Today we’re going to look at the numbers,
and crush many of the myths of the fighting
on the Eastern Front of WW2.
As stated in the last video, the German Army
has a reputation of being vastly superior
tactically and operationally to the Red Army
on the Eastern Front of WW2.
The story goes like this - despite having
inferior numbers, a lack of tanks and equipment,
and a lack of replacements, the German Heer
killed many more times the number of Red Army
soldiers and tanks.
The German generals - the ones saying how
superior they were - said their divisions
were like rocks, drowning in a sea of Soviet rifles and tanks.
But is this actually the case?
With the opening of new archival material,
a different story is beginning to emerge.
One that says the German Heer wasn’t superior
to the Red Army.
And the statistics give weight to that argument.
Let’s tell the story.
Here we have a table from the book “The
Price of Victory: the Red Army’s Casualties
in the Great Patriotic War.”
Now these statistics are some of the latest to
emerge, and also, may be a little conservative,
And we'll compare these to others later.
On the left we have the year and the type
of casualties.
We have the USSR and her allies, Germany and
her allies on the far right, and in the middle,
we have the ratio of losses between the two sides.
At the bottom, you’ll see the totals for
the whole war.
So let’s dive in.
1941, massive Soviet losses sustained.
1,313,100 dead or missing, 3,478,200 captured,
a grand total of 4,791,300 casualties in 1941.
Compare this to the staggeringly small number
of German and Axis Allied losses sustained
that year and the ratio favours the Germans
12.2 to 1.
The ratio of captured soldiers is an incredible
325.1 to 1.
And it's massive numbers of captured Soviet men and
material captured.
If the war had ended in 1941, this probably
would have been the most successful war of
all time.
However, it didn’t end in 1941.
The Soviets continued to fight.
1942, the Soviets lose more men killed than
they did in 1941.
And the ratio favours the Germans again, at 3.5
to 1.
That’s a better ratio than 1941, but here’s
where things differ.
1942, the captured ratio goes down to just
12 to 1 from the 325 to 1 it was before.
With a grand total of 5 to 1 in losses, still favouring
the Germans.
And it's still impressive numbers, but hold on a second,
why wasn’t the German Army able to repeat
the successes of the previous year?
They actually killed more Soviets than they
did the year before, so it’s not like they
weren’t capable of fighting - they were actually
fighting harder in 1942.
We must bear in mind here, the Germans had
only lost 312,600 men in 1941 - not terrible
losses compared to what the Soviets suffered
- and this isn’t including replacements,
which we’ll get to later.
So why then aren’t the Germans able to capture
as many Soviets as they did the year before
when they killed more this year?
And it doesn’t stop in 1942.
1943, more Red Army soldiers die than ever
before, 2,324,000.
Germany's losses are also the highest so far
at 700,700, with another 49,000 Axis Allied
losses, yet the ratio is still favours them by 3.1 to 1.
Captured, 4.1 to 1, but just look at the numbers.
Just 603,900 captured Soviets.
This is pocket money compared to the ratio
achieved in 1941, or even 1942.
So what’s going on? Why are more people dead but less people are captured?
Despite a ratio of 3.3 to 1, the Germans are
beginning to lose? Which is a bit strange.
1944, Red Army losses come down to just 1,938,600.
Captured 130,100, for a grand total of 2,068,700.
Compare this to the Axis though.
1,232,900 Germans killed or missing, 523,900
captured, a total of 1,756,800.
This out of 2,094,600 total axis losses sustained
in 1941.
The ratio is actually 1 to 1 at this point.
And the axis lose more men than the Soviets do
in 1944.
The ratio of captured soldier goes into the
Soviet favour - at 1 to 5.8.
And the Germans are on the defensive here.
Now I've heard a lot about how great the Germans were
on defense?
So why? I mean the narrative says that.
So why isn't the numbers reflecting that?
Surely, if the Germans were so good at defense the numbers would reflect that. But yet they're not.
Why aren’t they inflicting many more times
the number of casualties? Like the narrative
says they should be.
And the traditional narrative says they do, so
what’s going on?
They’re not even inflicting twice as many
losses now.
1945, a total of 924,000 Soviet losses.
The Germans themselves lose 1,463,800.
More than the Soviets.
Total Axis losses are 1,813,400, a ratio of
1 to 2.
