1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to a structural member for nuclear reactor pressure tubes.
More particularly, the present invention relates to a new structural member that is used as a beam designed to support the loads and stresses of multiple nuclear reactor fuel channel pressure tubes.
2. Description of the Prior Art
Nuclear power plants traditionally have been designed for achieving long term, safe, and reliable performance. To assure safety, the plants incorporate systems and procedures representing a studied anticipation of emergency conditions. Design approaches will have considered theories or premises which may include, for example, design redundancies which are challenged by updated rules of performance as operating experience with nuclear power progresses. Thus, investigators in this power field continuously are called upon to develop improved analytic models of operation exhibiting improved boundings of operational factors and to further achieve higher levels of safety in view of changing rules of safety related performance. Because of the necessarily extensive time interval involved in developing or constructing a new nuclear power facility, for example such an effort may encompass ten years or more, and further in view of the numerous nuclear power facilities now in operation, these investigators typically are called upon to meet new rule criteria by modification of long-existing facilities. Retrofitting procedures can be quite extensive, calling for revised electrical power supplies, major valving replacements, and the like.
The nuclear industry has evolved a variety of reactor types. One such type finding substantial field use performs to produce steam for turbine drive within the reactor core itself and is referred to as a boiling water reactor (BWR). The reactor heated water of the BWR serves not only as working fluid, but also as a reaction moderator, and along with other parameters, its proper supply and application within the system necessarily has been the subject of safety requirements or rule generations by government regulatory agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Typically, the general structure of a BWR nuclear system will include an upstanding reactor vessel which incorporates a lower reactor core structure beneath which are control rod drives. Above the core are, in order, a steam separator assembly and a steam dryer assembly leading to a steam outlet. Above the reactor is a shield wall and outwardly of that a drywell. A pressure suppression chamber (wetwell), being torroidal in shape, is located below and encircling the drywell.
In more typical BWR installations, water coolant is heated in the reactor core to rise within the reactor vessel as a two-phase mixture of water and steam. This dual phase mixture then passes upwardly through the steam separator assembly and steam dryer structure to enter the steam line leading to a turbine. Following turbine drive, the steam is condensed to water and returned to the reactor by relatively large condensate and feedwater pumps of a feedwater system. The feedwater enters the downcomer region of the reactor, where it is mixed with the water returning from the steam separator and drying functions. The water in the downcomer region is circulated through the reactor core via the vertically oriented recirculation pumps which direct flow to the vertical jet pumps located between the core shroud and vessel wall (downcomer annulus). In typical fashion, two distinct recirculation loops with corresponding recirculation pumps are employed for this recirculation function.
In the event of some form of breakage or exursion generating malfunction, referred to as a "loss-of-coolant accident" (LOCA), designers anticipate that the relatively higher temperature-higher pressure water within the reactor will commence to be lost. A variety of safety systems and procedures may then be invoked both for containment and for thermal control of this LOCA. For the latter, thermal control, safety designs recognize that, while loss of the water moderator terminates the core reaction to eliminate a possibility of a nuclear incident, the momentum of generated heat or the residual energy within the reactor will remain of such magnitude as to require a cooling control to avoid for example, core melt down. In general, the amount of water within the containment system is more than adequate for this purpose, for example that contained in the suppression pool, or additionally, the condensate storage tank. To apply this water coolant for the safety purpose, a variety of safety related techniques or "emergency core cooling systems" (ECCS) have been developed to accommodate the LOCA. For example, core spray (CS) systems and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) installations have been evolved in a variety of configurations.
The LPCI system incorporates, for example, four pumps which are activated by a safety system in the event of a coolant loss. Where the loss of coolant is of sufficient extent, and the vessel pressure remains high, for example in the event of a small pipe break then, an automatic safety system will function to depressurize the reactor vessel permitting the relatively lower pressure water supply pumps to operate to introduce water to the reactor. Because the recirculation system earlier described is ideally structured for this purpose, generally it is used by the LPCI system for water introduction under ECCS conditions.
Safety designs heretofore have recognized, however, that a recirculation loop may be broken under a LOCA condition. Thus, the pumping of water into that loop under such a LOCA condition may have no effectiveness. Accordingly, the LPCI systems have been equipped with a recirculation loop selection feature termed "loop selection logic" to avoid such conditions. This safety control detects the broken recirculation loop and initiates a procedure injecting water into the redundant, intact recirculation loop by actuating appropriate LPCI injection valves. Experience with such LPCI loop selection features have shown them to be complex and difficult to test and maintain. Under more current rule-based requirements, the design must accommodate for such occurrences as valve failure and the like. However, to function more effectively under current rules, procedures for retrofitting existing facilities to update them are elaborate and quite expensive, implementation involving such activities as recabling, pump reconnection activities and the like. Thus, an approach has been sought by investigators which offers operators the opportunity to eliminate the requirement for a loop selection logic regimen and associated costs therewith while improving the reliability of the LPCI system.
Numerous innovations for structural member for nuclear reactor pressure tubes have been provided in the prior art that are described as follows. Even though these innovations may be suitable for the specific individual purposes to which they address, they differ from the present invention as hereinafter contrasted.
USPTO Backgrounds
USPTO Backgrounds