizing in these areas, because
pro-Mubarak supporters, including tribes in
the south and traditional leaders in other
areas, they had a hold on these--on the people
of their areas.
So a lot of these people coming out now could
be seen as pro-Mubarak influence.
But at the same time, they were forgotten
during the past.
And as a result, they were prone to come out
once they saw that everyone else was coming
out.
I mean, the philosophy of revolution grew
over the past two years and the concept of
being able to go out to speak for your rights
reached these areas within these past two
years, especially with the mobilization that
happened during the parliamentary elections.
Let's not forget that a lot of them are Salafi
and Islamist influence.
And they also--you know, they were also influenced
to come out due to that.
Many Salafis, including the main Salafi party,
[incompr.]
party, weren't necessarily entirely pro-Morsi
during this past [incompr.]
They were more very critical.
So that might have encouraged a lot of people
in rural areas and cities and rural governorates
to join in for now.
DESVARIEUX: Thank you for joining us, Mohamed
ELMESHAD: Thanks.
Thank you.
DESVARIEUX: And thank you for joining us on
The Real News Network.