Again, the Germans are on the defensive, an
army on the defensive has advantages over
attackers.
So why then aren’t they inflicting many more times
the number of losses?
Total losses for the whole war.
Soviets, 8.7 million dead, 5.8 million captured,
a total of 14,654,000.
German losses, 3.5 million dead, 1.4 million
captured, and a total of 4,941,600.
However, total Axis allies numbers - 3.9 million
dead, 2 million captured, a total of 5,980,300.
Overall ratio, 2.5 to 1.
Now the author does admit, due to discrepancies
in the archival material, that the ratio may
be, at worst, slightly higher at 3 to 1.
So a ratio of 2.5 or maybe 3 to 1 is the overall ratio - that is not bad.
Considering the ratio in 1941, 3 to 1 isn't bad.
Considering the Red Army had to retake all
the ground lost, and then fight their way into
central Europe, that ratio is not that bad.
And just to point out, overall Soviet losses were
around 30 million, but that’s including
civilians, this is the number of military
deaths.
But, in case you think these numbers are wrong
somehow, let’s look at the statistics from
a different source.
This time from Glantz, who is relying on Krivosheev
- who’s numbers are disputed, but we’ll
get into them anyway just in case.
Here, we're assuming the casualties are double for
the Soviets, and two million more for the
Germans, the ratio is at most 4.27 to 1.
So, we have a casualty ratio of anywhere between
2.5 to 1, and 4.27 to 1, depending on how
you count the numbers.
The true figure is probably somewhere in between,
but again, even at 4.27 to 1, this is not
that bad of a ratio.
The Soviets lose, at the absolute most, 4
men to every Axis man they kill.
So, Myth number 1 - the Germans killed or
captured many more times the number of Soviets.
No, it’s 2.5 or maybe 3 to 1, or at the very most
4.27 to 1.
That’s not the 10 to 1 as some people keep
spouting.
And as mentioned, the Red Army had to fight
their way into central Europe as well as retake
all the ground that they lost.
The price of victory - yes it was high - but realistically it's not that high.
Yes, the Germans did inflict a lot of losses
in 1941, and that is where this myth of German
superiority arises.
Myth number 2.
The Wehrmacht didn’t have the manpower to
sustain its losses and slowly decreased in
size as the war went on.
Incorrect.
Between the 22nd of June 1941 and the 30th
of June 1942, the Wehrmacht in the East increased
its size by 110,000 men.
Between the 1st of July 1942, and the 30th
of June 1943, the Wehrmacht in the East increased
its size by 365,000 men.
The total number of losses sustained between
the 22nd of June 1941 and the 30th of June
1943 for the Wehrmacht was 3,965,000.
Total number of replacements, 4,440,000, for
an increase in the number of men by 475,000.
Now, some of you may be sitting there scratching
your heads going
"wait a second that doesn't make any sense". One - the narrative says something different.
In the narrative
individual divisions were suffering from manpower
crises.
So this doesn't make sense, and yet, the numbers show that the Germans were replacing their losses.
So what’s going on there?
And two - these losses don’t match the numbers
on the previous table.
In fact, they’re higher.
According to the Price of Victory, the total
number of German losses was 1,721,000 by the
end of 1943.
Yet, Enduring the Whirlwind, which is getting
its information from Müller-Hillebrand’s
Das Heer 1933-1945 published in the 1950’s
or 60’s, the total losses up until the 30th
of June 1943 is 3,965,000.
So what’s going on here?
Well, interestingly, it seems that the Price
of Victory was giving conservative estimates
of German losses in the original table.
To quote another author, Glantz - “By 31
January 1941, the German Army in the East
had suffered 917,985 casualties, in addition
to 18,098 Luftwaffe casualties and significant
losses among the armies of Germany’s allies
in Finland, Romania, and Hungary.” Glantz,
Looking at Enduring the Whirlwind -
"...overall German losses in the East by the
end of November, including sick transported
back to Germany for treatment, amounted to
926,100 men. During the same period 410,000
replacements had arrived to join the 90,000
already present within divisional replacement
battalions, meaning that the Ostheer would
have been short 426,221 men by December.”
“...total German Army casualties in the
East amounted to 1,094,251 men by 31 December
[1941], including 167,354 killed, 600,584
wounded, 34,514 missing, and at least 291,799
sick who had to be repatriated to Germany.
