15.11.2014 Official Journal of the European Union L 330/27 COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No 1222/2014 of 8 October 2014 supplementing Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for the specification of the methodology for the identification of global systemically important institutions and for the definition of subcategories of global systemically important institutions (Text with EEA relevance) THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (), and in particular Article 131(18) thereof, Whereas: (1)  Directive 2013/36/EU empowers competent or designated authorities of the Member States to impose higher own funds requirements on global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) in order to compensate for the higher risk that G-SIIs represent for the financial system and the potential impact of their failure on taxpayers. That Directive outlines certain basic principles of a methodology for the identification of G-SIIs and for the allo- cation of G-SlIs to subcategories in accordance with their systemic relevance. In accordance with that allocation they will be assigned an additional Common Equity Tier 1 capital requirement, the G-SII buffer. That meth- odology of identification and allocation of G-SIIs is based on five categories measuring the systemic significance of a bank for the global financial market, and is further specified in this Regulation. (2)  In order to follow the approach of Directive 2013/36/EU, this Regulation should take into account standards for the methodology of assessing global systemically important banks and for the higher loss absorbency requirement by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, that are based on the framework for global systemically im- portant financial institutions established by the Financial Stability Board following the report ‘Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions — FSB Recommendations and Time Lines’. (3)  Directive 2013/36/EU makes clear that the identification and allocation methodology is harmonised in all Member States by the use of uniform and transparent parameters for determining an overall score of an entity to measure its systemic importance. In order to ensure that the sample of banks and banking groups both of the Union and authorised in third countries serving as a reference to reflect the global financial system are uniform across the Union, the European Banking Authority (EBA) should determine that sample. Exclusions and additions to that sample based on supervisory judgment should be chosen strictly to ensure its function as a term of refer- ence and should not be based on other grounds. (4)  The G-SII identification process should be based on comparable data and should take into account that institu- tions need clarity as to whether and in which amount a buffer requirement will apply to them, therefore, time- lines and procedures for that process should be included in the methodology. However, since the identification of G-SlIs should be based on up-to-date data relating to the sample of large global banking groups some of which are authorised in third countries, the data needed will not be available earlier than the second half of each year. In order to enable institutions to comply with the requirements resulting from their status as a G-SII, the buffer requirement should take effect as of approximately one year following their identification as a G-SIL (5)  Directive 2013/36/EU sets out five categories measuring systemic significance, which consist of quantifiable indi- cators. In order to minimise the administrative burden for institutions and authorities, those categories are iden- tical to those applied by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In further defining the quantifiable indica- tors, this Regulation should follow the same approach. The indicators should be chosen to reflect the different aspects of potential negative externalities of an entity’s failure and its critical functions for the stability of the financial system. The reference system for assessing systemic significance should be the global financial markets and the global economy. () OJL176,27.6.2013, p. 338.