The game of poker is a multiplayer game, generally accommodating, for example, a minimum of four and a maximum of between eight and ten players. During the game players make wagers which are accumulated in a single pool (“the pot”). Once the wagering stages of the game have been completed, the players who remain in the game reveal the playing cards in their hands. The hands are ranked, and the player with the highest-ranking hand wins the pot.
The game of poker is a zero-sum game insofar as, in each turn of the game, a gain of the winner is equal to accumulated losses of the other players in the game. However, a party who arranges or hosts a game of poker may levy a commission (“a rake”) on the players or on the pot in order to obtain revenue. Further examples of such multiplayer zero-sum games are backgammon, bridge, gin rummy, canasta, whist or mah-jong.
A system and method for playing zero-sum games, such as poker, over a computer network is described in published PCT Application WO 03/093921 A2, published 13 Nov. 2003. The entire contents of WO 03/093921 A2 are incorporated by reference herein. The system of the '921 PCT publication includes a central gaming server accessible over the Internet and enables participation in games such as poker games by individuals accessing diverse portal websites (poker websites).
In the last several years, systems have been commercialised such as that described in the ′921 patent publication wherein a gaming website provides a facility for online game playing, particularly online poker playing. Such systems have become popular and, gaming sites may host hundreds, even thousands of players at a time.
In online poker, the success of an online poker website (“virtual poker room”) is directly related to the magnitude of a pool of would-be players who desire to play a game of online poker. Simply put, the larger the pool of players (i.e. the “liquidity”), the more poker games (i.e. virtual poker tables each accommodating a maximum of, say, eight players) the system can spawn, thereby increasing its attractiveness to other would-be players. In particular, a player may join in a virtual poker game at which an unoccupied playing position, or vacancy, exists. If a virtual poker game has no vacancies available, a would-be player may have to wait a considerable time before a vacant playing position becomes available, allowing the player to join the game, which may cause frustration and which may cause the would-be player to leave the gaming website. Conversely, a would-be player may also have to wait for a considerable period before a sufficient number of other would-be players become available to establish a poker game and to enable play to commence, which can also cause frustration and lead to player attrition. Increased liquidity is generally attractive to would-be players.
In order to maximise this size advantage, some online poker rooms operate under a centralised topology, in which there is a single operating entity (“operator”) that owns and runs the gaming website and the player pool is homogeneous (i.e. all players are registered with, or “belong to”, this single operator). The operator makes money by charging a rake on the accumulated pot in each game of poker that is played in the online poker room. Under a centralised topology, a player will always be playing only with other players who are registered with the same (i.e. the only) operator. Settlement of player wagers is straightforward: 1) the operator deducts its rake from the pot; 2) the balance of the pot is paid over to the player that has won the game; and 3) the next game starts and the process repeats.
Other online poker rooms may operate under a distributed topology (also referred to, in the art, as a network topology). Under this topology, the player pool is heterogeneous, as players registered with different, possibly competing, operators are pooled together to maximise liquidity of the collective player pool, as previously discussed. This means that players registered with different operators could find themselves playing in the same poker game. In this instance, settlement of player wagers is more complex than in the centralised topology, as situations invariably arise in which funds have to be transferred, (or “cleared”) between different operators whose players are playing under a distributed topology. The principles underlying a distributed topology are set forth in the above-referenced patent application WO 03/093921 A2.
Furthermore, under a distributed topology, the rake in each game must be divided between (or “allocated to”) the various operators whose players have participated in the game. At the simplest level, it is known to allocate the rake in a game as a function of the proportion of players from each operator that participated in the game. For example, suppose that four players from operator A, three players from operator B and one player from operator C participated in the game, then operator A would receive one-half of the rake for that game, operator B would receive ⅜ths of the rake and ⅛th of the rake would be allocated to operator
C.
It is also known to allocate rake as a function of the number of players who contributed to the pot during a game. In the above example, suppose the player from operator C did not contribute to the pot (e.g. by folding immediately after being dealt a hand). In this instance, operator A would receive 4/7ths of the rake for that game, operator B would receive 3/7ths of the rake and operator C would not receive any rake at all.
It is further known to allocate rake as a function of players' proportional contribution to the pot during the game.
These prior art rake allocation methods result in operators attaching a greater value, in terms of rake generation capacity, to skilled players (referred to as “sharks”) who play the game regularly, for high stakes and who play multiple games simultaneously. A lesser value is attached to lesser skilled players (referred to as “fish”) who may play less frequently and do so primarily for recreation. Operators are thus rationally incentivised to direct their marketing and promotional activities to attracting sharks to their online poker rooms rather than fish. Over time, this may result in a network player ecology that is overweight with sharks relative to fish. This is undesirable as it may cause fish to lose their bankrolls more quickly than they would otherwise, resulting in a poor playing experience and consequent attrition of lesser-skilled players, thereby decreasing player liquidity.
The applicant has appreciated that enhancements are possible to the rake allocation method of the system of the '921 publication that will promote and enhance the player liquidity of the network.
The allocated rake constitutes operator revenue which the operator may utilise (i.e. “re-allocate”), in part, for marketing purposes and for player retention. For example, the operator may apply some of the allocated rake to pay affiliates to attract new players to the operator's poker room and may award some of the allocated rake to reward and retain preferred players. Such rake re-allocation is usually performed periodically, in arrears, for example once a month.
The applicant has appreciated that enhancements are possible to such prior-art rake re-allocation methods that provide operators with commercial advantages.
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