In addition, an estimated 2,735 tanks and
104 assault guns had been listed as Totalausfalle
by this point, with a further 415 being permanently
These numbers probably include men who would
later return to the ranks, which is why they’re
higher.
If they’re not, then the ratio of losses
in 1941 drops further than the 12.2 to 1 originally
stated.
Some of you may think that Soviet losses
were higher, and we’ll get to that shortly,
but for now, let’s just take in the fact
that the ratio isn’t that bad.
2 or 3 to one, maybe 4 to one, doesn’t sound like the Germans were drowning under Soviet hordes.
Myth number 3, the Soviets had vastly more
men in the field at any one moment in time.
Incorrect.
The idea that the Soviets outnumbered the
Germans in the field 10 to 1, as some people
think that they do, is completely false.
This table, taken from Glantz’s
When Titan’s Clashed.
Shows the comparative Strengths of Combat Forces on
the Soviet-German Front 1941 to 1945.
The Dates are on the left, the Soviets in
the centre left, Germans on the right, and
the ratio in the middle.
Eagle-eyed viewers may be typing away now
saying that the ratio doesn’t add up.
Please bear in mind that the ratio is not
taking into account the Axis or Soviet allies,
and is just focusing on the Soviet losses
vs German losses which is the main point.
Let’s start at the beginning.
22nd of June 1941, Germany outnumbers the
Red Army at the front.
2,743,000 Soviets vs 3,118,910 Germans.
With Axis Allies, the total Axis forces on
the Eastern Front is 3,957,910.
A ratio of 1 to 1.14.
With Axis allies included, the ratio is more
like 1 to 1.44.
Now, the Soviets do have a lot of mobilization
potential, 12 million men.
However, you can’t just suddenly spring
12 million men and women into action.
They don’t have enough equipment at hand
to even do that, especially since they’re busy
packing up their industry brick by brick and
shipping it to the Urals.
It takes time to mobilize these men, and meanwhile
Germany is busy devouring 4.8 million Soviet
soldiers at the front, as shown in the first
table.
On the 11th of September 1941, the Soviets
have 3.4 million men at the front, axis total
4.2 million, with 3.3 million of them German.
Notice how the German Army has increased in
size.
The ratio is more or less 1 to 1, with Axis
allies increasing that further in favour of
the Axis.
1st of November 1941, just 2.2 million Soviets
vs 2,867,000 Germans.
A ratio of 1 to 1.3 in favour of the Germans.
Total axis troops 3.5 million.
Again, Germans and Axis outnumber the Soviets.
1st of December 1941, finally, for the first
real time in the war, the Soviets outnumber
the Germans.
4,197,000 Soviets vs 3,364,000 axis,
2.76 million of them German.
A ratio of 1.52 to 1 in favour of the Soviets.
And this is when the Soviets start fighting
back properly.
This Moscow 1941, the German army is defeated
outside the city.
As we saw before, losses by the end of the
year for the Germans were 312,600 men, total
axis 384,100.
Soviet losses by this point are 4,791,300.
Doesn’t it seem strange though, that the Germans
lose the ability to advance and defeat their enemy
when they no longer outnumber the Soviets? Very very strange.
Even if they are outnumbered now, 1.52 to
1, surely the “superior” German Army can
take on that many Soviets at once. That's not even 2 to 1.
They’re outnumbered by maybe around 700,000
men.
The Soviet “horde” is not really a horde at this
point, yet the Germans cannot advance.
Very very strange.
Notice that the Germans lose men by March
of 1942, down to 2,580,000.
Soviets gain men, to 4,663,697, now outnumbering
the Germans 1.8 to 1.
However, by the time we get to the 5th of
May 1942, the Germans and Axis as a whole
are beginning to recover their losses.
They now have 3.4 million men in the East
compared to the Soviet 5.4 million.
In one month, now to June of 1942, the Soviets
have lost men, and Germany and her allies
have gained men.
5,313,000 Soviets vs 3,578,000 Axis, a ratio
of 1.98 to 1.
With this ratio, the Germans speed off towards
the Caucasus and Stalingrad.
Hundreds of miles taken in a matter of weeks.
5th of July, ratio is at 2.1 to 1, and Blau still
under way.
6th of August, 1942, losses occurred on the
German side decreasing the number of men that
they actually have.
The Soviets are beginning to fight back, but
the Battle of Stalingrad hasn’t begun yet.
There are some historians out there who will say
that the Battle of Stalingrad was lost before
the Germans even set foot in the city.
These numbers seem to support that conclusion.
7th of October, 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad
is at full swing, the German Blitzkrieg is
stopped in its tracks.
Look at the ratio, still only 2.28 to 1 at this point.
Where are the Red Army “hordes”? I'm not seeing them.
Surely the “superior” German Schützen
can take on 2.28 Soviet riflemen?
Again, the numbers say they can’t.
1st of November, just prior to Operation Uranus,
German numbers in the east are declining.
This is before Operation Uranus.
After Operation Uranus, and after the surrender
of the Sixth Army on the 2nd of February 1942,
German forces down to just 2,200,000.
6.1 million Soviets, so therefore a ratio of 2.77 to 1.
According to the first table we saw, Soviet
losses in 1942 were 3,942,100, and the Germans
only 594,200 (although that’s not including
the 6th Army who hadn't quite surrendered yet).
Yet the Germans have fled the Caucasus.
Surely at this point they’re defeated? No.
3rd of April 1943, the Germans have 2,832,000
men.
They’re best general, Manstein, has just
crushed the Soviets at the Third Battle of
Kharkov, against forces outnumbering him, to quote him
“many times their superior in numbers”.
Manstein says of the Winter Campaign - “The
German fighting troops, convinced of their
superiority as soldiers, stood their ground
in the most desperate situations, and their
courage and self-sacrifice did much to compensate
for the enemy’s numerical preponderance.”
At worst, the Soviets outnumber the Germans
2.77 to 1 at this time on the strategic scale.
Again, doesn’t sound like the German generals
are making good their tactical or operational
superiority. I mean, Manstein is,
but he’s the best that they’ve got. What about the rest? Are they doing anything about this?
“The question now was how the German side
should continue the struggle the following
summer [1943]. Obviously, after so many major
formations had been lost, there would no longer
be the forces available to mount another crucial
offensive on the scale of 1941 and 1942.”
By the 9th of July 1943, the Germans alone
have 3,483,000 men.
That’s 100,000 more men than they had at
the beginning of the war in 1941, when they
when they took out 4,791,300 Soviets - a ratio of 12.2
to 1 in their own losses.
Now, suddenly they couldn’t fight an enemy
that outnumbered them 1.93 to 1, and that’s
not including Axis Allies.
I'm sorry, that doesn’t make any sense.
Now they can’t even break through to the
enemy’s operational depths at Kursk.
They could do that just months before when
they had a million fewer men, so what’s
happened here?
And these numbers may be too low - according
to Enduring the Whirlwind, again using Müller-Hillebrand’s
Das Heer, the Germans had 475,000 more men
on the 30th of June 1943, than they had when
the war began.
The German Army is at its peak in July of
1943, yet it cannot even break through to
the operational depths now?
Why? Because the German Army is no longer
fighting an enemy that’s unprepared for war.
1941, it breaks through to the operational depths
against an enemy that's numerically inferior and not prepared for war,
and then runs rings around it until that enemy finally regains its footing.
1942, again it breaks through to the operational depths
of an enemy that outnumbers it barely 2 to
1 (although not in the area it breaks through
at).
1943, somehow now cannot break through an enemy that outnumbers it barely 2 to 1 again,
when it has more men than it’s ever had before.
It’s because that enemy is no longer unprepared
for war.
The Soviets and Germans at this stage are
equal in strength, but the Soviets have double
the men.
And while they had double the men the year
before, the Soviets have finally recovered.
They have the equipment they didn’t have
before. They have the organization, they didn’t
have before. They have the air force, they
didn’t have before. They have the means
to fight back.
And so they do.
27th of July, 1943, German losses are mounting,
having suffered at Kursk.
14th of October, 1943, German losses increasing
again, with 814,200 men lost in the east in
1943.
They’ve also lost the initiative, they’re
also now fighting a two front war, and they’re
fighting enemies that are equipped to
deal with them.
Still, they have as many men in the east as
they did in March of 1942, but this time they’re
outnumbered 2.57 to 1.
By March of 1944, the Germans are outnumbered
2.66 to 1 and similar numbers by May 1944.
But note, the ratio is actually better than
it was in the February of 1943, when Manstein
is about to fight the Third Battle of Kharkov.
And there’s more German troops in the field
than there were then.
So could the Germans pull it back?
No, 1st of July of 1944 - a fifth of all German
troops in the East are suddenly gone.
Staggering losses!
Why? Operation Bagration is in full swing.
The destruction of Army Group Centre.
By September 1944, the Germans are definitely
on the retreat, with a ratio of 3.15 to 1.
But wait, the Germans are on the defensive
at this point, and the Germans are great on
the defensive - right?
Surely they could inflict staggering losses
on the Soviets?
No, the Soviets take fewer casualties in 1944
than the Axis Allies - and by October, German
soldiers in the east reach their lowest point
yet, 1,790,138.
They’re now outnumbered 3.69 to 1.
This is, in fact, the highest ratio in favour
of the Soviets for the whole war, up until
the very end, and it’s not even 4 to one.
Again, now even four to one. Doesn’t sound like “hordes”
to me, and... no it's not. It's not.
November 1944, the ratio gets slightly better
for the Germans, at 3.6 to 1.
New Year's day, 1945, and the ratio is 3.3
to 1 - the Germans are somehow recovering
their losses, despite being at the bottom
of the manpower barrel.
1st of March, 1945, the ratio is 3.17 to 1,
although both the Soviet now
and Germans are reducing their numbers at this point.
1st of April, 1945, 3.5 to 1, with the Germans
at 1,960,000 men - which was higher than in
October of 1944.
8th of May, 1945, the war’s end - a ratio
of 3.77 to 1.
This was the worst ratio of the war, and it
occurred right at the end.
Again, at no point did the Soviets outnumber
the Germans in the field by 4 to 1.
3.77 at the most and that was at the very end.
Most of the time it was 2 to one, and in 1941
it was definitely a lot less than that.
And in the words of the German generals - the
Wehrmacht was decreasing in number as the
war went on.
As shown, up until 1943, this is Incorrect.
They actually peaked in number just before
Kursk in 1943.
Myth number 5 (4), some of you will say “the
Germans lost because the German Army was fighting
a two front war, they couldn’t deploy all
their men in the East”.
Incorrect.
Assuming the last table wasn’t good enough
for you, let’s look at the numbers again.
At the beginning of the war on the Eastern
Front, the Wehrmacht has 7 million men in total, with
just under 4 million in the East.
The Soviets have 5.3 million men at this time,
2.7 million on the Eastern Front.
At this time, Germany is fighting in North
Africa with two divisions.
It’s not fighting a two-front war.
Yes, it has to protect its other borders,
but so do the Soviets.
Stalin is really worried about Japan and keeps
a sizeable portion of the Red Army in the
Far East.
According to Enduring the Whirlwind, even
on the 1st of May, 1942, the Soviets have
5,040,440 men in the Far East or internally,
and 5,677,915 at the front.
Slight variation to the statistics here, but
again, almost half the Soviet Army is not
at the front.
By the 1st of November 1942, this number decreases
to 3.8 million elsewhere, with 6.6 million
at the front, probably for Operation Uranus
and Mars, but again sizeable numbers still
elsewhere.
Again, the argument about Germany fighting
a two front war doesn’t add up as the Western
Allies don’t really become a factor until
1943, or even mid 1944, while Operation Bagration
is tearing through Army Group Centre, and
the Soviets have already won the war.
The Germans lose the war in the East before
the two front war even becomes a thing.
Myth Number 6 (5) - the German Army couldn’t
keep up production in tanks or equipment.
Incorrect.
Up to the 31st of December 1941, the Germans
produced half as many rifles as the Soviets.
Considering they only took 312,000 casualties
- or maybe a million if you follow Glantz
- that’s enough to replenish what they lost,
especially if you consider they had more in
reserve stock prior to the war.
The Germans produce more machine guns and
pistols in 1941, and more tanks than the Soviets.
Yes, in the first year of the war, the Soviets
produce less tanks than the Germans.
Now, by 1942 as you can see, the Soviets do
start producing a lot more rifles, guns, and
tanks.
We’ll get to tank production in a second,
but Myth Number 7 (6), the Soviets charged into
battle without rifles - incorrect.
They were producing enough, even for Stalingrad.
There is one reference in Glantz’s Stalingrad
trilogy where the Soviets didn’t have enough
rifles to fully equip their men.
On the 21st to 22nd of September 1942, Batiuk
cannot find enough rifles to equip the whole
of his 284th Rifle Division, and so he only sends
one regiment across the Volga.
1043rd Regiment has enough rifles, although
not enough of its other equipment, and so
goes into 62nd Army’s reserve while the
rest of the division and equipment arrives.
That is it - no reference that I’ve seen
to units not having enough rifles - at least
not unless they’re surrounded.
And no reference to units throwing themselves
at the Germans without enough rifles, so I
guess the film Enemy at the Gates isn’t
an accurate representation of what was actually
going on.
Let’s look at the tank production.
“At first glance, the lamentable tank state
of the panzer divisions, especially those
with Heeresgruppe Nord and Mitte, appears
to be representative of an overall shortage
of armoured vehicles within the German Army.
Certainly, this is the conclusion presented
within the post-war literature, even though
most provide scant details, if any.”
The Soviets had 22,600 tanks at the beginning
of the war in 1941, compared to the German
6,364.
That’s a ratio of 3.5 to 1 in favour of
the Soviets.
Most of these Soviet tanks are light tanks,
which is probably why the Germans reduce the
Soviet tanks to 9,325 by May of 1942.
As you can see though, the number of German
tanks actually increased by June of 1942,
from 6,364 to 6,863.
And the number of medium tanks in that number
grew from 2,213 to 3,327.
So German tank numbers were both increasing
and improving in quality between 1941 and
mid 1942.
The ratio of tanks is 1.36 in the Soviet’s
favour, which is a lot less than the 3.5 to
1 they enjoyed in 1941.
But wait, isn’t this the time when the Germans
were being defeated at Moscow?
Why is that? The Soviets have less tanks than
they did at the beginning of the war, yet
the Germans are now suddenly losing?
Same again by the 1st of December 1942, with
7,768 German tanks on the field.
Please note that the increase in the lighter
models is actually an increase in the number
of StuGs, which are great machines so that's not a problem.
Compare this to the Soviet tanks for November
of 1942, just before Operation Uranus, at
13,798.
Most of these Soviet tanks are light tanks,
and the medium tanks are at parity with the
Germans for the first time since the beginning
of the war.
But if you look at the ratio, the Soviets
don’t even outnumber the Germans two to
one at this point, at 1.77 to 1 in the Soviet’s
favour.
By the 1st of July 1943, the Germans have
11,447 tanks (the most they’ve ever had)
vs the Soviet 21,064, a ratio of 1.84 to 1
in the Soviet's favour.
And the quality of the German tanks is improving
all the time - as are the Soviet, obviously
- but the German equipment is actually there.
Where is this myth that the Germans were starved
of equipment?
It clearly doesn't exist.
They had the equipment - they had the tanks! The statistics prove it.
Up until 1943, the Germans grew their tank
production year on year, and the Soviets never
quite recovered the tank numbers they had
in 1941.
They almost do this by July 1943, but even
so, the ratio compared to the German tanks
at this point is nothing like it was in 1941.
Now, some of you will point out - “but the
German Panzer divisions were understocked! They didn't have enough tanks!”
Well obviously some were in the middle of a battle, yes.
But let’s look at this other table, from
a different source, so numbers are slightly
different.
The stock that the Germans had on the 1st
of July 1942 was 6,558.
1,613 of that was on other fronts, 2,836 was
on the Eastern Front…
And 2,109 tanks were lost in the ether.
No, seriously - they were either in storage
or were simply unaccounted for.
Or, they were actually at the front.
“This leaves 2,109 tanks and assault guns
unaccounted for. Evidently, more armoured
vehicles were either on the Eastern Front,
or at least should have been, than the diminutive
figures cited with the panzer divisions have
led scholars to believe. Admittedly, because
of severe shortages of spare parts, a number
of these may actually have been in long-term
repair. Consequently, they might have been
located at maintenance facilities within Germany
or at the major tank repair centres established
within the occupied eastern territories. However,
they also may have been with formations in
the field but went unreported by these units
since they were not expected to become operational
for an extended period of time. The temptation
and benefits of exacerbating deficiencies
and the German Army’s shambolic reporting
methods at this time may also have played
a role.” Liedtke P198
The reference to the shambolic reporting practices
of the German Army should ring alarm bells
if it hasn’t already.
Why are we doubting Soviet numbers, when they
give them, but not German numbers?
Historians have trusted the Germans more for
political, military or even cultural reasons,
but the reality is there are large discrepancies
in both the narrative and the statistics.
German tank numbers speak volumes for this
problem, and perhaps explains why nobody can
be sure what the actual casualty ratio was
for both sides.
But here’s what the statistics are suggesting
- the German Army tank numbers grew, even
if they didn’t reach the troops in the field.
“Given all these varied complexities and
inconsistencies, historians could perhaps
be forgiven for never having solidly ascertained
what the circumstances of the Panzertruppen
actually were by the summer of 1942. On the
one hand, Germany’s overall production of
armoured vehicles surpassed known losses and,
even with the addition of new formations,
this should have translated into the panzer
divisions being largely restocked with the
tanks they needed. On the other hand, the
detailed figures we have for the actual strength
of the panzer divisions reveal significant
shortages. A final conclusion awaits a more
thorough study.” Liedtke P199
So far we’ve looked at the numbers and realised
that the Soviets didn’t outnumber the Germans
by 10 to 1, or another silly number.
Instead, what we’ve seen is that the Soviets
had fewer men at any one moment in time and
3.5 five as many tanks compared to the Germans
for most of 1941, twice as many men and tanks
as the Germans in 1942, until Operation Uranus,
and twice as many men and tanks in 1943 compared
to the Germans.
Yet, despite being outnumbered two to one,
the Germans were unable to repeat the successes
they’d enjoyed in 1941.
Ok so, if the German Army wasn’t superior
to the Soviet Red Army, why then did the German
Army inflict massive losses on the Soviets
in 1941?
Well, at the start of Barbarossa, the Germans
facing the Soviets had 3.9 million men in
151 divisions, the Red Army facing the Germans
had 2.9 million men in 163 divisions.
These numbers, from Enduring the Whirlwind,
vary from the numbers we had before, with
both inflated, but I think this just proves that nobody
has the correct statistics.
But the reason the Germans enjoyed success
in 1941 is because they simply outnumbered
the Red Army.
At the beginning of the war, the Red Army
had around 8 to 11 thousand men in each division,
compared to the 14,500 they were meant to
have had. (Liedtke P116)
And they distributed their forces evenly across
the entire front - very socialist of them
- rather than concentrating in tactical, operational,
or strategic positions. (P38 Glantz)
This was perhaps because they hadn’t finished
mobilizing yet and didn’t have enough divisions
in the west to actually man the front.
Essentially, they were concentrated too far
forward, with no operational depth - ideal
conditions for the Germans to smash through
the thin front lines and begin the encirclement
operations that crushed them.
So why then did the Germans do so well in
1941 and early 1942?
The Germans had a war winning strategy -
 Bewegungskrieg - often called Blitzkrieg but according
to Glantz and Robert Citino this is the more
historically accurate term - Bewegungskrieg.
The Germans would concentrate their hard-hitting
units against the soft targets of the enemy.
At the Schwerpunkt - or focus point - they
would outnumber the Soviets, easily breaking
through their lines.
Once the German panzers were in the operational
depths, they could drive forwards hundreds
of miles, destroying all the rear service
units in their path.
Having encircled a large chunk of the Red
Army, or having simply ran out of steam, they
would dig in and wait until the pocket was
destroyed, or until supplies and reinforcements
could reach them.
The Red Army on the other hand, was constantly
attacking, usually everywhere along the front
- failing to concentrate their forces for
one reason or another.
In desperation, they were trying to slow the
Germans down, or trying to break through to
the encircled force. A good example is in fact the Kotluban' operations at Stalingrad.
On the tactical and operational level, they
were on the attack, against a defender.
Often, an attacking force has to have a superior
force ratio to the defender in order to succeed.
And an attacking force usually takes more
losses than a defending opponent.
The Red Army in 1941 and 1942, did not have
the equipment, the manpower, nor the time
- thanks to Bewegungskrieg - to concentrate
the necessary forces needed at a specific
point in the front to make a breakthrough.
They had to keep hitting the Germans over
and over again, desperately trying to slow
them down.
This alone explains the higher losses sustained
by the Red Army.
But when you consider that the Red Army was
on the attack right up until 1945, it’s
astounding that their losses weren’t significantly
higher.
So why did the Germans start losing?
By the end of 1941, the Soviets were no longer
outnumbered by the Germans for the first real
time in the war.
While they certainly didn’t have enough
equipment or manpower, they did have enough
to stop the Germans outside of Moscow.
The Germans were beaten by the Red Army.
In 1942, the Germans regained the initiative,
striking through the Ukraine to Stalingrad
and the Caucasus.
“German military operations had historically
aimed not at seizing territory, however, but
at the destruction of armies, and the number
of prisoners had been far below expectations.
It was now clear to everyone that the entire
operational scheme for Blue, with its highly
elaborate juxtaposition of staggered starts,
concentric maneuvers, and large-scale encirclements
chopped up into smaller ones, had failed miserably.
Indeed, in its current operational shape [20th
of June 1942], it could only be described
as a mess.” Citino P176
The problem was that, once they’d broken
through the Soviet front lines, Blau turned
into a fiasco.
This is the reason the number of Soviet soldiers
captured by the Germans decreases so dramatically
in 1942, compared to 1941.
“The Wehrmacht went from bad to worse, losing
its way in the vastness of the Don bend in
a vain search for Soviet forces to destroy.
It was not a pretty sight: a huge and still
immensely powerful army flailing around on
a fruitless hunting expedition. It turned
east and southeast, then south and southwest.
Each new direction yielded nothing, and resulted
in a decision to go even deeper in search
of its prey.” Citino P176-177
Bewegungskrieg had its limits, and this was
shown in 1942 and 1943, let alone 1941.
No longer able to encircle and destroy large
swathes of enemy units, the panzers rolled
into more determined resistance.
By the middle of 1943, the Red Army had recovered
from the horrendous losses sustained in the
first year of the war.
And, most importantly, they hadn’t collapsed.
When Barbarossa failed to finish the Soviet
Union, that is when Germany lost the war.
This was in 1941, even before Moscow.
Blau, Stalingrad, and Kursk, couldn’t replicate
the successes of the first year of war - and
the main reason was because the Red Army recovered
from its initial surprise and reinvented itself
in the middle of war.
The Soviets were then able to concentrate
their forces at specific points on the front,
and hit individual German divisions with entire
armies.
For example, south of Stalingrad, 16th Motorized
Division held a front of 250 kilometers,
(which is rediculous anyway) against an entire Soviet Army.
But, just because this one division was outnumbered
by an enemy several times its size, doesn’t
mean that the Germans were outnumbered by
that amount across the entire front.
Soviet deception operations were incredibly
effective at tricking the Germans - they hid
their plans and hid where they were about to strike.
By early 1943, it took Manstein - the best
general that Germany had - to stabilize the front.
But even Manstein, at the height of German
power in the East, at Kursk in 1943, couldn’t even
break through the Soviet front lines.
The Soviets had learnt not only how to defeat
the Bewegungskrieg, but also the Schwerpunkt.
And they did this by outnumbering the Germans
by 2 to 1 at best.
Their may have been more Soviets from 1942
onwards than their German counterparts, but
they didn’t use hordes of men, like the
Germans claimed they did.
Let us put to bed the myth of German Wehrmacht
superiority, and see the Soviets, not as inferiors,
but as equals in the fighting.
If we can do that, we can look upon the German
success in 1941 in a whole new light - not only
did they achieve truly amazing results, they
achieved this against an equal enemy.
Unfortunately for them, that equal enemy was
also able to recover from the initial blow,
and strike back with avengence.
I will conclude this video by saying this
-
As stated in the last video, your perception
of the Eastern Front really is wrong - unless
you have a less-German-centric-view of the
conflict than most people.
If you would like a follow-up to this video,
I highly recommend the video “Why Germany
Lost : The Three Alibis” where Jonathan
House - a historian who worked with Glantz
- lays out the reasons why the original German
explanations for their loss in the war don’t
make any sense.
Link in the description below and on the screen.
Thanks for watching, bye for now.
